De Locis Theologicis

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Sonnet 5 Translation

Introduction

Melchor Cano was born in 1509 in Tarancón, in the Spanish province of Cuenca, and entered the Dominican Order as a young man, professing at the convent of San Esteban in Salamanca in 1523. There he became a student of Francisco de Vitoria, the Dominican theologian generally regarded as the founder of the School of Salamanca and, by extension, of much of early modern international law. Under Vitoria's guidance, Cano acquired both a rigorous training in Thomistic theology and a taste for careful, structured argumentation that would mark all of his later work. He completed his formation at the College of San Gregorio in Valladolid and was ordained a priest of the Order of Preachers.

Cano's academic career advanced quickly. He taught theology first at Valladolid, then briefly held a chair at Alcalá de Henares, before returning to Salamanca in 1546 to succeed his own teacher, Vitoria, in the university's first and most prestigious chair of theology — a position he held for more than a decade and from which he exercised enormous influence over Spanish theological education. He was later called to represent the Spanish crown at the Council of Trent, where he took an active part in the deliberations on Scripture and tradition, on justification, and on the sacraments, consistently arguing for positions rooted in the Thomist and Dominican tradition of Salamanca against currents he judged doctrinally lax or methodologically unsound. In his later years Cano served as bishop-elect of the Canary Islands, a see he never occupied in person, and as Provincial of the Dominican Order in Castile. He remained an influential and often controversial voice at the Spanish court until his death in Toledo in 1560.

Cano was known in his own day as a formidable, and at times combative, controversialist. He was a sharp critic of what he took to be doctrinal laxity and intellectual excess wherever he found it, and he did not spare even members of his own religious family: his suspicion of the newly founded Society of Jesus, and of certain currents of Spanish spirituality he judged insufficiently grounded in sound doctrine, made him one of the most contested figures of the Spanish theological scene at mid-century. Yet it is precisely this combination of polemical energy and rigorous method that gives his major work its lasting importance.

That work is the treatise translated in the present volume, known by its Latin title De Locis Theologicis — On the Theological Loci, rendered here as On the Books Concerning Theological Topics. It occupied Cano for much of his mature career and

remained unfinished at his death; it was first published in Salamanca in 1563, three years after he died, and has been reprinted and studied continuously ever since. It is widely regarded as one of the foundational texts of Catholic theological methodology, and it exercised a formative influence on how theologians after Trent understood the nature, sources, and proper conduct of their discipline.

The aim of the work is announced in its title. A locus theologicus, a "theological place" or "topic," is a source from which a theologian may legitimately draw arguments in defense or explanation of Catholic doctrine. Drawing on the ancient rhetorical tradition of the topoi, the commonplaces from which an orator could draw material for persuasion, Cano set out to identify, order, and evaluate the sources available to the theologian with the same systematic rigor that logicians brought to the analysis of valid argument. He distinguishes ten such loci: Sacred Scripture; the Apostolic traditions handed down outside Scripture; the authority of the Catholic Church; the authority of the General Councils; the authority of the Church of Rome in particular; the consensus of the Saints; the authority of the Scholastic theologians; the arguments of natural reason; the authority of philosophers; and, finally, human history. Of these he treats the first four as properly and immediately theological, and the remainder as auxiliary or extrinsic — useful, and at times necessary, to the theologian, but not themselves constitutive of the discipline in the way Scripture and the Church's authority are.

What made the project genuinely new was not the list of sources itself, many elements of which had long circulated in scattered form, but the systematic and critical spirit in which Cano treated them. For each locus he asks not only what it is and why it carries weight, but how firm that weight actually is, and how an argument drawn from it ought to be handled in disputation — when it yields certainty, when only probability, and when it may safely be set aside. This is not merely a catalogue of authorities but a theory of theological argumentation as such: an attempt to give theology the same self-conscious methodological foundation that Aristotle had given to logic and natural philosophy. It is this ambition that has led later scholars to describe Cano as, in effect, a founder of theological epistemology, and to trace the influence of his scheme of loci through the subsequent history of Catholic dogmatic and controversial theology, well past the sixteenth century.

The immediate occasion for much of this labor was controversial. Cano wrote in the years of the Protestant Reformation, and the shadow of Luther, Calvin, and their followers falls across nearly every book of the treatise. Where the reformers had sharply narrowed the sources of theological authority, insisting on Scripture alone as interpreted by the individual conscience, Cano set out to show, source by source, why the Catholic

Church's broader account of theological authority was rationally defensible and historically grounded. The work is accordingly not a dry manual but a sustained argument, conducted with the same combative energy that marked its author's public life, in defense of the Church's claim to hand down, interpret, and safeguard revealed truth across the centuries.

For the reader today, De Locis Theologicis repays attention on two levels at once. As a historical document, it offers a remarkably clear window onto the theological controversies of the mid-sixteenth century and onto the intellectual world of the School of Salamanca at the height of its influence. As a work of method, it remains a serious, and still-debated, attempt to answer a question that has lost none of its urgency: by what right, and on what grounds, does the theologian claim to know what he claims to know? It is in the hope of making that attempt more widely accessible to English-language readers that the present translation has been undertaken.

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On the Books Concerning Theological Topics

Proem

I have often pondered with myself, excellent reader, whether more good has been brought to mankind by the man who introduced an abundance of many things into the disciplines, or by the one who prepared the method and the way by which the disciplines themselves might be handed down more easily and conveniently in order. For we cannot deny that we owe much to the inventors of things, and we certainly owe much also to those who, by method and skill, adapted the things invented to common use.

Indeed, when I consider with care the erudition of the ancients, and gather in my mind the varied furniture of doctrine in them, I see that no small part of our advantages was brought in through them. But when I set about to reconsider the work and care of the more recent school, I understand that very many benefits have been procured by the aid and diligence of this newer art.

And as I have long pondered this carefully, reason itself leads me especially to this opinion, that I judge both parties to have deserved equally well of the good arts. For although the ancient authors of the doctrines supplied a great abundance of riches to the most learned and diligent men, the want of the more recent writers is compensated by ease of teaching, by which they more skillfully influence the minds of the unlearned and the dull; and the things that were once disputed at large and freely, they now express article by article and concisely, bringing no small light to the more obscure discoveries of the ancients. And in this one respect, as far as I can gather by conjecture, the moderns will be found either equal to the ancients, or even superior, though far inferior in all other things. Certainly, after those earlier men, the later ones can scarcely claim anything for themselves in the discovery of things. But if they take to themselves order, arrangement, and clarity, they seem in some manner to claim these by their own right.

Wherefore, by reading both, the theologian will undoubtedly make scholastic disputation fuller. For having borrowed, as it were, matter from the one, and the form of discoursing from the other, he will surely be capable of exhorting in sound doctrine, and of refuting those who contradict it. This is, as the Apostle Paul says to Titus, the chief task of the Christian teacher.

The desire to explain this moved me entirely to undertake a disputation on theological topics — a disputation, unless my judgment deceives me, by no means unsuitable for learned men, and greatly necessary for the unlearned. And I did this all the more willingly because no theologian up to now, as far as I know, has undertaken to treat this

kind of subject — since, besides that common art of discoursing which we have received from the dialecticians, the theologian must of necessity have another, and likewise other topics for disputing, from which he may draw arguments not as common and foreign, but as his own, both for confirming his own doctrines and for refuting the opinions of his adversaries.

This work, indeed arduous, I now begin, first humbly and submissively taking refuge as a suppliant in the help of Jesus Christ. For I do not undertake it relying on my own talent or learning, but on the help and favor of the Holy Spirit; and if the Father and the Son grant this to me for the completion of this book, I hope to render no small service to theologians, for whose benefit this little work is published above all.

Book I

Chapter I

On the Division of the Whole Work

Since I am about to give a continuous discourse on theological topics, I have decided to divide the whole presently into fourteen books. Of these, the first shall briefly enumerate the topics from which the theologian may draw suitable arguments, whether he wishes to prove his own conclusions or to refute contrary ones. The remaining ten shall teach more fully and accurately what force each of the topics contains — that is, from which certain arguments may be drawn, and from which merely probable ones. In the twelfth and thirteenth, it will be discussed what use such topics have, both in scholastic combat and in the exposition of Sacred Scripture. For what use they have in popular preaching is not at all difficult to say, but it must nevertheless be passed over, lest the discourse seem foreign to the purpose of the school. The last book, finally, since not all topics are suited to every disputation, will show individually with which arguments the disputation with the theologian must properly be carried on against heretics, with which particularly against Jews and Saracens, and with which finally against pagans, if ever there must be a contest with these for the catholic faith. When, by God's favor, I shall have completed these things more fully, my disputation on theological topics will be apt and perfect on every side, and complete in all its parts and numbers.

Chapter II

On the Two Kinds of Arguments by which Every Disputation is Carried On

But before I enumerate the theological topics, which the first part of this disputation promises, this must first be established by us: that every argument is drawn either from reason or from authority. For by these two means we produce assent to anything that comes into controversy. Now whereas in all other disciplines reason holds the first place and authority the last, in theology, however, it is one discipline in which the weight of authority, rather than of reason, must be sought in disputing. For it has claimed for itself a place from authority so proper to it, that it receives reasons as if they were guests and strangers, or else admits them into its own service, as though summoned from afar. For it relies chiefly on faith, which, unless it proceeds from authority, can neither be called faith nor even be understood. For faith is, as the Apostle teaches, the evidence of things not appearing, so that if you wished to make certain things certain by reason, you would surely go mad with reason. The principal place, therefore, both among the faithful and among theologians, belongs to authority. Reason then follows as a kind of attendant.

This is what the Apostle seems to signify when he says that the teacher of the Church must hold fast to the faithful word which is in accordance with doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine, and to refute those who contradict. For first it is necessary that whoever wishes to be a master of the Christian school should hold fast to the word of faith; but unless he soon also employs the method of doctrine, he will indeed be able to be a believer, but he will not be able to be a teacher of believers. For even men of great experience, as Saint Thomas rightly gathers from Aristotle, cannot dispute with adversaries unless method is added to experience.

Both, therefore, are necessary to the theologian — both authority and reason — but in such a way that authority holds the first place in theology, and reason the last. What, then, was the foundation of the first part has been excellently laid. For there are indeed handed down, from which arguments are drawn, two kinds of topics: one from authority, the other from reason; but almost all theological arguments are derived from that former source. This matter, as well as the number and order of the topics, the index which follows will show.

Chapter III

On the Number and Order of Theological Topics

What was taught earlier by Plato and Aristotle, and is enjoined by Cicero — that every instruction undertaken concerning any matter ought to proceed from a definition, so that it may be understood what the thing under discussion is — this certainly ought not to have been neglected by me in the disputation which is to be on theological topics, so that what a theological topic is should be explained before all else, unless it were already so evident from what we have said that the matter needed no explanation. For in this work we were not promising to treat of common topics, which are usually treated concerning the whole subject matter, or concerning the heads of notable matters, which are now also called common topics — such as justification, grace, sin, faith, and other things of this kind (which very many of our own writers have done, and among the Lutherans not only Philip but Calvin also did — men not lacking in eloquence, yet impious, so that one may recognize them as disciples of Luther) — but, just as Aristotle in the Topics set forth common topics, as it were the seats and marks of arguments, from which every argumentation for every disputation might be found, so we propose certain peculiar topics of theology, as the dwelling-places of all theological arguments, from which all theologians will find their arguments, whether for confirming or for refuting. Wherefore, since the definition of a theological topic was already evident from what was said in the proem, it did not need to be explained more carefully here, but what was obscure had to be undertaken at once, and a fixed and definite number of such topics indicated. We, then, embrace the list of theological topics in the number of ten, not unaware that there will be some who will reduce these same topics to a smaller number, and others who will wish there to be a larger number. But concerning the figure of the enumeration nothing need detain us, provided that no topic at all be counted as superfluous, or any necessary one omitted.

The first topic, then, is the authority of Sacred Scripture, which is contained in the canonical books. The second is the authority of the traditions of Christ and the apostles, which, since they were not written but have come down to us from ear to ear, you would most rightly call oracles of the living voice. The third is the authority of the Catholic Church. The fourth, the authority of Councils, especially general ones, in which the authority of the Catholic Church resides. The fifth, the authority of the Roman Church, which by divine privilege both is and is called Apostolic. The sixth is the authority of the ancient saints. The seventh is the authority of the scholastic theologians, to whom let us also add those skilled in pontifical law. For the doctrine of this law, as it were on the other side, corresponds to scholastic theology. The eighth is natural reason, which

extends most widely through all the sciences discovered by the natural light. The ninth is the authority of the philosophers, who follow nature as their guide, among whom without doubt are the imperial jurists, who themselves also profess, as the jurist says, true philosophy. The last, finally, is the authority of human history, whether written by trustworthy authors, or handed down from nation to nation, not superstitiously and old-wifishly, but with grave and constant method.

There are, then, these ten topics, in which all theological arguments lie hidden, to be brought to light with this distinction: that those which are drawn from the first seven topics are nearly proper to this discipline, while those which are drawn from the latter three are, as it were, borrowed and begged from elsewhere. For since there are, as I said above, two kinds of arguing — one through authority, the other through reason — and since the former is proper to the theologian, the latter to the philosopher, the theologian must take refuge in the latter if he is not permitted to use the former. Although it is sometimes permitted to employ both kinds of arguing at once, as we shall show in its proper place hereafter. Concerning the first part of the work, then, since, as we said at the beginning, it did not require a long discourse, let this much be said thus far.

Book II

Proem

Although I see that many hold the opinion that one who does not know how to illuminate his own thoughts with the splendor of style abuses both knowledge and letters shamelessly if he writes — yet I, for my part, if a theologian does not bring eloquence, am so far from disdaining this that I do not even demand it. For to speak clearly about obscure matters that are difficult to understand, and not only with acuteness of thought but also with ornament of words, is so laborious and arduous that whoever should wish to demand it would be unjust. And indeed I see that it has so far happened to few that the same men have labored in both kinds at once, pursuing in theological controversies both that elegant manner of speaking and this acute manner of disputing.

But how far I myself have advanced in either, let the judgment of others decide; certainly I have pursued both. For a flood of empty words, in which thought is lacking, displeases me; nor am I captivated by subtlety of thought if there is dryness of style. And concerning the cultivation of language, let each reader freely use his own judgment in

reading my work; for I place no obstacle to this. But in the treatment of those matters which, in these many and weighty and useful books, we are about to discuss accurately and copiously, we shall, as it seems to us, bring great help to our theologians, so that not only the unlearned but even the learned may perhaps acquire something both for discoursing and for judging.

Nor would I wish this to be thought said arrogantly; for, granting to many the science of eloquence, since it is the property of the school to discourse tersely and concisely, and to cut everything, as it were, to the quick, since I have spent my life in this study, I am not, unless I am mistaken, arrogant if I claim this by a certain right of my own. Nor am I so foolish as not to fear that I myself have often erred even in the matters themselves. But it is one thing never to hold a false opinion, which I do not claim for myself; it is another to press the weightiest and most difficult matters by a method and a method of reasoning, which I have certainly assumed by right, as it seems to me; but I can be mistaken — let the wrong be pardoned.

For indeed all that I have said tends to this: not that I claim for myself knowledge of the matters — for what could be more foreign to a modest man? — but that no candidate of more polished letters should demand of me, in scholastic disputation, a polished discourse, much less one adorned with the finery of rhetoricians. For I wish to please the school; I do not dare to remove the proper words and peculiar forms of speech belonging to the school. For although I desire to dispute more elegantly than our writers usually do, yet I ought not to impose two labors on theologians, one in understanding the matter, the other in understanding the words. Briefly, I confess to my readers the secret of my mind: whoever is to have, through me, a form of discoursing in theology, I do not wish him to understand my writings with difficulty, and to need a grammarian as interpreter in order to understand the theologian.

But enough of this. For now it is time that we pursue the things that are next to be explained. These will indeed afford us great labor, and likewise will exhibit a lengthy disputation. But the length will be compensated by usefulness. For nothing more useful can be handed down to the school of theologians than that they should learn which topic furnishes firm arguments, and which, on the contrary, weak ones. By this means especially the nerves and joints of theology stand firm and solid.

Chapter I

On the Most Solid Foundation of Sacred Scripture and the Four Engines by which it is Assailed

And the first topic, indeed, is without controversy firm by divine and equally weighty authority. For we call those books sacred and canonical which the sacred authors received as the Holy Spirit dictated. Of those, then, which it has been established to be such, we shall without doubt believe to be most certain and most true; just as Augustine teaches, repeats, and impresses in On the City of God, book 2, chapter 3, and in the Confessions, chapter 15, and in Epistle 7 to Marcellinus, and Epistle 19 to Jerome, and in book 1 of On Christian Doctrine, chapter 37, and in book 2 Against Donatus on Baptism, chapter 3, and in the proem of book 3 On the Trinity. And rightly indeed does he so teach. For unless you have laid this foundation faithfully, whatever you build upon it in theology will collapse; and that city of God itself will collapse, whose foundations are in the holy mountains, and in the writings of the princes who were in it. Of which writings the author is not man, but God. For the Lord will recount in the writings of the peoples and of these princes who were in it. The Lord, then, guards the authority of this topic, and the princes guard it too. For it is indeed the tower of David, and a thousand shields hang from it, all the armor of the mighty.

This whole matter, since we shall explain it more fully in the thirteenth book, it will be enough here to have touched briefly. But this tower, however well fortified otherwise, is wont to be battered by four rams.

First, that the sacred letters themselves have reported that men were sometimes deceived by God; therefore it is possible that the sacred authors were deceived by the Holy Spirit, so that whatever argument you take from such authors will be uncertain.

Second, that it does not yet seem to have been established which books are to be referred to the canon of the Sacred Scriptures, since out of the Old Testament seven, and out of the New as many, are rejected by men both learned and catholic. Wherefore, if the theologian should draw an argument from there, it will be weak and will lack divine authority.

Third, that, although it might be certain which books are of this sacred kind, it is nevertheless not yet established whether the Latin codices agree with the Greek and Hebrew ones; wherefore an argument drawn from a Latin exemplar will be weak, since it rests only on the sense and understanding of the interpreter.

Fourth, that, even were it clear which exemplar ought chiefly to be followed, it is nevertheless not equally certain whether the apostles or the prophets, in the testimonies which are indeed brought forward from them, speak from the Spirit of God or from themselves, since the sacred authors seem to write some things in human fashion apart from divine revelation. Not all the testimonies of the canonical books, therefore, have the authority of God, such as could produce certain faith.

Nor indeed shall we pursue, in explaining these arguments, all the abundance we are capable of, lest the whole discourse be consumed in this one place; but we shall take care to repel, with the greatest brevity that will be allowed, these four rams by which some attempt to shake and overthrow the walls of our religion. For we are not attempting to bring in here a mass and medley of many things, but to prescribe a form of discoursing for the theologian. The shorter this is, the more excellent it will be.

Chapter II

Where the Arguments are Set Forth of Those Wishing to Persuade that God Can Sometimes Deceive

The first controversy. To begin, then, from that controversy which, although the easiest, is nevertheless the chief of the rest, let there come first into the open the opinion of the younger men — an opinion well known not to all, but to a few — who assert that God has sometimes deceived men through human or angelic ministry. For that the Spirit of Truth himself, of himself, should deceive anyone, they do not dare to call into doubt, lest they incur the odium of impiety. But that God can deceive through another, this they think they can persuade.

The first argument. First, that Abraham lied to his servants, saying: "Wait here; I and the boy, after we have worshipped, will return to you." And yet this was a prophecy of divine revelation, as Ambrose teaches in book 1 On Abraham, chapter 8, in these words: "He prophesied what he did not know; he himself alone was planning to return after his son was sacrificed, but the Lord spoke through his mouth. But he spoke deceptively to the servants, lest, the business being known, someone should impede it, or interrupt with groaning or weeping." By the ministry of a man, therefore, God deceives men.

The second argument. They bring forward also another argument of the same matter, that Jacob deceived his father Isaac too, by a lie even deliberately contrived, saying: "I am your firstborn, Esau; I have done as you commanded me; rise, and eat of my game." And a little after, when Isaac had asked, "Are you my son Esau?" Jacob answered, "I am." Jacob, therefore, lied; which the father recognized, saying: "Your brother came

fraudulently," etc. But Jacob did and said all these things by divine revelation, as Innocent relates. God, therefore, can deceive through another.

The third argument. To this, Isaiah said to Hezekiah: "Tomorrow you shall die, and not live"; and Isaiah himself without doubt assented to his own words, and indeed only by prophetic light, for he recognized that revelation to be divine. The light of prophecy, therefore, is sometimes the cause of the prophet's being deceived. For Hezekiah did not die at that time, but recovered.

The fourth argument. Moreover, when the Lord once asked, "Who will deceive Ahab?" the spirit going forth said, "I will deceive him." To whom the Lord said, "By what means?" Then he said, "I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets." And the Lord said, "You shall deceive, and you shall prevail; go forth, and do so." But Micaiah adds: "Now therefore, behold, the Lord has put a spirit of lying in the mouth of all the prophets who are here, and the Lord has spoken evil against you." God, therefore, deceives through the demonic minister. This is what Augustine confesses in book 83 of the Questions. For just as a judge considers it unworthy and wicked to strike the condemned man with his own hand, yet by his order the executioner does this — so whom God would not deceive of himself, that one a demon deceives at God's command. For I am willing, by the same likeness and almost the same words that Augustine uses, to construct an argument on this matter.

The fifth argument. Likewise, the Jews, at the Lord's command, deceived the Egyptians. For the children of Israel did as the Lord had commanded Moses, and asked of the Egyptians vessels of silver and gold. And the Lord gave favor to his people in the sight of the Egyptians, so that they lent to them; and they despoiled the Egyptians. By God's authorship, then, man deceives man. Nor is it strange, if God orders one to deceive an enemy who deserves to be deceived, since this pertains to justice and truth, that to the deserving things deserved should be distributed, as the same Augustine argues in the passage just cited.

The sixth argument. But these testimonies do not press as hard; harder are those which, since they are nearly all of one kind, will be mentioned together. The first is this: "Who changes the heart of princes, and deceives them, and makes them err like drunken men." The second this: "The man who has placed uncleanness in his heart, and comes to the prophet inquiring of me: I the Lord will answer him; and when the prophet has erred and spoken a word, I the Lord have deceived that prophet." The third this: "Why have you made us err, O Lord, from your ways?" The fourth is that of the Apostle, saying: "As they did not see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a reprobate mind." The

fifth is also that of the same Apostle: "Because they did not receive the love of the truth, therefore God will send them the working of error." By these testimonies Augustine clearly thinks it is taught that God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills to evil, let alone their minds to falsehood.

The seventh argument. Nor is reason foreign to these. For since error is a punishment, nothing prevents God, who is said by the prophets to be the author of all punishments, from himself producing error, especially in one who, by his preceding faults, has deserved to be led into error by a just judge. "Life and death," it says, "poverty and honesty are from God; wisdom and discipline are with God; error and darkness are created together for sinners."

The eighth argument. This is confirmed especially by the fact that God is the cause of every motion: for "in him we move and have our being." Error, therefore, which is the motion of a man erring, God can produce in man, and will thus be able to deceive.

The ninth argument. Of this same matter there is another argument, that lying is not by its own nature evil. God can therefore command someone to lie. That first point is shown from the fact that Joseph confirmed a lie even with an oath: "By the health of Pharaoh," he said, "you are spies." Now it is not to be believed that a just man would utter a lie confirmed by an oath, unless he had divine revelation, by which he would be excused from mortal sin. Then this is also proved from the fact that Micaiah says: "Would that I were a man not having the spirit, and that I might rather speak a lie." It is not, then, intrinsically evil, what the prophet, at God's instigation, desires.

Add to this, that Aristotle in the fourth book of the Ethics divides lying into boastfulness and irony, which is the proper division of lying, on the authority of Saint Thomas, Summa Theologiae II-II, question 110, article 2. But the use of this — which can be called dissimulation in Latin, for in Greek it is called eirōneia — is frequent in the Sacred Letters, as there: "Behold, Adam has become as one of us." And in another place: "Now you are filled, now you are made rich, you reign without us." And 3 Kings 22: "Go up," says Micaiah, "and prosper," etc. If, then, irony is a lie, and God indeed sometimes speaks ironically through the sacred authors, there seems no reason, as it appears, why we should deny that God can lie through others.

By these testimonies and reasonings the newer theologians, little practiced in the Sacred Letters, could persuade themselves of their opinion. For as to what arguments they themselves use, I deliberately pass over in silence — lest those who read this book conceive hatred against those scholastic authors, and prefer the ignorance of the crowd and the unlearned to the Academies, when they hear what is sometimes argued by our

own. But enough of this. Now let us explain the question itself, and vindicate divine truth — which will be easy — from such adversaries. For who would not most easily understand that to believe God a deceiver is wicked and impious?

Chapter III

Showing that God Can Never Deceive Either of Himself or Through Another

That question being now to be explained, since I wish to be brief, this must be laid down at once: that the description of divine power is twofold. For we understand a certain general power, which, since it is constrained by no law, not even a natural one, is called by theologians absolute; and another, subordinate to this, which looks to the predetermined order of things, and is therefore called ordinary power. And that higher power is usually defined with regard to those things whose existence does not involve repugnance, or which do not imply contradiction — for so they speak. But the ordinary power, which is subordinate to that prior one as to a kind of genus, they define with regard to those things which can exist consistently with the law and the statutes of God. We must also lay down this: that to lie is nothing other than to assert a falsehood with the intention of deceiving.

For so Augustine and Gelasius have defined it. From two elements, then, a lie is composed: if a falsehood is uttered, and if it is uttered with the intention that the hearers be deceived.

But also who is properly said to deceive must be briefly explained first, so that what we wish to teach may more easily be understood. For he who speaks the truth is not properly to be considered deceptive, even though the hearer, through a depraved understanding of the truth, falls into the greatest errors. Improperly, however, things created by God are said to be deceptive; they are likewise said to be snares, but for the feet of the foolish. Who, then, properly deceives another? Surely he who, by asserting a falsehood, is the cause for another to be deceived. Otherwise, if we define someone as deceptive from another's error and ignorance, truth itself will be most deceptive to us.

The first conclusion. These things being established, let the first conclusion be this: It is heretical to assert that God can lie by ordinary power. For "God is true; but every man is a liar." And again: "If we do not believe, he remains faithful; he cannot deny himself." And in another place finally: "God is not like a man, that he should lie." And this conclusion indeed is so certain among all, that to have confirmed it even with explicit testimonies would seem superfluous. Wherefore, having stated this briefly, let us proceed to the rest.

The second conclusion. The second conclusion is this: Whoever thinks that God, by ordinary power, can lie or deceive through an agent, errs most disgracefully in the faith. For to brand this with the mark of heresy will pertain to the authority of the Church. And this conclusion is gathered first from the fact that it belongs to the same person to command evil and to do evil: for whoever is the cause of that thing which is done at his command is the cause of that thing. But according to the catholic faith God cannot be the author of sin; therefore not even of a lie, which according to ordinary power is a sin. Not, therefore, by God's authorship does either an angel or a man deceive anyone.

Then, since the Lord, when he speaks to us through agents, whether angels or men, himself testifies that he is speaking, as is established in many places of the Sacred Letters — thus, if God's agents were lying, it would be necessary that God too should be lying. Who does not see how absurd this is?

Moreover, those who hold this opinion could not be certain whether God has deceived us through the apostles and prophets. And since in the Sacred Letters God himself indeed rarely spoke of himself, but most frequently through angels and through men: if we can be deceived by God through these agents, certainly the firmness of the Sacred Letters will collapse. And this reasoning indeed has so much weight with me, that I do not doubt that this error would be condemned with the mark of heresy by the Catholic Church, if it were referred for consultation; since it either entirely overturns the foundations of our faith, or certainly does not allow them to stand firm. Furthermore, we shall not be bound to give faith to the sacred authors, if once we adopt the opinion that God can deceive through others. Nor will any promise of God be firm, except what God has himself fulfilled through himself. This is plainly in conflict with the Apostle.

For when in the Epistle to the Hebrews he had touched upon that promise, which was made to Abraham doubtless through the ministry of an angel, he says: "God, wishing to show to the heirs of the promise the immutability of his counsel, interposed an oath, that by two immutable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we might have a most strong comfort, who have fled for refuge to lay hold of the hope set before us, which we have as an anchor of the soul, sure and firm." Now it would not be sure and firm, if we believe this opinion. It is concluded, then, that God can in no way deceive.

Nor should you say to me that the sacred writers were just and holy men: for "holy men of God spoke as they were moved by the Holy Spirit"; and again: "As he spoke through the mouth of his holy ones," etc. — and that through such men God neither wishes nor indeed is able to deceive, but is able to do so through the ministry of wicked men. For first, if even the impious man speaks as inspired by the Spirit of God, those words are

attributed to God, and thus have the authority of God. Then, if the impious man lies by God's counsel or precept, certainly the pious man could lie by the same counsel or precept. God, therefore, cannot deceive through another, which was said in the second conclusion.

The third conclusion. God, even by absolute power, can lie neither of himself nor through another. "Since he is omnipotent," says Augustine, "he cannot die, he cannot be deceived, he cannot lie." And again the same author: "When we have said so many things about the omnipotence of God, if they wish to find what the omnipotent cannot do, they have it ready at hand: I will say it: he cannot lie." The Lord himself seems to me clearly to confirm this, when he says: "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away." Let all heaven and the whole of nature, then, sooner collapse, than that divine truth should fail to stand fast.

Moreover, that testimony of the Apostle, already cited above, shows this same thing. "God is true," he says, "but every man is a liar." In this passage Paul does not mean that all men actually lie, but that they are of such a nature that they can lie. For he is speaking of nature, not of custom. For one may find men who, either following right reason as their guide, or aided and admonished by the grace and law of the Gospel, shrink from lying and embrace the truth. But since such is the weakness of humanity, that it can sometimes abandon the truth it holds, Scripture therefore said that every man is a liar. From which it is understood that God is called truthful in that sense in which lying is incompatible with the divine nature.

This is concluded not only by probable argumentation but also by the necessary reasoning of theologians. For the same contrariety exists between evil and good as between the true and the false; but it is repugnant to the first goodness to do evil; therefore also to the first truth to say what is false. Hence these sayings: "The Lord is faithful in all his words, and holy in all his works." And: "God is faithful, and without any iniquity." God, therefore, is as foreign to falsehood as to iniquity; and just as he can do iniquity neither of himself nor through another, so neither can he deceive anyone.

But if anyone were deceived by God's authorship, then a lie would already flow from the fountain of truth itself. But not only on the testimony of the Evangelist, but also under the guidance of nature, we know that every lie is not from the truth. But in fact (that the discourse may return to where it set out) both — to do evil and to speak falsely — are in conflict with a stable and immutable nature. Whence, when Scripture had said: "God is not as man, that he should lie," it immediately added: "nor as the son of man, that he should be changed." For lying is indeed the mark of a mutable nature. Add to this, that if

God can deceive men through another, he could also accomplish the same thing through himself. For the other evils, which have punishment disjoined from fault, God can give both through ministers and without ministers, through himself.

And, to conclude once for all, if God could lie, we ourselves could rightly fear whether he has ever lied at some time. But, you say, there is no room for such fear, since it is established by ordinary power that God cannot lie.

That is well said indeed; but, since this cannot be established except through revelation, how can we know whether, in that very revelation, God might have abused his absolute power? For as Augustine says, how is it to be believed by one who thinks that he must sometimes lie? For perhaps he lies precisely then, when he commands that we believe him. Thus, unless it is so, the certainty of the Sacred Letters perishes.

Besides, among the philosophers it is as evident that God does not lie, as that he is both supremely good and supremely wise, and consequently can neither deceive nor be deceived: nor does it matter at all whether he accomplishes this through himself or through his agents. For neither is that the purest truth which has any falsehood or deceit mixed in with it in any way; nor is that understood to be the highest, than which we conceive a greater. More truthful, moreover, would be he who could deceive neither through himself nor through another, than he who could deceive through another.

Thus, divine truth being firmly established, and corroborated by the certainty of reasons and testimonies, nothing remains but for us to dissolve the arguments of our adversaries.

Chapter IV

In which the Arguments of Chapter Two are Dissolved

Response to the first. To the first argument, then, there is not one single response among theologians. For there are those who piously and gravely contend that Abraham did not lie. For he did not, as they say, speak contrary to what he had in mind: rather he believed that his son would immediately be raised up, as the Apostle seems to relate in these words: "By faith Abraham offered Isaac, when he was tried, and offered up his only-begotten son, in whom he had received the promises, reckoning that God was able to raise him up even from the dead."

There are others, on the contrary, with whom I strongly agree, who admit indeed that Abraham lied in the sense that he spoke contrary to his mind for the purpose of dissimulation, but that he prophesied because he spoke the truth, which at that time he did not know. For this is what the words of Ambrose suggest. Concerning the first

argument, then, enough has been said. Next, as was proposed, let us speak of the rest.

Response to the second. To the second, certain theologians of no small reputation reply that Jacob did indeed lie, but at his mother's instigation, not by God's revelation. But we, whose intention is to defend the meaning of the saints as far as we are able, must reply quite differently. Augustine indeed, in the Questions on Genesis, excuses Jacob from the lie, and adduces in support of this that Scripture said of him that he was a simple man, that is, not feigned and without guile, as the Seventy translators rendered it. He was, then, without guile who seems to have practiced guile. Wherefore, in that passage, as he says, we are compelled to understand a spiritual mystery. And in book 16 of the City of God: "What," he says, "is the guile of the simple, what is the fiction of one not lying, but a profound mystery of truth?"

Chrysostom too, in homily 6 on the Epistle to the Colossians and homily 53 on Genesis, just as he excuses Abraham and Phinehas from homicide, so he excuses Jacob, since he believes that God cooperated with him, from the lie. Ambrose also excuses him, in book 2 On Jacob and the Blessed Life, chapters 2 and 3; Innocent, On Divorce, chapter Gaudemus; the Master of the Sentences, book 3, distinction 38; Gratian, 22nd cause, question 2, chapter Quaeritur; Alexander of Hales, part 2, question 139, member 6; Saint Thomas, Summa II-II, question 110, article 3, reply to objection 3.

Nor indeed should those be heeded who thought that Jacob was excused by revelation, not from having lied, but from having sinned by lying — that such a lie, as they say, can sometimes rightly be said to be done by the familiar counsel of the Holy Spirit.

These authors I would not only refute but would also show, by very many arguments, to have erred gravely, were it not that Saint Augustine had already labored carefully on this same cause against the Priscillianists, and had discussed so much, that if the same labor were undertaken again by us, we should be doing nothing other than what we are forbidden by the old proverb — acting an act already done. Let us, then, leave these men with their theology, since the holy doctors not only deny that Jacob sinned, but even maintain that he spoke the truth, and prophesied by those very words. In this matter I observe that our forefathers could not fail to notice what was clear and established — namely, that those words of Jacob were, in their proper sense, a lie; nor is it absurd if a man, however just, should lie once or twice. Wherefore, since they have constantly maintained that Jacob did not lie, they must be thought to have had particular and weighty reasons for being led to this opinion.

Furthermore, just as, by the legitimate principles of allegory, the just man is a figure of the just, and the wicked of the wicked, so too a falsehood may, without absurdity, be

assumed as a type of truth. I know what may be said against this. For I have read the Commentaries of Saint Gregory, in which he does not bind his exposition to this rule; I have also read Jerome, who, on Habakkuk 1, when he had converted an evil spirit by tropology into a good sense, says: "Tropology is free, and is circumscribed only by these laws, that it should follow the devotion of the understanding."

But this is too long a fight, and the present occasion does not permit such breadth. I myself would not wish to abuse this liberty, but would rather prescribe certain limits and lines for mystical senses. For it is not fitting that a figure and image of things be drawn except from things near and similar, just as a metaphor is; since a thing which is the figure of another must necessarily bear its likeness. Nor was Solomon a type of Christ's sins, but of his peace; nor was Jephthah, in his impiety against his daughter, a type of God, but of zeal.

But Saint Thomas, II-II, question 88, article 2, reply to objection 2, seems to resist this — and indeed it does seem so. But I have already said that I am not here dealing with free allegories, but with those which are pressed by a certain method and reasoning. In this sense neither Jerome nor Thomas spoke. For what fellowship has light with darkness? What has Christ to do with Belial, that, through a mystical sense, we should make light a figure of darkness, and Christ a figure of Belial? But more on this elsewhere, more opportunely.

Now, to return to our purpose, the Sacred Scriptures must be treated by us according to a fixed rule; nor shall we make of the wicked man, in that in which he is wicked, or of the liar, in that in which he is a liar, a type of the just or the truthful man. Since, then, it is established that Jacob, even when he snatched away his brother's blessing, foreshadowed the faith of the Gentiles, it follows that, by God's particular arrangement, all those things both said and done had the image of a future truth, and were therefore not lies.

What then? Is this true: "I am your firstborn, Esau"? It is indeed true. For he is both the firstborn according to the flesh, and the firstborn according to right. For the Apostle too expresses two kinds of children, saying: "Not all who are of Israel are Israelites; nor are all who are the seed of Abraham, children: but they who are the children of the promise are reckoned in the seed." And immediately: "Not only that, but Rebecca also, from one act of intercourse," etc. And: "Because the elder shall serve the younger," etc.

Paul, therefore, calls the people of the Gentiles the seed of Abraham, and calls this same people the younger brother whom the elder was to serve. As, then, the people of the Gentiles, without lying, could say: "I am the seed of Abraham," now substituted into the faith and inheritance of the Jews; so too Jacob, since he had a right to the firstborn status,

into which he had been substituted by God's authorship, truly indeed said: "I am your firstborn, Esau." What? Since John the Baptist was called Elijah by the Lord, not by nature indeed, but by the office of forerunner — could not Jacob too, in the same manner, who succeeded his brother by hereditary right, assert without falsehood that he was Esau? But you say: How did Jacob understand that this right pertained to him? Certainly either by God's revelation, or by his mother's instruction, who is related, in Genesis chapter 25, to have had familiar counsel with God. And on the refutation of the second argument we have said enough.

Response to the third. The third argument, which is brought against us from the testimony of Isaiah, Saint Thomas, II-II, question 171, article 6, reply to objection 2, refutes. This refutation, since it is lengthy, and we aim at brevity, need not be transcribed here. For it can also be answered more briefly otherwise: that prophecies of this kind are threatening prophecies — for so the Scholastics call them. Since the prophets understood this (for understanding is necessary in prophecy), they were not at all deceived. Rather, indeed, performing their ministry in good faith, they nevertheless thought that the threats could be changed by a change of morals. For this reason Jonah was unwilling to announce the destruction of Nineveh, because he thought that divine mercy would be moved to relent toward the repentant Ninevites. Wherefore, in such simple declarations, the nature of things and common usage lead us to understand a tacit condition.

A notable example of this matter is read in Genesis chapter 20, where the Lord, rebuking King Abimelech, uses these words: "And you shall die because of the woman whom you have taken." But after he had excused himself, the Lord spoke in this manner: "Now restore the man's wife to him, and he will pray for you, and you shall live: but if you will not restore her, know that you shall surely die." You see how, in the first pronouncement, he more vehemently shakes his mind, that he may be intent on making satisfaction; in the second, however, he plainly explains his will, by which, in pronouncing the punishment, he signifies nothing other than that he is warning those whom he wishes to spare; except that he does not express syllable by syllable what is nevertheless easy to understand. To the third argument, then, let this be the answer.

Response to the fourth. To the fourth, the answer is easy: that the verb of commanding does not always carry with it either a precept or a counsel, but sometimes also a permission, as in John: "What you do, do quickly"; and elsewhere the Lord said to Balaam: "If these men have come to call you, rise, and go with them." To whom, nevertheless, the angel afterward said: "I have come to oppose you, because your way is perverse." Saint Thomas, On Evil, question 3, article 1, reply to objection 17. Thus, then, it was said: "go forth, and do"; and thus altogether God is said to have given a spirit of

lying in the mouth of all the prophets, by conceding it, that is, not by commanding it.

In this sense is also understood: "And lead us not into temptation"; and perhaps also that: "You are king of kings, and the God of heaven has given you the kingdom and the dominion," etc.; and that: "You would have no power over me at all, unless it had been given to you from above"; and finally that the Father is said to have handed over the Son into the hands of the wicked. But since the divine permission itself (for we must return to our purpose), by which a man is led either into error or into fault, is carried out not by good ministers but by evil ones, therefore Augustine asserted that God sometimes deceives through evil agents. And let this much be said, for now, in refutation of the fourth argument, for we shall perhaps refute that later point by a clearer way and method.

Response to the fifth. To the argument also which is placed in the fifth position, I respond thus: that God did not indeed command the children of Israel to despoil the Egyptians, but to ask for vessels of silver and gold as a loan. He commanded afterward that the vessels received should not be returned. This he could legitimately do, both for other reasons, and especially for these: one, that the Egyptians had not paid the Jews the wages of their labors. For they had oppressed them with the hard works of clay and brick, and with all servitude, as is read in Exodus chapter 1. They could, therefore, even in peace, seize from the unwilling the wages owed to them, when there was no other way of recovering things otherwise owed. The other reason was that, in a just war, they could by right of victory carry off the property of their enemies. As Epiphanius also explained and taught in the book Ancoratus, and Clement of Alexandria before him, book 1 of the Stromata. Indeed, both causes may be gathered from Wisdom chapter 10. The former there: "And he rendered to the just the wages of their labors"; the latter there: "Therefore the just carried off the spoils of the wicked."

The Master of the Sentences, however, in book 3, distinction 37, affirms that the Jews who were the best of men sinned in no way; but as for the weaker ones, who deceived the Egyptians out of a certain greed, it was rather permitted to them to do this than commanded. For what Augustine said — that the Israelites were commanded to deceive the enemy — he himself corrected in that very same passage and question, saying: "It came about that God commanded it, or rather, in view of their desire, permitted it." It pertains, indeed, to justice and truth, that he who deserves to be deceived should be deceived — by God indeed conceding it, but by man, or an evil angel, effecting it. Whom, though God may indeed bring forth severely as agents of his justice for the purpose of avenging, he is not therefore immediately the cause of their wicked deed. For not immediately, if someone seeks money from a usurer, and uses the fault of a perverse

man, is that same person the author of the usury.

Nor indeed will it seem difficult that the same deed should be referred both to God and to Satan, if in one and the same motion we consider action and passion as plainly different things. For these two things bring it about that, in such cases, the reasoning of the divine and the diabolical action is far different. In his calamity, moreover, Job recognizes not only the work of the demon, but also of God, whom he says took away from him those things which, at Satan's instigation and impulse, had been carried off through the Chaldeans. For indeed, since the suffering was good and just, and God's counsel also was best and the purpose most holy, it was natural for the man of God to recognize there the blameless operation of God, precisely where the wickedness of men and of Satan betrayed itself by its own depraved operation.

I see that, while I wished to speak briefly, what I have said has come out rather obscure: but I shall try, and speak, if I can, more plainly. In that evil deed there was both fault and punishment, and an evil action joined to a just suffering. God, therefore, was not idle there: but he was entirely the author of what was good in that deed; he was, however, foreign to what was evil in it. Thus God indeed took away the camels from the holy man, but not only justly but even kindly; Satan also took them away, but cruelly, not to say impiously; the Chaldeans too took them away, but both greedily and unjustly. There is nothing absurd, then, if we refer the same deed, insofar as it is punishment, to God as its author, and insofar as it is fault, to Satan — so that Satan acts both in the fault and in the punishment, while God indeed acts in the punishment, but does not act in the fault, but permits it.

Response to the sixth. And by this same response the sixth argument also is refuted. For God does not deceive by causing the deception itself, but by permitting it to happen. By this same reasoning he is also said both to blind and to harden hearts, as Gregory, Moral., book 13, chapter 16, and Thomas, Against the Gentiles, book 3, chapter 162, have taught. And Clement of Alexandria, in book 1 of the Stromata, explaining that saying of Matthew 13, "Therefore I speak to them in parables," etc., says: "The Lord does not produce the ignorance" (for this would be wicked to think), "but prophetically denounces that which was already present." Thus also God is said to hand men over to a reprobate mind and to passions of disgrace. "I have let them go," he says, "according to the desires of their hearts: they shall walk in their own devisings."

And in this same sense the remaining testimonies are to be interpreted. For Augustine himself, in the book On Predestination and Grace, chapter 4, taught how we ought to understand his own words. "God," he says, "does not produce in man the hardness of

heart itself, but he is said to harden him whom he has been unwilling to soften; thus also to blind him whom he has been unwilling to illuminate, and to repel him whom he has been unwilling to call." Thus far he. And in the book On the Articles Falsely Imputed to Him by the Pelagians, article 10, he detests the opinion of those who believe God to be the author of anyone's evil will or action, whether by exciting, or persuading, or impelling the desires of sinners. For God tempts no one. And again: "Do not say: he led me astray." And again: "Your destruction, Israel, is from yourself alone; your help is only in me." And elsewhere: "You love all the things that exist, and hate none of the things you have made." But God hates the blindness of heart, error, obstinacy — since the impious man and his impiety are hateful to God.

God, therefore, properly does nothing of this kind in man, but only permits it by his judgment. For obstinacy, error of mind, and blindness are sins which, if we wish to follow the proper sense of the word, God in no way produces in men — unless one prefers the folly of Melanchthon, who says that the betrayal of Judas is as much God's own proper work as the calling of Paul. But this error is plainly refuted not only by the testimonies of Scripture but also by the reasonings of nature. For first, that reasoning of Augustine's stands ready: that no one becomes worse through a wise author. For there is so great a fault as cannot fall upon any wise man. Much less, then, will a man become worse through God as author, since God is more excellent than any wise man. Likewise, that other reason of the same Augustine is not a slight one: that the things which come about through my authorship necessarily come about by my willing, and either by my persuading, or counseling, or commanding; but there would be no just and right judgment of God concerning sins, if men sinned by God's will, persuasion, counsel, and precept.

Plato, moreover, in the second book of the Republic, says that one must fight in every way to prevent God, who is good, from being called the cause of evils — otherwise God would be fighting against himself, who would have commanded things contrary to his own laws to come about. Thus he orders to be expelled from the city those who utter such wicked words, harmful to us, as he says, and ill-suited to themselves. But it belongs to another place and time to refute this madness, or rather insanity. Let us now pursue the rest. For in refuting these, the testimonies of this sixth argument will be more openly explained.

Response to the seventh. When, then, in the seventh place it is objected that God is the cause of all punishments, we certainly deny this: but he is truly and properly the cause of those things which are only punishment, not fault. There is sometimes, however, as the Apostle teaches to the Romans and the Thessalonians, one fault that is the punishment

of another. In which case the impious man falls into punishment, God abandoning him, not causing it.

But Cajetan, on that text, "Behold, I will raise up evil against you from your own house," says: "The discourse is not about the evil of fault, but about the evil of punishment. For God is not the author of sin as such, but insofar as it is the punishment of the sinner, or of another." Thus far he. And on that text, "The Lord commanded him to curse David," he says: "He acknowledges that curse, insofar as it is penal, to proceed to him from God. For God brings about that curse through Shimei, not insofar as it was a sin, but insofar as it was a punishment of David himself. As above also, through the mouth of Nathan, he had said: 'I will raise up evil from your house' — not insofar as it was the evil of fault, but of punishment." Thus far he too.

And this latter opinion indeed can be defended by an easier method, if that distinction be repeated which was laid down in resolving the fifth argument — that in one and the same deed both action and passion are to be considered. For when temporal things, even health and life, are taken away, the suffering is not only just on God's part, but is also good on the part of the sufferer. I do not mean useful to the sufferer (for who would doubt this?), but honorable and meritorious, if it is borne with an equable and patient mind. Since, then, insofar as it is a suffering it is a punishment, it can rightly, unless I am mistaken, be said that God is the author of an evil deed, not insofar as it is the evil of fault, but insofar as it is the evil of punishment. For since, according to Aristotle, action and passion are the same motion, it is the same as if we should say that God is the author not of a bad action, but of a good passion.

But when one sin is the punishment of another, the matter cannot be so easily resolved. For then neither the action nor the passion is honorable; but he who is punished sins both in acting and in suffering, as when the Gentiles, for example, dishonored their bodies among themselves, and, having abandoned natural use, were clothed with a shamefulness hostile to nature, receiving in themselves the due reward of their error — in such a case we can distinguish nothing in it of which we might assert God to be the cause. For whether acting or suffering, both because they were acting, and because they were suffering, they were sinning on both counts. Wherefore God was in no way the author either of such actions or of such passions.

That, then, which Cajetan said in the former place seems too watered-down to be able to stand in true theology, and whether theology admits such formal subtleties, I do not know. For if God is the author of sin insofar as it is the punishment of the sinner, he will be the absolute cause of all punishments, even when the fault of the sinner is the later

punishment of an earlier fault. Thus he will be the cause of hardening, of blindness, of error, and of those passions which it is not even permitted, out of modesty, to name. And since a moral cause, of which we are presently speaking, does not act except through the will as mover — by God's certainly willing it, and hence either commanding, or persuading, or instigating it, those sins will come about which befall as the punishment of earlier ones. All of which, indeed, are both plainly false in themselves and vehemently contradictory among themselves.

I understand, however, that Saint Augustine, in book 5 Against Julian, contends at length that sins are not only the matter of permission or divine forbearance, but also of power, when, namely, earlier sins are punished through later ones. He adduces, indeed, in support of this not only those testimonies which we have brought forward in our arguments, but also these: "The Lord mingled a spirit of dizziness in the midst of it, and they made Egypt err, as a drunken man errs." And: "It was the Lord's sentence, that their hearts should be hardened, and that they should not deserve any clemency, as the Lord had commanded Moses." And: "The king did not yield to the people, because the Lord had turned away from him, that he might raise up his word," etc., in the place where our translation has "because the Lord had turned away from him," the Seventy translated, "for the turning was from the Lord." Which words Augustine rendered thus: "because the turning was from the Lord." And rightly indeed, for metastrephō properly means "I turn about." To this also that is similar: "He turned their heart, that they should hate his people, and deal deceitfully with his servants."

Augustine adds finally also this, by which alone he seems to win his case: "For this very purpose I have raised you up, that I might show in you my power"; and immediately: "Whom he wills he hardens." Willingly, then, God hardens; and afterward: "But if God, willing to show his wrath and to make known his patience," etc. Such sins, then, belong to the divine power: wherefore God acts in these things too, not merely permits. This is confirmed especially by the fact that, when David rebuked Abishai, who wished to cut off the head of Shimei, he said: "Let him alone: for the Lord has commanded him to curse David"; and a little after: "Let him alone," he says, "that he may curse, according to the Lord's command."

Into this question, which I was trying to flee, as the saying goes, with horse and foot, I have fallen, willing or not. For it is so joined to the one that is presently being treated, that I could not separate the one from the other, although I have labored long and much on this matter. For when I consider what the plan of the work undertaken requires, I decline, as far as is in my power, the controversies that occur and follow upon it — all the more those which I see to be worthy of being treated more fully and explained more

accurately. Hence indeed a large volume displeases me; and on the other hand I am vexed that matters of the greatest weight should be weighed with less careful diligence than their importance requires. This must necessarily happen in the matter now in hand. For although many things will be said, many things must nevertheless be passed over which would have been very necessary for fully resolving this subject.

And the ancient fathers, lest they should open a window to the impious for referring their hardness, blindness, errors, and sins to God, in expressions of this kind which seem to suggest God's action, acknowledge only permission. Which sobriety, while I embrace it, I judge to be by no means without danger, if we add nothing to permission — that it is neither properly the action of God, nor mere permission alone. For thus, as I think, we shall hold the genuine, solid, and exact understanding of Sacred Scripture. First, however, this must be understood: that the force and energy of Scripture in passages of this kind is not sufficiently explained by negation. For if God blinds him whom he does not illuminate, and hardens him whom he does not soften, then indeed all who are dead in sin have been blinded and hardened by God. Which neither Scripture nor reason admits.

For we read that certain persons have been peculiarly blinded and hardened by God: in whom the Lord has shown his wrath, justice, and power by a notable and singular vengeance. Then this too must be certain and clear to us: that God does not properly blind, nor harden, nor deceive, nor turn the hearts of men to hatred, nor finally do those things which, on the surface of the letter, he is asserted to do. For these things, as we have established above, are all foreign to the nature of God. They are, therefore, attributed to God improperly and figuratively, for a threefold reason, as I judge.

First, indeed, since, when his light is removed, nothing else but fog and blindness remains; since, when the spirit of his sweetness is taken away, our hearts harden into stones; since, when his direction ceases, they are twisted into crookedness — he is said to blind, to harden, to make err, those from whom he takes away the faculty of seeing, of softening, of entering upon the right path. For those too who would take this light from our eyes, and those who would remove the column by which a building is made firm and stands, would truly and rightly be said both to darken the eyes and to destroy the building. Now when we say that God takes away the faculty of seeing, and other similar things, this is not to be understood as though man, deprived of the faculty of free choice, could not himself see, nor soften, nor enter the right path; but it is rather to be understood thus: that, since man cannot see without light, nor be softened without the sweet oil of the Spirit, nor enter the right path without God's direction, therefore he who, by a just judgment upon men, takes these things away is said in some manner also

to take away the faculty of accomplishing them.

The second reason, which seems to come closer to the proper sense of the words, is that God uses Satan as a minister for executing his judgments, and is therefore said to accomplish those things which his minister, strengthened by his authority, accomplishes; just as we rightly understand that the things which a judge's officer does, in carrying out his just sentence, are in their own way done by the judge as well.

Jerome gave a third reason, to Hedibia. Just as there is one heat of the sun, and according to the underlying substances it melts some things, hardens others, dissolves some, binds others fast — for wax is melted and clay is hardened, and yet the nature of the heat is not different — so God, by one and the same light altogether, is said to blind the one who is badly disposed, and to illuminate the one who is well disposed; and by the very same benefit to harden the one, to soften the other. Indeed, by the very same miracles displayed, Israel was softened, Pharaoh hardened; by the same light of doctrine the apostles saw, the Pharisees were made blind. Since the divine light, although in itself it is brought forth for the purpose of seeing, nevertheless, through occasion, produces blindness in him who has badly disposed eyes, and hardness in him who is badly disposed in mind.

And to this is similar the fact that those are said to seduce and deceive who show darkness to someone by ambiguous or obscure speech. By this reasoning the Lord, having addressed the crowds in parables, is said to have blinded them. And Jeremiah: "You have seduced me, O Lord," he says, "and I am seduced." For because at the beginning he had heard this: "I have made you a prophet to the nations"; and again: "Behold, I have set you over nations and kingdoms" — he thought that he would say nothing against the people of the Jews, but against the various nations round about; whence also he gladly took up the prophecy. But when he saw that it had happened to him otherwise than he had expected, he complains that he has been deceived by the Lord — not, however, deceived by falsehood, but by ambiguity. Nor does it matter whether (as Jerome says) Jeremiah was thence seduced, or rather from these words: "Do not fear before their face, for I am with you, to deliver you," etc.

By these three reasons, then, not only are those passages explained which have been cited above, but it is also understood at the same time why God threatens that he will now summon the ministers of his wrath with a hiss, now that they shall be to him like a razor for shaving the head and the whole beard, now a net and a snare for ensnaring the wicked, now a hammer for striking, finally a rod, an axe, a saw, which he may lift up, with which he may cut, which he may draw.

For as to what is read in 2 Kings 16, that by the Lord's command Shimei cursed King David, that this was employed by a figurative manner of speech is sufficiently and abundantly proved by this great argument, that it is written in Ecclesiasticus 15: "He has commanded no one to act impiously." And indeed it conflicts with right reason that a man should sin in doing what he does at God's command. But Shimei without doubt sinned in cursing. The "command," therefore, is sometimes taken in the sacred books for a law and ordination, whether it be a law binding by authority, or a permission, or a prescribed punishment, or even the fixed order of nature.

For thus, what is said in Matthew 19: "For the hardness of your heart he permitted you," is said in Mark chapter 10: "He wrote you this precept." Thus also Lamentations 3: "Who is this who has said that it should be done, the Lord not commanding it?" Which passage others translate thus: "Who would say that anything happens which the Lord does not command?" And again: "He has established them forever, and to the age of ages; he has made a decree," etc. What, then, comes about by the order of divine justice is said to come about by divine command. Now I had forgotten that saying of Paul: "Whom he wills, he hardens." But first, theologians also posit a will of permission. Whence Augustine, in the Enchiridion, chapter 25, says: "Nothing happens, unless the Almighty wills it to happen, either by allowing it to happen, or by himself doing it." Then, things are said to happen by someone's will when they happen not against his will. For thus a father is said to will to beget a son. And on the seventh argument, too much has now been said.

Response to the eighth. The eighth, however, will be refuted very briefly. For it must be understood that there are two kinds of causes, natural and moral. So that he who commands, who counsels, who persuades, who impels, is called the moral cause of that thing which comes about by his command, counsel, persuasion, or impulse. Now God is indeed the natural cause of all motions; for he operates with a general and natural concurrence with all agent causes: but he is not the moral cause either of error or of any depraved action. The act, therefore, which is a sin, if it is considered in the genus of natural things, is to be referred only to natural causes; but if it is considered in the order of moral things, it will be inaptly and absurdly referred back to naturally acting causes. For he would indeed be foolish who should attribute his own or another's faults to the motive intelligences of the heavens.

Wherefore, although the whole of things and actions, insofar as they are the effects of nature, have God as their author; yet, when sins are in question, since by the very name "sin" a free and moral act is at once understood, we shall indeed be most inept if we ascribe our errors and sins to God. For he, as we have said, in the manner of a moral

cause, neither moves toward error, nor toward any other depraved action — that is, he neither lies at all, nor counsels nor commands evil. By these and similar means one would properly both deceive, and be held the cause of sins. But this division of causes has been more fully explained in the lecture on the Sacraments in general. Now we have said enough for the explanation of the eighth argument.

Response to the ninth. But the last is easily refuted. For I deny what is assumed first, on which the whole of that argumentation rests as on its persuasive basis. For lying is by nature so evil that no one can, for any reason, justly lie — which Aristotle also teaches in Book 4 of the Ethics, and Augustine demonstrates in his book On Lying.

To the first reason, by which the contrary of this is urged, there are those who reply that Joseph indeed truly lied, but in jest. And if you object that all perjury is a mortal sin, they cleverly reply that Joseph did not swear absolutely that they were spies, but conditionally. For he says: "Send one of you, and let him bring him, until what you have said be proved true or false; otherwise, by the health of Pharaoh, you are spies."

But Saint Augustine, in the Questions on Genesis, frees the whole assertion from the charge of lying, and takes that word "are" in the sense of "shall be held to be." This usage of the word is not unusual. For in 3 Kings 18, Elijah says: "He who answers by fire, let him be God" — that is, let him be held to be God. Saint Bonaventure too went in this direction, and added that Joseph said those words by way of testing and inquiring, as judges are accustomed to do, without lying. For in trials, indeed, statements are used in place of questions. Now those who question do not lie. For they are not considered to be asserting anything, but to be probing in order to elicit the truth. Such was that question: "Do you not know that there is no one like me in the science of divination?" Gratian, however, teaches that this was said in jest, and therefore should not be held to be a lie, since it was not said with the intention to deceive.

To the second reason I reply that the speech of the prophet is figurative, either to express the greatest certainty of the matter, or to express a vehement desire that, if it could be so, these evils should not happen — which is commonly said among the Spaniards without blame: "plega a Dios que yo mienta" ("would to God that I were lying"). But to the third reason let this be held as the response: that irony is taken there by Aristotle for a certain base and dissembled cavil, craftily prepared for deceiving. For the Greek word eirōneuomai sometimes means to deceive in a cavilling manner. But Socrates, a pretender in all his speech, whom the Greeks called eirōn, was not only without fault in this but even praised for it. For irony, illusion, or mockery, is a figure used among the Latins, where no lying is present. All the arguments, then, which we set forth at the beginning of

this controversy, have in this manner been refuted.

It may, however, be raised against us — and indeed by learned and erudite men — asking whether we seem to act prudently enough, who, having taught at the beginning of this work that the truth of God, on which faith rests, is the first principle of theology, now nevertheless seem to be establishing the doctrine quite differently: since we call the divine truth into question, and even strive to confirm it by reasons of philosophy.

It is absurd, however, as Aristotle teaches, to wish to dispute the principles of any discipline with just anyone. And Basil, on Psalm 115, says: "In any pursuit of knowledge which proceeds in order toward an end, it is impossible to seek demonstrations of the first subjects. But it is necessary, the principles of all arts which rest on proof being laid down without investigation or reasoning, to show the rest, which follow thereupon, by reasoning. Thus also the mystery of theology, built from faith, by no means seeks proof by reasonings." Thus far Basil. And Hilary, in the book To Constantius Augustus, says: "Faith is not a matter for the question of philosophy, but for the doctrine of the Gospel."

Since, then, both theology and faith rest upon this as their highest principle — that all things revealed by God in the Scriptures are true — it seems foolish either to call this into doubt, or to wish to settle it by the arguments of philosophy, as though faith were a matter for the questions of philosophy, and not rather, as in other disciplines, so especially in this one, that the disciple should believe while learning.

And indeed, just as the first principles of philosophy are preconceived in the mind by those not wholly devoid of reason, and could not be called into question except most absurdly: so all Christians have this anticipation, or pre-notion, impressed as it were upon their minds, without any intervening argument — that God is by nature truthful, and that no one can therefore be deceived by him. Wherefore we can, as has been said, be accused even by learned men of the charge of imprudence, who have made a controversy out of a matter which ought not to be controversial, and have established the first foundation of faith and theology not only by testimony but even by reasoning.

To these I would wish our position to be sufficiently known. For we are not men whose mind wanders in error, nor who never have anything definite to follow. For what kind of theology would this be, or rather what kind of discipline, with the rational basis of its principles removed? Which is utterly destroyed, if the principle, just like the conclusion, should also come into controversy.

Since, however, I sometimes seem to myself to be disputing not with perfect and fully wise theologians, but with those with whom it goes well if there are even mere

semblances of theology in them, I move some stones which I would certainly not move, were it not that I feared the imprudence of certain men, who, while the younger theologians everywhere read without judgment, fall into those opinions which it seems necessary to refute, so that we may lay the foundations of theology equally for the learned and the unlearned.

It must, therefore, be granted to us, if for the sake of the unlearned we discuss certain things outside the art of proper disputation. Nor should our prudence be sought there, where the teacher is the more prudent the more he accommodates himself to the talents and inexperience of the unlearned. Furthermore (that we may also reply somewhat to the learned), the principles of the disciplines do not all undergo the same treatment universally. For some are so well known and evident that those who call them into question are to be disciplined not with the words, arguments, and disputation of philosophers, but with blows, chains, and prison — such as, that anything must either be or not be, and that the whole is always greater than its part; but others are of such a kind that they can sometimes be denied out of ignorance, and yet also be confirmed by rather illustrious reasonings. For thus Aristotle taught that Dialectic and Metaphysics refute those who deny the principles of the other disciplines; and he himself often persuades, from manifest effects, the less manifest causes of things, by which causes, nevertheless, the principles of philosophy are contained.

But it is also established that there are two parts to every discipline: one, in which we lay down, establish, and confirm the principles themselves as foundations; the other, in which, the principles having been laid down, we proceed to the things that follow from them. And in this latter part, indeed, if anyone should deny the principles, which are of course presupposed in the science, there is no need to contend with him in a contentious disputation. For if someone should deny to a theologian, who wishes to draw his conclusions from principles, that God exists, he would be foolish to wish to institute a theological disputation against such a one.

In that former part, however, which we have said comes first, it will be permitted not only to illustrate obscure things by clear ones, but also to show less known principles from those things which are better known to us. For it generally happens that the causes of things which are by nature manifest in themselves are obscure to us. Just as to the eye of the night-owl the rays of the sun are darkness, so if God's existence were denied to a wise man, although this is the first principle of theology, he would nevertheless take pains to establish, by some way and reasoning, that God exists. It ought not, therefore, to seem strange to anyone, if in this very book, where we are dealing with the firmness of theological principles, we ourselves not only explain but also establish the principles

themselves.

But an enemy shakes the foundations of a city in one way, attempting to overthrow them; an artisan, in another way, who strives not only to lay them but also to confirm them. But let us now leave these matters aside, and hasten on to those things which press more closely and more forcibly. For that first engine indeed was not so well constructed that a longer or more vigorous discourse would be needed to overthrow it. But upon that other engine, since the adversaries have constructed it with greater skill and force, we too must press with greater zeal and a more vigorous force of disputation.

Chapter V

In which Fourteen Books from the Sacred Bible are Enumerated, which Some Either Doubt to be Canonical or Certainly Reject from the Canon

It has been called into doubt, then, both formerly and in our own time, whether those seven books of the Old Testament — Baruch, Tobias, Judith, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, and the two books of Maccabees — are to be held as canonical. From the New Testament too, nearly the same question exists concerning the Epistle of Paul to the Hebrews, the Epistle of James, the second Epistle of Peter, the two later Epistles of John, the Epistle of Jude, and the book of the Apocalypse.

For there are theologians, and there have been — among them indeed both noble men of old, and in fact leading figures, and certain learned and grave moderns — who, moved by many great reasons, have denied that these books ought to be counted among the canonical ones. Other authors, however, themselves also most distinguished, assert on the contrary that all these are canonical. And to confirm this matter they employ very many and very great arguments as well. Thus so great a disagreement among the most learned men compels one to hesitate concerning so great a matter.

I, however, in order to explain this controversy more clearly, shall divide this whole question concerning the canonical books into four parts. First I shall show to whose authority it belongs to define which book is canonical. Then I shall demonstrate that these books, which are now called into doubt, are sacred. Then I shall bring forward the arguments which could have deceived, by their plausibility, men otherwise both learned and pious. Finally I shall dissolve these same arguments. For all these things must be referred to this question.

Chapter VI

Contains the Arguments of Those Who Attempt to Persuade that Sacred Scripture Does Not Need the Approval of the Church

And indeed, as far as pertains to the first part, the Lutherans have at times asserted that Scripture does not need the approval of the Church or of anyone else, but that judgment concerning Scripture is to be made from the Scriptures themselves; or rather that all other things are to be judged through the Scriptures, while they themselves are manifest of themselves to anyone who has the light of the Holy Spirit and of faith. But if you should ask them, who will give us confidence that these things proceeded from God? Who will assure us that they have come down safe and untouched to our own age? Who will persuade us that this book is to be received with reverence, but that one struck from the list? They say it is just as if someone should ask whence we shall learn to distinguish light from darkness, white from black, sweet from bitter; for Scripture does not bear before it a sense of its truth more obscure than white and black things bear of their color, or sweet and bitter things of their taste; just as also among the philosophers, by means of common conceptions of the mind (for so they call them), all other things are proven, since these themselves need no proof. Thus the Lutherans judge that the knowledge of the divine word, which is the common principle of catholic doctrine, is so far at hand that no approval of men is necessary. And this same most pernicious error formerly gained strength among the Wycliffites, as Thomas Waldensis attests, book 2, Doctrinale of the Ancient Faith, chapter 19 — lest anyone think that this heresy first arose from Luther.

The first argument. They urge, in the first place, from the fact that the Lord says in John 5: "I do not receive testimony from man." But whether it be the Supreme Pontiff, or a Council, or even the whole Church, these are men: therefore Christ's Gospel, or the remaining parts of Scripture, do not receive testimony from these.

The second argument. They confirm the same again from that saying of John the Apostle, in his first epistle: "You have no need that anyone should teach you; but as his anointing teaches you concerning all things, and is true."

The third argument. In the third place they argue from this saying of the Lord: "If anyone wishes to do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God"; to which is similar this: "My sheep hear my voice, but a stranger they do not follow." With this testimony Luther boasts as though the matter were already settled, and, before battle has even been joined, exults like a fierce victor. For openly, as he says, the Gospel testifies that the sheep themselves, of themselves, have a fitting capacity for discerning the

Scriptures.

The fourth argument. Fourth, they assert that saying of John: "If you receive the testimony of men, the testimony of God is greater: he who believes in the Son of God has the testimony of God in himself." In all things, therefore, which pertain to faith, we ought not to have recourse to external testimonies of men, but to that which God provides as testimony within us.

The fifth argument. To this they add also that from Deuteronomy: "Whoever shall refuse to hear the words of the prophet which he shall speak in my name, I will be his avenger; but the prophet who shall presume to speak in my name what I have not commanded him to say shall be put to death. But if you should answer in silent thought: How can I know the word which the Lord has not spoken? You shall have this sign: if what that prophet has foretold in the name of the Lord does not come to pass, this the Lord has not spoken," etc. Behold how, in discerning the words of God from the words of men, the faithful people are not referred back to the pontiff or the priest, not to a council of men, but are instructed, from the very evidence of the facts themselves, to discern.

The sixth argument. To the same effect also pertains that saying of John: "Beloved, do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits, whether they be of God: because many false prophets have gone out into the world. By this is the spirit of God known," etc.

The seventh argument. They confirm the same, moreover, from that testimony of the Apostle: "The natural man does not perceive the things that are of the Spirit of God, but the spiritual man judges all things." Again from this: "Let two or three prophets speak, and let the rest judge"; and a little after: "If anyone seems to be spiritual, let him acknowledge that the things I write to you are the commandments of the Lord." Whoever, then, has the spirit of God in him, can rightly know the words of the Lord and discern them.

They put forward other testimonies too, which, since they look to the same point and are refuted in the same manner, it is not necessary to bring forward here; but let us add the reasonings which they also employ to confirm their error.

The first reasoning. If the Church, they say, should pass judgment on the Divine Scriptures, then the inferior would usurp authority over the law of the superior. This is plainly absurd. For, as Augustine says, it is not permitted for a judge to judge concerning the laws, but according to them, distinction 4, chapter In istis.

The second reasoning. Moreover, what assurance, they say, shall we have of eternal life, if whatever promises concerning it exist in the Sacred Letters rest on the judgment of men alone? Again, how far will our faith be called into suspicion among men, if it is believed to have, by the favor of men, an authority no more than precarious? And since the Apostle asserts that the foundation of the Church is the catholic and apostolic doctrine, the certainty of this doctrine must be established prior to the Church's beginning to exist. For if the Christian Church was founded upon the writings of the prophets and the preaching of the apostles, then wherever that doctrine is found, its approval certainly preceded the Church, without which the Church itself would never have come into being. It is, then, a most empty invention (as Calvin says, chapter 1 of the Institutes) that the power of judging Scripture lies with the Church, as though the Scripture's certainty depended on the Church's nod.

The third reasoning. Moreover, if the truth of Sacred Scripture depended on the testimony of men, and were proven from it, then the final resolution of faith would be made into the authority of the Church. For we believe that Christ was the son of David, because God revealed this to the prophets and apostles. But if we held that God had revealed this on the authority of the Church, then our faith would in the end be traced back not to God, but to men. Wherefore the formal ground of faith would be not divine but human truth.

The fourth reasoning. Finally, as Aristotle taught in book 1 of the Posterior Analytics, chapter 2: that on account of which each thing is such, that thing itself is more so. If, then, the canonical Scripture were proven by the authority of the Church, we would believe men more than God. But it is established that no authority is greater than the divine, by which the Sacred Letters are indeed empowered. Sacred Scripture, therefore, will not be confirmed through the Church, nor will it depend on its approval.

By these and other arguments heretics can urge their error; they cannot make it persuasive. For they err grievously, when, in asserting the Scriptures, they attempt to undermine the authority of the Church. Concerning this matter we shall now dispute briefly, and only with respect to this present cause concerning the canonical books; because both the authority of the Church against heretics has already been most accurately disputed by very many catholic men, and we too must afterward assert and confirm this in general.

Chapter VII

Teaches to Whose Authority it Belongs to Judge Concerning the Canonical Books

The first conclusion. Let this, then, as far as pertains to the present matter, be the first proposition: that judgment concerning the Scriptures cannot in any way properly be made through the Scriptures themselves. For, to say nothing of many others whose case is altogether similar, certainly that the books of Ruth, Esther, and Job are canonical will in no way be proven from the Scriptures themselves. Therefore, if this matter comes into controversy, the proof must be sought from elsewhere than from the Sacred Letters. Then, since we wish to press this same point further, if it should be in controversy whether both Testaments, the New and the Old, were published with God as their author, this dispute cannot be settled by the authority of either Testament. For by the same reasoning by which the whole volume would be doubted, any particular part of the volume would also be called into doubt. It is necessary, therefore, to establish some judge of this question apart from the Sacred Letters.

Moreover, Basilides produces I know not what prophets — Barchabas, Barchob, and others of this kind — who in fact never existed in earlier centuries, as Eusebius attests, book 4 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 8. But books of such prophets cannot be refuted through the Scriptures themselves. For Basilides would say that, besides the four major and the fourteen minor prophets, there were also other prophets in the Old Testament, and would confirm this by the testimonies of that same Testament.

Nor are other examples lacking for these reasonings. For certain heretics rejected the Gospels, on the grounds that Christ the Lord neither wrote anything himself nor commanded anything to be written, as Augustine relates, Retractions, book 2, chapter 16. Others rejected all the epistles of Paul, as is found in Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book 3, chapter 27, Irenaeus, book 1, chapter 26, and Origen, on Psalm 82, as related by the same Eusebius, book 6, chapter 28 (see also Irenaeus, that same chapter 26, and chapter 29). Others denied the whole law of Moses, and indeed all the Scriptures of the Old Testament, as Augustine attests, both often elsewhere and especially in his book Against Faustus, and Eusebius, book 5, the last chapter.

We, however, accept these books in general. Likewise we despise the Gospels put forward by heretics under the names of Nicodemus and Bartholomew, while we venerate the Gospel of Mark. And we, for our part, give a reason for these positions: but they cannot in any way give a reason for that which the universal Church holds and has always held. Indeed, once the authority of living judges is removed, nothing remains for them but to remove the entire body of the Sacred Bible from the midst.

Add to this that Scripture is a dead judge, who can neither hear the arguments of both parties in a dispute, nor himself pronounce a sentence. It follows also that, if such a form of judgment were prescribed in some human commonwealth — such that there would be no living judges, but every controversy arising concerning the writings of that commonwealth would be settled by the written letters alone — besides the fact that this form of judging would be most foolish, there would also be no end of litigation. For no force could be brought against one who denies the document, if there were no living judges.

Thus in Deuteronomy 17, those who disagree are not referred to the writing, but to the examination and judgment of living men; and Malachi chapter 2 says: "The lips of the priest guard knowledge, and they shall seek the law from his mouth" — from his mouth, it says, not from the law itself; and in Acts 15 the Antiochenes did not appeal to Scripture, to learn whether Paul's words were divine, but to the apostles and elders who were at Jerusalem. Nor did the apostles and elders set up Scripture as judge, but themselves and the Holy Spirit. "It has seemed good," they say, "not to Scripture, but to the Holy Spirit and to us." For the Holy Spirit does not dwell in the letter, but in the spirit; not in syllables, but in hearts. But if those who opposed Paul had sought judgment on that matter from Scripture, the question would remain ambiguous to this day.

The second proposition. Judgment concerning the canonical Scriptures does not belong to private citizens of the Christian commonwealth. First, because in a human commonwealth such judgments would not be permitted to private men, unless the lawgivers had lost their senses. For each of those who are in disagreement would, by equal right, claim this authority of judging for himself: and thus there would be no end of disputes. It will, therefore, be foolish to wish to follow the private revelations or opinions of each individual, especially in a matter necessary to faith. For each man would decide according to his own faction, and would assert that whatever he himself thought was revealed to him by God.

What of the fact that no private man has certain authority in the Church, nor has any of the rest of the faithful established and solid truth? Thus any judgment whatsoever proceeding from a private citizen will be weak: and consequently the faith of the Scriptures would rest on an uncertain and feeble foundation. What of the fact that in Deuteronomy 17 grave questions are commanded to be referred not to private persons, but to those who hold public power in the Church? What then? Did the Antiochenes, as private men, take judgment upon themselves in that controversy in which it was doubted whether Paul's words were of God or not? Not at all; but they sent to the

apostles and elders who were at Jerusalem, Acts 15.

Add to this, that since certain very learned men denied that the Epistle to the Hebrews was canonical, while other authors, themselves also not undistinguished, excluded the Apocalypse of John, that controversy among such learned men could not be settled by the private judgment of any individual. See Origen, homily 7 on Ezekiel; Gregory Nazianzen in his Apology; Jerome on Ezekiel chapter 13 and on Jeremiah chapter 23 — so that you may understand how little weight ought to be given, in such matters, to the prejudices of private men. But more on this later. Now let us pursue the rest.

The third proposition. It belongs to the Church to determine which book is canonical, and its authority is a sure rule both for receiving books into the number of the sacred, or for rejecting them from that number. This was held by Irenaeus, book 3, Against Heresies, chapters 2, 3, and 4, and by Augustine, Against Faustus, book 13, chapter 4, and book 28, chapters 2 and 4, and in the second book On Christian Doctrine, chapter 8, and finally in the book Against the Letter of Mani, chapter 5, where occurs that saying worn smooth on everyone's lips: "I would not believe the Gospel, unless the authority of the Church moved me."

This same point is defined by the First Council of Toledo in these words: "If anyone shall say or believe that other Scriptures are canonical besides those which the Catholic Church receives, let him be anathema." The authority of the Catholic Church, therefore, presents a sure argument for both receiving and rejecting sacred books, which is confirmed by many great reasons.

For first, if such a matter should come into dispute, since the judgment cannot be made either from the Scriptures themselves or from the private opinion of anyone, it is necessary to seek it from some other source. Now there is nowhere from which we ought more fittingly and reliably to seek such judgment and censure than from the Church, which is the pillar and foundation of truth. This question, then, must be referred to the tribunal of the Church; and its decree will be the touchstone for testing which book is canonical.

Likewise, as Saint Augustine argues against Faustus the Manichee, in the books of the pagans we discover their true authors by no other means than by the common consent and testimony of those who came before us. For how do we know the books of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, except from the continuous testimonies of those who preceded us in age? If, then, in all other matters this way is the safest and surest for knowing the author of any book, why will this same way not be sure and established for a catholic man, for understanding that this book is Matthew's, that one is not Thomas's, this epistle was

written by Paul, that one was not written by Paul? By the testimony of the Church, then, sacred books are to be admitted.

This John the Evangelist seems to have signified when he says: "This is that disciple who bears witness of these things; and we know that his testimony is true." John, then, bears testimony to the Gospel, and the Church approves it, saying: "And we know," etc. Otherwise, what would be the point of that sudden and unexpected change of number? The Apostle Paul too clearly teaches this in the Epistle to the Galatians, chapter 2. For when he had received the Gospel by the revelation of Jesus Christ, and had remained with Peter and James for fifteen days, he went up again to Jerusalem according to revelation, and conferred with the apostles and the faithful concerning the Gospel which he was preaching among the Gentiles; and privately with those who seemed to be something, lest perhaps he should be running, or had run, in vain. But if the approval of the Church were not necessary, certainly Paul would not have been anxious to go up to confer about the Gospel, lest perhaps, etc.

And, as Augustine says against Faustus, if the apostle Paul had not found in the flesh apostles with whom he might confer about the Gospel, the Church would not have believed him at all. And Jerome, in his letter to Augustine, discussing these words of the Apostle, says that from these words he shows that he had no confidence in preaching the Gospel, unless it had been strengthened by the judgment of Peter and those who were with him. This letter is also found in the second volume of Augustine's works, number 2. And Tertullian, book 4 Against Marcion, says: "For this reason Paul went up to Jerusalem to consult the apostles, lest perhaps he had run in vain. For the singularity of a document, deprived of the patronage of predecessors, would not suffice for faith. Finally, when he had compared and agreed with the authors concerning the rule of faith, they joined right hands. Therefore, if Luke's own illuminator desired the authority of his predecessors both for his faith and for his preaching, how much more should I demand it for the Gospel of Luke, which was necessary even for the Gospel of his teacher?" Thus far he.

The same is also found in Acts 15. For when at Antioch it was doubted whether Paul and Barnabas truly believed and taught concerning the cessation of the legal observances, the faithful decided that Paul and Barnabas and certain others should go up to the apostles and presbyters at Jerusalem. It is not, then, that each person of himself knows whether a doctrine is from God or not, or that the doctrine itself immediately shows itself to be divine to anyone; rather, the approval of the Church is needed.

This the Lutherans finally confessed at the Diet of Augsburg — namely, that the Church has authority to discern the words of God from the words of men. And Luther, in his book On the Babylonian Captivity, where he treats of the Sacrament of Order, confesses indeed that the Church has the power of discerning the word of God from the words of men, but that it is not for that reason the judge of the word of God. As Augustine says that the soul is so grasped by truth itself that through it the soul can judge most certainly concerning all things, but cannot judge the truth itself; rather it is compelled to say, with infallible certainty, that this is the truth, being judged rather than judging — so also in the Church, he says, there is such a perception, the Spirit illuminating it, in judging and approving doctrines, which it cannot demonstrate, and yet holds most certainly. For just as among philosophers no one judges concerning common conceptions, but all are judged by means of them, so among us no one judges concerning the sense of the Spirit, which judges all and is judged by none. But we do not wish, in this present place, to contend over these words.

We only conclude this much, which the Lutherans even now, however unwillingly, grant — that from the authority of the Church a sure argument is taken, either for admitting sacred books, or for rejecting those that are not sacred.

But here a not insignificant question presents itself: whether by the name "Church" we mean in this place the Church which existed in the time of the apostles, or the congregation of the faithful who exist now, or rather the universal collection of Christians propagated from the baptism of Christ, through the apostles and their other successors, down to these present times.

For Durandus, in book 3 of the Sentences, distinction 24, question 1, and Gerson, On the Spiritual Life of the Soul, lecture 2, corollary 7, refer such authority of approving the sacred books, or also of rejecting the non-sacred ones, to the Church of the faithful who existed together with the apostles. But John Driedo, book 1 On Ecclesiastical Scriptures and Dogmas, chapter 1, and Thomas Waldensis, book 2 On the Doctrine of the Ancient Faith, chapters 19 and 20, judge that this authority is to be referred to the whole series of fathers and faithful succeeding from the apostles — which indeed seems to have been the same opinion of Irenaeus, book 3, chapter 3, and book 4, chapter 63, Against Heresies; and of Tertullian, book 4 Against Marcion; and of Augustine, book 33 Against Faustus the Manichee, and in book 2, chapter 6, Against Julian the Pelagian, and book 2 On Christian Doctrine, chapter 8, and Epistle 63. But others, nevertheless, attribute this same authority also to the Church of this present time, which is indeed the same as the ancient Church, and has the same Spirit of truth assisting it.

I myself, however, judge in the first place that it belonged to the apostles to approve sacred books, not to reject the non-sacred. For we have no other canonical books, of either the Old or the New Testament, than those which the apostles approved and handed down to the Church. I judge, further, that such apostolic tradition becomes known by no better means than through the fathers and doctors of the Church succeeding after the apostles — just as there is no surer and more direct way for knowing the other traditions of Christ and the apostles, as we shall show in its proper place hereafter. And indeed neither of these two points needs to be confirmed by elaborate reasonings; it is enough merely to point them out.

But this must be demonstrated: that the Church of the faithful now living cannot, indeed, write a canonical book, but can define whether a book under discussion is canonical or not. Because the determination of doubts which now arise concerning the faith belongs to the present Church. For there must be a living judge in the Church, who can decide controversies of faith, since God has not failed his Church in matters necessary to it. But whether a book is canonical or not touches very closely upon the faith. The judgment of this matter, therefore, will belong to the Church of this present time. For if the Church which now exists cannot condemn errors which oppose sound doctrine, then certainly, the judges having been removed from the scene, the heretics of this age could live and even reign with impunity.

Again, in the time of Jerome a catholic was permitted to doubt whether the Apocalypse of John was sacred and canonical. Now, however, as we shall show in its proper place, it is not permitted to call this into doubt. Therefore, after the times of Jerome, the Church had the authority of settling that question. Wherefore, since in our own time some call into doubt whether the books of Baruch and Maccabees, and the others about which the question is in hand, are canonical or not, this ambiguity can certainly be resolved by the judgment of the present Church.

Moreover, the Church which now exists cannot err in faith. Therefore, if it has believed some book to be canonical, a fitting and firm argument will be taken by theologians from its testimony. For the present Church can, by its own right, both teach those who have received the faith whatever things belong to the faith, and can itself hand down to its posterity the sacred books which it received through the tradition of the ancients. And these posterity must necessarily have their faith immediately from the present Church; just as we, the present generation, have believed immediately from those who immediately preceded us, and they from those above them, in a certain series and order, all the way up to the apostles, to whom the faithful then living believed most immediately. For just as in the disciplines we discern two kinds of principles, one remote,

the other proximate — this latter being first for us, that former being first in itself — and conclusions are referred back to the first beginnings only through the more proximate ones; so too the faith of those who succeed cannot be referred to those who did not precede them in time, except through us, until one arrives at the apostles, and from there at Christ, where the catholic faith stands as upon its first foundation. Just as both kinds of principles in the disciplines are firm, and both likewise prove their conclusions with certainty, although one is mediate and the other immediate, so too the Church which now exists presents a sure argument of Christian doctrine, although its own faith must ultimately be referred to the doctrine of Christ and the apostles.

In this matter Thomas Waldensis seems to me to be mistaken. For, as we indicated a little before, it is one thing to ask what the present Church can define, and how far it has authority to decide controversies; it is quite another to investigate by what way and method one can arrive at a right and firm definition of these matters. And we, indeed, frankly confess that new revelations are not now to be expected, whether from the Supreme Pontiff, or from a Council, or even from the whole Church; but rather the documents of our forefathers and the writings of the saints are to be sought out. The apostolic traditions, too, and the Sacred Letters are to be consulted, and through such means, sought out in this manner, the proposed question of faith is to be decided. For the apostles and elders, gathered in the Council of Jerusalem, after a great inquiry had been made, both from things previously done and from the writings of the prophets, gave their judgment on the matter proposed and called into question.

Thomas Waldensis, unless I am mistaken, errs also on another point, when he asserts that the testimony of lay believers pertains to this matter too, but that it is not necessary to have recourse to them, because, he says, they did not know how to entrust their faith to the memories of their successors in fitting words free from all entanglement. For matters pertaining to faith fall into a twofold distinction: one kind, which all the faithful explicitly believe — such as that the Son of God assumed human nature; the other kind, which only the leaders are bound to believe explicitly, while the people believe implicitly in the faith of their leaders — such as that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. From the common people, then, untrained in matters of faith which fall under the first kind, you might perhaps rightly demand testimony, since the faith of these matters pertains equally to leaders and to lesser folk. But in those matters which pertain to the second kind, if any question should arise, it would be most foolish to consult the untrained crowd, a doting old man, a gossiping old woman, an unlearned cobbler — and this especially, if such questions are to be referred not to the present Church, but to that of former times. And this is exactly what Thomas Waldensis himself

asserted ought to be done.

Since, then, explicit faith concerning the number of the canonical books is not a matter for the common people, but for the leaders, to whom indeed it belongs to know which are the sacred books, we must admit that, in such a question as we are now treating, testimony is not to be sought from the common people, but from the doctors of the Church, whom even the untrained common people are bound to believe, and to whom the judgment of such matters belongs — which is as just as it is certain. Whence it follows that, if all the saints and doctors of the Church should assert that some book is canonical, this is to be held as certain, just as if the whole Church had asserted it. This must be explained more fully elsewhere. Concerning the third proposition, then, enough has been said.

The fourth proposition. It belongs especially to a universal Council to define which book is canonical. This proposition, indeed, I would patiently bear not being admitted by heretics. But I am grieved deeply that certain of the faithful deny it — among whom Thomas Waldensis seems to be, book 2 Doctrinale of the Ancient Faith, chapter 19. Yet this is clearly proven, because it belongs especially to the pastors of the Church to set before the faithful those things which have been divinely revealed; both because the whole Church is not able to set forth and teach such revealed things, and because, even if it could, it would not be fitting for the whole Church to assume the office of teaching; and because it is the proper duty of pastors to feed the sheep with knowledge and doctrine, as is said in Jeremiah 3; and because sometimes there is contention even among catholics themselves as to whether this or that book is canonical.

To settle such a dispute, then, there must be judges in the Church, whose judgment the faithful ought to follow. Now we accept no judges in the doctrine of faith more fittingly than the bishops and doctors, to whom the instruction of the faithful has been entrusted, and whom, if you remove from the scene, you immediately take away the judgments of the universal Church; since the whole Church itself — that is, all the faithful — ought not, nor indeed can, come together to judge a proposed question.

Moreover, a Council is a sure rule in matters of faith, as we shall show later. Since, then, this question concerning the sacred and canonical books touches upon faith, it can be abundantly settled by the testimony of a Council. This the Antiochenes are seen to have understood. For they referred the question concerning the legal observances not to the common people of the faithful, but to the synod of apostles and elders. Nor, after the Council's decision, was there any room left for doubting. Acts 15.

The fifth proposition. It belongs to the Supreme Pontiff to define which book is canonical. First, because the greater causes of the Church are to be referred to the Supreme Pontiff, as Innocent proves in On Baptism, chapter Maiores, which we too shall demonstrate. But this cause concerning the canonical books is among the greatest; it is, therefore, to be referred to the Supreme Pontiff.

Then, because it can happen that there is disagreement among the Fathers gathered in Council. But if there were no judge in the Church to settle this contention and dispute, certainly the Church would not have been provided for by God in matters necessary to it. Moreover, because the Supreme Pontiff, whenever he pronounces on matters of faith, cannot err — which must also be shown in its proper place hereafter. By the testimony, then, of the Pontiff himself, as by a sure judge, we will be able to prove which book is canonical, and which, on the contrary, is not.

Finally, this is shown by the argument concerning Pope Nicholas. For what the Apostolic See has truly approved is today held as accepted, and what it has rejected is up to now considered altogether without effect. Thus the writings of the doctors which it has approved, the Church approves; those which, on the contrary, it has rejected, the Church rejects. We are, therefore, compelled to hold firm and certain the testimony of the Supreme Pontiffs on these matters, by the perpetual experience of the facts themselves.

For indeed the Gospel which Paul preached among the Gentiles, as we showed earlier from Tertullian, Jerome, and Augustine, would not have been received by the Church, had it not been strengthened by Peter's authority; and, as Jerome himself writes in his book On Illustrious Men, citing Clement in the sixth book of the Hypotyposes, that when Peter had heard the Gospel of Mark, he approved it, and by his own authority gave it out to be read by the Church. And indeed the same Eusebius, book 2 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 15, confirms this by the testimony not only of Clement, but also of Papias.

It is established, moreover, that he who succeeds to Peter has this same power, certainly in those matters which are necessary to the Church. To the Supreme Pontiff, then, belongs this kind of judgment concerning the canonical books. For if any similar question had arisen under the old law, its determination would belong to the high priest, as we read in Deuteronomy 17.

Thus far we have said, with as much brevity as could be managed, what was sufficient for the present place, so that the pious reader might understand which authors ought to be trusted in establishing the canonical books. For if any of these points need stronger force

and arguments, so as to be proven in general to all, they will be confirmed afterward in their proper places. Now, however, I think it must be our task to refute, as briefly as we can, the arguments of the enemies of true religion.

Chapter VIII

In which the Arguments of Chapter Six are Refuted

Response to the first. To the first argument, then, I reply thus: If Christ does not receive testimony from man, where then is this: "There was a man sent from God, that he might bear witness concerning the light"? Where again this: "You shall bear witness of me, because you have been with me from the beginning"? Where, finally, lest we repeat everything, this: "You shall be my witnesses in Jerusalem," etc.?

The sense, then, is: I indeed do not need the testimony of man, but nevertheless I offer the testimony of John for your sake. And so he adds: "But I say these things, that you may be saved." But that he himself does not seek human testimony — by which indeed he himself is rightly believed to have no need — he proves by adding: "I have testimony greater than John's," etc. And indeed this proves that he who has divine testimony does not, for his own sake, accept testimony from man, yet does not refuse it when offered for the benefit of others. To this same sense he then adds: "I do not receive glory from men" — although Peter is said to have glorified God by his death. And this much concerning the first argument.

Response to the second. To the second, the answer is easy: that the Apostle there is speaking not with the untrained, but with the learned. For he says: "I have not written to you as to those ignorant of the truth, but as to those who know it." For wise teachers of the Church, then, the interior anointing suffices for refuting things contrary to the faith; but for the ignorant, external teaching is also necessary, especially that of those whom God has established in the Church as pastors and doctors.

It must also be understood that the doctrine of faith necessary for individual men can perhaps become known to each one through himself, if he has the Spirit abiding in him. But those matters which, in the faith, are not necessary for individuals as such, but pertain to the common good of the Church, are not immediately known by good men simply because they possess some spirit of God and anointing. For if it were proposed to a simple little woman whether the accidents in the Sacrament of the altar exist without a subject, although she may be holy and just, there is no need that she be taught this by the anointing. But if you should ask her whether Christ shed his blood for our sins, this indeed will be taught by the anointing, since God does not deny the faith necessary for

salvation to one who does what is in their power.

Furthermore, since this question concerning the number of the canonical books does not pertain to individuals, but must be referred to the learned men in the Church, it follows that, for knowing whether this book or that is canonical, it is not enough to have the anointing. For the anointing does not simply teach everyone about all things, but teaches each person concerning those things which are proper and necessary to him.

And this was abundantly sufficient to dispose of the second argument. But, to accommodate those who desire something further in the explanation of that testimony, a third response must still be added. It is not the case that, because some in the primitive Church had made such progress both in virtue and in doctrine that they needed no external teacher — since, taught by the Spirit, they knew all things — we should therefore extend that grace of the Holy Spirit to all and to this present time as well. Otherwise, if anyone does not now have the gift of tongues, or many of the other things which the Spirit imparted to the faithful from the beginning, he should think that he has not received the Spirit, nor consider himself anointed, unless, like the Egyptian monk Anthony, he understands the Divine Scriptures without any knowledge of letters.

But if the anointing even now teaches all things without an external teacher, then parents should not teach their little ones the doctrine of Christ; nor should the people even go to the churches to hear and learn the Gospel itself; indeed, they should read no books at all, nor listen to a man reading and explaining; rather they should expect to be caught up to the third heaven, and there to perceive all the mysteries of Christian doctrine.

Let us beware, says Augustine, of such most arrogant temptations, and let us rather consider that the apostle Paul himself, although divinely instructed both by voice and by spirit, was nevertheless sent to a man, that he might learn from him what he ought to do; and let us consider Cornelius, who, although an angel announced to him that his prayers had been heard and his alms regarded, was nevertheless handed over to Peter to be instructed, from whom he might hear what he should believe, what he should hope for, what he should love. Acts 10. And this much concerning the second argument.

Response to the third. The third could first be disposed of by repeating that distinction of matters which we laid down in refuting the previous argument. For we freely grant that the doctrine necessary to each person in his own life and state will be clear and known to one who does the will of God: just as a well-disposed sense of taste easily discerns differences of flavor, so the best disposition of the soul causes a man to discern the doctrine of God necessary for salvation from a contrary error which is not from God. But those matters which are common to the Church, and do not pertain to the judgment

and faith of individuals, cannot be discerned and judged by just anyone, however much he may do the will of God. And of this kind are the matters at issue in this controversy concerning the number of the Divine Books.

Nor is the judgment even of those matters so evident to anyone that it is immediately at hand without a teacher. For there were some who received the word of Paul with eagerness, and yet daily searched the Scriptures to see whether these things were so (Acts 17); and when some taught that no one could be saved without circumcision, it was not immediately clear to just anyone whether that voice and doctrine was from God or not; but the question was rather referred to the apostles and elders, and, after a council had been convened and a thorough inquiry made beforehand, it was settled (Acts 15).

But if what has been said in refutation of this argument should still not seem sufficient to anyone, let him have this answer as well: that Christ did not say that he who does the will of God can, by himself and without a teacher, distinguish all the true doctrine of the prophets, evangelists, and apostles from the false, or that the sheep, without an external teacher, can recognize the voice of Christ and refute one contrary and foreign to it; but he taught this: that when a fitting teacher of the faith is present, who proposes the matter to be believed in fitting place and time, with solid weight and sure authority, then the hearer, if he is good, will receive God's doctrine, but if evil, will reject it.

For Christ was speaking particularly of himself and his own doctrine; whom, since the Father God had sealed, and had given as leader and teacher to the world, and had approved by every kind of testimony — to him, announcing the Gospel with so many and such great arguments, to him, excelling in glory of life, doctrine, and miracles, to him, possessed of human and indeed divine authority — no one without sin could refuse to give faith.

Let Luther now go his way, and, as though he had shaken the Church's faith with the most powerful battering-rams, let him revel in the most empty exultation: we, however, should rather understand that to be the sense of Christ's words which we have stated, both from other testimonies of the Evangelist, and especially from this same passage, which Luther cites against us from chapter 10. "The works," says the Lord, "which I do in my Father's name, these bear witness concerning me; but you do not believe, because you are not of my sheep"; and immediately: "My sheep hear my voice." For certainly, if they did not hear it, they would not be the sheep of Christ — as those who, deaf to the voice of their own shepherd, however well tested and certain, would grow deaf with closed ears. From which it is plain how inappropriately Luther applies those testimonies of the Lord to this case which we are now discussing. Concerning the third argument,

then, this much.

Response to the fourth. Before I respond to the fourth, I think it worthwhile to touch briefly on certain points, so that not only this argument may more easily be dissolved, but also so that what is to be discussed afterward may be more readily explained.

I establish, then, first, that according to the common law, certain exterior and human incitements are necessary, by which we may be led to faith in the Gospel. For how shall they believe in him whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? Likewise: "If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin"; and: "If I had not done the works which no one else has done, they would have an excuse for their sin." It is, therefore, not only necessary that the things of faith be set before the one who is to believe simply by a man, as though they were first principles for a disciple; but it is also necessary that some exterior persuasion and human incitement be applied — just as certain principles of geometry are explained and urged by a teacher.

Hence it is that, when Moses said to the Lord, "They will not believe me," the Lord gave him the power of working signs; hence again this: "They preached everywhere, the Lord cooperating, and confirming the word by the signs that followed." To this pertains: "This man came for a witness," etc., "that all might believe through him." And Sergius Paulus, a prudent man, when he had seen what was done, believed, marveling at the doctrine of the Lord (Acts 13). The centurion, seeing what had happened, glorified God, saying, "Truly this was the Son of God" (Luke 23). And the father knew that it was at that hour in which Jesus had said to him, "Your son lives," and he himself believed, and his whole household; and a little before: "Many of the Samaritans of that city believed in him because of the word of the woman who bore witness, saying, He told me all things whatsoever I have done"; and many came to Jesus, and said, "John indeed did no sign; but all things whatsoever John said concerning this man were true." And John 20: "That disciple, who had come first to the tomb, went in, and saw, and believed. For they did not yet know the Scripture, that he must rise again from the dead." Philip, finally, and Peter did not propose faith to the eunuch and to Cornelius alone, but also brought forward reasons, etc.

Then this too must be established: that human authority, and all those aforementioned incitements, or whatever others are employed by one who proposes the faith, are not sufficient causes for believing, such that we would be bound to believe by them alone; but besides this there is need of an interior efficient cause — that is, God's special help moving one to believe. This Saint Thomas teaches, on Romans 10, lecture 2; and Saint Augustine, Retractions, book 1, chapter 21, and often elsewhere.

Indeed the Sacred Letters teach this too. "How beautiful," it says, "are the feet of those who preach the gospel of peace, who preach good things! But not all obey the Gospel. For Isaiah says: Lord, who has believed our report? and to whom has the arm of the Lord been revealed?" Likewise: "Do not murmur among yourselves; no one can come to me, unless the Father, who sent me, draws him. It is written in the Prophets: And they shall all be taught of God. Everyone who has heard from the Father, and has learned, comes to me." And further on, when certain disciples said, "This is a hard saying, and who can hear it?" the Lord said, "Therefore I said to you, that no one can come to me, unless it has been given to him by my Father." And in another place: "But although he had done such great signs before them, they did not believe in him, that the word of Isaiah might be fulfilled: Lord, who has believed our report? and to whom has the arm of the Lord been revealed?" etc.

All exterior and human persuasions, then, are not enough for believing, however competently the things of faith may be set forth by men; but in addition an interior cause is necessary — that is, a certain divine light inciting one to believe, and certain interior eyes given by God's gift for seeing. "Your eyes," says Moses, "have seen those great signs and wonders, and yet the Lord has not given you a heart to understand, and ears to hear, nor eyes to see."

This too Christ clearly confirmed by his own voice, saying to Peter: "Blessed are you, Simon Bar-Jona, because flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven." Certainly Peter had heard the testimony of John the Baptist, who had openly proclaimed that Christ was the Son of God; he had moreover seen many of Christ's miracles; and yet, after all these things, Christ attributes the confession of faith not to the testimony or authority of John, not to the miracles seen, but to divine revelation.

And to the Thessalonians: "We give thanks to God, because, when you received from us the word of the hearing of faith, you received it not as the word of men, but, as it truly is, the word of God, who works in you who believe." There are also very many other testimonies of the Sacred Letters in confirmation of this matter, as to the Corinthians: "No one can say, 'Lord Jesus,' except in the Holy Spirit," and the rest that follows. And again, among the gifts of the spirit, Paul enumerates faith; and elsewhere: "We are not sufficient," etc. And in Luke: "A certain woman, a worshipper of God, heard Paul; whose heart the Lord opened to attend to the things that were being said by Paul." And this: "He stirs up, morning by morning, he stirs up my ear, that I may hear as a master: the Lord God has opened my ear." The day would fail me, if I wished to recall all the testimonies by which this foundation is established.

To which a third point must be added: that the formal ground of our faith is not the authority of the Church — that is, the final resolution of faith is not made into the testimony of the Church. The scholastic matters themselves seize upon scholastic forms of speech, and the Latinists ought to forgive us the terms which long usage of the schools has worn smooth. For we follow not so much elegance of style as clarity of disputation. But to the matter.

I cannot here pass over in silence the error of those who assert that our faith is to be traced back to this, as to its final cause for believing — namely, that we believe the Church to be truthful, to which, they say, we first assent through acquired faith before assenting through infused faith. If this were true, the first formal ground of infused faith would not be uncreated truth, but created. Wherefore our faith would not rest, as on its foundation, on divine truth, but on human truth.

Then, since the assent to a conclusion is not more certain than the assent to its principles, as Aristotle demonstrates in book 1 of the Posterior Analytics, if infused faith rested upon acquired faith, then the belief that God is triune, to which we assent through infused faith, would not be for us either firmer or more certain than the belief that the Church is truthful, to which, according to their view, we assent through acquired faith and through the incitements of human causes.

Moreover, we never judge any man, however much through acquired faith, to be truthful in such a way that we do not fear that he could either be deceived or deceive. Wherefore, if the assent of catholic faith depended on acquired faith, it could not be entirely firm.

To this, if all those who taught me, indeed even the angels of heaven, should assert to me the opposite of what I hold by faith, my faith would not for that reason be shaken, according to the prescription of the apostle Paul: "Though we, or an angel from heaven, should preach a gospel to you," etc. The assent of our faith, then, does not rest on human causes and incitements, which acquired faith indeed follows. Wherefore, lest our mind waver, the authority of Divine Scripture must be sought from a source higher than either human reason or authority.

Moreover, the apostles and prophets ultimately resolved their faith into the divine authority and truth. We, therefore, do not resolve our faith into the human authority of the Church. For it is the same faith, and therefore has the same object and formal ground.

This is confirmed especially by the fact that those things which happen accidentally to the object of some habit do not vary the formal ground of that object. But it is entirely accidental that the articles to be believed are proposed through these or those men. Since, then, the prophets and apostles assented to the articles of faith because God revealed them, we too shall have the same reason for believing. Unless perhaps our faith is not a theological virtue, whose first and formal ground, if we believe these men, is not divine but human truth.

Nor are there lacking testimonies of the Sacred Letters in confirmation of this matter, as this: "They believed the Lord and Moses his servant." It did not say, "Moses and the Lord," but "the Lord and Moses." Likewise: "He who believes in me, does not believe in me, but in him who sent me," and the rest that follows: and to the Thessalonians: "We give thanks to God, because, when you received from us the word of the hearing of faith, you received it, not as the word of men, but, as it truly is, the word of God."

To these three sure and stable conclusions is joined also this: that the final resolution of our faith is made into an interior efficient cause — that is, into God moving us to believe. For example, to this article: "God is triune"; and to this: "The Church cannot err," and to all the other universal principles of Christian doctrine, I assent through infused faith, not because John said so, or any other man, but because God has revealed it; but to this: "God has revealed it," I believe immediately, moved by God through a special instinct.

Thus, on the part of the object, the moving formal ground is the divine revealing truth; but this nevertheless does not suffice to move, unless there is present an interior cause — that is, God also moving through a gratuitous and special concurrence. Saint Thomas, II-II, question 2, article 9, reply to objection 3; Augustine, Confessions, book 2, chapter 3.

And although, this foundation now having been laid, the faith clings firmly to it, it nevertheless also stands by that testimony which is referred to in the argument. For this is the sense which John the apostle has when he says: "If we receive the testimony of men, the testimony of God is greater." But whence, O apostle, shall we believe that this is God's testimony? "He who believes," he says, "in the Son of God, has the testimony of God in himself."

But if we wish to trace this matter back to its source and see whence all things flow, we must in the end understand this: that the habit of faith stands in relation to the discipline of theology, just as the habit of intellect stands in relation to the human sciences and faculties. Just as, then, our intellect, in the course of the natural disciplines, first engages

with the principles, and then proceeds to know the rest of the things which are derived from the principles laid down, so in the knowledge of supernatural things there are certain supernatural principles, from faith in which the believing soul proceeds to investigate the rest. "He who comes to God," it says, "must believe that he exists, and that he is a rewarder to those who seek him"; and again: "Whereas you ought to be teachers because of the time, you again need to be taught what are the elements of the beginning of the words of God"; and immediately he teaches what such elements are, saying: "Leaving the discourse on the beginning of Christ, let us be carried on to more perfect things, not laying again the foundation of repentance, of faith toward God, of the doctrine of baptisms, of the laying on of hands also, of the resurrection of the dead, and of eternal judgment."

These matters having been set forth, it can easily, I think, be understood that what was said a little before is true — that is, that certain human and exterior aids must intervene for believing, and yet that these are not sufficient in themselves, nor is the resolution of our faith made into such things, but into an interior divine cause, which excites and moves us to believe.

For indeed, into the assent to the principles of geometry or arithmetic come many things as it were preambles and antecedents — such as sensory knowledge, and the explanation and persuasion of a teacher, who does not propose these same principles in just any way, but explains them also either through examples manifest to the senses, or through most well-known effects. But the formal ground of assent is none of those things; rather these are, as it were, determinations and conditions, without which such principles would not be understood by the disciple. The formal ground, however, is the inherent natural light, by which indeed that evident assent is produced — just as this exterior light is the formal ground which makes colors evident. In this manner, then, proposing things to be believed, persuading, working miracles — these indeed determine the intellect to believe, as it were conditions, without which the intellect is scarcely ever determined; but the formal ground of assent is the light of faith, which God infuses into the believer.

Now if you apply these things which we have said to the Sacred Letters, you will indeed find them to be so consonant that we ought to prevail over any adversary. To this pertains that saying of John: "Now we believe not because of your speech; for we ourselves have heard, and we know that this is truly the Savior of the world" — to say nothing of those other passages which have been recalled to us above.

For in refuting the fourth argument enough and more than enough has been said; from which, however, the last three arguments may most easily be dissolved. For although,

with respect to one or another man rejecting the Sacred Letters, the authority of the Church is prior — since we rightly prove to him that this is the epistle of Paul, that one of James, through the authority of the Church — it is nevertheless not thereby concluded that the authority of the Church is absolutely the formal ground of believing, in the same way that, if we rely on most well-known effects to persuade one who denies the principles of natural philosophy, we are not thereby seeking the cause on which the principles of philosophy depend, but rather some argument or sure indication of the matter which has come into controversy. And it happens in almost all disciplines that, against one who is ignorant of the cause, we use the effect, because of the mutual connection between the two.

And indeed I could show this abundantly with various examples from many disciplines, but things that are evident ought not to be drawn out at length. We shall, then, employ a single example of that kind, which is both easy to understand and, though set in one matter, can be transferred to many. That the earth is interposed between the Sun and the Moon, the astronomer argues from the eclipse of the Moon, and yet he does not thereby bring forward an inept kind of argumentation. For this has been excellently employed by the most learned men, whose authority I would not use, if I had to address some country folk. But since I am writing to those for whom these things are not unheard of, why should I pretend that, if I have put any effort into these studies, I have wasted it?

There has been employed, then, by the most erudite men, a certain kind of arguing, which the moderns call "a posteriori" — Aristotle, following the ancient interpreters, calls it demonstration "that it is" (quia est); we call it "from effects." Since these are often better known than their causes, they are repeatedly brought forward to demonstrate the causes; yet these effects will not for that reason immediately become the formal grounds of their causes. For, to remain on the same point, if we argue that the Earth is interposed from the eclipse of the Moon, the eclipse itself is not for that reason the formal ground of the interposition; rather, on the contrary, if the nature of the matter is considered, the interposition of the Earth itself is the formal ground why the Moon suffers eclipse. What, then, happens in the other arts also happens in theology, namely that the order of things is sometimes altered for the sake of human understanding — thus it happens that, against those who deny the New Testament, we most fittingly argue from the Old, and conversely, against those who deny the Old, from the New. For that men are carried, by a certain natural inclination as it were, from things better known to us to things less known, is attested not only by the philosopher, but we also experience this with no philosopher as our authority.

Wherefore, to the Jew, for whom the Old Testament is more certain, we urge the New from the Old. "We have," it says, "a more sure prophetic word: to which you do well to attend, as to a lamp shining in a dark place, until the day dawns, and the morning star arises in your hearts." And Acts 17: "Those who had received the word of Paul with eagerness searched the Scriptures daily, to see whether these things were so." Conversely, however, against one who accepts the New Testament but rejects the Old, we must gather the authority of the Old from the New.

In the same manner, too, the authority of the Church is connected with the authority of the Sacred Letters, and by the law of connected things we take each as proof of the other. But if it is asked in general whence it is established for the believer that those things which he holds by faith have been revealed by God, he cannot bring in the authority of the Church, because it is itself one of the revealed truths that the Church cannot err, as is found in 1 Timothy, chapter 3. Nor does the true catholic, as some imagine, assent to this — "The Church is truthful" — solely through human conjectures, on which acquired faith rests; in the way that the Saracens cling to their teachers, and the Jews to their rabbis, and the Gentiles to their philosophers, and finally everyone to their own elders. Not so, I say, do Christians; but through an interior light infused by the Holy Spirit, by which they are moved most firmly and most certainly to believe that the Christian Church cannot err, while the Saracens, Jews, and Pagans can.

Then it can be answered that, even if it were universally necessary that the Church propose those things which are to be believed, it would not therefore follow that the final resolution of faith is made into the authority of the Church. For the authority of the Church is not the reason which moves of itself to belief, but the cause without which we would not believe. For, in order that we may believe according to the law prescribed by Paul, it is necessary that the things we ought to believe be proposed to us through a man. God, however, provided that there should be a Church which, by sure and firm judgment, would propose those things which we are truly to believe. For the Church proposes — to illustrate the matter by example — that the Gospel of Matthew was revealed by God; nor can it propose to me anything but the truth.

I, therefore, do not believe that the Evangelist speaks the truth because the Church says he speaks the truth, but because God has revealed it. And yet the Church, in proposing this, is the cause without which I would not admit that Gospel to be Matthew's. I believe, then, with certainty that the Church is inspired by the Holy Spirit, not in the sense that it confers truth or authority on the canonical books, but in the sense that it teaches that these, and not others, are canonical. Nor, if it provides us access to knowing such Sacred Books, must we immediately rest there; rather we must proceed further and

rely on the solid truth of God.

From this it can be understood what Augustine meant when he said: "I would not believe the Gospel, unless the authority of the Church moved me"; and again: "Through Catholics I had come to believe the Gospel." Augustine's business, namely, was with the Manichaeans, who, without controversy, wished a certain Gospel of their own to be believed, and to establish faith in Mani. Augustine, then, asks what they would do, if they should encounter a man who did not even believe the Gospel; by what kind of persuasion they would bring him to their own opinion. He affirms that he himself could not have been brought to embrace the Gospel by any other means than by being won over by the authority of the Church.

He does not, therefore, teach that the faith of the Gospel is founded on the authority of the Church, but simply that there is no sure way by which either unbelievers or novices in the faith might enter into the Sacred Books, except through the one and the same consensus of the Catholic Church. This he himself explained sufficiently in chapter 4 of this same letter, and in the book On the Usefulness of Believing, addressed to Honoratus. A sure argument, then, in a controversy concerning any sacred book whatsoever, is taken from the authority of the Church, and this Augustine teaches; but the faith of the Divine Books must be referred not to this, but to divine authority.

Response to the fifth. Nor do we wish to detain the reader any further, after this, in dissolving those last three arguments, but rather to hasten on to explain those matters which have been left in the middle. The testimony, then, from Deuteronomy, which the adversaries next employ, does nothing at all for them. For just as, when the Lord warned the faithful to beware of wolves, and to recognize them, as trees, not by their leaves but by their fruits, this does not immediately exclude either the faithful watchfulness of dogs, and nature's wonderful sagacity in detecting wolves, or the vigilant care of shepherds and the diligent providence of all (for if these things were lacking, the sheep themselves could not by themselves protect themselves, however much a sign from Christ they might have by which to recognize wolves) — so Moses instructed the people to discern false prophets indeed by the outcome of events, but he does not thereby neglect the judgment of the priests in these matters, to whom indeed he himself had just before ordered all doubtful cases to be referred. Often, however, it could happen in practice that judgment concerning some prophet would be difficult and ambiguous, with various and conflicting opinions, as happens.

Response to the sixth and seventh. The testimony, indeed, which is brought from John, since it is similar, is overturned by a similar reasoning too. But the other, from the first

Epistle to the Corinthians, cannot be so easily refuted; yet it is established that Paul's words are wonderfully twisted by the Lutherans. For if the spiritual man — that is, one in whom is the Spirit of God (for so they interpret it) — judges absolutely all things, how is it that Elisha said, "Her soul is in bitterness, and the Lord has hidden it from me"? (2 Kings 4). How is it that Job, having learned by sure arguments that he was ignorant of many things, confesses his ignorance, saying, "I have spoken foolishly, and things that exceed beyond measure my knowledge"? (Job 38, 39, 40, 41, 42). How is it that the apostles did not understand the things that were said? (Luke 18). How is it that Peter and John did not yet know the Scripture? (John 20). How is it that Christ opened the Scriptures to his disciples, which had before been closed to them? (Luke 24). How is it that Peter did not judge his own dissimulation to be contrary to the Gospel? How is it that the same Peter again said, "Far be it, Lord, for I have never eaten anything common and unclean"? For he was perplexed within himself as to what the vision which he had seen might mean (Acts 10).

Let the Lutherans explain to me, if they can, why the eunuch, in whom without doubt the Spirit of God was present, could not work out the passage of Isaiah without an external teacher (Acts 8). Let them explain also why the faithful who were of the circumcision disputed against Peter, because he had gone to Cornelius, if just men can judge all things. Let them explain too what we mentioned a little before in this matter — what it was that prevented the Antiochenes from discerning that Paul's doctrine was true, and that of others false, but instead caused them to refer the matter to the senate at Jerusalem, so that the question might be decided by the council of the elders and apostles. I would add not a few such examples from the Sacred Books, were they not readily at hand; and even those we have given are sufficient to win the case.

Paul, then, does not mean that any just man whatsoever can judge all things. For among the Corinthians themselves there were certain little ones and imperfect ones, who, although they did not lack the spirit for righteousness, nevertheless lacked the capacity to discern those mysteries which the Apostle communicated to the perfect. "I could not," he says, "speak to you as to spiritual men; as to little children in Christ, I gave you milk to drink," etc. By "spiritual men," then, he means the perfect, among whom he himself spoke wisdom — those who, like Paul, had received the apostolic spirit, so that they knew what had been given to them, who spoke not in the learned words of human wisdom, who briefly possessed the sense of Christ by a special gift of the Spirit.

But not even these judged all things simply, unless we wish them to have been, through the Spirit, geometers and physicists and astrologers as well. Nor did they know all spiritual things universally. For the Spirit reserved certain things to himself, and revealed

certain things privately to one, others to another. There is, then, a fitting distribution, as there: "He will teach you all truth"; and also there: "The anointing teaches you concerning all things." Spiritual and apostolic men, then, discern all things — that is, supernatural and natural, spiritual and corporeal — not each individual thing, but all those things which were necessary for salvation.

These matters having been understood, there is no need to answer the other testimony from the same epistle. But the first reasoning is disposed of in this manner. It is not fitting for true and serious theologians to play with ambiguity of words. We do not, then, in this place use "judgment" in the sense of one who is superior to the very matter he judges. Otherwise, if that were always the meaning of this word, then, according to Paul, when two or three prophets speak, and the rest judge, it would be necessary that those who give judgment be superior both to the prophets and to prophecy itself.

We assert, then, that the Church judges concerning the Scriptures and their sense — that is, distinguishes the human from the divine, the true from the false. And the Church has this faculty from Christ, without any usurped authority, as we established before. "My Spirit," he says, "which is in you, and my words, which I have put in your mouth, shall not depart from the mouth of your offspring forever." Concerning this matter, since we shall dispute at length elsewhere, nothing further need be said now. The reasonings, moreover, which follow have all already been refuted in the response to the fourth argument. Let us proceed, then, to the remaining controversies, and pursue the order we have established.

Chapter IX

Shows that Those Books, About which There Was Controversy, are Without Doubt to be Held as Canonical

In the second part of this controversy we promised to show that those fourteen books, which have been called into doubt, are canonical. That this may be done as briefly as possible, let this be the first conclusion.

The first conclusion. To exempt Baruch from the canon of the Sacred Scriptures is not only rash, but erroneous. I call it "erroneous" here, since the meaning of this term is varied and ambiguous — something I do not dare to call "heresy," though it comes close to it. This is shown, first, from the Council of Florence under Eugene IV, in the decree On the Union of the Jacobites and Armenians, where Baruch is numbered among the prophets and sacred authors. Then the Synod of Trent under Paul III openly counts the book of Baruch among the canonical ones. It is, therefore, erroneous to exclude it from

the canonical books; for Eusebius too, in the book On the Demonstration of the Gospel, chapter 19, does not hesitate to affirm that the prophecy of Baruch is divine, and the same is affirmed by Clement of Alexandria, book 2 of the Paedagogus, chapter 3.

Finally, on the vigil of Pentecost, it is read under the name of a prophet to the whole Christian people, through all the churches. In this matter, if the Churches of Christ were deceived, they would be deceived most perniciously. Why so? Surely, as soon as the people understood that they were being deceived by the priests in such a matter, they would no longer have any sure faith in those proposing either prophecies or even the Gospels, since these same priests would already have been false and deceiving in a similar cause and matter. But if the faith of the Christian people wavers and falters here, certainly I do not see in what other place it could stand firm. As for those who wish the untrained common people not to depend on the authority of the priests, but to investigate for themselves whether the book that is read is canonical, that opinion has long since been exploded.

Let us confess, then, lest we err gravely in the doctrine of the Church, that the book of Baruch, which the Church has read under the name of a prophet for so many centuries, must be reckoned among the canonical books. For no pious man can be persuaded that God would have allowed the Christian people to be deceived for so many centuries in so grave a matter.

The second conclusion. To reject Tobias, Judith, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, and the two books of Maccabees from the canon is much more erroneous, not to say heretical. Augustine, first of all, numbers these same six books too, among the others, as canonical (book 2, On Christian Doctrine, chapter 4), where he wove together a catalogue of the Divine Scriptures, doubtless according to the common opinion of the Church. Isidore too, Etymologies, book 6, chapter 1, speaking of these books, says that although the Hebrews do not receive them within their canon, yet the Christian Church honors and proclaims them among the Divine Books.

This conclusion is, moreover, defined by Innocent I, in his letter to Exuperius, bishop of Toulouse, in the last chapter, where he inserted the list of the books of the Sacred Scriptures. Pope Gelasius too, with a Council of 70 bishops, decreed this, and asserted that the Holy and Catholic Roman Church receives and venerates these books too in the order of the Old Testament.

This same conclusion is taught by the Third Council of Carthage, which, although it was provincial, was nevertheless confirmed both by Leo IV (distinction 20, chapter De libellis) and by the Synod celebrated in Trullo. Nor should it trouble us that this Trullan

Synod is said to have approved the Council of Carthage (singular), not the Councils (plural); since among the Greeks there is a single council called "Carthaginian" — the Greek one — in whose canon 24 this enumeration of the Sacred Books is found. Although the Fathers of the Trullan Synod do not approve the Council of Carthage in the singular number, as Gratian understood it, but rather the canons issued at New Carthage.

Finally, you have this same conclusion in the two Councils already cited — both Florence under Eugene IV, and Trent under Paul III.

The third conclusion. It is heretical not to count the Epistle to the Hebrews among the canonical books. First, because this contradicts the definition of all the Pontiffs and Councils that have enumerated the Sacred Books — Innocent I and Gelasius, the Third Council of Carthage, Florence, Trent, and finally Laodicea — which Council, indeed, was clearly confirmed by the Trullan Synod.

This conclusion is, moreover, proven by the fact that the Epistle to the Hebrews was received at the Council of Nicaea, as Saint Thomas attests in his commentary on this same epistle. For so holy a man would not have asserted so weighty a matter, unless he had verified it.

Furthermore, this is clearly shown from the Council of Ephesus, whose words are: "Divine Scripture commemorates that Christ was made the High Priest and Apostle of our confession. If, then, anyone denies that the very Word of God was made our High Priest and Apostle, let him be anathema." Thus far the Council. Now the Apostle said this nowhere else than in the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is, therefore, Divine Scripture; and from its authority alone an effective argument is drawn for refuting heresy.

Now if, after such illustrious testimonies of the Supreme Pontiffs and Councils, I should wish to cite holy authors to confirm this opinion, I fear I might be charged with bringing forward witnesses by no means necessary in a matter not in doubt. And yet it is no light argument, that which is drawn from the common consent of all the saints.

And, to pass over the Greek writers, all of whom, as Jerome says to Dardanus, maintain a firm consensus to a man — and to omit the rest of the Latins too, except for Jerome alone, concerning whose opinion we shall discuss afterward — Saint Augustine most constantly holds everywhere that this epistle is canonical. For in book 2 On Christian Doctrine he places it in the canon of the Sacred Scriptures; and in book 3 On the Trinity he believes the authority of this epistle to be so solid, that it is no more permitted to depart from it than from the other Divine Scriptures.

And since, after the time of Augustine, all the saints, all the theologians, all the catholics have held this epistle to be canonical, what is it that these moderns attempt to bring darkness into the noonday light? Unless they wish the whole Church, for a thousand years now, to have been mired in the gravest error and in great ignorance of this question — a Church by whose usage this epistle is read among all peoples under the name of the Apostle.

The fourth conclusion. It is heretical not to count the Epistle of James among the canonical books. First, because Jerome, in the book On Illustrious Men, asserts that this epistle, although it was once doubted, nevertheless gradually, as time went on, earned authority. Already, then, even in the age of Saint Jerome, the Church had received this epistle. Likewise, because Innocent and Gelasius, and all the Councils — Carthage, Laodicea, Florence, Trent — placed it among the sacred books.

To these add the ancient saints, whom we shall also mention by name later, and all the moderns together with the ancient scholastic theologians — in short, all Catholics. For by the usage of the Church it is read everywhere among the nations as sacred and apostolic. Let Luther, then, go his way, and, having abandoned the weightiest testimonies, let him put his faith in himself alone — that is, in a complete and uncorrupted witness! We, however, resting on a solid foundation, hold that it is canonical.

And, if upon this foundation of the Church we wish to build soundly, let us number among the canonical books also the second Epistle of Peter, the two later Epistles of John, and that other Epistle of Jude, and let us judge the contrary opinion heretical. For the causes underlying these are entirely the same as those I have just mentioned.

First, that this was the opinion of Jerome, in his letter to Paulinus; of Augustine, book 2, On Christian Doctrine, chapter 8; of Isidore, book 6 of the Etymologies, chapter 1; of Damascene, book 4, chapter 18 — not to mention all the ancients, none of whom fails to cite testimonies from these epistles as divine.

The other, that Innocent, Gelasius, the Council of Laodicea, of Carthage, of Florence, of Trent reckon these too, by common consent, among the canonical books. Since this is established among all, we must confess that these are canonical.

The last, that the universal Church, at various times of the year, proposes and reads these under the name of the apostles. In this matter, to press the same point once more, if the people were deceived by the priests, they could afterward by no means be brought, even when their pastors agreed in the same opinion, to have an undoubting faith — an evil

than which nothing more grave could invade the Church.

The fifth conclusion. To exclude the book of the Apocalypse from the canonical books is heretical. This is shown, first of all, since, on the authority of Saint Jerome, in the book On Illustrious Men, and in the letter to Dardanus, and in the letter to Paulinus, and in other places too, and also reported by Saint Augustine, book 2 On Christian Doctrine, the Church holds the book of the Apocalypse to be canonical.

Likewise, Epiphanius, in Heresy 51, which was that of the Alogi, refutes as heretics those who deny that either the Gospel or the Apocalypse of John is Sacred Scripture. And Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus, book 2, chapter 12, counts the Apocalypse among the Scriptures. And Dionysius, in the book Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 3, proves it to belong to John the Evangelist. And Origen, in Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book 6, chapter 18. The same Eusebius too, in his Chronicle. And Dionysius of Alexandria affirms without doubt that the Apocalypse was written by the Spirit of God, on the authority of Eusebius, book 7 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 23. And Justin Martyr, in Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book 4, chapter 18 — the passage occurs in the Dialogue with Trypho. And Irenaeus, book 4, Against Heresies. And Chrysostom, as reported by Suidas. And Damascene, book 4, chapter 18. For I pass over the more recent writers, who have also illustrated this book with their commentaries — Bede, Cassiodorus, Rabanus, Rupert, Richard of Saint Victor, etc. Wherefore Tertullian, most truly, in book 4 Against Marcion, asserts that the order of bishops succeeding from the apostles attributes this same book to John the Evangelist. It is, then, Sacred Scripture, if we believe the order of bishops succeeding from the apostles.

Moreover, Innocent, Gelasius, the Council of Carthage, of Florence, of Trent have defined that the Apocalypse is to be held among the canonical books. Moreover, the Fourth Council of Toledo says: "The authority of many Councils, and the synodal decrees of the Roman pontiffs, have established that the Apocalypse is to be received among the Divine Books; and because there are very many who do not receive its authority, if anyone henceforth does not receive it, he shall incur the sentence of excommunication." Thus far the Council.

Finally, since by ecclesiastical usage it is proposed under the name of John the Evangelist — that is, as something to be read to the people as sacred — it is not permitted to doubt that it is canonical. These matters having been both most openly set forth and most firmly corroborated, I think I have sufficiently shown what I promised in the second part of this question — that those fourteen books of the Old and New Testaments are to be honored with divine honor along with the rest of the sacred books, and are

henceforth to be held, without controversy, as canonical.

Chapter X

Contains the Argumentations of the Adversaries Against What Was Defined in the Preceding Chapter

Now the third part will set forth the arguments by which those who have rashly and inconsiderately held the contrary opinions seem to have been moved. For as to Luther's argument, that no book of the Old Testament should be received by a Christian, because, if we accept Moses in one commandment, we must accept the whole of Moses, be circumcised, and observe the Sabbath — there is no reason why we should be troubled by this, since both Tertullian, in five books Against Marcion, and Augustine, in thirty-three books Against Faustus the Manichee, have refuted, abundantly and learnedly, not only this argument of Luther's, but also many others.

Besides the fact that we deliberately pass over, in this book, many objections of many people — partly because they are frivolous and trifling (for Aristotle wisely taught that, whenever some fool puts forward contrary claims, it is not fitting for a wise man to be troubled), partly because they are either over-subtle or useless; nor, in a work which I wish to be both most weighty and most useful, must we wait around to answer about a bent oar or a dove's neck.

The first argument. The first argument, then, attempts to undermine the first conclusion laid down above, namely that neither Augustine, nor Damascene, nor Innocent, nor Gelasius, nor the Council of Laodicea, nor that of Carthage counted that little book of Baruch among the number of the canonical books. Indeed Augustine, when he professed to be weaving the whole canon of the Divine Scriptures, omitted the little book of Baruch from his enumeration; and Innocent, having listed all the others besides this one, asserted that the rest were to be condemned.

The force of this argument is confirmed, moreover, by the little proem prefixed to this book, where, since it is not found in the Hebrew canon, it is said to be added only for the information of readers. This is taken from the proem of Saint Jerome in his commentary on Jeremiah. For this same reason, too, although Jerome illustrated all the other prophets with his commentaries, on this one he wrote no commentary at all.

The second argument. The second argument attempts to weaken the second conclusion, namely that Saint Jerome, in the "Helmeted Prologue" which is prefixed to the books of Kings, and in his letter to Chromatius and Heliodorus, which is the proem to Proverbs,

excludes those six books of the Old Testament from the canon. But the books which Jerome rejects, the Church rejects, as Gelasius relates in the chapter Sancta Romana, distinction 15. They are not, therefore, canonical. This same point is also confirmed by another, not insignificant, argument.

For Cyprian, in the Exposition of the Creed, on the authority of the fathers from whom he says he received it, excludes these same six books from the number of the sacred. Melito did the same — who indeed went to the East for the purpose of investigating this matter, namely where our preaching had its beginning, and, having diligently inquired into all things, found by full investigation that these books were to be rejected from the canon of the Old Testament, as Eusebius attests, book 4 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 26.

Origen too, on the first Psalm, rejects these six books from the canon, along with the Hebrews, as Eusebius relates, book 6, chapter 18. But the same Eusebius, book 6, chapter 2, also seems to exclude these books from the sacred ones. Nor is Damascene, book 4, chapter 18, foreign to this opinion; nor is Saint Thomas certain about Ecclesiasticus; nor even is Saint Augustine, in the book On Care to Be Taken for the Dead. Epiphanius too, in the little book On Weights and Measures, rejects the books of Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus from the canon. And the same reasoning applies to the other five. This conclusion, therefore, is not so well established as we would wish.

This argument's force is, moreover, confirmed by the fact that, at the Council of Laodicea, from the Old Testament only those books are enumerated which Jerome enumerates, and there is no mention at all of those six.

It is confirmed, furthermore, by the fact that the Trullan Synod approves the eighty-five chapters of the Apostolic Canons; but in chapter 84, neither Tobias, nor Judith, nor Ecclesiasticus is numbered among the canonical books; they are not, therefore, canonical. For the apostles handed down such books to the Church; nor do we have any other sacred books than those we have received from them.

This is finally confirmed by the fact that the synagogue could not err in faith (for it was indeed the same Church then, which was afterward propagated among the Gentiles; wherefore it was contained by the same Divine Spirit, and had the same God assisting and governing it); but the Hebrews all rejected those six books from the canon, as not only Jerome and Josephus, but also Origen, on the first Psalm, and the other authors, most constantly attest; these six books, therefore, are not canonical.

The third argument. The third argument, however, bears against both conclusions. For if it were erroneous to reject those books of the Old Testament from the canon, certainly pious and learned men, after the definitions of the Pontiffs and Councils, would by no means have fallen into condemned error. Nor indeed is it likely that such men were unaware of what the Supreme Pontiffs and Councils had prescribed on this matter. But it is established that very many, and indeed the most learned, have gone over to the contrary opinion — men who have nevertheless always been held as catholic in the Church. For the gloss on Jerome's proem, over all the books of Divine Scripture, and likewise John Driedo, in the first book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, deny that Baruch is canonical. But Nicholas of Lyra, on Ezra chapter 1, and on Tobias; the Abulensis, on Matthew chapter 1; Saint Antoninus, part 3, title 18; Cajetan, in several places, but especially at the end of his commentaries on the historical books of the Old Testament — these also deny that the other six are sacred. If we should grant that all these men had departed from the definition of the faith, we would be giving offense not only to them, but also to the rest of the faithful — as though the zeal of Christ had so fallen asleep in them that no one cried out against these prescribed authors. This, certainly, even if there were no other argument, is a sufficiently great one for us to confess that these books are not canonical.

The fourth argument. The fourth argument is particular to the books of Maccabees, that they should be struck from the number of the canonical books. For Pope Gelasius rejected the second book, as we have mentioned above; and Saint Gregory, Moralia, book 19, rejects both; Eusebius rejects them, in the book On Times; and Richard, book 2 of the Exceptiones, chapter 9; and Ockham, part 4 of the Dialogues, first tract, book 3, chapter 16. And Saint Augustine, Against the Second Letter of Gaudentius, chapter 23, teaches that they were indeed received by the Church, but not with certain faith.

Nor is there a lack, in this matter, of an abundance of reasonings by which the same point can be urged. The first is, that in the first book it is said that Antiochus the Illustrious reigned in the one hundred and thirty-seventh year of the kingdom of the Greeks; whereas it is established, both from the annals of the Greeks and from Eusebius in his Chronography, that he held the kingdom in the one hundred and fifty-third year. Likewise, in the same book and chapter, the author of this book wrongly applies to the idol of Antiochus the "abomination of desolation," which was foretold by Daniel — in which matter he is mistaken, as Cajetan shows on Matthew chapter 24.

The second reasoning is, that in the second book the author begs pardon from his readers for his fault — something foreign to divine authority. For certainly, one who confesses that his own writings need pardon thereby proclaims that they are not the

oracles of the Holy Spirit, as Calvin too argues, Institutes, chapter 9.

The third reasoning is, that in the same book, right at the beginning, in the letter which is placed first, mention is made of another which immediately follows; but it is said to have been written in the one hundred and sixty-ninth year, although it was actually written in the one hundred and eighty-eighth year, as can be seen at the beginning of that same letter.

The fourth reasoning, that in the letter which is placed second, of which mention is made in the one above, Judas is referred to as still alive — although he had already died, not only by the one hundred and eighty-eighth year, but even by the one hundred and sixty-ninth year, as can be seen in the first book of Maccabees.

The fifth reasoning, that in this same second book Antiochus is said to have been torn limb from limb; but afterward his death is described in a far different manner.

The sixth reasoning, that in this same second book certain apocryphal things are related concerning the Ark of the Lord, and these are supposedly proven from the descriptions of Jeremiah; which, however, Jeremiah never even hinted at, not even in a dream — indeed he seems to have written the contrary, in chapter 3 of his Prophecy, saying: "They shall no longer speak of the Ark of the Lord," etc.

The final reasoning, that in both books the Maccabees are referred to as leaders over Judah and Jerusalem; whereas it is better known than that I need confirm it here, that they were not of the tribe of Judah, but of the tribe of Levi. Philo indeed, in book 2 On Times, says that for this reason enmities and rivalries arose at that time, because the Maccabees had usurped leadership from the house of David — which plainly conflicts with that prophecy of Jacob: "The scepter shall not be taken away from Judah, nor a ruler from his thigh, until he comes who is to be sent." If these individual reasonings do not move one, they can nevertheless, taken together, move not only the unlearned but even the learned to judge that the books of Maccabees are not in the canon. And all these reasonings are appendages of the fourth argument, by which the second conclusion is undermined.

The fifth argument. The fifth principal argument does not indeed conflict with the conclusions themselves, but contends that the reasoning which we have brought forward is not sufficiently firm. For the Council of Carthage and Innocent enumerate five books of Solomon — Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, the Song of Songs, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus. But that these latter two are not Solomon's is agreed upon among nearly all the most learned, as Augustine too relates, City of God, book 17, chapter 20. Innocent, therefore, erred,

and the Council erred too. Wherefore they did not wish to pronounce anything concerning the faith, but spoke from opinion. Thus no sure argument is taken from either the Pontiffs or the Councils to confirm what we wish.

The sixth argument. The sixth argument too is directed against those reasonings which were established to confirm these two conclusions. For "canonical book" is rendered in Latin as "regular." But this can be understood in two ways. For it is understood as regular either for confirming the faith, or for instructing morals. Therefore, although those books are defined by the Pontiffs and Councils to be canonical, we are not immediately compelled to believe that they are canonical for confirming the dogmas of the faith; but it is enough if we admit them to be canonical in the latter sense. The holy authors too cite testimonies from the fourth book of Esdras with the same reverence as from these seven which are approved by us, as is evident in Ambrose, the book On the Good of Death, chapter 10, and on Luke, chapter 1. But it is certain that the fourth book of Esdras is not canonical. It is not, therefore, sufficiently shown, merely from the fact that the saints cite testimonies from such books as sacred, that they are divine.

The seventh argument. The seventh argument, against the third conclusion, is that Saint Jerome is uncertain whether that Epistle to the Hebrews is canonical; indeed he asserts that the Latins do not receive it, as is evident from the book On Illustrious Men, under Caius, and from his commentaries on Isaiah. Eusebius too (book 6, chapter 16) says: "Caius, a most eloquent man, asserts that there are thirteen epistles of the apostle Paul, not mentioning the one written to the Hebrews, which even now among the Latins is thought not to be by the apostle Paul." It is not, therefore, certain that it is canonical. The same Jerome also doubts the authority of this epistle in the book On Illustrious Men, under Paul, and in his letter to Paulinus, and in his commentaries on Jeremiah.

And lest everything be referred back to the authority of Saint Jerome, reason itself urges this same point. The first is Luther's, in the prologues, where he says: "The Epistle to the Hebrews is neither Paul's, nor any apostle's. For it has a hard knot, in that, in chapter 6 and in chapter 10, it simply denies repentance to sinners after baptism; and in chapter 12 it says that Esau found no place for repentance, although he sought it with tears." This is contrary to all the Gospels and the epistles of Paul. Thus Luther.

Certain men, moreover, by no means of small repute in the Catholic Church, add another reason: that if this epistle had been Paul's, doubtless, being addressed to the Hebrews by a Hebrew, it would have been written in the Hebrew language. But they urge with many arguments that it was not; both because the author of this epistle says, "Melchizedek is interpreted as king of righteousness" — which, if he were speaking in the

Hebrew language, would be absurd, no different than saying, "Melchizedek is interpreted as Melchizedek"; and because the same author cites Hebrew testimonies, not according to the Hebrew text, but according to the translation of the Seventy — so he was not a Hebrew writing to Hebrews in the Hebrew tongue; and because a Hebrew version of this epistle is nowhere to be found among the nations — and it is not probable that, of all the apostolic epistles, this one alone should have perished, since the rest are preserved among us in the language in which they were written by the Apostle.

They urge, moreover, by a third reason, that the author of this epistle was not Paul, because, to prove to the Hebrews that Christ is the Son of God, he uses this testimony: "He shall be to me a son, and I will be to him a father" — which, however, in the genuine sense of the letter, is understood of Solomon, as is evident in the second book of Kings and in the first book of Chronicles. But it would be unworthy of so great an apostle, in so great a matter, and that too at the beginning of an epistle addressed to obstinate Hebrews, to use so weak an argument.

They add yet a fourth reason, that the author of this epistle asserts that he was confirmed in the evangelical doctrine by those who had heard the Lord. But Paul, in Galatians, proclaims that he did not learn the Gospel from man, but, without an intermediary, through the revelation of Jesus Christ.

They bring forward a fifth reason too, that the author of this epistle, speaking properly of a "testament," in the way it is distinguished from a "covenant," proves that the Old Testament too was confirmed by death and blood, and proves this by the testimony of Exodus — where, however, Moses was speaking not of a testament properly, but of a covenant. He is not, therefore, Paul, since he applies the testimonies of the Sacred Letters less aptly.

The final reason is that the author of this same epistle asserts that in the Ark there was a jar of manna, the rod of Aaron, and the tablets — whereas in the third book of Kings it is expressly said that nothing but the tablets was in the Ark. It is not, therefore, Paul's, nor is the epistle canonical, as one which most evidently conflicts with a canonical book. Behold by what reasonings Erasmus of Rotterdam, and Cajetan following him, attempt to overturn the third conclusion.

The eighth argument. They attempt to weaken the fourth conclusion with arguments of this kind. The salutation of the epistle inscribed to James contains nothing of God, nothing of Jesus Christ, nothing of grace or peace, but offers a greeting in a profane manner. It does not, therefore, savor of apostolic usage and authority. Wherefore James does not seem to be the author of this epistle, nor indeed does any other apostle. Of this

matter there is another indication in Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book 2, chapter 23, discussing this epistle in these words: "It must be known, however, that it is not received by some, nor does any of the ancients easily mention it." For as to Luther's argument, made with crude reasoning, that this epistle is no apostle's, because it attributes justification to works contrary to Paul — this is to be utterly disdained by learned men, and to be passed over by us, lest we discuss the matter of faith and works as a mere digression.

The ninth argument. The ninth argument against this same conclusion is urged: that the style of the second epistle, which is attributed to Peter, is far different from the style of the first, and consequently they were not written by the same author. But it is certain that the author of the first was the apostle Peter. The second, therefore, was not written by the apostle Peter. For this very reason, Jerome doubts concerning this second epistle, in his second letter to Cyprian; and Eusebius (book 3, chapter 3) says: "Concerning the second epistle of Peter, it is uncertain to many," etc.

The tenth argument. The tenth argument against this same conclusion is that Eusebius, book 3 of the Ecclesiastical History, subscribes to the opinion of those who assert that the two later epistles of John are not the Evangelist's, but a certain John's, surnamed "the Presbyter" (the Elder); whence the salutation of these epistles is of this kind: "The Elder to Gaius," "The Elder to the Elect Lady." Now "the elder" is the same as "the presbyter." But it is also clear that Jerome descended into this same opinion of Eusebius, in the book On Illustrious Men, when he was weaving together the life and works both of John the Evangelist and of Papias.

The eleventh argument. The eleventh argument likewise attempts to undermine this same conclusion: that the Epistle of Jude cites a testimony from the apocryphal book of Enoch. For this reason many have, with good reason, rejected it. For Jerome attests that very many rejected it; likewise Eusebius, book 2 of the Ecclesiastical History.

The twelfth argument. The final argument, against the fifth conclusion, relies on many conjectures, all of which Erasmus gathered together in his annotations on the Apocalypse. As far as I can recall, he repeats nine reasons why the Apocalypse seems not to belong to John the Apostle and Evangelist: one, that Eusebius, book 3 of the Ecclesiastical History, asserts that the Apocalypse is not John the Evangelist's; another, that Dionysius of Alexandria, a most weighty author and one who judged this book most candidly, suspects that the work was written by some other John; a third, that Dorotheus, bishop of Tyre and martyr, relates that John wrote his Gospel on the island of Patmos, but makes absolutely no mention at all of the Apocalypse; a fourth, that

Caius, a thoroughly orthodox man, openly denies that the Apocalypse is John the Evangelist's, as reported in Eusebius, book 7, chapter 21; a fifth, that Anastasius, in his Catalogue, where he discussed such matters most accurately and without controversy, does not dare to affirm that this work is John the Evangelist's; a sixth, that John the Evangelist, out of modesty, keeps his name silent in the Gospel, while the author of the Apocalypse, on the contrary, frequently insists upon his own name; a seventh, that the Greeks did not receive this book, as Jerome attests to Dardanus — indeed many most learned men have attacked the whole book as fictitious, as though it had nothing of apostolic gravity, and as though there were nothing in its sentiments worthy of apostolic majesty; an eighth, that the style of the Gospel and of this book differ greatly; a ninth, that in the Greek manuscripts the title was not "John the Evangelist," but "John the Theologian," who elsewhere is surnamed "the Presbyter." Erasmus employs these conjectures, in order to take this book away from John the Evangelist.

But Luther considers it neither apostolic nor prophetic, on the grounds that it calls blessed those who keep what is written in it, although no one knows whether he is blessed or not; and moreover, since human understanding cannot at all grasp that writing, it is, he says, just the same as if we did not have it. Yet the divine books, since they are adapted to the benefit of the people, are not entirely removed from human understanding. Behold the arguments by which the truth of the faith can indeed be assailed by men, but certainly cannot be conquered or overcome. This will become plain in the final part of this question, where we shall see how much weight, and how much fitness, each of these arguments has.

Chapter XI

In which the Arguments Placed in the Previous Chapter are Refuted

I would not be surrounding catholic dogmas with such gross darkness of these men, were I not able to kindle a light by which they might be put to flight as if by a rising sun. Otherwise, in citing the arguments of heretics, to point one's fingers only at the sources, lest their muddy waters be channeled into our writings, is the counsel of friends indeed, but, unless love deceives me, of friends who fear where there is no need for fear. For the unlearned would think the arguments too great to be refuted by us, if we either touched on them only summarily and briefly, or else entirely passed over them in silence. We ourselves, then, who have sharpened the adversaries' blade, shall blunt it.

Response to the first. To the first argument, although we can reply that not all canonical books were received at once by the universal Church, so that it could have happened that

a book the earlier Councils had by no means received was confirmed by later ones, we reply nevertheless — and more truly — that the prophecy of Baruch was reckoned by the ancients as a kind of part of Jeremiah. Lest this seem to be our own invention, it must be supported by the testimonies of antiquity.

Augustine, first of all, hands this down in book 18 of The City of God, in these words: "Jeremiah, prophesying of Christ, says: 'This is my God, and there shall no other be reckoned beside him: afterward he was seen on earth, and conversed with men.'" And immediately Augustine says: "This testimony some attribute not to Jeremiah, but to Baruch, his scribe; but it is more commonly held to be Jeremiah's." And the author of the book Questions on the Old and New Testament, question 102 — whether this was Augustine, or whoever else it finally was. Cassiodorus too, on Psalm 81. Chrysostom likewise cites this same testimony under the name of Jeremiah, in a certain homily On the Trinity. The Sixth Synod too, session 8, relates this same testimony under the name of Jeremiah, from another homily of the same Chrysostom, whose beginning is "A profound division."

Clement of Alexandria likewise, Paedagogus, book 1, chapter 10, attributes to Jeremiah that passage, "Hear, Israel, the commandments of life," etc., which we have in Baruch chapter 3; and, in book 2, chapter 3, citing that passage, "Where are...," etc., he calls it Divine Scripture. And Basil, book 4 Against Eunomius, on that passage, "That they may know you the only true God"; Ambrose likewise, book 1 On Penance, chapter 8, and book 3 of the Hexameron, chapter 14, and book 1 On Faith, chapter 2, cite testimonies from this same book under the name of Jeremiah. To these add Pope Sixtus in his first letter to all the faithful of Christ; Felix, in his letter to Peter, bishop of Antioch, condemned at the Fifth Synod; and finally Pelagius, in his letter to Vigilius.

Behold: that little book which is now read under the name of Baruch, the ancients of old attributed to Jeremiah, and it would be difficult to believe this, were it not that we have the most certain witnesses of this fact — by whose authority we have, with some difficulty indeed, but nevertheless abundantly, disposed of that first argument.

To the confirmation, however, an easier response can be given. For I admit that, in the time of Saint Jerome, what we now hold was not yet so certain. But just as, before the time of Jerome, although some had asserted that the Epistle of James was published by another under his name, it nevertheless, as he himself says, gradually, as time went on, obtained authority; and the Epistle of Jude, which Jerome asserts was rejected by very many, earned authority through usage — so too this book of Baruch, although it was not received by some in former times, is now nevertheless held worthy of being received by

the Church and the universal Councils.

Response to the second. The second argument too is easily dissolved. For it is not true that, in determining the canonical books, the Church's rule is Jerome — which Cajetan wrongly, not to say perniciously, supposed. For Jerome, as John Cochlaeus rightly said, followed Josephus in his enumeration of the canonical books of the Old Testament; and Josephus, in book 1 Against Apion, enumerates twenty-two books, as he says, from the tradition of his forefathers — as Eusebius attests, book 3, chapters 9 and 10. But Augustine, in this matter, follows not the Jews but the Christians, and rightly so. For the Church of the Gentiles is the pillar and foundation of the truth. Now Gelasius's approval of Jerome's opinion is to be understood not as establishing the canon of the Sacred Scriptures, but as condemning those authors whom Jerome rebukes out of zeal for God and devotion to the faith. And let this much be said on the second argument.

For to its first confirmation I reply with what the doctors generally believe — that that book is not Cyprian's, but Rufinus's. Certainly Saint Cyprian, in his letter to Rogatian, cites Ecclesiasticus, and in the book On the Dress of Virgins cites Wisdom, as divine books; but as for what Rufinus asserts — that these books are to be rejected from the canon by the tradition of the fathers — let it be said with the reader's indulgence, he was ignorant of the traditions of the fathers. For the Third Council of Carthage, which numbered these among the canonical books, says that it received this from the fathers; and Augustine, book 1 On the Predestination of the Saints, affirms that the immediate successors of the apostles cited the book of Wisdom as divine; and Dionysius cites a testimony from this same book with the great honor of a preface, saying: "You will find that someone, among the very first instructions of the Scriptures, spoke of the divine Wisdom: 'I became a lover of her form.'"

Why should I mention them all? Jerome, on the first chapter of Jeremiah, cites it as a prophet's book; Ambrose, in book 1 On Faith; Gregory, Moralia 18, and the Council of Sardica, in its letter to all the bishops, cite the book of Wisdom as divine; and finally the Eleventh Council of Toledo, in its confession of faith, asserts that it is Sacred Scripture.

What of Ecclesiasticus? Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book 7, cites it as divine; Ambrose, sermon 31 and book 4 On Faith; Pope Evaristus, in his first letter to the African bishops; Sixtus II, in his letter to Bishop Gratus. And Epiphanius, in Heresy 76, of the Anomoeans, hands down as a certain matter of faith that both books are Divine Scripture.

It was not, then, by the tradition of the fathers that Rufinus refuted these books, but rather by his own opinion — and at a time when the matter had not yet been settled. For

the same reason, we excuse the others too. For as to the fact that Saint Thomas is cited in support of this opinion, this is by no means to be tolerated, as one can gather from Part I, question 1, article 3, and from his commentary on the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names. But in that question 89 he said nothing of his own; rather he cited Augustine word for word — and yet Augustine, in book 2 On Christian Doctrine, chapter 8, and book 17 of The City of God, chapter 8, and in his letter to Orosius against the Priscillianists, chapter 11, indeed even in that very book On Care to Be Taken for the Dead, chapter 17, manifestly declared what constant and firm opinion he held.

The second confirmation, however, which is taken from the authority of the Council of Laodicea, is weak. For the Council does not deny that these are canonical, even though it was unwilling to number them among the canonical — because the matter was not yet sufficiently established. This is, as we have already often said, that not all canonical books were received by the Church with common consent at once.

To the third confirmation (since we do not wish at present to dispute anything concerning the authority of the canons called those of the Apostles, for this question is separate from the one now in hand), we reply in two ways. First, lest anyone wish to press us with such an argument, let him understand that, in this same chapter 84, three books of Maccabees are numbered among the canonical. If, then, we are compelled to accept these eighty-five canons of the Apostles, let those very men who reject the books of Maccabees answer us here; but if, on the other hand, lest they should have to admit these to be canonical, they disregard the testimony of this chapter, then surely there is no reason why they should want to overwhelm us with its weight.

But reserving this dispute, as we said, for another occasion, we add, as sufficient for the present matter, another response: that Clement, who is said to have gathered these scattered canons into one volume, did not collect all the canonical books which the apostles handed down to the Church by word of mouth. For neither the Councils nor the immediate successors of the apostles learned that these books were sacred from any other source than from the apostles themselves.

Yet Irenaeus says, book 3, chapter 3 — and it is related by Eusebius, book 5, chapter 6 — that Clement, since he had always lived with the apostles and had been instructed by them, retained a fresh memory of their tradition and always had their pattern before his eyes. Thus, if this response does not please, let another be given: that not all those canons were published by Clement, but that some were added by the Greeks.

To the final confirmation, finally, let this be the response. Dealing generously with them, and even granting them that the Synagogue could not err in faith (which,

however, is not as certain as it is concerning the Catholic Church), we deny that these books were rejected by the Synagogue. For it is one thing not to receive, another to reject. The Jews, then, did not by public authority receive these books within their canon, although some of them too believed them to be divine and sacred. On this matter see Cochlaeus, in his little book On the Authority of Canonical Scripture and the Catholic Church. On the second argument, then, this much.

Response to the third. To the third principal argument it is replied that, before that time, the matter was neither so well settled, nor was the reading of the Councils so constant, nor was the impudence of heretics so brazen in either weakening or rejecting canonical books. Wherefore the faithful were not so concerned about such a question, whose determination they could be ignorant of without loss to their piety.

But if we wish to turn this same argument against the adversaries, there is nothing we could do more easily. For, as we learned from the First Council of Toledo, if anyone shall say or believe that other Scriptures, besides those which the Catholic Church receives, are to be held in authority or venerated, let him be anathema. Since, then, very many — as we showed above — venerate these books as divine, certainly, if the Church did not receive them, they would all equally fall under the anathema of the Council of Toledo. Let us, then, not condemn these men of boldness and rashness, but rather grant that those others labored under ignorance. Indeed, since it is more pernicious for the Church to receive as sacred books which are in fact not so, than to reject a book which is truly sacred — as Saint Thomas explains more fully in Part I, question 68, article 1, and in On the Power of God, question 4, article 1 — since the Council of Carthage, of Florence, of Trent, Innocent, Gelasius, and almost all the saints have handed down these books to the Church as sacred, certainly, if they were not so, we would be most perniciously deceived. On the third argument, then, enough has been said.

Response to the fourth. To the fourth argument, it is said first that Gelasius perhaps embraces both books under the name of one — which he did also in the case of Esdras, and not he alone, but Isidore and Jerome too, who, in translating Esdras, published it as a single book, following the custom of the Hebrews, by which the first and second books of Esdras are one, as Origen teaches on the first Psalm, and Eusebius, book 6, chapter 18. That this was Gelasius's intention is shown abundantly by this great argument: that this same man approves the reading of the Scriptures which are distributed throughout the year's cycle, and assigns the book of Maccabees to the Sundays of October, on which the Church reads both books. Then it is answered that Gelasius perhaps held an ambiguous opinion concerning the second book, and for that reason omitted that book from his enumeration. But Augustine, The City of God, book 18, and Isidore, Etymologies, book

6, assert that both books of Maccabees are received by the Church — which is also asserted in the proem to these books. Nor is it permitted to call this into doubt now, even though it was once permitted to Saint Gregory, Eusebius, and the rest to have some doubt.

Now as to the first reasoning brought forward in confirmation of this fourth argument, John Annius, in his commentaries on the second book of Philo's On Times, hands down that the books of Maccabees, which were written without dates, were rendered apocryphal by Josephus's addition of dates. He shows this by the same argument we have used; by which same reasoning John Lucidus too was moved, in book 4 of his Chronography. Whence, however, our friend Annius derived this — whether that the books of Maccabees were once held without dates, or that Josephus added the dates — I freely confess escapes me. But if this is true, just as an error in numbers, which is most easily made, is attributed not to the authors but to the copyists, so too the errors which were introduced through Josephus's carelessness we shall attribute not to the author of the book of Maccabees, but to Josephus; nor shall we for that reason judge these books to be apocryphal. Although it does not seem likely to me that Josephus could have corrupted the genuine and true reading held by Catholics, with all ecclesiastical men passing over it in silence and indeed connivance — unless we wish to suppose that, for fifteen hundred years and more, while the Church slept with both ears, an enemy man sowed tares.

Wherefore Eusebius of Caesarea does much better, who, although he did not believe these books were to be referred to the number of the sacred, nevertheless asserts that their author does not reckon the kingdom of the Greeks from Alexander, but from Seleucus Nicanor, who reigned in Syria in the eleventh year reckoned from Alexander's death. To which number, if you add the five years during which Alexander ruled as monarch over the Greeks, you arrive at a total of sixteen years, by which the reckoning of the monarchy of the Greeks according to the Hebrew method was smaller. For the Greeks reckoned from Alexander.

Thus, that Antiochus is said, according to the Greek annals, to have reigned in the one hundred and fifty-third year, and according to the first book of Maccabees in the one hundred and thirty-seventh year, is a disagreement of words, not of facts. For if you add sixteen to one hundred and thirty-seven, the number one hundred and fifty-three results. John Lucidus, however, differs from Eusebius in this, that he writes that Alexander reigned seven years after obtaining the monarchy, and that Seleucus came in the eighth year already passed after Alexander's death. But as far as the present question is concerned, it does not matter much which of these is true, since the principal

reckoning with which we are here concerned is not at all affected by the variation.

In confirmation of this argument, Ambrosius Catharinus affirms that Cajetan committed as many errors as he poured out nearly as many words. For thus he speaks. But this man, ready enough to find fault, does not notice that he himself, in criticizing Cajetan, has often and greatly erred. In this very passage, indeed, he erred three times. But it is neither my task, nor is this the occasion, to refute his errors.

What then? Did Cajetan not err here? He did indeed err. First, in that he rashly and inconsiderately, not to say proudly and arrogantly, says that the author of the book of Maccabees was mistaken in his understanding of Daniel — though it is established that he wrote that book under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Then, Cajetan wrongly supposes that, if the author of the book of Maccabees employs the words of Daniel, he must therefore be interpreting Daniel — as though it were not permitted for Bernard to use the words of Scripture freely throughout his works; and if one should charge that he misunderstands them, on the grounds that he applies the words to a sense other than their genuine and proper scriptural one, he would seem foolish. Indeed, more recent poets have most elegantly employed even whole verses of the ancients, and yet those earlier verses are not, by this later use, taken in the same sense as the original.

Cajetan is moreover mistaken in this, that he thinks the prophecy of Daniel could not be applied to the idol of Antiochus, because the Lord declared it was to be referred to future times. For the same Scripture pertains both to Lucifer, and to Nebuchadnezzar, and to the Antichrist. It was, then, most empty to find fault with the author of the book of Maccabees for alluding, in the idol, abomination, and desolation of Antiochus, to the words of Daniel, or at least for applying them in a similar case. For even if he had brought Daniel to bear in that sense, he would have done so excellently — something which both Paul and the other apostles often did.

But the second reasoning is refuted in two ways. First, nothing prevents the Holy Spirit from assisting a writer who nevertheless, in certain places, speaks in a human manner out of modesty. For thus Paul says: "Though unskilled in speech, yet not in knowledge"; and again: "As one less wise, I speak more"; and again: "Bear with me in this wrong." Second, it is one thing to speak of the truth of the history itself, another of its translation into another language. The translator, then, seeks pardon not for falsity, of which there was none, but for the manner of expression, which was a human matter. The second reasoning, then, is overturned by this twofold response.

But the third too can be refuted in two ways. First, it is not necessary to admit that the letter mentioned in the first is the one that immediately follows; but if anyone insists

that it is, he has a ready answer: that the dates were badly distinguished through the carelessness of the copyists. For those words, "in the one hundred and eighty-eighth year," are not the beginning of the following letter, but the end of the preceding one, so that the subsequent letter has this beginning: "The people who are at Jerusalem." The argument for this is that we usually place the day or year in which a letter is written, not at the very beginning, but at the end; the greeting, however, comes right at the beginning. Although Constantine joined both together, both in his letter to Pope Donus and in his letter to George, Patriarch of Constantinople. The letter, then, which is placed second was written in the one hundred and sixty-ninth year, as is said in the first letter; while the one which indeed precedes in the order of writing, but was actually sent later, was written in the one hundred and eighty-eighth year.

Thus, to the fourth reasoning, it could easily be said, as we noted before, that that letter is not the one which the first one mentions. There is, therefore, no need to admit that it was written in the one hundred and sixty-ninth year. Indeed, the compiler of this second book — whether he was Josephus, as Annius supposes, or someone else — perhaps placed at the beginning of the book whatever letters he could find written by the Jews, without preserving any order.

But if we admit that this is the second letter, the one which the first mentions, it should be said that the number is given not according to the Hebrew computation, but according to the Greek. For it could have happened, without any inconvenience, that those who sent that letter followed the Greek reckoning of the monarchy — which, however, the man who is said to have abridged that book did not wish to change, but copied the number as he found it written. In other places, however, he always followed the Hebrew reckoning.

Judas, then, died, according to the Hebrew reckoning, in the one hundred and fifty-second year completed — that is, in the one hundred and fifty-third year. If you add to this the sixteen years of the Greek reckoning, you arrive at the number one hundred and sixty-nine, which is the same as the former. For in the year Judas died, the letter was written. Thus there is no need, with Rupert, in the book On the Victory of the Word, to imagine some other Judas than the Maccabee as the one who sent that letter.

To the fifth, there are those who think that it was not Antiochus himself who was torn limb from limb, but a general sent by him — for so chapter 1 seems to indicate — while Antiochus himself, having escaped by flight, perished of a plague, as is said in chapter 9. There are also those who contend that, in chapter 1, the particle "and" was added by the fault of the copyists, and that the true reading is this: "They struck down the general, and

those who were with him they tore limb from limb," etc. I know, however, that the verb "to strike" sometimes means the same as "to kill," as in that passage: "He struck the Philistine," etc., and there: "Saul struck a thousand," etc. But we are not compelled here, abandoning the proper meaning of the word, to take refuge in a figurative expression, especially since it is written of Antiochus, Daniel chapter 2: "And the Romans shall come upon him, and he shall be struck" — where Jerome says that "struck" is said, not because he perished, etc.; and 2 Kings 2: "The servants of David struck three hundred and sixty of Benjamin, who also died."

But not even this objection, which Lyra raises — that Antiochus, as is said here, "fell" — conflicts with this explanation. For death is not always meant by that word, but one who has been defeated is truly said to have "fallen." "They fell," it says, "fleeing downhill."

Nor does this present an obstacle either — that it is read there: "When he had entered within the precinct of the temple, they closed the temple"; and "when Antiochus had entered," etc. — where it seems to be indicated that, Antiochus being shut in, no place of flight was left to him. For it is not to be understood that the temple was closed after the entrance of the general, but rather while the soldiers were within the precinct of the temple — as if we should say, for example, that the priests in the courts closed the doors of the temple. But, on the contrary, when the soldiers of Antiochus had opened the closed entrance of the temple, as soon as the matter became known, they were overwhelmed by the Jews with stones. The general himself, then, who was struck — if by "general" Antiochus is understood — could, through that same entrance he had opened, have gone out and fled; on account of which flight it is said in chapter 9 that he returned dishonorably and shamefully from Persia.

But, lest we seem to be searching for loopholes to escape, that response is both clearer and truer, with which the authority of grave historians agrees — namely, that it is not the same Antiochus who is referred to in chapter 1 and the one mentioned in chapter 9; but that there the death of Antiochus the Great is recorded, while here it is that of Antiochus Epiphanes, whose end is also recounted in chapter 6 of the first book. For Strabo, book 16, says that this man, having attempted to plunder the temple of Bel, was killed by the neighboring barbarians.

To the sixth, although Rupert wishes all these things to be understood figuratively of the Ark of the New Testament — that is, the humanity of Jesus Christ — yet, taken literally, that miracle either already has come to pass, when the Hebrews, after the Gentiles were expelled from Judea, gathered together from the various places where they had been scattered; or perhaps it will yet come to pass, in the conversion of the Jews before the day

of judgment.

Nor should the divine promise be weakened by our conjectures. For God is true, but every man is a liar.

The final reasoning is variously twisted by different authors in their attempts to resolve it. For some imagine that the Maccabees traced their origin to the tribe of Judah through their mother, and by this reasoning defend that the scepter was not taken away from Judah. Others, following the traditions of the Talmud, assert that, while the Maccabees existed as leaders, there were also certain judges from the tribe of Judah, in whom resided the highest power of deciding and commanding — who in Hebrew were called sanedrin, in Latin "Senate," as among the Romans. Whence this passage: "The people who are at Jerusalem, and the senate, and Judas," etc. Thus, when Herod — who was the first man of foreign origin to obtain the kingdom of the Jewish nation — removed these men from the scene out of hatred for the Davidic kingdom, then it is truly said that the scepter was taken away from the tribe of Judah. Others resolve this difficulty by affirming that this other prophecy of Jacob's was a promise to be understood according to the law of conditional warnings, which is changed when morals change — and just as the sentence against the Ninevites was set aside after their repentance, so too this divine promise might have been altered for the sinning sons of Judah. They derive this rule for explaining both warnings and promises from Ezekiel, in whom both God's warning and his promise are transferred according to the converted or averted morals of men.

We, however, whose intention is not to attack or hostilely reject the explanations of others, shall more easily resolve this passage if we understand, from the first book of Maccabees, that the people of the Jews handed over leadership to the Maccabees, not as something proper and hereditary, but for the preservation of a trust — namely, that they might in the meantime protect the people of Israel, until a faithful prophet should arise, either to instruct them, or the one whom they expected to come from the tribe of Judah. By this, the scepter was not taken away from the tribe of Judah — especially since that tribe itself is believed to have consented, at least from the beginning, to this arrangement and decision of the people.

The fourth argument, then, together with its confirmations, has in this manner been refuted. For as to the argument which Cajetan puts forward on Matthew chapter 24 — that the author of the book of Maccabees erred in his interpretation of Daniel's prophecy, which he applies to Antiochus, while Luke clearly applied it to the army of the Romans — this is of no weight at all. For the same letter can pertain both to Nebuchadnezzar and to the Antichrist. Thus the same passage pertains both to

Antiochus, and to the idol of the Romans, and to the Antichrist. This matter, since it is in no way obscure, needs no explanation from us.

Response to the fifth. Let us now refute the fifth argument. Not only the Council of Carthage and Innocent, but very many others too, assigned Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus to Solomon. For the book of Wisdom is cited under Solomon's name by Tertullian, On the Prescription of Heretics; Origen, on the Epistle to the Romans, book 8; Cyprian, in his fourth sermon On Immortality; Basil, book 5 Against Eunomius; Ambrose, sermon 8 on the Psalm "Blessed are the Spotless," and book 3 of the Hexameron, chapter 15, and book 4 On Faith, chapter 6; and Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, book 11, chapter 5. Indeed Eusebius himself, book 4 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 22, asserts that Hegesippus, Irenaeus, and all the ancients attributed the book of Wisdom to Solomon. Others who certainly attributed it to him include Evaristus, in his letter to the African bishops; Felix I, to all the bishops of Gaul; Felix II, to Athanasius and the other bishops of Egypt; Epiphanius, Heresy 76, of the Anomoeans; Damascene, in the fourth book of his Theology — where Jodocus Clichtoveus argues with many arguments that this book was not Philo's, but Solomon's, the greatest of which is that the words which the author speaks of himself in chapter 9 of this same book can fit no one but Solomon.

Ecclesiasticus too has been attributed, by the most noble authors, to the name of Solomon: Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book 7; Gregory Nazianzen, oration 8; Basil, book 4 Against Eunomius; Chrysostom, or whoever else was the author, in the third homily of the unfinished work on Matthew; Ambrose, on the seventh chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians; Jerome, on chapter 10 of Ecclesiastes; Cyprian, to Rogatian, and book 3 to Quirinus, and sermon 1 On Almsgiving; Cassiodorus, on Psalms 55, 66, and 93; Gregory, Moralia, book 10, and 1, question 1, chapter "Non est putanda"; Sixtus I, in his letter to all the brethren; Marcellinus, to Bishop Solomon; Fabian, in his letter to all the Eastern bishops; Sixtus II, to Gratus; Damasus, to the bishops of Italy; Pope John, to Bishop Valerius. If, then, after so many and such grave authorities, we assert that these books are Solomon's, there will certainly be no reason for us to fear.

Then, that a book is by this or that writer does not matter much to the catholic faith, provided it is believed that the Holy Spirit is its author — a point which Gregory, in the proem on Job, chapter 1, learnedly both states and explains. For it does not matter with what pen a king wrote a letter, if he truly wrote it. Whence there would be no obstacle to Innocent and the Council of Carthage following the common opinion of the ancients in a matter which does not pertain to the faith. Nor could they, for that reason, have erred in enumerating the canonical books, since it is certain that this pertains to the faith.

Then, to pass over these two responses, we have another, much stronger, which John Driedo drew from Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, book 11. For since Solomon, according to Scripture, spoke three thousand parables and five thousand songs, which were not gathered by Solomon into any one volume, there were various men who collected Solomon's scattered sayings, as is evident from Proverbs chapter 25. Thus Augustinus Steuchus of Gubbio, following Rabbi Moses and the Talmudists, believed that Isaiah wrote the books of Solomon — which I myself hold to be uncertain; but this is established, that the sayings of the books commonly called "Sapiential" were indeed first drawn from Solomon, but were not collected by the same author. Whence Jesus son of Sirach, in Ecclesiasticus, does not say that he produced wisdom, but that he renewed it from his own heart. Of this matter, then, Innocent and the Council of Carthage were not ignorant, and for the best reason attributed all these books to Solomon. And let this be what we say on the fifth argument.

Response to the sixth. The sixth argument is Cajetan's, at the end of his commentaries on the historical books of the Old Testament. It is shameful, however, that a man otherwise ingenious and learned, a pious man and a pillar of our order, should have wished to evade a most firm argument with an empty invention of a new distinction, and, in trying to deflect a lighter blow, should have received a heavier one. For since the term "canonical book" is taken, by all writers except Cajetan alone, to mean "sacred and divine," it cannot even be entertained as a suspicion, much less grasped by the mind, that the Pontiffs and all the Councils used the term differently than it was in universal usage.

Then, the Council of Carthage, lest anyone should twist it otherwise, declared what it meant by the name "canonical scriptures," saying: "Besides the canonical scriptures, let nothing be read in the Church under the name of the Divine Scriptures. The canonical scriptures, moreover, are," etc. And Innocent says: "These books are received into the canon of the Sacred Scriptures." And at the Council of Florence, by the inspiration of the same Spirit, all those books which the Church receives and venerates, and concerning which the present dispute is undertaken, are asserted to have been written by sacred authors.

Moreover, since under the same context all those books are defined, without any distinction being made, to be canonical, it is ridiculous that we should hold them canonical in one sense in part, and in another sense in part. And if we once admit this distinction, no book can stand as sacred by the authority of the Councils and Pontiffs. For by a similar reasoning, if it had pleased them, heretics could say that any one of the other books is not canonical for confirming the faith, but only for instructing morals.

Since this is altogether absurd, we ought rather to retain that reasoning which Cajetan wished to overturn — a man, as I have often said, learned and pious among the foremost, but who, in establishing the Sacred Books, by following the novelties and ingenuity of Erasmus, while wishing to follow in another's footsteps, stained his own glory. And this much on the sixth argument.

To the confirmation, an easier response can be given: that not only Ambrose, but also Cyprian, to Pompeius, and Augustine, The City of God, book 18, cite testimonies from the third and fourth books of Esdras, but not as having been produced by the Divine Spirit, such that it would be unlawful to contradict them.

Response to the seventh. In the seventh principal argument, I am distressed that not only outsiders, but even our own (let this be said with all due deference) have fallen into so novel, not to say so light, an opinion as to deny that the Epistle to the Hebrews belongs to the apostle Paul. But this is much more distressing — that, if it is not Paul's, it should immediately be held not canonical. For a book can certainly be canonical even with an uncertain author. For whether Luke or Barnabas, as some have thought, wrote this epistle, it will be canonical. For the Holy Spirit spoke both through Luke and through Barnabas.

But to the matter. Since it is heretical to exclude this epistle from the Sacred Scriptures, it is certainly rash, to say no more, to doubt its author, which is confirmed by the most certain testimonies to have been Paul. Origen, first of all, in book 1 of his commentaries on Matthew, as related by Eusebius, book 6 of the Ecclesiastical History, says: "I say that it is most evidently the apostle Paul's; and all our ancient forefathers always accepted it as the apostle Paul's; and the opinion has come down to us that its language was composed in Greek either by Clement, bishop of the city of Rome, or by Luke."

Clement of Alexandria likewise, in Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book 6, says: "It is manifestly Paul's, written indeed in the Hebrew tongue as to Hebrews, but translated into Greek by Luke."

Eusebius too went over to this same opinion, in book 3 of the Ecclesiastical History, where, having said that Clement, bishop of Rome, in his letter to the Corinthians, used testimonies from this epistle under the name of Paul, he immediately adds: "From this it is established that the Apostle, writing this epistle to be sent to the Hebrews, composed it in his native tongue, and, as some relate, Luke the Evangelist, but others say Clement, translated it — which is the more true opinion, since the very style of Clement's epistle agrees with this one, and the sense of both writings bears no small similarity." Thus far Eusebius. And in chapter 3 of the same book: "There are manifestly fourteen epistles of

Paul."

The day would fail me, were I to wish to enumerate the Greek authors who attributed this epistle to Paul. No less would it fail me, were I to mention the Latin ones too. For why should I cite Athanasius, in his letter to the African bishops, and in book 2 On the Faith of the Trinity? Why Cyril, Treasury, book 12? Why Chrysostom, in almost infinite places? Why Ignatius? Why Irenaeus? Why Damascene? Why Anacletus, in his letter On the Ordination of Bishops? Why Hyginus, in his letter to all the faithful of Christ? Why the Council of Laodicea?

Why, finally, the Council of Ephesus, since all the Greek writers (as Jerome attests to Dardanus) confess with one voice that this epistle is the apostle Paul's? Theophylact certainly marvels at the impudence of those who deny that this epistle is Paul's, and affirms that they sin no less than if they were to deny that Christ belongs to Paul.

What of the Latins? Indeed they confess it too. Ambrose confesses it, on the Psalm "Blessed are the Spotless," and in the book On Those Who Are Initiated into the Mysteries, chapter 8; Augustine, moreover, book 2 On Christian Doctrine, chapter 8, and often elsewhere. Likewise Gregory, Moralia, book 5, chapter 3; Gelasius, with the Council of seventy bishops; Pope Innocent; the Councils of Carthage, Florence, Trent. Why do I delay? For fifteen hundred years the Church has read this under the name of the apostle Paul; and do we dare to call into doubt what all Catholics have held without ambiguity for so many centuries past?

I pass over the fact that Peter, unless I am much mistaken, testifies that Paul wrote an epistle to the Hebrews. For that the first epistle of Peter was written to the Hebrews, the salutation itself teaches so openly that not even Cajetan himself could deny it. But the second epistle of Peter was also written to the same people. For he says: "Behold, I now write to you this second epistle." And at the end of this same epistle Peter says: "As also our most beloved brother Paul has written to you, as also in all his epistles," etc. — "to you," that is, to the Hebrews, to whom Peter was writing. Hence, having made this distinction, he adds: "as also in all his epistles" — so that you might understand, not obscurely, that Paul wrote to the Hebrews concerning the patience and salvation of Christ, and the same thing in his other epistles as well. There is, then, no reason for anyone to doubt the author of this epistle.

But Jerome doubts. Certainly, even if he had doubted, this could not for that reason render our own certain and undoubted faith ambiguous. But we deny that Jerome holds an uncertain opinion in this matter, which is most falsely imputed to him. For, to pass over in silence the countless places where Jerome cites testimonies from this epistle under

the name of Paul, and to set aside even the fact that, in the book On Illustrious Men, under Paul, after stating the contrary opinion of certain men, he refutes their arguments — that passage, indeed, is the clearest witness to Jerome's true opinion, found in his letter to Dardanus On the Promised Land, in these words: "The vessel of election speaks to the Hebrews, of faith, by which Abraham is called," etc. Nor does it escape me that the unbelief of the Jews did not accept these testimonies.

This must be said for our side: that this epistle, which is inscribed "to the Hebrews," is received not only by the Churches of the East, but by all the Greek-speaking writers of former times, as the apostle Paul's; and that it does not matter whose it is, since it is the work of an ecclesiastical man, and is daily celebrated in the reading of the Churches. But if the custom of the Latins does not receive it among the canonical scriptures, neither do the Churches of the Greeks receive the Apocalypse of John with the same freedom; and yet we receive both, following not the custom of this present time, but the authority of the ancient writers, who use the testimonies of both, not as they are sometimes accustomed to do with apocryphal writings, but as canonical and ecclesiastical. Thus far Jerome. And on the Epistle to Titus he says: "Read the epistle to the Hebrews of the apostle Paul, or, if you think it is someone else's, it does not matter, since it has already been received among the ecclesiastical books."

To the first reasoning, then, since those apostolic passages were carefully and diligently explained in the lecture On Penance, there is no need to respond now. To the second it is necessary to respond, and indeed in the order in which the individual particulars of the objection were set out against the established truth. For as to what was objected in the first particular, this is easily dissolved, since it could have happened that the translator left indeed the Hebrew words in the text, but, as is customary, added a translation in the margin, which a copyist later inserted into the text. The same thing perhaps happened in Matthew as well, in those words: "Eli, Eli," etc.

Now that things which some expositor perhaps placed in the margin are sometimes inserted into the text by the fault of copyists, Nicholas of Lyra rightly observes on 2 Kings 8; for those words — "of which Solomon made all the golden vessels in the temple, and the bronze sea, and the pillars, and the altar" — are established to have been added and inserted in this manner.

It could also have arisen from another cause: that the Apostle or the Evangelist, writing in Hebrew, added a translation of certain words, since among the Jews there were certain words either Chaldean or Syriac which could conveniently be rendered into the Hebrew language — such as "Golgotha" and "Ephphatha."

Behold two reasons by which that argument of Cajetan's could meanwhile be dissolved. By it, Cajetan would not even be able to persuade himself that the book of Genesis was written in the Hebrew tongue. For there it is read that Rachel called her son's name Ben-oni, that is, "son of my sorrow"; but his name was given him by his father as Benjamin, that is, "son of the right hand"; and in Exodus: "For it is the Passover," that is, "the passing-over of the Lord."

Let these men, who wish to give us trouble with similar cleverness, answer us; and if they cannot, we shall give a third reason. Namely, there are names compounded of many simple elements, which sometimes remain whole in the compound, and sometimes are corrupted; if I should wish to explain these in other words, even in the same language, nothing absurd would arise — as if, for example, I should say: "Deicola is interpreted 'worshipper of God'"; "paterfamilias," that is, "governor and parent of the household." The same thing could have happened with the names Ben-oni and Melchizedek.

But, lest we take refuge in these as in an altar of last resort, the most excellent and truest reason is this: that the translator could rightly do this, since it was necessary that the Hebrew words remain. For if the translator had rendered, "God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" the Latins would not have understood why the bystanders said: "This man calls Elijah." Wherefore, being compelled to retain the Hebrew words, he added their translation — which he could equally have done even if the Hebrew words had not been retained. Certainly in Genesis 35 and Exodus 12, the Hebrew text does not contain the interpretation of the names, but the translator added it of his own accord.

But if you should object that this particular is not Sacred Scripture, if this is true — that it proceeded from the workshop of the translator — the conclusion is granted at once; nor do I see why we should be horrified by this. Then, that inference is denied: that if it proceeds from the translator, it is outside the Sacred Letters. For a particle which is added in the translation of the Sacred Letters, for the sake of preserving either correctness or comprehension, is not judged to be foreign to the Sacred Letters.

Whence Jerome, in his commentaries on the Epistle to the Galatians, says: "Scripture preserves this custom in many places, of placing a Hebrew word together with its translation: Bartimaeus, son of Timaeus; Asher, wealth; Tabitha, Dorcas; and Mesech, native." Behold, Jerome calls even that particle, which the translator is known to have added, "Scripture." And this applies especially to the Epistle to the Hebrews, whose translator was either Luke or Clement — and that this was done while the Apostle was both living and watching seems more likely to be true. I would assert that it is certainly true, were it not that the Academy's moderation pleases me in a matter of conjecture.

Nothing, then, in that first reason ought to move us to believe that this epistle was not written in Hebrew.

But not even the second reason moves us; for the same would also tell against the Apostle, who, in the book of Acts, speaking to the Jews, cites the Old Scripture according to the translation of the Seventy. Thus the translator, whether Luke or Clement, although Paul, a Hebrew, spoke in Hebrew, nevertheless wished to render the version of the Seventy translators more faithfully, lest the Greeks be disturbed by the novelty of the text. For this same reason, the Apostle, writing to the Romans, employs the testimony of Habakkuk according to the translation of the Seventy, lest he bring to Roman ears speech unfamiliar to them — as Jerome attests, in his commentaries on Habakkuk.

Now the third reason, which is brought against us in the final part of this argument, is nothing at all. I have indeed heard from a Jew, to whom the Jews of Carpentras gave first place among their own people, that this Hebrew epistle, and the Gospel of Matthew too, still exist today. But whether that Jew wished to mock us, or whether they now have, from some Hebrew translation, a Hebrew epistle of Paul and a Gospel of Matthew, while the genuine Gospel of Matthew to the Hebrews and the epistle of Paul to the Hebrews have actually perished through the carelessness of the Jews — this is the most likely explanation.

To the third reasoning, by which it is also argued that Paul is not believed to be the author of this epistle, it is first replied that that testimony, in its literal sense, refers to Christ. Nor is it an obstacle that the literal sense also pertains to Solomon, since the same letter can contain several literal senses at once, as Saint Thomas, and before him Saint Augustine, have taught.

Just as, then, Christ is sometimes signified literally under the name of David, as in Ezekiel 34: "I will raise up over them one Shepherd, my servant David"; and Jeremiah 30: "Serving the Lord his God, and David his king," etc. — so too Scripture, in that passage, signified Christ the Lord through the name of Solomon. Lest this escape us, it adds: "I will establish his throne forever."

That, in Luke, the angel referred this to Christ is better known than that it needs explanation: "He shall be called the Son of the Most High," it says, "and he shall sit upon the house of David." Augustine, moreover, attests, on Psalm 71, that, although it is inscribed to Solomon, the Jews nevertheless most invincibly defend that the prophecy is concerning Christ, because certain things are said there which cannot apply to Solomon. The same reasoning, indeed, compels us to think the same of Psalm 44.

Secondly, even if Paul had applied this testimony in an allegorical sense, he would be doing nothing foreign to his own custom — he who, both often elsewhere, and especially in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, argues from an allegorical sense. For it is one thing to draw a certain and effective argument from a spiritual sense, which Augustine, Dionysius, and Jerome denied is possible; it is quite another to draw from it a probable argument, which no truly learned man can deny.

For what rhetoricians do, in joining probable arguments to certain and established ones, the Apostle does as well. He could, moreover, do this much more fittingly and forcefully in this passage, where the Hebrews understood that the things God had promised to David concerning Solomon were to be fulfilled in Christ. They understood this, having been frequently reminded by these same Sacred Letters, as is evident from Micah 4 and Daniel 7.

To the fourth reasoning, there would be no need to respond, if Paul's discourse were more aptly divided by colon and comma. For the reading ought to be in this manner: "Which, having received its beginning to be declared through the Lord, was confirmed unto us by those who heard him" — so that those words, "by those who heard him," refer not to the following participle, but to the preceding infinitive. But for one to whom this does not appeal, let him have this response: that what Paul says — "was confirmed unto us" — he refers not to himself in particular, but to the Jews in general, as the interlinear gloss has noted. Besides which, Paul does not say that he received the doctrine from those who heard, but the confirmation of salvation: for he received both the Sacraments from them, and the confirmation of doctrine — both because Ananias told him what he ought to do, and because he went up to the apostles who preceded him, lest perhaps he should run in vain, etc.

To the fifth, the answer should be given in this manner: that the term "testament" among the Latins sometimes signifies a covenant and a promise, as Jerome wrote on Jeremiah chapter 31 and Malachi chapter 2, and as Innocent, in the chapter "Cum Marthae," On the Celebration of Mass, afterward learnedly taught. In this sense is to be understood what is said in the canon: "This is the chalice of the new and eternal Testament" — that is, of the new and eternal promise; and also that passage in Hebrews: "He is the mediator of the New Testament, that they who are called may receive the promise of an eternal inheritance." This too is established among the Greeks: that the word diatheke sometimes properly means "testament," sometimes "covenant," "league," and "promise," as Budé proves in his commentaries from the third chapter of the Acts of the Apostles. In this latter sense too, in Genesis 9, and Psalms 54, 88, and 105, the word diatheke is read.

The Hebrew word berith, too, which occurs in Exodus 24 and Jeremiah 31, although it frequently signifies a covenant or league, is nevertheless sometimes bent to the meaning of "testament." For both Jerome, on Zechariah 9, and the translator of the Psalms, on Psalm 44, render the word berith as "testament." Indeed, although Aquila always translates that word as "covenant," the Seventy nevertheless usually render it as "testament," as Jerome attests on Malachi chapter 2. In the Hebrew word, then, Paul could play, in the manner of rhetoricians, and bend the word from its proper to its improper meaning — which he could equally have done, had he spoken in Greek or in Latin. And this is all the more so, because a document sealed by sound persons is called a "testament," even though by a later codicil some things may be changed and others introduced, or even the whole thing once provided for in the testament may be entirely annulled. Wherefore that old bequest too was indeed a testament sealed by one living, but opened by Christ's death, as the torn veil shows, and abolished, as it were by a codicil, through the Evangelical Law. This is what Lactantius, in On True Wisdom, seems to me to have understood.

Nothing, then, prevents Paul from citing Exodus, which speaks of the old covenant, while also speaking properly of a Testament. Indeed it is a fitting argument that the perfect Testament — that is, the New — should be confirmed by blood and by the death of the testator, since that imperfect Old one was confirmed not without blood, so that figure might match figure. And this response indeed answers Cajetan's argument satisfactorily, even if the Hebrew word signifies, properly, not "testament" but only "covenant" — which both Jerome, on Jeremiah chapter 31, and learned Hebrews maintain.

To the final reasoning, the very man who raised it gives the answer: that those three things were indeed all in the Ark, as Paul says, but the jar and the rod hanging outside, on the side, while the tablets were within — as is found in the third book of Kings. Again, perhaps after the time of Solomon, the priests, wishing the rod and the manna to be kept in a more secret and safer place, placed them inside the Ark together with the tablets. Of this matter Paul was not unaware; we are the ones who are ignorant of the traditions of the Hebrews. Theophylact, in his commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, chapter 9, asserts that Paul, well instructed in Jewish matters by Gamaliel, had this from tradition, and that even today the sect of the Pharisees agrees that the matter stands thus. Chrysostom, in homily 18, had likewise pointed this out before.

On the seventh argument, then, and the reasonings attached to it, enough has been said. For as to what Cajetan argues from those words, "But I shall see you sooner" — that it seems contrary to reason that Paul, after having appealed to Caesar, should promise to

give himself to the Jews — this is so trivial that it is tedious even to mention, let alone refute.

Response to the eighth. In the eighth principal argument, by which the fourth conclusion is attacked, Cajetan indeed does not deny that the Epistle of James is canonical, but asserts that its author is uncertain. Erasmus adds that it does not savor of apostolic authority.

But since Jerome, in On Illustrious Men; Pope Urban, in his letter On the Common Life; Alexander V, in his letter to all the bishops; Anacletus, in his letter On the Oppression of Bishops; Pope Marcellus, to the bishops of the province of Antioch; Gelasius, with the Council of seventy; Innocent I; the Council of Mileve, chapter 7; the Councils of Laodicea, Carthage, Florence, Trent — have all affirmed that this is the epistle of James the apostle, James the apostle, I say — and this confirmed by the usage of the universal Church — it is rash, not to say erroneous, to wish to undermine the certainty of this epistle either from an uncertain author or from the style of its greeting; and this on an argument too trivial for us to need to answer it.

Response to the ninth. To the ninth argument I reply thus: it is erroneous, not to say heretical, to deny that this second epistle is the apostle Peter's. For it conflicts, first of all, with all the saints; then with Innocent and Gelasius; moreover with the Councils of Laodicea, Carthage, Florence, Trent; and finally with the usage of the Catholic Church, which reads it on the feast of the Transfiguration under the name of the apostle Peter.

It would also contain something false, if the apostle Peter had not been its author. For although the argument from the salutation of the epistle itself might perhaps be evaded, on the grounds that it was added by some forger, that which is read in the first chapter of this epistle can be evaded by no reasoning at all: "This voice," he says, "we heard, brought from heaven, when we were with him on the holy mountain." But if Peter did not write the epistle (and to attribute it to John or to James would be manifest folly), the epistle contains a falsehood — which is heretical.

That argument, however, which moved Erasmus — and indeed very many before Jerome, as he himself relates in On Illustrious Men, under Peter — is weak, since it often happens that the same author writes not merely a different but even the same sentiment in a differing style. This, to pass over the rest, can be seen in Saint Gregory, whose letters, if you compare them with his other works and judge from the different manner of expression, you would judge to have been written by a different author.

Jerome, however, in his letter to Hedibia, question 11, answers differently, saying: "The two epistles which are attributed to Peter differ from one another in style and character, and in the structure of their words; from which we understand that Peter, according to the necessity of the matter, made use of different translators." Behold: Jerome does not conclude from the dissimilar style different authors, but different translators. For the apostles, when writing in a foreign language, preferred to write through a translator rather than to make improper use of the gift of tongues, which they had received not for elegance and luxury, but for necessary uses. Nor does it escape me that Erasmus twists this passage of Jerome's — but he does so in his usual manner, throwing everything into confusion according to his own whim.

Response to the tenth. Because of the tenth argument, Erasmus and Cajetan deny that those two later epistles are John the Evangelist's. This opinion I would judge to be not merely rash, but even erroneous. For if they are asserted to be by John, surnamed the Elder, they are certainly not canonical — for no one has ever judged John the presbyter to be a sacred author. But they are, without doubt, as has been demonstrated by us above, canonical epistles; they are not, therefore, John the presbyter's, but the Evangelist's.

This is attested by Origen, on the first Psalm, in Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book 6, chapter 18; Clement, Stromata, book 2; Damascene, book 4; Isidore, Etymologies, book 6; Augustine, book 2 On Christian Doctrine; Jerome, to Evagrius; Innocent I; Gelasius; the Councils of Laodicea, Carthage, Florence, and Trent. But during the Easter season the universal Church reads these two epistles to the people under the name of the apostle John. We shall, then, entrust ourselves more safely to the Church, the Councils, and the ancient saints, than to these novel authors — whose argument, since it is weak, needs no further refutation.

Response to the eleventh. The eleventh argument would be unworthy of being counted among the others, were it not that Cajetan, on account of it, asserted that this epistle has less authority than the others, which are certainly of Sacred Scripture. For he does not dare expressly to deny the authority of this epistle, lest he incur some odium or charge. But since Jerome asserts that its authority has already earned acceptance through age and use, and that it is counted among the canonical, I marvel indeed why Cajetan did not subject the opinions of others to Jerome's judgment, whom he himself held to be the certain rule for the Sacred Books.

Cajetan's assertion, then, is dangerous here, if the force of the comparative is maintained: "It is," he says, "of lesser authority than those which are certainly of Sacred Scripture." It is

not, therefore, certainly Sacred Scripture — which is erroneous.

But certain men before Jerome did not approve this epistle. I admit it; but there were certain matters in controversy before Jerome's time, which it is now heretical to call into doubt. But it cites an apocryphal book. Perhaps it was not apocryphal among the Hebrews. And even if it were, as both Jerome and very many others hold, it is no wonder if it is cited by Jude the Apostle, since Paul too cites testimonies from Aratus, Menander, and Epimenides — pagan and profane poets. See Jerome, in his letter to Epiphanius, chapter 5, and to Titus, chapter 1.

But Cajetan rebuts this response, saying: "Not without reason has this epistle been refuted by many, since, although it is much more permissible to cite apocryphal works than poets, nevertheless it detracts from the authority of Sacred Scripture that an apocryphal prophecy should be introduced as though it were simply and absolutely a prophecy." Thus he.

But it is one thing for a whole book to be apocryphal — which is what Jerome means, since certain things contained in that book were ambiguous — and another for that particular passage, which Jude cites, to be apocryphal — which neither Jerome nor any other Catholic has said. For even if we had no other grounds for holding it to be a prophecy, the authority of Jude is enough for us to judge that it most truly proceeded from the Holy Spirit — just as we believe those words, "It is more blessed to give than to receive," to be the words of Jesus Christ, because Paul said so. But I am foolish to try to refute such arguments.

Response to the twelfth. To the final argument, where the conjectures of Erasmus and Luther are set forth to weaken the authority of the Apocalypse, after what we have said it will not be necessary to respond; it will be enough merely to advise the students. For we have run quickly over what is manifest, in order to dwell on the more obscure points; and Francis Titelmann has worked most accurately on this matter, and has published a separate treatise on the controversy, from which the reader can obtain whatever may seem lacking in this our response. For reason demands that we at last bring this second controversy to an end.

Chapter XII

In which are Set Forth the Arguments of Those Who Wish to Persuade that, in Understanding the Sacred Scriptures, One Must Have Recourse to the Hebrew and Greek Sources

In the third question, however, there is great disagreement, and unless it is settled, we are necessarily caught up in the gravest error and in ignorance of the greatest matters: namely, whether, in understanding the Sacred Letters, recourse must be had to the Hebrew and Greek source, or whether the Latin edition itself is of such great authority and weight that it does not depend on the original text, nor needs to be either corrected or refined by it.

The first argument. The first part of this controversy is urged, above all else, by the testimony of Saint Jerome, who, in his book against Helvidius, is believed to be the first author of this assertion — chiefly for this reason, that the water flowing from the source must be believed much purer than that of the streams.

The same author, too, in his letter to Marcella, whose beginning is "After the former," when he had confessed that he had made some emendations in the common edition of the Latin Gospels, and had brought the Latin back to its Greek original, despising his detractors, says: "If the water of the purest source displeases, let them drink of the muddy streams, and add to their reading of the Scriptures the diligence by which they know the forests frequented by birds and the depths where shellfish dwell."

He confirms the same in his letter to Damasus on the word "Hosanna," whose beginning is "Many," and in his commentaries on Zechariah, saying: "We are compelled to have recourse to the Hebrews, and to seek the truth of knowledge from the source rather than from the streams" — indeed, as Cicero too says in On the Orator, it is the mark of a slow mind to pursue the streams without seeing the sources of things. And in his letter to Vitalis he teaches that he was accustomed to take refuge in the Hebrew truth, as in a stronghold and citadel.

The second argument. To this add the testimony of Augustine, from book 2 On Christian Doctrine, chapters 15 and 18, and The City of God, in which passages he subscribes to Jerome's opinion. Moreover, Damasus compelled Jerome to bring the New Testament back to the Greek truth, as Jerome himself attests in his preface On the Four Gospels. But Damasus would not have commanded this, had he not understood that the truth of the New Testament was to be sought from the Greek source.

The third argument. Jerome himself, too, in his commentaries, often finds fault with the old translator, as one who frequently erred in translating. It is not necessary, then, to put faith in the old Latin edition, unless we wish to charge Jerome either with malice, if he criticized deliberately, or with ignorance, if, not understanding, he criticized things that had been well translated. From some source other than the Latin edition, then, must the firm understanding of the Sacred Letters be sought.

What of the fact that Lefèvre d'Étaples, Erasmus, Steuchus of Gubbio, and various other moderns seem to convict the old translator, now of carelessness, now of negligence, now of inexperience, now of superstition, with fitting causes and reasonings? It is not, however, my intention to relate all the arguments of those who are accustomed to criticize the Latin edition which the Church uses. For refuting these arguments, both more time and more labor must be devoted elsewhere. I shall bring forward only those criticisms by which they accuse the old edition of falsity.

First, then, they say that the Latin translator, in the last chapter of Numbers, rendered a sense which conflicts not only with the Hebrew truth, but altogether with the Sacred Letters themselves. For that edition contains a not obscure command, that no man should marry a woman except from his own tribe and family; nor should any woman marry a man of another tribe and family.

But this is so far from the truth of Scripture that nothing could be more contrary to it. For Moses himself was the first to neglect this, nor did he himself take a wife from his own tribe. Aaron took as wife Elisheba, of the tribe of Judah, Exodus 6. The sister of the king of Judah married Jehoiada the high priest, 2 Chronicles 22 and 4 Kings 2. Elisabeth, although she was of the daughters of Aaron, was a kinswoman of the blessed Mary, who was without doubt of the tribe of Judah. David took Michal, daughter of Saul, of the tribe of Benjamin, as wife. The eleven tribes pretext not a law, but an oath, in refusing to give their daughters to the Benjaminites — while at the same time openly indicating that those who had not sworn were prevented by no law, Judges 21. It is, then, a substituted, adulterated, and false reading, which has been rendered solely on the translator's authority.

Then, on Micah 5, the old Latin edition reads thus: "And you, Bethlehem Ephrathah, are little among the thousands of Judah; out of you shall come forth to me," etc. But Matthew cites these same words in a sense entirely contrary, saying: "And you, Bethlehem, are by no means the least."

Moreover, on Psalm 7, verse 12, our edition has: "Is he angry every day?" — where the Hebrew truth has the contrary sense, with which Jerome entirely agrees.

Calvin also contends that this passage of Ecclesiastes 9 — "No one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or of love" — has been falsely rendered by the translator, and that the translator's interpretation is false, since very many know that they are worthy of hatred, and some have known that they were worthy of love.

There are also those who believe that the translator gave a false reading at Matthew 24, when, instead of "lightning's flash," he rendered "lightning" — which certainly does not reach from east to west, but it is the flash of the sun that does so.

They also press this point: that on Jonah 4 the translator rendered that the Lord prepared "ivy," that it might be a shade over Jonah's head, etc., whereas, on Jerome's own authority, the kikaion is neither ivy nor a gourd, but a certain kind of shrub, unknown to the Latins and Greeks, but familiar to the Syrians. The Lord, then, did not prepare ivy, nor did Jonah rest under the shade of ivy — which the translator wrongly rendered.

The fourth argument. Moreover, if we ought to be bound to the edition of the old Latin translator, we would be compelled even to accept the story of Susanna, and even the narrative of Bel and the Dragon — which, since the Hebrew truth does not contain it, Jerome calls a fable, not intending to add it to the Sacred Books, except that, among the unlearned, as he himself says, it might seem that he had cut off a great part of the volume. Likewise we would be compelled to accept the last chapter of Mark, which Jerome, to Hedibia, question 3, does not believe to be necessary, since it is found in only a few Gospels, and this little chapter is absent in almost all the Greek books. It would also be necessary to venerate the story of the adulterous woman, which is now found in John chapter 8, although Eusebius knows of it only in the Gospel according to the Hebrews; nor does Jerome acknowledge it at all; nor did even Chrysostom deem it worthy of his commentary, although he mentions it elsewhere. And Euthymius, although he narrates it, nevertheless says a little earlier that it is not found in the more exact copies, because it seems not legitimate.

The fifth argument. Again, if the edition of the Latin translator were to be followed, we would have to admit that all will rise again, and consequently all will die, according to what is said in the first Epistle to the Corinthians: "We shall indeed all rise again, but we shall not all be changed." But we are not bound to hold this opinion, as Saint Thomas too argues in his commentary on this same passage; indeed the most probable opinion is that those men who shall be found alive on the day of judgment, with no death intervening, shall be judged while alive — which the Apostle certainly seems to assert in the first Epistle to the Thessalonians.

Add to this, that the translator was not himself a prophet or a sacred author, but transferred the Sacred Letters, with human spirit and understanding, from a foreign language into his own. He could, therefore, err and be deceived in translating. Wherefore we are not bound to embrace the translator's sense, but the very text itself, as it has been handed down by the sacred author, whether in Hebrew or in Greek. For it is one thing, as Jerome says, to be a prophet, and another to be a translator: the former predicts future things by the spirit, the latter, by learning and abundance of words, translates what he understands.

The sixth argument. Moreover, if it is not permitted to depart from the translation of the Latin translator, we condemn the diligence and skill in languages of all the more recent scholars in translating the Sacred Letters, as though it were idle for understanding the Sacred Letters. Indeed, even if the Hebrew or Greek words have a different sense, this sense, it seems, must be disregarded, while that other sense, which the old Latin text prefers, must be held by all means.

Nor can these arguments be satisfied by the response that Jerome, the author of this edition, was much more skilled in languages than anyone else, and that consequently his authority, talent, and learning are greater than those of any other more recent translator. This response, I say, does not satisfy. First, because it is better to see with your own eyes than with another's; it would, therefore, be better for each person to be skilled in the languages themselves, and to see for himself rather than to believe a translator.

Then also, because, since the Seventy translators, most learned men and most skilled in the Hebrew and Greek languages, sometimes slipped in translating, there is no reason for us to suppose that Jerome alone never erred from the truth while translating. To pass over the fact that whether this old edition is Jerome's or someone else's is contested with the greatest disagreement among the most learned men: as for the New Testament, to say nothing of the Old, either Jerome did not translate it, or, if he did, his translation does not exist. But even if it did exist, the argument we have just made would always remain whole — that Jerome's own sense, since he was not himself a sacred author, need not always be embraced.

The seventh argument. Moreover, in the first Clementine, under the title On Teachers, the Council of Vienne decreed that, in the universities of Bologna, Paris, and Salamanca, teachers of the three languages should be appointed, who should, through diligent instruction, transmit their skill to others — which the Synod would by no means have decreed, had it not been greatly necessary for understanding the Sacred Letters.

Moreover, it does not seem that this should be denied to Divine Scripture, which must be granted to all human writings — namely, that, when there is doubt concerning some writing, recourse should be had to the original from which it was translated.

By these arguments — and not light ones at that, but, as very many judge, quite firm — those eager for novelties first persuaded themselves that, for knowing the truth of the New and Old Testament, skill in the two languages, Greek and Hebrew, is necessary; from this they descended further into the opinion that they do not think themselves to be expounding the Sacred Letters if they follow the common Latin translation, since this, they say, is to explain not the author of Sacred Scripture, but its translator; finally they have progressed even to assert that one ought not to embrace the authority of the Latin translator, but rather of the Hebrew text itself in the Old Testament, and the Greek in the New — from which it follows that our Latin edition must be entirely refined and corrected by the Hebrew and Greek exemplars.

This persuasion, however, excellent reader, if you have perhaps put it on, take it off, I beg you, for a while, until we set before you what is more true and more certain. We, for our part, shall attempt to refute this opinion, received by very many; and we shall refute it, I hope, with the help of him whose cause we wish to defend against the attackers of truth.

For if I have applied myself to this particular dispute, moved either by some display of self, or by zeal for contention, I think not only my folly, but also my character and disposition, ought to be condemned. For if obstinacy is reproved, and slander is restrained, even in the smallest matters, should I, in matters of the greatest weight, and which pertain especially to the preservation of the Church's unity, wish either to contend pugnaciously with others, or to frustrate both others and myself at once? Desiring, then, to dispute for the sake of finding the truth, we shall define this controversy most briefly with four conclusions.

Chapter XIII

In which the Authority of the Old Vulgate Edition is Demonstrated, and that One Need Not Now Have Recourse to the Hebrew or Greek

The first conclusion, which contains the matter and the cause chiefly — for the rest are, as it were, corollaries — is this: that this old and common edition, which the Latin Church has used since the time of Saint Jerome, is to be retained by the faithful in all those matters which pertain to faith and morals.

The second: that if any question of morals or faith should arise among Catholics, it ought to be settled by means of this old Latin edition; so that, if some testimony of it confirms one side of the question, that side is to be embraced by Catholics, but if, on the contrary, it disapproves it, that side is to be rejected.

The third: that, in disputation concerning faith and morals, one ought not, at this present time, to appeal to the Hebrew or Greek exemplars, nor should a certain assurance of controversies be drawn from them.

The fourth: that, in those matters which pertain to faith and morals, the Latin exemplars are not to be corrected by the Hebrew or Greek.

The first — whether you wish to call it, in the scholastic manner, an axiom, a pronouncement, or a proposition — the Council of Trent, session 4, defines in these words: "The Holy Synod, considering that no small benefit may accrue to the Church of God, if it should become known which of the many Latin editions of the Sacred Books now in circulation is to be held as authentic, has decided and decreed that this same old and Vulgate edition, which has been approved in the Church by the long usage of so many centuries, shall be held as authentic in public lectures, disputations, preachings, and expositions, and that no one shall dare or presume to reject it under any pretext whatsoever." Thus far the Council. But, lest we overwhelm the adversaries with the Council's authority alone, we shall set forth the reasons why it so defined; for the Synod could not have lacked reasonings by which it so judged.

For either this Latin Scripture contains some falsehood pertaining to faith and morals, or, on the contrary, what it everywhere hands down to us is true. If it is true, this is what we are striving to confirm; but if false, then the Roman and Latin Church — in which alone, at this present time, the catholic faith perseveres — would be gravely erring concerning matters of faith, for it would be proposing some false Scripture, as though revealed by the Holy Spirit, under the name of a prophet, an apostle, or an evangelist. By this one fact it would deprive itself of authority in proposing the rest of its teachings — than which nothing more absurd or more inconvenient could happen.

Then, to set forth, by way of example, something with wider application: if it should perhaps now be called into doubt whether the story of the adulterous woman is true, and someone should deny that it is true — then either this error is sufficiently exploded by the unanimous consent of the Latin manuscripts, and this is indeed exactly what we are seeking; or it is not sufficiently exploded, and it is permitted with impunity to despise that story, which is celebrated by the consent of all the Latins, and which is read yearly in the Church under the name of John the Evangelist — and then already the faith and

authority of the Roman, Latin, and Catholic Church is broken, violated, and weakened, since it will, by similar reasoning, be judged capable of erring in other matters as well.

Since this was utterly absurd, the same Council of Trent rightly decreed, in this same session, that if anyone should not receive as sacred the canonical books themselves, whole and entire, with all their parts, as they are accustomed to be read in the Catholic Church and as they are contained in the old Vulgate Latin edition, let him be anathema. It is established, then, that the Latin edition, approved by the Church's usage for so many hundreds of years, must be held unshaken in those matters which pertain to faith and morals.

Moreover, since the scholastic authors, for almost four hundred years now, have held to the Latin edition alone, both in confirming theological dogmas and also in refuting heresies, I ask whether they accomplished anything at all in their disputations, or not. For if nothing certain was accomplished, O wretched men, who for three hundred years and more wasted both their oil and their labor! For they had no skill in the Greek and Hebrew languages, but, content with the Latin translator alone, confirmed the doctrines of the school, and rejected all that conflicted with them — while the Roman, indeed the Latin, Church kept silent, watched, and approved. But if something was indeed accomplished by the scholastic theologians, it must certainly be believed that they safely committed themselves to the Latin edition for establishing their conclusions. This edition, then, is to be retained by the faithful.

Finally, I ask whether the inquisitors of heretical depravity, in refuting and punishing heretics, ought to hold diligently to this Latin edition, or whether it is rather necessary for them to have recourse to the Greek and Hebrew truth, which they by no means know? For if it is unworthy that the judgment of so grave a tribunal should depend on a matter wholly unknown; if it is absurd for our own people to appeal to outsiders, that is, to Hebrews and Greeks; if it is impious to refer a consultation on the catholic faith to the senate of Jews and schismatics — I do not see, indeed, how a theologian could agree with this error, so as not to think that certain faith is to be placed in the Latin edition.

I understand, however, that crafty and shameless men will, with applause even, mock these dilemmas of ours. For they deride all the authors of the schools, and they cavil at the whole business of the knowledge of the faith. But we, with these arguments, do not wish to convict insolent heretics as adversaries, but to persuade modest theologians of the truth.

Indeed, those who desire to weaken this edition of ours seem to me to be contriving nothing else than a certain hidden patronage for heretics. For surely they will despise the

inquisitors, who hold the Latin Scripture as a certain rule, even though they are held in ignorance of the Greek and Hebrew truth; they will despise the scholastic authors, who bound their faith to the common Latin translator, whose understanding, however, they say, we are not bound to follow; they will despise even the ancient saints, who lacked skill in the Hebrew language. For among the Greeks, we know that Dorotheus, Origen, and Eusebius were skilled in Hebrew letters; but among the Latins, besides Clement and Jerome, scarcely anyone else knew Hebrew letters. Wherefore it would be almost necessary that the saints err in their understanding of the Old Testament, indeed that they handle with blind eyes all the sacraments of that same instrument.

If Christian ears rightly shudder at this, let us agree entirely that the old Vulgate edition is to be held by the faithful. Indeed (as Brother Francis Titelmann, a man outstanding in letters and learning, distinguished in character and piety, most excellently said), when we consider God's provident dispensation, we easily see how the truth of Scripture has always been connected with the rectitude of the faith, and how it has been accustomed to depart along with it. For as long as the firmness of the right faith persisted among the Jews alone, we know that the solidity of the Scriptures also lay hidden among them alone. But after the truth, rejected by the Jews, was received by the Gentiles, the Church of the Gentiles was deemed worthy to receive, in its own proper idiom — that is, Greek, which was both the most common among those who had believed from among the Gentiles, and most widely known — the Scripture of the New Testament, for the establishment of saving faith.

Furthermore, when the truth of the faith had begun to devolve upon the Latins, with the Greeks for the most part separated from the body of the Church, either through their inborn fickleness or through a zeal for contention, it followed that the Latins received some worthy stability of Scripture, by divine gift. Nor can it in any way be considered likely that the Latin Church — among whom the truth of the Christian faith has existed now for many years — should still have no Latin Scripture on which it could safely rely for establishing its dogmas, and by which it could refute the adversaries of its faith with worthy authority.

Another most serious harm, too, seems to me to be brought upon the Church by those who, setting aside the Latin edition, judge that pure and firm truth is to be drawn from elsewhere — namely, that the Latin faithful, being ignorant of Greek and Hebrew letters, when they read Sacred Scripture in their own Latin tongue, will always be left hanging in uncertain opinion. For they will not know whether what they read in Latin is held the same way, or differently, among the Greeks and Hebrews. The faith of those reading will, then, waver at every point, and will nowhere be able to stand firm. What

could be more pernicious than this? Let us, then, hold without doubt that the Latin Vulgate edition is the safe anchor of the faithful who read it; and by these same arguments let us also hold the second conclusion, which, as we said before, is a corollary of this first one which we have just confirmed.

The third conclusion we first show from the fact that several particles of Scripture would be taken away from us — particles which are not read in the Greek or Hebrew exemplars of this present time, such as the story of the children and of Susanna in Daniel, and the story of the adulterous woman in John. Indeed, even that excellent testimony concerning the Trinity — "There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit," etc. — was, some years ago, removed from us through the errors of the Greeks; just as these new translators have also expunged from the Latin exemplar the final ending of Mark, and many other passages besides. The controversy of faith, then, is not to be resolved by appeal to the Greek or Hebrew exemplars; otherwise we would have to reject those parts of Scripture which the Council of Trent, and indeed the Church with one voice and consent, receives.

Then, that third conclusion is also shown by this argument: that, if the truth is to be weighed according to the Greek exemplars, we have, in Psalm 13, eight verses which the Hebrew text does not have at all. Thus they would rightly be struck out by us, even though we have them on the authority of the Apostle. But the Church has demonstrated that neither Origen nor Jerome did enough with this argument, since it has believed, up to this present time, that those eight verses in Psalm 13 should be retained — which it would not have done, had they been inserted, as those men assert, through the error of ignorant men.

Likewise, the doctors of the Hebrews — our enemies, that is — have striven with great effort to corrupt the Hebrew text, so as to make the Old Testament conflict with our exemplars, as Eusebius relates, Ecclesiastical History, book 4, chapter 18. The Greeks too, with the same contentiousness, have in many places violated the New Testament, in order to bend Scripture to their own meaning, as Tertullian attests, book 5 Against Marcion, and Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book 5, the last chapter, and Irenaeus, Against Heresies, book 1, chapter 29, and Basil, book 2 Against Eunomius; Saint Ambrose too, in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, and in the proem to the first book on Luke; and Jerome, in the proem on the Epistle to Philemon; and Origen, in his commentaries on the Epistle to the Romans. For in very many Greek exemplars that entire clause is lacking — "Now to him who is able," etc. — which not even Theophylact had.

Nor did they do this only in the Sacred Letters, but also in the manuscripts of the saints. For at the Sixth Council of Constantinople, Macarius and his disciples were convicted of having either truncated or distorted the testimonies of the saints in confirmation of their error. And at the Seventh Synod, in the fourth session, it is shown that the Iconoclasts deceived people with a distorted testimony of the blessed Nilus; and in the fifth session certain books were shown to the Synod, distorted by heretics. Indeed, that two little books were produced under the name of Vigilius, the Roman Pontiff, and a letter written under the name of Mennas to that same Vigilius, having forged and counterfeit titles, was made plain by this same Council. And Leo, in a certain letter to the Palestinians, complains that a letter which he had written to Flavian had been distorted by the Greeks. And Nicholas, in his letter to the Emperor Michael, attests that this was the custom of the Greeks.

Gregory, in his fourteenth letter of book 5, judges that the Council of Chalcedon, like that of Ephesus, was distorted by the Greeks, and for this reason advises Narses not to trust just any new manuscripts indiscriminately; he affirms, moreover, that the Roman manuscripts are more reliable than the Greek ones. Dionysius too, bishop of Corinth, in Eusebius, book 4, chapter 23, says: "What wonder is it, if men have attempted to falsify the very words of the Lord in Holy Scripture, when they have corrupted these humble writings of ours?" This Dionysius said, complaining that his own letters had been corrupted by the adulterous deletions and additions of heretics.

There is extant a letter of Cyril to Successus, bishop of Diocaesarea, in which he relates that he had been asked by Budus, bishop of the city of Emesa, whether he agreed that the letter of Athanasius to Epictetus, bishop of the Corinthians, had responded thus: "If these things are not corrupted in your copies — for very many of them are found to have been distorted by the enemies of the Church." And when they had compared the letter with the ancient copies, they found it corrupted, etc.

In this matter, all good men should be warned to understand that they must beware of the deceit of Calvin, Philip [Melanchthon], and others like them, whenever they apply the opinions of the ancient saints to their own cause. This is all the more so when they fail to note the book or the passage; for then their reliability, in citing the opinions of the ancients, is all the more suspect. I would bring forward many such passages, were it not tedious to the reader, and were we not now occupied with other matters. We must not, then, have recourse to the Hebrew and Greek exemplars, since these have been corrupted.

But Jerome, on Isaiah chapter 6, does not believe it likely that the Hebrews would have corrupted their own Scripture. What the case was in Jerome's time, I do not dispute, although Justin proved against Trypho that many passages of the prophets had been cut away by the Jews; and among other things he relates this: "Say among the nations, that the Lord reigned from the wood (the tree)." From which verse he contends that the words "from the wood" had been removed. After that time, certainly, Jerome, were he alive, would not deny that the Scriptures had been corrupted by the Jews.

Moreover, those who cling to the Hebrew exemplars must necessarily follow the expositions of the rabbis, and not those of the Catholics. For the Catholics have expounded either the translation of the Seventy or the Latin edition. It is unworthy, then, that the oracles of our faith should now once again be sought from the Hebrews. For the Christian truth must be sought from the men of the Church, not from the rabbis of the synagogue.

To this, that one or two examples among many may be brought forward: in Genesis, chapter 8, our Latin edition has that the raven, sent out by Noah, went out and did not return. So Jerome has it, in his Dialogue against the Luciferians and in his letter to Oceanus; so Cyprian, in his letter to the heretic Novatian, that hope of pardon is not to be denied to the fallen; so Ambrose, On Noah and the Ark, chapter 17; so Augustine, in his sixth tract on John; so Isidore and Chrysostom, in their commentaries on Genesis; so Eusebius, in his Chronicle; so, in short, all the catholic doctors, both Greek and Latin, both ancient and modern, have held it from the Seventy translators. On the contrary, the Jews now read that the raven went out and returned — whom the new Lutheran translators, Pellican and Münster, follow.

Whom, then, do you think ought rather to be believed? The Jews, the enemies of Christ? Heretics, the enemies of the Church? Should we not rather believe the Seventy translators? Should we not rather believe Jerome? Should we not rather believe the ancient holy men of the Church? — all of whom, agreeing with one another, could in no way assert the same things, unless they were held together by one divine spirit.

Jerome attests, not once, that the translations of Symmachus, Theodotion, and Aquila have little authority, since they were either infected with Judaism or notorious for the mark of heresy. Irenaeus too, in Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book 5, chapter 8, weakens the translation of Theodotion and Aquila by this argument: that both were Jews and proselytes, and that the Ebionites followed them. And shall we admit Jews and heretics as the translators of the Jews, and as companions in error? Are all our exemplars, then, both Greek and Latin, both ancient and new, corrupted by copyists, and have they

remained so for a thousand years? By no means at all.

But if the moderns hold a different view than the ancient Hebrews, who would not rather prefer to subscribe to the opinion of the ancients, than to cling more closely to these moderns? — especially since, harried by so many exiles and struck with such great blindness, they have lost the knowledge of their own language and of all good disciplines, and retain no faith in God, and scarcely even common human sense.

In this matter I cannot wonder enough that Augustinus Steuchus of Gubbio, a man otherwise excellently learned and pious, preferred to agree with the Jews and heretics rather than with Catholics. For Cajetan, always clinging to the same footsteps, embraces throughout the Hebrew codices in the Old Testament, and the Greek in the New, with scarcely any regard for the Latin translator. Nor was he even warned by himself, when, writing on Luke chapter 3, he said it was in accordance with reason that the new Hebrew texts should rather be mutilated and corrupted, than that the Seventy translators — good and distinguished men — should have labored to invent a fabrication and a falsehood. This, certainly, among learned men, is a forceful and fitting argument. For as for the little reasonings which they add to whitewash this incredible novelty, this is neither the day nor the place to refute them. For it is enough, for now, to refute the adversaries with their own arguments, since, once these have been knocked down from their pedestal, the truth of our opinion is abundantly confirmed.

To return, then, to where the discourse departed: if it should be called into question whether the raven returned to the Ark, I ask whether a Catholic could freely and with impunity deny this, even if, in all the Hebrew exemplars, as these men say, the contrary is found. If it can be denied, then we have certainly proven that the Hebrew exemplars are neither firm nor fit for settling catholic controversies. If it cannot be denied, then say, if you like, that neither Jerome, nor Ambrose, nor Cyprian, nor Augustine, nor Chrysostom, nor the rest of the catholic men of this rank are catholic, and call us heretics too — for we deny that the raven returned to the Ark. Since to say this would be a most insolent madness, let us rather say this: that these new Hebrew exemplars have no force, in theological questions, for producing faith.

Moreover, there is great disagreement, very often, among the Greek manuscripts now in hand; whence even those who, in our times, say they weigh the Latin against the Greek, not infrequently disagree among themselves, not only in words but also in meanings.

What of the fact that, meanwhile, these new translators do not interpret the same exemplars in the same sense! For verse 4 of Psalm 109, Luther translated one way, Bugenhagen another, Pellican another, Bucer another, Münster another, Zwingli

another, Felix another, Pagninus yet another — so that now Theodotion, Symmachus, Aquila, the fifth, likewise the sixth and seventh editions, and even the Vulgate of the Seventy, seem to me very few in number, if we compare them to the countless versions of these men.

What of the fact that Erasmus does not even agree with himself? For there is a fifth edition extant, and there would have been a sixth too, had he not either feared branding himself with the mark of inconsistency, or been overtaken by death. But certainly this variety of versions has always been, as it were, native and proper to heretics.

This was indeed objected of old, by the men of the Church, against the Artemonites — that not even their own exemplars agreed with themselves, if they compared the earlier with the later ones: "They are always correcting," he says, "men who are always displeased with what they correct, and they constantly seek out new readings, while those readings which are in common use are made to seem contrary to them."

And Luther, indeed, first altered the old edition of the New Testament with his own German translation, in order to persuade the people that our forefathers, up to that time, had not had the true text of the Gospel. Yet this same man, not many years later, so corrected his own edition that learned men have noted thirty changed passages, and more, in the Gospel of Matthew alone.

Thus fickle men do not so much translate the Sacred Letters from the sources, as they themselves are turned about around the sources, and, led by various and foreign doctrines, waver like little children and are carried about by every wind of doctrine. And indeed, whenever some novelty bubbles up like a new wind, immediately the weight of the grain and the lightness of the chaff are discerned; then, without great effort, that which was held by no weight within the threshing-floor is shaken off from it.

Why, you will ask, this such a long preamble? Surely, that we might understand that these novel translators, by the discrepancy either of their exemplars or of their interpretations, introduce into the Church a variety greatly to be suspected, and altogether to be feared by pious minds. And novelty itself, indeed, is first to be feared, since it cannot exist without disturbance to the commonwealth; for this reason, when the Hebrews asked for a king, the Lord, if we believe Gregory, was angry with them, because he holds all novelty in the commonwealth detestable. Change of affairs, too, is to be feared; for even small shifts have such great power to disturb the common state of citizens, that, as Plato says, when the modes of music are changed, a change of the commonwealth and of morals must necessarily follow.

Wherefore those who proceed to exchange the most weighty manners of the divine law for other, new ones — sharper, perhaps, but nevertheless light — should take care lest, under the pretext of translations, they overturn at the same time the ceremonies of religion, the sacraments, and the priesthood. For these things are so interconnected and joined to one another, that none of them can be torn or separated from the others. Thus whoever disturbs any one of these must necessarily disturb the rest as well — as we have learned from the example of the Lutherans, who, with their new inventions, changed all of these together at once.

Moreover, we ought, as I said before, to reject and fear all the more that variety which is, indeed, the enemy of constancy and unity — virtues which the Church cannot possess, if there is no unity and agreement in the same Scripture. In this respect our own ages are more fortunate than the ancient ones. For formerly nearly as many exemplars were in circulation as there were manuscripts. But now, however, by the special providence, without doubt, of the Holy Spirit, through the diligence of Damasus and the great labors of Jerome, the Holy Church has received a harmonious unity of the Scriptures, and all variety has been removed from the midst, a single Latin edition having been received by the consent of all.

Wherefore those who recall us to the Greek exemplars wish to bring back that same variety from which Jerome once delivered our books — indeed, that same falsity from which he purged our manuscripts. For variety of manuscripts is usually an easy occasion for corruption. And even where there is no corruption, variety itself is nevertheless harmful. For that which is different can never be asserted to be true — as Jerome wrote to Domnio and Rogatian, and to Damasus: "That what varies is not true," he says, "is proved even by the testimony of slanderers themselves. For if faith is to be placed in the Latin exemplars," he says, "let those answer, who have nearly as many exemplars as manuscripts." The variety of the Latin exemplars, then, which existed at that time, undermined the trustworthiness of such exemplars.

And indeed this argument had such great force and effectiveness that it even blunted the obstinate impudence of Luther. For he himself, as Cochlaeus relates in his book On the Authority of Canonical Scripture, says: "If the world stands much longer, it will once again be necessary, on account of the diverse interpretations of Scripture which now exist, for us to accept the decrees of a Council, in order to preserve the unity of the faith."

Most providently, then, has the Holy Synod of Trent decreed that, of the many Latin editions of the Sacred Books, one old and Vulgate edition, received by the long usage of so many centuries, should be held as authentic in public disputations. It is not, then, at

this present time, in the discussion of faith and morals, to be appealed to the Hebrew or Greek exemplars; since the dogmas of the faith could be poorly confirmed, or the unity of the Church poorly maintained, through the discrepant manuscripts of either the Hebrews or the Greeks.

And by almost these same arguments, the fourth and final conclusion too can be made persuasive. For the manuscripts of the Hebrews or the Greeks are not even more accurate than the Latin ones; indeed they frequently have a different reading than reason itself and the truth demand — as Brother Francis Titelmann has most learnedly and abundantly discussed, both in his Collations on the Epistle to the Romans and in his Apology for the Old Translator. From these countless passages, it has seemed good to draw only two examples, that theologians may learn from them how little trust is to be placed in these new translators.

One passage is at Romans 12. For where our edition has "serving the Lord," the new translators generally render "serving the time"; and yet our reading is to be preferred, which the corrected Greek manuscripts of old also had. For Chrysostom and Theophylact do not read "serving the occasion," but "serving the Lord." Origen too had this same reading. And indeed Jerome, in his letter to Marcella, whose beginning is "After the former letter," having criticized another reading, asserted that, according to the Greek truth, it should be read: "serving the Lord."

The other is found in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 7. For where we read: "He who is with a wife is anxious for the things of the world, how he may please his wife, and is divided," these men, translating from the Greek source, as they say, render it thus: "He who is with a wife thinks of the things of the world, how he may please his wife; the wife and the virgin are divided." Saint Jerome, however, in his first book Against Jovinian, teaches that this latter reading is not of apostolic truth — although he admits that he himself had once explained that passage in that sense, etc.

Thus, then, Jerome at times obtained certain exemplars, both Hebrew and Greek, much more accurate than those to which the more recent translators and expositors have bound their faith. And when they oppose to us certain manuscripts, written six hundred years ago in golden letters (for these they call "sources"), Jerome answers for us against them, saying: "Let those who wish have the old books, whether written on purple parchment in gold and silver, or in what are commonly called uncial letters — burdens rather written out than books — provided they allow me and mine to have poor little scraps, and codices not so beautiful as they are accurate."

Wherefore it often happens to these men, who are eager for innovation, that, while following the readings of the Hebrew or Greek manuscripts which they have in hand, they do nothing else than correct what has been corrected, using what is uncorrected.

In this matter, Isidore Clarius is not to be tolerated, whose emendation is nothing else than a censure of the old translator. For he promises, at the front of his work, a corrected old edition; but afterward, having deflected by this promise the odium of novelty, he inserts many things, adds some, changes others — so that the reader can understand nothing else, in the changed passages, than either an error of the old translator or a corruption of the old manuscripts. How much better it would have been to confess it as a new edition, rather than a corrected old one, lest simple readers be deceived by ambiguous words! Very many such passages are known in Isidore Clarius, both in the Old and in the New Testament; and I would bring them forward, were the discourse not hastening on to other matters.

I only give this warning: that such changes, or deletions, or additions, which often delight curious men, would be most distasteful to our forefathers, were they alive now. This can be gathered from the first book of the history they call the Tripartite History.

For when, as is related there, many bishops had come together, and one of them had been asked to deliver a sermon to the people — a man, namely, endowed with eloquence and wisdom — that passage came up: "Take up your bed, and walk," where, instead of "bed," he said "couch." Then Spyridon, bishop of the Cypriots, a most holy man, indignant at him, and leaping up from the priestly seat, said: "Are you better than him who said 'bed,' that you are ashamed to use his words?" And he did this in the sight of the people, teaching humility to one who was puffed up with the arrogance of eloquence. For he was fit to instill shame, since he was venerable and glorious in his works, and at the same time a presbyter both in age and in priestly office.

What would this man do here, if he heard the readings of Isidore Clarius, of Erasmus, of Cajetan, and of the rest, so various and so numerous, with their changes and reversals? With what feeling do you think he would bear it, when, in other books, but especially in the Davidic psalms, he found Cajetan's reading and text so discrepant from our own, that you could scarcely recognize whether it is the same sacred book, or a different one? What would Jerome say? Would he tolerate the psalms translated word for word? — he who, in his book On the Method of Translation, commends Horace's precept — "the faithful translator will not take care to render word for word" — even, and especially, in the translation of the Sacred Letters? And in his letter to Augustine, Jerome asserts that he preserved the truth of the senses rather than the order of the words; and to Sunia and

Fretela he lays down the rule of a good translator: that words should not correspond to words as though equal and measured against one another, but sense to sense.

What of the fact that Cicero, in book 3 On Ends, says that unskilled translators are accustomed to render word for word? Cajetan, then, errs above all others, who, forgetful of this precept, while wishing to render a faithful translation of the Psalms, rendered one that is, for the use of the Church, entirely useless.

Chapter XIV

In which the Arguments of Chapter Twelve are Refuted

Response to the first. And first, indeed, when Jerome's authority is set against us, it will not be difficult to reply. For there were two reasons why, at that time, recourse had to be had to the sources: one, that the sources were not so muddied, nor were the primary springs of the Scriptures disturbed; the other, that at that time there was a great variety and inconsistency among the Latin manuscripts, which could not conveniently be removed except by referring the Latin texts back to the Greek and Hebrew exemplars. That these were the reasons which led Jerome to that opinion is plainly evident from the proem to Damasus on the four Gospels, and from his letter to Sunia and Fretela. But now, since there is a single harmony among all the Latin exemplars, it is rather the Greek variants that need to be refined and brought back to their original unity by means of our Latin edition; and it is the sounder course to drink clear water from settled pools, rather than foul liquid from a disturbed source.

Furthermore, if the reader will permit a brief excursion from scholastic disputation, we, who are sons of Abraham according to the promise, dig wells in the foreign territory of the Philistines; but the Philistines, envious of another's good fortune, try to block up the wells that have been found. Isaac, however, with much diligence, re-dug and cleared them, until living water was found. There the shepherds of Gerar quarreled with Isaac's shepherds, saying, "The water is ours." Wherefore Isaac called the name of the well, from what had happened, "Calumny." Moving on from there, he dug another well, over which they did not quarrel, and so he called its name "Breadth."

In exactly this manner the Roman and Latin Church digs wells of living water — that is, of the Sacred Letters; she finds the water of saving wisdom; she finds, I say, the veins of life — but in what is, as it were, the foreign territory of the Jews and the Greeks. But they strive to muddy and block up the wells; indeed they quarrel against us and say: "The water is ours, the spring is ours; whoever is not a Hebrew or a Greek ought not to dig in foreign soil. In our own tongue," they say, "Christ spoke, the prophets spoke, the apostles

and evangelists spoke. You Latins are guests, and you ought to beg these letters from us; by our labor, and by our correction, must your texts be restored to their genuine truth." Thus the Jews, the heretics, and the curious lovers of novelty strive to fill in our wells with earth, and contend against us; but it is sheer calumny. For how shall those who are strangers to the body illuminate it? How shall those who do not have the mind of Christ interpret the thoughts of Christ? Shall those who fight against us be the ones to equip our weapons? By no means. Let us, then, dig another well, which we shall call "Breadth" — namely, the Church, spread far and wide, over which let no controversy be stirred up. For the Church is the pillar and foundation of the truth; she is the city of God, whom the rushing of the river makes glad. This river's water has nourished her children for a thousand years now. This water we ought both to approve and to hold fast, and not seek other springs of truth.

Response to the second. But we have seen the first arguments; let us now see the rest. For as to the authority of Augustine and Damasus that is brought against us, after what has been said, it carries no weight. For whether you set Augustine or Damasus against us, both are speaking of their own time. As for Innocent, distinction 20, chapter De quibus, whom some also wish to set against us, I do not in fact understand what he means, unless the passage is corrupted. For I think it should be read not "Greek" but "canonical." On this matter, perhaps more fully in another book.

Response to the third. As for that point which Erasmus thought to press most forcefully, it is most trivial. For there are many passages which Jerome at first believed to be errors, both in the old edition of the New Testament and in the translation of the Seventy, but which, upon weighing them more carefully afterward, or even being advised by friends, or certainly by enemies, he found were not to be corrected — as Francis Titelmann has shown in his Apology. Indeed, Jerome, in his Hebrew Questions, notes that the Seventy translators rendered "Friend" as "Shepherd," contrary to the Hebrew truth — and yet he himself afterward followed the Seventy.

Nor does the opinion of Augustinus Steuchus of Gubbio escape me; but it is plain that it is a contrived invention. For what could be more inept than to say that the error of the Seventy translators crept into Jerome's edition through the fault of copyists? What, again, could be less probable than that the Seventy translators, most distinguished men, should have erred in a matter most obvious, which was easy even for ordinary people? Now indeed, how unjustly the old edition is everywhere criticized by Lefèvre, Erasmus, and Steuchus, Francis Titelmann has clearly shown in a single epistle, the one to the Romans. From which it is sufficiently understood how much trust ought to be placed in these would-be critics.

But as to that first objection, by which our old edition is charged with falsity, it is the argument of Osiander in his Harmony of the Gospels. And before him, Nicholas of Lyra, on Judges 10, and Burgensis, on Numbers 36, had branded the old translator with this same mark. But Jerome followed the Seventy. With them agree Damascene, book 4, chapter 15; Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book 1, chapter 6; Epiphanius, Heresy 78; Ambrose, Commentary on Luke, book 3; Nicephorus, book 1, chapter 11; Bede, on Luke, book 1, chapter 10. Whose carelessness, if it be that, I would rather imitate than the obscure diligence of these others.

Therefore, since in law the rationale behind it must be considered, the law is to be understood of those women who, in the absence of male heirs, inherit their father's estate. This was the reason that led Saint Thomas, I-II, question 105, article 2, reply to objection 2, and book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 30, question 2, article 1, question 3, reply to the fourth, to grant free marriage to the daughters of Aaron — in whom, namely, the rationale of this law was absent. And in Leviticus 21 the high priest is commanded to take a virgin wife from his own people, not from his own family or tribe. And from Judges 10 it is established that Tola and Abimelech were kinsmen, of whom one was from the tribe of Issachar, the other from the tribe of Manasseh. And a man, a Levite from the territory of Ephraim, took a wife from the tribe of Judah, Judges 19. Josephus, Antiquities, book 5, chapter 6. Our edition, then, is not false, but the letter must nevertheless be rightly interpreted.

What, then — someone will say — does the genealogy traced down to Joseph have to do with the Lord? It certainly has much to do with it. For when the Evangelist was writing, it was established among the Jews that Joseph was of the same tribe — for this reason both he and Mary were enrolled at Bethlehem, as being descended, namely, from one stock. But that the blessed Virgin had no brothers, all the histories agree. She had, then, married a kinsman of her own tribe.

What, then, was known to the Jewish people at that time, there was no need for the Evangelist to write — namely, that Joseph descended from David. By this one fact he preserved the custom of the Scriptures, by which the genealogical line of women is not traced, and he truly taught that point about which there could be controversy. For as to the fact that Mary was of the same family — since this was most widely known to the people at that time — the Evangelist did not think it needed mentioning.

There is also another argument of this same Osiander, in his Harmony of the Gospels, where he asserts: "The Hebrews, in the inflections of their words, have no neuter gender, from which it follows that they make improper use of the masculine or feminine form in

place of the neuter. So that where we say, 'It is not good for man to be alone,' an unskilled translator would render: 'Adam alone is not good to be.'" In the same manner, he says, in place of what Jerome translated, "You are small," it should clearly and truly be rendered: "It is too little for you to be among the thousands, or princes, of Judah" — for which statement the reason is most fittingly given: "For out of you," etc. This reasoning, he says, is most inept if it is fitted to the preceding statement according to Jerome's version. But that the latter clause is the cause of the former, the nature of the language reveals, common sense judges, and the Holy Spirit testifies through the mouth of the Evangelist.

Thus far we have related Osiander's words. But the impudence of this insolent heretic is to be marveled at. The Chaldean paraphrase, all the more recent Jews, and the Seventy translators agree with Jerome, and this one man alone thinks himself wise.

But since the Hebrew text has no conjunction, the whole statement can indeed be taken in such a way that the second clause is the cause of the first. This is the sense the high priests and scribes held, whose words Matthew faithfully reported, as he was bound to do. But it can also be taken in such a way that the latter part is understood as somewhat adversative — which is the sense Jerome took, as is evident from his commentary on Micah. And if you consider the matter carefully, it makes very little difference which way the statement is taken. Wherefore Osiander is ridiculous, raising such great commotion over a matter of no importance.

That which is added in the third place is easily disposed of. For the manuscripts of the Seventy translators had a mark of interrogation, and they translated it thus: "Will he be angry every day?" And Augustine indeed, although he read it without a question, nevertheless expressed our sense, saying: "Patient, and not bringing wrath every day." Thus the Seventy translators seem to have expressed the sense of that verse excellently, if the preceding clauses must be connected to what follows.

As for what Calvin objects, Institutes, chapter 5, this is cold and feeble — both because, as some hold, Solomon is speaking there of love and hatred in the sense of predestination and reprobation, which they think is shown by what follows — "but all things are kept uncertain for the future" — and also because he speaks according to common usage, and adapts his speech to the common manner of speaking, by which, since a man does not know whether he is worthy of death, he truly says: "Man does not know whether he is worthy of hatred or of love"; and also because, as elsewhere often in that book, he assumes the role of one arguing, not of one defining a position.

Thus, in that chapter, he argues right from the beginning that many evils follow from the fact that all things happen alike to the just and the wicked in this world. One of the absurd consequences he proposes is that there are differing servants in the house of the Lord, some good, some wicked, and yet the Lord does not declare whom he loves, whom he pursues with hatred; but he seems to conduct himself toward the wicked man as benignly as toward the pious one, nor is he any less stern and severe toward good servants than toward wicked ones. For all the good and evil things of this life are common to both. Our edition, then, contains nothing false, whether we embrace this first, second, or third sense.

For as to what certain men suspect — that the translator at Matthew 24 falsely rendered "lightning's flash" as "lightning," on the grounds that it is not the lightning-bolt but the flash that goes out from the east and stretches all the way to the west — this is a most ridiculous argument. For first, if there is any error here, it seems more likely to have been the copyists' fault, not the translator's. For the words "fulgur" (lightning-bolt) and "fulgor" (flash) are so similar that it is easy for one to be substituted for the other. Wherefore this fault is rather unjustly thrown back upon the translator, when it would more fairly be assigned to the copyists. Then, the translator could have made no error at all here, since all the Greek exemplars, both old and new, agree, and read nothing other than astrapē — a word which means precisely "lightning-bolt," not "flash." But it cannot even be understood as "flash," even if the Greek word meant both. For the sun rises gradually, and its approach is sensed long before it appears. Its flash, then, does not arrive unexpectedly.

The Lord, however, undoubtedly means to signify that his coming will be sudden and unexpected. This is most aptly expressed by the likeness of lightning, which, before you expect it, has already flashed forth and vanished. And although lightning does not, strictly speaking according to natural philosophy, stretch from east to west, yet, for expressing a coming of Christ that is sudden and unexpected, but visible to all eyes, it is enough to apply what appears so to our own eyes.

Otherwise Saint Thomas might be accused of being ignorant of the science of optics, who, wishing to explain how divine things shine forth in human things, gives the example of a mirror, in which, as he says, an image is seen — which, although it is not really so, nevertheless appears so to us; indeed Moses too might be accused of being inexperienced in astronomy, who set up "two great lights," although there are others much greater.

But to our perception those two appear the greatest; nor is it foreign to the authors of Sacred Scripture to adapt themselves to the unlearned people and to speak as the common folk usually do. To these matters I would add several more examples, were enough and more than enough not already said on this point. Elihu, certainly, in accordance with this same reasoning, said: "From the south comes the storm, and cold from the north," Job 37. In the same way the Prophet says: "He who founded the earth upon the waters" — as though the lower waters were beneath, although they actually rise above, as we shall show in the thirteenth book. By a similar rule, the three angels who appeared to the Patriarch are said to have eaten, not because they really ate, but because they appeared to eat — though Justin takes it figuratively, just as fire is said to "devour" and "consume," because it destroys. This passage occurs in the Dialogue with Trypho.

Now those points need no lengthy discussion, by which the translators thought it was not necessary always to translate the very same things, as signified in Hebrew speech, into the same things in Greek and Latin, but that it was sometimes enough if things close to and most similar were substituted. For they applied, even in translating the Sacred Letters, that rule of translation stated by Cicero — that words are not to be counted but weighed, and that sense must be rendered for sense in such a way that, as far as could be done and was permissible, even if sometimes the exact wording was set aside, the reader's understanding might be helped. They thought this was especially permissible when the Hebrew authors had used some comparison with an animal, a tree, a shrub, an herb, or some other thing which was unknown to the Greeks and Latins; as in Isaiah 1, where the Latin edition has: "When you shall be like an oak with falling leaves," the Hebrew has "Ela" — a word which, if we trust the Seventy translators, and Jerome himself too in his commentaries, signifies "terebinth" rather than "oak." But since the terebinth is a foreign and unknown tree, known among the Latins only by name, it was not inappropriately substituted by "oak" in place of "terebinth" — a tree known to all languages and peoples.

Likewise, in Psalm 101, for "pelican" the Hebrew has qaath, and for "owl of the night" kos. The former some have rendered "jackdaw," others "pelican," others "onocrotalus"; the latter some have rendered partly "horned owl," partly "cuckoo," partly "screech-owl." And indeed the Seventy translators rendered the Hebrew word, which Jerome consistently translates as "onocrotalus," sometimes as "pelican," sometimes as "bird," and even sometimes as "lion." Nor did they do this because the words were many and ambiguous, but because, since among the Hebrews the names of animals and especially plants are largely unknown, they thought it made no difference which of several similar things was substituted, provided the same sense remained.

For the likeness sought there is one in which all these things agree, not some other particular and special nature. Just as also, among the Latins, when it is said proverbially, "the dog in the manger" — if someone should translate it into Spanish as "el perro del hortelano" ("the gardener's dog"), he would certainly translate it excellently; because under a different thing and word, one and the same sense would have been conveyed to the reader.

Wherefore Cajetan's scrupulousness was excessive, who, on Isaiah 1, did not want the word "Ela" changed in the Latin exemplar, as though there were some danger in our reading either "oak," or "terebinth," or some other similar tree. From this same matter the error of those is exposed who, since Jerome there renders "onocrotalus," while the Seventy generally render "pelican," supposed these to be the same bird.

In this error the author of the commentaries on the Psalms which circulate under Jerome's title was involved as well. That these are not Jerome's, however, is plainly proven by this one passage alone, where this author manifestly betrays clear ignorance. For he says: "Pelicanus is called in Latin 'onocrotalus.'" What ignorance, however, could be greater than to suppose that "onocrotalus" is a Latin word? But enough of this. Now let us assert this point, again and again: that, in translating such comparisons, it makes no difference at all whether the same things are rendered into the same things, or into similar and closely related things, provided the sense is not different but the same.

What of the fact that, when the Latins lack both the Hebrew thing itself and a name for it, if the translator named a thing otherwise unknown to us from some related and neighboring thing, he did nothing at all absurd? Indeed he attempted a thing granted to all translators, either by authority or by relatedness — namely, either to assign a Latin name to signify the thing, or at least to transfer it in order to suggest something similar or closely related.

Thus, since on Jonah chapter 4 some translated "gourd" and others "ivy," they exercised their own right, nor were they bound by such scrupulousness about words that they should allow the Greeks and the Latins alike to understand nothing at all in that passage. Nor is this unlike the objection that Porphyry raised against Daniel's prophecy — namely, that the story of Susanna is fabricated, and is not found among the Hebrews, but is a Greek invention, since the story contains the pun "from the mastic tree (schinos) to cut (schisai), and from the holm-oak (prinos) to saw (prisai)" — an etymology which fits the Greek language better than the Hebrew. Since what Eusebius, Apollinaris, and Jerome answered to this has been rejected by the Church, we answer much more truly: that the Greek translator could have done this, and could rightly have done what the

Latin translator shrank from doing.

For it was not necessary that the same trees be rendered in that passage as the Hebrew language had, since, if the same trees had been rendered, not only could the etymology not have been preserved, but neither could the wit of the prophecy, nor the point of the saying. He, therefore, translated other, similar or closely related, trees, in which both the keenness and the purpose of the prophetic judgment could be preserved. Besides which, those trees were named by the prophet in the Chaldean language, so there is no need for us to be troubled if neither these nor similar ones are found in Hebrew.

To the arguments, then, by which the truth of our edition is generally attacked, we have, unless I am mistaken, given an abundant response. Although I have deliberately passed over some points, which seemed easier than to be worth either the oil or the labor needed to refute them. Such is that point of Lefèvre d'Étaples, that the Church, through the translator's error, impiously reads "angels" instead of "God." For he believes that reading impious — "You have made him a little less than the angels." How ignorantly and inconsiderately, how rashly and foolishly he erred in this matter would not be difficult to show, were it not that Erasmus, before us, had already proven this same point with great force of argument. Certainly the translator of the Epistle to the Hebrews was either Clement or Luke, as the gravest authors have handed down. To charge either of these with impiety would be a sacrilege. Nor do I know whether one could, without impiety, accuse the Church too, which approved this epistle in which the supposed impious error occurs. But enough of this. Let us now pursue the rest.

For indeed, since ecclesiastical usage, after that time, approved the story of Susanna and read it to the people under the name of the prophet Daniel, and since the Council of Trent has also confirmed this by its own definition, that story is certainly now to be received by the faithful. Africanus indeed objected to Origen that the story of Susanna seems fictitious and foreign to prophetic Scripture, as Eusebius attests, book 6, chapter 23. But to him, as the same Eusebius says, Origen, writing back most clearly, asserts that one should by no means listen to the inventions and frauds of the Jews, but that this alone should be held as true in the Divine Scriptures which the Seventy translators rendered; for that alone is what has been confirmed by apostolic authority. Thus Eusebius.

This same point is also related by Jerome, in his Catalogue, speaking of this Julius Africanus; and Jerome himself, in book 1 of his Apology against Rufinus, clears up what he had said in his prefaces, saying: "But as for what I report — what the Hebrews are accustomed to say against the story of Susanna, the hymn of the three young men, and

the tales of Bel and the Dragon, which are not found in the Hebrew volume — he who accuses me of foolishness proves himself a slanderer; for I did not explain what I myself thought, but what they were saying against us." Thus far Jerome.

Response to the fifth. To the next argument, then, since we do not wish to be lengthy in explaining each one, we reply briefly: that this passage from the first Epistle to the Corinthians is read two ways among the Greeks, and, as the Vulgate has it, in this manner: "We shall indeed not all sleep, but we shall all be changed." The authority for this is Didymus, and Jerome, in his letter to Minervius and Alexander.

Neither reading, however, has been rejected by the men of the Church. Indeed, they have always noted that the reading is doubtful and variant; nor have they embraced either one as certain and established. We are not, then, compelled to accept either reading, since the doctors of the Church have not asserted either side as established and catholic. The same would happen with any other particular passage of the Latin edition, if exactly the same situation had occurred there. But where the catholic doctors have held one and the same reading without variation, and have not wavered in their judgment between two opinions, we are not permitted to call the Latin edition into question.

But not even here can the opinion of Erasmus, Lefèvre, and Cajetan be approved, who, in a matter where it made no difference which way it was stated, preferred to choose the reading which novelty's appeal made more attractive. This twice deserves to be called pagan, since they prefer to pursue curious things rather than solid ones. We, however, prefer to follow Origen, Didymus, Athanasius, Augustine, Cyprian, Tertullian, and the common consent of the Latins. For Acacius, bishop of the city of Caesarea, says, as cited by Jerome, that our reading is found in the majority of Greek exemplars, but the other reading in fewer. Nor does it escape me what Chrysostom and Theophylact wrote in their commentaries, and what Jerome too wrote in a certain letter to Marcella. But, as I said before, it troubles me that, in matters disputed on both sides, theologians are more delighted by new things than by old ones — old things approved by the usage of our forefathers. And this much on the fifth argument.

To what follows, let this be the response. There is a great error among those who think they can understand or interpret Sacred Scripture without a special gift of the Holy Spirit. This gift, indeed, the more necessary it is for understanding and interpreting the Sacred Letters, the more rarely and with greater difficulty does it occur. For learning, abundance of words, and skill in many languages can be supplied by human diligence. But if the particular spirit — given by God's gratuitous mercy, not so much for the benefit of the one who receives it, as for the benefit of the Church — is lacking to an

interpreter of the Sacred Books, everything will be dry and cold, however much it may have been labored over and long before thought out and discovered; indeed, much will be false in the interpretation, having been rendered by mere human sense and understanding.

For Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book 1, believes that the interpretation of Scripture is a prophecy and an inspiration of God; and the Apostle, in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, lists it among the other gifts of the Holy Spirit, and calls it not philosophy, but prophecy — meaning, namely, that explaining the Sacred Letters requires the same spirit by which they themselves were composed, that is, the divine and prophetic spirit.

This Peter confirms in his second epistle, saying: "We have a more sure prophetic word, to which you do well to attend, as to a lamp shining in a dark place; understanding this first, that no prophecy of Scripture is made by private interpretation. For prophecy was not brought at any time by the will of man, but holy men of God spoke, being moved by the Holy Spirit."

This passage, as the most distinguished men before us have understood, has this sense: "You do well indeed to attend to the prophets; but understand this first — that the divine prophecies are not understood by human and private interpretation. For holy men of God spoke by the Holy Spirit, and the natural man does not perceive the things that are of the Spirit of God. For who has known the mind of the Lord?"

And Isaiah signified this same thing, saying: "The Lord has given me a learned tongue, that I should know how to sustain him who is fallen by a word. He wakens, morning by morning, he wakens my ear, that I may hear as a master"; and in Luke: "The Lord opened the understanding of his disciples, that they might understand the Scriptures." By this testimony Hilary proves, on Psalm 115, that the understanding of the Scriptures is a gift of God.

But if the understanding of the Scriptures is a gift of God, and no one can interpret the Scriptures except one who understands them, it certainly follows that no one can succeed in translating the Sacred Letters into another language without God's special grace. Otherwise, if Saint Jerome thought that abundance of words, secular eloquence, skill in three languages, and manifold knowledge of things were sufficient — and since he knew himself to be abundantly equipped with all these — why does he, in his letter to Desiderius, beg for the help of others' prayers, that he might be able to translate the books into the Latin tongue in the same spirit in which they were written? Why likewise, in his letter to Paulinus, about to interpret the Sacred Scriptures, does he say: "Reveal my

eyes, and I shall consider the wondrous things of your law"? For the law is spiritual, and revelation is needed for it to be understood. And again he says: "How many today think they know the Letters, and hold the sealed book, yet cannot open it, unless he who has the key of David unlocks it." And on Galatians 1: "There are some who trouble you, and wish to pervert the Gospel of Christ" — he says: "Everyone who interprets the Gospel by a spirit different from that in which it was written troubles the believers, and perverts the Gospel of Christ; so that what is in front, he puts behind, and what is behind, he turns to the front. If someone follows only the letter, he puts what comes later in front; if someone rests content with the interpretations of the Jews, he sends what is by nature placed in front behind." And later in the same chapter, on the text, "I make known to you the Gospel, that it is not according to man," etc., he says: "Marcion and Basilides, and the other plagues of the heretics, do not have the Gospel of God, because they do not have the Holy Spirit, without which the Gospel that is taught becomes merely human. Let us not think that the Gospel lies in the words of the Scriptures, but in the sense; not in the surface, but in the marrow; not in the leaves of speech, but in the root of reason." Thus far Jerome.

If he speaks truly, he certainly compels us to believe either that the old translator translated the Sacred Letters by a special gift of the Holy Spirit, or that the Latin Church, for many centuries past, has not had the Gospel of God, but of man. When, then, you object that the translator was not a prophet — indeed, truly, he was not a prophet, but he had, as Titelmann rightly asserts, a certain spirit close and akin to the prophetic — such as we have shown to be necessary for interpreting the Sacred Letters; indeed, such as was necessary, that the Latin Church might have an edition of the Sacred Books which it could safely follow in matters of faith and morals.

Now let us easily answer the final argument. As for the fact that we have neglected comparing the Latin to the Greek and Hebrew, we could, in any case, defend ourselves by the example of Saint Ambrose, who, though he knew Greek, and published commentaries on the Sacred Letters, often did not deign to consult the Greek, even where it was established that there was some variant reading. This can be seen in his commentaries on the twelfth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. And if we were more disturbed than helped by the very variety of translators, the example of Sophronius would excuse us, who admitted this of himself to Jerome. We, however, do not wish to condemn either the versions of the new translators, or skill in languages, or the comparison of the Latin with the Greek and Hebrew exemplars; rather we commend these greatly.

For if Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, book 2, chapter 11, says that even the versions of common and rather unlearned translators help understanding more than they hinder it, I neither can nor ought to rightly criticize the various editions of the most learned men. And, to forestall the resentment of those who could slander us either as wretched and barbarous men, lacking in good letters, or as envious critics of others' labors, I confess — and most candidly too — that there are many further advantages, in the knowledge of languages, for understanding the Sacred Letters. Far from it that I should attack skill in languages.

Chapter XV

On the Usefulness of the Hebrew and Greek Languages

For, to begin with, the languages are most useful where one disputes with unbelievers, or even where unbelievers of a foreign tongue are being instructed in the faith. This reason alone is given in that Clementine 1, On Teachers, on account of which languages are to be thoroughly learned in the universities. Otherwise, what would be the point of the Arabic language, which is there prescribed to be taught? By this argument Erasmus seems to have been somewhat moved, so as to assert, on the basis of this Clementine constitution, that the Hebrew and Greek languages are necessary for understanding the Sacred Letters.

Another advantage of the languages lies in explaining those expressions which have great emphasis, or some inherent property, among the Hebrews and Greeks, which Latin speech is unable to express. Jerome has noted many such expressions, both in his Hebrew Questions and in his commentaries. We shall give one or two by way of example.

Thus at Mark 6 the translator rendered: "And when he had dismissed them" — where, however, the Greek word apotassesthai does not simply mean "to dismiss," but "to dismiss kindly and graciously," in the way we courteously bid farewell to friends after a celebrated banquet. In this matter the Evangelist, writing in Greek, also commended the great courtesy and graciousness of Jesus Christ even toward common people — something which can scarcely be expressed by a Latin word.

And in the Epistle to the Ephesians, for what our edition has as "from the foundation of the world," the Greek has katabolē. Wishing to explain the emphasis of this word, Jerome, in his commentaries, says: "It is not exactly katabolē, which signifies 'foundation'; whence we too, because of the poverty of our language and the novelty of the matter, and (as someone has said) because Greek speech is broader and the Greek language more fortunate, shall attempt not so much to render the word literally (which

is impossible) as to explain the force of the word by a certain circumlocution. Katabolē properly is said when something is thrown downward, or when some matter takes its beginning. Whence those who lay the foundations of future buildings are said to have 'cast down' (katabeblēkenai). Paul, then, wishing to show that God devised the whole universe out of nothing, referred not to its condition, nor to its being created and made, but to its katabolē — that is, the beginning of its foundation." Thus far Jerome.

And in book 1 Against Jovinian, treating that passage in 1 Corinthians 7, "not that I may cast a snare upon you," he says that Latin speech does not capture the Greek property here either; for in what words could one express it? Wherefore, in the Latin manuscripts, because of the difficulty of translation, this is entirely absent. There are many other examples of this kind, which we omit for the sake of brevity. Let whoever wishes read further in Hilary's exposition of the Psalms, who asserts, in many passages, that Latin speech does not fully render the understanding of the Greek letter. Ambrose too, in his explanation of Psalm 118, says that the Latins cannot, in all cases, express the force of the Greek language, since in Greek there is generally greater force and grandeur of expression. In this regard, Erasmus's annotations on the New Testament could be of great help to theologians, had he not sprinkled them with so many errors.

There is also another usefulness, for grasping several catholic senses from the same Scripture, especially when, among the Greeks and Hebrews, a word is ambiguous. For our dialecticians usually call such words "polysemous" and "ambiguous." For the translator could render only one single meaning of a word. Thus, in Ecclesiastes 2, where our edition has, "I thought to withdraw my flesh from wine," others translate, "to draw my flesh into wine," still others, "to attract my flesh in wine." This entirely contrary translation was caused by the contrary meaning of the Hebrew word — something which Jerome himself noted in his commentaries.

And, in book 1 of his Apology against Rufinus, treating Psalm 2, "Lay hold of discipline," for which he himself translated, "Worship the son," or also, "Worship purely" — "Were it not," he says, "both tedious, and likely to smack of self-glorification, I would now show you what benefit there is in wearing down the thresholds of teachers, and learning the art from its practitioners; and you would see what a great forest there is, among the Hebrews, of ambiguous nouns and verbs, which provided material for differing interpretation, since each person, among the doubtful options, translates whichever seems to him more consistent." Thus far Jerome. See likewise Ambrose, on the second Psalm, concerning the word "Bereshith."

Ambiguity, too, sometimes provides a charming use and play on words in a foreign language, which cannot only not be preserved in our own, but where not even the genuine sense can be rendered without great liberty. Thus, in Jeremiah 1, for what we have as "watchful," the Hebrew word is shaqed, which is ambiguous, and signifies both "almond" and "watching," as Jerome discusses there and at the end of his commentary on Ecclesiastes. Since, then, the prophet had been shown, in his vision, an almond rod (or "watchful" rod), when asked by the Lord what he saw, he answered, in the Hebrew language, that he saw a rod of shaqed. Then the Lord, playing on the occasion of this word, said: "You have seen well; for I will watch," etc.

Thus, although Jeremiah understood the word in one sense, the Lord, bending it to the other, created, out of the ambiguity of the language, a most elegant harmony of meaning — just as if someone, seeing a certain celestial constellation, said he saw a "dog," it might wittily be said to him: "You have seen well; for the Dog Star will burn you," etc. Now if the Latin translator had rendered shaqed as "almond," as the Seventy had done, he would have had to add, quite absurdly: "You have seen well; for I will watch," etc.; whence he was compelled, by a certain new and unusual liberty of translation, to render "watchful rod" to Latin ears. This I would not dare to assert, were it not that so weighty an authority as Jerome had established it.

The fourth usefulness in the learning of languages lies in recognizing the idioms, phrases, and proverbs of a foreign tongue: such as these: "Do not look back"; and: "Greet no one on the way" — by which a certain great urgency of journey is signified, as it were proverbially and figuratively. This too is said, by a proverbial figure, among both the Hebrews and the Spaniards: "To everyone who has, more shall be given; but from him who has not, even what he has shall be taken away." Thus, of a faithless and treacherous counselor, it is said in Ecclesiasticus: "Guard your soul from a counselor, lest perhaps he plant a stake in the ground, and say to you, 'Your way is good.'" Thus, by a Hebrew phrase, "sons of the shaken-out (or quivered) ones" means strong and ready men. On this, read Jerome, in his letter to Marcella, whose beginning is "Blessed Pamphilus."

Thus "daughters of song," Ecclesiastes 12, are understood as "ears." Thus Saul is called "a son of one year" when he began to reign — that is, "innocent." Unless (as Eucherius thought) you understand it this way: that Saul, having been chosen by Samuel, remained silent at home for one year, and, the year completed, began to reign. But more on this example elsewhere. For perhaps, through a scribal error, "one year" was introduced instead of "twenty-one years."

Thus Nimrod is called "a mighty hunter before the Lord," that is, under heaven — as though the mightiest of all men who were under heaven. I know some interpret it this way: that he was called "a hunter before the Lord" as if "God's hunter," by which the civil power of a single monarchy would be signified as a vindication approved by God, as being God's minister. But the explanation I gave first pleases the most learned Hebrews. Or certainly he is called "a hunter before God," that is, "out in the open air." For he compelled men, who were wandering like wild beasts in the fields, into civil society.

Thus, that "the Lord rained from the Lord" — some think this is a Hebraism, meaning "from above"; but they understand "the Son from the Father": Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book 1, chapter 1; Jerome, on Hosea 1; Irenaeus, book 3, chapter 6; Basil, book 5 Against Eunomius; Marcellinus, to Bishop Solomon; the Council of Sirmium, canon 15.

And certainly, to pass over the other books of the Old Testament, the Proverbs of Solomon, unless one takes account of Hebrew custom and idiom, can scarcely be explained at all. For what is said among the Hebrews as a proverbial expression is sometimes no proverb at all among the Latins; and very many, not knowing this, in expounding the Proverbs, either take refuge in allegories, or even invent various absurdities; and it would have been much better to confess their ignorance simply, than to make others heirs of their own incompetence. I could easily mention the errors of these Latin commentators, were it not that the present occasion demands otherwise; and we do not wish, here, either out of respect or goodwill, to attack anyone by name. This is established: that the parables promise one thing in their depths, another on their surface, and do not sound what is literally written. From which it is manifest, as Jerome says at the end of his commentary on Ecclesiastes, that the book of Proverbs does not, as simple folk suppose, contain plain precepts, but rather, just as gold is sought in the earth, the kernel in the nut, and hidden fruit in the rough husks of chestnuts, so too in these the divine sense must be sought more deeply. This we shall do with difficulty, to say no more, without skill in the Hebrew language. Jerome would have greatly aided Latin understanding, had he published commentaries on the books of Proverbs. For those that circulate, although attributed to Jerome in the Decretal, title On Constitutions, are nevertheless clearly shown not to be Jerome's.

The fifth usefulness is for correcting those errors which have crept in either through the carelessness of typesetters, or through the inexperience of those who copied the texts. Thus at Joshua 11: "There was no city that did not surrender itself" — where the second negative is superfluous, as is plainly gathered from what follows. But since the Seventy translators perhaps had that negative in their exemplar, they were compelled to refer the verb "surrendered" to a different subject, and either to delete the pronoun "itself," or to

omit it.

Likewise, Psalm 26: "that I may see the will of the Lord," instead of "the delight," Greek terpnotēta. And in the title of Psalm 62: "of Idumea," instead of "of Judea," as all the Greek and Hebrew exemplars show. And Psalm 65: "And I exulted under my tongue," instead of "I exalted" — which is evident both from the Greek and from the Hebrew. There are those who think there is also an error in Psalm 19: "They themselves are bound, and have fallen," instead of "they are bent" — for so Jerome translated: "they are bowed down"; and the other translators agree. And again, Psalm 124: "But those who turn aside into bonds" (obligationes), instead of "into crookedness" (obliquationes); Jerome rendered "perversities"; Felix, "wicked deeds"; others, "iniquities." Here Titelmann agrees.

But these two passages are in fact uncorrupted. For in the former, the Greek has synepodisthēsan; now sympodizo means "I bind," "I impede by ties," and "I entangle." In the latter, indeed, we read in Greek straggalias, a word which in Latin is "binding," "knot," and "entangled tie" — just as Nazianzen too used it in an oration. And Jerome, on Isaiah chapter 58, reads "bonds" (obligationes) along with us. Whence also the "knot of the throat," and the place of strangulation, is called by the Greeks straggalē; and straggalizo means "I strangle," "I choke." That passage in Psalm 106 is, indeed, truly corrupted: "Contention is poured out over the princes," instead of "contempt"; Greek exoudenōsis — the same word which, in Psalm 122, the translator rendered as "scorn." Rufinus, however, in book 8 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 1, translates it thus: "Contempt is poured out over the princes." And Job 19: "or surely they are carved in flint," instead of "certainly"; and Luke 10: "looking up," instead of "taking up" (hypolabōn) — although the author of the little book On True and False Penitence, which circulates under Augustine's name, has followed the common error. And Luke 15: "he overturns," instead of "he sweeps" (saroi). And the first Epistle to the Corinthians 2: "is spiritually examined," instead of "are examined" (anakrinetai); and chapter 10: "All who [eat] of one bread," instead of "All indeed"; and chapter 15: "I die daily, because of your glory," instead of "by your glory." For there the Apostle is swearing, and the particle nē is an oath-particle among the Greeks. And to the Hebrews chapter 5: "an interpretable word," instead of "uninterpretable" — that is, ineffable and most difficult to explain, as is clear from Jerome's letter to Evagrius.

And the same Jerome, in his Hebrew Questions on Genesis 3, says it should be read: "He himself shall crush your head," not "she." For since, among the Hebrews, the neuter gender refers to "seed," the translator, weighing the thing signified, rendered it in the masculine, "he"; which the unlearned, not understanding, and supposing it a scribal error, substituted "she."

To pass over those examples which Augustinus Steuchus of Gubbio mentions: "as the deer (cervus) longs for shade," instead of "the slave" (servus); and "by the heat of the sun" (solis), instead of "of salt" (salis); and "my soul thirsted for God, the fountain" (fontem), instead of "the strong one" (fortem); and "the earth was killed (interfecta) by bloodshed," instead of "infected" (infecta). For also, on Psalm 10, where we have, "He who loves iniquity hates his own soul," Saint Jerome believes it should be read "his soul" (anima sua) — that is, God's own — for "his soul" refers to God, not to the sinner. And the sense fits wonderfully, so that God is understood to test both, the just and the wicked, but nevertheless to reject the wicked, for the hatred of God is rejection. We, however, can follow the Greek exemplars of the Seventy translators which now exist. For these do not have "of the soul" but "the soul." And perhaps from this comes that passage in Tobit: "But those who do iniquity are enemies of their own soul." Similarly, in his letter to Sunia and Fretela, for what is read in Psalm 5, "direct my way in your sight," he contends it should be read: "direct your way in my sight." For so he himself translated: "direct your way before my face." But in this too we follow the Greek exemplars, and approve the Vulgate reading, where this can indeed be done. Similar is that passage at Philippians 3: "we who serve God in spirit," where Ambrose, book 2 On the Holy Spirit, chapter 6, believes it should be read "to the Spirit." Nor do such errors occur only in the Latin language; we find them in Hebrew and Greek as well.

Cajetan noted — and rightly, in my judgment — that, at 2 Kings 21, the name "Michal" was falsely substituted by the Hebrews for "Merob," as is evident from 1 Kings 12. Jerome too noted, on Psalm 131, that the Seventy translators rendered not chēran, that is "widow," but thēran, that is "hunting" — but that, because of the similarity of the words, "widow" (chēran) was substituted for "hunting" (thēran), especially since the poor are mentioned in the following verse. Unless perhaps the Latin translator rendered "sustenance" or "hunting," and the error gained acceptance so that "widow" came to be read. For the Hebrew word in no way signifies "widow," but means "hunting," "sustenance," and "provisions."

Errors of this kind can be corrected by grave reasoning and prudent judgment. For who could tolerate those men who, as is said in Quintilian, while attacking the ignorance of copyists, betray their own? And who, while wishing to purge the Sacred Books — which they say are teeming with errors — actually contaminate them? I admit, indeed, that it was easy and natural for an unlearned and careless copyist, especially given some similarity of words and things, to dismiss what was correct and substitute what was corrupt; I admit too that there was once such great reverence for the Sacred Letters, that, once errors — however clear — had crept in, it was held a sacrilege to touch them at all.

But I also see, in this present age, a shameless rashness which dares so much in correcting the Sacred Codices, that the Manichaeans of old seem, by comparison, to have shown some moderation in this matter — they whom Augustine, writing to Jerome, says were accustomed to contend that many passages of the Divine Scriptures had been corrupted, not by the apostles who wrote them, but by certain (I know not whom) corruptors of the manuscripts. But enough of this for now.

This, however, must not be passed over: that Saint Jerome, on chapter 40 of Ezekiel, writes that almost all the Hebrew words and names which are placed in the Latin translation have been corrupted by excessive age and distorted by the fault of copyists. To correct these, then, knowledge of the Hebrew language is necessary. For even if all the names remained whole and untouched, the interpretations of the names themselves, by which many mysteries of Sacred Scripture are revealed, are not available without skill in this language, as Augustine attests, On Christian Doctrine, book 2, chapter 16. In this same passage he also acknowledges that those who have separately interpreted the Hebrew names have conferred no small benefit on Latin readers.

The sixth usefulness would be for understanding certain passages — namely, those which could have been rendered more clearly by the translator, or which simply cannot be explained without knowledge of the languages. As, in John: "There was a certain ruler" (regulus), for which the Greek has basilikos, that is, "of the royal court," or "courtier," as Jerome noted on Isaiah. The translator seems to have read in Greek basiliskos ("petty king"). But all the Greek exemplars have basilikos, that is, "royal" or "of the king." From this it can be conjectured that the translator rendered "royal" (regalis), but that some half-learned person substituted "petty king" (regulus). And in John chapter 1: "He who is to come after me, was made before me," which could more clearly be rendered: "was set before me," or "preferred before me" — as Augustine noted, on Numbers, question 51, and on John, homily 3; and Acts 27: "since sailing was not safe, because the fast had now passed," instead of: "because they had endured fasting beyond the [usual] time"; and Romans 12: "not avenging yourselves," instead of "defending yourselves." For the number of the beast, which is written in Apocalypse chapter 13, we can scarcely, or indeed by no means, explain without understanding the Greek alphabet according to its arithmetic order. On this matter we shall discuss more fully in book 13.

The seventh usefulness is to avoid error arising from the ambiguity of Latin speech. As, "the Son of Man" is what Christ is called in the Gospel. Here, since the genitive in Latin is of common gender, among the Greeks it is defined by the masculine article, so that it is understood not as "son of a virgin," but "son of Adam." "Son of man," indeed, according to Hebrew idiom, means, like "son of the earth," an obscure and contemptible man — by

which very designation the Son of God repeatedly glories in the Gospel. So great was the humility of the Incarnate Word. Although, as Augustine says, Christ frequently reminds us of what he has mercifully condescended to be for our sake.

A similar example occurs at the end of Romans: "Gaius, my host, and of the whole Church, greets you" — where "of the whole Church" is a genitive of relation, not a vocative, so that Gaius is understood to have given hospitality not only to Paul, but to the whole Church as well. And Luke 11: "Give as alms what remains over," where the Latin speech is ambiguous. For "what remains" can be understood either as "the one thing that is left to you," or as "what is superfluous." Both senses are admitted by the Latin speech; the Greek, however, excludes one of them. For the Greek has ta enonta, that is, "what is within," or "what you have" — as Theophylact, and Cyril, book 2 on Leviticus, and Augustine, on Psalm 125, and Chrysostom, homily 33 to the people and on the Epistle to the Hebrews, homily 9, explain. For the Greek reading has this latter sense; it does not seem to have the first or second — although that second sense pleased Saint Thomas, who in this matter follows both Bede, on Luke, and Gregory, in his letter to Augustine, bishop of the English; and it is cited in the canon law collections, distinction 12, question 1, chapter "Quia tua."

There is, finally, another usefulness — for grasping certain words, whether Hebrew or Greek, which have remained in the Latin edition, either to preserve a more sacred ancient authority, or because they could not conveniently be translated into another language — as Augustine, The City of God, book 18, chapter 11, relates. Thus at Matthew 11: "The poor are evangelized" — that is, receive good news. For just as, in human kingship, the secret mysteries of kings are conveyed to the poor through the rich, so, on the contrary, in Christ's kingdom, the heavenly tidings have been brought to the rich through the poor. And in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, at the end: "Anathema, Marana tha" — of which the former is Greek, the latter not so much Hebrew as Syriac. Jerome discusses this matter in a certain letter to Marcella, whose beginning is "Recently," and in his letter to Damasus on the word "Hosanna," in which he notes that Hilary, due to his ignorance of the Hebrew language, badly interpreted that word.

There are perhaps other advantages too in skill with languages. For I could not enumerate them all; but I have given enough to keep my discussion from being undermined through neglect of this matter. These points will, however, be better and more fully treated by others, who may perhaps take up the defense of languages as their special cause. In that case they may say whatever they wish, and we shall gladly listen, if they keep themselves within the bounds prescribed by religion and modesty; and provided they do not exchange either the true usefulness of languages for deceptive

vanity, or the old edition of the Latin translator for other new ones, supposedly more elegant and better.

For there are some who, since the ancient version of the New Testament is rather lacking in elegance and polish, would very much like it removed, and some more "Latin" version put in its place. They wish, it seems, to paint the wisdom of God with the colors of rhetorical art, and to adorn it, as if it were a young girl, with the little flowers of the rhetoricians. But that wisdom, being modest, does not seek ornament; being grave, it knows no cosmetic; being manly, it is not captivated by feminine adornment. "Without trappings," says someone, "is everything that genuine affection dictates." Love, then, knows no trappings. "The ornaments of eloquence," says another, "belong not to the business of action, but to leisure; nor are painted words the work of war, but of repose." Therefore, that which sounds the battle-cry, which exalts its voice like a trumpet, which thunders death upon the charging enemy, sounds something rough and barbaric, I know not what, not like a song played sweetly and melodiously on a lyre or cithara. What happened to Theopompus, who toyed with Sacred Scripture in the manner of the rhetoricians, has been handed down to memory.

But let us set aside these outside matters, and come to our own. "Not in persuasive words of human wisdom," he says, "but in the demonstration of the Spirit and of power." And again: "O Timothy, avoid," he says, "the profane novelties of words." If, then, even the novelty of words is to be avoided, antiquity is to be held fast; and if novelty is profane, then what is old is sacred — as Vincent of Lérins said.

Likewise: "The words of the Lord are pure words, silver tried by fire" — that is, from a pure and simple spirit, a pure and simple discourse was to be expected. Nor would anything but a chaste adornment befit a grave, honorable, and mature woman; see Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, book 4, chapter 6.

Wherefore I will say candidly: I have never been able to approve even those who have published paraphrases of the Sacred Letters, however Latin and elegant. For when they assume the persona of Christ or Paul speaking, the more elegantly and polishedly they speak, the less they preserve their spirit and majesty, and thus become, in some manner, guilty of an offense against that very spirit and majesty.

Certainly, what I said as a boy, with the great approval of wise men, still holds: if either Christ or Paul were to speak to me in their language, neither would be Christ to me, nor Paul. Christ is not, believe me, a polished speaker; he is not embellished, not elaborately adorned. As for Paul, he is indeed not unskilled in knowledge, but he is unskilled in speech. Allow Christ, then, his own tongue; allow Paul his own tongue: for both are like

the pen of a scribe writing swiftly, not laboring over every single word and letter. The old edition of the New Testament, then — for this is what we were discussing — although it is simple and unrefined, ought not for this reason to be esteemed less. On the third question, then, enough has been said.

Chapter XVI

In which are Set Forth the Arguments of Those Who Have Been of the Opinion that the Sacred Authors, in the Canonical Books, Did Not Always Speak by the Divine Spirit

The fourth controversy. Let this be the fourth consequent question: whether the sacred authors, in the canonical books, sometimes speak by a human spirit, without divine and supernatural revelation. For there were certain men of the Church, as Jerome attests in his proem to the Epistle to Philemon, who believed that the sacred authors did not always have the Spirit speaking within them.

The first argument. Because, they say, human weakness could not have sustained one unbroken tenor of the Holy Spirit through so long a course of discourse, nor is it fitting that we should, without cause, drag down the majesty of the Holy Spirit to the natural and evident necessities of this little body. They give examples of this from the second Epistle to Timothy: "The cloak which I left at Troas with Carpus, bring with you when you come"; and this: "Luke alone is with me"; and: "Trophimus I left sick"; and other things of this kind, which are found scattered throughout Paul's epistles, written in a human manner. The sacred writers, then, did not always have the Holy Spirit abiding and speaking within them. For this too was peculiar to Christ the Lord, as is said in John chapter 1: "Upon whomever you shall see the Spirit descending, and remaining upon him," etc.

This is confirmed, moreover, by this argument especially: that just as God does not fail in necessary things, so he does not overflow in superfluous ones, as Aristotle demonstrated. But for those things which were known by the natural light, supernatural revelation was not necessary. What, then, the sacred writers had seen and touched with their own hands, they spoke not by divine light infused, but in a human manner.

The second argument. Then, the Apostle, in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, lays down certain things, of which he asserts that they are the Lord's commands. "I command," he says, "not I, but the Lord." But shortly after he adds: "To the rest I say, not the Lord." But if Paul wrote everything from the internal revelation of the Holy Spirit, he certainly would not say, "I say, not the Lord," since such counsels, given by God's

revelation, are the Lord's — just as what was said by the prophets through revelation were the words of God. For a prophet would not have asserted: "This I say, not the Lord."

This argument Basil confirms not lightly, but, I dare say, most weightily, in book 5 Against Eunomius, the second-to-last chapter, in these words: "Whatever the Spirit speaks are the words of God; and for this reason all Scripture, divinely inspired and useful, is that which the Spirit has spoken. For this truly shows that the Spirit is not a creature; since every rational creature is such when it speaks the things that are God's: as when Paul says, 'Now concerning virgins I have no commandment, but I give counsel, as one who has received mercy; but to those who are joined in marriage I command, not I, but the Lord.' And the prophet: 'O Lord, I will speak judgments to you. What, since the wicked prosper?' And again: 'Woe to me, mother, why did you bear me?' But sometimes he says, 'Thus says the Lord.' And sometimes Moses: 'I am of slow speech and a stammering tongue.' But at times he himself says: 'Thus says the Lord: let my people go, that they may sacrifice to me.' But the Spirit does not speak thus. For he does not sometimes speak his own words, sometimes God's (for that belongs to a creature), but all the words of the Spirit are the words of God." Thus far Basil.

But Origen too, in homily 16 on Numbers, says: "The discourse which is written concerning Jonah, and was not fulfilled, seems to have been uttered by Jonah rather than by God. For it is not always necessary that the things said through a prophet be taken as having been said by God. For through Moses God indeed spoke many things, yet Moses also commanded some things by his own authority. This the Lord distinguishes with the most evident clarity in the Gospels, when, asked about the divorce of a woman, he says: 'Moses, because of the hardness of your heart, permitted you to put away your wives, but from the beginning it was not so,' etc. Paul too shows this in his letters, when he says of certain things: 'The Lord says, and not I'; and of other things: 'But this I say, not the Lord'; and again, in other places: 'I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give counsel'; and again: 'What I say, I do not say according to God.' Whence, similarly, even among the other prophets, some things the Lord spoke, and not the prophets; but other things the prophets spoke, and not the Lord." Thus far Origen, who embraced this same opinion also in the proem to his commentaries on John.

And Ambrose, book 8 On Luke, chapter 60, explaining that passage, "Because of the hardness of your heart," etc., says: "This passage shows that the things which were written on account of human frailty were not written by God. Whence also the Apostle says: 'I declare, not I, but the Lord, that a wife should not depart from her husband'; and below: 'But to the rest,' he says, 'I say, not the Lord: If anyone,' etc. Here the Apostle

denied that it is of divine law that any marriage whatsoever should be dissolved." Thus far Ambrose alone.

Since, then, Basil, Ambrose, and Origen — most distinguished men — held not only this opinion themselves, but even confirmed it with the testimonies of Sacred Scripture, it will be nothing absurd if we too assert that not everything the sacred authors wrote was written by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit.

The third argument. Add to this, that the Apostle, in the second Epistle to the Corinthians, says he was moved to repentance, because he had troubled them with the rebuke of his first epistle. But no one can repent of a thing once written, except one who believes that he erred in writing it. Paul, then, did not think that whatever he wrote to the Corinthians, he wrote by the Divine Spirit. Add again, that in this same later epistle, he says: "Wherein anyone is bold (I speak in foolishness), I am bold also. They are ministers of Christ (as one less wise, I say) I am more." But it is blasphemous to affirm that the words of the Holy Spirit were spoken "in foolishness." By the spirit of man, then, did Paul speak there. Add also, that in this same epistle, when the Apostle had said that he had labored more than all, having immediately added a correction, he teaches that he had spoken somewhat incautiously. "Yet not I," he says, "but the grace of God with me."

The fourth argument. Moreover, if everything the apostles prescribed proceeds entirely from divine authority and revelation, then certainly that precept of Paul's, by which he commands that a bishop be the husband of one wife, would be divine, not human. Thus it would follow that the Supreme Pontiff could not grant dispensation in this matter. For, as Augustine says to Januarius, no one would dare to alter what Christ had prescribed. But that a man who had been twice married should become bishop, the Supreme Pontiff, even with the whole world's approval, has at times done. Not all the Apostle's decrees, then, were prescribed with the Holy Spirit as their author.

The fifth argument. Moreover, Matthew slipped in his memory; for he placed "Jeremiah" instead of "Zechariah"; and Mark likewise, when he asserts that what was written in Malachi was written in Isaiah; and again when he reports that the Lord was crucified at the third hour, although he was judged by Pilate at about the sixth hour, as is said in John chapter 19. From which it follows that the Holy Spirit was not always present to every Evangelist in writing every detail.

The sixth argument. Moreover, Luke, in chapter 3 of his Gospel, says that Cainan was the son of Arphaxad, and Shelah the son of Cainan. But it is established, from Genesis chapter 11, that Shelah was not the grandson of Arphaxad, but his son, with no

intervening generation between them. There is, then, a superfluous generation in the genealogy of Christ, and so it was not inserted by the instinct of the Holy Spirit.

The seventh argument. Finally, this same Luke, in Acts chapter 7, relates many things which could not have been related under the breath of the Spirit. Such is, first, that Joseph summoned all his kindred, seventy-five souls. But it is well established, from Genesis 46 and Exodus 1, that only seventy souls are enumerated. Nor can it be said that Stephen is also reckoning those sons of Joseph who were born afterward, and saying, by anticipation or prolepsis, that these together with the others made seventy-five. For Joseph could not have summoned them. But Luke says that Joseph summoned seventy-five souls.

That which is added next is even more serious — that Jacob and the patriarchs were transferred to Shechem, although Josephus, Antiquities, book 2, chapter 8, asserts that the brothers of Joseph were buried in Hebron. In this matter he must be believed to have written nothing other than what was commonly held, handed down by tradition from the ancestors. Besides which, Luke here openly says that the patriarchs were buried in the tomb which Abraham bought. Yet it is certain that Abraham bought a tomb in Hebron, Genesis 23.

The third point is much more difficult, which he adds again: that Abraham bought the tomb from the sons of Hamor, the sons of Shechem. For Jacob indeed bought a piece of land from the sons of Hamor, as is written in Genesis chapter 33; but Abraham bought, not from the sons of Hamor, but from Ephron, son of Zohar, the double cave, as is clearly handed down in Genesis chapter 23. What of the fact that Luke says Hamor was the son of Shechem, although Genesis 33 says, on the contrary, that Hamor was the father of Shechem, not his son? In vain, then, it seems, do we assert that there is nothing in the Sacred Books that was not written under the breath of that same Spirit.

But on the contrary side, this is the consideration: that if certain things were written or recorded in the canonical books in a human manner and spirit, nothing would seem to prevent some falsehood from being among them. Now if we acknowledge any error in the Sacred Scriptures, who will believe their author to be the Holy Spirit?

Chapter XVII

In which it is Shown that the Individual Particulars of the Canonical Books Were Written with the Holy Spirit's Assistance

That, in this question and controversy, there have not been lacking those who embraced this former position, Saint Jerome attests — not only in the passage we cited a little above, but also in his commentaries on the fifth chapter of Micah. The mark of this error has also been branded on Erasmus, to say nothing of others. How impious this error is, I demonstrate first by this argument: that the authority of the Sacred Scriptures is, in great part, undermined, if this opinion is true. For, as Augustine says, if any single falsehood whatsoever is found in any Sacred Book, the certainty of the whole book perishes. By this one argument Augustine, On the Harmony of the Gospels, book 2, chapter 12, believes it has been sufficiently shown and made clear that the writings of the prophets and apostles contain no falsehood at all — not only the falsehood that is produced by lying, but not even that which arises from forgetfulness.

In light matters, they say, and matters that pertain nothing to our salvation, the sacred authors both are deceived and deceive. We can, then, call into doubt those things which are the greatest and most weighty. The case is not the same, they say; since, if the Spirit, by whom the sacred authors had to instruct the Church, abandons the Church itself in small things, he does not therefore at once abandon it in great things. For the gravest theologians agree that the Church can err in the smallest matters, but cannot err in the greatest. What, then, they say, prevents us from asserting, in the same way, that the apostles and evangelists sometimes slipped in matters of small importance, while they did not slip in necessary matters? For if it pleases the heavens, they recognize such errors especially in the apostles and evangelists.

But if we say, "The Spirit suggested everything to the apostles and evangelists," they say: "Not absolutely everything, but whatever Christ had said to them. But these were the greatest things." If we add, "The Spirit taught them all truth," they reply: "Not absolutely all, indeed, but whatever was necessary for salvation." Thus these men try to slip away. But they try in vain nonetheless.

For first, what, I ask, will these men do, if they should debate by name with one who says that many of the miracles of the Gospels are fabricated, and that the Evangelists, following the example of Herodotus, Xenophon, and Plato, made use of invented narratives, either for the sake of glorifying Christ, or for stirring up the affections of the faithful toward Christ? Surely men could do this without the Spirit of God.

Then, how easily will it be for anyone to judge matters either grave or light according to his own opinion and disposition? Now one man will tell you that to preach three persons of one substance is a small matter, and does not pertain to our salvation; now another will contend that two operations and two wills in Christ are not weighty matters. For someone will also judge it a light matter, to be disregarded, that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from a single principle. Indeed, that Christ rose on the third day or the fourth, since it does not greatly pertain to salvation, someone will think of no consequence. In these matters, then, the evangelists, apostles, and prophets could err, slip, and be mistaken.

Moreover, to pass over the rest of the Scripture, in the sacred histories it could not be distinguished or discerned what comes from God, what from man; what the author produces from divine revelation, and what, on the contrary, from human spirit and ingenuity. Wherefore the faith of both readers and listeners would waver everywhere, while not knowing by what spirit — man's or God's — any particular passage of the Sacred Chronicles had been written.

Who, indeed, is so shameless (to speak somewhat in a human manner on behalf of the evangelists) that, if he wished to write something for public consumption concerning matters whose memory was most recent, and which the readers had not so much heard with their ears as embraced with their eyes, he would insert things of his own accord which, while contributing nothing to the matter, would render the whole narrative false and uncertain? Were the evangelists so foolish, that they would either fabricate, or even assert as certain, things they could have omitted without any risk — and this with manifest peril to the very cause they had undertaken to persuade people of? If they had been such men, certainly the Jews, to whom they were so greatly hateful, would have striven with every force and skill, and would indeed have succeeded, in exposing such fictions or errors.

But we are speaking in a human manner. For if, in their sudden public preachings, the Holy Spirit attuned the tongues of the apostles, how much more in their writings, which were to endure forever? And if the apostles and evangelists were made fit ministers of the New Testament, their sufficiency, indeed, is not from themselves, but from God: their error, then, would be God's, not theirs. For we have received the Testament of Christ from the apostles; and when we hear them, we hear Christ; when we read their Gospel, we read the Gospel of Christ.

But if the law of Moses, which is the ministry of death, was written with such exact diligence that not one iota or one tittle of it could be passed over, then much more

certainly will the Gospel of Christ, which is the ministry of spirit and of life, have been written with such great care and the assisting breath of God, that not only is there no word, but not even any single letter, which was not supplied by the Divine Spirit.

What of the fact that the Apostle utterly recoils from an officious lie, even one that might seem most conducive to the praise of God, saying: "But if Christ has not risen again, then is our preaching vain, and your faith also is vain. Yes, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have testified against God, that he raised up Christ, whom he has not raised up, if the dead rise not again"? But if this falsehood — which would have both commended God's power and kept the people in their duty — is excluded from the sacred authors, certainly any other falsehood will, much more, be rejected. For there would be no light falsehood at all in the Sacred Letters, but a grave one, by which the authority of Scripture would be diminished.

Now if we should wish to bring forward, in confirmation of this matter, testimonies from the secret Letters themselves, it is indeed to be feared that those who wish to maintain the opposite error might defend themselves on this very ground — that the author of Sacred Scripture, even in the passage we shall cite, was speaking not from the Divine Spirit, but from his own. Thus it would happen that scarcely any testimony from the Sacred Letters would be firm against heretics. Wherefore let us remove these men, who, by their erroneous opinion, both diminish the force and lessen the authority of all Scripture, from this discussion entirely. Let us ourselves confess that every single thing, whether great or small, was published by the sacred authors under the dictation of the Holy Spirit. This we have received from the fathers; this is implanted and, as it were, engraved upon the minds of the faithful; this, then, both we ourselves, and the Church especially, as our teacher and guide, ought to hold fast.

Chapter XVIII

In which the Arguments of Chapter Sixteen are Refuted

Response to the first. For confirming and defending the truth, those supports of reasonings and testimonies which were set out in the preceding chapter should be enough. Now, however, those arguments must be refuted with which the adversaries fought against it.

And from the first argument, by which the truth was attacked, the defense is easy and ready. For I admit that the individual particles of Scripture, in order to be written by the sacred authors, did not need a proper and express revelation; but I truly and rightly maintain that each particular was nonetheless written from a special instinct and

inspiration of the Holy Spirit.

"He," Christ says, "will teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance whatever I have said to you." Sometimes he will bring to mind things forgotten; sometimes he will bring to mind things heard with their own ears; things which could otherwise have come to mind naturally and of their own accord — these too he will suggest, not only supernatural things but natural ones as well, and things which would otherwise be written in a human manner. "Everything," he says, "whatever I have said to you."

And the Apostle says: "We have received, not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit who is from God, that we may know the things that have been given to us by God; which things also we speak, not in the learned words of human wisdom, but in the doctrine of the Spirit, comparing spiritual things with spiritual. For the spiritual man judges all things, as it is written: 'Who has known the mind of the Lord?' But we have the mind of Christ."

Behold: the apostles, in whose name Paul speaks, received the Spirit for publishing the doctrine of the Spirit, by which they judged all things in the mind of Christ. Surely those living creatures, full of eyes all around, placed as an emblem of the four evangelists, we can rightly and most fittingly apply to all the sacred writers. The sacred authors, then, wrote nothing with blind eyes, but the Spirit himself guided the pen of the writers, lest they err in writing. For this reason, when in his second Epistle to the Corinthians the Apostle had said certain things which could have been said, in a human manner, by a leader of the Church, he immediately added: "Do you seek proof of him who speaks in me — Christ?" By the Holy Spirit, then, inspired, the holy men of God wrote whatever parts of Scripture they wrote.

"Do not think," he says, "how, or what you shall speak; for it shall be given you in that hour what you shall speak." This same precept indeed was given to the sacred authors — that they should not think about how or what they should write; for it was given to them, in that hour, what they should write. This gift of the Holy Spirit, however, they did not have throughout the entire course of their lives; but only for so long as their tongue was the pen of a scribe writing swiftly.

But Christ never spoke a single word that did not also proceed from the Holy Spirit. For, to use the language of the schools, the most sacred tongue of Christ Jesus was the eternal instrument of his divinity.

And from this the certain collapse of that argument is apparent, by which we then confirmed the contrary position. For we do not assert that every part whatsoever of

Sacred Scripture was published by an immediate revelation of the Holy Spirit, which would properly be called "revelation."

Indeed Luke himself committed to writing the things he received from the apostles, as he attests in the proem to his Gospel; and that Mark, having been asked by the disciples, wrote what he had learned from Peter, is attested by Clement, in book 6 of the Dispositions, in Eusebius, book 2, Ecclesiastical History, chapter 15; Papias, in the same author, the same book, etc., and book 8, the last chapter; and Origen, book 1 of his Commentaries on Matthew, as related by the same Eusebius, book 6, chapter 18; and Eusebius himself too, book 3, chapter 4; and Jerome, On Illustrious Men, under Mark; and Irenaeus, Against Heresies, book 3, chapter 1. Whether, then, Matthew and John, or Mark and Luke — although the former related things seen, the latter things heard — did not need new revelation of the Holy Spirit, they nevertheless needed the special direction of the Holy Spirit. We have, then, in this manner satisfied the first argument.

Response to the second. To the second, let this be the answer. Paul, in that passage, indeed calls "the Lord's" either a command or a counsel which Christ the Lord either commanded or counseled with his own mouth in the Gospel. For that Paul thought his own counsel to be the counsel of the Holy Spirit, he himself sufficiently indicates, saying: "She will be more blessed, if she so remains, according to my counsel: but I think that I too have the Spirit of God."

The confirmation of this argument, moreover, is drawn especially from what was answered to the first argument. For the things the sacred authors wrote fall into a twofold distinction. Some things they knew only through supernatural revelation, and these Basil hands down as being from the Holy Spirit; other things they held by natural knowledge — namely, things they had either seen with their eyes, or even touched with their hands. And these latter things, as we said a little before, did not need supernatural light and express revelation in order to be written; but they nevertheless needed the presence and special help of the Holy Spirit, so that, although they were human and known by natural reason, they might nevertheless be written down by divine power without any error. These, indeed, are the things which, according to Basil, Paul and the prophets spoke of their own accord.

Some too are accustomed to cite, of the ancients, not only the opinions but even the very words of Origen, which surely should be taken no differently than Origen himself took them. But Origen rather indicated this matter than asserted it. For he does not persist in this opinion. Indeed Ambrose too, in his commentary on the first Epistle to the Corinthians, where the passage properly belongs, most clearly agreed with us.

Response to the third. To that which was objected in the third place, the response is brief and not difficult. For there, "to repent" does not mean "to change one's mind," but "to grieve." Now a father grieves when he sees his children sorrowing, but rejoices when he understands that the sorrow has led to salvation. As for what is added, this too is most easy. For the manner in which Paul is to be understood, Paul himself explains, saying: "What I speak, I do not speak according to God, but as it were in foolishness"; and a little before: "Again I say, lest anyone think me to be foolish; otherwise, take me as a fool"; and in chapter 12 of this same epistle: "If I wish to boast, I shall not be foolish; for I shall speak the truth"; and a little after: "I have become foolish; you have compelled me."

What, then — is he wise or foolish? Surely wise in truth, but as if foolish, seeming to assume the role of a fool and to boast of himself. For praising oneself is the mark of a foolish man. But this, which seemed to be foolishness, was the wisdom of God, so that the Apostle might boast not of his own will, but compelled to it, not out of vanity, but out of charity. This seemingly foolish boasting, then, was from the Holy Spirit.

But not even what follows is difficult. For it is not, as someone says, that Paul had spoken incautiously; but, lest anyone interpret in that praise any arrogance or vanity, he teaches that he glories not in himself, but in the Lord. "Yet not I," he says, "but the grace of God with me." This is much like the fact that, when the Lord had called the doctrine of the Gospel his own, he immediately added: "My doctrine is not mine, but his who sent me, the Father's." In this manner, then, when Paul had truly said that he had labored more than all, he adds — and truly adds — that he had not labored more than all, etc.

Response to the fourth. To the fourth argument there are those who reply that the authority of the Church is so great that it has even changed certain things concerning the Sacred Scriptures. They give examples of this kind: the Sabbath; the eating of what is strangled, and of blood; baptism in the name of Jesus; and that Christ gave the Eucharist to those who had eaten supper, while the Church gives it to the fasting; that Christ gave it under both kinds, the Church to the laity under one; that, finally, Paul permitted spouses unequal in faith to remain married, while the Church has disapproved this. Thus, although it is a law of Scripture that one who has had two wives should not be ordained bishop, the Church can nevertheless either partly dissolve, or even entirely abrogate, that law.

This response, however, has a certain path which leads to a consistency and preservation of ecclesiastical authority — which, if we follow, we shall never go astray, and we shall follow both what is certain and safe, and what is fitted to the union of the faithful, and what is forceful and strong. But it must surely be guarded against, lest, in refuting

arguments, if we take refuge in the Church as if at an altar, we appear to be peasants rather than theologians.

To me, then, another response seems much more learned and more true, one which rests on a twofold distinction. The first is this: certain precepts of Scripture were temporary — that is, to be observed for a time, according to the circumstances of place, time, persons, or other matters and causes. And precepts of this kind were, of themselves, abrogated at a predetermined time, without any intervention even of the Church's authority. For what was established for the necessity of the time ought equally to cease when the necessity ceases that compelled it — distinction 1, question 1, "Quod pro necessitate." Of this kind was the observance of the Sabbath and all the other things which properly pertained to the old law; of this kind too was that law concerning things sacrificed to idols, blood, and what is strangled; of this kind, finally, was the apostolic custom of baptism in the name of Jesus.

Other precepts, however, are eternal, whose obligation to be observed is not brief and temporal, but perpetual and everlasting. By "everlasting," I mean, according to the usage of Scripture, what will always be, not what has always been. In this category are all the precepts of nature, which are contained in both the Old and the New Testament; in this category too is that law: "Unless one is born again," etc., and another similar one concerning the Sacrament of Penance.

The precepts of the apostles, again, which are written in the Sacred Letters, are of two kinds: some they received from Christ himself, to be published to the nations, according to that saying: "Baptize all nations, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you"; others, however, were not in fact enjoined upon the apostles by Christ, but they themselves, after Christ's ascension into heaven, handed these down to the peoples. These, nevertheless, are called the precepts of Christ and of God, not only for this reason, that they were promulgated through the power received from the Lord, but also because they were published under the special suggestion of God's Spirit. "It seemed good," they say, "to the Holy Spirit, and to us, to impose nothing more upon you," etc. Citing these words, Basil, book 5 Against Eunomius, says: "It seemed good to the Spirit indeed, from whom, as Lord of the Church, the laws were given; but to the apostles as ministers, through whom the decrees were published." That these precepts can also be called Christ's, Christ himself teaches, saying: "He who hears you, hears me; and he who rejects you, rejects me."

Among these commands of Scripture, however, there is a not insignificant distinction: that the former, those handed down by the Lord to the apostles, since they are the

proper precepts of the new law, the Church can neither dissolve nor remit to anyone, just as it cannot the law of nature either. The reason for this we gave in our lecture On Penance — namely, that Christ the Lord, as the author of the evangelical law, himself published no precepts personally, except those which were supremely necessary for salvation.

But the latter commands were, properly speaking, human and ecclesiastical — those, namely, which were published by the apostles as they governed the Church, no differently than other precepts were afterward published by the leaders of the Church who succeeded them, though with unequal authority. For none of the apostles could err in their precepts; rather, each of them was guided most specially by the Holy Spirit in laying down the laws of the Church. But the later bishops do not have this special presence of the Holy Spirit, except when they are gathered together in Christ's and the Church's name — which indeed happens at general Councils. On this matter we shall discuss more fully afterward in book 5.

But these precepts — although they were apostolic, and even written in the Sacred Letters — the Supreme Pontiff can free his subjects from, either in part, or entirely; and by this same reasoning, even if no other applied, that apostolic law concerning abstaining from blood and what is strangled could have been abrogated through the Church's power. Although, as we said, the Gentiles were warned by that law not to abuse their liberty to the offense of the brethren. The apostles, however, prescribe only as far as was expedient for the time, in which matters those Gentiles might give offense to the brethren. Since, then, a law must be judged by its purpose, this law is understood to be abrogated when there is no longer any danger from those offenses and disagreements which the apostles wished to forestall.

These points being established, the fourth argument, I think, will easily be refuted. For Paul's precept about not ordaining as bishop a man who has been twice married is of the second kind — that is, human and ecclesiastical — whose binding force the Church can, by its own right, dissolve. But it has not done this, except once or twice, and even then only under a grave and pressing cause. Nor is this permitted to anyone in the Church except the Supreme Pontiff; for bishops are not permitted, against the Apostle, to grant dispensation to men twice married, as Lucius and Innocent teach.

Saint Augustine, however, was speaking of laws of the first kind — which, if Christ himself promulgated them, since they are truly and properly divine and evangelical, no one either can or dares to alter. On the fourth argument, then, I think enough has been said to dispose of it.

Response to the fifth. The fifth, however, is refuted thus. First, there are those who hold that, either through the malice of impious men, or through a copyist's error, "Jeremiah" was written instead of "Zechariah." This was the opinion of Eusebius, Demonstration of the Gospel, book 10, demonstration 4. This view did not displease Origen either, and Cajetan judged it likely to be true. Nor is Jerome certainly averse to this opinion; indeed, on Psalm 77, he says that, through a scribal error, "Jeremiah" was substituted for "Zechariah." There are others who think that this same saying was once found written in Jeremiah too, but that not all of Jeremiah's prophecies now exist. Augustine too, in his book On the Harmony of the Evangelists, book 3, chapter 7, holds the opinion that, since Jeremiah and Zechariah wrote by the same Spirit, it makes no difference if you attribute the saying of one to the other; indeed, he thinks this was done by the special design of the Holy Spirit, that all the Sacred Books might be believed to have been written by one and the same author.

As for that objection raised against Mark the Evangelist, this is usually thought trivial by those who generally weigh the Latin edition against the Greek exemplars. In these, since it is not read, "as it is written in Isaiah," but rather, "as it is written in the Prophets," they say the argument is weak, since it rests on a corruption of the manuscripts. That Theophylact subscribed to this opinion can certainly easily be shown. For he does not read "in Isaiah," but "in the Prophets." And Jerome too, in his commentary on Matthew chapter 3, subscribes to this same opinion, saying: "We think that the name 'Isaiah' was added through the fault of the copyists, which we can also prove from other passages; or certainly that one body of text was made from various scriptural testimonies." Jerome, then, thinks — whichever explanation you accept — that the passage has been corrupted. This he also believed concerning Psalm 13.

But Erasmus, although he admits that all the Greek exemplars he was himself able to see have "in the Prophets," nevertheless approves our reading, and asserts that the Greek text was altered by the Greeks. Jerome himself too, in his letter to Pammachius, On the Best Method of Translating, approves only this reading which we have; nor does he even mention the other reading there at all. And Porphyry, book 14.

He accuses Mark the Evangelist on this charge: that he, an unskilled and uneducated man, did not even know his own letters, since he reports something as though written by one and the same prophet, when it was written not by one, but by two. To this slander, Chrysostom, in replying, does not claim either that the manuscripts are corrupt, or that the passage was certainly distorted by some impious person; rather he plainly agrees that it is to be read in exactly the manner in which Porphyry read it in his objection.

From this it becomes plain that, before the times of Chrysostom and Jerome, all the manuscripts, both Greek and Latin, agreed with our edition. Here I cannot help laughing at these new translators, who, with such ease and confidence, correct the not-corrupt Latin from the corrupt Greek. For surely they will tolerate it, if we now play at their game, since it is their habit to play at ours — indeed, they will rather tolerate that, what their standard-bearer Erasmus does here with utmost right and great reason, we too should do in other passages, and, setting aside the Greek exemplars, venerate the Latin edition.

But to bring the discourse back to where it digressed: since this argument is not as easy as it seemed to these men, it must be refuted with much greater force and skill. Those words, then, "as it is written in Isaiah," do not refer to everything that follows, but only to this: "the voice of one crying in the wilderness," etc. But the words, "Behold, I send my messenger," etc., the Evangelist added as if from himself — which he could rightly do, even though the same words are found in another prophet. For, if I am citing Aristotle, it is not necessary that all the words that follow be Aristotle's own; indeed I am permitted to add some things of my own, especially if they greatly contribute to explaining Aristotle.

Thus, since those words of the Evangelist — "Behold, I send my messenger," etc. — were a kind of explanation of Isaiah's words, it detracts nothing from Mark's reliability, if he both explained and adorned Isaiah's testimony by adding such words. Unless he is a faithless servant who, by adding ornament of words, enhances the gift of his master. This is Chrysostom's response. Jerome, however, says that the evangelists were concerned not with the precise words but with the sense; and that all those things which follow in Mark, written by Isaiah, are there not according to the precise words, but according to the sense. For he who openly said, "the voice of one crying," etc., understood that this was the same angel who would prepare the way for the Lord. And this response is especially approved by Bede, in his commentary on Mark.

Now, as to the fact that Mark too is charged with falsity, for having written that Christ was crucified at the third hour, I see four opinions held on this matter, none of which is without need of greater probability. The first is held by those who note that John does not write that Pilate sat upon the judgment seat at about the sixth hour of the day, but at about the sixth hour of the Preparation. But the day and the Preparation begin from different points. For it is consonant with reason that the Jews were accustomed to attend to the paschal preparation before the beginning of the day — that is, before sunrise. For if Christians, in the vigils of such feasts, begin to make certain necessary preparations long before dawn, the Jews are to be believed to have done the same, and even more so,

since they had to prepare not only unleavened bread for many days, but also many other things, both for the feast day and for the evening of the Passover.

There are also others, following Augustine, who think that Mark was not speaking of the crucifixion by the soldiers, but of the crucifixion by the Jews. For these latter were chiefly the ones who crucified Christ, as Peter declared to them in Acts chapter 4. So that the Evangelist might show that the Lord Jesus was crucified not so much by the soldiers — who performed only a simple service for the governor — as by the Jews, after he had described the soldiers' service, saying, "And crucifying him, they divided," etc., he then, returning to the voice that demanded the just man's blood, and the authors of that crime, attributed the cross of the Lord to them, in these words: "Now it was the third hour, and they crucified him." He did not think the hour of the soldiers' crucifixion needed to be expressed, since it was commonly known.

Others believe they sufficiently address this difficulty by saying that Christ was crucified between the third and sixth hours, and that, as is usual with intermediate points, the hour of Christ's death was named from both extremes — from one, the third; from the other, the sixth. But this response presents an evident difficulty. For if something happens at the fifth hour, and someone says it happened at either the fourth or sixth hour from either extreme, although he speaks improperly, this can nonetheless somehow be tolerated. But that what happens at the fifth hour should be said to happen at the third or second, neither usage nor reason permits. Others, then, propose this: that, just as the night was divided by the Jews into four watches, so the day was divided into four stations or parts. The first of these began at dawn and lasted until the third hour of the day, and was called "the first," because it took its beginning from the first hour; the second began at the third hour and lasted until the sixth, and was called "the third hour," because it had its beginning from the third hour; the third part of the day began at the sixth hour and lasted until the ninth, and was likewise named, from the hour at which it began, "the sixth hour"; the fourth station and part of the day, finally, began at the ninth hour and lasted until sunset, and was called either "the ninth hour" or "evening."

If these things are true, the evangelists will agree beautifully. For in the second station, which was called "the third hour," Christ was crucified near its end — that hour, namely, not yet having elapsed. A little earlier, however, in this same hour and station of the day, Pilate sat upon the judgment seat — that is, at about the sixth hour. For it was truly the third hour still, but it was close to the sixth.

This opinion, no doubt, will be by far the most probable, if it can be proven that the day was usually divided by the Jews in this manner. And indeed, in the history of the Passion,

explicit mention is made of the hours of dawn, the third, sixth, and ninth; but of the intervening hours, nothing at all is said. But the parable of the householder hiring laborers for his vineyard, which these men also cite in confirmation of this matter, not only does not help, but actually works against them, since there the Lord mentions not only the first, third, sixth, and ninth hours, but also the eleventh. This would be absurd, if the fourth part of the day — that is, the ninth hour — encompassed all the remaining time of that same day. And in truth, to put it briefly and simply, he who made explicit mention of the eleventh hour, which falls between the ninth and the twelfth, most certainly did not divide the day in that manner into four stations and four hours, but, as is our custom, into twelve parts and hours. But however these matters stand, we shall most gladly subscribe to this response, if that division of the day into four stations, and those four namings derived again from their beginnings, can be supported either by suitable testimony or by probable reasoning.

Nor are there lacking those who think all this was invented by the more recent Jews. For the second station of the day, since it encompassed only three hours — the fourth, fifth, and sixth — should have been named, not "the third hour" from the end, that is, of the immediately preceding station, but "the fourth hour" from the beginning of that same station. Who, indeed, could tolerate a station that extends from the tenth hour to the end of the twelfth, being called "the ninth hour"? Certainly, just as the first hour, if what these men say is true, takes its name from its own beginning, so too the other stations would be named from their own proper beginnings.

It seems to me the simplest reasoning for explaining this passage, if, with Theophylact and Cajetan, we should say that Mark wrote thus: "Now it was the sixth hour" — but that unlearned or careless copyists changed that mark for "six" into a "G," which is the mark for "three." This was easy to do, in this passage, on account of some similarity of the letters, and it is better known than that it needs pointing out that this often happens in authors whose books contain numbers and marks of this kind.

Nor was it only the authority of Theophylact and Cajetan that moved me to hold this opinion, but reason as well. For that the Lord was crucified truly and properly at the sixth hour — to leave aside the fact that this is also commonly believed by Christians and is everywhere celebrated in the office and prayers of the Cross — is certainly gathered from the Gospel of John. For he relates that Pilate sat upon the judgment seat at about the sixth hour. The fifth hour, then, had almost entirely elapsed. Otherwise it would falsely be called "about the sixth hour." But it is incredible that what remained of the fifth hour, since it was so brief and small a space, was not used up in passing the sentence, in receiving Jesus and leading him forth, in carrying the cross all the way to the place of

Calvary. For the distance between the places was not small, nor was there such speed along the way that Simon of Cyrene could not be pressed into service in the meantime, and Christ could not address the women in a not insignificant discourse.

Thus, without doubt, if Mark meant to speak properly and truly (and there is no reason why he should not have wished to), he did not write that the Lord was crucified at the third hour, but at the sixth. This Jerome, if indeed he is the author of these commentaries, openly teaches on Psalm 77. But whoever expounded that psalm, if it was not Jerome, was certainly a learned man. And Erasmus, in his annotations on this passage in Mark, cites this commentary under Jerome's name.

It is added that Mark generally writes nothing other than what Matthew writes, and this especially in the history of Christ's passion. Wherefore, when I consider that Mark, in the history of the passion, wrote not only the same things in the same order as Matthew, but even in almost the very same words, I am easily led to believe that he himself wrote not the mark for "three," but for "six," as it is in Matthew.

As for what the author of the commentaries on Mark, which circulate under Jerome's title, objects to this opinion, it is most easily refuted. "If the Lord," he says, "was crucified at the sixth hour, so that darkness covered the earth from the sixth to the ninth hour, those passing by could not have shaken their heads at him, whom they could not at all see through the darkness." To this I respond, most briefly, that Christ was crucified at the beginning of the sixth hour. But as that same hour was passing, insults were hurled at him. Yet around the end of that same hour, darkness surrounded the world — which Mark seems most aptly to indicate by these words: "And when the sixth hour was come" (facta hora sexta). For what is more ready to hand than to understand "come" not as "beginning," but as "completed"? For that is correctly said, both in common usage and by philosophers, to have "come about" (factum) which is not just begun, but consummated.

From this, whether Osiander likes it or not, it is plainly understood that all the Evangelist's statements cohere, if we read: "Now it was the sixth hour, and they crucified him." Since, during the course of that hour, the things happened which the Evangelist relates next, he therefore finally says: "And when the sixth hour was come, there was darkness," etc. — so that, the hour now having been completed, unless we are very slow, we should understand that the darkness had then come about. And on the fifth objection, then, enough, I think, has been quite abundantly disputed.

Response to the sixth. As for that objection which was placed in the sixth position, by what method our friend Cajetan has attempted to repel it, I make this confession, indeed, unwillingly, but I shall make it nonetheless, lest I seem to have spared our own

side in defending the truth of the Gospel. He indicates, first (for he does not persist in this opinion afterward), that Luke the Evangelist followed the error of the Seventy translators in this passage, but without any error of his own. This I am not only unable to understand, but cannot even form a conception of in thought.

For if the Evangelist, unawares, follows the erring Seventy translators in the history of the Gospel, then, although unaware, he nevertheless errs. But if, knowingly and deliberately, as is said, he inserts a fabricated narrative from the Seventy into his own Gospel, he errs all the more, in that he deliberately contaminates the sincerity of the Gospel with a fabricated story.

In short: if Cainan was not the son of Arphaxad, nor Shelah the son of Cainan, then the Gospel history is certainly false, in which it is not obscurely said that Cainan was the son of Arphaxad, and Shelah the son of Cainan. Now, that Luke had the most weighty authorities, whom he followed in this error, may perhaps free the Evangelist from blame, but it certainly cannot free the Gospel from error. For this reason, I think Steuchus of Gubbio deserving of all the more rebuke, who openly, constantly, and without any tempering of modesty or reverence, asserts that the Seventy erred, and that Luke followed them in their error.

Now, as to what Jerome says against Helvidius — that the evangelists sometimes express the opinion of the common people, which, as he says, is the true law of history — this is rightly said, if you look to the words used. For not only historians, but absolutely all wise men, as Aristotle pointed out, although they think differently from the common people, often speak according to the common people; yet they do not for that reason speak falsely. Thus Scripture calls "brothers" those who, according to the strict rules of philosophy, are not properly and truly brothers, but who are commonly called brothers, and this without falsity. Thus too the evangelists called Joseph the father of the Lord, yet they did not, in fact, follow a false opinion of the crowd, even though they were speaking according to common usage. For Joseph was called the father of Christ without lying, both because he was his foster-father, and because he was the husband of Christ's mother: for both are accustomed to be called fathers.

What, then, are we to do, who, as the proverb says, hold a wolf by both ears? For if we strive to assert and defend the version of the Old Testament which the Church uses, we accuse not only the Seventy translators of a most insipid invention, but even the Evangelist of a most evident error. But if we wish to defend and protect Luke, we discredit a version of Sacred Scripture approved by the Church's usage and decree. One falls into Scylla while trying to avoid Charybdis.

For us, however, this above all must be avoided: that we should not deprive Luke the Evangelist, and thereby the Gospel of Christ, of its own — that is, divine — authority. Let us, then, defend that generation in the genealogy of Christ which Luke set down from the edition of the Seventy translators. For the Church too has approved this edition through its own usage. All the Greek writers, certainly, recognize this generation along with the Seventy translators; so too does Augustine, The City of God, book 16, chapter 10. Nor is it likely, by any means, that the Seventy translators — good men — vainly and frivolously invented that one generation.

What of the fact that, as Origen says, this is to be held as true in the Divine Scriptures, which the Seventy translators rendered? For this is what has been confirmed by apostolic authority. Our edition of the Old Testament, then, is in fact incomplete. The exemplars, however, which Jerome obtained, were not complete either. Thus he could, without fault or error, omit one generation. For the evangelist Matthew too omitted several, and omitted them without error, when he was composing the genealogy of Christ. Otherwise we would be defending our edition from all falsity indeed, but not from all incompleteness.

Nor does it escape me what has been said by Hartmann, John Nauclerus, and Lucidus — that the Gospel of Luke is corrupted, and that, instead of the word "fuit" ("was"), the particle "et" ("and also") should be substituted, in this manner: "Who was Shelah, who was also Cainan" — so that Shelah is understood to have had two names. But these men do not seem to have read the edition of the Seventy, from which the Evangelist received the name "Cainan." For in the edition of the Seventy translators, it cannot even be imagined that Shelah and Cainan were the same person.

But this controversy is resolved otherwise, and perhaps better, if we say that the true and accurate Hebrew exemplars do not in fact have that generation of Cainan, but that it was added by the Seventy translators. Nor was it added falsely; rather it was held, either from the tradition of the ancestors, or from histories worthy of belief, that Arphaxad begot Cainan, and Cainan begot Shelah. The Seventy translators, then, not only truly but perhaps even prudently inserted that single generation — fearing, namely, that the pagans might accuse either the ancient traditions of the Hebrews, or even the Sacred Letters themselves, of falsehood, if they should read in these that Arphaxad begot Shelah, while learning from those traditions that it was not Arphaxad, but Cainan, who begot Shelah.

The Spirit of God, however, by a hidden design known to us, moved the mind and hand of Moses, so that he passed over that one generation in the series of the fathers — just as,

by divine counsel, Matthew also omitted several in the genealogy of Christ. That the same cause applied to both Moses and Matthew, we may not absurdly gather by this conjecture.

Matthew, when he first listed the ancestors of Christ, says: "All the generations from Abraham to David," etc. — so that no one might suspect that some ancestor had been left out by a slip of memory, rather than deliberately omitted in silence. And although the Evangelist could perhaps give many reasons for this fact, he nevertheless seems, in his epilogue, to put forward chiefly that reason which involves the commending of the number fourteen. For this reason, indeed, he wished the three orders of generations to be equal in number, so that the number fourteen might be consecrated three times over in the Lord's genealogical line. That Moses did the same thing, for an entirely similar reason, is altogether plausible. For from Adam to Noah he wove ten generations; and from Noah to Abraham, ten others again — so that we might understand that there lies hidden some mystery in the number ten, into which he had compressed both series of the ancestors. Why, however, the number fourteen is referred to the evangelical law, but the number ten to the law of nature, is not for this occasion or this place to discuss. Here we say only this: that the Seventy translators did not add the generation of Cainan without reason, nor did Moses omit this same generation without a mystery; that both were done truly, and both prudently; and that, in the one case, Luke truly and prudently followed them. Nor should anyone make a great commotion against us, because we have said that our edition is incomplete in certain places.

For several Hebrew words can be brought forward, which Jerome himself, in his commentaries, admits could have been translated more meaningfully and better. Indeed, on Isaiah chapter 19, he says: "In that passage which we translated as 'bending and bridling,' we could say 'crooked and wanton.' But we, in quickly translating what was written, were deceived by ambiguity, and said 'bridling' for the Hebrew word agmon. Aquila translated it more meaningfully as streblounta, that is, 'one who does nothing right, but everything perverse.'" Thus far Jerome — who, in chapter 9 of this same prophet, had translated the same word as "perverting." And indeed neither the sense nor the Hebrew words allow us to admit "bridling," which will need to be explained elsewhere. On the sixth argument, then, enough has been said, I think, with sufficient care.

Response to the seventh. To that which finally follows, placed seventh, there are many and varied responses given by the most learned men, but ones so improbable that they satisfy neither the learned nor the pious. For the first particular of the objection, Augustinus Steuchus of Gubbio repels in this way: he says that, in the edition of the

Seventy translators, both Genesis 46 and Exodus 1, through a copyist's error, "75" was written instead of "70 souls." The same corruption occurred at the hands of copyists in Acts 7 as well; or else Luke, not knowing Hebrew, cited the passage as it stood at that time, already corrupted; or else, if the Seventy translators had indeed so rendered it, the Evangelist followed their edition, which was everywhere most widely received.

But Jerome, in his Hebrew Questions, attributes nothing to the negligence of copyists, but teaches that the Hebrew truth indeed protests against this; that the Seventy translators, however, by prolepsis (anticipation), put down seventy-five souls; and that Luke ought not to write anything contrary to that Scripture which had already been published among the Gentiles. For at that time, at least, the authority of the Seventy translators was held in greater esteem than Luke's, who was considered, among the nations, an unknown and lowly man, not of great reliability. "Although very many relate," he says, "that Luke the Evangelist, as a proselyte, was ignorant of Hebrew letters." Thus far Jerome alone.

Now, to begin from the start, it is scarcely credible that all the exemplars, both new and old, Greek and Latin, were corrupted in three places at once. But that no author before Steuchus, although very many had encountered these passages and this question, could notice so evident a matter, seems to me by no means likely. And if we resort, at our pleasure, to the carelessness of copyists for resolving such knots, it is indeed to be feared that, while we try to expose someone else's ignorance, we expose our own. Otherwise, if this is acceptable, let us explain all ambiguous questions, and everything that seems to conflict in Sacred Scripture, in this same manner.

This is exactly what Steuchus does everywhere. For, in order to dispose of the final part of the objection too, he asserts that, through the fault of the scribes, "Abraham" was written instead of "Jacob," and "of the Father" instead of "of the Son." Certainly if Saint Jerome, when the authority of the Seventy translators themselves was objected to him, could defend himself by this same kind of defense, he would have most gladly made use of it. But, seeing that all the exemplars marvelously agreed, and that all the expositors said one and the same thing, he did not plead that the manuscripts were corrupt, but confessed plainly that the Seventy translators had indeed rendered it thus, and that Luke the Evangelist followed them.

But that Luke the Evangelist cited a passage from the Old Testament, corrupted as it stood at that time, I find much more absurd, when I begin to test the reasoning against the truth. For either we make the Evangelist ignorant, if the corruption escaped him; or we make him timid, if, possessing divine authority, he did not dare to restore what was

corrupted — something Steuchus has dared to do without any authority at all.

It is, moreover, impious to attribute what Luke wrote by the counsel of the Holy Spirit to ignorance of the Hebrew letters. Since, then, we have said, for necessary reasons, that the individual particulars of Scripture were written by divine inspiration and breath, none of them, certainly, can have proceeded from ignorance of languages, unless the Holy Spirit, who guided both the mind and the hand of the Evangelist, was himself ignorant of the Hebrew letters. Let us say, then, what is sufficient for the present point: that the Seventy translators put seventy-five souls in Genesis 46 and Exodus 1, which is manifestly gathered from the context. For since, in Genesis 46, the Seventy translators enumerated the sons of Manasseh and Ephraim — that is, Machir, Gilead, Shuthelah, Tahan, Eden — it necessarily resulted that the number seventy-five was formed. But whether the Hebrew exemplars, which the Seventy translators rendered, had already counted those grandsons of Joseph in that genealogy, or whether the Seventy translators themselves added them by anticipation, is uncertain.

This much is certain: that whatever they subtracted, they subtracted in good faith, and perhaps even by prudent design; and whatever they added, they added without deceit. For it is established that, in several places, they produce more of a paraphrase than a translation. Luke, however, and the other apostles and evangelists, made use of the edition of the Seventy translators, since at that time it was the most excellent. Nor do they follow a foreign error, as some imprudently assert; rather, in that matter where the Seventy spoke truly, they make use of their testimonies.

Nor does it trouble me, what some object — that the truth of this history can be defended only by a figurative manner of speech. For our own edition needs this same defense too. For since seventy souls are said to have entered Egypt, it is necessary also to count Ephraim and Manasseh to complete the number, although they themselves did not enter Egypt. Nor is it strange, if there is anticipation in the edition of the Seventy translators, since we admit postponement even in our own. For, in Genesis chapter 12, after the death of Terah, the Lord's command is written, by which he commands Abraham to leave his land and his kindred. But in Acts 7 Stephen clearly teaches that this command was given in Chaldea before Terah died and came to Haran. This both Saint Augustine perceptively noted, The City of God, book 16, and reason itself demonstrates. For since Abraham is commanded to leave his land and his kindred, we are compelled to understand Chaldea, which was Abraham's own land, where also he had his kindred. But if he had been commanded to leave Haran, he certainly would not have been leaving either his own land or his own kindred. For although Haran was part of Mesopotamia, it was not part of Chaldea — as some have rather unlearnedly asserted.

Nor does it escape me that Jerome, on Ezekiel chapter 30, wrote that, in the historical books, no anticipated narrative is to be found, but only in the Psalms and the Prophets. This I ought rather to marvel at than to refute, since it is established that anticipations are also employed in the Gospels. On this matter, more carefully elsewhere. But not even this point troubles me — that Joseph is said to have summoned seventy-five souls; for the same difficulty would exist if he had put only seventy souls, since he never summoned Ephraim and Manasseh at all. Not, then, as Jerome rightly said to Pammachius On the Best Method of Translating, are the words to be considered in the Scriptures, but the sense. On the first particular of the seventh argument, then, this much.

Now the second, although it seems more difficult, will nevertheless be refuted more easily. For that the twelve patriarchs were buried not in Hebron but in Shechem, we know not only from Stephen's narrative, but also from Jerome's testimony. For in the epitaph of Paula to Eustochium, when he was writing of Paula's pilgrimage, he says thus: "She crossed Shechem, and around Jacob's well she entered the church that had been built there. And turning aside from there, she saw the tombs of the twelve patriarchs." But to Pammachius, On the Best Method of Translating, he says: "The twelve patriarchs are not buried in Hebron, but in Shechem." This same opinion Bede follows, and other men of the Church. How much trust, however, is to be given to Josephus in matters of history, we shall demonstrate later, in the eleventh point. And on the second part of the seventh argument, let this much be said.

The third, however, and last, seems to present an insoluble question. For what Augustinus Steuchus of Gubbio says — and Aloysius Lippomanus, following him — that the passage has been corrupted, and that "Jacob" should be read instead of "Abraham," and "of the Son" substituted for "of the Father," cannot stand in any way at all — both because it is not at all likely that all the Greek and Latin exemplars were already corrupted from the time of the apostles, and because it is not probable that Jerome, Rabanus, Bede, and other authors of the Church, who encountered this passage and this question, would have neglected such a defense, had they thought there was even the slightest probability in it. Nor would prudent and grave men have called this a most difficult question, if it could be resolved with the slightest effort, as it seemed to these moderns.

What of the fact that, in words so dissimilar, there was no occasion for corruption? For if copyists, instead of "he sweeps" (everrit), write "he overturns" (evertit); or instead of "strong" (fortem), "fountain" (fontem) — they will be deceived, indeed, by a great similarity of the words. But to write "Abraham" for "Jacob," "of the son" for "of the

father" — in such great discrepancy of names, no causes of corruption can be imagined, except the drunkenness or madness of copyists. What of the fact that, in the Greek exemplar, neither "of the son" nor "of the father" is expressed at all, but, after the word "Hamor," only the genitive "of Shechem" is found written? Where the Latin translator, since this was the more natural choice, understood "son," not "father." In this same manner, Sanctes Pagninus too translates it. Nor does it escape me that, in the letter to Pammachius On the Best Method of Translating, "of the father" is read, not "of the son." But perhaps this is Erasmus's reading, not Jerome's. But concerning the word "father," I will not delay further. For if the Greek phrase allows — which it certainly does — that either "son" or "father" be understood, Stephen, who spoke in Greek, will suffer no slander on this point at all.

But in the word "Abraham," Steuchus's response has no place. For, in place of this, if Luke is said to have written "Jacob," he will be no less accused. For Jacob did not buy the tomb for a price of silver, but for a hundred young sheep, as is written in Joshua, the last chapter. I know what the new translators discuss on this point; but the Scripture which the Church approves, and the edition of the Seventy as well, have "a hundred young sheep," not "a hundred pieces of silver." Let it stand, then, that the exemplars are not corrupted.

And since the other responses of others can be refuted with this same ease, I see no reason why we should linger over refuting them. But I do not gladly criticize the opinions of others. In this case, then, Bede's opinion pleases me, with which Rabanus also agrees. His words run in this manner: "Blessed Stephen, speaking to the common people, follows more the opinion of the common people in his speech. For, joining two narratives together at once, he attends not so much to the order of the surrounding history, as to the cause which was at issue," etc. Rabanus says almost the same. By these words they have modestly and reverently indicated that what generally happens to ordinary people happened to Stephen — namely, that, in a long narrative, and especially a sudden one, he confused and mixed up certain details, and even slipped in memory in certain things — but only in those matters which had little or nothing at all to do with the matter at hand. For he was intent on the cause that was chiefly at issue.

Luke, however, wishing to preserve the truth of the history, did not change even one iota, but related the matter as it had been told by Stephen. We, however, must vindicate from all error not Stephen, but the Evangelist. For it is only to the apostles, prophets, and evangelists that we have learned, by Catholic faith's teaching, to ascribe this honor — that we believe none of them slipped even in memory, nor erred either in great matters or in small ones. But Stephen, you say, was full of the Holy Spirit. I admit it. But the

Spirit spoke in him. This too I admit. But the Spirit speaks differently in Christ, differently in the prophets and apostles, differently in Stephen and Ambrose. Yet certainly he spoke through all of these. Through a general Council, God speaks to the Church; through the pastors of the Church, God speaks to the Church; through the ancient saints, God speaks to the Church. And yet all of these can slip in small matters, especially in memory, where slipping is easier. It is, then, the privilege of the sacred writers that none of them err in writing. It is the privilege of the apostles that none of them err in teaching. This privilege, neither reason nor authority grants to Stephen.

Nor indeed is it foreign to the sacred authors to also relate the words of those who err. Thus Jephthah, in Judges 11, claims three hundred years of possession, although in reality there had not been three hundred. And yet the sacred historian related "three hundred." Thus too Matthew, if we believe Jerome, related Micah's prophecy not as it had been written by Micah, but as it had been pronounced by the scribes. To write at length how, by vain and frivolous arguments, Erasmus has criticized this opinion of Jerome's, is not for this occasion or this time.

This must be said: that to twist the words of Jerome and Augustine into a sense by which they are believed to assert that the evangelists sometimes slipped, cannot be done except imprudently. For when Jerome, in his letter On the Best Method of Translating, had related certain passages from the sacred authors which could be ascribed to a slip of memory, he adds: "I repeat these things, not to accuse the evangelists of falsity. For this is the mark of the impious — Celsus, Porphyry, Julian." This Erasmus, however, takes to mean that Jerome detests the charge of falsity in the evangelists, but not equally a slip of memory — as if something were not false unless it was written through a deliberately contrived lie. Certainly, whether the evangelists departed from the truth through a slip of memory, or through ignorance, they will rightly be charged with falsity.

And since Augustine too, in his book On the Harmony of the Evangelists, book 3, chapter 7, attributes the fact that the evangelist Matthew, chapter 27, cited under the name of Jeremiah what is found in Zechariah, not to a slip of memory, nor to an error, but to the counsel, direction, ordinance, and command of the Holy Spirit — for which reason he maintains that it was done without falsity — Erasmus, on the contrary, interprets this as an error and a slip on the part of the Evangelist, contrary to Augustine's actual opinion. How falsely these things are imputed to these most holy men can most easily be judged, both from these very passages carefully examined, and from the other testimonies of these same authors, which we cited in the preceding chapter.

For it is now time that we bring the fourth controversy to an end. And here too this first major topic shall be concluded — not with few words indeed (for that could not be done, since it was a most extensive matter, supplying ample material for a proper volume of its own), but with as few as could be managed, so that the authority of this most fundamental topic might stand in such a state that it could be shaken neither by the rashness of human ingenuity nor by the wrongdoing of heretics.

Book III

On the Apostolic Traditions, which are Placed in the Second Position

Chapter I

In which the Arguments of Those Who Have Attacked the Apostolic Traditions are Related

Good. We have already established the authority of Divine Scripture in the first place. Let us next take up the second; and let us explain, by way and method, how great is the force and authority of the apostolic traditions.

And indeed the Lutherans believe this topic to be too weak for dogmas of the faith to be confirmed by arguments drawn from it. For they think it can in no way be proven that the Church's traditions descended from Christ and the apostles. They are not so foolish, indeed, as to go about weakening the words of Christ, once it has been established that they are Christ's, on the grounds that they were not written by the evangelists. But since they think that only those who heard Christ and the apostles can know what Christ or the apostles said, they conclude that, among us now, not even a single dogma can be proven by tradition; rather, all controversies of faith and religion must be settled by the testimonies of the Sacred Letters, and nothing decided except what is expressed in the Sacred Letters.

Erasmus too, both often elsewhere and especially in the dedicatory letter to the works of Hilary, asserts that it is the mark of truly theological learning to define nothing beyond what has been handed down in the Sacred Books; that everything else is a matter of debate to be deferred to that time when, the mirror having been set aside, we shall see God face to face. Nor were these the first or the only ones to attempt to bring this plague upon this topic. Wycliffe had attempted the same thing before them, as Thomas Waldensis writes, Doctrinale of the Ancient Faith, book 2, chapter 19; certain heretics in other centuries before had attempted this too, whom Bernard mentions in homily 66 on

the Song of Songs. But Augustine also attributes this heresy to the Arians, in his conflict against Maximinus, as Thomas Waldensis relates in his book On the Sacraments, doctrine 2.

The Arians, certainly, who assembled at the Synod of Seleucia, not obscurely testified that, in a question of faith, they would accept nothing at all beyond the Divine Scriptures, as Epiphanius attests, Heresy 73 — who himself also assigns this error to the Arians, Heresy 75. Basil says Eunomius was caught up in this same error. Tertullian, in his book On the Prescription of Heretics, and Irenaeus, Against Heresies, book 3, chapter 2, add to these Valentinus and Marcion. A certain Basil, bishop of Ancyra, in the confession he presented to the Seventh Synod, in his seventh anathema, confesses that this was the common opinion not only of the Iconoclasts, but of Arius, Nestorius, Eutyches, and Dioscorus. Although this error was common to almost all heretics, the Lutherans nevertheless claimed it as their own, and strove with all the force they could to maintain that the apostles' authority lies in nothing beyond the Sacred Scriptures.

The first argument. Untrustworthy, they say, and uncertain is that transmission from hand to hand, since the one who receives it either does not listen carefully enough, or sometimes forgets through the injury of illness, age, or nature, or certainly sometimes dies before he can pass on what he received. Things that pass from ear to ear, too, either grow daily in size, or else certainly do not remain the same, but are altered as they pass through different ears. Indeed they even perish, unless written records preserve them. How little remains of Pythagoras? What is left of the Druids? Surely, trusting in traditions, they handed down nothing in writing for the eternity of memory. Wherefore those things which Christ the Lord saw to be necessary for the salvation of the faithful, and which he wished to be fixed and perpetual in the Church, he either commanded or suggested should be consecrated in writing.

The second argument. Augustine too is a witness that the Lord did and said many things which were not written, but that those things were chosen to be written which would be sufficient for the salvation of believers. Augustine also taught this — that, when something most obscure is debated, with no certain and clear documents of Divine Scripture to help, human presumption ought to restrain itself, taking no side in either direction. And immediately he says: "I believe that there would be the clearest authority of the divine sayings on this point too, if man could not be ignorant of it without loss to his promised salvation." Nothing, then, that is necessary to be believed lies outside the Sacred Letters.

The third argument. Paul too teaches that Scripture is sufficient, so that through it the man of God may be perfect, equipped for every good work. If, then, everything that was enough to make the faithful equipped for every good work was written, why are these unwritten traditions imagined to be necessary for forming morals?

The fourth and fifth arguments. What of the fact that we are not commanded to believe whatever the priests teach us, but only what they teach according to the law of the Lord? If, then, they teach anything beyond the law, there is no need to trust them. For since seducers frequently come forth from the true churches themselves — as the author of the Unfinished Work cleverly said — not even the teachers are to be believed, however much they prefer the tradition of the churches, unless they say things that agree with the truth of the Scriptures. For Papias too, inserting that idea of his thousand years after the resurrection, as though delivered by the apostles, moved Irenaeus and many other men of the Church, not by the truth of the argument, but by the authority of apostolic tradition. And Irenaeus himself too, by the tradition of John the Evangelist and other apostles, teaches that Christ the Lord, on the day he died, was forty years old. This is so far from the truth that nothing could be more contrary to truth.

The sixth, seventh, and eighth arguments. Thus Theophilus of Alexandria wrote that it is the mark of a demonic spirit to think anything divine outside the authority of the Scriptures. And Jerome condemned doctrines which, without the authority and testimonies of the Scriptures, are put forward from apostolic tradition. And again: "Without the authority of the Scriptures," he says, "chattering carries no weight of faith"; and again: "The opinion of those who, by the tradition of an ancient history, held that the Zechariah who was killed between the temple and the altar was the father of John the Baptist, is rejected solely for this reason — that it has no authority from the Scriptures. Hence it can be despised with the same ease with which it was approved." And Origen says: "It is necessary for us to call the Holy Scriptures into testimony. For our own understandings and explanations have no credibility without these witnesses."

The ninth argument. This is, moreover, especially confirmed by that speech which Theodoret relates Constantine to have used at the Council of Nicaea: "In disputations concerning divine matters," he says, "the teaching of the Holy Spirit is held as already prescribed. For the books of the Gospels and the apostles, together with the oracles of the ancient prophets, fully show us the mind of the Godhead. Let us therefore take from the sayings of the Divine Spirit the explanations of our questions." To this speech, Calvin says, no one at the time raised any objection. This silence was not without treachery, if it is true that, besides the Sacred Scriptures, the traditions of the evangelists, apostles, and prophets must be held to in ambiguous questions of faith. Since, then, Theodoret writes

that the bishops gladly embraced what the emperor had said, it is established that the doctrine of traditions is novel, and entirely unknown in those centuries.

These traditions of the elders, then, have little force for confirming the dogmas of the faith; indeed, since they are human, not divine, we ought not to set great store by them, lest the same charge be made against us that was made against the Pharisees: "In vain do they worship me, teaching as doctrines the commandments of men."

The tenth argument. What of the fact that it has always been characteristic of heretics to instruct their disciples with mysteries and traditions? This is foreign to the doctrine of Christ, who spoke openly to the world, and spoke nothing in secret. And if he said anything in darkness, he certainly commanded the apostles to speak it themselves in the light, and what they heard in the ear, to preach upon the housetops. We Christians, then, have no hidden traditions of mysteries.

The eleventh and twelfth arguments. But if we assert our faith and religion by the traditions of the ancients, this is exactly what the pagans do, what the Jews do, what the Saracens do; and they retain their sects especially for this reason, that, just as we do, they too cling to the institutions of their forefathers; and they defend these by possession of the longest standing, and undertake a just war on their behalf. But our discipline is not Pythagorean, that we should stand upon traditions as upon footprints; the doctrine of Christ has been published in letters; these we ought to embrace in every question of faith and religion. Thus the Lutherans argue.

Chapter II

That, with the Lutherans, Disputation Seems Superfluous, Not Only on This Topic, But on Certain Others as Well

For my own part, whenever I compare myself with the Lutherans for the purpose of disputing, my discourse is suddenly turned away from me, and the entire method of disputing is immediately taken from me. For with what plan ought I, or could I, dispute against these men, who, while removing all the principles of theology, make use of almost one single thing alone — the boldness of mere assertion, which serves them perpetually in place of all dialectical and theological topics? What am I to write against these men, who want there to be no law in the Church by which the meanings of Scripture might be settled, but think that each person should use his own judgment; and that one need not hold what others have held, but only what one's own reason has prescribed?

What, indeed, could be more foolish than to dispute with one who admits nothing but the words of Scripture, but, reserving the interpretation of it for himself alone, thinks that all the rest are hallucinating in marvelous ways? If Muhammad, lest he be forced to fall in a badly undertaken cause, were the matter examined by way and method, closed off every avenue of disputation by the law he himself promulgated, then Luther too, removing from his own side all the principles of discourse, will, if he undertakes a disputation, be able to find neither entrance nor exit. For it is the same thing to accept the Scriptures alone, without any rule, and interpreted according to each individual's whim, as it is to accept no fixed and certain principle of discourse at all.

Wherefore the wretched Lutherans, no differently than the Saracens, can detect neither their own absurdities nor their master's; nor, in disputing with them, can we do anything else than waste time and effort. They would, however, have the right to dispute, if they had left some choice of principles, so that there might be access to the discovery of truth. As it is, however, they leave no principles at all. The disputation with them will, then, be vain and futile. For we must remember entirely that maxim, so often employed by the scholastics that it has become almost proverbial: that one ought not to dispute against one who denies the principles, since this is done in vain.

To this is added the fact that they assert paradoxes which conflict with common sense, and if you wish to refute these by argument, you make matters that are by no means doubtful into doubtful ones by your very arguing. For since, in a syllogism, the premises, in order to produce any conviction, ought to be more certain and better known than what follows from them, it is certainly to be feared that, when we refute the Lutherans' positions, by refuting most absurd things with less evident arguments, we commit this very fault of faulty and inept reasoning ourselves.

Nor indeed do we need to seek far afield for examples of this, since we have one right at hand. For, to maintain that opinion which I have just mentioned, the Lutherans first posit that the Sacred Letters do not have several senses. They posit this falsely; but let us grant this to them generously. They will assume, next, that one single sense is most certainly and most familiarly taught in the Scriptures, and that they are not, like some waxen nose, bendable into every sense, but are rather set forth in themselves, and lie open to anyone without a teacher or instructor. Having laid these claims down so excellently and shrewdly, they now easily conclude that, for understanding the Sacred Books, one need wait for neither the tradition of the ancients nor the judgment of the Church.

All of which, since it is both plainly false in itself, and vehemently contrary to the Scriptures themselves, if I should strive to refute it from the opposite direction, "the water will stick in my throat," as the saying goes — for I see how ridiculous it is to wish to confute empty and contrived opinions, the prodigies not of disputing theologians but of dreaming men; how foolish it is to respond with counterarguments to just anyone who opposes you; how useless it is to bring torches into the noonday sun; how idle, finally, it is to take risks over a matter that is obvious.

Peter says that there are, in Paul's epistles, certain things difficult to understand, which unlearned and unstable men twist to their own destruction; but these men, on the contrary, say that all of Paul's epistles are most easy to understand. Paul speaks wisdom, hidden in mystery, to the perfect, but gives milk to drink to babes, since they cannot bear anything else; these men, without distinction, all of them, and, if it please God, devour all the sacraments of Scripture amid their cups, and digest even solid food in the manner of ostriches. The Father has hidden certain things from the wise and prudent; to these men he has revealed everything. The Son once spoke to his disciples in parables; to these men he always speaks openly and utters no proverb at all.

The book shown in the Apocalypse, sealed with seven seals, which, when you give it to a man who knows letters, to read it, he will answer you: "I cannot, for it is sealed" — but for these men the Lamb has opened the book, and has likewise opened their eyes, so that they may see what we, wretched and blind, cannot see — indeed, what Origen, Basil, Gregory, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and Hilary did not see.

That eunuch of the Acts of the Apostles, so devout that, having left the royal court, he came from the farthest ends of the earth to the temple; so great a lover of the divine law that he read the Sacred Letters even in his chariot — he could not understand Isaiah, unless someone taught him; and yet, according to these men, all the prophets are understood without a teacher or interpreter. In short, as Jerome says, no art can be grasped without a teacher; only the knowledge of the Scriptures is one which these men everywhere claim for themselves, presume to have, and teach, before they have even learned it.

There are, in the Sacred Books, very many passages of such great difficulty and obscurity, that, even after the vigils, studies, and labors of all the ancient interpreters, they still seem scarcely capable of being understood by the most learned and the very best men. And shall an unlearned multitude, in which there is neither reason nor judgment, easily resolve and interpret all the passages of Scripture? Is it really so easy to resolve — to say nothing of the rest — the ambiguity of the Hebrew language, the figures of speech most

obscure even through their antiquity, phrases foreign to these languages to which we are accustomed, proverbs unheard among us, foreign parables, and translations sometimes drawn from very far afield? Explain to me easily, if you can, the Proverbs of Solomon and the Song of Songs, the prophecies of Ezekiel, Daniel, Isaiah, Jeremiah; explain the Davidic psalms; and if you do explain them, then indeed the Sacred Books are neither difficult nor obscure. "Who is wise," says Hosea, "and shall understand these things? who is prudent, and shall know these things?" And Solomon: "Who is like the wise man? and who has known the solution of the saying?" And yet all these men are wise, and resolve the most difficult questions of Scripture with the greatest of ease.

But if the Scriptures cannot be twisted and bent into various senses, how is it that all the heresies have arisen from a depraved understanding of the Scriptures? This not only Hilary teaches, book 2 On the Trinity, Jerome, on Galatians 1, Irenaeus, Against Heresies, book 1, chapter 1, Augustine, on John, treatise 18, Vincent of Lérins, Against the Profane Novelties, and the Seventh Synod, session 6 — but we know it manifestly from experience as well.

Whence, then, do controversies arise even among the Lutherans themselves over the greatest matters, if the Scriptures cannot be bent into various senses? For those words, "This is my body," some take properly, others figuratively.

Since these things are so, the understanding of the divine Scripture must be sought and held by a different method than these men say. For if it is to be directed by a private rule, how can Helvidius be convicted of error concerning the perpetual virginity of Mary? How Arius, concerning the true nature of God in Christ? Indeed, how will it even be established whether his understanding or that one's is the true one, if it is permitted to each person to interpret the Scriptures according to his own judgment?

For since there will, as commonly happens, be various opinions concerning the same passage of Scripture, no one will guarantee which is the certain one. For all those who disagree among themselves will, with equal justification, each defend his own view. For this is almost an inborn disease of human minds — that they do not know how to yield, once a matter has been brought into contention; and after the matter has grown heated, each person regards as most true whatever he has rashly undertaken to defend.

Either, then, each person has his own certain sense, and the madness of the ancients will return, which Aristotle, in book 4 of the Metaphysics, exploded with manifest arguments; or no one's opinion will be certain, and, besides the fact that there will be no end of disagreements, we shall have no certain judgment of the Christian faith, but each person will fashion his own faith for himself out of his own opinion. Thus there will be

no catholic faith at all.

And indeed the Lutherans are ridiculous, who demand that certain faith be placed in themselves as interpreters of the Sacred Letters — and interpreting them, moreover, in a new and indeed astonishing way. The apostles were not believed, as Erasmus falsely jokes, until many great miracles had established the credibility of their doctrine; and now any man at all demands to be believed, on the grounds that he claims to have the spirit of understanding, although none of them could heal even a lame horse. Many things must be passed over, lest the discourse have any unpleasantness; and yet many things are said which openly refute their madness.

Indeed, had Cochlaeus not already anticipated me, in his letters to the princes of Germany and to the men of Bern, I would take the risk of giving examples, and would play in various ways on both sides of the question, so that, by this very risk, it might be plain to everyone how easy it is for any theme whatsoever to be either proven or disproven from the Sacred Letters, if each person interprets them according to his own fancy.

Although, I confess, there are some passages of Scripture which cannot be twisted into one sense or another even by the most contentious of men. For who could distort that passage which Paul wrote to the Corinthians — that to one is given, through the Spirit, the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, to another the interpretation of tongues? But these men confound all the offices of the ecclesiastical body; for them the whole body is an eye. For all of them, with the Spirit as their teacher, understand all the mysteries of Scripture without exception. But it is well that Luther himself confesses that he does not understand certain passages in the Psalms. It is well that Christ gave teachers in the Church, not to all, but to certain ones, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry.

But on these matters I have discussed much in the second book, and more still will be discussed in the seventh — not because we wish to enter into combat with the Lutherans, who fight, as the saying goes, with closed eyes like gladiators, but so that Catholics may see that, having surveyed every topic with reason and judgment, none is more certain, none more stable, none, finally, more necessary for explaining the Sacred Letters, than that in which the tradition of the Church is contained. For which reason the impudence of the Lutherans is all the more detestable, who strive to undermine and utterly destroy this topic. But that this entire question may once and for all be established here, where it properly belongs, certain foundations must be laid, which contain the very sinews and strength of theology and of faith together.

Chapter III

In which Four Foundations are Laid for Establishing the Traditions of Christ and the Apostles

The first foundation. The Church is older than Scripture, and faith and religion accordingly stand firm without Scripture. For those most ancient fathers of the first centuries, who, under the law of nature before Moses, were held to be true worshippers of God, preserved the rite of sacrifices and the true opinion concerning divine matters, not by written laws, but by the actual practice and institution of their forefathers. Circumcision too, first received from God, Abraham handed down afterward to his family. That offspring of the Hebrew people preserved such a sacrament not inscribed on parchment or tablets, but impressed, as it were, upon minds steeped in custom, and held the true faith and religion of the one God for many years in Egypt without any written law.

Christ the Lord, too, wrote no book; indeed, as far as we read, he did not even command that one be written. He did not say, "Go, write," but, "Go, preach the Gospel to every creature," Mark, the last chapter. And through Jeremiah, chapter 30: "I will put my law," he says, "in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts." And the Apostle, in 2 Corinthians 3, says: "You are the epistle of Christ, ministered by us, written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God, not in tablets of stone, but in the fleshly tablets of the heart." The evangelical law, then, which is a law of the spirit, not of the letter, was not at first inscribed in writing, but engraved upon the souls of the faithful.

For the other apostles too first taught the Gospel with the living voice, and only afterward committed it to writing — as Irenaeus attests, sufficiently weighty and reliable witness, in his book Against Valentinus, book 3; Eusebius, both elsewhere not obscurely, and more clearly still in book 3 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 24; Chrysostom, homily 1 on Matthew; Theophylact, at the beginning of his commentary on Matthew; Jerome, On Illustrious Men, in the Catalogue, under Matthew and John; in short, not to enumerate them all one by one, all the writers of the Church.

For I do not wish to seem prolix on matters that are obvious, especially since Luke the Evangelist himself offers the most certain testimony of this fact, saying: "Since many have attempted to set in order a narration of the things which have been fulfilled among us: even as they have been delivered to us, who from the beginning were themselves eyewitnesses, and ministers of the word: it has seemed good to me also, having diligently attained to the knowledge of all things from the beginning, to write to you in order, most excellent Theophilus, that you may know the truth of those words in which you

have been instructed."

It is established, then, that the writing of the Gospels came after the doctrine of the faith had already become widespread. Came after, I say, not preceded it. It is established likewise that the Christian Church and religion stood not first by letters, but by tradition. It is established again that the doctrine of the faith in the primitive Church had its authority not from the Scriptures, but, on the contrary, the Scriptures had their authority from tradition. "Even as they have been delivered to us," he says, "who from the beginning were themselves eyewitnesses, and ministers of the word." It is established, finally, that there were once, in the Church of Christ, catholic dogmas which were not contained in any Sacred Letters. Moved by this consideration, Irenaeus says that even if the apostles had left us no Scriptures at all, we would nevertheless have had to follow the order of the tradition of the Church — which order, indeed, the faithful followed even before the written Gospel.

The second foundation. Not everything which pertains to Christian doctrine is, even now, expressed in the Sacred Letters. For the perpetual virginity of the Blessed Mary, the descent of Christ into hell, the baptism of infants, the conversion of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, the equality of the three persons in one substance and their distinction through relative properties — you will not find these so expressed in the canonical books, and yet they are so certain in the faith that the Church has judged the authors of contrary dogmas to be heretics.

Just as, then, the article of the resurrection was contained in this: "I am the God of Abraham and of Isaac" — which Christ the Lord later explained to those who understood less — so too the Church, through the Spirit of Truth, has explained certain things which are found obscure in the Sacred Letters.

The third foundation. Many things pertain to the doctrine and faith of Christians which are contained neither openly nor obscurely in the Sacred Letters. This Innocent first proves, On the Celebration of the Mass, chapter "Cum Marthae." For the words which we use in the consecration of the chalice, and which we profess Christ the Lord used — namely, "the mystery of faith" and "the eternal testament" — are not found in the Evangelists; nor even is this: "having lifted up his eyes to God his Father." We would not know, too, that Christ said the saying, "It is more blessed to give than to receive," had Paul not taught us this in Acts. Just as, then, the evangelical Scripture has not encompassed all the deeds of Jesus, so too not even all his words — but certain things have been received through tradition.

Again, that the help of the holy martyrs is to be sought in prayers, that their memorials are to be celebrated, that images are to be venerated, that in the sacrifice of the Eucharist the blood is to be both consecrated and received by the priests together with the body, that the Sacraments of Confirmation and Holy Orders are not to be repeated — the Sacred Letters have perhaps nowhere handed down such things; and yet the Catholic Church holds these and very many other things of this kind as firmly as if they had been inscribed in the sacred codices. Finally, the four Gospels which the Church now receives, the fourteen epistles of Paul — in short, to say it briefly, we hold most firmly both the Old and the New Testament, and yet we cannot hold them by the authority of Scripture itself. There are, then, many dogmas of the catholic faith which are not contained in the Sacred Letters.

The fourth foundation. The apostles handed down, for the greatest reasons, certain things in writing, but other things by the living voice. But what those reasons were seems necessary to trace further back. We know, moreover, that this custom of handing down certain things to disciples, not in writing but by word, was once observed by philosophers as well.

That Pythagoras instructed his disciples in this manner is attested by the writings of all later authors; he himself, as Clement of Alexandria relates in Stromata 1, was circumcised, so that, entering the inner sanctuaries, he might learn the mystical philosophy of the Egyptians. Galen, On Anatomical Procedures, book 2, says that the ancient physicians preserved the arts handed down by their forefathers, as it were, from hand to hand. Cicero, On the Laws, book 1, thinks that morals should be sown in the commonwealth, and that not everything ought to be sanctioned in writing; and in this same book he thinks that sacred rites are better preserved in the commonwealth, if they are received from the fathers and then handed down through families. Caesar, On the Gallic War, book 6, writes that the Druids considered it a sacrilege for the precepts of their discipline to be committed to writing.

Likewise, not only the celebrated doctors of the Hebrews, but also, among our own, Hilary and Origen, write that Moses received on the mountain not only the law, but also a more secret exposition of the law, by divine gift, and that he was commanded by God to write the law for the people, but to reveal the hidden mysteries of the law, with great religious silence, only to his own minister Joshua, and that Joshua in turn should reveal them to the chief priests who succeeded him. Anatolius too, in Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book 7, chapter 28, relates that the Seventy translators, when King Ptolemy questioned them, answered many things from the traditions of Moses.

And the author of the fourth book of Esdras, chapter 14, attests this not obscurely as well: "I related," he says, "many wonders to Moses, and I commanded him, saying: These words you shall make public, and these you shall hide." This same command the Lord gave to Ezra for restoring the law, saying: "Certain things you shall make public, certain things you shall deliver secretly to the wise." The Prophet too seems to have had such traditions in mind, when he says: "We have heard with our ears, O God, our fathers have declared to us"; and again: "What great things he commanded our fathers, to make them known to their sons." Moses himself, too, recalls such traditions of the ancients, when he says: "Ask your fathers, and they will tell you; your elders, and they will declare to you."

To hand down certain things, then, not in writing but by word, was the design not only of the philosophers, but of Moses, indeed even of God himself. This wise design, then, Jesus Christ, the teacher of life, held; the apostles held it too. For they did not wish to write many things that had been handed down to them by the Lord. By what considerations they were moved to do this must be briefly explained.

Caesar, On the Gallic War, book 6, says that the Druids established this for two reasons, so that the precepts of their discipline would not be published in writing: because they did not wish their discipline to be spread among the common people, and because they did not wish those who learned, relying on writing, to pay less attention to their memory — which generally happens to most people, that, with the support of letters, they relax their diligence and memory in thoroughly learning a subject. Surely, as it pleases John Pico in his Apology, that first reason was the chief one for Pythagoras and Plato, in order to entrust certain hidden mysteries to disciples by the tradition of words. For they thought they could preserve the dignity of philosophy in no other way.

Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 5, relates that the Egyptians were accustomed to entrust their mysteries to no one indiscriminately, nor to convey the knowledge of divine matters to the profane, but only to those who were to attain to kingship, and, among the priests, to those who had been judged the most worthy by education, doctrine, and lineage. There is extant a letter of Lysis the Pythagorean, in which he rebukes Hipparchus, for philosophizing publicly, contrary to what their teacher had established. For it was not lawful, he said, to extend to everyone those things that were to be shared only with the few — and these, indeed, eloquent and diligent ones. Those who indiscriminately handed down the precepts of Pythagoras to the common crowd were considered equally impious as those who would reveal the secrets of the Eleusinian goddesses to profane men. They were also like those who, into a deep well full of mud, would pour pure and shining water — who would accomplish nothing except to muddy the water and lose it. Nor was Hipparchus reproved by Lysis alone, but he was also

accused by other disciples and expelled from the school, and a tomb was erected for him as though for a dead man, as Clement of Alexandria writes in Stromata 3.

"It is not permitted," says Pindar too, "to disclose the ancient discourse before all, except by the most faithful paths of silence." For nature loves to be hidden, as Porphyry wrote, nor does God allow divine mysteries to enter polluted ears of the common crowd. Nature has hidden gold and gems in the deepest recesses of the earth, and so they are held in great price; they would become cheap, were they exposed. Basil, in his book On the Holy Spirit, chapter 29, and Origen, homily 5 on Numbers, assert that for this reason Moses did not allow everything that was in the temple to be accessible to all, since he knew that things worn smooth by common use are exposed to contempt, while what is set apart and rare has the greatest admiration and reverence attached to it.

Plato, writing to Dionysius concerning certain sacred mysteries, warns him to tear up the letter at once, lest it fall into the hands of the unworthy crowd; so great was the care once taken, even by the pagans, to protect the mysteries of their disciplines from contempt and profane abuse — and this especially, if the mystery pertained to sacred matters. King Tarquin ordered Marcus Tullius, a duumvir, who had given a book containing the secrets of the sacred rites — which had been entrusted to his good faith and safekeeping — to one Petronius Sabinus to be copied, to be sewn into a sack and thrown into the sea; a kind of punishment later inflicted upon parricides. And most justly so, as Valerius says, since a like vengeance must atone for a violation either of one's parents or of God.

This was, namely, the reason why the apostles privately transmitted certain things from mind to mind, with only the spoken word intervening. For it was fitting to keep certain mysteries, especially sacred ones, hidden from the unlearned common people, to be communicated separately to the perfect and to the elders. "I determined not to know anything among you," he says, "except Jesus Christ, and him crucified: but we speak wisdom among the perfect." And again: "Hold the form of sound words, which you have heard from me; guard the good deposit, and those things which you have heard from me through many witnesses, commend these to faithful men, who shall be fit to teach others also."

But if the apostles had indiscriminately handed down to the common people the forms by which the Sacraments were to be performed, or the rites by which they were to be administered, and other such secrets of religion, what else would this be but, against the law of Christ, to give what is holy to dogs and to cast pearls before swine? Indeed, what else would it be but to abolish all the mysteries of the Christian religion? For nothing is a mystery that is conveyed to popular ears. This, then, is the first reason why the apostles

handed down certain things without writing — namely, lest our sacred things either be mocked by the pagans, or fall into contempt even among the common run of the faithful.

The second reason is that the living voice has, I know not what, a certain hidden energy, and, conveyed to the disciple's ears from the author's own mouth, resounds more powerfully — as Jerome says to Paulinus. It would have been unworthy, then, that the whole doctrine of the Gospel, which is the law of spirit and of life, should everywhere be entrusted to dead letters, and committed to hearts in no respect at all, when it was specifically written of it: "I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts."

It is the mark of slaves and the unlearned to do everything by written prescription. Let this written law, then, by which absolutely everything, even the smallest details, is determined in advance, belong to the Jews; but let the sons, now perfect men, called into the freedom of grace, have the law engraved in their hearts. Wherefore those who confine the Gospel entirely within letters and parchment, leaving nothing to its spoken word, nothing to hearts, take away much from the Gospel, both of its dignity and of its powers.

Papias, in Eusebius, says: "If anyone ever came who had followed the apostles, I would diligently inquire from them what Andrew, what Peter had said, and what Philip, or Thomas, or what James, John, Matthew had said. For I did not believe that the readings of books would profit me as much as the teaching of a living and present voice." Thus far Papias.

Where, then, in the world is that "word" which the Lutherans are so accustomed to boast of so greatly? For a written word, if we wish to speak truly and properly, is not "the word." Among us, however, who defend the oracles and voices of Christ and the apostles, the word of the Lord truly and properly remains forever. The word, I say, the living word, which, conveyed from the teachers' mouth into the disciples' ears, resounds more powerfully. "My words," it says, "which I have put in your mouth, shall not depart from your seed's mouth, henceforth and forever."

Add to this, that there is greater force in Tradition than in Scripture for refuting heretics. Hegesippus, in Eusebius, relates that the Church remained a pure and undefiled virgin until the disciples of the Lord had passed away, with the corruptors of the truth, if there were any, hiding in the secret recesses of the earth; but that, once that whole generation, which had received the hearing of the living voice from the Lord, had departed from this light, then the heretics, with bare head, as they say, attacked the apostolic truth.

And Ignatius, in the same author, teaches especially that the contagion of heretics is avoided by clinging more diligently and tenaciously to the traditions of the apostles. Tertullian too warns, even more openly, that against heretics we should argue more by Traditions than by Scriptures. For Scriptures are easily twisted into various senses, traditions are not. "There is none of the heretics," as Hilary writes to Constantius Augustus, "who does not falsely claim that he preaches the things by which he blasphemes according to the Scriptures. They all speak the Scriptures without their sense." And Irenaeus, book 1, chapter 1, says: "Heretics rely on the Scriptures to confirm their dogmas, lest they seem to be without a witness. But they distort the sayings of God, and out of the figure of a man render the figure of a fox or a bear." Thus far he.

Heretics, moreover, do what they see their father has done, as Vincent of Lérins elegantly says, and follow the cunning devices of their author. For what will he not do to wretched little men, who attacked the very Lord of majesty with the testimonies of the Scriptures? "If you are the Son of God," he says, "cast yourself down: for it is written," etc. Thus, whatever dogma a heretic puts forward, he immediately says: "For it is written," and prepares not one, but a thousand testimonies, a thousand examples, from the law, from the psalms, from the apostles, from the prophets, by which, interpreted in a novel manner, he tries to approve his own opinion.

To what end has this been repeated at such length? Surely, that you may understand not only that Tradition has greater force than Scripture against heretics, but also that almost every dispute with heretics must be referred back to the traditions received from our forefathers. For since both parties — Catholics and heretics alike — each cite the Sacred Letters for their own opinion, the difference lies in the sense and interpretation. But which is the true and legitimate sense of Scripture cannot be known for certain except by the tradition of the Church. This we have already taught a little before, and we shall demonstrate further with many great arguments in book 7.

And from this the most weighty reason becomes plain, why the apostolic Traditions were necessary. For the sense of the Apostolic Scriptures was not to be explained by the apostles through other Scriptures — unless they themselves were to issue commentaries on their own works, which was always foreign to such weighty men. They handed down, then, the understanding of Sacred Scripture to their disciples by the living voice, so that God might fulfill, for all time, in his Churches, this: "I will put my law in their inward parts." For the evangelical law, as Jerome most elegantly wrote in his commentaries to the Galatians, is not in the writings but in the sense, not on the surface but in the marrow, not in the leaves of words but in the root of reason.

From this it emerges all the more that, through such traditions, the ecclesiastical orders are each divinely maintained in their own place: while the elders, who hold the keys of the kingdom of heaven, open the most sacred mysteries of Sacred Scripture, to whomever and whenever it has seemed fitting, both in time and in place, and the lesser ones receive from the masters of the Church the sacraments of the closed book. Otherwise there would be no teachers in the Church at all, but anyone, however common and uneducated, would seek by himself, without a teacher, the understanding of those things which he could have had directly accessible and explained through the interpretation and writings of the apostles.

But now the apostolic traditions are entrusted not to just anyone, but, according to Paul, to the wise and prudent, and to faithful and devoted custodians of the entrusted Sacrament, who are also fit to teach others. On this matter Dionysius carefully warns Timothy not to disclose the Holy of Holies, exposing it indiscriminately to the unlearned, but to reveal the understandings of sacred matters more secretly, to the saints alone — for this very reason, he says, those first leaders of ours necessarily handed down the highest and supersubstantial matters, partly by written, partly by unwritten instructions, according to what the sacred laws determine.

What of the fact that, as Cicero says, customs are more pleasantly sown in the commonwealth by tradition? — lest, if everything is sanctioned in writing, everything become burdensome, and the volume of laws and doctrine, by its own bulk and magnitude, becomes terrifying. What of the fact that, by this means especially, the authority of the Church is commended, which Christ commended so greatly, as to a most cherished bride? For since she preserves not only the words but also the sense of her Bridegroom in her heart, truly, as the Apostle said, she is the pillar and foundation of the truth. And it was fitting that something like a touchstone should be left in the Church's hand, by which she might test false and true doctrines, and likewise discern the true sense of Scripture from the false. But enough on the reasons.

Now that foundation must be confirmed and shown, that the apostles handed down the doctrine of the Gospel partly in writing, partly also by word. Of this matter the first witnesses are Dionysius, On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 1; Clement of Alexandria, in his book On the Passover, in Eusebius, book 6 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 11, and in Stromata 1 and 5; Origen, homily 5 on Numbers; Papias, in Eusebius, book 6 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 39; Hegesippus, on the same Eusebius's authority, book 4 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 8; Ignatius, on the same Eusebius's report, book 3, chapter 36; Irenaeus, book 3, chapters 3 and 4 — whom Eusebius too cites, book 4 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 14, and book 5, chapters 6

and 20; Tertullian, in his book On the Soldier's Crown; Cyprian, On the Washing of Feet; Epiphanius, On Heresies, both often elsewhere and especially where he refutes the dogmas of the Arians and the Apostolici; Jerome, Against the Luciferians; Augustine, On Baptism Against the Donatists, book 2, chapter 7, and book 4, chapter 24, and book 5, chapters 23 and 26; Damascene, book 4, chapters 13 and 17; Basil, On the Holy Spirit, chapters 27 and 29. Gratian also cites one or another of these, distinction 11, chapter "Ecclesiasticorum," and distinction 12, chapter "Illa autem."

Can anything, then, be true that is contrary to such a chorus of such men? But if so great a cloud of witnesses does not move the hearts of heretics, let them at least be moved by divine testimonies. Although what so many and such great men have testified with one and the same consent is not human but divine.

But there are also excellent testimonies of Divine Scripture available. "Stand fast," says Paul, "and hold the traditions which you have received, whether by epistle or by word"; and again: "Now I praise you, brethren, that, as I delivered to you, you keep my precepts"; and in this same chapter, afterward: "I have received from the Lord that which also I delivered to you"; and a little after: "The rest, when I come, I will set in order"; and to Timothy: "Hold the form of sound words," he says, "which you have heard from me; guard the good deposit"; and further: "Those things which you have heard from me through many witnesses, commend these to faithful men, who shall be fit to teach others also." And John, in his second epistle, says: "Having many things to write to you, I would not by paper and ink: for I hope that I shall be with you, and speak face to face."

What more is needed? We have two epistles of Peter, and we believe he sat mute at Antioch for seven years, speechless at Rome for twenty-five years? Did he teach nothing else by word than what he left written in two epistles? What of Andrew, Thomas, Bartholomew, Philip — did they not, without writing, with only the spoken word intervening, both found in faith and maintain in religion the Churches assigned to them? Let us, then, agree on what cannot be denied — that the doctrine of the faith was not handed down entirely by the apostles in writing, but in part by word.

Chapter IV

In which are Laid Out the Ways for Investigating the Traditions of Christ and the Apostles

These things being known, it remains to explain — for here lies the hinge of the whole discourse — by what method the theologian can be certain that this or that dogma was handed down by the apostles. By way of example, let us propose some things that apply more broadly. If it should come into question whether we have the minor orders, the Lenten fast, the baptism of infants, the veneration of images, the symbol (creed) of faith from the tradition of the apostles, we say it must now be explained whether there is some plain and ready way by which a certain understanding of these matters can be reached. For we are not men who, like the Pharisees, wish to peddle our traditions as though they were divine and apostolic; rather, in every nation, we desire to distinguish the true from the false, just as we distinguish the divine from the human — and this especially where the dogmas of the catholic faith are concerned. In this matter, indeed, a confused mingling of such things is most pernicious. There are, then, four open ways, which, if we follow, we shall by no means go astray in investigating the traditions of the apostles.

The first way is opened by Augustine, both elsewhere and especially in book 4 Against the Donatists, in these words: "What the universal Church holds, and was not instituted by Councils but always retained, is most rightly believed to have been handed down by no other authority than the apostolic." The reasoning of this is at hand. For if we can trace the origin and beginning of some custom long observed throughout the whole Church neither to the Supreme Pontiffs nor to Councils of bishops, but that custom is traced back all the way to the times of the apostles, it is plainly concluded that it proceeded from the apostles.

For example, if it should be called into doubt whether the minor orders of subdeacon, lector, and the rest exist in the Church by the tradition of the apostles, this is how it will be investigated: if the beginning of these orders is found either in Damasus, or in Symmachus, or in any other Pontiff or Council, then certainly it was not an apostolic tradition; but if, before any Pontiff whatsoever, before any Council whatsoever, mention of this matter is found among earlier writers, going all the way back to the times of the apostles, then at last we understand that the minor orders existed by apostolic tradition — as indeed they really did, since not only later writers but Ignatius, in his eighth letter to the Antiochenes, Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 3, Clement, in his letter to all, and Anacletus, in his decrees, mention this matter as already accepted in the Church.

By this same reasoning, you will also show that the law of fasting was an apostolic tradition, of which it is established that Augustine made mention, in his letter 86 to Casulanus, and his letters 118 and 119 to Januarius; Jerome, to Laeta, On the Education of a Daughter, and book 2 Against Jovinian, and on Isaiah chapter 58; Ambrose, sermons 25 and 38; Chrysostom, homilies 3 and 16 to the people of Antioch; Basil, both in other sermons and especially at the beginning of the one he delivered against the drunkards, and in his later sermon on fasting; the Council of Nicaea, cited in distinction 18, chapter "Habeatur"; the Council of Laodicea, in many canons; Sozomen, Tripartite History, book 1, chapter 10; Origen, homily 10 on Leviticus; Irenaeus, in Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book 5, chapter 24; Telesphorus, in his letter to all — who is falsely thought by some to be the author of our practice of fasting, since Ignatius, in his fourth letter to the Philippians, mentions this matter earlier — and we even have apostolic canon 68, which is also approved by the Trullan Synod, canon 9 and canon 20.

Wherefore Theophilus of Alexandria, truly and rightly, in his first and third Paschal books, not only prescribes that the law of fasting was handed down by our forefathers, but affirms that it was an evangelical tradition. And Epiphanius, Heresy 80, where he teaches the doctrine and faith of the Church which is preserved by ecclesiastical tradition, both mentions the Lenten fast, and openly says that the apostles handed down the fasts of the fourth and sixth days of the week. And Pope Leo, in his sermon on Pentecost, whose beginning is "Most fully" (Plenissime), says that the fast of the four seasons of the Trinity was instituted by the apostles. Jerome, moreover, to Marcella, against Montanus, not obscurely teaches that we fast Lent according to the tradition of the apostles. What we have done in this example, we can do in many others; and by this same reasoning we can prove that the baptism of infants, the consecration of virgins, monastic profession, the lamps and burning candles in churches, the veneration of images, and many other things of this kind were handed down by the apostles. Indeed, what we have said concerning customs must also be observed concerning dogmas of faith, if heretics slander any one of them as novel. A striking example of this is found in Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book 5, the last chapter. But let us proceed to the rest.

The second way, then, is close to this one, and indeed more straightforward. If some dogma of faith, the fathers, from the beginning, held in complete agreement according to the succession of their times, and refuted its contrary as heretical, and yet this is not found in the Sacred Letters, then certainly the Church holds it through apostolic tradition. Examples are: the perpetual virginity of the Blessed Mary; the descent of Christ into hell, to deliver the soul of Adam and of the other fathers who were held there; the fixed number of the Gospels, and other things of this kind, which, not to be lengthy,

need not be enumerated. For all the dogmas of the faith the Church has received from the apostles, either in writing or by word, since they were the ministers of the word; nor does the Church have any new revelations in matters of faith, but preserves those which the apostles, through the Holy Spirit, left to the faithful people, as we shall demonstrate afterward.

The third way. If something is now approved in the Church by the common consent of the faithful, which human power nevertheless could not have brought about, this must necessarily be derived from the tradition of the apostles. Thus, to dissolve vows and to remit oaths was not within human power — both because, by natural law, we are bound to render to God the vows we have made, and to keep our oaths, and human authority cannot pardon or remove those things which are owed and established by natural law, as Gratian, distinction 13, teaches right from the beginning; and also because, in those matters owed by an inferior to a superior on the basis of an agreement, the inferior power has no authority. The same reasoning applies to the dissolution of a ratified but unconsummated marriage through a solemn monastic vow. For since even an unconsummated marriage was, before the evangelical law, indissoluble by natural law, and there was no human faculty in any commonwealth for dissolving such a marriage, it follows that this custom of the Church descended from the institution of Christ and the apostles. For it cannot be believed that the Church of God usurped to itself, in general, any power in matters pertaining to natural law, except such as it received from Christ and the apostles handing it down. For this would already be a grave error in matters of morals, in which we shall show in its proper place that the Church cannot err.

Nor does it escape me that Alexander III seems to teach otherwise in this final example. For when it was objected to him that marriage could not be dissolved by a solemn vow of religion, since it is written, "What God has joined, let not man separate," he answered that this testimony of Scripture must be interpreted of a consummated marriage. By this response he indicated, namely, that a ratified marriage, if not consummated, may humanly be separated.

But, setting aside the fact that those words of Adam — "This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh," etc., from which the Lord concluded that man neither ought nor indeed could separate what God had joined — were spoken in Paradise at a time when marriage had not yet been consummated; and to pass over also the fact that the marriage contract itself is, by its own nature, so firm and perpetual that it cannot be dissolved even by the will of the contracting parties — although this is generally most effective for dissolving human agreements — it has certainly always seemed absurd to the gravest theologians that any marriage at all should be separated by man.

How much more weightily did Innocent III say, in another context indeed, but applicable to this point as well, that it is not man, but God, who dissolves what the Supreme Pontiff dissolves not by human, but by divine, authority. Surely it is reasonable that, with regard to what the Lord said to Peter — "Whatsoever you shall loose on earth," etc. — the Church received from the apostles the extent to which this should be either expanded or constrained, since they, without doubt, handed down such things as necessary for the governance of the Church.

And some relate that John the Evangelist, at Christ's command, was separated from his bride for the sake of the Gospel. Jerome certainly, in book 1 Against Jovinian, asserts that John was both a virgin and a husband. Epiphanius too, Heresy 78, relates that Thecla was freed by Paul from her marriage, although she had as her betrothed the most handsome leading man of the city, and that this holy virgin despised earthly things in order to become capable of heavenly ones. But we say this against Alexander. For someone might perhaps say: by no means at all — for one who, in response to an argument by which Catholics are pressed, prepares a different answer, is not thereby contradicting the Pontiff. On the third way, then, enough has been said.

The fourth way, equally gentle and equally well-trodden, is this. If men of the Church testify with one voice that some dogma, or even a single custom, has been received by us from the apostles, this is without doubt a certain argument for us to believe that it is so. Thus that images were handed down by the apostles, the fathers said at the Seventh General Synod, session 6. And that the creed of faith, by which the common people profess their faith, the Church had received from the apostles handing it down, is attested by Rufinus, in his exposition of the creed; Jerome, to Pammachius, On the Errors of John of Jerusalem; Ambrose, sermon 38 On Fasting and Lent; Cassian, book 6 to the Emperor Leo; Isidore, Etymologies, book 6, chapter 18; Pope Leo, in letters 8 and 13 to the Empress; Clement, in his first letter to James — if indeed Clement is the author of that letter. But enough on these matters. For it would take too long to give more examples, nor is it necessary for the purpose we have undertaken. It will, however, have been enough to have shown four ways by which some tradition may be investigated as apostolic.

Chapter V

On the Various Kinds of Apostolic Traditions

But before I confirm the authority of this topic, I think it should be noted that the precepts and institutions of the apostles fall into a twofold distinction. For some were temporary, whose rationale was brief and for a time; others were perpetual, having, as it were, an everlasting cause for being observed in the Church. Examples of the former kind are: baptism in the name of Jesus, and abstinence from blood and from what is strangled; an example of this latter kind, however, is the mixing of water with the chalice.

There is also another division of apostolic tradition. For some traditions the apostles received from Christ the Lord — such as that Matrimony, Confirmation, and Extreme Unction are Sacraments of the New Law, which Christ himself instituted, the first and indeed sole author of his own Sacraments, but handed down to the apostles to be administered to the Christian people; other traditions, however, the apostles themselves, under the suggestion of the Holy Spirit, published for the benefit of the Church — traditions which Christ the Lord, while he lived on earth, never published himself, such as the Lenten fast. Although Jerome, on the second chapter of Jonah, Ambrose, sermon 36, and Chrysostom, homily 1 on Genesis, seem to attribute this to Christ as its author, in reality, as I myself believe, this was an apostolic institution. It is attributed to Christ, however, either because it was instituted by the apostles in imitation of Christ's own fasting, or because apostolic decrees are reckoned as Christ's own — Christ, who spoke to the Church through the apostles, and indeed through the Holy Spirit to the apostles, according to that which is written in John chapter 16: "I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. But when that Spirit of truth shall come, he will teach you all truth: for he shall not speak of himself, but whatsoever he shall hear, he shall speak; for he shall receive of mine, and shall declare it to you." And the Apostle, having given a certain counsel of his own, says: "But I think that I too have the Spirit of God"; and again: "Or do you seek proof of him who speaks in me — Christ?"

In these kinds of traditions, however, the same considerations must be observed which we noted in the previous book concerning the laws of Scripture too; but that distinction, especially, which was laid down there concerning the precepts of Scripture, ought to be carried over here to the traditions as well. For from the bond of those traditions, received from Christ, which the apostles left for the faithful to observe, the Church cannot exempt the faithful, nor abolish them by any contrary custom.

For if, for example, the matters and forms of the Sacraments of Confirmation, Holy Orders, and Extreme Unction were received by the apostles from Christ, and we have

received them from the apostles; if likewise, in the same manner, that unconsummated marriages are dissolved by a solemn profession of chastity, while consummated ones are dissolved by conversion to the faith, with the unbelieving spouse departing — Christ the Lord declared these things to the apostles, and they to us — then, in these matters, as in divine institutions, the Church has no power at all. In this sense the two chapters, "Sunt quidam" and "Contra statuta," distinction 25, question 1, must be explained. Nor can traditions of this kind be abrogated through a contrary custom; rather, such a contrary custom is rightly opposed by chapter "Veritate," and chapter "Si consuetudinem," and chapter "Frustra," distinction 8.

In other matters, however, which the apostles established as pastors of the Church, the Supreme Pontiff can indeed grant dispensation, as in the other laws of the Church (for so the schools speak), and likewise a contrary popular custom can abrogate institutions of this kind. Thus the threefold immersion, which apostolic canon 49 shows the Church to have had by apostolic tradition in the Sacrament of Baptism, has been abolished through a contrary custom. Of this same order, too, is the Lenten fast, and likewise the penalties established by the apostles for crimes, which are cited in distinction 82, chapter "Presbyter," from the Council of Gangra.

To this category belongs that which heretics are accustomed to press from the first letter of Anacletus: "When the consecration is finished, let all communicate, who do not wish to lack the thresholds of the church; for so the apostles established" — although Anacletus is speaking of the ministers who assisted the bishop in offering sacrifice on the more solemn days. Wherefore it cannot be gathered from this that all who attended the Mass were also bound, at that time, to receive Communion of the Eucharist — especially on those days that were not more solemn ones. For although, according to ancient custom, by the institution of the apostles, the communion even of the whole people was required from the very beginning of the newly-born Church, it is nevertheless established that, by the time of Chrysostom, this precept had been relaxed, and the communion of those present was left to their own will, to which the deacon invited them with a loud voice, but did not compel them.

These things, then, and others of this kind, although they were handed down by the apostles, are nevertheless not so fixed that they cannot be changed — whereas the precepts and institutions of Christ himself, as we have said, are so stable and established that it is not permitted for them to be overturned by the authority of any man. The reasoning for this, given in the preceding place, would be repeated here in vain. And I wish this to be understood of institutions pertaining to the governance of the people. For the dogmas of the faith, whether Christ himself revealed them directly to the apostles

or the Holy Spirit revealed them after Christ's ascension into heaven, cannot be changed, but remain firm in this truth, just as much as those which were uttered by Christ's own mouth.

Chapter VI

On the Firmness and Certainty of the Apostolic Traditions

These matters having been explained, it will not be difficult to show what is chiefly sought in this part — namely, that the most certain arguments can be drawn from the traditions of Christ and the apostles, both for proving the customs of the Church and for confirming the dogmas of the faith.

For if the apostle Paul opposes the custom of the Church to the contentious Corinthians, why should we not likewise oppose to heretics the custom of the Church, received continuously from the apostles, and approved by the usage of so many centuries and the consent of the nations, when they demand of us Scripture for the confirmation of every matter? Certainly Paul, although he seemed to have said enough, both through the Scriptures and through the reasoning of nature, to produce that conviction in the Corinthians which he wished to persuade them of, nevertheless, considering that there would be some among the Corinthians who might, by chance, resist such testimonies and reasonings, had no other argument readier for winning the case than to recall them to the custom of the Church: "If anyone," he says, "seems to be contentious, we have no such custom, nor does the Church of God." What he says is this: if anyone is so hard and obstinate that, even with arguments laid out, he is not persuaded, but still contends that a woman ought to pray with her head uncovered, I refute him by no other means than this — that the Churches of God have no such custom.

So great is the force in tradition, that those whom neither the Scriptures nor the reasoning of nature could move, Paul thought should be refuted by the custom and institution of the Churches. Again, in the first Epistle to Timothy: "If anyone," he says, "teaches otherwise, and does not consent to sound words" — he does not say "to the Scriptures." And to the Galatians: "If anyone," he says, "preaches a Gospel to you other than what you have received, let him be anathema." From these passages Origen, in his commentaries on the Epistle to Titus, rightly defines as a heretic one who professes to believe in Christ, but believes something different about the truth of the Christian faith than what the ecclesiastical tradition holds. And in book 1 On First Principles, he says: "Just as, when many among the Greeks and barbarians promised the truth, we ceased to seek it among all who asserted it through false opinions, after we believed that Christ was

the Son of God, and were persuaded that this truth was to be learned from him — so too, since there are many who think they know the things of Christ, and some of them hold opinions different from earlier ones, let that ecclesiastical preaching alone be preserved, which has been handed down through the order of succession from the apostles, and which remains in the Churches even to the present; that alone is to be believed as truth which in nothing disagrees with the ecclesiastical tradition." Thus far Origen.

Ignatius too, in his letter to Heron, says: "Everyone who says anything beyond what has been handed down, even if he is worthy of belief, even if he fasts, even if he keeps his dignity, even if he works signs, even if he prophesies, let him appear to you as a wolf." If, then, anyone who opposes ecclesiastical tradition is to be considered anathema, a heretic, and a wolf, then certainly a most certain argumentation is drawn from it for confirming the dogmas of faith and the customs of the Church.

Moreover, the most weighty authors openly confirm that institutions of this kind, even received without writing, have the same force as if they had been written by the apostles. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, book 3, chapter 4, and book 4, chapter 43; Tertullian too, although he himself later departed from the tradition of the Church, nevertheless holds this same opinion in his book On the Soldier's Crown. It is worth citing his words at present, for he relates not only what he thinks, but also why he thinks it. "The ancient observances of the Church," he says, "if no Scripture has determined them, custom has certainly strengthened, which without doubt flowed from tradition." And immediately, having mentioned certain traditions of which there is no mention in the Scriptures, he says: "If you demand the law of these and other practices, no written law will be offered to you. Custom is their author, the confirmer and observer of faith, a fit witness of ancient tradition. Custom, moreover, is accepted as law even in civil matters; nor does it matter whether it rests on writing or on reason." Thus far Tertullian. And he indeed speaks excellently here; since if reason commends a law, then a custom, which rests on reason, deserves no less commendation than a law — distinction 1, chapter "Consuetudo."

Basil, moreover, in his book On the Holy Spirit, chapter 27, confirms this same point with a great argument too, saying: "Of the dogmas which are preached in the Church, we hold some from the doctrine handed down in writing, and some, again, we have received from the tradition of the apostles, delivered in a hidden mystery. Both of these have equal force for piety; nor does anyone who has even slightly experienced this contradict them. For if we should attempt to reject customs that have not been delivered in writing, as though they had little weight, we would also be condemning those things in the

Gospel that are held to be necessary for salvation — indeed, we would rather be reducing the very preaching of the faith to a bare name." Thus far Basil.

His reasoning, even if his authority is set aside, will produce the most certain conviction of this matter. For since we receive the Scriptures themselves by the authority of the Church, nor do we prove by any more certain argument that the Gospel inscribed with Matthew's name is truly his, than that we have received it as such from the fathers — by a similar reasoning, surely, we shall derive firm arguments from the other institutions which we retain from the apostles.

But if anyone should introduce some new sacred book which our forefathers never received (as Basilides did, who named and established prophets for himself), this can be refuted by no more certain argument than the tradition of our forefathers, as has already been more fully explained in the second book. Thus, in Eusebius, book 6, chapter 10, Serapion most weightily rejected a Gospel put forward by heretics under the name of Peter. And, as Basil argues, even in the judgments of the commonwealth, where a written document is lacking, faith is placed in witnesses; and just as in human affairs we accept eyewitnesses, so in matters of faith we accept those who have heard with their own ears, since faith comes from hearing. But it would be a ridiculous commonwealth that, in its judgments, would prove everything by writing, nothing without writing. For we make Scriptures on account of those who are litigious; otherwise good men are bound, by word alone, to truth and duty.

Moreover, many things pertain to Christian morals and doctrine which are not found in the Sacred Letters, as has already been established by us. It would, then, be foolish to demand Scripture in all matters. There is, then, sometimes need of Tradition for confirming the dogmas of the faith. Again, since Polycarp, Tertullian, and Irenaeus confidently objected unwritten traditions against Marcion and Valentinus; Epiphanius against the Melchisedechians, the Apostolici, the Aerians; Jerome against Vigilantius; Augustine against the Donatists; in short, to say it briefly, all the saints have confidently set traditions against the adversaries of the Catholic faith, and have, by their force — exactly as if they had been written — each defeated the heresies of his own time, certainly we too shall be able, with no less effectiveness, by means of such traditions, to refute and overthrow whatever dogmas of heretics there may be now or in the future.

For it would be most absurd, as Jerome concludes against Vigilantius, to listen to a single Luther or Oecolampadius prattling away in a corner of the Church, while despising all our forefathers, going back to the apostles themselves — whose traditions, if we should neglect, it is difficult to say how much detriment religion would suffer, as is said in

distinction 2, chapter "Ecclesiasticorum." For what would the appearance of all things be, what especially would piety toward God, worship, and ceremonies be — I do not speak of the Church, whose mysteries and sacraments consist for the most part of tradition, but of any commonwealth, however moderately well-organized, if those customs, which grew up together with the commonwealth from its very beginning, were despised, undermined, and overturned?

We have been longer on this point than necessary. For who is there to whom those things are not clear, which are recounted at greater length by certain authors? Among these is recalled Augustine, in his letter to Januarius, and another to Casulanus too, in which he wrote that it is the mark of the most insolent madness to dispute whether such customs ought to be observed; and that those who have despised them ought to be no less coerced — even if some of them are merely human — than if they had transgressed divine laws.

We could mention other authors too, but we would be using witnesses, in a matter not in doubt, which are not necessary. For Paul alone abundantly proves this point, in his second epistle to the Thessalonians, chapter 2, saying: "Hold the traditions, which you have received, either by epistle or by word." The apostolic dogmas, then, have equal force, and are equally to be retained, whether they came to the Church by writing or by word — as Saint Basil argues, in his book On the Holy Spirit, chapter 29, from this very testimony of the Apostle. Indeed, the Apostle himself, writing to the Hebrews, argued both from the Scriptures and from Tradition, as Chrysostom notes, homily 18 on the Epistle to the Hebrews.

From all these and many other considerations, it is plain that those who have despised traditions have always, rightly and deservedly, been rejected by the Church as heretics. Thus those were held as heretics who counted for nothing the solemn fasts of Lent received from the apostles, as can be seen in Augustine, On Heresies, chapter 53, and in the letter of the Council of Gangra to the bishops of Armenia; thus those who denied the distinction between bishop and presbyter were also condemned for heresy, as you will find in Augustine, the same book and chapter, and in Epiphanius, book 3, chapter 75, and in the Council of Constance; in short, whether the Wycliffites or the Lutherans or any other older plague, the Church has detested no less for having denied such traditions, than for having rejected written dogmas.

Hence, indeed, comes the fact that the Seventh General Synod, in action 7, published a doctrine most consonant with our present discourse, in these words: "We confess that we wish to retain firmly the ecclesiastical traditions, whether by writing or by custom,

among which is the depicting of images. Observing, then, the tradition of the Catholic Church, we define that holy images are to be venerated. Whoever, then, shall dare to think otherwise, or to contaminate the ecclesiastical traditions in the manner of impious heretics — if they are bishops, let them be deposed; if laymen, let them be deprived of communion." And at the end of this same session, the fathers say: "If anyone has no regard for the traditions of the Church, whether by writing or by valid custom, let him be anathema."

And the Council of Trent, session 4, defines the same in these words: "The most holy Synod of Trent, perceiving that the saving truth of the Gospel and the doctrine of morals are contained in the written books, and in the unwritten traditions of Christ himself, which, received by the apostles, or handed down, as it were from hand to hand, by the apostles themselves at the dictation of the Holy Spirit, have come down to us — receives and venerates the traditions themselves, pertaining both to faith and to morals, with the same affection of piety and reverence as the Sacred Books, since they were dictated either by the mouth of Christ himself or by the Holy Spirit, and have been preserved by continuous succession in the Catholic Church." And later: "But if anyone knowingly and deliberately despises the aforesaid traditions, let him be anathema." No more need be said.

For it is fitting to return to those foundations which I laid down in the third chapter, from which, even if we added nothing else, that very point which we are now pursuing in this present chapter would be sufficiently established. But, just as it is an endless task to pursue every single point, so it is necessary to explain certain matters more fully. Nor, however, should what we have given for explaining this topic seem excessive. For the greater the force brought against this topic by heretics, the more we needed to labor, so that it might be explained and fortified as diligently as possible. And, as we said above, of the ten parts into which we divided the nature and force of the theological topics, this second one, which consists in tradition, touches most closely upon theology and faith. And so great a matter could not be settled in few words. But let us now finally dissolve those arguments which we set against the traditions in the first chapter.

Chapter VII

In which the Arguments of Chapter One are Refuted

Response to the first. That argument, indeed, which was laid out at the beginning, is not difficult to refute. For it is ridiculous to believe that apostolic traditions cannot be preserved in the hearts of the faithful with the same fidelity and diligence as if they were written on papyrus. For Scripture of the living Spirit of God is not erased any more easily than ink is, and there are very many traditions which you may see most easily preserved by custom and usage. But if Christ's providence is lacking to the Christian Church, then truly I am defending neither preserved traditions nor the certain authority of Scripture; for both equally rest on no foundation without God's care, and if you remove that, neither tradition nor Scripture is vindicated. But if the Church is Christ's own care, then it will no longer be in doubt that, just as he preserves the Gospel in its sense rather than in its letter, so too he preserves the other traditions, which the apostles so greatly commended to him.

"O Timothy," says Paul, "guard the deposit, avoiding the profane novelties of words, and the oppositions of science falsely so called." I marvel that this passage was understood by Cajetan as referring to the deposit of the flock entrusted to him, not to the doctrine entrusted to him — especially since he interprets a very similar passage in the second Epistle to Timothy not of the flock, but of the doctrine. Cajetan should have been warned that Paul was speaking of the word of God, from what he immediately adds: "avoiding the profane novelties of words, and the oppositions of science falsely so called" — for both of these are contrary to apostolic tradition: both the profane novelty of words and a falsely-named science.

Tradition, indeed, is commended by its antiquity; and if you hear anything new in the Church, then you should know that this is contrary both to antiquity and to the apostolic faith. But when you read that "words" are to be avoided, let it not come to your mind as the mere sound of words, but their meaning. For the Apostle commands the avoidance of novel dogmas and opinions, not empty or new sounds of words. Although we ought also, as far as possible, to avoid novel words too, in the discipline of faith and morals.

By "science falsely so called," understand either sophistry, or the cabbalistic art. For the hidden traditions of the cabbalists are opposed to the apostolic traditions in exactly the way that fables are opposed to truths, and superstitious things to sacred ones. Although, in discussing against the Gnostics, the Apostle — as Theophylact truly affirms — denounces their false knowledge, which they nevertheless sold to the unlearned common

people at a great price. But if nothing is so contrary to the ancient dogmas handed down by the apostles as opinions in the Church that are both new and profane (for apostolic faith approves what is ancient and equally sacred mysteries, and despises what is contrary), and nothing is so much in accord with the apostles as not departing from what we received long ago — for the Apostle is speaking, surely, of the deposit of the word, not of the flock — and likewise if "science falsely so called" is understood either as sophistry, as some hold, or as cabbalistic knowledge, as even Cajetan thought, or as that of the Gnostics, as Theophylact and I myself also approve — then it is necessary that, since false knowledge is opposed to true knowledge, the same applies, conversely, to those contrary things.

Although these points are so plain that the matter needs no confirmation, they should nevertheless be confirmed for us by the authority of Vincent of Lérins, a most weighty man. "The deposit," he says, "is that which has been entrusted to you, not what you have discovered; what you have received, not what you have devised; a matter of doctrine, not of ingenuity; of public tradition, not of private usurpation; a thing brought to you, not produced by you; in which you ought not to be the author, but the guardian; not the founder, but the follower; not the leader, but the one who follows. You have received gold; render gold. I do not want you to substitute something else for something else. Guard it on account of enemies, on account of thieves; guard it also diligently, carefully, faithfully, so that, in its proper time, when it is fitting, you may render it to whomever it is fitting. 'Avoiding the profane novelties of words' — that is, of opinions, of dogmas, of matters which are contrary to antiquity. For no heresy has ever arisen except under a definite name, in a definite place, at a definite time; nor has anyone established a heresy who has not first separated himself from the consensus of the Catholic Church and of antiquity. This, then, has been the legitimate and customary practice among all heresies — that they delight in profane novelties and disdain the established teachings of antiquity. But, on the contrary, this is the proper mark of Catholics — to preserve the deposits of the holy fathers, and to condemn profane novelties. For thus, at the Council of Ephesus, it was the unanimous voice of all the fathers, that what had been anciently handed down should be held fast, and what had been newly invented should be exploded." Thus far Vincent.

Indeed the force of this apostolic testimony against heretics was so great that Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 2, writes that the heretics, since they were defeated by this testimony, rejected Paul's epistles to Timothy.

To bring the discourse back, then, to where it digressed: our forefathers were not negligent in so necessary a matter, but, just as the Apostle entrusted this great care to

Timothy and through him to all, they too preserved it with great care. Thus, in their first argument, the Lutherans reason no differently than if ecclesiastical matters were not conducted by divine providence. But if they proceed in this manner, by the same reasoning they will also argue that not even the canonical books will always remain the same, but, if it please them, may even perish.

For how many books do learned moths and bookworms consume? How many monuments of authors have perished through human neglect? Surely Pythagoras himself too, as Lysias the Pythagorean writes to Hipparchus, left in his will certain commentaries to his daughter Dama; and yet these too have perished, indeed even more so than traditions. Since these things are so, there is no need to fear that the institutions of the apostles, which are written by the finger of God not on tablets of stone but in the very inward parts of the Church, will be effaced by human forgetfulness. And on the first argument, then, we have said quite a lot — indeed, I fear too much.

Response to the second. To the second, I respond thus. Augustine does not mean that the deeds and words of Jesus written by the evangelists are sufficient for the salvation and instruction of the faithful in an absolute sense. Otherwise the apostolic epistles, the Acts of the Apostles, the book of the Apocalypse, indeed the entire instrument of the Old Law, would seem superfluous and unnecessary. But this is what he means: that it was not necessary for the salvation of the faithful that other things be written, from among the deeds and words of Jesus, beyond what was actually written. For to write these was sufficient; the rest were omitted by the evangelists without fault.

For as to that other point, where Augustine is again objected to us, the defense is easy and ready. For those things which we hold by the usage and custom of the Church are not only not obscure, but so plain that Augustine himself judged it the mark of the most insolent madness to dispute about them. When, then, he says, "Where the most obscure matter is debated," etc., he sufficiently indicates that he is speaking in no way of those things which rest on the Church's institution and tradition. Otherwise, I would like the adversaries to explain to us what this same Augustine, in his book Against Cresconius 1, chapter 33, explicitly hands down, in these words: "Although, indeed, no example of this matter is produced from the canonical Scriptures, yet the truth of these same Scriptures is held by us in this matter too, when we do what has already pleased the universal Church — a Church which the authority of the Scriptures themselves commends — since, because Holy Scripture cannot deceive, whoever fears to be deceived should consult that same Church, which Holy Scripture, without any ambiguity, demonstrates."

Response to the third. Now the testimony of the Apostle is wrongly cited against us. For Paul here calls "the man of God" a teacher of the Church, who is equipped by the Sacred Letters for every work of his ministry. For there are four things which a minister of the sacred word ought to perform: namely, to teach, to refute, to correct, to instruct. All of these, indeed, Divine Scripture supplies to teachers of the Gospel. But if anyone contends that this passage should be understood generally, I would not strongly resist this; let him only grant me that the Scriptures do not always prescribe individually and specifically concerning every single matter. For if everything were written specifically, what is meant by this: "The rest, when I come, I will set in order"? What again by this: "Having many things to write to you, I would not by paper and ink: for I hope to be with you, and to speak face to face"?

Divine Scripture, then, instructs us not only concerning those things which are written, but also concerning those things which are not written. "Hold," says Paul, "the traditions which you have received, whether by epistle or by word." And in this same chapter 3 of the second Epistle to Timothy, by whose testimony we are assailed, when the Apostle had said: "But you have followed my doctrine and my manner of life" — words by which he embraces both kinds of discipline, both what is contained in writing and what in institution — he immediately adds: "But you continue in those things which you have learned, and which have been entrusted to you." For Timothy had learned the Sacred Letters, as the Apostle states in this same place, and besides this had received the mysteries of evangelical doctrine entrusted to him, as was said in chapter 2 and in chapter 6 of the first Epistle to him. The Apostle, then, does not exclude traditions in this passage, but rather commends them.

Response to the fourth. Now indeed, as for that argument which Luther adds from Deuteronomy chapter 17, this carries almost no weight at all. For we have received the law not only written on papyrus sheets, but rather that which is inscribed in our inward parts. Nor are we so unlearned that, among us, a law handed down only by word has less the name of "law" than one published in letters. We admit, then, that priests are not to be heeded, unless they teach according to the law of the Lord. But those who hand down apostolic institutions to the Church teach us most especially according to the law of the Lord; while those who fight against ecclesiastical traditions, we maintain, fight against the law of the Lord.

From this, Calvin's calumny is easily crushed. For he accuses the Church, as though it had introduced traditions against the Sacred Letters. For it is said, in Deuteronomy 12, that we should not seek other ceremonies in worshipping God besides those commanded by the law, nor add anything to them or take anything away. And Solomon says: "Add

nothing to the words of God, lest you be reproved and found a liar." But although the traditions of the Church were, in a sense, additions to Sacred Scripture, they were nevertheless not added to the word of God; rather they are themselves divine words, no differently than those which are written in the Sacred Books.

For we are not, at present, discussing traditions which have come down from later prelates of the Church — defending these belongs to another place and time — but our disputation concerns the traditions of Christ and the apostles, which we here defend, rightly and truly, as divine oracles. Nor are even these traditions additions to the Divine Scriptures, but rather completions, and, as it were, commentaries on them.

Otherwise, let the prophets be accused, for having added something to the law of Moses; let the apostles be accused, who added epistles to the Gospels, and adorned the simplicity of the donkey and her colt with their fittingly placed garments; accuse likewise, if you wish, these same men, who established the decree concerning things sacrificed to idols, blood, and what is strangled, and also published certain canons which are not written in the Sacred Books. But these are not, as we have said, additions to Scripture, but interpretations — as has been more fully explained against the Greeks at the Council of Florence, sessions 4, 5, 6, and 7.

By this same reasoning we also defend the ecclesiastical doctrine, laws, and salutary institutions. For the Church, in publishing these, does not lay new foundations, nor add new structures, but builds, upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, gold, silver, and precious stones, and renders the seeds of the kingdom of heaven not different but the same, only increased — as Eusebius said, book 3 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 37. And we too, in book 7, the final chapter, if life remains, shall further enrich this same doctrine. Now enough has been said on the fourth argument.

Response to the fifth. Let us answer the fifth. Chrysostom, moreover — or whoever else is the author — does not say "to the truth of the Scriptures," which heretics are accustomed to cite, but "unless they say things which are in agreement with the truth." Although, indeed, those who teach the apostolic traditions truly say things which agree with the truth of the Scriptures as well.

As for what is objected to us concerning Papias's tradition, this is refuted by Eusebius, book 5 of the Ecclesiastical History, the last chapter, where he says that Papias, being a man of small and limited understanding, took the spiritual and mystical traditions of the apostles bodily and according to the letter. We are not, then, bound to believe immediately, just because one or another claims the authority of apostolic traditions. For there are also some who advance the Sacred Letters whom we rightly and deservedly

reject, since they misuse the testimonies of the Sacred Letters. In the same manner, Irenaeus too could have been deceived by Papias and other disciples of John concerning the age of the Lord Savior; for he believed it, without examining whether he believed those who spoke truthfully. But we shall discuss this matter more carefully afterward.

Response to the sixth, seventh, and eighth. As for the testimonies of Theophilus, Jerome, and Origen, there is no need to respond at greater length. For they speak against those who peddled to posterity either human inventions contrary even to the Sacred Letters, or certain apocryphal histories, as though they were divine and certain things. Otherwise, if Jerome (for they press his testimony most insistently) did not think anything should be believed except what had been handed down in the Sacred Letters, with what face does he argue, against the Luciferians, Vigilantius, and Helvidius, from the authority of traditions?

Now how frivolous and plainly ridiculous Calvin's confirmation is, I shall make plain, with no trouble at all, to those who will weigh it with me a little. Indeed I would also exhort him to turn his mind seriously to this point, if I had confidence that I could profit him at all by teaching. But since the Lutherans, having set aside the rule of truth, have only this one purpose — to advance their own cause by whatever means they can — I shall say only a few things, by which good and true theologians may extricate themselves from their sophistries.

First, Joachim Camerarius's text reads not "fully" (plene) but "plainly" (plane) in this manner: "the Gospels," etc., "plainly instruct us concerning the mind of the Godhead." Then, even if we should read it as Calvin cites it, nothing is thereby gained. For since the Scriptures themselves not obscurely commend the teaching authority of the Church and the authority of traditions, they certainly do instruct us fully concerning the mind of the Godhead. For they teach that the mind of the Godhead, whether handed down in writing or by word, is equally to be held.

What of the fact that it would be the mark of an agitated and unlearned assembly to immediately rebuff, in the very proem, the words of a speaker — especially one who was speaking in good faith? Or was it reasonable to stir up tumults at once, and impudently to anticipate that which had to be settled at the Council with great force and contention? For the Arians had already prescribed, as was shown in the first chapter, that they would accept nothing at all in a question of faith besides the Scriptures.

The fathers of Synods, however, are accustomed most prudently to disregard whatever is said in passing by anyone whose words are not going to establish the faith of the Council, so that the matter which is chiefly to be dealt with may be handled more

conveniently, in its proper place and time — as we shall have to explain afterward in book 5.

Nor did the fathers at Nicaea embrace everything that Constantine had said; but when he had urged that, hostile discord being set aside, the questions should be resolved, and wished that all should confess the unity of the apostolic dogmas, Theodoret says: "To these things the greater part assented, and established harmony and soundness of dogmas among themselves. A few, however," etc. From Constantine's testimony, then, and the Synod's silence, nothing at all is concluded.

Besides which, even if the disputation were to be conducted with the Sacred Letters, their sense would nevertheless have to be received not from the dead letters themselves, but from the tradition of the living voice; thus we would always need the use and authority of tradition. On the eighth argument, then, this much.

Response to the ninth. The traditions of the apostles, of which we speak, however, are not human but divine. Thus those who teach them do not teach "the doctrines of men" — which are understood to mean either doctrines altogether contrary to the precepts of God, according to that which the Lord said in Mark chapter 15: "Why do you transgress the commandments of God for the sake of your traditions?" — or else certain idle and vain traditions, such as that concerning the washing of hands after a meal, which could perhaps be useful for the cleansing of hands, but certainly not for the worship of God. For this reason the Lord rightly said, through Isaiah: "But in vain do they worship me." But Cyprian, in that letter, rebukes those who were attempting to introduce a new custom contrary to Christ's institution.

Response to the tenth. The tenth argument, indeed, I pressed more insistently, so that this response might explain that there is the greatest distinction between the traditions of heretics and of Catholics. For heretics divulge their mysteries to weak women and to ignorant little men; but Catholics consider it a sacrilege to divulge the mystical and sacred traditions of the Church to the common run of weak women and ignorant little men. The reasons for this, since they were given in the third chapter, the reader may take from there as pertinent to this point as well.

Heretics, again, are accustomed to hide their secret traditions from learned men, especially those who preside over the Catholic Churches; Catholics, on the contrary, according to what the Apostle commands, entrust the mysteries of Christian discipline only to those who are fit to teach others as well. Wherefore the deposit of doctrine is public, since it is entrusted to the magistrates of the commonwealth. "O Timothy," he says — "O bishop, you who are both prelate and teacher of the Church — guard the

deposit"; and again: "What you have heard from me, commend these to faithful men, who shall be fit to teach others also." And this must be noted more carefully: that this deposit was committed to Timothy not secretly in a corner and privately, but before many witnesses, so that it might be understood to be a matter not of private usurpation, not of clandestine and stolen doctrine, but of public tradition, of open discipline, and without deceit.

Those who fail to perceive this clearly do not sufficiently explain what sense this passage has: "I have spoken nothing in secret." For the doctrine of Christ, in which there is nothing feigned, nothing fictitious, nothing fraudulent, but everything sincere, true, and simple, has nothing at all hidden, secret, or shadowy. Since heretics have this quality, their doctrine is rightly called "hidden" — just as any citizen is said to "hide" something from the commonwealth, when he secretly conveys to private men, rather than to the proper authorities, things that ought to be revealed to the magistrates. For he who publicizes to the people what is meant to be made known to the people, while publishing openly — though only to the magistrates, as is fitting — what is meant to be disclosed only to the authorities of the commonwealth, does nothing at all in a hidden manner. We, then, do not, in the manner of heretics, conceal mysteries, but, by the institution of the apostles, hide them from the common crowd, and reveal them to the elders — things which it is fitting for elders to know, but not fitting for the crowd to know.

What then, you will ask, does this mean: "What you have heard in the ear, preach upon the housetops"? For what is preached upon the housetops is brought out to the common crowd. But indeed, at the time the Lord gave this command to his disciples, he had not yet opened their understanding, that they might understand the Scriptures; he had not yet spoken to them, for forty days, concerning the kingdom of God — that is, concerning the administration of the Christian commonwealth; he had not yet sent the Spirit, who would teach those things which they could not bear while Christ lived. He had handed down that part of evangelical discipline which pertained to all the faithful, and those laws which it was expedient should be known even to the common people.

Such, then, is the Lord's precept: "What you have heard in mystery, preach more openly; what you have learned in secret, speak publicly; what I have taught you, either on the mountain or within the house, say boldly in the cities." But the circumstances of time and matter must be taken into account; for "I have many things to say to you, which you cannot bear now." When I shall have declared these things to you, there will indeed be a different law. I do not wish you to preach those things upon the housetops; I do not wish you to announce them to the common crowd. For the same reason for hiding them

will then be yours as is now mine — that the common crowd will not be able to bear them.

I know that Clement of Alexandria, in Stromata 1, understands this passage as referring to the secret traditions which had been delivered "in the ear," which he explains are to be preached "upon the housetops" — that is, loftily and excellently. But the explanation I have given seems to me much more probable. For our sense too is supported by this: "I have always taught in the synagogue and in the temple, where all the Jews gather, and I have spoken nothing in secret." The tenth argument, then, has been sufficiently refuted.

Response to the eleventh. As for the eleventh, since it must be carefully explained in book 13 of this work, I do not intend to refute it at present. The readers need only be reminded of this, which Lucian the Martyr, in Eusebius, book 9 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 6, pursues at length and learnedly — that we Christians are not bound by the error of some merely human persuasion, nor are we deceived, like others, by an unexamined tradition of our forefathers; but that God himself is the author of our institution and doctrine, by whose teaching we rightly and truly glory. But more on this elsewhere. Now the final argument must be dissolved.

Response to the twelfth. The refutation of this argument too, since it must also be referred to book 13, will be most brief here. Indeed, Julian the Apostate objected to the Christians their irrationality and rusticity, and their "wisdom," where there was nothing else but believing. To this objection Gregory Nazianzen responds, in his first invective Against Julian, that this is not foreign to his own philosophers, whom he admires so greatly, since they too employ this kind of teaching. For the first and greatest precept of Pythagoras was that, if anyone should question his disciples about his doctrines, or demand some reasoning for them, they should answer nothing other than that this is how it had seemed to Pythagoras — and that this was an unimpeachable reason for the doctrine. "Thus, then," he says, "and indeed even more so, reason demands that we not deny faith to those things which have been spoken by divine men, and that their report be held as credible proof of reason, stronger than any rational or irrational demonstration." Thus far Gregory.

Here certainly Gregory does not seem to be horrified by what is rejected in the argument as though absurd — that our discipline is similar to the Pythagorean one, or rather that this latter is similar to ours. But suppose it is most dissimilar — why does that argument fight more against doctrine handed down by word than against that which has been published in letters? For surely we believe both, and shall try, if we can, to give a reasoned account of both. And we shall give one, if the Lord grants life, many, the

greatest, and the weightiest reasons, where we have promised to do so. For this topic can now be concluded. And on the second source of arguments, we have spoken. As for the remaining eight, the method of disputation extends very broadly; but we shall, as far as we are able and as is permitted, compress it into a brief space.

Book IV

On the Authority of the Church

Chapter I

By What Arguments the Authority of the Church is Attacked

The third part of this work is now complete, which I wish to be most well known to theologians. In this fourth book we must now explain and defend the authority of the Church — a matter on which churchmen have written so abundantly that they have produced great volumes on this single topic alone. What their purpose was is of no concern at present. The purpose of this present writing and occasion, however, is to discuss the authority of the Church in the judgment of faith, and so to teach briefly whether firm arguments can be drawn from the common sense of the faithful to confirm the dogmas of theology.

Montanus, indeed, was the first to persuade his disciples to show no reverence to the Church that exists throughout the whole earth, as Apollinaris and Eusebius have attested. Nestorius later affirmed that the entire Church erred in worshipping things it should not — for he said it followed ignorant and erring teachers — as Vincent of Lérins relates. And the Iconoclasts afterward asserted that the Church, in venerating images, had been caught up for a long time and to a great degree in a shameful error, as the Seventh Synod relates in its sixth action.

The Donatists and the Rogatians too contemned the authority of the Catholic Church — not in word, indeed, but in fact — as Augustine writes, both often elsewhere and especially in letters 48 to Vincent, 50 to Boniface, and 161 to Honoratus. And, to avoid naming them all, Luther finally followed his own Wycliffe, and said the Church erred, among other things, in that it gave communion to the laity under one kind, contrary to the law of Christ. Indeed he once asserted, if Cochlaeus reports truly, that the Church had erred almost from the beginning, in that, contrary to Paul, it had held that law and works were necessary for salvation.

In short, it is characteristic of all heretics that, as soon as they see themselves pressed by the authority of the Church, they either despise it, or transfer the reality and the name of "Church" to themselves, and deny that it exists in those where it truly does. Heretics attempt to persuade people of both these positions — since both amount to one and the same thing — by very many arguments.

The first is of this kind: Aaron, the high priest himself, and others of the people, whether of higher or lower rank, worshipped the molten calf and offered to it peace offerings and burnt offerings; the Church of Christ, then, could in the same way worship a carved image and images. If it does so, as indeed it does, it has without doubt erred most shamefully in faith and religion.

Again, the Church, in the times of Isaiah and Jeremiah, fell into error concerning the worship of the one true God; what, then, prevents it from erring even now in the worship of the one true God? For it is the same Church, and no difference will be found, in this matter, between the new people and the old. As for the premise of this argumentation, they think they can show it from the clearest testimonies of these same prophets.

"The ox," says the first one, "has known its owner, and the donkey its master's manger; but Israel has not known me... From the sole of the foot even to the top of the head there is no soundness in it." And the second says: "Confounded are the house of Israel, they and their kings, their princes and priests and prophets, saying to wood, 'You are my father,' and to a stone, 'You have given me birth.'" And a little after: "What do you wish to dispute with me in judgment? You have all forsaken me, says the Lord." Likewise: "Go about the streets of Jerusalem, and look, and see if you can find a man who does what is right and seeks the truth, and I will be merciful to him. But I said, perhaps they are poor and foolish, ignorant of the way of the Lord, the judgment of their God. I will go, then, to the great men, for they have known the way of the Lord. And behold, these all the more have broken the yoke..." The whole Church, then, at that time, was in error.

Moreover, the Church need not be pointed out with a finger; indeed it can exist hidden, with no visible form appearing. But it is futile to await the judgment of something whose very nature you are completely ignorant of. This they urge, since, among the people of the Jews, the Church was often so disfigured that no visible form of it remained at all. For what form do we think stood out, when Elijah lamented that he alone was left? What, when that people, scattered among the Babylonians, Persians, and Egyptians, served foreign nations and foreign gods in a foreign land, without priesthood, without temple, without scepter? Since Christ's coming, then, the Church too could

remain hidden and disfigured, and be so oppressed by wars, seditions, and heresies, that it shines forth in no part at all.

And indeed, in his own age, Hilary believed the Church to be hidden rather than seen. So thoroughly had the Arian faction confused everything. "Wrongly," he says, "has love of walls captivated you; wrongly do you venerate the Church of God in roofs and buildings; wrongly do you press the name of peace under these. Is it not doubtful that the Antichrist will sit in these very buildings? Mountains, and woods, and lakes, and prisons, and chasms are safer for me; for in these the prophets, whether remaining or submerged, prophesied."

By these words he modestly and reverently signifies that the Church of Christ is to be sought not in bishops, not in priests, not in temples, not in the throng of the people, but in pious men — who sometimes, in the manner of the prophets, wander in the field and in deserted places, or hide in the woods, in caves and in the caverns of the earth.

What of the fact that, with the schism long persisting under rival pontiffs, no visible appearance of the Church appeared in the meantime? If the faithful of that age had sought a manifest Church, and believed in no other than one perceivable by human eyes, they certainly would have found none. Was there, then, no Church at that time, simply because it was hidden?

And just as the Church once shone forth clearly and brightly, how do we know whether it will always retain a true and genuine form hereafter? For surely, if, in past centuries, the Lord punished the wicked deeds of his people so severely that he allowed it to be tossed about by the most absurd lies and engulfed in the deepest darkness, why should we not fear that the Church of Christ could even now be hidden and enveloped in blind night and thick fog, to such an extent that no true face of it shines forth?

As though there were no longer any judgments of the Lord, that he might today punish the world with the same kind of punishment with which he once avenged the ingratitude of the old people — namely, by striking shepherds and sheep alike with stupor and blindness, and removing the outward recognition of his Church from the sight of men.

Here, indeed, heretics taunt us as though the matter were already settled, and mock us in astonishing ways, since we glory in those words: "The temple of the Lord, the temple of the Lord, this is it." "Samaria too was transferred," they say; "and when Jerusalem, clinging to outward masks, boasted of its temple, ceremonies, priesthood, sacraments, and Scriptures, it too was transferred."

Thus, what happened to the Eastern Church could happen also to the Western, so that its visible form might either vanish into smoke or certainly hide itself entirely. But who has given us any confidence either that our sins are lighter than theirs were, or that God will not take notice of us as he did of them?

Especially since the Apostle not obscurely prophesies a falling-away to come within the Church — which surely cannot come, while a true form and appearance of the Church still exists. But what will such a Church be like at that time, of which the Lord says: "Nevertheless, when the Son of man comes, do you think he will find faith on the earth?" What, I say, will it be like, when the sacrifice and the offering shall fail? What, finally, when, as John writes, the smoke of the pit shall darken the sun and the air? From which nothing else can be understood, surely, than that the Church is to be so obscured in our present age, that it cannot be found except in darkness. Why, indeed, do we defend the outward face and splendor of the Church, when all the glory of the king's daughter is from within? But if the Church is invisible and hidden, then any argument drawn from its authority will likewise be unexplored and uncertain.

Moreover, the Church is constituted solely from the number of the predestined; but the number of the elect, to be placed in heavenly blessedness, is known to God alone. The Church, then, is entirely hidden and unknown to us. This first proposition, in which the whole difficulty lies, is urged especially by the testimony of Augustine, who explicitly asserts that the enclosed garden, the sealed fountain, the well of living water, and the paradise with its abundance of fruits, consist only of the number of the predestined, who are hidden within. No believer doubts, indeed, that all these things are properly attributed to the Church of Christ.

Nor can it even be doubted — although Augustine did not explain it this way — that, in the enclosed garden and the sealed fountain, none other are understood than those of whom it is written: "The firm foundation of God stands, having this seal: the Lord knows who are his." Augustine also proves this same point from the fact that Peter said the ark was a type of the Church, in which eight souls were saved through water. None, then, are to be considered as inside the ark except those who are saved. For Christ is not the head of any other Church than the one of which he is the savior, and which he presents to himself in glory, as the Apostle teaches in Ephesians. Those, then, who will be neither saved nor glorious are not parts of that Church of which Christ is the head.

Then, the Church is composed of the sons of God, since she is mother to none other than those of whom God is father. Now it is clear that those are truly sons of God who are to receive their paternal inheritance. "If sons," it says, "then heirs also: heirs indeed of

God, and joint heirs with Christ."

Likewise, Christ's flock is constituted only from Christ's sheep; but those alone are Christ's sheep of whom he himself says: "My sheep hear my voice, and I give them eternal life, and they shall never perish."

Finally, John the Evangelist, speaking of certain men who seemed to have left the Church, although in fact they had never been in the Church, says: "They went out from us, but they were not of us." Why so? "Because," he says, "if they had been of us, they would surely have remained with us." None, then, are of the Church, except those who remain in the grace they have received. And this passage, since it was readily at hand, Augustine, in his book On Correction and Grace, chapter 9, and On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 8, understands of the predestined — following Jerome, namely, in his dialogue against the Luciferians.

To this, the true Church of Christ must be perfect and unblemished. For "she is all beautiful, and there is no blemish in her." And again: "My dove is one, my perfect one." The Apostle too has himself described her as without spot or wrinkle. And Isaiah says: "There shall no more pass through you the uncircumcised and the unclean." But to consider the Church unblemished, when all its members have some impurity, how empty and fabulous is this! No such Church, then, now exists at this present time. It seems to have existed only in that time when John truly wrote: "Whoever sins has not seen him." And: "Whoever is born of God does not commit sin; and he cannot sin, because he is born of God. In this the children of God and the children of the devil are made manifest."

But if it is necessary that all who are members of the ecclesiastical society exist without sin and blemish, then either there are certainly none, or they are hidden and unknown to us. This the Apostle seems to affirm, when, distinguishing the Church of Christ from the Synagogue, he describes it not as something sensible and tangible, but as something spiritual and untouchable — namely, as consisting only of the perfect and predestined. "You have not come," he says, "to a mountain that may be touched, and a burning fire, but to mount Sion, and to the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to the Church of the firstborn who are written in heaven, and to the spirits of just men made perfect."

Add to this, that the faithful are bound to believe in the Church not as something arbitrary, but as holy. But in a holy congregation only holy persons can be understood. "The Church of the just," it says, "is the children of wisdom." But if you should point to some men, one of whom is wicked, you would say falsely that all these are righteous —

just as, if of ten men one sits while the rest run, it would be false to say that the ten are running.

There is also another, most forceful reason for the same conclusion: that if the wicked are members of the Church, they will also be members of Christ. But they are, without doubt, members of the devil. Wherefore the same men would simultaneously be citizens both of Jerusalem and of Babylon, and members at once of both Christ and the devil. What could be said or imagined more absurd than this? Unless perhaps there is fellowship between light and darkness, an agreement between Christ and Belial. Members of the same body certainly cannot be contrary to one another in turn; but, on the contrary, evil is contrary to good, death to life, and — as the Wise Man says — the sinner is contrary to the just man; the just man and the sinner, then, are not members of the ecclesiastical body.

Aristotle too teaches — a most weighty authority on this matter, with whom Saint Thomas also agrees — that dead limbs are members no differently than painted or sculpted ones are; the sinner, then, since he is dead, is not truly and properly a member and a part of the Church, but only equivocally and figuratively.

Moreover, "we, being many, are one bread, and one body," as the Apostle teaches in the first Epistle to the Corinthians; and it is established, as Cyprian shrewdly argues to Magnus, that bread is made by combining many grains into one; sinners, then, who are chaff, do not enter into the composition either of the bread or of the body of the Church. This Augustine attests not obscurely, and in so many places, that there can be no doubt this was his firm and constant opinion. For in his second book against Petilian, he says: "Nor are the wicked to be thought to be in the body of Christ, which is the Church, although they bodily partake of its sacraments."

Likewise, in his second book against Cresconius, he says: "He who, with a perverse mind, seems to be within, while in fact he is without, has already been judged by Christ himself." And later: "Even without the Church's knowledge, on account of their evil and polluted conscience, those condemned by Christ are no longer in the body of Christ, which is the Church, since Christ cannot have condemned members. Accordingly, they themselves too baptize outside the Church. For all these monstrous things, far be it that they should be counted among the members of that one unique dove." He is speaking, without doubt, of believing sinners, as is clearly evident from the context before and after. Likewise, in his book On the Unity of the Church, he affirms that the wicked are by no means to be reckoned in the Church.

Likewise, in the fourth book On Baptism Against the Donatists, and explicitly also in the sixth book, he affirms that those who act against Christ's commands do not belong to that Church which Christ cleanses with the washing of water, and of which it is written, "My dove is one." And in the seventh book he says that the wicked do not belong to the structure of the house, which is the Church, and that they are in the house no differently than chaff is said to be in grain. But in this same book he also relates that Cyprian, in his letter to Magnus, is not only the author of this opinion, but its confirmer as well. He confirms it, moreover, with that prophetic testimony: "Who makes the like-minded to dwell in his house." Those, then, who have neither one soul nor one heart in the Lord, by no means dwell in the Church, which is the house of God.

And Jerome says: "The Church of Christ has no spot or wrinkle. Whoever, then, is a sinner, and stained with some defilement, cannot be called part of the Church of Christ. It is possible, however, for the sinner to run to the physician, and for his wounds to be healed, and for him to become part of the Church, which is the body of Christ." But if the Church, to whose authority we defer, must necessarily be holy, and accordingly consist solely of the pious and the just, it will then nowhere produce certain conviction in theology, until it can demonstrate, by some sure indication, that it is holy. And this it cannot do by any means, since God alone knows the hearts of the children of men.

They also ask us why we are so foolish in our judgment of the Church, when Christ marked it out by a most certain symbol. "I am the good shepherd," he says, "and I know my sheep, and my sheep know me; my sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me." Whoever, then, does not hear the voice of Christ, does not belong to Christ's flock, and accordingly is not even part of the Church of Christ.

Moreover, if the good and the wicked together constituted the Church, then, just as it is called holy because of a small number of just men, by the same reasoning, and with even greater force, it would be called wicked because of the much greater number of unjust ones. Wherefore the very same assembly would be both Christ's Church and the Synagogue of Satan. The good alone, then, constitute the Church of Christ. Wherefore it is invisible to men, and indeed too little known for its testimony to produce certain and well-established faith.

There are, moreover, two Churches — the Greek and the Latin — and which of the two is to be believed is not, they say, adequately settled. The usual answer is that the Greeks are schismatics, and that therefore the Church has perished among them. By what right? Because, by separating themselves from the Roman Pontiff, they have lost the privilege of the ecclesiastical name. But what then? Do not those who fall away from Christ, the

true head of the Church, lose it much more?

And, before the birth of Christ, there was one Church of all the earlier peoples, and yet there was in it no single shepherd or ruler. The name and reality of "Church," then, does not depend on a single pontiff. The Greek Church, then, will exist, although it does not obey the Roman bishop. Indeed, were that bishop to die, there would nonetheless still be one Church, and that same Church the pillar and foundation of truth.

The truth and unity of the Church, then, does not arise from this head. But if it has one Lord, one faith of Christ, one baptism; if it acknowledges one Son, worships one Spirit, recognizes one God and Father of all, there will be one Church of Christ. For by these things the Apostle defines the one Church of Christ. There is, then, no reason why the Greeks, in whom all these things are present, and among whom there are also many good men, should not constitute the Church of Christ. Arrogantly, then, does the Latin Church usurp for itself, in the judgment of faith, the name of the catholic Church.

Wherefore, unless it agrees in opinion with the Greek Church, it lacks the authority of the universal Church, and we are not bound to revere its judgment as though it were truly catholic.

Moreover, it is called the catholic Church for this reason — that it is spread through all nations and throughout the whole world — as Augustine showed in his second book against the Petilianists; but it is this Church alone which binds and constrains us by its judgment, since the Sacred Letters have commended to us this Church and no other, as the same Augustine shows in very many places. The Church which now exists, then — if indeed it exists at all — has no certain authority, since it has ceased to be catholic, that is, universal.

Moreover, no argument at all can be drawn from the opinion of the universal Church. For how shall we seek the consensus of all the faithful on a question of faith? It is vain, then, to wish to draw an argument from the catholic Church. Someone might perhaps say: the pastors represent the Church, and indeed are themselves the very Church; it is enough, then, to seek their opinion, since their opinion is altogether the same as the Church's.

But there was, in the times of Isaiah, a Church at Jerusalem; yet this is how he speaks of its pastors: "Its watchmen are all blind, they know nothing at all; dumb dogs, unable to bark, seeing vain things, sleeping and loving dreams." "The shepherds themselves did not know understanding. All have turned to their own way, from the highest even to the last."

The Church also endured into the time of Jeremiah; let us hear what he says of its pastors. "How do you say, We are wise, and the law of the Lord is with us? Surely the lying pen of the scribes has wrought a lie. The wise men are confounded, they are terrified and taken; for they have cast away the word of the Lord, and there is no wisdom in them... From the least even to the greatest, all follow after greed; from the prophet even to the priest, all practice deceit."

But why, according to this reasoning, would those four hundred prophets, who all lied to Ahab, not represent the Church? But the true Church of God — that is, whoever among the people were pious — stood on the side of Micaiah. Certainly, if the matter stands this way, the prophets and priests would have presented an image of the Church, since against Jeremiah they all confidently boasted, to a man, that it could not happen that the law should perish from the priest, counsel from the wise man, the word from the prophet. Against all of them, however, one Jeremiah is sent, who announces from the Lord that the law will indeed perish from the priest, counsel from the wise man, the word from the prophet. But if priests and pastors constitute the God's Church, whose testimony ought to be revered, it follows that they were estranged from the Church of God, and indeed fought against it.

In Israel, indeed, this happened to Elijah, Micaiah, and others like them; in Judah, to Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the rest of their kind, whom the priests, pastors, and prophets of their own age not only alienated from themselves, but even cursed with dire imprecations. If this should be judged absurd and impious — to say nothing of foolish as well — let it stand, then, that the priests and pastors were not the Church of God, but an impious conspiracy and assembly of the worst of men, against whose consensus one was bound to dissent. Since, then, present-day pastors could likewise resemble those of old, they certainly do not represent the Church of Christ, nor are the dogmas of faith proven by their judgment. And if the Church of God consists of pastors and bishops, where in the world does the Church reside, since the Council of Basel deposed Eugenius from the pontificate, with Amadeus substituted in his place? For the Council, as far as its outward forms are concerned, was legitimate, and was convened not by one pontiff alone, but by two. Eugenius was there condemned for schism, rebellion, and obstinacy, along with the whole flock of cardinals and bishops who opposed the Council. From the bosom of those schismatic, rebellious, and obstinate men proceeded whatever Popes, Cardinals, Bishops, Abbots, and Priests there have since been.

To which side, then, shall the name of "Church" be assigned? Shall we deny that it was a general synod, the one which was consecrated with the legate of the Roman see presiding? Or shall we admit that the schismatic Eugenius, with his whole company,

from which all succeeding bishops were sanctified, was right? Either, then, pastors gathered even in a general council by no means represent the Church of God, or, however many there are, they have been ordained by heretics and schismatics.

The Lutherans make especially great use of these arguments. As for what Calvin adds — that there are two marks of the Church, the sincere preaching of the word and the right administration of the sacraments; that, among the gathering of Catholics, instead of the ministry of the word there reigns a doctrine fashioned from lies; that in the place of the Lord's Supper has come the most foul sacrilege; that public assemblies in churches are schools of idolatry and impiety; wherefore the true and genuine Church of Christ is not among us, but rather a deadly and sacrilegious conspiracy of Satan — since this is imprudently, shamefully, and slanderously objected, it need not be addressed at present.

Chapter II

What is Signified by the Word "Church"

I, for my part, shall proceed and do what I judge ought to be done at the outset of all disputations, and especially of this one — namely, to explain what the matter under dispute actually is, lest the discourse wander and go astray, if those who disagree with one another do not understand that the thing being discussed is the same.

"Ecclesia," then, is a Greek word, and, if you render it word for word, is called in Latin "convocation" — either because she calls everyone to herself, as Julius and Rabanus thought, or because all those who gather into her do so not by their own merits and righteousness, but by God's grace and calling. For this latter etymology of the name, too, I hope will please the readers.

For Paul, writing to the Church at Rome, says: "To all who are at Rome, called to be saints." And in the first Epistle to the Corinthians: "To the Church of God which is at Corinth, called to be saints." And a little after: "Faithful is God, through whom you were called into the fellowship of his Son Jesus Christ." Since this fellowship is undoubtedly Christ's Church, let those who arrogate to themselves this title see whether, in the manner of heretics, they are falsely claiming that the Church exists among themselves.

But concerning the etymology of the name I will not delay further; the Church is certainly an "assembly" — whence "Ecclesiastes" means "the one who addresses an assembly." And although that word has sometimes been used generally for any assembly whatsoever, whether of the impious or the pious, of unbelievers or believers, yet in the New Testament, as far as I can recall, the assembly of unbelievers is nowhere called

"Church." This usage, indeed, has so prevailed among Christians, that they now recognize the name "Church" in no multitude whatsoever, except one that has come together through faith in Christ and his calling. "Church," moreover, is both the very place to which the multitude flocks, and, properly, the multitude itself. There are very many examples of both these usages in the Sacred Letters.

The holy writers, however, observed this distinction between the Synagogue and the Church: that the true people of old was equally called both "Church" and "Synagogue"; but the Christian people has never been called "Synagogue," either by Sacred Scripture or by any approved author. This was done either to distinguish the two commonwealths, or because there is some difference between "congregation," which "Synagogue" signifies, and "convocation," which "Church" means. For cattle are usually said to "congregate" (whence we say "flocks," properly not of men but of cattle or beasts); but only men are usually "convoked." By this much the Church of Christ surpasses the Synagogue.

And although the fellowship of angels and men is sometimes called "Church," and sometimes "the kingdom of heaven" — which is composed of men both already in possession and still on the journey — we do not intend at present to discuss anything but the Church militant, that is, the assembly of believers still journeying. Nor is it necessary to show these meanings of the word by examples, since they occur everywhere both in the Sacred Letters and in the books of all the saints.

But just as it conflicts not only with the truth but also with common sense to understand unbelievers who have not yet been baptized as falling under the term "Church of Christ," so it must be established that heretics are not parts of the Church. This is the common position not only of theologians who have written recently, but also of those held most distinguished by their very antiquity. This is attested by Cyprian, Augustine, Gregory, and the two Councils of the Lateran and Florence.

Rightly, then, does Pope Nicholas define the Church as a collection of catholics. Certainly those who define the Church more strictly do not hesitate to say it is constituted only of the number of the faithful; but even those who define it more loosely nevertheless do not dare to call "men of the Church" those whom they do not see to be catholic. For it is absurd to assert that those who are not parts of the catholic Church are parts of the Church of Christ.

But even a heretical Pope, until he is deposed by the Church, since he always retains his authority, will still be head of the Church; heretics, then, will be numbered among the parts of the Church. The Apostle too, when he had said that Hymenaeus and Philetus had fallen from the truth, and overthrown the faith of some, adds that, in a great house,

there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and earthenware — some, indeed, for honor, others for disgrace. By these words, as Augustine says, he signifies that even those who have departed from the faith are in the great house — not, indeed, as vessels of honor, but as vessels of disgrace. This same opinion he also confirms by the testimony of Cyprian.

But for us, hastening to discharge what we have promised, it is not our intention to shake out every scruple that arises along the way. For why should we weigh, at this point, whether a Pope can be a heretic? Or again, whether, as soon as he has fallen into heresy, he ceases to be head of the Church? Yet both of these would have had to be explained in disposing of the previous argument. This is neither suited to our brevity, nor pertains to the work we have undertaken. And if anything must be said on these matters, it will be said more opportunely elsewhere. We shall explain that question in book 6; on this latter point, our friend Cajetan has discussed at length and breadth in his book On the Authority of the Pope and Councils.

Lest we seem, however, deterred by the difficulty of this argument, to be giving ground, it must be understood that the Church can be spoken of in two ways. First, that which the congregation of all the faithful, from the beginning of the world to its end, constitutes — in the way Saint Thomas speaks of the Church, Part III, question 8, article 3; and all those who say that the same Church now exists which existed both among the people of the Jews under the law of Moses and among pious men of old under the law of nature. In this sense, catechumens are most truly members of the Church. For this Church is distinguished not by the sacrament of baptism, but by faith, which has at all times distinguished the people of God from the gatherings of unbelievers. Then, the Church is also said to be that which is gathered in the name of Christ through baptism — which is both the sacrament of faith, and properly makes members and parts of the Church, and distinguishes the Church of Christ from the Synagogue.

Of this Church, catechumens are not parts; and all those are parts who bear the mark of Christ's baptism, unless, after external heresy, they have been cut off by the public judgment of the Church. For as long as someone is a minister of the commonwealth and exercises its authority and power, for so long he both can and ought to be called a part of it.

In this sense, then, just as the Church — that is, the Christian commonwealth — is constituted not only by interior faith, but also by the exterior sacrament of baptism, so too its parts are separated not merely by interior unbelief, but by schism and the division of an external judgment. Thus, if in that definition of Nicholas the Church is taken in

this second sense, the faithful must be said to be such not from the faith of Christ, but from the sacrament of faith. But more on this in the final chapter of this book.

To the latter argument, I respond thus. If the Apostle applied those words to Hymenaeus and Philetus, he was not looking to that time when they had already left the common house of the faithful through their private sect, but rather to that time when, through the faith and baptism they had received, they were still contained within the great house. This is Augustine's opinion, in these very passages we have cited. Although, on account of Cyprian, by whose authority he says he is pressed, he also admits that heretics too are, in some manner, in the great house, on account of these same sacraments, in administering which they coincide with the Church.

But Augustine, as I said, added this reluctantly; for he follows the former point gladly. I myself, indeed, to speak as I think, do not understand what reason Augustine had for taking Cyprian's words in that sense, which to me seems as foreign to Cyprian's intent as heaven is foreign to the nature of earth. For, to pass over the fact that, in the passages I cited a little before, Cyprian himself not obscurely excludes heretics from the Church, certainly in his letter to Antonianus, whose testimony Augustine misuses, he not only does not depart from that same opinion, but confirms it even more openly, saying: "But as for what pertains to the person of Novatian, you should know that we ought not to be overly curious, when his teaching shows him to be outside. Whoever he is, and whatever he is, he is not a Christian, who is not in the Church of Christ."

Nor did Cyprian have any other reason for denying the baptism of heretics, except that it was always his firm and constant opinion that they are both outside the Church and baptize outside it. In the words which Augustine relates, Cyprian signifies nothing other than the arrogance and conceit of the Novatianists, who thought they could do what was not even granted to the apostles — namely, to separate the tares from the grain, to sift the chaff from the wheat, and, casting aside the vessels of wood and earthenware, to choose out only the gold and silver ones. Here, by the wooden and earthen vessels, Cyprian does not mean those whose speech had spread like cancer, but precisely those whom he had also called "tares" and "chaff" — that is, the fragile and weak, who err and have always been mixed in with the firm and the perfect in the Church. Since the Novatianists could not tolerate these, forgetting humility and gentleness, they tried to cast them out of the Church before their time. Although to refer the wooden and earthen vessels solely to the wicked, as Cyprian does, is found unsatisfactory not only by Augustine, but by me as well.

The Apostle's sense, then, is plain. For when he had said that some had fallen from the truth, lest all should be thought fragile, and we should accordingly fear for the Church's faith, he adds: "But the firm foundation of God stands." But since someone might perhaps ask why God has, in his Church, both firm and weak members, allowing some to stand and others to fall, the Apostle answers this: that "in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and earthenware."

There is also another interpretation of this testimony of the Apostle, by which the errors of the Manichaeans, the Pelagians, the Cathars, the Donatists, the Beghards, and the Beguines are likewise refuted — errors into which Hymenaeus and perhaps Philetus had fallen. For it is not at all likely that they had fallen into believing that the resurrection of bodies had already taken place.

But since, imbued with a false persuasion of absolute holiness, they asserted that life in mortal flesh was similar to that which the just shall have, immortal, with the angels after the resurrection — that is, free from every weakness and imperfection — for this reason the vessel of election says they asserted that the resurrection had already happened. Their vain and futile opinion, then, Paul refutes in few words, saying: "But the firm foundation of God stands." These words, unless I am mistaken, have this sense. The election of the faithful, on God's part, is indeed certain and unchangeable. This he calls the "foundation," since it is the first beginning of human salvation. For "whom he predestined, those he also called; and whom he called, those he also justified; and whom he justified, those he also glorified." The firm foundation of God, then, stands, having this seal: "The Lord knows who are his."

For our election, obscure and unknown even to ourselves, is enclosed, sealed as it were by the knowledge of God alone, so that it is, on our part, uncertain and hidden, while, on God's part, it is settled and fixed. But since our salvation also depends on our own free choice, no one ought to promise himself certain and stable righteousness from God's election; no one, puffed up by the sense of his own flesh, should preach an angelic way of life in mortal flesh; no one should claim for himself an impeccability and a virtue absolute in every respect; no one should disdain fellowship with the rest of the faithful, in whom he sees something human still remaining. This, indeed, is what he adds: "let him depart from iniquity," and "let him strive, above all, by good works, to make his calling sure" — not relying so much on his own purity as to fear no possibility of being contaminated and defiled by iniquity.

Let him then understand that, in a great house, there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and earthenware; and that some are for honor, others for

disgrace. Thus, if he sees some vessels breaking, let him repair and strengthen them as best he can, considering himself, lest he too be broken. And if he seems to himself to be a vessel for honor, let him patiently bear the vessels for disgrace, and not depart from the great house out of disgust for them. For just as these dishonored and unglorious vessels have, by free will, turned to disgrace, so by that same freedom they could be turned to honor.

From these considerations, not only is that argument dissolved, but this too is established — which is the very thing chiefly sought in this definition — that the Church is constituted by a collection of all the faithful, both the strong and the weak, both the just and the unjust. If we have established this plainly and briefly, neither we nor the reader will regret the effort.

Chapter III

Who are Those Faithful from Whom the Church is Truly and Properly Constituted

In settling the parts of the Church, we observe that there have been three errors. The first was held by those who did not think the Church could have a part where there is not solid purity and integrity of life. Such, in the past, were the Cathari, and, sharing this same madness, the Donatists. Today, among the Lutherans, there are the Anabaptists, who, with the Pelagians, hold that the righteousness of the faithful is entirely perfect even in this mortal life, and, with the Cathari and Donatists, tolerate no weakness in the Church.

There were others who granted a place in the Church only to those predestined to glory. The chief authors of this error are found to be John Wycliffe and John Hus, condemned at the Council of Constance.

The last group thought that only the good belong to the Church, the wicked by no means. This, after certain men of old, is now asserted by the Lutherans — not all of them, but those held most distinguished among them.

It is not, however, my intention to take up again, in exhaustive detail, what has been disputed by Catholics against these errors. I shall, then, give a summary of the arguments by which each is refuted.

The first error, then, is refuted, above all, by exactly the same testimonies by which the Pelagians and Donatists were once refuted. "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." Likewise: "Forgive us our debts" — a prayer Christ

taught his apostles, who were surely parts of the Church. Likewise: "In many things we all offend." Likewise: "Every high priest, taken from among men, is appointed for men in the things that pertain to God, that he may offer gifts and sacrifices for sins; who is able to have compassion on those who are ignorant and who err, since he himself also is surrounded with weakness; and therefore he ought, as for the people, so also for himself, to offer for sins."

Likewise: "Do not enter into judgment with your servant, for in your sight no man living shall be justified." Likewise: "For there is no man who does not sin." Likewise: "Who can say, My heart is clean, I am pure from sin?" Likewise: "There is no just man on earth who does good and does not sin" — and other similar passages, usually cited from Job and Daniel.

If, then, every individual member of the Church had to be entirely free from all blemish and fault, there would certainly be no Church at all on earth; since, as the aforesaid testimonies prove, no mortal anywhere is so perfect and unblemished in every respect.

Moreover, Cephas was without doubt part of the Church — he who was a pillar of the Church — yet the apostle resisted him to his face, because he was reprehensible and did not walk rightly according to the truth of the Gospel. There is, then, no need for the members of the Church to be so pure that no blemish, no blot, remains in them. To this, the Apostle recognized a Church among the Thessalonians; yet among these same Thessalonians he also noted certain ones walking disorderly and acting officiously, whom he teaches should not be considered as strangers and enemies, but corrected as brothers. The fraternity and society of Christ, then, has some imperfect brothers and companions.

What more is needed? Does not the Apostle affirm that there are certain little ones and weak ones in the Church? "As to little children in Christ," he says, "I gave you milk to drink, not solid food." And again: "Take in him who is weak in the faith." What of this too: "And he himself gave some indeed as apostles, and some as prophets, others as evangelists, and others as pastors and teachers, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the building up of the body of Christ, until we all come to the unity of faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fullness of Christ, that we be no longer little children, tossed to and fro." And immediately: "Let us grow," he says, "in him through all things, who is the head, Christ; from whom the whole body, joined together and connected through every joint of supply, according to the working in due measure of every part, makes the increase of the body, for the edification of itself in love." Not all the members of the

Church, then, are everywhere fully complete and filled out in all their measure and parts.

But it would be idle to dwell further on the refutation of this error, especially since Augustine and Jerome have labored most diligently on this almost same cause. Let us, then, proceed to the rest.

The second heresy, moreover, was first exploded by our forefathers, since it is necessarily bound up with other most pestilential errors condemned at the same Council. "If the Pope is foreknown to be damned, he has no power over the faithful, except perhaps from the Emperor." Likewise: "No one can rationally assert of himself, without revelation, that he is head of a particular church." Likewise: "Present righteousness and grace do not make anyone either a member of Christ or of the Church." Likewise: "The predestined, even if unbelievers, are always members of Christ and of the Church. Wherefore neither was Paul ever a member of the devil, nor Judas of Christ."

All of which are both plainly false in themselves and vehemently opposed to the catholic faith. The commonwealth of Christ would have been most unwisely established, if the authority of its magistrates were so thoroughly cloaked in darkness that it shone clear to none of the faithful at all. For since all the faithful are in doubt as to whether the Supreme Pontiff, bishops, priests, and other ministers of the Church are predestined or not, they must also be in doubt as to whether they are bound by their decrees and judgments. Thus it would follow that all the dogmas of the Church and of Councils would be ambiguous, and all laws weak and inadequate to compel obedience. What could be said more foolish than that a citizen of a city cannot at all recognize who its magistrates are? Those, then, who hold this opinion make the author of the Christian commonwealth foolish, and at the same time overturn all decrees, precepts, and sanctions, and indeed the entire power of the Church from its foundation. This power must necessarily waver and collapse among those for whom it is hidden, uncertain, and feeble.

Nor is it necessary to use arguments drawn from reason to refute an irrational opinion — I will not say "madness" — since the testimonies of Scripture are most evident for refuting it. "You," it says, "are the light of the world. A city cannot be hidden, set upon a mountain; nor do they light a candle and put it under a bushel..." Likewise: "If he will not hear them, tell it to the Church; but if he will not hear the Church..." The Church, then, must necessarily be manifest and known to the faithful.

Likewise, Christ taught that even that servant belonged to the kingdom of heaven and to his household who, because he had no mercy on his fellow servant, was handed over to the torturers. Not, then, only the predestined servants are contained in Christ's

household, which is the Church. Likewise: "The kingdom of heaven is like a king who made a marriage for his son..." into which even that man entered who was cast into outer darkness. Likewise: "The kingdom of heaven is like ten virgins..." of whom five were foolish and five wise. He does not say that the five are like the kingdom, but the ten. And yet the door was shut against five of them. Likewise, that the Church is mixed of the predestined and the foreknown reprobate is shown by that parable of Christ in which it is compared to a net, by which fish of every kind are gathered, and not sorted until they are brought to shore — where the angels will separate the wicked from among the just, and cast them into the furnace of fire.

That same point is also shown by the parable in which the Church is said to be like a field, sown with good seed, which is corrupted by the deceit of an enemy with tares — tares which are not cleared out until the harvest has been brought to the threshing-floor, when the tares must be gathered and bound in bundles to be burned. And since we are tracking down everything, the Church is that threshing-floor, in which the wheat is so gathered that it lies hidden under chaff, until, winnowed and sifted, it is at last stored in the granary; while the chaff is burned with unquenchable fire.

Moreover, that "people," "city," and "household" are named after God's present righteousness, not after foreknowledge, this shows: "You who once were not the people of God, but now are the people of God." Likewise this: "At that time you were without Christ, alienated from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers to the covenants... but now you are no longer strangers and foreigners, but you are fellow citizens with the saints, and of the household of God..." For, unless this is so, then every man who is predestined to glory is blessed and just, even when he is wretched and impious. We are not, then, properly named from foreknowledge, but from present righteousness.

"He gave them power," it says, "to become sons of God." To whom? Surely not to those whom he foreknew would believe. No, but "to those who believe in his name." Likewise: "You were once darkness, but now light in the Lord; walk as children of light." Likewise: "Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? Shall I, then, take the members of Christ, and make them members of a harlot?" Likewise: "He who does righteousness is righteous; he who commits sin is of the devil... in this the children of God and the children of the devil are made manifest." Likewise: "We, being many, are one body in Christ, and individually members one of another" — which, unless according to present righteousness, we are in no way at all. Likewise: "In one Spirit we have all been baptized into one body." Through baptism, then, and not through the grace of predestination, do we pass into the body of Christ. But on the refutation of this error we have said enough.

Now let us refute the third, and final, error. This is, above all, accomplished by these same very parables of the Gospel which we have already used, from which Cyprian, Jerome, and Augustine argue the same point. For in the Lord's field, among the thriving crops, burdocks, thistles, and barren oats run riot. On the threshing-floor, chaff covers the grain. In the net, both good and bad fish are enclosed; in the great house, there are wooden and earthen vessels, both those for honor and those for disgrace. In the kingdom of heaven, foolish virgins are found together with the wise. In Christ's household, the wicked servant is found — not only the one who denied mercy to his fellow servant, but also the one who, set over the household, when he made excuses about the Lord's delay, and cast aside his former fear, began to beat the menservants and maidservants, to eat, drink, and become drunk.

What? Do we not read, in the Apocalypse, of churches whose angels and ministers God exhorts to repentance for crimes already admitted? Does not the Apostle, writing to the Galatians, also call those churches "churches," whose error he himself charges them with, having gone astray? Among the Corinthians too there was not one kind of sin, but many; nor were the failings light, but scandalous. And yet the Apostle not only acknowledges them as a Church, but proclaims them as the holy fellowship of Christ. If, among the Corinthians, where contentions, factions, and rivalries burn, where lawsuits and quarrels thrive, where a crime is favored that would be execrable even to the pagans, where the name of Paul, whom they ought to have honored as a father, is torn apart, where divine gifts serve ambition rather than charity, where some hold the resurrection of the dead in mockery, where, finally, very many things are done unseemly and disorderly — if, among such people, the Church remains, who dares to snatch away the title of "Church" from those upon whom not even a tenth part of these crimes could be charged? Those who rage with such excessive harshness against present-day churches — what, I ask, would they have done to the Galatians and Corinthians, who were almost deserters of the Gospel?

The Church, then, has its carnal members, whom the Apostle warns are not to be abandoned by the spiritual ones. It has its sick and weak, for whom the remedies of the sacraments, prepared by Christ, are administered by physicians. For those who are inside, indeed, the sacrament of penance is prepared — which would be in vain in the Church, if there were no sinners in it.

And the Lutherans, since they wish to evade the judgments of the Church, lest they be forced to confess that wicked men hold ecclesiastical power, deny that these are parts of the Church; and so they fashion for themselves a Church that no man can see, since it dwells in inaccessible darkness — a Church, indeed, which I myself do not understand. I

would be ashamed to say I do not understand it, if those who defend it understood it themselves. But these men wish to wrap and obscure what was placed in the clear light by Christ, lest they seem to have departed from the unity of the catholic Church.

There is, however, as Augustine says, no security of unity except in the Church, which, set upon a mountain, cannot be hidden — and is, therefore, necessarily known in every part of the earth. It is also rightly said by the same Augustine that, where the Church is not manifest, there not even Christ can be manifest — Christ, who is made known through the Church, not only to men, but to principalities and powers in the heavenly places.

For us, then, the Church is a lamp, set upon a lampstand, which all who are in the house may see — just as it was for the Antiochenes, when they went up to Jerusalem to settle a dispute, or as the Lord prescribed when he said: "Tell it to the Church..." Otherwise, for those to whom the Church is hidden, what are they to do, when they fall into grave controversies of law and religion? Are they always to be in suspense, standing on no firm ground? Surely all will be uncertain, if the Church exists only among the pious. For in any judgment of the Church, he against whom the sentence is pronounced will object that the judges are not pious.

Wherefore those who define the Church solely by the number of the righteous, while taking away all power from wicked pastors of the Church, also weaken the force of ecclesiastical judgments, and can have no firm dogmas of the Church at all. And unless Christ understood that the wicked would, at times, occupy not just any parts of his Church, but even the foremost ones, he certainly would never have given this warning: "The scribes and Pharisees have sat on the seat of Moses; whatsoever they shall say to you, do; but according to their works, do not."

What, indeed, does Paul say? "Here now it is required of the stewards, that a man be found faithful," he says. "But to me it is a very small thing to be judged by you." But if good morals were necessary for someone to be a part and a minister of the Church, the Apostle would certainly not have considered it a very small thing to be judged by men — since he saw that such a judgment would be bound up with the ruin of apostolic authority. But now, seeing that this was not necessary for the authority of a steward — that quality which certain Corinthians demanded — he says: "To me it is a very small thing," etc.

Now, how many, and how forceful, scruples — what confusion and perplexity — would have been thrust even upon the minds of the stewards themselves, if they would immediately become strangers to the Church through sin, and thereby lose all power in

the Church? Well, then, does the Apostle add: "But neither do I judge my own self," etc. And how great would be the rashness of human judgments, if the parts and offices of the Church depended on the soul's virtue? For this reason he added: "Therefore judge nothing before the time." How many schisms would we see daily in the Church, while one said to another, "You are not of the Church, because you are wicked; I am of the Church, because I am good"? And while one man would condemn someone whom another would defend, how great a source of lawsuits and quarrels do you think this would be? Excellently, then, does the Apostle conclude: "But these things I have transferred, in a figure, to myself and Apollos, that no one may be puffed up against another, on behalf of another."

Let it stand, then, that the name "Church" embraces all the faithful, both the good and the wicked. This is what we undertook to explain in this chapter.

Chapter IV

What Authority the Catholic Church Has in the Dogma of Faith

These things have been said about the name of the Church, which, since they seemed necessary, neither could nor should have been passed over by us. Let us now turn to the matter itself which is at hand, and show that the authority of the Church has such great force for producing faith that it supplies even the firmest arguments to theologians.

Before I do this, it is worth noting that the Church is not only the gathering of catholics itself, who have given their name to Christ through baptism and been consecrated into a special and new commonwealth, but also the leaders and prelates of the Church themselves, in whom indeed the authority of this commonwealth chiefly resides. Nor do we invent this from some recent opinion, or assert it without testimonies of Scripture. Aristotle's famous saying applies here: that a city is, above all, what is principal within it. For this reason, what the leaders and governors of a city do and think, the city itself is said to do and think.

Of this there is an example in the Sacred Books: "All the elders of Israel gathered together, with the princes of the tribes and the leaders of the families of the children of Israel, to King Solomon in Jerusalem." And further below: "And the king turned his face, and blessed the whole assembly of Israel: for all the assembly of Israel was standing." Similar too is this: "Moses came, and, having called together the elders of the people, he related all the words which the Lord had commanded. And all the people answered together: All that the Lord has spoken, we will do."

There is, then, no reason for the faithful to recoil from the word "Church" in this sense, as heretics are accustomed to do, out of hatred for ecclesiastical power — which Christ willed to reside not with the laity, but with the priests and pastors of the Church, as will be explained elsewhere, at another time, if opportunity allows. Now, in the manner of the schools, let us settle the entire matter, which is the chief topic of this book, in four conclusions.

Let this, then, be the first conclusion: The faith of the Church cannot fail.

For she is the bride of Christ through faith, as it is written: "I will betroth you to myself in faith." But if the Church's faith should fail, then the marriage of the bridegroom and the bride would be dissolved — a marriage which is nonetheless indissoluble and perpetual. "I will betroth you to myself," it says, "forever." And the bride says: "I held him, and will not let him go." And he again says: "Behold, I am with you," he says, "all days, even to the consummation of the age."

By this testimony Leo makes use of this proof, writing to the Empress and to Theodore. For Julius proves it, in his decrees, by that testimony of the Psalm: "Surround Zion, and embrace her... for this is God, our God forever and ever: he himself will rule us forever." Whoever reads this Psalm will understand, even without my pointing it out, that it must be understood of the Church of Christ. The same point is also shown by this: "He shall reign in the house of Jacob forever, and of his kingdom there shall be no end."

If, then, the Church of Christ is upheld forever by his hand, armed by his protection, supported by his power, and ruled by his wisdom, faith will certainly remain in her — without which there is no kingdom of Christ on earth at all.

This is, moreover, confirmed by that most clear prophecy of Isaiah: "This is my covenant with them, says the Lord: my spirit that is in you, and my words that I have put in your mouth, shall not depart out of your mouth, nor out of the mouth of your seed, nor out of the mouth of your seed's seed, says the Lord, from this time forth and forever." Similar to this is: "I have made a covenant with my chosen, I have sworn to David my servant: forever will I establish your seed." Likewise, Psalm 131: "The Lord has chosen Zion, he has chosen her for his dwelling. This is my rest forever and ever." Very similar too is that passage of Jeremiah: "Behold, the days come, says the Lord..."

Moreover, the wise man is described by the Lord as one who built his house upon a rock; Christ, then, founded his house upon a rock. Wherefore neither rain, nor floods, nor winds can overwhelm it.

But, as Paul says, we stand by faith; the Church, then, will always have faith. For otherwise she will not stand, but fall. What of the fact that, in plain words, the Lord promises this firmness of faith to his Church, saying: "Upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it"? Not even hell, then, will be able to take away the faith of the Church.

The second conclusion: The Church cannot err in believing.

For some interpret the perpetual faith of the Church in such a way that they understand God to be present to the Church until the end of the age, so that true faith and charity should never be lacking to her, but that she could still probably be ignorant of some particular matter — and that, this matter being unknown, the Church would not thereby lose her faith.

For the sake of argument, let us suppose that it had not been revealed by God that the Blessed Virgin had existed free from original sin. (For there is no harm in proposing, by way of example, something fictitious, to make the matter more easily understood — although in fact the example is true, as we shall show later.) They say, then, that even though the Church believed the Holy Virgin had been conceived without sin, and likewise defined that this was to be believed by everyone, she would not be thought, for this reason, to have suffered a loss of faith. For, although she might be mistaken, a probable and blameless error would not exclude the Church's faith.

Of this opinion, on the face of it, seem to be the interlinear Gloss (for so they call it), on that passage, "the gates of hell shall not prevail against it"; and Saint Thomas, book 4, distinction 6, question 1, article 3, question 2, reply to objection 3; and Cardinal Torquemada, Summa of the Church, book 2, chapter 91; and Alfonso de Castro of Zamora, On the Just Punishment of Heretics, book 1, chapter 5.

But in fact we have already established, in the previous proposition, precisely this — that the Church will always have faith. This much is true: who denies it? But, moreover, that the Church cannot err in faith must be understood by the faithful in this way: that whatever the Church holds as a dogma of faith is true; nor is anything false which she either believes or proposes to be believed.

For since she is, as the Apostle teaches in Ephesians, the body of Christ, she is moved and governed, certainly, by her own head. The Church's error, then, would have to be referred back to Christ as its author. By no means at all, then, can she err in faith. For the Spirit of Truth is the soul of this body: "One Spirit," it says, "and one body." But if the Church is moved by the Spirit of Truth, she can be moved into no error, not even

unknowingly.

The Church, moreover, has an outstanding promise, that she will never be abandoned by Christ, but will rather be led, by his Spirit, into all truth. "I will ask the Father," he says, "and he will give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you forever, the Spirit of truth... but you shall know him, because he shall dwell with you." And afterward: "But the Comforter, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance whatever I have said to you." Likewise: "But when that Spirit of truth shall come, he will teach you all truth."

Nor does it escape me that heretics try to evade this argument in two ways. First, they say that such words are to be understood of the apostles alone, and do not pertain to their successors in the Church. Then they assert that Christ did not promise the Spirit of truth only to the assembled group of twelve together, but also to each of the apostles individually — and not just to them, but in the same way to other disciples too, whether to those he had already called, or to those who would join afterward. For if we interpret such promises in this way — as though given to no individual Christian, but to the universal Church all together — we accomplish nothing other than to remove from all Christians that consolation which ought to redound to them individually. But both objections, alike, are silly and unlearned nonsense.

For, first, that those words ought to be referred not only to the apostles, but also to their successors, is plain, above all, from this: "that he may abide with you forever." This is similar to that other passage: "Behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the age." It is also plain, again, from this: "Sanctify them in the truth: your word is truth. And for them I sanctify myself, that they also may be sanctified in the truth. But I do not pray for them alone, but also for those who shall believe in me through their word." And concerning this promise, Isaiah seems to me an illustrious witness — not only a prophet, but an interpreter too. "My Spirit," he says, "which is in you... shall not depart out of your mouth, nor out of the mouth of your seed, from now and forever."

The same Spirit of truth, then, which Christ promised to the apostles, he also promised to the Church that would come after them — unless we wish to think that the Church, once the apostles had died, was abandoned by the Lord; indeed, that neither the counsels nor the precepts of the Gospel would pertain to her at all. For, on this view, what the Lord spoke to the apostles would be said to apply only to them, not to those who would come after them in the Church. What could be said more foolish than this?

Now that second evasion — how empty and ridiculous it is too! For if they want this to have been said in such a way that it applies commonly to the faithful, but distributively,

fitting each individual one, then it follows that to any single faithful person whatsoever there is present an everlasting Spirit of truth, who teaches him all truth, and suggests to him everything that has been said in the Gospel. But suppose all are gifted with the spirit of wisdom, of understanding, of light, of truth — can we possibly deny that whatever is attributed individually to each member belongs entirely and fully to the body as a whole?

Let us hear how Calvin responds to this. "This," he says, "although it has some appearance of truth, I nevertheless deny to be true." O foolish man, fighting against manifest truth! Does he not know that the gifts of the Holy Spirit, distributed individually to each member, are all conferred in common? Does the eye see, and not the man see all the more? Is not the eye the lamp of the body? What could be more absurd than that a member could have something the body cannot accomplish, or possess a part of something the whole does not possess?

"To each one of us," he says, "grace has been given according to the measure of the gift of Christ... And he himself gave some as apostles..." "For the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the building up of the body of Christ." And later: "Let us grow in him, through all things, who is the head, Christ; from whom the whole body, joined together and connected, according to the working in due measure of every part, makes the increase of the body for the edification of itself in love." A member, then, since it is what it is only as part of the whole body, claims nothing as its own private possession; but contributes everything to the body in such a way that it is the body's actions and perfections, rather than the member's own, that seem to be displayed.

Wherefore it is absurd that these men, with whom we are now discussing, should be relieved of the very burden they ought to bear. For they do not prove that Christ's words have nothing at all to do with the Church; they prove that they pertain to individuals — which is the opposite of what they should have proven, if their goal was to weaken the force of the argument.

We, indeed, just as we know that the soul is, above all, the act and perfection of the organic physical body, but secondarily also of its individual members — in which, although it performs various functions, all these functions are properly the body's own, and have been granted by nature to the members for the sake of the body itself — so too we refer the Spirit of truth, first, to the body of the Church, and then, for the sake of the Church, to the individual parts of the Church as well — not equally, but by a certain analogy and proportion, according to the measure of each member.

"One body," it says, "and one Spirit. To each one of us grace has been given according to the measure of the gift of Christ." But what is this "measure" of Christ? "According to the working," it says, "in due measure of every part." The Spirit, then, has been promised to individuals each in his own manner, so that he teaches the great, and teaches the little ones too. But to little ones he gives milk to drink; to the greater, solid food. To the former he speaks of Christ, and him crucified; to the latter he speaks wisdom hidden in mystery.

But the Spirit of truth is present to the individual members in such a way that not only is he not absent from the whole body, but he is understood to be present to the body even before, and more fundamentally than, to the members. Indeed, if truth is the gift of all the members, then it will certainly be all the firmer and more certain when all the members at once have converged upon it.

Wherefore, if the Church held something false as a dogma of catholic faith, neither would the Spirit of Christ remain eternally with the faithful, nor would he teach them all truth. These promises of Christ, unless we wish to render them vain and void, cannot fail to be true and reliable. And if the Church believed, or proposed as something to be believed, a false dogma, however much she might do this out of ignorance, how could she be the pillar and foundation of truth? Certainly, if truth rests upon the shoulders of the Church, it cannot be entirely lacking to her — unless both Christ is lacking to his own Church, and truth itself is lacking to Christ.

In sum, if the Church could be deceived in a question of faith, she could also receive as divine a book which was nevertheless not from God — since the same reasoning applies to a single book as to any single dogma. Wherefore this argument would not hold: "The Church holds the Gospel of Matthew as canonical, therefore it is canonical." Since this would be said most impiously and most absurdly, let us rather say this: that the faithful rightly believe the catholic Church, not only in the sense that the catholic Church's faith never fails, but also in this sense — that she herself can believe or teach nothing that is contrary to true faith.

But Calvin and Bucer interpret our position deceitfully and craftily, as if we deny that the Church can err in such a sense that, relying on the favor and presence of the Spirit, she may safely proceed wherever she wishes, even without the word. Accordingly, whatever she believes, decides, or settles beyond the word of God would have to be held as nothing less than a certain oracle of God. They claim, then, that this is the point of disagreement: that we place the authority of the Church outside the word of God, while they want it bound to the word, and do not permit it to be separated from it.

Calvin, moreover, labors strenuously to gather passages in which the prophets, the apostles, and indeed Christ himself, are recorded as having brought forth nothing of their own, but as having spoken from the mouth of the Lord. He concludes that it is far more fitting that the Church, as a disciple of Christ, should depend constantly on his mouth, and neither be wise nor think anything of her own accord, but set the limit of her own wisdom where he set the end of his speech. For most rightly does Chrysostom say: "Many boast of the Holy Spirit, but those who speak their own things falsely claim him. Just as Christ testified that he did not speak from himself, so, if anything beyond the Gospel is thrust upon us under the title of the Spirit, let us not believe it. Indeed Christ declares that nothing more is to be expected of his Spirit than that he illuminate minds to perceive the truth of his teaching. 'The Spirit,' he says, 'will lead you into all truth.' But how? Because 'he will bring to your remembrance whatever I have said to you.'" All this is Calvin's.

But Bucer said something much more unlearned still — that the Church is to be believed only when she pronounces according to the Scriptures rightly understood. But in saying this, he makes everything the Church has defined ambiguous. For if she can pronounce otherwise than what Scripture, rightly understood, requires, we shall always be able to object that the Church is mistaken in this — that she has wrongly understood Scripture. But who, then, will be the judge of whether the Church interprets Scripture rightly or wrongly?

They accomplish nothing, then, who set the Church's authority not absolutely, but conditionally. For if the matter stands this way, then I too must be believed, whenever I pronounce something according to the Scriptures rightly understood. For this is to believe not me, but Scripture. But absolutely, not conditionally, did the people believe the Lord and Moses his servant. Absolutely, too, did the peoples believe the prophets and apostles. What kind of thing would it be, indeed, to withdraw faith from the prophets and apostles as they spoke, with the exception that they might have misunderstood the words of God? What would it be, likewise, if this exception too were added: "You speak a lie; the Lord our God did not send you"? It is truly remarkable how shameless these scoundrels are. For what authority will the Church have left at all, if, in every dogma, law, and definition, it can be evaded in two ways — either by claiming that the Church is speaking its own words, or, if it is the word of the Lord, that it has not been rightly understood?

But I return to Calvin, who, when the Lord's well-known testimony was raised against him — "If he will not hear the Church, let him be to you as a heathen man and a publican" — finally admits that the Church must be heard, as one who never agrees with

anything except the truth of God, and pronounces nothing except from the word of the Lord. On this he insists: that it is not permitted for the Church to establish new doctrine, and to hand down more, as an oracle, than what the Lord has revealed by his own word.

But truly, here he babbles wonderfully among his own followers, and either foolishly does not know, or maliciously lies, when he says that we hold, as an oracle of faith, whatever men have devised without God's revelation. We, indeed, wish our faith to be joined to the word of God by an indivisible bond, nor do we confidently and firmly maintain any assent of the Church, except one which we know, and hold with a firm conviction, to have proceeded from God. But this too we are certainly persuaded of: that the Lord is present to his Church perpetually and continuously, and governs her by his Spirit, so that she hands down nothing as the doctrine of faith which was not also handed down by God to the apostles. Thus we detest all profane novelties, and reject, in the judgment of faith, everything that the apostles did not hand down to the Church.

The question, then, turns not on this point, but rather on this hinge: that the Lutherans deny that the Church received anything at all from the apostles without writing; we, on the contrary, assert that many things were received. On this matter we have both said much elsewhere, often, and shall say much more later. Although, indeed, this question has already been explained so fully and abundantly in the previous book, that nothing further seems to need to be desired.

Truth itself has laid hold of my hand, and forced me to pause and linger a little while I explain the earlier conclusions. Let us, then, hasten more quickly into the later ones.

Let this, then, be the third conclusion: Not only could the ancient Church not err in faith, but not even the Church which now exists, or which will exist until the consummation of the age, can or will be able to err in faith.

This conclusion has been shown, in part, in chapter 7 of the second book, and is, in part, proven by what we have just said. For Christ's promises concerning his presence, concerning the Spirit of truth, concerning his everlasting kingdom, concerning the body of which he himself was to be the head, must necessarily pertain not only to the Church which existed in the time of the apostles, but also to the catholic Church which was to exist until the end of the age. Since this is manifestly gathered from the arguments laid down in confirming the previous conclusions, it would certainly be useless either to repeat the same actions, by repeating the same arguments, or, if we propose new ones, to use reasonings hardly necessary in a matter not in doubt.

Certainly, whoever should attempt to deny the Spirit of truth to the present Church will deny her too the power of binding and loosing, will deny the sacraments and the priesthood, and indeed all the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Thus the Church of Christ would now be reduced to a bare name, and would be a fabricated word with no reality behind it. But enough on the third conclusion.

The fourth conclusion. Not only does the universal Church — that is, the collection of all the faithful — possess this everlasting Spirit of truth, but the leaders and pastors of the Church possess it too.

For we have said that the word "Church" is used both for the faithful people and for the pastors of the Church. The previous conclusions, then, asserted this: that whatever the Church — that is, the assembly of all the faithful — holds, is true. This one, however, affirms that the pastors and teachers of the Church cannot err in faith, but that whatever they teach the faithful people, as far as it pertains to the faith of Christ, is most true.

I shall demonstrate this conclusion presently, but first let me note that the error of one or another pastor, or even of all pastors taken individually, does not detract from the faith — just as not even the error of a small number of the faithful detracts from the faith of the Christian people. We maintain, then, that all pastors and teachers together can never depart from the faith. This is indeed so.

This, in my opinion, is first manifestly demonstrated by that testimony of the Apostle: "And he himself gave some indeed as apostles, and some as prophets, others as evangelists, and others as pastors and teachers, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the building up of the body of Christ, until we all come into the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fullness of Christ, that we be no longer little children tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the wickedness of men, by cunning in deceit of error."

Surely, if pastors and teachers should err here and there, and depart from the right path of faith, the sheep too would certainly err, and would wander, scattered, no differently than if they had no shepherd at all. For when the shepherd walks along precipitous paths, it is necessary, as Gregory says, that the flock follow him over the cliff. Nor can it happen otherwise than that the remaining members are carried wherever the eyes have directed their gaze and focus, and the head has inclined and turned.

Well, then, does Paul assert that, lest the people be tossed about by various winds of doctrine, it is a matter of divine providence to give to the Church teachers and pastors, by

whose authority the common people — by their nature excitable and fickle — are kept, by a heavenly gift, constant in their faith.

But if Christ gave his Church no pastor at all, then surely that good shepherd would already be abandoning his own flock. And it is much better for the Church to have no pastors at all than to have erring ones. If, then, all the pastors, to a man, departed from the truth, Christ would have utterly abandoned his sheep. Moreover, if all pastors were caught up in some error, they would either move the people entirely from their standing and position, or certainly cause them to waver, vacillate, and fluctuate. Thus the house of Christ would not be the pillar and foundation of truth.

Let us further suppose that all the bishops together converge upon the same opinion, and propose this to the unlearned people to be believed; then I ask, ought the people follow them, or not? If they ought, then, with the priests and bishops erring, the people must necessarily err too. The error of all the priests, then, will be the error of the whole Church. But if it is permitted for the people to consider the teaching of all the pastors light and unimportant, see, I ask, whether anything more absurd than this opinion could be said or imagined. For if, on one side, the pastors, and on the other, the sheep, are split into opposing parties, this disjunction of a body that ought to be compacted and connected through every joint will tear apart the entire unity of the Church, and will not only overturn the society established by Christ between the leaders and the people, but will also dissolve the common bond of fellowship among the faithful themselves — the closest tie of which fellowship is precisely an undivided unity of faith and consensus of all the parts. But it would indeed be divided among all, if the members of the peoples were torn away from their own heads.

And once the unlearned common people have departed from the common opinion of their teachers, whose doctrine will they follow afterward? If they have thrown away the salt, with what shall it be salted? If they have turned the gaze of their mind away from the light, what will they see but darkness? If the eye is evil, will not the whole body also be full of darkness? But where, then, is that saying: "The scribes and Pharisees have sat upon the seat of Moses; whatsoever they tell you, do"? Will the scribes and Pharisees be in a better state and condition than the pastors and teachers of the Church of Christ?

Certainly, if the Lord were speaking only to those then present, and not likewise to future generations, as the author of the Unfinished Work argues, his words would have been spoken, not written. But they were spoken on account of those men, and written on account of these.

To this: the truth of faith, in controversies among Catholics — as we established in the second book, and shall confirm also in books five and seven — is not to be sought from the common people. Both because this would be an endless task, requiring that the opinion of all the faithful be sought to settle every single question, and because, even if this could be done most conveniently, it would still not be fitting to seek out and await the judgment of cobblers or weak women, one by one. For whether you should question each person separately about a question that has come into doubt, or wish to gather everyone into a council, such an inquiry of this kind would surely be ridiculous. Thus, through the authority of the Church, no controversy at all could be settled, if we were obliged to seek the consensus of the entire common people in order to settle it.

To this must be added what we have already said long ago: that certain things pertain to the doctrine and faith of the Church which the common people are entirely ignorant of — such as that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit; that the intellectual soul is the substantial form of the human body; that the Book of Esther is canonical; and other similar things. To seek the opinion of the people on these matters is so absurd that it would not fall even into the minds of fools, let alone the wise. For it cannot please anyone that such great matters should be judged by the votes of an unlearned crowd.

Moreover, in the letter of the Council of Ephesus to Nestorius, this is demanded of Nestorius, if he wishes to satisfy the Church: that he confess by oath that he thinks and teaches what all the bishops throughout the East and West, and the presidents of the peoples, believed and taught. This same letter was also approved by the Sixth Synod, in action 11. Likewise, at the Council of Trent, session 3, it was defined that it belongs to the Church to judge the true sense and interpretation of the Scriptures. But to wish that the entire congregation of the faithful pronounce judgment on such a matter would be madness. The pastors and teachers of the Church, then, are those to whom such judgments belong.

And the most diligent inquiry into faith made by Hegesippus is celebrated in the writings of Eusebius of Caesarea — who, when traveling to Rome, did not seek the opinion of the common people concerning the faith, but considered it sufficient for confirming his own faith if, in conversation with the bishops in each individual place, he found them all to be preachers and teachers of the same faith.

Irenaeus, too, when he opposes the authority of the Church to heretics, opposes only the opinion of the bishops, in the order of succession from the apostles, and considers their sense and faith to be the sense and faith of the Church; and he considers that whoever

opposes them opposes the Church. Cyprian, likewise, in his book On the Unity of the Catholic Church, says: "Does he think he is with Christ, who acts against the priests of Christ? Who separates himself from the fellowship of the clergy? He bears arms against the Church, he fights against the disposition of God... he who, with the bishops despised, and the priests of God abandoned, dares..." And in his letter to Pupianus: "Christ says to the apostles," he says, "and through them to all the leaders who succeed the apostles by vicarious ordination: 'He who hears you, hears me; and he who rejects you, rejects me.'" And later he asserts that the Church is not a multitude of the obstinate, but the people united to the priest, and the flock clinging to its shepherd. Whence those who are not with the bishops are not in the Church, and it is in vain for those to flatter themselves who have not kept peace with the priests — "since the Church, which is one and catholic, is not split apart, but connected and joined together by the cement of priests cohering with one another..."

Augustine, finally, since it would take too long to mention everyone, when he relies on the Church's authority against heretics, clearly means the bishops who succeed the apostles all the way down to his own time.

Chapter V

Certain Objections Against This Last Conclusion

These statements would be more than sufficient for both the explanation and confirmation of these conclusions, were it not that this last one is objected to by certain theologians on the grounds that, at the time of the Lord's Passion, all the apostles lost the faith of Christ — from which it would follow that all the bishops succeeding the apostles could likewise lose the faith of Christ.

For as to the fact that, at that time, faith remained in the Blessed Virgin alone, the candle, they say, signifies this — the one candle which, in the offices of those days, alone is not extinguished, from which the disciples received the light they had lost. But since this argument seemed weak even to them, they also confirm this same point with the testimonies of the ancient saints and of Sacred Scripture.

The first argument, then, is drawn from this — that, according to Matthew, he says: "You shall all be offended because of me this night: for it is written, I will strike the shepherd, and the sheep of the flock shall be scattered" — that is, loosed from the unity of the faith. For this is how the interlinear Gloss explains it.

The second, from what is read in Luke — that the words of the women announcing Christ's resurrection seemed, to the apostles, to be idle tales. The third, from what Mark relates — that Christ reproached all the apostles for unbelief and hardness of heart. The fourth, from Augustine, on that verse of the Psalm, "My eyes have failed": "All the disciples," he says, "despaired that he himself was the Christ. The apostles were outdone by the thief, who believed at that time when they had failed." Cardinal Torquemada also cites Ambrose, Jerome, Gregory, and Isidore in support of this same point.

It is, however, difficult — given the difficulty of the matter — to speak about the facility with which these men, moved by such arguments, claim that the apostles, all of them universally, lost the faith. This conflicts not only with reason, but with the Sacred Letters as well. For, to say nothing of Peter, whose faith we shall later show did not fail, even regarding the other apostles this opinion is not only not certain, but not even probable.

"The disciples," it says, "went into Galilee, to the mountain where Jesus had appointed them: and seeing him, they worshipped him; but some doubted." "Some," it says — not "all." I see that this doubt is referred, by some, not to the apostles, but to some other disciples, I know not which; but I myself have always preferred the opinion of Theophylact and Remigius, who teach that this should be referred to that earlier time when Christ had previously appeared to the disciples. This is, I think, what Mark understood, when he says: "He rebuked their unbelief and hardness of heart, because they did not believe those who had seen him risen." For whether this appearance, which Mark writes of, took place on the day of the Ascension, as many think, or earlier, as some others also believe, there is no doubt that Mark, in this recapitulation, gathered together those reproaches which the other evangelists had written about separately.

"Because they had not believed," he says, "those who had seen him risen." It is established, however, from the other evangelists, that this unbelief and hardness of heart, arising from the cause that those who had seen Christ rise were not believed, does not pertain to all the apostles. For Peter and John, on hearing the news, ran to the tomb; and James, according to the Gospel of the Hebrews, swore from the hour at which he had drunk of the Lord's cup that he would not eat bread until he saw Christ risen — as Jerome attests in his Catalogue of Ecclesiastical Writers.

Not all the apostles, then, are to be believed to have suffered a loss of faith, unless — which is absurd — you believe all of them to have been unbelievers. For faith, once received by a Christian, is not removed except through unbelief. It is even more absurd to brand all the apostles with the mark of heresy. Those who do this, and do so without suitable and pressing reasons, do injury not only to them, but also to Christ and to the

Church. Who, indeed, does not see how weak the arguments are which the authors of this opinion have advanced? These have, in part, already been refuted by us above, and in part will now be refuted in a single word. For if they prove anything, they prove only that the apostles failed in the confession of faith, or perhaps in the living faith that works through love.

To this can also be referred that ecclesiastical custom of extinguishing all the candles but one. Although Rupert, in his book On Divine Offices, book 5, asserts that the extinguished candles signify the earlier prophets put to death by the Jews, while that candle which is hidden for a short time signifies Christ.

But indeed, even if the apostles at that time had lacked faith, nothing against the conclusion would follow from it. For, as Augustine notes, the apostles failed at that time when they were not yet leaders of the Church, and that promise had not yet been fulfilled: "I have strengthened her pillars." One shepherd, then, existed at that time — Jesus Christ. But Peter and the other apostles, after they were established by Christ as pastors, held the catholic faith always, without controversy.

As for the rest, the calumny of heretics — that the pastors of the Church are men, and therefore can both deceive and be deceived — is a small and beggarly argument indeed. For it is one thing to discuss the weakness of human nature, and another to discuss the divine grace and providence by which men are kept in the truth of the faith. For the entire assembly of the faithful together is, indeed, made up of men; the prophets too, the apostles, and the evangelists, were men; but since they received the Spirit of truth, they could not fall into a false doctrine of faith. So too, then, all the teachers of the Church, taken together, are indeed men, but, since they are governed by the divine Spirit and led into true dogmas, they cannot decline into false ones.

But how inept, how frivolous, how ridiculous is this — that some interpret it this way, that we do not believe "in" the Church for this reason: because they are men, and "every man is a liar." This is certainly not the reason that has led most weighty men to deny that one ought to believe "in" the Church. But there is an older, finer, and more apt reason, given by the authors themselves who first stated it.

For Augustine says: "We believe Peter, we believe Paul; we do not believe in Paul or in Peter; for to believe 'in' him is to love him by believing, to go toward him by believing." Thus far Augustine. And Rufinus says: "It is not said 'in the holy Church,' but 'the holy Church' is to be believed — not as God, but as a Church gathered together by God. By this little preposition, then, the Creator is distinguished from creatures." Thus far he. For this reason, then, these authors do not permit us to believe "in" the Church, since the

Church is not the end-point of our faith.

There arises, at this point, also a certain rather difficult question. For since the Church is spoken of by Jerome in two ways — both as that which has no spot or wrinkle, and is truly the body of Christ, and as that which is gathered in the name of Christ without complete virtues, indeed mixed with certain vices — how can we be certain in which sense the name "Church" is taken when it is called the pillar and foundation of truth?

Heretics, indeed, cavil that whatever is set forth in the Scriptures concerning either the authority or the truth of the Church must be taken entirely in this latter sense, not the former. They concede, then, the Spirit of truth to the Church of the saints; to the Church mixed with the wicked, they do not concede it. Nor do they defend themselves only on the grounds that, in the case of an ambiguous term, one is free to choose either meaning, but they also rely on other arguments to persuade us that, in this passage and question, the name "Church" cannot be used otherwise.

The first of these is that, in Jerome's view, "Church" is used abusively in this second sense: just as "strong," "prudent," "chaste," "just," and "temperate," he says, are sometimes used fully of those who possess perfect virtue, and sometimes abusively of those who are only beginning. If, then, the former meaning is proper, the latter is improper; without doubt, then, we shall more fittingly use the word "Church" in that former sense — that is, for the assembly of the just.

Again, when the Apostle says, "The Church is subject to Christ," and "Christ loved the Church... and Christ is the head of the Church, he is the savior of its body" — that word is taken to mean the congregation of the saints, as Jerome and Augustine have interpreted it. What reason, then, will there be for us to understand it differently, when the Apostle writes that the Church is the pillar and foundation of truth? Moreover, Paul ennobled, with that encomium, not just any Church, but that one which is the house of God. But only the just are believed to be the house of God, as Augustine too says; the Church of the saints, then, is the only one that is the pillar of truth.

Moreover, Augustine explicitly teaches that the house and the Church of God — which exists only among good and holy servants of God — is that which is built upon the rock, and which has also received the keys, and the power of loosing and binding. The same house of God, then, is the one that is the pillar and foundation of truth. Wherefore, if the pastors who claim the name "Church" for themselves are wicked, this and similar passages do not pertain to them. This Augustine himself confirms in many other places as well.

If these things are true, then not only this final conclusion which is now being weighed, but all the others too, are completely overturned, and indeed everything we have established at all in this present discussion.

But although these and many other arguments are advanced by heretics in support of that opinion, we must nevertheless follow the Church, and flee from everything that is at odds with her own approval. First, however, I think this must be understood: that this present line of defense and method which they attempt does not merely overturn our own reasonings, but actually leads to a conclusion contrary to the catholic faith and discordant with the nature of all public affairs. For if the Spirit of truth was promised by Christ in the Gospel only to the good, then the other promises too will pertain only to that Church which is constituted of the just alone. Wherefore, it must be repeated again and again: neither the authority to make laws, nor the power of the keys, nor the remission of sins, nor the force of doctrine, nor the dignity of the priesthood, nor indeed any public power of the Gospel at all, will be found anywhere, except in a Church entirely and in every respect good.

But since, in the catholic Church, which has existed since the time of the apostles, the wicked and the good have always been mixed together, then in that Church there would have been, surely, no firm faith, no certain truth, no clear power, no solid authority. Thus everything decreed and defined, whether by the consensus of pontiffs, or of councils, or even of the whole Church, would have absolutely no force at all. For whether you should say that they were not just, or that, even if just, they are nevertheless unknown to us — either way, by either method, you would dissolve their dogmas, decrees, and laws. And it would be, as we said above, the most foolish and absurd of all the conceivable arrangements for the public affairs of Christ.

Thus it turns out to be true, what I said at the beginning: that the Spirit of truth, the support of the catholic faith, and the other gifts of the Holy Spirit, were promised and given to that Church which the apostles founded by their doctrine and their miracles, to which they wrote their epistles, which Christ always had on earth, and which the Sacred Letters fittingly and prudently describe as consisting of good and bad fish, of wheat and tares, of grain and chaff, of foolish and wise virgins, of good and wicked servants.

Let heretics, then, keep for themselves the name "Church," both invidious and obscure, and interpret as that "Church" which no mortal has ever yet beheld; we, however, shall interpret "Church" according to the usage both of divine speech and of our own life. Nor let us measure it, like proud and arrogant men, by the grandeur of mere words; but let us reckon as the Church that which actually exists, and pass over that one which is nowhere

to be found at all. For we are men, and we ought, accordingly, to hope for that commonwealth which is in the use and common life of men, not the one which is merely imagined.

I would like all these things to be understood by me in this sense: not that there is no multitude or collection of good men before God on earth, which is called, in the Sacred Letters, both Church and bride and friend of God; but that we should by no means separate ourselves from the wicked who are in the house and Church of God, where there are vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and earthenware — not all for honor, but some even for disgrace. But these matters have, I think, already been explained sufficiently with care above.

Let us now respond to those arguments which we have just put forward; for the ones laid out at the beginning of this book we shall answer in the following, and final, chapter. "In an ambiguous term," they say, "one may take any one of several meanings." By no means at all, I say. Rather, what comes before and after must first be examined; then one must consider what the nature of the matter is, what coheres, what conflicts, and many other things entirely, which we shall pursue more accurately and exactingly in book thirteen.

But if, where Christ promises gifts to his Church necessary for keeping the faithful in duty and in truth, we should refer these only to hidden and invisible members, those gifts would indeed be empty, and little fitted to the common good. Indeed, as has been shown above, they would be harmful and gravely pernicious, since they would provide the most depraved citizens with perpetual grounds for discord, and everlasting impunity and license for every kind of crime.

Now, if, with reason as our guide and teacher, we consider it unjust to a good and wise prince when someone interprets his privileges in such a way that they seem granted in vain — or worse, to harmful effect — how much more will he be an unjust, depraved, and malicious interpreter of Christ, who takes the favors and gifts which Christ promised to his commonwealth in a sense that not only displays vanity but actually leads to ruin? That passage of Paul, and other similar ones, must therefore be understood of the Church which embraces both the good and the wicked together.

But such an assembly and gathering, they say, is called "Church" only abusively. This I deny in the first place. For the case is not the same as with "strong," "prudent," "just," and "temperate." I admit, indeed, with Jerome, that such terms of virtue can be applied to beginners and the imperfect only abusively, since the true definition of virtue expresses not those incipient and, so to speak, only partially-formed dispositions, but habits that

are plainly absolute and perfect — as Aristotle, Saint Thomas, and the other true philosophers have taught.

But the word "Church" indicates nothing like what these men imagine, by which we would exclude the wicked from that assembly which properly claims for itself the name "Church." Wherefore there is no impropriety, no abuse, if "Church" is also applied to that body which, in one baptism, one faith, one religion, has the wicked mixed in with the good.

Although we can also respond otherwise: that Jerome, in speaking of the Church of Christ, was generally speaking in much the same sense in which we use "the people of God," "the house of God," "the servants of Christ." For somehow it happens that the genitive case added tends to lead the understanding, above all, toward the good. Thus, if it is applied to a Church corrupted by vice, there is perhaps some abuse — but one more easily grasped by the mind than expressed in words. For "the people of God," too, is most frequently said, in the Sacred Letters, of that people who are particularly dedicated to God, in whom, namely, faith in God and worship of him flourish — even though there may be some sinners among them. But enough on Jerome's testimonies.

To that point which was raised next, we shall respond in the following chapter, where it will be explained in what sense the Apostle, in Ephesians 5, named the "Church." As for the fact that the house of God is also that great house, in which there are vessels of gold and silver, as well as of wood and earthenware — there is no need to demonstrate this. We nevertheless reserve this point, though clear enough, for a future occasion, when the arguments of the first chapter shall be resolved.

As for what is finally objected from Augustine's words, this must be read and heard cautiously, as men of the Church before us have warned. For those words can convey a twofold sense. One, that only the just are understood to be ministers of Christ and of the Church, that they alone remit sins, and that they alone possess ecclesiastical authority and power. This sense is established to conflict not only with reason, but also with the Church's faith and even with the Sacred Letters. But to discuss this matter does not belong to this occasion or this undertaking. The other sense of Augustine, then, is without doubt this: that the just alone are said to have received the keys of the kingdom of heaven, the power of binding and loosing, the Spirit of truth, and the other spiritual graces — meaning that all these gifts have been promised and conferred upon the Church not for the sake of the wicked, but for the sake of the good.

For just as what a paterfamilias entrusts to stewards and managers, for distributing to the household's benefit, is understood to have been given not to the stewards, but to the

household itself — and just as what the people give to bishops and clergy, to be spent for the use of the poor, is said to have been conferred not on the bishops and clergy, but on the poor — so too, if a prince should grant something to an unknown man on account of the prayers and merit of his friend, he would rightly and truly say that he gave it not to the unknown man, but to his friend.

In accordance with this very principle, too, those passages must be explained which are brought forward from Augustine against the authority of Peter and his successors: "The keys were received not by one man, Peter, but by the unity of the Church." Likewise: "The power of binding and loosing Peter received together with all, as bearing the person of that very unity." Likewise: "The keys were given to the Church, when they were given to Peter, and when it is said to him, it is said to all: 'Feed my sheep.'" All these, in my opinion, signify nothing other than that Peter and the other ministers of the Church received the keys and the other public offices of the Gospel neither for themselves nor for their own merits, but for the Church and for the Church's sake.

Although I know that the earlier passages are interpreted differently by others. For there are some who refer them to the use of power, which the wicked, since they cannot legitimately have it, are said not to have. Others refer them entirely to grace — not that sacramental grace which is also customarily given through wicked ministers, but that which corresponds to the prayers of the minister, as is found in the Decretals, De Cons., distinction 4, where Augustine seems to indicate this.

Others, finally, think that Augustine is speaking of public plunderers, usurers, concubinaries, and the sacrilegious — from whom, in former times, just as if they had been cut off from the Church, it was not permitted to receive the sacraments. And so such ministers did not give the grace of the sacraments.

But to discuss this, as we have already said many times, is not for this day and occasion. The madness of the Waldensians has long since been exploded, and we need not labor over that matter now. Enough, then, has been said on these points. Let us now refute, as briefly as we can, the arguments laid out at the beginning against the authority of the Church.

Chapter VI

In which the Arguments of the First Chapter are Refuted

The first argument, indeed, is most ready to refute, and not in one way only, but in several. First, because neither Moses nor Joshua, under whose governance that time fell, fell into the people's frenzy and madness. Second, because it is not even certain that all those who remained in the camp consented to that crime; indeed it is most likely that some even resisted.

For, as soon as Moses uttered that cry, "Whoever is for the Lord, let him join me," all the sons of Levi gathered to him, and consecrated their hands to the Lord, each one against his own son and brother. From which it is understood that those who joined themselves to him at Moses's single command, who stood with the Lord, whom the Lord made ministers of his justice in vengeance, were not partners and accomplices in that crime with the rest.

What of the fact that Aaron had not yet been initiated into the priesthood, nor had the ephod yet been placed upon him, nor the breastplate, in which were the Urim and Thummim, fastened and fitted to him? It is no wonder, then, if Aaron and his sons, not yet established as shepherds of the people nor consecrated as priests, did not err in faith and religion. Although Aaron, as also later happened to Peter and to Marcellinus, sinned out of fear, not out of unbelief.

Nothing, then, is brought against us who assert that priests and pastors, once instituted by Christ in the Church, cannot all err in faith and religion. On the first argument, then, this much.

The second, however, seems more weighty — one which not only Calvin, but the Donatists too, used against Catholics, as Augustine relates in his book On the Unity of the Church, chapter 12.

But it is not necessary to devise new responses now, since this argument has already been excellently answered by Augustine: "Often," he says, "divine speech rebukes the impious crowds of the Church as though they were all such, and no good person remained at all. We are warned, from this, that they are all called such within a certain number of their own — that is, all the sons of hell. They themselves, then, either ignorantly or deceptively, gather from the Scriptures such things as are found said either of the wicked mixed in with the good until the end, or of the devastation of the earlier people of the Jews; and they wish to twist these into application to the Church of God, as though it seemed to have fallen and perished from the whole world." Thus far Augustine.

Such oracles of the prophets, then, have, first of all, this sense: that, since in comparison with the wicked the good are so few that they seem to be none at all, Scripture rebukes the whole people in a single comprehensive statement, although some good remain in it. Then, those statements were, for the most part, predictions rather than rebukes. For the people is described not as it was then, but as it would become after the coming of the Messiah. Both senses, lest heretics charge that this is our own invention, must be proven by clear examples of Scripture.

Ezekiel prophesied at the same time as Jeremiah. Let us hear what the Lord says to him: "But the house of Israel will not hear you, because they will not hear me. For all the house of Israel is of a hardened forehead and a stubborn heart." Do you think that, in this entire depraved house, any part remained to which this general sentence did not apply? Hear, too, what the Lord also says: "Mark with the sign of Tau the foreheads of the men who sigh and grieve over all the abominations that are done in its midst." Not all, then, had consented to the people's crime; not all were of hardened forehead and stubborn heart.

Let there be another example. "Save me, O Lord," it says, "for the holy man has failed... Vain things have they spoken, each one to his neighbor." Behold, one man laments, with a loud and plaintive voice, the faults of the entire human race, as though he alone were left. But what does the divine response say to him? "For the misery of the needy, and the groaning of the poor, now will I arise." Understanding, then, that he has many companions in his complaint, he says: "You, O Lord, will preserve us, and will keep us from this generation forever."

In his book against the Donatists, after the conference, chapter 20, Augustine likewise says: "Lest perhaps they think that this was only a custom of the prophets, and does not pertain to the New Testament, but only to the close of the Old, that it is in this way that the reprehensible are rebuked, as though all in that people were rebuked, and in this way that the praiseworthy are addressed, as though all there were praised — behold, the Apostle speaks thus to the Corinthians: 'Paul... to the Church of God which is at Corinth, sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints, with all who invoke the name of the Lord... Grace to you and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ. I give thanks to my God always for you, for the grace of God which is given to you in Christ Jesus; because in everything you have been enriched in him in all speech and in all knowledge...' Who, hearing this, would believe that there are some reprobates in the Church of the Corinthians, since these words sound as though this praise were addressed to all? And yet, a little after, he says: 'I beseech you, brethren... that there be no schisms among you...' And, as though rebuking them all for this horrible vice, he says: 'Is Christ

divided? Was Paul crucified for you, or were you baptized in the name of Paul?'..." Thus far he.

He could also have mentioned what is added in this same epistle: "As to little children in Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not solid food; for you were not yet able to bear it. But neither yet now are you able; for you are still carnal. For whereas there is among you envying and strife..." Likewise: "And you are puffed up, and have not rather mourned, that he who has done this deed might be taken away from among you." Likewise, from the Epistle to the Galatians: "O foolish Galatians, who has bewitched you, that you should not obey the truth..." And yet afterward he says: "Brethren, if a man be overtaken in a fault, you who are spiritual, instruct such a one in the spirit of meekness..." Likewise, to the Philippians: "For all seek their own, not the things which are Jesus Christ's..." These passages, and many other similar ones, I think were passed over by that great theologian in his disputation, because they were easy ones; but they are certainly useful for the present undertaking, and he touched upon most of them in his letter to Vincent.

Now, that very many such testimonies of the prophets must be referred to the state and morals of the Jewish people after the Messiah, will be shown by many examples in the following book as well, and is sufficiently shown now in a single example. Haggai admonished Zerubbabel, and Joshua the high priest, and the whole people together, to build the house of God, in these words: "And now be strong, O Zerubbabel, says the Lord, and be strong, O Joshua, high priest, and be strong, all you people of the land, and work; for I am with you, and my spirit shall be in your midst; do not fear." But later, in this same chapter, Haggai adds: "If one who is defiled by reason of a dead body touch any of these, shall it be made unclean?" And the priests answered, "It shall be unclean." And Haggai answered: "So is this people before my face, says the Lord, and so is all the work of their hands; and whatever they have offered there shall be unclean."

This whole passage we more fittingly understand of the people's condition after the consummation of the Old Testament. Although Augustine also interpreted this example as referring to the earlier ones. But, as I said, this is more aptly and fittingly applied to the condition of the people after the coming of the Messiah, and we shall show in the next book that many other passages, especially in Isaiah, serve this same purpose.

On the testimonies of Isaiah and Jeremiah, then, enough has been said.

As for that point raised third — that the Church can be hidden — the Donatists too once posited this. To whom Augustine, however, responded in these words: "The Church is not hidden from us, since it is not under a bushel, but upon a lampstand, that

it may shine for all who are in the house. And of it is said, 'A city cannot be hidden, set upon a mountain.' To the Donatists it is hidden." Thus far Augustine alone.

That first point, however, is false — that the old people once had no form of the Church at all. For when Elijah complained that he alone was left, Scripture mentions seven thousand men who had not bent their knees before Baal — men, surely, to whom it was clear and evident that it was not the faith and unity, but the kingdom, that was divided, and that there still existed, accordingly, in Jerusalem the temple of God, the high priest, and the true doctrine of law and religion. Of this sort was Tobit, who, when everyone went to the golden calves which Jeroboam had made, went instead to the temple of the Lord and worshipped there the Lord God of Israel, faithfully offering tithes and observing the other similar things according to the law of God even as a young boy.

Then, it does not follow that, if that ancient people wavered so much that it seems almost to have fallen, and was so scattered that it nearly lost its form and appearance, the Church of Christ too could be obscured to such a degree that no appearance of it shines forth at all. For that old people, since they were to fall, often threatened ruin. And since it was destined that, for that commonwealth, an everlasting night, as it were, was to be cast over them, it is no wonder that it gradually became obscured and vanished. What, then, if it sometimes scarcely even appeared, given that so small a light and so faint a glimmer of night shone upon it?... a lamp, surely, in a dark place. But these matters will be more carefully explained in the following book.

As for Hilary's authority, with which Calvin thinks we should be pressed, Vincent once raised this against Augustine; but Augustine crushed and ground down, as mere slanders, all the passages he had gathered from Hilary, in almost these words: "The Church is sometimes obscured indeed by a multitude of scandals, but even then she shines forth in her most firm members. Sometimes she is overwhelmed and disturbed by the waves of temptation, and such was the time of which Hilary wrote, from which you thought you could lay an ambush against so many divine testimonies... You could say, in this same manner, that the churches of Galatia did not exist at that time, when the Apostle said: 'O foolish Galatians, who has bewitched you?' For thus you slander a learned man, who was severely reproaching the slow-hearted and the timid. For who does not know that, at that time, many of small understanding were deceived by obscure words, so that they thought this was believed by the Arians which they themselves also believed; while others yielded out of fear, and feigned consent? Although those who were most firm at that time, and could understand the insidious words of the heretics, were indeed few in comparison with the rest, nevertheless even some of these were bravely exiled for the faith, while others hid throughout the whole world. Hilary, then,

was rebuking either the tares, not the wheat, of the ten Asian provinces, or even the wheat itself, which was endangered by a certain falling-away, and he thought it should be rebuked all the more vigorously, the more useful this would be. For the canonical Scriptures too have this manner of rebuking — that it is spoken as if to all, while the word reaches only certain ones." Thus far Augustine.

But Jerome says: "The whole world groaned, and marveled to find itself Arian. The little ship of the apostles was in danger, the winds pressed hard, the sides were battered by the waves, no hope remained; the Lord is roused, he commands the storm, the beast dies, calm returns. To speak more plainly: all the bishops who had been exiled from their own seats return to their churches. Then Egypt received back its triumphant Athanasius; then the church of Gaul embraced Hilary, returning from battle; then Italy changed its mourning garments at the return of Eusebius." This is what Jerome says, and much else besides, which, for brevity's sake, I pass over.

But this is enough for all to understand that the ship of the Church, tossed about on the high seas amid the storms of heresies, seditions, and discords, was indeed buffeted and almost overwhelmed by the waves; but it was nevertheless not submerged, even in so great a storm. Indeed, it stood out, in its own few but most steadfast members, who, the harder they labored at the oars, the more visible and renowned they became.

Nor is there any need here to bring forward the faith and light of the Roman Church, which was never itself entirely hidden, but was always manifest to the whole world, as will be more carefully shown in the sixth book hereafter.

Nor indeed, under rival pontiffs, is the faith of the Church either dissolved or hidden. Indeed, even at such a time, the catholic Church gives a manifest proof of her faith. The judgments of the pastors are then at risk, which, without a certain head of the Church, will be weak and uncertain. On this matter we shall discuss in another book.

Now, in the sixth argument, Calvin spends much effort and many words, and exhausts himself in useless labor. He could have said it more briefly and easily: that since the Synagogue has been entirely extinguished and destroyed, the Church of Christ too must utterly be destroyed. But the falling-away which the Apostle predicted cannot come, while a true appearance of the Church still exists. This Calvin asserts, but does not prove. It is, then, false. Indeed, since Germany has, for the most part, fallen away not only from the Roman Pontiff, but from its own Roman Emperor as well, perhaps that prophecy of Paul's has been fulfilled, and the most unhappy times of the Antichrist are accordingly at hand.

But "when the Son of Man comes, will he find faith on the earth?" To this argument, Jerome responds that the "faith" named here is that of which the Lord was speaking when he said, "Your faith has made you whole." And elsewhere, of the centurion: "I have not found such great faith in Israel." And again to the apostles: "Why are you fearful, O you of little faith?" And in another place too: "If you had faith like a grain of mustard seed..." For neither the centurion nor that little woman had believed in the mysteries of the Trinity, but the simplicity of mind and the soul devoted to its God were commended. This is the faith which God declares to be rarely found. This is the faith which is found difficult to attain even in perfection among those who otherwise believe well.

In the same manner Augustine answers that the Lord is speaking of perfect faith, which is so difficult to find among men, that even in the most admirable saints something is found where they wavered. He adds, moreover, that the Lord spoke this way on account of the abundance of the wicked and the scarcity of the good, which will especially be the case in that age. For this reason he did not say, "The Son of Man, when he comes, will not find faith on the earth," but, as if in doubt, says, "Do you think he will find faith?" Not because he, who knows all things, was in doubt about anything, but so that, by his own feigned doubt, he might represent ours; since, on account of the many scandals sprouting up near the end of the age, this is what human weakness would be inclined to say.

But the error of those must be exposed who, moved by the most vain arguments, have come to think that the faith could remain in one single person alone. For since the name "Church" is collective, if only one person believed, the Church would not be believing. Add that the Lord, through Matthew, says: "Behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the age." "With you," he says. And through John, when he promises the everlasting Spirit of truth to the faithful, he promises it to many, not to one alone.

Add also that the body is not one member, but many, as the Apostle teaches to the Corinthians. But the body of Christ, which is the Church, as the same Apostle shows to the Ephesians, will endure to the end. Never, then, will there be lacking many faithful in the Church. Moreover, the wheat together with the tares in the field, and the good fish together with the bad in the net, will endure until the consummation of the age. Faith, then, will not remain in only one person.

"But the sacrifice and the oblation shall cease." I myself think this prophecy of Daniel should be referred not to the end of the age, but to the consummation of the Synagogue. But if anyone should wish to refer it to the time of the Antichrist, I would not strongly

contend against this, provided he interprets it in such a way that, on account of the savagery of a most cruel tyrant, the priests cease from public and solemn sacrifice.

As for what is objected from the Apocalypse of John, since it is most obscure, it has no force at all against us for producing conviction. Although I confess this oracle has been fulfilled in Luther, to whom was given the key of the pit of the abyss, so that, by drawing out errors thoroughly submerged and buried, he covered the world with such darkness that it seemed almost to have wrapped the very light itself in shadow. But the light of the Church still shines forth for those who have eyes to see. For the Lutherans are blind, and leaders of the blind.

But if all the glory of the king's daughter is from within, and there is nothing of external splendor in her, how can this cohere with: "The queen stood at your right hand, in clothing of gold, surrounded with variety"? Likewise: "Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works"; and, "A city cannot be hidden, set upon a mountain; nor do they light a candle and put it under a bushel, but upon a lampstand, that those who enter may see the light"; and other similar passages, which, not to be lengthy, must be passed over. It is plain, then, that in the bride of Christ, in whom there is nothing feigned, nothing painted, nothing simulated, but everything true, sincere, and solid, all external glory too proceeds from interior virtue and splendor. And on the sixth argument we have said too much.

Now, for refuting the remaining arguments, it is worth noting that, by a figurative manner of speech, many things which apply to a part are accustomed to be transferred to the whole. We make use of this very often elsewhere, but especially when we speak of a city, a people, a kingdom, or any assembly at all — concerning which we say things in general that not all the parts of the commonwealth, but sometimes only a few, fulfill. For we call a people "robust," a nation "warlike," not because all in that commonwealth are robust or warlike, but because the men selected from it for the business of war are usually of such a kind. Nor do we speak of the human commonwealth any differently than we speak of the human body. For a man is said to act or to suffer, what his hand or foot either does or even suffers. He is said to be clean or unclean, if his face is either clean or unclean — and entirely in the same manner with the rest.

Hence it comes about that the words which we see fitting certain parts of the Church are attributed to the Church itself. By this rule, the Church is called friend, beautiful, immaculate, holy — namely, by reason of the good; an enclosed garden, a sealed fountain — by reason of the elect. Since these are the first and best part of the Christian Church — indeed, the chief members of the kingdom of heaven, however despised and

contemptible they may be in the earthly commonwealth — truly and rightly are those things which apply to them transferred to the whole Church. For, as we have already taught from Aristotle above, that is what a city is said to be or to do, which its principal and leading men are said to be or to do.

Nor, in this passage, where we are pressed especially by the Lutherans, should the testimony of Luther himself be neglected, by which they may understand that the matter is so clear and evident that not even Luther himself could deny it. He, then, in a certain sermon to the people, explaining how the Church is called "holy," teaches, by synecdoche, that Matthew wrote that the robbers blasphemed, although Luke writes that only one of them did this. "Thus," he says, "one and the same people is rebuked in the Prophets, although many among them are good; and is again praised, although many among them are wicked. And this is a figure of the most beautiful charity, which makes all good things common, and likewise all evil things common, that one may bear the burdens of another, and so fulfill the law of Christ. Thus a city, or a region, or a household, is said to have done or suffered what some within it have done or suffered." Thus far Luther.

Here I appeal to all heretics, to be judges themselves of whether it is prudent for them to oppose us with the claim that the Church is the enclosed garden, the sealed fountain, the well of living water, the paradise with its abundance of fruits, holy, beautiful, perfect, glorious without spot or wrinkle — so as to conclude from this that no one foreknown to be damned, no one weak, no one wicked, is in it. But let us answer each point in turn.

In the seventh argument, an encomium of the Church from the Song of Songs is set forth, to which we have, I think, abundantly responded. It is added, next, that in the ark were only those who were saved, and that the ark was an image of the Church. But, lest anyone fall into the error of thinking that all who pass into the Church through baptism are saved, Peter cautiously and wisely added: "Which also now saves you in like manner — baptism, not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the inquiry of a good conscience."

Otherwise, as Jerome says against the Luciferians, just as in the ark there were all kinds of animals, so too in the Church there are men of every nation and of every kind of conduct. Just as there were, there, the leopard and the kid goats, the wolf and the lambs, so here too the just and the sinners — that is, the vessels of gold and silver dwell together with those of wood and earthenware. The ark, then, is a type of the Church especially in this respect — that outside it no one was saved, not in the sense that all who were brought within it were saved. But for the sacraments of the ark, one must consult Jerome

in that dialogue.

Let us proceed to the rest. Christ, they say, is not the head of any other Church than the one of which he is savior. This first point is not so straightforward. For Christ is the head of the angels too, yet it is not certain that he is properly their savior. Certainly I do not think so, although the contrary has been argued by some. This is not the place to discuss this matter. Then, this connection is weak: "Christ is the savior of the Church, therefore he saves all who are in the Church." For he is the savior of all men, especially of the faithful, and yet he does not actually save them all in fact.

And even granting that Christ saves his body, which is the Church — saves it, I say, in its actual effect and outcome — it still does not follow that he saves everyone who is in the Church. Both because it has already been shown and made clear that certain things are truly said of the Church which apply to her not by reason of all her parts, but only of certain ones; and also because the terms "whole" and "parts" extend more broadly than the terms "body" and "members," as we shall explain shortly. Thus it does not follow that, if the body of Christ and all its members are saved, all the parts of the Church are saved.

Nor, indeed, does Paul say that Christ presents to himself a Church already glorious; he only asserts that he gave himself up so that he might present her glorious. Just as he died, that we might all live, and yet not all live; so he gave himself up for the Church, that he might cleanse and glorify her, and yet not all who are in the Church are cleansed and glorified. Although he truly does present his Church to himself as glorious — but not in all her parts, and perhaps not at this present time.

Now what follows is most easy. For although the sons of God are sometimes named according to predestination, the proper and more frequent designation comes from present righteousness, as has been explained in the third chapter. We see, however, that sons are truly, and at times justly, disinherited. It does not follow, then: "He is a son, therefore he will receive the inheritance" — unless you also add this: "and he has not lost the right he received."

Since, however, "son of God" is not always understood to mean someone upright, but sometimes also one who has squandered his father's goods, I think it must also be distinguished that the Church consists only of the sons of God. For if you call "sons" those who, through baptism, have been begotten to Christ and to the Church, this we ourselves assert. But among these there are some wicked and foolish sons, whom the care of the father and mother again longs to bring forth, until Christ be formed in them. But if, according to the more frequent usage of Scripture, you call "sons of God" only those

who are upright and wise, then certainly the Church is constituted not only of these, but also of those who have rubbed off the likeness of their father's uprightness and wisdom. For the name "son" is also sometimes extended to these. "Is not he," it says, "your father?" But it was a perverse generation, and unfaithful sons.

Likewise: "I have nourished and raised up sons, but they have despised me." Likewise: "Return, you returning sons, and I will heal your backslidings." Likewise: "As the lily among thorns, so is my love among the daughters." Which all the faithful of Christ recognize is said of the holy men of the Church. Whence does he call them "thorns," except, as Augustine says, on account of the malignity of their conduct? And whence "daughters," except on account of the communion of the sacraments? The good daughter, then, is in the midst of the wicked, and in the same paternal house.

But Christ's flock is constituted only from Christ's sheep. So what? As if the shepherd has no other animals. He has goats too, indeed, and kid goats. The shepherd, then, has not only a sheepfold, but also a goat pen and a kid pen. Kids and lambs, moreover, are distinguished in God's knowledge and understanding, but confused in the knowledge and thinking of men.

While we live here, although the flocks are different, they are nonetheless in one congregation, and so mixed together that they cannot be separated until he comes who will separate them from one another — "as a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats, and shall set the sheep on the right hand, but the goats on the left."

But, in order to answer this argument more precisely and distinctly, in the manner of the schools, I think this must be considered: that just as the word "sheep" is taken, not only in that passage but in nearly the whole Sacred Letters, for the good and the just, so too "sheepfold" designates the Church in terms of the good and the just. Such are, as we said above, certain other terms too — "friend," "dove," "immaculate," "enclosed garden," "sealed fountain," "paradise with its fruits" — which are attributed to the Church either on account of the just or even on account of the elect. Wherefore it does not follow that, if there are only sheep in the sheepfold, there are no kids in the Church — whom the bride has been commanded to feed, until that supreme shepherd shall separate them from the lambs.

The name "sheep," moreover, sometimes signifies the wicked in the Church too, not just the upright. Hence come these sayings: "I have gone astray like a lost sheep." And: "All we, like sheep, have gone astray." And: "Like sheep they are laid in hell." And: "Your wrath has burned against the sheep of your pasture." And in the Gospels we read of the "wandering sheep" and of "the sheep that perished of the house of Israel."

And when the Lord entrusted his sheep to Peter, if we suppose this term to be used solely for the good, we ought certainly to fear that the wicked might think themselves exempt from Peter's care. But in truth, whoever holds the sacrament of faith is understood to have been entrusted to Peter; nor is it to be inquired of him only whether he has fed the flock of the good, but also whether he has strengthened what was weak, healed what was sick, bound up what was broken, brought back what was driven away, and sought what had perished. In this sense, the flock of Christ is no narrower than the Church, but, just as the Church does, contains diseased sheep along with healthy ones. The Lord, however, in John chapter 10, used the word "sheep" in that other sense.

Now, as to what is finally objected in this seventh principal argument, it is easy to refute. For if false prophets went out from the disciples, then they were first within, and at home; for they could not otherwise have gone out. "But they were not of us," it says. This is explained in two ways. First, John signifies that those were feigned and pretended disciples of Christ, who, like friends and table-companions for a time, withdrew on the day of necessity. "They lived among us," he says, "they shared the same table with us, and all the other sacraments in common; but it was a pretense of virtue, a peddling, a show; and so, since they were not from the heart and truly ours, they were not of us. For if they had been such as we are, Christians from the heart, they would surely have remained with us."

He is also speaking, perhaps, of certain apostolic-seeming men, when he says: "They went out from us, but they were not of us." For some, right from the beginning of the newly-born Church, peddled themselves under the name of apostles, although they were not true apostles of Christ, but false apostles. What he says, then, is this: they went out from us — that is, from our school and society — but they were not of us, that is, they were not truly apostles; for if they had been such, they surely would have remained with us. For the true apostles, whom Christ chose for the office of the Gospel, said not one thing now and another then, but always the same thing, and they had a constant and perpetual standard of both truth and life. For this pertained to the authority of the Gospel — that its first ministers, to whom indeed it had been entrusted, should always and everywhere preserve the scent and savor of Christ. The deceitful workers, on the contrary, although they had at times transformed themselves into apostles of Christ, their foolishness eventually became manifest to all, and their end was according to their works.

Although, if John were speaking of the predestined, as Jerome and Augustine thought, the heretics would still accomplish nothing. For what consequence is there in this: "they are not of us" — that is, "they are not of the elect" — and therefore "they are not in the

house of God, which is the Church"? As if there were not, in the house of God, alongside the vessels chosen for honor, also unchosen vessels — namely, for disgrace.

But on the seventh argument we have said a great deal. Now let us dissolve the eighth.

To the testimonies from the Song of Songs, after what has already been said, there is no need to respond further.

As for that point objected from the Apostle, Saint Augustine, in book 2 of his Retractations, interprets it this way: that the Apostle describes the Church not as she already is, but as she is being prepared to be, when she will appear glorious as well. And in his book On the Perfection of Righteousness, he says: "For since the Apostle did not merely say that he might present to himself a Church not having spot or wrinkle, but also added 'glorious,' he sufficiently indicated when she will be without spot or anything of this kind — namely, when she is glorious. For it must not be said that she is glorious now, amid such great evils, such great scandals, such great a mixture of the most wicked of men, such great reproaches of the impious. For if the Lord himself was not glorified except in the glory of the resurrection, how can it be said, before his resurrection, that his Church was glorious? He cleanses her, then, with the washing of water, removing past sins, and then, perfecting her cures, makes her arrive at that glorious state, without spot or wrinkle." Thus far Augustine — an opinion held not only by Saint Thomas, but also by Jerome and Bernard. This same Augustine also interpreted the testimony of Isaiah in this same sense, in his book against the Donatists, after the conference, chapter 8.

Although there is another, more fitting, understanding of that passage — that the uncircumcised and barbarous people would no longer oppress the Church of God, as one who tramples with the foot oppresses. And in chapter 9 he teaches that the times of the Church must be distinguished, and that, according to this diversity, various passages of Scripture, which announce in part the purity of the Church, in part the mixture of the wicked, must be reconciled.

I recall, however, that I have sometimes explained Paul's words in such a way that they are all referred to the present effect of baptism as well. For what he says, "that he might present her to himself without spot," is plain and straightforward, since baptism, without controversy, washes away absolutely all spots. But what he adds, "without wrinkle," is certainly understood to pertain to the newness of baptism, which has removed and consumed the old man. For our youth is renewed, like the eagle's, through the washing of regeneration and the renewing of the Holy Spirit, which he has poured out upon us abundantly.

But how is the Church glorious through baptism? Surely, she is presented as a glorious bride to her bridegroom, when she is presented to him as a virgin renowned in lineage and virtue, beautiful, pure, in precious garments, adorned with gold and gems. Not even that queen who stood at the right hand of the king in clothing of gold, surrounded with variety; not Esther, shining in royal attire and surrounded with her own glory; not Solomon in all his glory — none of these were described as so glorious; rather, the Church, newly initiated into the sacrament of baptism, is more glorious to her Christ. For these things apply no less to the Church than to the Synagogue: "I have washed you with water, and cleansed your blood from you, and anointed you with oil. And I clothed you with embroidered garments, and shod you with violet-colored shoes, and girded you about with fine linen, and I clothed you with rich apparel. And I decked you with ornaments: and I put bracelets on your hands, and a chain on your neck. And I put a jewel on your forehead, and earrings in your ears, and a beautiful crown on your head. And you were adorned with gold and silver."

To explain each of these things individually in terms of the efficacy of baptism would indeed have been easy, but is not the task of this present occasion. We are not, then, compelled to refer to a future time those effects which baptism produces in the present Church. For the Apostle gathered all these things into these two: that the Church be holy and immaculate. "That he might present to himself," he says, "a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing, but that she be holy and without blemish." Such, indeed, we believe her now also to be — not, indeed, in every part of her, for that, as we said before, is not necessary, but in many members, whose holiness and purity make the Church herself truly be called holy and immaculate.

Indeed, in infants and adults newly washed through baptism, there is no question at all but that the Church is holy and immaculate. But to be "without spot," as Augustine taught, is not absurdly said also of one who both lacks damnable crimes, and does not neglect to cleanse even his venial sins through almsgiving. For Scripture calls such men "immaculate." "I shall be immaculate with him," it says. How? "I shall keep myself from my iniquity." Likewise: "Blessed are the immaculate in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord. For they who work iniquity have not walked in his ways." In these, then, who are clean of iniquity and crime — and there are very many such — the Church is immaculate, although all contract some impurity, that is, venial fault, from their light and unstable nature.

According to this interpretation, which seems to me more consonant both with Paul's words and with his meaning, it is evident that the Church even now exists — entirely immaculate, indeed, that is, without any blemish at all, in some of her members; but in

others so pure that she can have a certain blemish, though a light one. Thus, in some respects, she is a dove; in others, perfect.

We call "perfect," speaking loosely, those who are content with mortal life, who achieve, as far as men can, the best plan and way of living on earth, even though they sometimes fail in the smallest things. "But everyone who sins has not known God; and everyone who is born of God does not commit sin." Saint Bernard, in his sermon on Septuagesima, whose beginning is "Great consolation to me," takes this passage of those who are sons of God according to predestination, whom he interprets as not sinning — that is, not remaining in sin. Saint Augustine, however, in his fourth homily on this Epistle of John, and in his second book On the Baptism of Infants, chapter 8, and his second book against Parmenian, chapter 7, and much more fully in his book On the Perfection of Righteousness, explains that the sons of God do not sin precisely because they are sons of God; but that those who sin do not know God, in that respect in which they sin. For sin proceeds not from faith and knowledge, but from ignorance. Faith and charity, on the contrary, by which we are sons of God, do not act wrongly, but refute every sin. Saint Thomas, with his school, follows this opinion, II-II, question 24, article 11, reply to objection 1. Other African bishops, together with Augustine, followed this same view, as is evident in the letter of five bishops to Innocent.

For just as Paul could say, "But if I do that which I do not wish, it is no longer I who do it, but the sin that dwells in me" — so too the righteous man, if he sometimes lightly falls short due to the law of a nature otherwise opposed, will likewise truly say: "It is no longer I who do it, but the sin that dwells in me."

This interpretation, since both certain passages of this epistle and most distinguished men agree with it, I do not dare to reject. But, to say frankly what I myself think, I am more pleased with Jerome's opinion, who does not think John is speaking of sin in general, but only of mortal sin. This is easily seen in the entire context of the epistle. For the Apostle's purpose throughout is to show that there is no fellowship between light and darkness, between Christ and Belial, and that righteousness and iniquity, crimes and charity, Christ and the Antichrist, cannot be mixed — no more, certainly, than night and day.

For there were certain heretics, such as very many of the Lutherans are today, for whom it was enough, once baptism had been received, to have faith even without works. This error John begins to dispel right from the first chapter, in these words: "God is light, and in him there is no darkness at all. If we say that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie." Likewise, in chapter 2: "And by this we know that we have known him,

if we keep his commandments. He who says that he knows him, and does not keep his commandments, is a liar." Likewise, in the same chapter: "He who says he abides in him ought himself also to walk as he walked... He who says he is in the light, and hates his brother, is in darkness." Likewise: "If anyone loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him..." Likewise, in chapter 3: "Everyone who commits sin commits iniquity also" — namely, lest anyone think the discussion concerns any sin whatsoever, even a light one. For iniquity is a grave sin.

Then he adds: "Everyone who abides in him does not sin; and everyone who sins has not seen him, nor known him." For there is a certain knowledge and understanding of God, familiar and proper to those who have the spirit of understanding, knowledge, and counsel — a spirit which all the wicked lack. And so they neither see nor know God, however much they proclaim that they have visions and revelations of God.

Likewise: "Little children, let no one deceive you. He who does righteousness is righteous, even as he also is righteous. He who commits sin" — namely, mortal sin — "is of the devil... Everyone who is born of God does not commit sin" — that is, as long as he is a son of God, since his seed, that is, charity, remains in him; and just as a good tree, unless it be corrupted, cannot bring forth bad fruit, so too the son of God cannot commit crime and wrongdoing, unless he has ceased to be a son of God. "In this the children of God and the children of the devil are made manifest. He who is righteous is a son of God; he who is not righteous, and does not love his brother, is a son of the devil."

Likewise, at the end of the epistle: "Everyone who is born of God does not sin" — that is, he does not violate charity, but keeps the commandments, since the generation of God preserves him, and the wicked one does not touch him. Surely, as long as he preserves that seed, the generation of God preserves him, and the wicked one does not touch him. But if he should willingly cast away that seed from which he was born, then, having truly become a son of the devil, the wicked one will not only touch him, but will make use of him as his own. This sense of Jerome's is also embraced by Augustine, in his fifth homily on this epistle.

And would that this doctrine of the Apostle were not necessary for the men of our own age. But we see that there are many who, neglecting care for and love of their brothers, and omitting other precepts of the Gospel and of nature, while devoting themselves day and night to little prayers and minor meditations (I will not say "contemplations"), falsely claim to both know and love God. "But by this we know that we have known him, if we keep his commandments. For he who does not love does not know God. This is the love of God, that we keep his commandments." Indeed, whoever reads both the

second, and especially the third, epistle of this same apostle will understand even more clearly that the Apostle's whole discourse rebukes those who falsely claimed to be good, just, friends, and sons of God, without love of their neighbor — and this all the more seriously, the greater the artifice of pretense with which they feigned to be devoted to the knowledge and contemplation of God.

But we have said more on this argument than the plan of this undertaking perhaps required. As for that testimony from the Epistle to the Hebrews, lest it be tedious to say more, we shall say nothing. Nor is it necessary to say anything, since our effort and attention are scarcely needed in dissolving arguments of this kind.

That point too, which is first raised in the ninth argument, is easy. For it has already been demonstrated that, for the Church to be holy, it is not necessary that all those who are said to be her parts be holy. We do not, however — although Jerome did this — use the term "Church" in two senses: both for that which is everywhere holy and is wholly the body of Christ, and for that which has the wicked mixed in with the holy. Rather, we teach that the Christian people is truly called holy, even though not all who are numbered among this people are holy. For those most elegant subtleties, by which this has been attacked, I think it best to disregard; they are mere sophistical trifles, more empty, as they say, than Sicilian nonsense. Besides, perhaps we believe the Church to be holy because she is a people dedicated, consecrated, and sanctified to God through baptism — for Scripture is accustomed to call such people "holy."

But that point which is added immediately afterward must be weighed carefully. It is one thing to be a "part" of the Church, and another to be a "member" of the Church. For the term "part" is more broadly extended, while the term "member" is more narrowly confined. "Part" relates to a "whole"; "member" relates to a living body. Thus a part can be found without life, as in a stone, a piece of wood, and other things of this kind. A member, however, cannot truly and properly even be conceived without life. Wherefore the wicked are indeed parts of the Church; but they are not members of the Church or of Christ. They are, rather, members of the devil. Yet they are considered to be in the Church, and counted and enrolled as citizens of this commonwealth — wicked and criminal citizens, nonetheless.

But by what method the good and the wicked together constitute one and the same people, and yet there is no fellowship between light and darkness, no agreement between Christ and Belial, Saint Augustine excellently explains, against the Donatists, after the conference, chapter 6. By this one point alone, the other confirmations of this argument are overturned, as they say, with the tips of one's fingers. For whether you say "body," or

"bread," or "grain," or "wheat," or any other such similar thing, these are names which fit the good of themselves, indeed, but, through the good, are also applied to that people of which the good are the primary part. That this is the sense of all of Augustine's words too is better known than that it needs to be judged.

For he denies that the wicked are in the body of Christ, and denies that Christ can have condemned members. He denies that they are counted among the members of the dove. He denies that they belong to that Church which has no spot or wrinkle. He denies that they pertain to the structure of the house of God, or even dwell in it, in which only the like-minded dwell. For all these things, as has very often been said, are attributed only to the good of themselves, and are attributed to the Church by reason of these. Just as, by reason of a part, certain notable and chief characteristics of the whole are usually predicated of the whole itself, which do not equally apply to each individual part. Although perhaps Augustine followed that division of Jerome's, distributing the Church into two kinds: that which is entirely good and is the body of Christ, and that which is made up of both the good and the wicked.

But with what face do they object Augustine against us, who, in his second book of Retractations, chapter 18, and on Psalm 24, in his thirteenth tractate, and on Psalm 25, in his sermon, and in his third book against Petilian, chapter 12, and in On the Unity of the Church, chapter 13, and against the Donatists, after the conference, from the fourth chapter to the eleventh, holds most openly and constantly the very opinion we hold? Nor is there any doubt that Cyprian and Jerome agreed with us on this same point — the former in his letter to Maximus, the latter in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians and in his dialogue against the Luciferians. On the ninth argument, then, this much.

To the tenth argument, the response has already been sufficiently given, I think, from what was said on the seventh.

But to the eleventh argument, let this be the response. It is not contrary to the custom of the Sacred Letters, if we sometimes call this same people happy and blessed, on account of the just, and sometimes wretched and unhappy, on account of the wicked. Behold, Moses sometimes calls Israel the chosen people, blessed, a holy nation, the special people of God; sometimes a most stubborn people, foolish and unwise. And Isaiah sometimes calls them the people of Gomorrah, sometimes also the people of God.

And indeed, if it is the usage of Scripture, as we have shown with many examples in refuting the second argument, to rebuke the people as though they were all wicked, and likewise to console them as though they were all good, it follows also that the same

people is called, in the rebuke and reproach, wicked, and, in the consolation and praise, holy. Nor did Augustine hesitate to interpret the Church as "black" in the wicked, "beautiful" in the good, in his third book On Christian Doctrine, chapter 32. Indeed Origen, on account of those who sold doves in it, called the Church a "den of thieves," in his treatise on Matthew, 15.

But if this support were to fail us, we have another — that, in such cases, there is a greater force of good than of evil. The few good are worth far more, for the people to be called good, than the many wicked are, for it to be called wicked.

We call the Church holy, moreover, because she is especially sacred to God; for this reason, although there may be very many wicked in her, she neither should nor can be called the Synagogue of Satan. Hence, at the Council of Constance, the shameless slander of one who called the Roman Church the Synagogue of Satan was condemned. On the eleventh argument, then, enough has been said.

The twelfth, however, is weak and trifling, although Calvin does not hesitate to exult over it where he ought rather to have blushed. He reasons, indeed, sometimes shrewdly, more often elegantly; but at times so inaptly, tastelessly, and coldly that you would scarcely believe he had any erudition or sharpness — indeed, any reasoning ability at all, or even common sense. So much can heretical error and blind obstinacy accomplish, that it utterly removes all learning, extinguishes the light of understanding, and blunts the entire edge of the mind.

But to the matter. It is true that the Greeks are schismatics, and that, for this reason, there is no Church among them. For we believe in one catholic Church. Wherefore it is necessary that whoever separates himself from this unity, since he is not in the one catholic Church, should not even be in the Church at all. Nor are the Greeks only schismatics, but they are also heretics — both for other reasons, and especially for this reason: that they deny that one pastor of the whole Church was established by Christ in Blessed Peter. But these matters, untimely here, will be discussed opportunely elsewhere. As for those who fall away so far from Christ, the true head of the Church, that they withdraw their faith from him, I admit that these, and much more so, lose the privilege of the ecclesiastical name.

But when the Supreme Pontiff dies, one Church without doubt remains, and the Spirit of truth remains in her; but she is left maimed and diminished, without Christ's vicar and without one shepherd of the catholic Church. Wherefore, although truth is then also in the Church, yet if controversies of faith and religion should arise, the judgments of the Church, headless on earth, will not be so certain. But to pursue this is not for this

present occasion.

And yet the Apostle, when, in that passage, he deliberately wished to define the unity of the Church, has entirely forgotten the very thing on which we say the Church's unity depends. But I cannot marvel enough at the futility of these men, who, while they have not kept the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace, but have separated themselves from the body of the Church, nevertheless object Paul to us in that passage, which is most contrary to them. For if Christ has one body, and not two, how shall we admit two Churches? And if there is one faith, how is one who disagrees in faith and religion to be considered as being in one Church? And he who despises Christ's vicar — does he indeed acknowledge one Son? Certainly, he who fashions the worship of God according to his own judgment neither worships one Spirit nor receives one Father, nor is he, accordingly, in one Church, which, without right and catholic faith, can neither worship nor possess the one God. But these points, which arise unwillingly outside the cause and beyond our undertaking, must be refuted briefly. Let us, then, pursue the rest.

There are, they say, some good men among the Greeks. Indeed, if there are some, they will only be those who agree with the catholic faith, who are free from schism, who hold the one head of the one body, and the one shepherd of the one flock — not only in heaven, but also on earth. For so it has seemed fitting to Christ, our head and shepherd, to leave one in his own place for the Church — whom, as soon as a faithful person rejects him, he abandons the unity both of the body and of the flock. Just as, in Israel under Jeroboam, there were certain pious men, but only those who, amid the division of the kingdom, contemplated no division of faith, religion, or priesthood. But more on this elsewhere.

Now I think this must be noted: that the Apostle, in that passage, describes the perfect unity and communion of the Church — namely, such as is found among good and holy men. For we must remember that the name "body" is properly that of the Church of the just. One body, then, is defined first by one spirit, which not only gives it life like a soul, but, as a spirit, moves, drives, and stirs each of its members toward its own end.

Then, one body also requires one hope of calling. Here the word "hope" is used for the thing hoped for and its glory, as also in that other passage: "But hope that is seen is not hope." This commonwealth, then, like others, has one end, to which all its citizens are called and destined, and toward which, accordingly, all the members of this body look.

Thirdly, one commonwealth requires one Lord, one king, one head. For if it had two heads, it would be monstrous. It demands, moreover, one faith. For unless the citizens of this commonwealth are faithful, they will not constitute the people of God. The people

of God, however, is understood to be dedicated to divine worship and religion. Unless, then, there is one common faith of all, there will not even be one religion, and accordingly not one Church of God either. What of the fact that, if we believe different things, since faith is, as it were, the eye of this body, we cannot have the same aim and end? One faith, then, is necessary.

It is necessary, finally, besides these, that there be one baptism, in which is contained the sharing of the other sacraments. For the Christian people consists not only of an interior communion of faith and a bond of charity, but also of an external testimony of faith and an association of sacraments. From which it follows that, unless the members are bound together externally in the same baptism and entirely the same sacraments, they cannot come together into one body of Christ, which is the Church. The Apostle, however, mentioned baptism alone, both because, among all the sacraments, it is especially one, and because this sacrament is the proper seal of the Christian nation, by which we are not only marked, but also consecrated — something which circumcision provided for the Synagogue.

Now, in the words Paul adds, "one God, one Father...," he is concerned, as it seems to me, lest we think that some tyranny and domination underlies this single Lord of this commonwealth. Having said, then, "one Lord," he softens and tempers his dominion with gentler words. Let not "one Lord," he says, terrify you; for "one God" is the same, and likewise "one Father." In the name "God," moreover, understand the goodness, sweetness, and providence of the Godhead. "Blessed is the people," it says, "whose Lord is its God." But far more blessed is that people whose Lord is its father; for in "father" a singular love and a by no means common care is signified, so that you should understand not so much a kingdom as the one family of a father and his sons. But I do not know how, while my discourse dwelt upon and clung to Paul's words, I have wandered rather far from my proposed subject, and have become almost forgetful of my undertaking.

I was saying that the Apostle defines the perfect unity of the body of the Church by all its proper causes. The unity of the Church, however, is more broadly extended, and is found even in those who do not keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace, who are not bound to one another through love, nor connected to their head by mutually grasping one another. Indeed, certain parts within this whole exist without faith — such as hidden heretics, as long as they have not been excluded from the Church. In them it is sufficient that there be one baptism and the same fellowship and communion of sacraments, for them to be said to be in the Church.

For theologians of the greatest authority affirm that it is not only not certain, but not even probable, that the Supreme Pontiff, bishops, and other ministers of the Church are deprived of power and jurisdiction by hidden and interior heresy. But that the rulers and magistrates, and indeed all the ministers of the commonwealth, should be those who are not parts of this commonwealth, cannot even be conceived in thought. From which a great indication arises that unity is not equal in all parts of the Church, but in some it is very imperfect.

If this is less understood, it can be perceived from the natural body. In this, spirit and soul exist in such a way as to give to certain parts the power of sensation, to others the power of growth, to others, as it seems, not even any animal or vital faculty at all — exactly as if those parts had neither soul nor spirit in themselves. Indeed we even see that, when some member, lacking sensation and life, withers in the body, since it is nonetheless continuous with the remaining parts, it shares in some external motion from the spirit, although the spirit communicates nothing interior or vital to it.

This is exactly the manner in which the Spirit of Christ exists in and preserves the body of the Church. For he so animates and gives life to certain parts that nothing seems wanting to them of vital motions; into others he flows in such a way that he confers on them, not life itself, but a certain interior, quasi-vital respiration; on others he lets fall only his external power and faculty, so that, although the members may be entirely dead and withered, yet, since they are not cut off from the body, they are moved by the spirit along with the body. This wonderful continuity and chain of connected parts, though weak and modest, nevertheless has such force in the Church, that, on account of the position they hold in the body, some parts are even called heads of the ecclesiastical body. "Woe to you," it says, "who are rich in Zion... the great men, the heads of the peoples."

Members are sometimes transferred, by metaphor, not from the life which they claim by their own nature, but from the position they have been allotted in the body. Thus, he who holds the first place in the governance of the Church is called the head of the Church, although he is not, properly and truly, a member of the body of the Church. But on these matters, which pertained to the unity of the Church, we seem to have said enough for this present occasion. Now let us speak of the universality of the Church, for this is sought in the thirteenth argument.

Katholou in Greek, if you render it word for word, you would interpret "according to the whole"; for holos means "whole." Whence "catholic," as Augustine says, received its name, because it is spread throughout the whole world, according to the predictions of the prophets. But since, in the whole world, all the nations too are understood, hence it

comes about that the Church is called catholic, that is, universal, because she extends far and wide among every nation, people, tribe, sex, and condition. Of both these matters there stands that notable oracle: "Ask of me, and I will give you the nations for your inheritance, and the ends of the earth for your possession." And by this distinction, she is set apart not only from the Synagogue, but also from the gatherings and congregations of heretics.

There are also some who say the Church is called catholic on account of her common faith and universal doctrine. For the faith and doctrine of the Church are common and universal in many ways. First, by reason of men, according to that saying: "Preach the Gospel to every creature." Then, by reason of place, as it is written: "They have preached everywhere, and their sound has gone out into all the earth." Moreover, by reason of time, since the apostles said not one thing then and another later, but always said the same thing. "God is faithful," it says, "because our word that was to you was not yes and no, but was yes in him." Likewise: "The wicked have told me fables, but not according to your law. All your commandments are truth." And later: "Your word endures forever, O Lord; your truth endures from generation to generation." What, then, is believed and taught by all, in every place and time, certainly and constantly, is truly called a catholic dogma. And that Church which has such dogmas and discipline is truly the catholic Church. For the assemblies of heretics have private, foreign, inconsistent, and clandestine doctrines.

Well, then, and wisely, does Vincent of Lérins say, on the profane novelties: "In the catholic Church itself, to which not one nation, not one corner, but a multitude as great as the sea is converted, let us hold to that which is believed everywhere, always, and by all. For this is truly and properly catholic, as the very force and meaning of the word declares, which truly and universally comprehends all these things. Since this is so, he is the true and genuine catholic, who determines that he should hold and believe only that which he has recognized the catholic Church to have held universally from antiquity. But whatever he should perceive to be subsequently introduced as new and unheard of by one person alone, contrary to all or against all, let him understand that this pertains not to religion, but rather to temptation." Thus far the man of Lérins.

I know that other reasons are usually given for why the Church is "catholic"; but these seemed to me the weightiest for asserting this name. With these established, that argument is easily dissolved. For first, the Church is not so contracted and reduced into narrow confines that she is not diffused throughout the world. Indeed, in our own memory, a new world has appeared, much the greatest and most extensive, into which the voice of Christ's disciples has gone out — lest anyone say that the Spaniards, French,

Italians, Germans, and other nations, in which the name of Christ either lives or has not been entirely destroyed, occupy only a small part of the world. Then, it is enough that the Church was once spread throughout the whole world, for her even now to be truly called catholic.

For surely she is the same Church, and holds the same faith, which the apostles published throughout the whole earth. Indeed, the universality of the present faith must be referred back to that universality which existed in the Church in time past; and this, in turn, back to that which the apostles published throughout the whole world, as has been demonstrated in the second book. From this it follows that, even if the Christian faith were perhaps reduced to the confines of a single province, it would nonetheless be catholic, and likewise that province, which held that faith, would also be a catholic Church. For individual churches too, comprehended under the universal one, are called "catholic," since they hold that faith which the universal Church holds, and has always held. But these points, and those that remain, are all plain enough. We shall, then, deal with them briefly.

It is objected, then, in the fourteenth argument, that it is futile to await the consensus of all the faithful. To this argument I would respond, most briefly, as follows.

There are two kinds of matters, as has been said elsewhere, which are believed by the Church. One kind pertains equally to all, such as that God is man, that our soul is immortal. And in this kind it is not very difficult to know the faith and sense of everyone. I do not mean, however, that each individual should be questioned separately — which would be most tedious, and indeed quite ridiculous — but that the faith of individuals on such matters makes itself immediately apparent, and can be known and perceived by us with moderate diligence, especially if the matter comes into dispute and the common people grow heated in their usual manner.

The other kind is that of matters which it concerns not the unlearned and inexperienced in the Church to know, but the elders and the wise — such as that the Epistle to the Hebrews is canonical, and very many other similar things. In this kind, if you should ask the common opinion of the populace, it would be as if you demanded a sense of colors from a blind man. Cautiously and prudently, then, when such matters happen perhaps to come up in popular conversation, those among the common people who are somewhat more modest assert nothing at all confidently and assertively; but they profess that they themselves believe and think, on these matters, what the Church believes and thinks. By this very name, indeed, they designate the wise and the elders of the Church.

Moreover, whether the question turns on the one kind or the other, the people ought not, and indeed cannot, pronounce a verdict as if from a judge's bench. Since, as we take here as certain and proven, the power of binding, loosing, and judging does not reside in individual faithful persons, but in the prelates and pastors of the Church. On this matter we shall discuss elsewhere.

Now we say this: that, in a controversy common to all, a certain argument is drawn from the common sense of the faithful, although it is not necessary to scrutinize the opinion of every single individual one by one. But in matters of faith proper to the learned and the wise, only their opinion is to be awaited; that of the common people is not to be awaited at all. For the former produce certain conviction of a catholic dogma; the latter produce none. But in the decrees and laws of both kinds of matters, neither the common people nor all the wise have a role; only those who are pastors of the Church, as we shall explain in the following books.

But those arguments by which the truth and authority of the pastors has been attacked shall be deferred to the book next following this one, where we shall refute these and many other similar points far more conveniently.

As for the fact that Calvin establishes two marks for recognizing the Church — namely, the order, commended by Christ, in the word and in the sacraments, to which marks, as to a touchstone, every congregation that puts forward the name "Church" must be tested — this would indeed be excellent, were it not that he wishes to hold this touchstone in his own hand, while denying it to all others. We assert that the Lutherans hold neither the sincere doctrine of the Gospel nor the legitimate administration of the sacraments. They, on the contrary, brand both these marks upon us. Who, then, will be the judge? They deny that the Church exists among us; they falsely claim that it exists among themselves, as we say. Who, then, are those for whom this Lydian stone is a certain, solid, and genuine test for discerning the true Church?

Arius, Nestorius, Macarius, Donatus, Pelagius, and all the other heretics, when they too made war against the Church, displayed the very same insolence in claiming for themselves those two marks of the Church.

Wherefore, in any controversy of faith with heretics, the very notion of "Church" will be at risk. For they will immediately object that we are either caught up in an error of faith, or that we do not administer the sacraments of Christ as he instituted and prescribed to us. The Church is, believe me, better known — far better known — than that, by raising whatever questions they like, not only her authority, but the very reality and name of "Church" itself should be called into doubt.

But Calvin, on this point, has shown himself so foolish that nothing of his is to be laughed at except his own foolishness. For he now says the Church exists among us, now denies it. Now he says the Church has never been entirely dead; now, on the contrary, he asserts that the pure preaching of the word has already vanished for several centuries. Then he affirms that, under the Roman Pontiff — whom he calls the Antichrist — the name "Church" has not been abolished, but that churches remain even under his tyranny; then he asserts that all present assemblies of Catholics are contaminated by idolatry and impious doctrine, and accordingly do not possess the power of the keys.

But if this is so, who, then, are the churches of Christ? Surely, if they are churches of Christ, they will be members of the catholic Church. Moreover, if they are members of the true and catholic Church, they cannot approve the crime of idolatry, or teach errors contrary to the Gospel.

Likewise, were it not that it would seem foolish even to me, I would demand of him, and force him to answer, whether he thinks there are some upright men in the assembly of Catholics. If none — since, as he says, they are all idolaters to a man, and no pious man can exist amid impiety — then, by this same reasoning, before Luther there would have been no good man among the Catholics, since they were all guilty of the same crime and caught up in the same error. The catholic Church of Christ, then, already existed nowhere in the world before Luther. And where, then, are those promises of Christ's eternal kingdom, which — being open, clear, and evident — this man could not by any interpretation evade? But if, on the other hand, there truly are some pious men among us, then certainly the Church among us is not impious, but pious. Since the Lutherans have separated themselves from this Church out of a zeal for contention, it is most clearly established that they have fallen away from the true Church of Christ. What? Is it doubtful that Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, Basil, Chrysostom, and the rest of the best and most outstanding men, whom we Catholics both venerate and acknowledge, were true members of the Church of Christ? But these all stand with us, and all oppose the Lutherans. This is most easy to show.

But why am I so foolish, wishing to persuade the Lutherans, in the manner of heretics, to make war against the Church of Christ? As if it were difficult to assign them, by evident and necessary reasons, to being neither in the Apostolic, nor in the Catholic, nor in the holy, nor in the one Church. Nothing, certainly, would be easier, nothing clearer, nothing more ready at hand, were this the occasion or the time. For surely, by the very same arguments with which Augustine dealt with the Donatists, to recall their minds to the true notion of the one holy, catholic, and apostolic Church, we can defeat the Lutherans with no trouble or labor at all.

And if the facts themselves, which are nevertheless in our favor, should fail us in this fight, the very names "Catholic" and "Lutheran" most openly and plainly demonstrate that we possess the true and genuine mark and character of the Church, and they do not — however much they fashion, simulate, and disguise the name "Church" for themselves. "If anywhere," says Jerome, "you hear those who are called Christ's, being named after someone else — for instance, Marcionites, Valentinians, Pelagians..." — know that this is not the Church of Christ, but the synagogue of the Antichrist. By this same distinction, Augustine and Epiphanius taught that heretics are to be distinguished from Catholics.

Since, then, the Lutherans have taken their surname from Luther, it is plain and clear that they have departed from the common faith and the catholic Church into a private and singular heresy. We, however, have no teacher of the faith on earth; our only heavenly one is Christ, from whom comes the name "Christian," which we hold as an inheritance from him. We are, then, in the Church of Christ. Concerning this, what could be said most briefly has been said by me in this manner.

Now I shall proceed, in the order established, to the remaining topics, and recall myself to my own task and duty.

Book V

On the Authority of Councils

Chapter I

Contains the Arguments which Heretics Use to Undermine the Authority of This Topic

After the authority of the Church follows the authority of Councils, which heretics attack with very many arguments.

Argument 1. The first is this: the Church is the pillar and foundation of truth. But to a Synod come only cardinals and bishops, who are fewer in number, nor weightier in the balance of authority — that is, neither in virtue nor in wisdom. The Synod, then, is not the Church's rule of belief; rather, on the contrary, the Church is the rule for the Synod.

Argument 2. Then, the pontiffs and Pharisees gathered a council whose judgment was impious, as is read in John chapter 11. Not always, then, is the judgment of a priestly synod to be approved. For just as the chief priests and the whole council sought false

testimony against Jesus, Matthew 26, and all the chief priests and elders of the people took counsel against Jesus, Matthew 27 — so too our bishops and pontiffs could render a judgment contrary to Jesus Christ.

Argument 3. Moreover, if bishops hold the truth and cannot be deceived, this must proceed from some divine covenant. But this covenant nowhere appears. And, for it to appear, it must either be interpreted otherwise than that which the Lord once made with Levi and his descendants: "My covenant," he says, "was with Levi: the law of truth was in his mouth, and iniquity was not found on his lips: he walked with me in peace and equity, and turned many away from iniquity. For the lips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law from his mouth: because he is the angel of the Lord of hosts. But you have departed from the way, and have caused many to stumble at the law; you have made void the covenant of Levi, says the Lord of hosts."

Likewise: "I beseech you, O Lord, who keep covenant with those who keep your commandments." On these words Jerome says: "It is not, then, immediately the case that what the Lord promises will come to pass; rather, he fulfills his promises in those who keep his commandments." Whence it is established that the covenant once made with the priestly tribe for preserving the truth is rendered void through the faults of their descendants. From which it follows, in the same way, that if truth has been promised by Christ to the apostles and to all the pontiffs who succeed them, they will preserve this same truth only for as long as they have not, by their own sins, deserved to be deprived of it.

Otherwise, as Jerome says on this passage of Malachi, it indeed belongs to the discipline of priests, when asked, to answer concerning the law; but if they show diligent attention to other matters while neglecting the Sacred Scriptures, they boast in vain of a dignity whose duties they do not perform. And this same Jerome writes that priests falsely boast of this: "The law shall not perish from the priest, nor counsel from the wise man, nor the word from the prophet" — since Scripture says, "Wisdom shall not enter into a perverse soul." And through Ezekiel the Lord says: "They shall seek a vision from the prophet, and the law shall perish from the priest, and counsel from the elders." On these words this same Jerome says: "These things were not only sought from the prophets, priests, and elders at that time when the Babylonian army was advancing against Jerusalem, but are sought daily in the churches. If these have lost vision, law, and counsel, they boast in vain that they have prophets, priests, and elders."

Add to this that testimony of Jeremiah: "The priests did not say, Where is the Lord? and those who held my law did not know me: and the pastors transgressed against me: and

the prophets prophesied in Baal." Jerome, in his commentaries, attests that these words should be used against the teachers of our own order.

Add also this: "Its watchmen are all blind, they know nothing at all; dumb dogs, unable to bark, seeing vain things, sleeping, and loving dreams... The shepherds themselves did not know understanding, they have all turned to their own way." From these things it is easily understood that one ought not to trust the judgments of pastors and priests, especially if the Lord is angry with them. If, then, only such men are gathered into a council, the council can certainly err.

Argument 4. Moreover, the authority of councils is usually proven especially by this testimony: "If two of you shall agree on earth about anything they shall ask, it shall be done for them by my Father, who is in heaven. For where there are two or three gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." But this testimony would equally prove that the judgments of provincial synods are certain — which is far from right faith, as is established both from other examples, and especially from the Council of Carthage under Cyprian, in which not two or three, but eighty bishops, gathered together, erred against orthodox doctrine concerning the single baptism. The truth of synods, then, rests on a weak, or rather no, foundation at all.

And in that testimony Christ promised to be present only to those councils which gather together in his own name. Let them, then, first give assurance that they assemble in Christ's name — for it could happen that wicked bishops conspire against Christ. Then, let them add nothing to the word of God, nor subtract from it — for this law has been prescribed to them.

Argument 5. To this, the Council of Rimini, with six hundred bishops, erred with Arius; the Second Council of Ephesus, also most numerously attended, erred with Dioscorus; and the Council of Constantinople, with three hundred pontiffs, erred with the Emperor Leo. Councils, then, however general, supply theologians with no firm argument at all.

Argument 6. Likewise, the Sixth Synod, celebrated at Trullo, erred not in one matter but in many, as can be seen in canons 2, 3, 13, 55, and 67. Councils, then, can err in faith and in morals.

Argument 7. Moreover, Albert Pighius, a learned and pious man, shows with many arguments that the acts which circulate under the name of the Sixth and Seventh Synods contain various errors. The credibility of councils, even general ones, is not, then, so certain that it should not be called into doubt.

Argument 8. Moreover, the Council of Constance defines that a council is above the Pope; but the Council of Florence, under Eugene IV, and the Council of the Lateran under Leo X, defined the contrary dogma. The authority of councils, then, is weak.

Argument 9. Again, the Council of Basel defines that whoever denies that a council is above the Pope, or asserts that the Pope can transfer a council to another place, or postpone it to another time, is a heretic. And yet no one, in subsequent times, has been so mad as to consider the authors of the contrary opinion heretics. The judgments of councils, then, are too uncertain to be able to produce certain conviction.

Argument 10. Moreover, Augustine, in book 2 On Baptism Against the Donatists, chapter 3, says: "Plenary councils are often corrected, the earlier ones by the later." This certainly would not happen, if they always attained the truth. And Isidore, distinction 50, chapter "Domino," says: "Whenever a discordant opinion is found in the proceedings of councils, the opinion of that council whose authority is older and more weighty should be held to rather." Not all the decrees of councils, then, are certain, but are sometimes diverse, and even contrary to one another.

Argument 11. Moreover, when it is said that a council cannot err, this is understood either of a mutilated council, without a head, or of a complete one, with the head's authority also involved. If mutilated, it has erred at some point, as Catholics themselves freely admit; but if complete, then a council will be gathered in vain to settle a question of faith, since the Roman Pontiff, without a general council, duly pronounces on matters of faith, as we shall demonstrate in the next chapter. Either, then, the dogmas of councils are uncertain, or they are gathered to no purpose. This Gregory Nazianzen plainly attests in his letter to Procopius, which is numbered 102, in these words: "Whatever assembly of bishops I flee from, it is because I have never yet seen any Synod come to an end endowed with any benefit, but rather one from which matters that were already bad were not so much corrected as further embittered."

Argument 12. Finally, Oecolampadius argues from the Roman council under Nicholas, where Berengarius, as he says, was compelled to swear to most false statements — statements from which neither Roffensis, in book 3 against Oecolampadius, chapter 12, nor Cajetan, in his little book on the Lord's Supper, could free him from error.

By these and other arguments heretics are accustomed to fight against the authority of this topic. Luther, however, in his usual manner, settles the matter not by any argumentation, but by mere assertion, saying: "Councils have often erred, especially the Council of Constance, which erred most impiously of all." And in a certain sermon to the people, he says that the first council, at which the apostles and their disciples were

present, erred, in that they thought law and works necessary for salvation. But we ought always to confirm and defend this topic — that no false reasoning can ever move us away from the true opinion of the Church.

Chapter II

Teaches What the Name Either of "Synod" or "Council" Signifies in This Present Context

There was no doubt that, by the name of "synod" or "council" — for they are indeed the same thing — our fathers have always understood priests, especially bishops, gathered into one place, to settle those causes which pertain to either the faith or the morals of the Church.

But the Lutherans want a new kind of council, unheard of in all past centuries, where, on a question of faith, judgment is rendered not by bishops and priests, but by orators and a mass of laymen, who prevail not by way and method, but by words and shouting. But it is most easy to dispel such an error. For the whole Church of the faithful cannot be gathered together; and even if it could, it would still not be expedient that our disciplinary controversies be referred to an undisciplined mob.

But if it would be foolish to seek the counsel of an agitated and unlearned populace for managing a commonwealth either in peace or in war, it is foolish too — and much more so — to wish that we should seek the consensus and judgment of the people on the gravest questions of faith. And if the people, in temporal matters, safely and prudently entrusts itself to the care, diligence, and counsel of magistrates, and claims for itself no counsel or authority in making laws, why do these men incite the Christian common people to refuse to entrust themselves to their own rulers, but rather press to be admitted into that consensus where, indeed, the entirely public causes are to be transacted not by private men, but by the public magistrates of the Church?

We are not, they say, so unlearned and slow as to wish either that the whole common people be gathered into council, which would be madness, or that questions of doctrine be referred to the unlearned crowd, which would be folly. But we desire this, and rightly and by every good right we desire it: that unlearned priests should not come to the council, and that, if there are any laymen skilled in the Sacred Letters (and there are very many), these should be summoned to the synod; and that, whether priests or laymen, men renowned for prudence and wisdom should be chosen, by whose counsel all the affairs of the Church and public business should be managed. For it is not fitting that, in matters of religion, an irreligious bishop should be preferred to a pious layman, or that,

in matters of doctrine, an unlearned priest should take precedence over a learned layman.

But as for what they slander concerning ignorant bishops, we shall explain this in refuting the arguments, for this too has already been objected, among other things, in this first chapter. As for their claim that selected men from the common people ought to be gathered into the synod — in this they err most shamefully, and do not understand what is the form and shape of the Christian commonwealth instituted by Christ. On this matter, very abundant discussion has already been carried out, in many volumes, by Albert Pighius and other Catholics.

Now, however, I am not disputing with the Lutherans whether all the faithful are priests; nor whether women have been admitted by Christ to the offices of the Church and the administration of sacred things — since such questions are not part of this present work and undertaking. I say only this: that not women, not laymen, but only priests and bishops ought to be gathered into council.

"I will come," says the Lord to Moses, "to you in the thick darkness of a cloud, that the people may hear me speaking to you, and may believe you forever... Go down and warn the people, lest perhaps they wish to cross the boundary to see the Lord, and a great multitude of them perish. The priests too, who approach the Lord, let them be sanctified... and you and Aaron with you shall come up," etc. In this form, then, Christ has established the Christian people through bishops and priests; nor ought the common people to ascend to consult with the priests, but to remain within the prescribed boundaries.

But, he says, Moses was not a priest, and yet he taught the people and settled questions of religion. To this I first respond, denying that Moses was not a priest. "Moses and Aaron," it says, "were among his priests" (Psalm 98). Likewise, he not only offered gifts to God, and sacrificed, but he also consecrated Aaron and his sons. He was, then, a priest. This is explicitly explained in Leviticus chapter 8. Then, give me another lawgiver, give me a leader and a prophet established by God, give me a man to whose words God has given such great authority, and then perhaps I would say that such a man, even if a layman, should be consulted along with the priests. But that was granted to Moses alone. It should not, then, be transferred indiscriminately to others.

For what the lawgiver himself properly prescribed for settling controversies is plain and clear in the law itself. "If you see that a judgment among you is difficult and ambiguous," he says, "you shall come to the priests of the Levitical line... etc., and you shall follow their opinion, and you shall not turn aside either to the right hand or to the left." In ambiguous questions, then, the people must run to the priests, and rest in their

judgment. Add to this that saying of Haggai: "Ask the priests concerning the law." Add also that of Malachi: "The lips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law from his mouth: because he is the angel of the Lord of hosts."

Nor is this form prescribed only in the Old Testament for settling controversies and prescribing doctrine; it is also preserved in the New, so that, in either dispensation alike, the people depend on the lips and judgment of the bishops and priests.

For that the doctrine of the Gospel is to be received from bishops, Paul attests, to the Ephesians, chapter 4, saying: "And he himself gave some indeed as apostles, and some as prophets, others as evangelists, and others as pastors and teachers," etc. In this passage, Paul, although he distributed the apostles, prophets, and evangelists into three classes, as it were, nevertheless distinguished "pastors" and "teachers" in thought alone — though he severely, soundly, and prudently united them in reality — so that the same persons in the Church might be understood as both feeding and teaching. But, in interpreting these words, a careless custom has wandered from the path, and gradually has come to understand some as pastors, others as teachers — than which nothing could have brought greater harm to the path of Christians.

For the Apostle wished that the authority not only of ruling, but also of feeding and teaching, should reside with the bishops. "Take heed," he says, "to yourselves and to the whole flock, over which the Holy Spirit has placed you bishops, to rule the Church of God." And again, to Timothy and Titus, he prescribed not different bishops and different teachers, but the same person as both bishop and teacher. And through Jeremiah the Lord says: "I will give you pastors, who shall feed you with knowledge and doctrine." The doctrine of the Gospel, then, is to be expected from the pastors of the Church, whom Paul handed down as being both bishops and teachers.

But that it also belongs to bishops and priests to decide controversies of faith, Luke teaches in Acts chapter 15. For when Paul and Barnabas and certain others had come to Jerusalem, they were received by the church that was at Jerusalem; but when the question had been raised, "they gathered together," he says — not women, not young men, not laymen... but the apostles and presbyters, to look into this matter.

But if Peter, in order to strengthen the wavering minds of the doubting Antiochenes by the authority of a Synod, thought that not all the faithful, but only the presbyters together with the apostles should be gathered together, why do we desire that little women, butchers, cooks, and tailors should come together into the most weighty assembly of the Church? For we know that, among the Lutherans, very many such people claim for themselves a knowledge of the Sacred Letters. Moreover, when it comes

into question which pastures are to be permitted to the sheep, and which, on the contrary, forbidden, that is a matter for the pastors to deliberate, not the sheep. The Lord, then, entrusted matters of this kind to the pastors of the Church.

Moreover, Christ granted the keys of the heavenly kingdom not indiscriminately to the common people, but to the apostles and their successors, as is said in the chapter "Firmiter" on the Supreme Trinity. For we need not now prove what belongs to another place and time, but, in the power of the keys, the same actions are involved — to open and to close, to bind and to loose, just as Christ himself explained in Matthew chapter 16. To resolve questions arising concerning the faith, then, and to bind the faithful, once judgment has been rendered, to believe, belongs not to just anyone, but only to those who, just as they have authority to close and open, so too have authority to bind and loose. This is, moreover, confirmed above all by the fact that removing those impediments by which the door of the kingdom of heaven is closed is the proper function of the keys. Ignorance of the faith, then, which is without doubt among such impediments, will be removed properly by those to whom the keys have been granted.

To this is added the fact that the Apostle, to the Romans chapter 10, understood "the heavens" to mean the apostles, when he applied to them that saying: "Into all the earth," etc. It will, then, be the proper function of the apostles, and of those who succeeded the apostles, to illuminate the rest, and to keep the people within bounds by their own power.

But if you take away the illuminations of heaven, by which everything the earth produces matures and ripens, this earth must necessarily remain barren, and truly, according to its name, parched. And likewise, if darkness should cover the earth, and gloom the peoples, none others will dispel it except those to whom Christ said: "You are the light of the world." But those who attribute to lower offices in the Church what belongs to the higher ones are like those who would attribute the power of illuminating to the earth, or the power of seeing to the feet. But since these matters have already been discussed more fully and accurately by others, it will be enough for us to have touched briefly on these few points.

Nor is there any reason for us to desire greater light on this matter than reason itself, and the continuous usage of the Church, has already made clear. For, within memory of the fathers, only bishops and presbyters have ever been summoned to a council. Nor even all of these, but those who are pastors and rulers of the Church. For the bishops whom our writers call "ring-bearing" (titular) bishops have sometimes, without proper cause, been admitted to a synod. But this is no wonder, for they are in the Church without proper

cause too. But more on this elsewhere.

Now let me briefly conclude what I have proposed. Indeed, unless I am mistaken, just as ordinary presbyters need not be summoned to a synod, neither do these titular bishops. For the whole business of an ecclesiastical council is conducted not by the power of holy orders, but by the power of jurisdiction. For no one can pronounce a sentence, or bind or loose, without jurisdiction. It is established, however, that the fathers, in a synod, either give laws for morals to the people, or judge questions of faith — neither of which a priest does without the right of binding and loosing.

But however these matters stand, the Lutherans certainly err, in the clearest light, who define a synod otherwise than as a gathering of bishops and priests. Bucer too errs shamefully and childishly, when he says that none but the sons of God ought to be summoned to a council of the Church. For first, if only the sons of God constitute a synod of the Church, I ask whether they ought to gather of their own accord, without being called, or whether there will rather be some authority by whose command they are summoned. If they come to the council called by another, who, I ask, will be the one who can discern the true sons of God? But if they come of their own accord, then each person will pass judgment on himself, and, relying on his own opinion of his own goodness, will thrust himself into the council? But how will he have any basis even for an opinion about himself, when he cannot even determine that the rest are righteous and holy?

And, to grasp more openly the madness of such men, imagine, in some commonwealth, citizens who, of their own accord and on their own authority, gather to deliberate on laws, magistrates, and religion, and each one does so all the more boldly, the more he trusts in his own virtue and zeal. Would such a form and appearance of a commonwealth be approved — I will not say by Solon or Lycurgus, but by any sensible man at all? Such confusion and disturbance, then, ought not to be introduced into a synod of the Church, which a man of sound mind would not even admit in villages and small towns.

Unless, perhaps, we fall into that madness of thinking that a man, as soon as he ceases to be a son of God, is also deprived of the power of ruling, feeding, judging, binding, and loosing. What sort of thing this is, it is not the task of this work to show; but it can be observed in the secular commonwealth, where, nevertheless, the uprightness or wickedness of citizens is not so obscure that it cannot sometimes be easily detected. This is not so easy in the Christian commonwealth, whose chief virtue — by which men are both named and truly are sons of God — is most hidden. "For he is not a Jew who is so openly, nor is circumcision that which is openly in the flesh; but he is a Jew who is so in

secret, and circumcision is of the heart, in the spirit, not in the letter, whose praise is not from men, but from God." Wherefore, if public power were likewise lost together with charity, it cannot be said with what great darkness the Church would be enveloped.

On this matter both we ourselves have discussed in the previous book, and very many others have discussed much more abundantly; we have, in passing, as it were, said these things, so that readers may understand what is sufficient for the present point — namely, that wicked bishops too must be gathered into a synod, since they have not lost the power of feeding, judging, binding, and loosing.

Let us, then, remove the Lutherans entirely from this discourse; and let us ourselves understand that the name of an ecclesiastical synod embraces not just anyone, but the pastors and pontiffs of the Church, gathered into one place, that they may pronounce on ecclesiastical causes — that is, on morals, faith, and religion.

Chapter III

In which the Various Kinds of Synods are Set Forth

What kind of assembly of men an ecclesiastical synod presents, I think has been sufficiently explained in the previous chapter. Now the term itself must be divided, so that we may see what truth and authority each individual kind of council possesses.

Gratian, distinction 3, chapter "Regula," divides synods twofold, into general and provincial. By this division, however, since it is a serious fault in dividing to omit something major, one kind has been overlooked. For there are not only general and provincial synods, but episcopal ones as well. Let us, then, if it please, name and even, if necessary, coin words. For, as Cicero hands down, new names must be given to new things. Although this term is recent indeed, it has nonetheless been received by usage among our own writers, and is now found not only among non-Latin authors, but among Latin ones too.

I myself call "general councils" those celebrated by the convocation of all the Christian bishops. Among many, however, it has often been disputed whether a general convocation is sufficient, or whether a general assembly is also necessary. For if the Supreme Pontiff should declare a general council, and yet only ten bishops from Italy alone should assemble, there is certainly no reason why such a synod should seem to be general. But, on the other hand, if it is necessary for all bishops to be assembled, then, first, perhaps no such council has yet existed in the Church, to which all the bishops universally have come. Then, every worst sort of bishop, by neglecting, not merely

through carelessness but through malice, to attend the synod, will slander it as not general. And any prince in his commonwealth, if a synod displeases him, could disrupt it with the least effort, claiming that his bishops cannot attend the council because of illness or disturbances.

But since it is not the task of this work to pursue all such controversies, we shall answer this question briefly. It is not enough for a general council, even if the summons is general, when so few are gathered that the greater and better part of the provinces seems to have been left out — especially if there is a legitimate reason why the bishops were not present at the synod. But if, through the malice of the most wicked men, one province, or even another, is absent, the council does not, for this reason, lose the name "general." But neither does a general council lose its name, if a few bishops are absent through negligence or any other occasion whatsoever — unless we are to doubt whether those four Councils, of Nicaea, Ephesus, Constantinople, and Chalcedon, were general.

Wherefore, as the faithful do, so do we speak here: we define a general synod as one convened by a legitimate summons of all the bishops, even if not all are actually gathered. For we must proceed according to the common sense of all the faithful, when we speak of the affairs and terms of the Church. And the wise have done likewise. Nor, however, is a general summons sufficient for a general council, unless there is also a general assembly. But for a general assembly, the gathering of all the bishops is not required.

Nor do I here define anything other than what is common in the Church. For we know that general councils can sometimes be celebrated without a summons, but this is rare and outside the usual practice. But more on this later. Now let us return to the remaining parts of the proposed division.

Provincial councils are those in which the Metropolitan or Primate summons all the bishops of a single province or even region. Episcopal synods are gatherings of priests, which individual bishops are now accustomed to hold in their own diocese for the private causes of particular churches. For synods of this kind, especially in Spain, were not formerly customary except for the reason expressed in distinction 18, the last chapter.

This division being established and approved by the consent of all, another distinction is taken up: that of councils, whether general, provincial, or episcopal, some are gathered by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, others not; again, some are confirmed by this same Roman Pontiff, others not confirmed by him.

For the Second Council of Ephesus, on Leo's authority, was indeed convened, but was not approved by Leo or by any other Supreme Pontiff. Eugene IV likewise declared the

Council of Basel, yet did not confirm it. But the Council of Constance, although at first gathered without the authority of any Roman bishop, was nevertheless confirmed by Martin V, the Supreme Pontiff. Likewise the Council of Mileve, which both Innocent and Celestine approved, was convened without the authority of the Supreme Pontiff.

Since, then, what Gratian thought to be a twofold distinction is found to need to be distributed into three parts, and each of the three is in turn divided twice into two — we must first discuss the general council, in two ways; then, by the same reasoning, the provincial; and afterward, the episcopal.

Chapter IV

In which the Conclusions are Laid Down which Contain the Authority of This Topic

These points being established, let this be the first conclusion: A general council, neither gathered nor confirmed by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, can err in faith.

This conclusion is manifestly proven by the error of the Council of Rimini, and of the Council of Constantinople under the Emperor Leo, which we cited against the authority of this topic in the fifth argument of the first chapter. Gratian too shows this same point, distinction 17, chapters "Regula" and "Multis," with the most clear testimonies of Julius and Pelagius. Damasus defines the same, in his letter to Archbishop Stephen, as do the three African councils, which had confessed this same point in their letter to this same Damasus.

For a council is not true and ratified that lacks the authority of the Roman bishop, as not only the pontiffs themselves, but the councils too, have taught. The Seventh Synod taught this, action 6, tome 1; the Eighth Synod too, actions 1 and 7; and the Roman Synod under Symmachus, distinction 96, chapter "Bene"; and the Synod of 90 bishops under Damasus, Tripartite History, book 5, chapter 29; and the Lateran Council under Leo X, session 11, where this same point is said to have been defined at the Synod of Alexandria.

Thus Socrates, Tripartite History, book 4, chapter 9, relates that the ecclesiastical rule commands that such councils not be celebrated apart from the judgment of the Roman Pontiff. This Julius said, in his letter to the Easterners, had been defined by the Council of Nicaea, and Marcellus, in his letter to the Antiochenes, says the apostles established this. Indeed, councils of this kind were always, in the Church, not only weak for producing the conviction of truth, but were almost gatherings of iniquity, and had sad,

indeed even ruinous, outcomes.

Bucer, however, says that those lie who affirm it is not permitted to gather a council without the consent of the Roman Pontiff. He confirms this, first, by the testimonies of Eusebius and the Tripartite History. Then there is, he says, a Canon of the Council of Nicaea concerning the holding of synods. There are also the Apostolic Canons, which prescribe two synods yearly in each province. He asserts, moreover, that whatever is established in such councils for truth against falsehood is firm and ratified, in such a way that it cannot even be rescinded by the Supreme Pontiff.

But who could respond to this man's impudence without indignation? First, indeed, how great an impudence it is, that he should cite to us Eusebius and the Tripartite History, in which nothing at all is found against us, and much in our favor? What of that other point — that he opposes to us the Council of Nicaea and the Apostolic Canons, in which there is discussion of provincial synods, which the Supreme Pontiffs themselves prescribed for the proper founding and administration of churches? We, however, are speaking of general synods, which cannot be gathered without the consent of the Supreme Pontiff, any more than the chief men of a kingdom could be gathered without the prince's consent — indeed, against his will. And what of this further claim — that he wishes to hold as firm whatever is established in these synods? "For truth," he says, "against falsehood." Surely, if it is for truth, it must be accepted wherever it is established — but who will give us certainty that whatever has been decreed by provincial synods is for truth? But enough on these matters; for they will be explained more fully in the fourth conclusion.

The second conclusion. A general council, even one gathered by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, can err in faith.

This is openly demonstrated by the example of the Second Council of Ephesus, where, despite the resistance of Leo's legates, almost all the bishops subscribed to Dioscorus's heresy. Pope Leo confirms this more clearly in the letters cited above on the fifth argument, as does the Eighth Synod, action 7, and Nicholas, in his letter to the Emperor Michael, and Eugene IV, in the decree on the union of the Jacobites, in which, after he had condemned the Second Council of Ephesus, gathered under Leo, which had consented to the Eutychian error, he says: "The holy Roman Church receives all the universal synods that have been legitimately gathered, celebrated, and confirmed by the authority of the Roman Pontiff." He did not say only "gathered," but "celebrated and confirmed."

This same point is shown by the example of the Council of Basel, whose error we objected in the ninth argument of the first chapter. But more on this in the response to that argument.

Moreover, no council is, or has been, ratified, that has not been supported by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, as Julius, Damasus, Pelagius, and other fathers cited in confirmation of the previous conclusion have not obscurely taught. But although a council may have been gathered at the declaration of the Supreme Pontiff, if its dogmas have not been confirmed by him, but he himself, or his legates, fought against them instead, then certainly the synod is not supported by Apostolic authority; it will not, then, be ratified and firm, nor fit, accordingly, for us to draw conviction from it. But this conclusion will be more fully explained in the next chapter.

The third conclusion. A general council confirmed by the authority of the Roman Pontiff produces certain conviction of catholic dogmas. We ought to hold this conclusion as so well established that we believe its contrary to be heretical.

First, because, otherwise, all the heresies once condemned by the authority of general councils would return, and the Nicene Creed too would become doubtful, once the authority of the general council is removed. Then, if such a council could err in faith, there would certainly be no certain way left by which we could determine catholic dogma in controversies of faith. For whoever rejects the judgment of the Supreme Pontiff, and of all the other pastors of the Church, will find no living judge from whose tribunal it is not permitted to depart.

The Lutherans want Scripture to be the judge in council — Scripture, which neither perceives, nor understands, nor is itself able to pronounce a judgment. Luther himself proclaims that the words "This is my body" should be taken literally; Zwingli, on the contrary, figuratively. Who will pronounce judgment? Will Scripture itself? Or rather the supreme judge of the Church, together with a council of priests, as is written in Deuteronomy chapter 17? But if, in human courts, someone should refuse the living judges established in a commonwealth, and take refuge instead in mute and lifeless letters, he would be rejected by all means whatsoever. But on these matters we have already said much elsewhere, and shall often say much more.

Now let us return to our proposal. Indeed, with the trust of councils rejected, we shall also lose a good part of Scripture's trust. For if anyone, with Luther, should strike the Epistle of James from the canonical letters, this question certainly cannot be settled by Scripture itself. There must, then, be living judges established. But if, having rejected the judgment of the pastors, you appeal to some other tribunal, you will certainly

accomplish nothing other than to decline the judges of Christ and the Church, and substitute human ones for divine ones. Whoever, indeed, you should choose besides the pastors of the Church, they will have only human and uncertain authority.

To this: either the faithful people is bound to stand by the council's definition, or it can also resist. If it is bound, then, with the council erring, the people too will necessarily be caught up in the same error. But if it can resist, where, then, is this: "He who hears you, hears me"? Where, again, this: "The scribes and Pharisees have sat upon the seat of Moses; whatsoever they shall say to you, observe and do"?

They say: if we are commanded to do whatever they tell us, why did Christ, elsewhere, wish us to beware of the leaven of the Pharisees? For Matthew interprets this as the doctrine of the Pharisees. Why, again, did he teach, by his own example as well, to despise their traditions? They can, then, mix some of their own doctrine into the purity of the Gospel — in which respect they should not only not be heeded, but should even be refuted. This, then, Christ guarded against — that the people should not, by the bad examples of teachers, be led into contempt of true doctrine. Christ, then, commands us to do what the Pharisees tell us only when they have sat upon the seat of Moses — that is, when they have expounded, taught, and presented the law of God. For if they teach their own doctrines, we not only can, but ought to disregard them — as Augustine, on John, not obscurely interprets.

These evangelical sayings, then, do not help the pastors at all. Indeed, since they can speak of their own accord, they can also, for that very reason, be disregarded by us. Whence Jerome, on Matthew chapter 7, on those words, "Not everyone who says to me," etc., says: "Just as he had said above that those who had the garment of a good life were not to be received, on account of the wickedness of their doctrines, so now, conversely, he asserts that faith should not be placed even in those who, though they possess integrity of faith, live shamefully and destroy the integrity of their doctrine by their evil deeds."

But these men, what Augustine says of hirelings, they cunningly and maliciously apply to the true pastors of the Church. Nor do they understand that, among hirelings, there are always true pastors too in the Church, whose voices the sheep ought to hear — especially if their voice is the same for all. For then the voice of the pastors is also the voice of the Church, and indeed of Christ. Otherwise, what does this mean: "I beseech you that you all say the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you. Is Christ divided?" Far from it! "God is not a God of dissension, but of peace."

And indeed, to gather this argument into a few words: if the sheep of all the pastors followed one and the same doctrine, there would be no fault in the sheep. Let them follow, then — suppose this is so — and, with all the pastors erring, all the sheep too will likewise err. But this, as has been demonstrated in the previous book, cannot happen. Now what Jerome means is immediately indicated. For he teaches that both qualities are necessary for the servants of God, so that faith may be accommodated to them — that the work be confirmed by the word, and the word by the works.

Moreover, Martin V, at the Council of Constance, among the other questions by which those suspected in faith were to be examined, already proposes this one: whether they believe that any general council whatsoever represents the universal Church. If, then, a general council has the authority of the universal Church, whoever removes this from the scene dissolves, by that same action, the authority of the whole Church. Excellent, then, is that saying of Augustine's, in his first book On Baptism Against the Donatists, chapter 18 — that the verdict of a plenary council is the consensus of the whole Church.

Moreover, no more convenient way appeared to Paul for tracking down the truth in a question that had arisen, than to refer the controversy to the council at Jerusalem. We ought, then, to enter upon and hold to that same way, which Paul judged most fitting for settling a question of faith, and to imitate that modesty which Luke describes, both regarding the Jews and the Gentiles, in Acts chapter 15. For the Gentiles could have protested against that council at Jerusalem, on the grounds that it was robbing them of the freedom given to them by Christ, and was imposing on the shoulders of the disciples certain ceremonies as necessary which seemed less necessary, since faith in Christ alone was sufficient for salvation. But not even the Jews resisted — although they could have opposed to the council's definition the Scripture which says, "The man whose flesh of his foreskin," etc. Showing such great honor to the council, they presented a form to be observed in future ages — that synods confirmed by the authority of Peter and his successors should be held in certain trust. "It has seemed good," they say, "to the Holy Spirit, and to us." The council's verdict, then, is the very judgment of the Holy Spirit itself.

There is added this further reason: that the catholic Church has always accepted the decrees of general councils, and has, without doubt, considered as heretics also those whom these councils themselves held to be such. It is necessary, then, to hold the faith of councils, if we wish to hold the faith of the Church. This point too has already been confirmed with great arguments in the previous book.

The fourth conclusion. A provincial council, not confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff, can err in faith.

An example of this you have in the Council of Milan, Ecclesiastical History, book 10, chapter 20; and in the Council of Antioch of 90 bishops, Tripartite History, book 4, chapter 9; and in that of Seleucia, Tripartite History, book 1, chapter 34; and in the Council of Carthage, of which we made mention while arguing this point.

This conclusion too is proven not only by examples, but also by the testimony of Symmachus, who says: "The councils of priests decreed by ecclesiastical laws throughout the provinces, since they lack the presence of the Pope, have lost their validity." Thus it cannot be denied that laws too harsh, or scarcely consonant with reason, have sometimes been published by provincial councils. Such, perhaps, was that one at Aachen, which is cited in question 36, the second question, chapter "Placuit." That one, again, was passed not only imprudently but even impiously by the Council of Elvira, on doing away with images.

But if a general council, lacking the authority of the bishop of Rome, can err in faith, then a provincial synod will err all the more.

The fifth conclusion. A provincial council confirmed by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff cannot err in faith.

The condemnation of many heretics would, indeed, be uncertain, if this conclusion were not certain. For very many heretics have been condemned not by general councils, but by provincial ones — such as Priscillian, at the First Council of Toledo; Helvidius, at the Council of Tyre; Pelagius, at the Councils of Mileve and Carthage. Although Gregory relates, On Heretics, chapter "Fraternitatis," that Pelagius was also condemned at the Council of Ephesus. But this opinion is not found today in the Council of Ephesus.

Then, it is neither expedient nor tolerable to gather individual general synods for condemning individual heretics; since, then, God has provided for his Church in necessary matters, surely, for refuting private heresies in the provinces, provincial councils will suffice, provided only that they are strengthened by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff.

Moreover, whomever such councils have condemned, the Church has always rejected as well; they cannot, then, err in faith. For if they could, at least one example would certainly be produced. But there is none at all.

For as to what Oecolampadius cites from the Roman Synod under Gelasius, where he says it was defined that the substance of the bread remains in the sacrament of the

Eucharist, we shall demonstrate, in the next chapter, that this is a fabrication. For that opinion belongs to no synod at all, nor even to Gelasius.

Moreover, Pope Symmachus relates that the provincial councils decreed yearly by the laws of the Church, since they lacked the Pope's presence, lost their validity; therefore, if they have his presence, they will be valid. Likewise, at the Seventh Synod, action 3, when Theodore had received the general councils, he immediately adds: "We do not turn away from local synods, but rather love, embrace, and receive them. Their divinely inspired canonical constitutions, corrections, and legislation we honor with the highest observance." Now this letter of Theodore and of the Easterners is itself approved by this same Seventh Synod.

And the Eighth Synod, in its final session, canon 1, says: "We profess to keep and observe the rules which have been handed down to the holy Church both by the holy apostles, and by the universal and local councils of the orthodox. And we likewise decree that all who are reckoned by the Christian name should canonically be subject to the condemnations and acquittals that have been pronounced by these." Thus far the Eighth Synod. Its words must be understood as applying especially to those councils which have been confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff. For the Supreme Pontiff, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, cannot err in the judgment of faith. The decrees of provincial councils pertaining to faith, then, are firm and certain, if confirmed by the Roman Pontiff. This is explained in Acts chapter 15.

For that council which is read to have gathered there was not a general, but a provincial council. And yet, with Peter presiding, no less trust was placed in it than if it had been a general synod.

By this, the slander of Erasmus is repelled. For when, in his annotation on the Epistle to the Romans, chapter 5, he had said that he did not consider himself so strictly bound by the Council of Mileve, and other similar provincial councils, he added: "Otherwise, if anyone presses that whatever was decreed in those must be observed, I shall bring forward, from these same councils, certain dogmas which the Church now condemns as heretical." Thus far he. But, as we have said, the Council of Mileve has been confirmed, and so a Christian is bound by it. As for those other councils, from which heretical dogmas would be produced, they have not been confirmed. And on this matter we add another conclusion.

The sixth conclusion. From provincial councils, although they lack the authority of the bishop of Rome, a probable argument can indeed be drawn, for urging dogmas of faith.

A sufficiently great argument for this is that, of the countless councils of this kind, scarcely five or six are found to have deviated from the right method of definition. If, then, councils of this kind for the most part hold the right faith, and rarely err in their definitions, then the argument drawn from this kind of council is undoubtedly most probable.

And certainly, unless they have been specifically rejected, they are commended either by the common silence of the Church, or even by an implicit consensus, if they have come to the Church's common knowledge. For it is not at all likely that the Church would, for a long time, conceal a heresy widely publicized in a provincial council throughout the whole world. For an error which is not resisted is approved, distinction 83, chapter "Error."

Nor should you object the Council of Elvira to me. For in the matter in which it erred, it has always been rejected by Catholics. This, then, is the chief reason why the Councils of Toledo, Arles, Seville, and other similar ancient councils, although not expressly, seem nevertheless to be implicitly approved by the Church.

For the Councils of Ancyra, Neocaesarea, Gangra, Sardica, the African councils, and those of Carthage have been confirmed by Leo IV, distinction 20, chapter "De libellis." The Trullan Synod too approved certain provincial councils, but we shall discuss more fully later how much weight this Trullan approval carries.

Now we assert only this: that councils which have not been approved by the Supreme Pontiff supply not, indeed, a certain, but nevertheless a probable, argument for strengthening a dogma of faith. This is gathered from Innocent, distinction 20, chapter "De quibus."

The seventh conclusion. Provincial councils, if confirmed by the Roman Pontiff in their decrees of faith, present a certain argument of truth.

For if the Synod of Toledo, with a successor of Peter presiding and confirming, could err in faith, there would seem to be no reason why a Roman synod could not err as well. Likewise, a provincial council confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff has certain authority, therefore so too does an episcopal synod. But I cannot bring to mind any other episcopal synod confirmed, in a judgment of faith, by the Roman bishop, besides the Synod of Alcalá (Complutum), under Archbishop Alfonso Carrillo of Toledo, where a certain master from Osma was condemned, who held false views concerning the keys of the Church and the sacrament of penance.

The final conclusion. An episcopal synod, of itself, can indeed produce probable, but not certain, conviction in a judgment of heresy.

We must first dispose of the former point, for the latter is already sufficiently dealt with. The former, then, is shown from the chapter "Ad abolendam," "On Heretics," where Lucius III binds with the bond of perpetual anathema those whom either the Roman Church, or individual bishops throughout their dioceses with the counsel of their clergy, or, if it should be necessary, with the counsel of neighboring bishops as well, have judged to be heretics. It is not, then, a slight conjecture that is taken from the judgments of such synods, which Lucius valued so highly that he decreed that those whom these same synods had declared heretics should be considered excommunicated. Nor does it escape me that certain learned men interpret this decretal of Lucius's as applying to those caught in manifest heresy.

Otherwise, they deny that an episcopal council, and accordingly a provincial one too, has the right to judge concerning heresy. This they prove by the fact that faith is a matter common to all, wherefore the power of judging concerning faith and contrary heresy will reside not with private churches, but with the universal Church. Likewise, they argue this from the chapter "Maiores," "On Baptism," and from the chapter "Quoties," question 24, the first question, where such causes are said to be referrable only to the apostolic see, since they have been reserved to it by special privilege from the Lord. And, after the words cited, this same Lucius seems to confirm this, saying: "We nonetheless decree, by the present ordinance, that whoever shall have been openly found in heresy..." The Pontiff, then, is speaking in the case where the heresy is manifest.

But to me the opinion of those has always seemed by far more probable, who think that those are plainly and simply bound by the chain of anathema through this decretal of Lucius's whom either the Roman Church, or a provincial synod, or even an episcopal one, have judged to be heretics, even though the heresy is not manifest to all.

For first, the text does not say "those whom they have declared heretics," but "those whom they have judged to be such." Otherwise, if that declaration concerned a manifest matter, and not a true judgment in a cause of faith, why would Lucius have referred this matter to a bishop with the counsel of his clergy, and not rather to theologians — so as to strike with anathema those who had been declared heretics by learned theologians?

Then, if Lucius did not use that word "judged" properly, but improperly, in the sense of "to expose a manifest matter," then, since this same word applies equally both to the Roman Church and to the bishop with his clergy, it would follow, by parity of reasoning, that we should also understand that those condemned by the Roman Church

were not "judged" to be heretics, but "declared" to be such — by Lucius's own usage. But it is established that this word, with respect to the Roman Church, is to be understood properly and simply; there is, then, no reason, when it is applied to the bishop's synod, to twist it into a different sense.

Add to this that the cause of one accused of heresy could, for various reasons, be referred to such synods. First, by a special commission of the apostolic see — as the First Council of Toledo investigated the case of Priscillian, and the Synod of Alcalá, under Lord Alfonso Carrillo, Archbishop of Toledo, investigated the case of a certain master from Osma.

Then, without a special commission of the Pontiff — which is what inquisitors now do — in heresy that is indeed manifest, but where it is not manifest whether the accused himself is a heretic, either because it has not been proven or established that he asserted a heretical proposition, or certainly because, even if he had asserted it, his obstinacy — without which no one is a heretic — was not yet established.

Finally, in heresy not so manifest as to be exposed to everyone everywhere, but nevertheless such that it was not necessary to refer it to a general council, or to the apostolic Church, since expert theologians agreed that it was heresy.

And in all these cases, the synod once had — and now those to whom the cognizance of faith has been entrusted still have — the right of pronouncing and judging on a cause of faith.

Although the judgments of such tribunals are not so well established that they could not be false — not only in a doubtful matter, controverted even among learned men (in which case local synods do not have the right to pronounce on heresy), but even in a matter that would seem manifest to all the theologians of the province (in which case they pronounce on a cause of faith without committing any crime of usurped judgment).

In these three cases, then, although these judgments are not certain and firm in the Church, it is nevertheless expedient that, since they are highly probable, they be held in the greatest esteem by the faithful. For it will not be a small harm to the Church, if she does not meanwhile guard against these men, as against the excommunicated, whom not only the Roman Church, but also a synod, whether provincial or episcopal, has judged to be heretics.

But let us look at the first objection. The cause of faith, they say, is common to all, and so it is not permitted for private judges to pronounce sentence on it. And yet the crime of

treason and of betraying the commonwealth touches all citizens together, and yet private judges are accustomed to render verdicts on it. For those chapters which they cite must be understood as applying when the matter is ambiguous among the bishops and theologians themselves — as Pelagius explained, distinction 17, chapter "Multis." This is also the sense found more clearly in Deuteronomy 17:8: "If you see that a judgment among you is difficult and ambiguous, and you see that the words are varied within your gates, rise up, and go up to the place which the Lord shall choose," etc.

As for what Lucius adds, this does nothing at all against us. For he did not say "whoever shall have been found in manifest heresy," but "whoever shall openly have been found in heresy." He wishes, as is clear from the same passage, that no one be handed over to the secular arm, unless it has been established that he is a heretic. For such punishments, in order to be carried out, require proof clearer than the light of noonday. But on the authority of councils enough has been said.

Chapter V

In which Certain Knots are Untied, by which Even Learned Men are Sometimes Tangled

These matters having been explained, nothing else seemed to remain but to refute the arguments laid out at the beginning. But, as I prepared to repel these objections, certain scruples presented themselves, which it is fitting to disentangle first, before we proceed to other matters, lest they be an obstacle to theologians on the path we opened in the previous chapter.

Question 1. The first doubt, then, to be resolved is this: whether a council celebrated through legates of the Supreme Pontiff has firm and certain authority, or whether the confirmation of the bishop of Rome must rather be awaited, in order for the council's decrees to be held as certain.

Cajetan, indeed, who has discussed the authority of the Pope and of councils most accurately, and whom we have chiefly followed, with certain corrections applied, says here many things explicitly which seem foreign to the present undertaking; but he finally affirms, as far as concerns the present point and question, that a council conducted through the Pontiff's legates can err in faith. For there still remains he for whose faith Christ prayed — he, I say, to whom the final word on faith must be referred. Wherefore, unless the definitions of councils are both approved and confirmed by the Supreme Pontiffs, they need not be considered certain and firm.

Cardinal Torquemada held this same view, book 3, chapters 6, 8, and 38, where he shows most fully that all the ancient councils of former times sought confirmation of their dogmas from the Supreme Pontiffs — something they certainly would not have done, had they not thought it necessary.

For that the Pontiff's confirmation applies also to dogmas of faith is clear from the letter of the Council of Nicaea to Pope Sylvester: "Whatever we have established," they say, "we beg that it be confirmed by the agreement of your own mouth." And Sylvester, writing back to this same synod, says: "I confirm and fix your doctrine against those who protest concerning the unity of the Trinity." And a little after: "I declare," he says, "that the things which have flowed into your and our mystery are true," etc.

And the fathers of the Council of Chalcedon, in their letter to Leo, say: "We have set forth to you the whole force of our proceedings, both for the confirmation of our sincerity, and for the firmness and consonance of what we have done." And Pope Leo, in his letter to the Council of Chalcedon, which is numbered 59, says: "Do not, then, be in doubt as to whether I approve what has been established by your unanimous agreement concerning the faith," etc. And afterward he says that he sends his approval of the synodal proceedings only in the cause of faith, on account of which, namely, the council was gathered. The same is evident from the letter of this Leo, the third of that name, by which he confirms the Sixth General Synod.

Add to this that the Church has never held as firm and ratified, before the Pontiff's own confirmation, what had been defined by legates presiding over a council. Hence the Emperor Marcian pressed Leo to approve the judgment of the Council of Chalcedon on matters of faith. And Leo, for this same reason, urged Marcian that the confirmation and approval of the council be conveyed to all the churches, as is written in letter 57 to this same Marcian.

Moreover, a council can err without legates; but the Supreme Pontiff does not transfer to legates the solidity of his own faith, which he claims for himself alone privately, since he is the vicar of Christ, the shepherd of the universal Church, and the rock upon which Christ founded his Church. The legates, then, together with the council, will be able to err. For Christ did not pray for Peter's legates, but for Peter.

To this: a provincial council, to which the legates of the Supreme Pontiff are present, can err in faith; but not if it has been confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff. The legates, then, do not have, in matters of faith, the same authority that the Supreme Pontiff himself has. Wherefore the decrees of a council will still be weak, even though confirmed by the judgment of legates.

Moreover, the Second Council of Ephesus erred with Dioscorus, and yet it had been legitimately convened on Leo's authority; the decree of a council, then, is not firm and ratified, unless it has been confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff. Nor is it valid to say that the Pontiff's legates and a few others resisted. For it is not necessary that all the fathers subscribe to the synodal opinion, for it to be considered a general council's judgment — since not even all the bishops subscribed to the judgment of the Council of Nicaea.

And if the legates themselves, as all the learned agree, can err, nothing would prevent them from having consented to the other bishops who were erring. Finally, the Pontiff's legate was present when, in the second and third sessions of the Council of Basel, a grave error occurred, and the legate himself subscribed to the error of the others too. It is not enough, then, that a council was gathered by the Pontiff's authority, and that the legates of the council approved its opinion, for it to be considered firm and certain in the Church.

But, on the contrary, certain most learned men think that a general council, legitimately gathered, even in the Pope's absence, has solid and certain authority, even before being confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff.

They can give two chief reasons for this opinion. One, that such a council, celebrated through the legates of the bishop of Rome, represents the universal Church, since it is a general council of the Church; it cannot, then, err in faith, any more than the universal Church can. That every general council represents the universal Church was defined by Martin V at the end of the Council of Constance.

The other reason is that a general council, legitimately gathered, is gathered in the Holy Spirit; wherefore it has the Spirit assisting it, and, relying on his presence, the fathers can certainly say, when they define something: "It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and to us."

This is, moreover, confirmed especially by the testimony of Julius, writing to the Eastern bishops: "Your rule has no force, since the legate of the Roman Church was not present, the canons prescribing that councils ought not to be held without his authority; nor is any council ratified, that has not been supported by his authority." Thus far Julius. He thinks, then, without doubt, that a council has force, is ratified, and rests on the authority of the Roman Church, if the legate of the Roman Church was present.

In explaining this difficult question, we lay down this point, which is established by the experience of actual events: that the legates of the Supreme Pontiff are not accustomed to go to a council, where a question of faith is to be discussed, without first being

instructed and warned concerning the faith of the Roman Church regarding the matters to be settled at the council. I say "accustomed," not "necessarily so." For the legates at the Council of Trent could not conveniently be instructed beforehand on the questions to be discussed, since these were almost infinite in number. But the rest of the councils have generally been convened to treat one or another single cause of faith, and so the legates went, having first been instructed on the faith of the Apostolic Church.

I lay this down first, then: that a council can conflict with the doctrine and instruction of the legates, and, conversely, the legates can conflict with the council — in which case the council's decrees will not be supported by Apostolic authority, but will rather have been refuted. For just as the gathering of a council, when the true and certain Pontiff of the Church protests against it, is vain and void, so too doctrine which the Pontiff, whether present in person or absent through his legates, contradicts, is uncertain and weak — and by this same argument exactly, since in both cases the authority of the bishop of Rome is lacking, without which neither the council nor the council's decrees are ratified.

But if anyone should think that a council, once rightly and legitimately gathered, cannot then err even when the Pontiff's legates resist, I would like them to answer the argument by which we proved the second conclusion of chapter 4, citing the example of the Second Council of Ephesus, where nearly all the bishops erred.

It was not, they say, a free council; rather, the verdict was extorted from Dioscorus by guile, threats, and terror. I see this. But, speaking of human nature, one who is broken by fear can also be broken by ambition. Wherefore, if a true and legitimate synod errs through fear, heretics will claim that all the other synods too served the ambitions of pontiffs and emperors. Thus it would follow that the authority of no synod at all is established.

How much more weightily do we assert this: that a council confirmed by Apostolic authority cannot, by any human passions, depart from the true faith. Just as not even the Church herself, however much rain may fall, however much the floods may come, however the winds may rush in, can give way from her place and desert her station of faith. But the remaining part of a council, however large, can be weakened by passion, if the Pontiff and his legates fight against it. For this is what that passage means: "You, Peter, strengthen your brethren."

What if a legate abandons the doctrine he received from the Pontiff, and embraces the opinion of the multitude? First, no such example will be produced, except perhaps from the council under the Emperor Michael, where Rodoald and Zacharias consented to Michael and Photius against the instruction and mandates of Nicholas — as can be seen

in Nicholas's letter to the Patriarchs, metropolitans, and other bishops.

Then, if a legate acts against his instructions, he is not considered to be acting from delegated power, and there is accordingly no reason to believe that what was done in this way is approved by the higher authority. Hence Pope Agatho says, as is evident in action 4 of the Sixth Synod: "We have given them" — that is, to the legates — "authority, only insofar as they have been instructed in this regard, that they presume to add nothing, take away nothing, or change nothing, but sincerely relate the tradition of this Apostolic See." And Leo, letter 43 to the Empress Pulcheria, says: "I have arranged to send Bishop Lucentius and the priest Basil, who shall carry out my instructions according to the rules they have received." The decrees, then, if any are approved by a legate contrary to the tradition of the Apostolic See, do not have the authority of the Roman Church, and stand no differently than if they had proceeded from a council without legates at all.

But what if the legates came to the synod without instruction from the apostolic see? Will the synod's judgment be firm and certain, before it is approved by the Supreme Pontiff? Certainly, in matters which do not pertain to faith, but to ecclesiastical governance, the decrees of such synods need not proceed from the Holy Spirit. Wherefore they are not entirely valid, unless confirmed by the consent of the Roman bishop — as can be seen in Leo's letter 51 to Anatolius, 52 to Marcian, 53 to Pulcheria, and 59 to the Council of Chalcedon.

But not even in causes of faith do they have such well-established authority that whoever calls it into doubt is a heretic. First, because the most distinguished authors we mentioned above, Cajetan and Torquemada, agree, not only without the charge of heresy but even probably, that no firm dogma proceeds from such synods, until approved through Christ's vicar. Then, because, as said before, the Pontiff cannot transfer to legates the solid authority which Peter possesses for confirming both brothers and dogmas. Then, because, if legates who received instruction from the apostolic see can depart from it, then those too who come to a council without instruction will be able to conflict with the doctrine of the apostolic see. Their confirmation, then, is weak. What of the fact that the legate Julian agreed with the doctrine of the Council of Basel, which no theologian considers so solid and certain that he would believe those who dissent from that doctrine to be heretics?

Nor do the contrary arguments accomplish anything. For the first is refuted thus. I admit, indeed, that any general council represents the universal Church, just as all the nobles and representatives of cities, when they meet to deal with public matters, represent the whole kingdom. But when you urge that the Church cannot err, this is true

in the sense in which it is understood of the faithful — for we understand the whole Church together, that is, all the faithful, not to err. But nothing prevents the greater part of the Church from erring. Thus I do not admit that the whole council, together with the legates, can err. But the greater part of the council can err, and the legates can subscribe to that erring majority. And this is precisely what we are saying at present: that the judgment of the greater part, even if the legates follow it, is not certain. It would be certain, however, if confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff. For it is not necessary, as we taught a little before, that all the fathers together approve the council's opinion.

To the second argument, let this be the response. A general council, over which legates preside, is indeed gathered in the Holy Spirit, since it has been convened on the authority of Christ's Vicar, the same legitimate leader of the Church. But the Church too is one body, whose spirit is God, who is always present to the Church. Just as, then, what has seemed good to the whole Church equally has also seemed good to the Holy Spirit, it does not immediately follow that whatever the greater part of the Church has judged is the judgment of the Holy Spirit. Thus, if something has been judged by all the bishops, it has certainly been judged by the Spirit of God; but it does not immediately follow that, if more of the council's fathers converge upon one opinion, that opinion must be believed to be the Holy Spirit's, unless it is confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff — to whom, surely, it belongs to settle the disputes and disagreements of the fathers.

Now Julius's testimony is most easily explained. For he passes over in silence what was already evident — that the council lacked the presence of the Supreme Pontiff — but states explicitly that the legates of the Roman Church were not present either. From these two — one passed over in silence, the other expressed — he concludes that no authority of the Roman Church at all intervened in that council. Wherefore it is void and vain. Otherwise, if anyone should crudely press us with this testimony, he is easily refuted. For this inference holds no force at all: "If the council had no legates, its judgment was weak; therefore, if it had legates, it was firm." But on the first question enough has been said.

Question 2. There follows another: whether the fathers of a council are truly judges, or rather counselors.

For there are not entirely bad authors who hold that the authority of councils lies not in judging and settling a cause of faith, but in seeking and investigating the truth. They refer, indeed, all the force of judgment to the single leader of the Church, the same Vicar of Christ, who, in deciding a cause of faith, calls upon more or fewer counselors, as the matter is more grave or more easy.

The first argument for this is drawn from the fact that, in the six books of the Decretals and the Clementines, the verdict is attributed not to the fathers, but to the Supreme Pontiff, although with the sacred council's approval. Whence Clement V, presiding at the Council of Vienne, says: "We, turning the gaze of our apostolic consideration (to which alone it belongs to declare these things) to such a clear testimony, and to the common opinion of the holy fathers, with the sacred council approving, declare," etc. Only to the apostolic see, then, does the judgment belong; that of the fathers is not a judgment, but a counsel.

Moreover, when the Pontiff gathers the presbyters of the Roman Church into an assembly, in order that some cause of faith be judged, he says, "by the counsel of our brethren," etc. They counsel, then; they do not judge.

To this: Deuteronomy 17: "If a difficult and ambiguous case… you shall come," it says, "to the priests of the Levitical line, and to the judge who shall be at that time," etc. And afterward: "But he who shall be proud," it says, "unwilling to obey the command of the priest who at that time ministers to the Lord your God, by decree of the judge that man shall die." Behold: the command is assigned not to all, but to the high priest, and the decree is said to belong not to the judges, but to the judge. The other priests, then, are counselors, not judges.

But, on the contrary side, this is the case: that, in that first council at Jerusalem, not only Peter, but the other apostles and elders too are said to be judges. "Wherefore I judge," James says, "that those from among the Gentiles are not to be troubled." And later in the same chapter, Paul calls these same decrees of the council "the precepts of the apostles." And in chapter 16 he says these dogmas were decreed by the apostles and elders.

To this question the response is most easy and ready: the bishops of a council, in a cause of faith, are not only counselors, but also judges. Otherwise, not only bishops would be summoned for rendering a synodal verdict, but also learned theologians and prudent men of the Church. This is unheard of, and contrary to the form prescribed in Acts chapter 15, where only the apostles, together with the presbyters, judged the question of faith.

Since, then, by the perpetual usage of the Church, only the pastors sit on a council, it follows that they are judges, not merely counselors. For if they were summoned only to counsel, there would be no place at all in the council for those bishops who were unskilled and inexperienced in theology, however much the theological question that arose came into doubt.

Moreover, not only the bishop of Rome, but also the other bishops, hold the keys of the heavenly kingdom, and therefore, in a cause of faith, the power of binding and loosing as well. "It has seemed good," they say, "to the Holy Spirit, and to us, to impose no further burden upon you than these necessary things," etc. All the bishops, then, impose the burden and the precept, and all together are the authors of the synodal verdict. And counselors who are not at the same time judges are not accustomed to subscribe to the judgment and verdict. But in a synodal decision, the subscriptions not only of the Pontiff, but also of the other bishops are appended. They are, then, without doubt, judges.

But here arises a scruple that troubles some men badly. For if all the bishops are judges, then surely the Supreme Pontiff will be bound, in rendering judgment, to follow the greater number of judges, and to approve their doctrine. For in every properly and well-ordered tribunal, the one who presides ought to confirm the judgment of the majority, and disregard that of the minority.

In resolving this question, Cardinal Torquemada, Summa of the Church, book 3, chapters 64 and 65, following the jurists himself, says many things which do not all seem correct to me. But it is not my intention to pursue each one individually, and refute the opinions of each author. For, as Cicero relates, it is the mark of one disputing sharply to consider not what each person says, but what each ought to say.

What was assumed, then — that the fathers of a council are not only counselors, but also judges — this we neither can nor ought to deny. For the fathers of the Council of Nicaea press Sylvester to confirm whatever they have established. And Leo says that he approves what was established by the Council of Chalcedon concerning faith. And the council itself says to Leo: "Honor our judgment with your decrees." And the Sixth Synod, action 18, says: "We anathematize," it says, "Theodore, Sergius, Cyrus," etc. And a little after: "All these things," it says, "having been established by this holy council, and confirmed by the subscription of our own fortitude, we decree that no one shall presume anything else concerning the faith," etc. Are these the words of one who counsels, or rather of one who judges? And in other places, the fathers speak not as counselors, but as judges.

But the scruple now raised, I easily remove. For I deny that, when faith is at issue, one must follow the judgment of the majority. Nor do we here, as in human elections or judgments, measure the verdict by the count of votes. We know that it often happens, in practice, that the greater number defeats the better one; we know that what pleases more people is not always the best; we know that, in matters pertaining to doctrine, the opinion of the wise should be preferred. And the wise are very few, while the number of

fools is infinite.

Four hundred prophets lied to Ahab; but truth proceeded from the mouth of Micaiah alone, despised though he was. Divine judgments, then, are not to be measured by human reasonings. Sometimes the Lord saves more quickly through the few than through the many.

For indeed, the greater part of the Second Council of Ephesus came over to Dioscorus's opinion, and yet the legates did not subscribe to the judgment of the majority. Wherefore the Supreme Pontiff is not bound to embrace the opinion of the greater part. Indeed, whether few or many incline toward error, it is the duty of the apostolic prelate to recall them to the true faith, according to what Christ said to Peter: "I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail; and you" — not one or another only, but, whether few or many — "strengthen your brethren."

Thus Damasus, writing to the bishops established throughout Illyricum, disregarded with great freedom the number of the Council of Rimini, and set against that great multitude one Vincentius and a few others, who spoke against that council's opinion. And Leo, when Anatolius proposed the decree of the Council of Chalcedon on the primacy of the Church of Constantinople, with the consent of six hundred thirty fathers, said: "As though what an unlawful multitude has willed could not be refuted! No councils flatter themselves on the multiplication of their assembly; nor would a more numerous body of priests dare to compare itself to, or prefer itself over, those three hundred and eighteen, since the Council of Nicaea was consecrated with so great a divine privilege that, whether ecclesiastical judgments are celebrated by fewer or by more, whatever differs from their constitution is entirely devoid of all authority." Thus far Leo.

Among us, then, it is not the case, as happens in human assemblies, that the opinion of the majority prevails. For if we once reduce a cause of faith to human conjectures and human prudence, it is certainly to be feared that we would turn the Church's business from a divine matter into a human one. Indeed, it is certain that those who rely on the probable judgment of many men undermine the firmness of our faith. For the Second General Council consisted of one hundred fifty fathers, while the Fourth had six hundred thirty fathers; yet the Church received both with equal veneration.

For these matters are not judged by number, but by weight. And weight is given to councils by the gravity and authority of the Supreme Pontiff; if this is present, a hundred fathers are enough; if it is lacking, none are enough, however many there may be. Nor, if the greater part of the fathers should truly hold the correct view, will the Supreme Pontiff resist them. For it belongs to Christ's special care, and has always belonged, that

the Church not be divided into two factions. Nor has the Roman bishop, if an example is sought, ever spoken against fathers of a council who held the true opinion.

To the second question, then, there is nothing we need to add, for the arguments raised against it are easily dissolved from what we have already said.

Question 3. There also arises another question, not easy to expound. For if a council, confirmed by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, is governed by the Holy Spirit in judging causes of faith, then its definitions will pertain to Sacred Scripture. For "Sacred Scripture" is what is written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit.

The conclusion of this argument a most learned man — one who had made such progress in theology that he could be compared with the most excellent theologians — did not fear to grant in my presence.

Gratian too seems to have come down to this opinion, confirmed by Saint Augustine's testimony, distinction 19, chapter "In canonicis," where he says that the decretal letters of the Supreme Pontiffs are canonical Scriptures; by the same reasoning, then, the decrees of councils would be held among the Canonical Scriptures.

But Innocent too, "On the Celebration of Mass," chapter "Cum Marthae," seems to embrace this same opinion. For he says that Sacred Scripture asserts that it is an injury done to a martyr to pray for a martyr. But this testimony belongs, surely, either to some pontiff, or to a council.

Reason too agrees with these testimonies. For the catholic faith believes nothing, except what has been revealed by God; but if we are bound to hold the decrees of councils certain according to the faith, these are certainly things revealed by God, and consequently canonical Scripture.

But how ill-considered this opinion is, the reader will understand even without my instruction. For if the Creed of Athanasius, or of the Council of Nicaea, is counted among the sacred letters, why is it neither incorporated into the codex of the Sacred Bible, nor enumerated among the canonical books? It is absurd, then, to hold as sacred and canonical the books which contain the decretal letters of pontiffs, or the verdicts of synods.

For there is found a twofold distinction between the sacred authors and the Supreme Pontiff and the fathers of a council. One, that the sacred authors write catholic dogmas from God's immediate revelation or inspiration. For they need no external incitements to write, nor do they argue, investigate, or draw conclusions through human reasoning from other writings. But the council and the Pontiff proceed by human power, and

follow reasoning, and discern the true from the false by arguing.

For the Supreme Pontiff is not to be thought to have that faculty which existed in the Apostles, Prophets, and Evangelists, by which, when a question of faith arose, he could immediately discern which side of the question is true or false. Rather, it is necessary first to take counsel, and weigh the arguments of each side; then, indeed, God's help will follow, which is needed, namely, for the Supreme Pontiff to be kept in the right faith.

In councils likewise, the fathers do not have the power to pronounce a verdict at once, as if on authority alone, without further discussion. But, the matter having first been treated through conferences and disputations, and prayers first poured out to God, the question will then be settled by the council without error — through, namely, God's help and favor, together with the diligence and zeal of men.

For even when the apostles and presbyters were gathered together at the council of Jerusalem, it was not immediately revealed to them what should be decided in the cause of faith, but, as Luke says, "a great inquiry" was made first. And at the Council of Nicaea, as Rufinus relates, the assembly deliberated day after day; nor did the fathers dare to settle so great a matter easily or rashly. Arius was frequently summoned before the council, and his assertions were discussed in continuous debate, and what should be held or established against these was sought with the greatest deliberation. Thus, after a long and extensive discussion, Arius was condemned by the most firm opinion of all. From which it is clear that the Holy Spirit assists not sleeping and yawning fathers, but those who diligently seek, by human way and reason, the truth of the matter under discussion.

The other distinction, moreover, is that the spirit of God is present in the sacred writers, as we explained more fully in the first book, in every single particular — even in the smallest matters? Yes, indeed. But to the fathers of a synod, the Spirit of truth is not present in all matters, but only in those things necessary for salvation. For what is said in the Synod of Athanasius — that flesh and soul are one man — this need not be true, even though the Council of Nicaea agreed with Athanasius. For whether those parts together compose man, or do not, belongs to the science of philosophy, not of faith; it is, then, a question for philosophers, not for the faithful. Now, a provincial synod under Stephen, the seventh of that name, decreed, through error, that all the ordinations made by Bonosus were void — which was rejected at the Roman synod under John IX. But this was a judgment of facts, not a decree of religion and faith.

Such are the matters settled in the Clementine "Pastoralis," "On Sentences and Res Judicata." For these do not pertain to faith and religion. Wherefore, although Clement erred, as Bucer contends, the authority of the council would not be undermined thereby.

Although that Clementine is Clement's, not the council's.

The case of pontiffs and of councils, however, is the same. Sixtus IV taught that Saint Catherine of Siena did not have the stigmata; some judged otherwise. Neither pontiff's judgment pertains to the Church of Christ; either we can approve or disapprove, without any difference to the faith. But let foolish men, who duel over matters of no importance, take their leave. For we give these examples here, so that the reader may understand that sacred authors are to be regarded differently than the fathers of councils — that the former speak the truth everywhere, while the latter can err in small matters.

Thus, what Christ promised to his Church — that the Spirit would teach her all truth — this must be referred to the truth of faith, as Augustine explicitly teaches, both in his commentaries on John and in his acts against Felix, book 2. For Christ did not pray that knowledge and truth of philosophy or of historical facts would not fail Peter, but that faith would not fail him.

Perhaps someone will say: are not, then, the decrees of the council of Jerusalem Sacred Scripture? For "a great inquiry" was made; but it has been said that it does not suit the authors of Sacred Scripture to inquire, and to reason in a human manner. Likewise — for someone will say this too — if the Supreme Pontiff and councils can err unless they apply diligence, then, since we cannot be certain whether the Supreme Pontiff and the fathers of a council showed themselves diligent and industrious, so that the inquiry proceeded by way and method, neither will we be certain whether they erred. Thus whatever they define will be uncertain.

The first scruple, indeed, is more easily removed. For just as Pilate's words pertain to the Canon, not insofar as Pilate spoke them, but insofar as the Evangelist wrote them, so too the definition of the council of Jerusalem is Sacred Scripture because Luke wove it together with the other parts of his history. Just as, conversely, the words of Peter which Clement relates are not part of the Canon, since Clement was not a sacred writer. This is a sufficient reason why the Canons of the Apostles, which this same Clement is said to have written, are not held among the canonical books — although Damascene, book 4, chapter 18, seems to refer them to the catalogue of sacred books, and Epiphanius, in his refutation of the final heresy, calls the Constitutions of the Apostles "divine scripture." But he is speaking, without doubt, of those constitutions which are not written in the sacred bibles. But it is one thing when truth itself is refined in disputation, with subtlety; another when, in passing and in transit, the discourse is adapted to some common opinion.

Wherefore, as the wise do, so do we use ecclesiastical terms in this matter, calling "sacred" and "canonical" only those books which were written under the Spirit's dictation.

But the second scruple has so settled in Sylvester's mind that he could scarcely drive it out from there. It would have been better to conceal it than to provoke others with the very scruple that was pricking him. There are also some who say, not obscurely, that, if the Roman Pontiff ever erred in defining a matter of faith, this could have happened because he did not apply as much diligence as he ought, before pronouncing his verdict — since he either did not fully examine the matter, or did not consult those whom he ought to have consulted.

If you object to them that the Apostolic See cannot err in faith, they admit this, indeed, but say that the name "Apostolic See" signifies not only the Supreme Pontiff, but the Pontiff himself only insofar as he acts according to what pertains to the chair — that is, insofar as he proceeds not from himself alone, but from the counsel of good and learned men. Thus the judgments of the Apostolic See are understood to mean not those which are pronounced secretly, maliciously, without counsel, by the Roman bishop alone, or even with a few favoring ones, but those which proceed from him with the counsel of very many wise men, the matter having first been fully examined.

This same point, that it might also be said of councils, falls entirely under the same reasons I gave a little before. For we ought not to think that the Supreme Pontiff alone errs when he sleeps, but speaks truly when he does not sleep, while the fathers, whether asleep or awake, always proceed correctly, and, as the saying goes, with eyes closed, discern obscure things even in darkness. It is common, believe me, to all judges of the Church that, if they should issue decrees with a certain rashness without judgment, suddenly stirred as if by a gust of wind, they accomplish nothing at all that is held to be solid, weighty, or certain. Those things alone are rightly held to be weighty and certain in the Church, which have been issued with judgment, deliberately and constantly. Wherefore those who call into doubt the diligence either of pontiffs or of councils in settling a cause of faith necessarily weaken every judgment of pontiffs and of councils.

We, then, shall remove that latter scruple, if it has lodged in anyone, in another way, from the heart. For God disposes all things gently, and at the same time foresees both the end and the means necessary for the end. For if he promised someone eternal life, he would soon also confer on him the grace of good actions, by which he would attain that life. Namely: "Whom he glorified, the same he also justified and called," as is said in Romans chapter 8. Thus entirely, when he has promised the Church firmness of faith, he cannot fail to grant the Church prayers and other supports, by which this firmness is

preserved.

Nor indeed can it be doubted that what happens in natural matters also occurs, by the same usage, in supernatural ones too — namely, that he who gives the end gives also the things that follow toward the end. Since this is a saying of the Philosophers, and is also worn smooth in the mouths of theologians, let the more Latin-minded permit me, sometimes, to speak our own things with our own people. For although we generally discuss matters more elegantly than they usually do, sometimes we wish to express the opinions we have received from the scholastics in these same words, lest, with the form of speech entirely changed, we should seem to have departed from the school.

Thus the Pontiff always supplies what is in his power, and the council does likewise, when they pronounce on faith; and the case falls, if anyone among us thinks otherwise. For just as, if Christ had said to Peter, "I have prayed for you, that your charity may not fail," it would be most certainly understood that diligence, care, vigilance, prayers, and the other timely aids, necessary for the preservation of charity, had been obtained for him — so too, when he said, "I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail," we doubt not at all that he obtained from his Father that whatever was needed for a right judgment in a question of faith would be present to Peter, whether this was to be expected from God or from man.

But if God should promise an abundance of crops for the coming year, what could be more foolish than to doubt whether men will sow seeds in the ground? Certainly, if they sow, they will reap; if they do not sow, they will not reap. But from God's promise we gather not only favorable turns of the heavens, by which everything the earth produces ripens more abundantly, but also the cares, labors, and diligence of the farmers. For that abundance of crops is not promised, except to those who plow, sow, and labor.

From these considerations it is easily understood that, when Christ promised the Spirit of truth to the apostles and their successors in the judgment of faith, nothing at all would be lacking to them that was necessary for settling controversies of faith. And if we once permit heretics this license — to call into question whether the judges of the Church exhibited the diligence and care that were needed for the question to be settled by way and method — who is so blind that he does not see that all the judgments of pontiffs and councils would immediately be undermined? Moreover, if this matter should come into question, and cannot be confirmed by certain arguments, then this much, at least, must be established and defined for theologians: that councils, however they may be otherwise constituted, cannot err in faith, if they have been confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff.

Although, in my judgment, it is absurd that any end should be reached except through fitting means. Thus I shall never admit that either the Pontiff or a council omitted some necessary diligence in deciding questions of faith. This could happen to any private individual — that he neither applies diligent effort to investigating the truth, nor, even if he has applied it, and presented himself wholly upright in the matter, still errs, although his error would be without fault. But error, even blameless error, is most far removed from the Church of God, as we established in the previous book. This is itself a most ample argument that neither the Pontiff nor councils have omitted anything necessary in deliberation.

For suppose something necessary had been omitted. Then I ask: ought the faithful to obey those who have judged on a question of faith, for as long as their negligence is unknown to the Church? They ought to obey, they say. Then, in that time, with the judges erring, the Church will err. "Without her own fault," you say, "the Church will err at that time." I grant this. But, as has been said, we ought not to admit even this error in the Church of God.

What of the fact that, if we once doubt the diligence of the judges, a new examination and a fresh judgment will always be demanded, to determine whether diligence was applied or not? Let us, then, grant to the judges established by God in the Church that nothing can be lacking to them which is necessary for a right and true judgment.

These points being explained, it is easily understood, returning to the head of this third question, that the decrees of neither pontiffs nor councils are parts of Sacred Scripture — which was objected in the first argument. Let us, then, speak to what was said in the second argument, where Gratian did not correctly grasp Augustine's opinion. The cause of this error was perhaps some corrupted manuscript. For the true reading of Augustine has it thus: "In canonical Scriptures, let one follow the authority of as many catholic churches as possible. Among these (namely, the churches) are surely those which have deserved to have apostolic sees, or to receive an epistle [from an apostle]."

The sense, moreover, is this: in judging the canonical books, one must first see what the catholic churches think. But, among the catholic churches, the testimony of those is to be preferred which either were sees of the apostles, like the Church of Jerusalem, or received some epistle from the apostles, like Corinth or Galatia. Augustine, then, was not speaking of the decretal letters of pontiffs, as Gratian falsely supposed. This certain other most diligent men, before us, have also noted.

To the third argument, one can respond in this manner: that pontifical laws are sometimes called "sacred," to distinguish them from the laws of princes. And in this sense

Innocent called it "Sacred Scripture." Thus, perhaps, the canonical law is called "sacred," while the civil one is called "human," "On the Oath of Calumny," chapter 1, as Hostiensis, Andreas, Siculus, Cardinal Barba, and other jurists have noted, and the Gloss, chapter "Ex diligenti," "On Simony." Indeed, Innocent IV, chapter "Cum de diversis," "On Privileges," book 6, not obscurely calls canon law "divine," and civil law "human." And Justinian calls canon law "sacred and divine" in his Authentica, "as the clergy before their own bishops," chapter "Si vero." This point, some half-learned person, perhaps unaware of it, in distinction 20, chapter "De quibus," where the true reading had "recur to the divine canonical writings," substituted "Greek" for this last word. For Innocent, in that chapter, was doing nothing less than sending judges, in deciding ecclesiastical causes, to Greek exemplars of the Bible. Otherwise, why not also to the Hebrew? Nor is it most true that, in settling causes of the Church, canonical writings were omitted by Innocent. Indeed, after divine Scripture, he placed them in second place, even before the writings of the saints. And this was Gratian's own particular purpose in that distinction. It is no wonder to us, then, if the writing of the canons is sometimes called "sacred" and "divine."

But we speak of Sacred Scripture in another sense. Although the testimony cited from Innocent is indeed Augustine's, speaking the words of the apostle, saying: "It is an injury to pray for a martyr, by whose own prayers we ought rather to be commended."

But the final argument is most easily refuted in this manner. A twofold kind of conclusions can be defined in a council. One kind is that which is properly theological, since they are gathered either from two principles believed by faith, or from one believed and another known by the light of nature. The other kind, however, is that of those which the Holy Spirit himself indeed revealed to the Apostles, Evangelists, or Prophets, but which, since this was not equally evident, is declared by a synod.

Those of the former kind pertain to faith secondarily and, so to speak, indirectly. Wherefore, as we shall more fully explain in its proper place later, whoever denies them will be a heretic, because he consequently denies the principle from which they are derived. But those of the latter kind pertain to faith properly and in themselves; nor ought we to expect these as new from pontiffs or councils.

For we assert, again and again, that the Church has no other Scriptures now, nor will have hereafter, beyond the Scriptures of those peoples and princes who were in her. I say, "were" — not "are" or "will be." For all the things which the Father entrusted to his only-begotten Son to be made known to the Church, the Son himself first revealed to the apostles, and then commanded them to publish abroad. "I have called you friends," he says, "because all things that I have heard from my Father, I have made known to you,"

John 15. And again: "He will teach you all things, and will bring to your remembrance whatever I have said to you," John 14. And again: "When the Spirit of truth shall come, he will teach you all truth," John 16. For these were the ministers of the New Testament, who beheld the glory of the Lord with face unveiled, 2 Corinthians 3. These were the ministers of the word, as Luke attests in the first chapter of his Gospel. To these too it was said: "Teach all nations to observe whatever I have commanded you," the last chapter of Matthew.

The apostles, then, received the whole truth of faith either from Christ while he lived on earth, or afterward from the Holy Spirit, and handed it down to the Church, according to the prescribed law, either in writing or by word.

Hence it is that Irenaeus, Jerome, and Augustine, against heretics, always do this — see whether their new dogmas agree with the ancient tradition and faith. And if heretics should put forward new scriptures, or fashion themselves into apostles or prophets, they are immediately rejected out of hatred for novelty. Thus, after the apostles, and those approved by the apostles, we look to no other sacred authors.

But whether the Supreme Pontiff or councils judge first concerning the true sense and interpretation of the Scriptures, as at the Council of Trent, session 3 — and indeed it is absurd that the Church should have the authority to discern the words of God from the words of men, but not have the authority to discern the sense of God from human sense. Let us, then, attribute this to councils above all else. Then also this — that they investigate, by way and method, the true and legitimate traditions of Christ and the apostles. Again, they establish, with sure understanding and connection, which conclusions cohere with these, and which conflict. In settling such matters, they consult not only the Sacred Letters, but also the institutions of the apostles, earlier councils, the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, the writings of the ancient saints, the dogmas of the scholastic theologians, and the right reasoning of philosophy. In short, they cast the cause under discussion into those very topics around which this book of ours has been organized. For they cannot derive arguments from other sources for resolving questions of faith or theology. But to seek new revelations and sacred scriptures is the mark of the Jews, who even now await new prophets.

Question 4. There also arises another very difficult question from what we have said: if not everything in councils is certain (for the Holy Spirit does not assist every individual council), by what way and method shall we track down the certain decrees of councils in matters of faith? For first, in the unique Clementine "On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith," that opinion is chosen as more probable which holds that grace and the

virtues are infused at baptism. For the same reason, then, we can say that, in other decrees of councils too, probable opinions are chosen, not established matters defined.

Then, in the chapter "Firmiter," "On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith," the fathers of the Lateran Council say: "We firmly believe and simply confess that there is one only true God, the Creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal, who, from the beginning of time, alike created from nothing both kinds of creature, the spiritual and the corporeal — namely, the angelic and the worldly." But it is not contrary to the faith to hold that the angels were created before the corporeal world. For Gregory Nazianzen asserts this in his first oration on the Nativity of the Lord, Basil (in the first conference of the Hexameron), Damascene (book 2, chapter 3), Ambrose (Hexameron, book 1, chapter 5), Jerome (in his commentary on the first chapter of the Epistle to Titus), Cassian (Conference 8, chapter 7). Whence neither Augustine (The City of God, book 11, chapter 32), nor Saint Thomas (Part I, question 61, article 3), thought this opinion contrary to the faith. And that Lateran Council Thomas had seen — indeed he had even published commentaries on that very chapter; the definitions of councils, then, or their confessions of faith, are not certain, but the fathers, even when they assert that they firmly profess and believe something, define nothing at all that the faithful are bound to follow.

To this question, this point must first be granted: that it is not enough, for the judgments of councils and pontiffs to be believed firm, that they be publicly celebrated in the divine office, even by the whole Church. For not even the histories which narrate the deeds of martyrs and confessors, although approved by the Supreme Pontiff or by a council, are decrees of faith — just as not even the little works of ecclesiastical doctors, which are approved at the synod of Pope Gelasius, distinction 15, chapter "Sancta Romana," are such.

This too we grant, and gladly: that it is not immediately to be believed that whatever is contained in the volume of canon law is a dogma of faith. For, as we shall more openly show in the book next following this, certain things are found in the decretal letters which are not decrees of the catholic faith. And this same point we were just now showing from the unique Clementine "On the Supreme Trinity." This is to be thought to have occurred not only in this Clementine, but we are accordingly warned that something similar can happen in other places too. This is especially the case when the judges either use words of opinion, or when the responses are referred not to the whole universal Church, but to particular churches and bishops.

For they are to be understood as pronouncing on faith only in that case where the judgment looks to all the faithful of Christ, and binds all. For the certainty of faith was not promised and granted to judges established by God for the sake of particular churches, which can individually err, but for the sake of the universal Church, which cannot err. Thus, the doctrine of the Supreme Pontiffs and councils, if proposed to the whole Church, if proposed with the obligation also of believing it, then indeed is a judgment on a cause of faith.

But it must be considered more carefully, both what is the nature of the matters on which judgment is given, and what is the proper sense and weight of the words. For, surely, ecclesiastical doctrine — which we are also bound to embrace — does not have the same degree, nor are all decrees of judgment to be held in the same regard. On this matter, since we shall discuss it far and wide in book twelve, it is not worth the effort to say more now. We say this: that not everything that the volumes of law or of councils contain are judgments of Christian doctrine, nor, again, are all judgments of doctrine censures of faith. For very many things pertain to the sound discipline of the Church which are not decrees of faith.

Will there not, then, someone ask, be some mark by which the judgments of councils on faith can be distinguished? There certainly will be. The first, and indeed a clear one, is if those who assert the contrary are judged heretics. Examples of this you have in the chapter "Damnamus," "On the Supreme Trinity," and the unique chapter "On the Supreme Trinity," in the sixth book, and the unique Clementine "On the Supreme Trinity," chapter 2.

The second mark is when a synod prescribes its decrees in this form: "If anyone shall hold this or that, let him be anathema" — such as are very many in the First Council of Toledo, and at the Council of Trent.

The third is if, against those who speak to the contrary, a sentence of excommunication is pronounced by the law itself. An example is "On Heretics," chapter "Cum Christus," and chapter "Ad Abolendam." At the Council of Trent, however, in the session held on October 11, 1551, concerning the Sacrament of the Eucharist, it was defined that sacramental confession of the Eucharist should precede, if the conscience is burdened with mortal sin. And immediately: "If anyone," says the synod, "shall presume to teach, preach, or pertinaciously assert the contrary, or even defend it by publicly debating it, let him be excommunicated by that very fact."

But this was guarded against because of the danger; for the contrary opinion was pernicious. And so that excommunication refers especially to public teaching. For that

Cajetan's opinion was not condemned as heretical, both we ourselves attest, who were present at the council, and the very context demonstrates. For Canon 11, which is also the last, runs in this manner: "If anyone shall say that faith alone is a sufficient preparation for receiving the most holy Sacrament of the Eucharist, let him be anathema." But immediately after, in a changed form of speech, these words are added: "and lest so great a Sacrament be received unworthily," etc. Here you see that no anathema is pronounced against Cajetan's opinion, but, since it was not only false but also harmful, it is rejected; and, because of the danger, especially public preaching and debate on it is forbidden.

And this same reasoning, perhaps, moved Martin V to condemn those who criticized that ecclesiastical custom of giving the Eucharist to the people under one species — not as heretics, but as ones who savored of heresy. For since the people had once received the Sacrament of the Eucharist under both species, and this had been confirmed by the authority and usage of the apostles, it was not heretical to call into doubt whether that true custom of the Church should be preferred to the new one. But since the Wycliffites asserted, for this reason, that the Church erred, because they thought it necessary for the people's salvation to receive both species of the Sacrament — twisting to this end those words of the Lord, "Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood..." — most prudently did Martin V say that the censure of this new ecclesiastical custom was not heresy, but savored of heresy.

There is also this further weighty argument, for why such errors are not branded with the mark of heresy: that, as we shall say later, it is not heretical to believe that the Church can err in referring men into the number of the saints. But the Church sometimes commands that the saints, on whom she confers such honor, be venerated with a particular feast day and worship; it is not, then, heresy to assert that, in this law and custom of venerating one or another saint, the Church errs. But it must be understood that certain customs of the Church were handed down to the Church by Christ and the Apostles, in which case anyone who should say the Church errs would be making Christ and the apostles the authors of that error — for which reason he is considered a heretic. Such were the Iconoclasts, who asserted that the Church erred in the veneration and worship of images. Other customs, however, were introduced after the apostles, in which, although the Church might err, the faith would not thereby be endangered. Without danger of heresy, then, one may hold that the Church can err in some law or custom. But on the second conclusion, enough. Let there be a third conclusion.

The third conclusion. In matters of morals not common to the whole Church, but referring to private individuals or churches, the Church can err through ignorance — and I mean not only in the judgment of facts, but even in the private precepts and laws

themselves.

For when someone, having secretly taken one wife, publicly marries another, the Church commands him, having left the first, to keep the second. In this matter she is without doubt deceived, and prescribes for the man something contrary to reason and the Gospel. The true and proper cause of this conclusion Innocent III gave, in the chapter "A nobis," "On the Sentence of Excommunication," in these words: "The judgment of God always rests on the truth, which neither deceives nor is deceived; but the judgment of the Church sometimes follows opinion, which often happens to deceive and to be deceived; for this reason it sometimes happens that he who is bound before God is loosed before the Church, and he who is free before God is bound by an ecclesiastical sentence." Thus far Innocent.

These matters, which seem evident, must be judged briefly and without long debate. For we do not set forth everything in order to inquire into it, but in order to explain it. In this matter, then, it is not so much the conclusion that must be considered, as the reason for the conclusion. For from this it is clear — and this is most worthy of attention — that the Church's decrees cannot be certain and firm, unless they rest on certain and firm principles and foundations. Wherefore, if even one of these, on which the Church's judgment depends, is uncertain, the Church's decree cannot be certain — whether the question be speculative or practical, for so our writers are accustomed to speak. For the conclusion, as the dialecticians' proverb has it, follows the weaker part, and if any one of the principles falters, the conclusion too must necessarily be weakened in that respect.

From this it is easily understood that the Church's judgments, which proceed from uncertain human testimonies, are weak for producing certain and well-established conviction. Such is that judgment by which she decides that some holy person should be entered in the catalogue of the saints.

Nor, nevertheless, is it permitted with impunity to call such decrees into doubt. Indeed, it is rash and irreligious to withdraw one's faith from the Church in the canonization of saints. For "it is an injury to a martyr," as Innocent teaches, chapter "Cum Marthae," "On the Celebration of Mass," "to pray for a martyr"; he, then, who rejects one inscribed in the catalogue of martyrs and in the number of the saints does an injury — and indeed a much greater one. Since he does this rashly and inconsiderately, he will rightly be punished by the Church.

Moreover, if any one decree of this kind should be called into question, we could certainly call into question, without crime, the holiness of Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, and the rest, and indeed assert that they have been condemned along with the demons.

Thus you could cut them down with slanders, and harass them with insults — all of which the ears of the faithful rightly shudder to hear.

But if the Church errs in placing righteous men in the catalogue of the saints, it would surely not be very absurd to reject the worship, by the Church, of all the saints canonized after Clement. What could be said more foolish or more shameless than this?

Likewise, it matters greatly to the common morals of the Church to know whom one ought to venerate religiously. Wherefore, if the Church erred in these matters, she would be gravely mistaken in morals as well. And if the Church should prescribe a law of abstinence which was contrary either to reason or to the Gospel, she would certainly be shamefully in error; she will, then, also err shamefully in the doctrine of morals, if she gives a law about venerating a saint, when to venerate him, if he is not a saint, conflicts both with reason and with the Gospel.

Lest, then, so great an error be in the Church, God must be believed to provide especially that the Church, whatever human testimonies she follows, should not err in the canonization of saints. A most ample argument of this most special providence is that the faith once placed in human witnesses, in such judgments, has never been undermined — which often happens in civil cases.

If these points, taken individually, do not perhaps move one, they certainly ought to move one when joined and connected together; so that, while we believe those who detract from the Church's credit in these matters are not heretics, we should believe them to be rash, imprudent, and irreligious.

These matters having been explained, the first, second, and third arguments are easily refuted. For what can be discussed concerning the last one, we shall explain at another time, on another occasion, if opportunity allows. Now this can briefly be said: that those who rashly and without discrimination defend every judgment of the Supreme Pontiff on any matter whatsoever undermine, rather than support, the authority of the Apostolic See; they overturn it, rather than confirm it. For, to pass over what has already been explained a little before in this chapter, what will he accomplish, disputing against heretics, whom they see take up the patronage of pontifical authority not from judgment but from passion, and who does not strive to draw out light and truth by the force of his own argument, but rather to bend himself to another's opinion and will? Peter has no need of our lies; he has no need of our flattery.

To approve or refute religious orders, then, since this depends not only on knowledge but also on prudence, does not pertain to those matters in which the Supreme Pontiff

cannot err. And already at the Lateran Council it was noted that the excessive multitude of religious orders — which we now see to be the case — greatly inconveniences the Church of Christ. The Council of Lyon too confesses that the importunate eagerness of petitioners extorted, against the synod's decree, the confirmation of certain religious orders. Whence it decreed that certain orders, even ones approved by the Apostolic See, were to be abolished as either harmful or useless to the Church, so that thereafter no one should be admitted to their profession.

And Celestine V confirmed, by his own privilege, the state and life of the Fraticelli; yet John XXII openly said that this privilege of confirmation was invalid, since Boniface, for certain rational reasons, had entirely nullified what Celestine had granted. Paul III likewise is said, by his letter, to have approved the order which Brother Baptista of Crema instituted in Italy; but recently that order has been rejected by public edict of the Venetians, and Baptista's doctrine, to which the men of that order adhered, has been condemned at Rome.

Weak, then, is the argument of those who, from such privileges — which are easily either granted, or rather extorted, in these times — assert that new religious orders are to be received no differently than if they had fallen from heaven, including even those which have no rule taken from approved ones, and profess none even of their own making.

Nor are privileges of this kind certain judgments of the Apostolic See, by which all the faithful would be bound. It will be enough if they have the same authority as decretal letters — of which it is established that several have been refuted by later, better counsel, since they did not proceed from a firm decree, but from the opinion of pontiffs.

And indeed, before the time of Saint Thomas, new orders were admitted so restrictively and with such gravity, that a probable argument of prudent counsel could be drawn from so weighty and solemn a judgment. But in our own present age, there are so many religious orders confirmed by the Pontiff, that whoever should wish to defend them all as useful or necessary to the Church would, with the best right and the weightiest of reasons, justly be charged with the name of imprudence, not to say folly.

But now this book on the authority of councils must be brought to a close — though first we should refute the attempt of those who have wished to launch an assault and an incursion against the most solid foundation of this topic.

Chapter VI

In which the Arguments of the First Chapter are Refuted

The first argument of the adversaries, then, is most readily refuted from what was said in the previous book. For we showed that the name "Church" is customarily applied to leaders and elders, and that the authority of the commonwealth resides in those whom the Holy Spirit has placed as bishops to rule the Church of God. And if the Church is the pillar and foundation of truth, the apostles too are the foundations of the Church, as is said in Ephesians chapter 2 and Revelation chapter 21. The strength and firmness of the body too depends on the head, and if you remove it, the body must necessarily collapse. But bishops are the heads of the peoples. And Peter is the head of the Church, as we shall demonstrate in the next book.

But, you say, bishops are uneducated. Valentinus and others like him once charged the holy presbyters with ignorance, not considering how much more valuable a devout simple man is than a blasphemous and impudent sophist — as Irenaeus says, book 5, Against Heresies. Sabinus too made this same objection against the Council of Nicaea, as is written in Tripartite History, book 2, chapter 8.

But the apostles too were uneducated; and yet through them God confounded the wise of this world. "Consider your calling, brethren," he says, "for not many wise... but God has chosen the foolish things of the world, to confound the wise." It is not on account of greater wisdom that the pastors of the Church are firm in faith and doctrine, but on account of Christ's special providence, lest, with pastors and teachers wavering, the people too should fluctuate, and be carried about by every wind of doctrine.

But what if bishops are not holy? Do they then lose the power of binding and loosing? Do they lack the authority to feed? "The scribes and Pharisees," he says, "have sat upon the seat of Moses: whatsoever they shall say to you, do; but according to their works, do not." Since it has been shown and made clear, both by very many others and especially by Augustine, that Christ's rays are poured into the Church even through wicked ministers, it would be superfluous to respond at greater length now to this argument, to which we have already abundantly responded before.

To what follows next, it is also not difficult to respond. For the deeds of the old priests were indeed contrary to Christ; yet the verdict of those otherwise wicked men was not only most true, but also most useful to the commonwealth. Indeed John the Evangelist attests that it was a divine oracle. For when, after a long and varied deliberation of the council, Caiaphas, who as high priest presided over the council, had spoken that verdict,

to which almost all consented — "It is expedient for us that one man should die for the people, and that the whole nation should not perish" — the Evangelist immediately added: "But this he did not say of himself; but, being the high priest of that year, he prophesied."

From this it follows that, although the lives and deeds of our own pontiffs may perhaps be contrary to the Lord Jesus, their judgments — those, namely, which have been approved by the Supreme Pontiff — will nevertheless be both true and useful to Christians, since they have been divinely instituted for the salvation of the people. Indeed they will be from the Holy Spirit, for that very reason we have learned from the Evangelist — namely, that they are pontiffs of the Church of Christ. On the second argument, then, enough.

The third argument is refuted thus. I deny that there is no covenant of Christ with the priests of the Church. For there is, first, one with Peter and the others who succeed him in the pontificate, as can be seen in Matthew 16 and Luke 22. Christ likewise promised the Spirit of truth to the apostles, and consequently to their successors, John 14, 15, and 16. The covenant of truth made with the Church, too, must finally be referred to the pastors and teachers of the Church. For God administers his Church no differently than he administers the world, where the lowest things are governed through the intermediate, the intermediate through the highest — as Dionysius taught.

Those ancient covenants and agreements, however, are far different from ours. For they were temporary, just as the law and the priesthood were. For the kingdom was taken away from the Jews, the law was taken away, the priesthood was transferred. The truth and authority of the priesthood, moreover, began to be undermined a little before the coming of Christ. For what becomes antiquated, ages, and is near its end must necessarily be weakened and become infirm. The prophets, then — especially those who were closest to Christ's coming — repeatedly announced to the Jewish people this collapse of the law, the truth, the authority, the priesthood, and the scepter.

If anyone should wish to apply their oracles on this matter to the Church of Christ, except in part, he is entirely ignorant of these: "You are a priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek." Likewise: "This is our God forever and ever, he himself will rule us forever." Likewise: "With everlasting mercy I have had mercy on you. Your Redeemer the Lord has said, as in the days of Noah, this is to me, to whom I swore that I would not bring floods upon the earth anymore; so have I sworn that I will not be angry with you, nor rebuke you: for the mountains shall be moved, and the hills shall tremble; but my mercy shall not depart from you, and the covenant of my peace shall not be moved."

Likewise: "I will make with the house of Israel and the house of Judah a new covenant, not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers... which they made void," etc. And a little after: "Thus says the Lord, who gives the sun for light by day... If these laws shall fail before me, then the seed of Israel also shall fail, that it not be a nation before me forever." Likewise: "I will make with them an everlasting covenant, and I will put my fear in their heart, that they not depart from me." Likewise: "I will strike for them a covenant of peace, it shall be an everlasting covenant for them."

And other similar passages in the New Testament: "He shall reign in the house of Jacob forever, and of his kingdom there shall be no end." "Behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the age." "I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Comforter, who shall abide with you forever, the Spirit of truth." "Upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." "This is the blood of the new and eternal covenant."

The general rebukes and threats of the Prophets, then, must especially be referred to the time of the Lord's Passion, as Jerome himself attests not once. What, then, does he mean when he applies all that was said against the ancient priests entirely to our own? Surely "all these things happened to them in figure, but were written for our admonition." Those things, then, which the Prophets rebuked in that ancient people pertain to us too — but with the distinction between Synagogue and Church preserved, so that the former is understood to be temporary, the latter perpetual. It is established, moreover, that without law and doctrine, without priest and teacher, without Christ and the Spirit of truth, the Church can in no way stand. Since this has already been explained abundantly enough in other places, it need not be repeated here in vain.

For ignorance of the ancient writings is harmful to the priests of the new law too, Jeremiah 3 and 23; Ezekiel 34; 2 Corinthians 3 and 4. But to which of the ancients was it ever said, "Upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell," etc.? And again, "I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail"? To which priests and pastors of the Synagogue, then, was the Spirit of truth promised, to remain with them forever and to establish them in all truth?

Jerome, then, is speaking neither of a council of priests, nor of all the pastors of the Church together. He applies the words of the Prophets to individual churches, and to private pontiffs and priests; he says nothing about the catholic Church and either her priesthood or her truth.

But this might move someone — what is written in Isaiah chapter 22: "I will expel you from your station, and remove you from your ministry... And I will call my servant

Eliakim, the son of Hilkiah, and I will clothe him with your tunic, and strengthen him with your girdle, and I will give your power into his hand; and he shall be as a father to the inhabitants of Jerusalem, and to the house of Judah. And I will give the key of the house of David upon his shoulder; and he shall open, and there shall be none to shut; and he shall shut, and there shall be none to open. And I will fasten him as a peg in a sure place, and he shall be for a throne of glory to his father's house," etc. That this was prophesied concerning the transfer of the priesthood of the old law into the new priesthood of Christ cannot be doubted. But what follows seems contrary to our sense: "The peg that was fastened in the sure place shall be removed, and shall be broken, and shall fall; and that which hung upon it shall perish, for the Lord has spoken." For if Christ the Lord, who is fastened in the Church like a peg, should be removed, and those who hung from him in faith before should later perish and fall — how do we promise the Church perpetual firmness in faith? How also do we assert that Christ will always be present to the pastors of the Church?

Jerome, in his commentaries, resolves this by referring it to the last days, when the charity of many will grow cold, and this will apply: "Do you think the Son of man, when he comes, will find faith on the earth?" This, as we said in the previous book, is not to be understood as though no Church will exist then at all, no faith of Christ, no mystical body of the faithful, no spirit of truth in that body — all of which would conflict with the Sacred Letters themselves — but rather, by the usage of the Scriptures, what is the smallest in comparison with other things is said to be nothing at all. To such a degree, then, will the number of the faithful be diminished in those days, that Christ will seem to have been removed from the midst of the Church. But their teacher will not fly away from those few who remain; Christ will give pastors and teachers even at that time too: "He gives them, until we all come into the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fullness of Christ." For we who live, who remain at the Lord's coming, shall come together, and shall be together with the Lord. The Church, then, and her appearance and form, will endure until the end of the age; and Christ, and the Spirit of truth, without whom she cannot stand, will accordingly endure with her. And Jerome refers that prophecy of Isaiah's to Christ according to the anagogical sense. For he had already explained the historical and literal sense in book 5 of his commentaries. But from the anagogical sense no certain argument can be drawn.

It must also be carefully considered, indeed, that those prophetic rebukes are not to be turned against all the pastors and priests of that time in such a way that no one is understood to be excepted. For it is permitted to preachers to express what touches most

people as though it touched all. Thus that whole people is sometimes rebuked by Isaiah, as though no soundness were found in it from the sole of the foot to the crown of the head. And yet this same prophet admits that some righteous men were left, saying: "Unless the Lord of hosts had left us a seed," etc. Thus Elijah inveighs against everyone, as though he alone were left; but the divine response says to him: "I have left myself seven thousand men, who have not bent their knees to Baal."

But on the third argument we have already said a great deal. For it could also have been abundantly refuted from what was answered in the previous book.

To the fourth, I respond, first, that the authority of councils does not rest on that testimony. For Christ does not seem, in that passage, to be establishing anything in advance about the councils of the Church, but rather to be commending the agreement of unity, which has great power for obtaining what is asked.

But if, on account of Innocent (distinction 20, chapter "De quibus") and on account of the Sixth Synod (action 17) and on account of the Council of Chalcedon, in its letter to Leo, that passage is understood as referring to synods, we can answer otherwise: that just as a council is gathered in a prince's name when it is declared by his authority, so too an ecclesiastical synod is gathered in Christ's name when it is convened at the declaration of Christ or of his vicar. Councils, then, which take place apart from the authority of the Roman Pontiff, need not have Christ in their midst. Such was that synod of Cyprian's. Although not even all righteous men, who gather together even in Christ's name, although they have Christ in their midst, always have this effect — that they can determine and hold the truth of the question proposed. But if the matter is necessary for salvation, this will be granted to them by the heavenly Father — that they will either be approved by him in whose name and authority they are gathered, if they have spoken the truth, or instructed, if they have not spoken the truth. For this is enough, for their prayers to be said to have been heard, according to the prescribed testimony of Matthew.

The points that follow, however, are Calvin's frivolous slanders, which are not worth the effort to answer. For I think I have already satisfied the first; the second we have answered both in the third question of the previous chapter, on the final argument, and in the last chapter of the third book, on the fourth argument. But on the fourth argument, this much.

Now, on the fifth, the response is already before our eyes from what has been said. For the Council of Rimini was gathered, against the will of Pope Liberius, by the work of heretics, as is related in the ecclesiastical history, and in Damasus's letter to the African bishops, and in distinction 15, chapter "Sancta Romana," from Gelasius. The Second

Council of Ephesus too, although gathered on Leo's authority, was corrupted by Dioscorus's threats and favors, with the Pontiff's legates and certain other good men resisting. Thus it was never confirmed, but rather condemned by Leo and the Council of Chalcedon. The Council of Constantinople, finally, was gathered against the wishes of the Pontiff of the Church, and was afterward rejected at the Seventh General Synod of 367 fathers, who gathered at Nicaea.

From this point, those are manifestly refuted who think that, while retaining the authority of a council, the Supreme Pontiff's need not be upheld. For what reason is there why the First Council of Constantinople, of 150 fathers, should be held as though one of the Gospels, while this other Council of Constantinople, where there were far more bishops, should be held as nothing? Surely the strength of councils comes from him for whom Christ prayed, that his faith might not fail, so that he could strengthen his brethren in faith. But more on this in the next book.

Now let us dissolve the sixth argument, in which there is no small question as to whether the Trullan canons have ecclesiastical authority.

That they do is urged by these arguments: first, that Gratian repeatedly cites these canons under the name of the Sixth Synod, as is evident in distinction 16, chapter "Placuit," and chapter "Quoniam," and "On Consecration," distinction 1, chapter "Iacobus," and "On Consecration," distinction 2, chapter "Didicimus," and question 27, the first question, chapter "Si quis episcopus." The Sixth Synod, however, without doubt has ecclesiastical authority, as we shall demonstrate shortly. Catholics, then, ought to approve the Trullan canons.

Then, this can be urged from Innocent III, "On the Age and Quality of Ordinands," chapter "A multis," which says it was established at the Sixth Synod that, if any of those approaching the clergy wished to be joined to a woman by marriage, he should do this before the order of subdeaconate. This is established to be canon 6 among the Trullan canons.

Moreover, Pope Adrian approves and receives these canons, and the synod from which they were issued, as can be seen in distinction 16, chapter "Sextam," and "On Consecration," distinction 3, chapter "Sextam." It is not permitted, then, for a catholic to doubt the Trullan canons.

Fourthly, this same point is shown from the Seventh Synod, action 3, where Tarasius says: "I receive the rightly and divinely issued decrees and handed-down canons of this same Sixth Synod." And in action 4, Bishop Peter said: "I have a codex containing the

canons of the Sixth Holy Synod." But the most holy Patriarch Tarasius added: "What is this ignorance under which very many labor concerning these canons? For it is a scandal to doubt whether they belong to the Synod."

And in action 6, Epiphanius, who was responding on behalf of the synod to the Iconoclasts, says: "The holy Sixth Synod, after it had pronounced its verdict on the one will of Christ under Constantine, gathered again unanimously, all of them, by divine will, after four or five years, and issued one hundred and two canons." But if those canons were issued by the fathers unanimously, by divine will, they are certainly approved by the testimony of the Seventh Synod too. And this same Seventh Synod says: "The holy fathers of the Sixth Synod defined that an assembly should be held throughout each individual province once a year. This canon, then, we too renew." Those fathers, then, had the authority to settle matters, and, if they were holy, as is said here, they usurped nothing for themselves against the rules of the Church. But if that council was gathered apart from the verdict of the Roman Pontiff, it is established to have been gathered against the ecclesiastical rules; this Trullan synod, then, has solid authority, if we believe the Seventh Synod. To this is added the fact that the Seventh Synod, actions 5 and 6, Nicholas, in his letter to the Emperor Michael, and the Council of Florence, session 5, make use of the authority of these canons.

But to me, considering this matter more carefully, the contrary opinion has generally seemed both more probable and weightier. Of this opinion I have as authorities Anastasius, librarian of the apostolic see, in his proem to the Eighth Synod, to which he came at Adrian II's command — for he was most skilled in both the Greek and Latin tongues, as is said in distinction 63, chapter 2.

Of this same opinion is Theophanes, the Greek historian, and Humbert of Silva Candida, apostolic legate of Leo IX, in his little book against the letter of Michael, patriarch of Constantinople. This book is cited by Gratian as the book of Leo IX against the letter of Niketas the abbot. But that these canons are not received by the Latins is also related by Theodore Balsamon and Matthew the monk, the greatest detractors of the Latins — the former in his interpretation of these same canons, the latter in his history of the councils and of illustrious men.

There are, moreover, irrefutable arguments confirming this opinion. First, that the Sixth Synod, gathered under the Emperor Constantine against the Monothelites by Agatho, and approved by Leo II, issued no canons at all. But there is no reason at all why that synod, which was afterward gathered under the Emperor Justinian, should be called the "Sixth Synod." But I will not dwell on the name. I assert only this: that neither the

Roman Pontiff nor his legates were present at that council. Let the bishops' subscriptions be examined, and the matter will become manifest. Justinian subscribed first, then the bishops who had attended the Sixth Synod, but neither equal in number nor entirely the same in name, as Theophanes and Anastasius have proven; but of the Roman Pontiff or his legates there is no subscription at all.

The second argument is that Justinian is read to have gathered a synod at Constantinople twice — first under Sergius the Roman Pontiff, later under John VII, this same one too being a Roman bishop. And of the former, Bede, On the Nature of Things, chapter 67, says: "Justinian commanded that Sergius, Pontiff of the Roman Church, be deported to Constantinople, because he had refused to favor and subscribe to his erratic synod, which he had held at Constantinople; he, however, on account of the fault of perfidy, was afterward deprived of the glory of the kingdom, and went into exile in Pontus." Thus far Bede. And Platina, in the Life of Sergius, says: "Justinian held a synod, in which certain things were approved that by no means agreed with orthodox faith. The legate of Sergius, who was then at Constantinople, also far too foolishly confirmed these same things by his own subscription. But when these decrees, brought afterward to Rome, were rejected by Sergius, Justinian, struck with anger, sent Zacharias, who dragged Sergius bound to him." Thus far Platina.

Of the latter occasion, this same Platina writes thus in the Life of John VII: "Justinian, troubled by the same folly he had had before he lost his empire, sent two metropolitans to Rome to Pope Sergius, to urge John, having held a synod, that, what the Easterners believed about the homousios, the Westerners too should affirm the same — with little books proposed, in which he was to subscribe. The Pontiff, however, sent the men back to the emperor with the matter unaccomplished." Thus far he.

And if anyone should wish to weigh the words of the Trullan council, he will immediately perceive what kind of council it was. For it runs thus: "Since the holy universal synods, the fifth and sixth, in disputing most fully on the mystery of the faith, did not produce canons, we therefore, gathering in this Imperial city, have written sacred canons. For it was fitting that a universal synod should promulgate ecclesiastical canons." Thus far the council.

But first: if you gathered in the city of Constantinople, tell me, at whose summons did you gather? Did some Roman bishop declare a council for you? By no means at all. But the Roman Pontiff, at that time, was certain, was catholic — I add also, was upright. To gather the primates of the Church without the will of the ecclesiastical leader — true, catholic, and pious — this is not to wish to make a synod, but to conspire against the

leader of the Church. Just as, if the chief men of a kingdom should gather to handle public affairs without the king's judgment, this would be reckoned a conspiracy rather than an assembly. "Justinian," you say, "made them gather." You report this excellently, indeed, for it has been handed down to memory that this man was wicked, and an enemy of the Roman Church. What kind of synod, then, shall we suppose proceeded from such a man?

But let us hear the reason for holding the assembly: "Since the holy universal synods, the fifth and sixth, made no canons, we therefore, gathering in this Imperial city, have written sacred canons. For it was fitting that a universal synod should promulgate ecclesiastical canons." Thus this Trullan synod is said to be a supplement of the two earlier ones, and to have added, surely, what was lacking from the fifth and sixth. For this reason, they say, it is not properly numbered as the sixth synod either, but is called penthekte, that is, "fifth-sixth." Namely, the Trullan synod first wanted to sell itself under the name of "the sixth synod," but now it is neither the sixth, nor the fifth, nor the seventh, but some kind of monster, the "fifth-sixth."

But who could tolerate this — that these fathers accuse two of the gravest councils, as if mutilated and incomplete, so that the cause for assembling might seem necessary? Indeed, the Church has not had even one general council where there was no cause of either heresy or schism. This Trullan synod alone is the one that is gathered not to crush a heresy, not to remove a schism, but to issue canons. What need was there, then, to stir up the pastors of all the churches from their own seats, so that, after almost innumerable canons — Apostolic, Nicene, Ancyran, Neocaesarean, Antiochene, and those of very many other martyrs and confessors, which are approved in the second Trullan canon — another one hundred and two should be issued by these fathers? How much more weightily, on the other hand, did the Sixth Synod act, which, once the cause of faith for which it had assembled was resolved, did not wish the Church to depart burdened with canons?

It was not necessary, then, to establish canons; but, if you wish to admit the truth, there was another reason for your assembly under Justinian — namely, to attack the Latins, and especially the Apostolic See, and, as Platina says, to approve, by some authority of your own, things by no means in accord with orthodox faith. For if, as you yourselves say, you gathered at Constantinople four or five years after the Sixth Synod was completed, under Justinian, son of Constantine (calculate the dates), this is that very erratic synod to which, according to Bede, Sergius refused to subscribe.

But let us now see — setting aside the rest, which do not now exist — why Sergius neither wanted nor indeed ought to have subscribed to these one hundred and two canons of yours.

In the second canon, you receive and confirm 85 canons of the Apostles; the apostolic see did not receive these, as Isidore attests, distinction 16, chapter "Canones." This can also be shown from Leo IX, chapter "Clementis," the same distinction, and even more from Gelasius, distinction 15, chapter "Sancta Romana." Why, then, should the apostolic see approve canon 84, which you approve, where the three books of Maccabees are admitted, contrary to the consensus of all the churches?

And in this same second canon, you approve Cyprian's synod on the baptizing of heretics, as though that law had been established according to a custom handed down to the Africans, and were not rather opposed to all the churches of God. For Cyprian's decree cannot be explained according to the norm of Trullan canon 95 and Nicene canon 19. Since Cyprian's canon was prescribed concerning heretics universally, especially the Donatists, who are established to have baptized in the name of the Trinity. Cyprian's decree, then, having been simply rejected by the universal Church, Sergius ought not to have approved it — which the Trullan synod did.

In the third canon, you call the law of the Roman Church on not ordaining men twice married "supreme right," and austere out of strictness, while you consider the laxness and dissolution of the see of Constantinople "kindness." You compose, as it were, a middle way from the two, but such a way as the Latin Church has always rejected. Rightly, then, did Sergius reject this synod of yours.

Canon 13 commands that subdeacons, deacons, and presbyters not be separated from their legitimate wives. This custom indeed prevailed among the Greeks, but a general synod wrongly prescribed it for the whole Church, against the usage of the Latins. Well, then, did Sergius reject your canons.

In canon 36, you decree that the throne of Constantinople should obtain equal privileges with the Apostolic See, and be preferred to those of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. You know that this canon was once contested by the holy Pope Leo. And although it was contested by reason, the succeeding Roman Pontiffs were unwilling to contradict this ambition and vanity of Constantinople.

In canon 62, you prescribe that, on all the days of Lent, except the Sabbath and the Lord's day, no new hosts be consecrated, but that, as among us on the day of preparation (Good Friday), there be a sacrifice of the previously consecrated elements. Prescribe this

to your Greeks, if you wish; for the Roman bishop would not approve this decree for the whole Church.

Now canon 55 needs no refutation from us at all, for it is absurd in itself, and manifestly injurious to the Roman Church. Let us hear it: "Since we have learned that, in the city of the Romans, on the holy days of Lent, they fast on the Sabbaths, contrary to the handed-down ecclesiastical custom, it has seemed good to the holy synod that, in the Church of the Romans, if anyone be found fasting on the Sabbath, let the clergyman be deposed, the layman be excommunicated." Does this canon seem to you likely to be approved by any Roman Pontiff? By no means at all.

What of canon 67? See whether it should be approved: "Sacred Scripture commands us," they say, "to abstain from blood and what is strangled. Rightly, then, do we condemn those who season the blood of any animal whatsoever by some art, and so eat it." But what greater ignorance of the Scriptures could there be, than to think that this Apostolic precept lasted down to those times? How much more truly have the Latins interpreted the decree of Jerusalem, as far as concerned blood and what is strangled, as remaining in force only for a brief time, for as long as the custom of the Jews and Gentiles was still being merged, and for as long as the Church was burying the Synagogue with a certain honor.

Let Gratian, then, take his leave, and attribute the Trullan canons to the Sixth Synod. Innocent, however, cited Gratian's decree under that same name by which it had been cited by Gratian — which has also happened, at times, to Saint Thomas and to other learned men too, that, trusting in Gratian's diligence, they cite chapters of the decree under false authors and titles. The same happened to Gregory IX too, who, under the title "On Constitutions," cited as Jerome's the commentary on Proverbs which is certainly not Jerome's.

That chapter, however, which Innocent cites is found in distinction 32, chapter "Si quis eorum," under the name of the Sixth Synod. But that Adrian received the Trullan canons is so far from the truth that nothing could be more contrary to truth. For those words are found in Tarasius's letter to Adrian, not, as Gratian, lapsing in memory, supposed, in Adrian's letter to Tarasius. Tarasius, then, received them, not Adrian, as is evident in actions 2 and 3 of the Seventh Synod. Adrian, indeed, cites Tarasius's words, in order to pierce the Constantinopolitans with their own blade: "For if," he says, "you confess that those canons are divine and legitimate, and yet by canon 82 you concede that an image of Christ is to be venerated, why do you now fight against sacred images?"

But if the Seventh Synod uses one canon to prove, by the testimony of the Greeks themselves, that images are to be venerated, what argument is thereby produced that it approved the other canons as well? As if Paul confirmed the whole of Menander, Aratus, or Epimenides, because he sometimes used their testimonies. Nor are those words, which we have cited from the Seventh Synod, the words of the synod itself, but of Tarasius, of Bishop Peter, of Epiphanius. It was not for that time and occasion to weigh these matters. For the question being settled was not whether the Trullan synod should be approved, but whether images should be venerated. Wherefore, those things which were said in passing, and outside the matter at hand, by private men at the council, were wisely passed over in silence by the fathers, lest new disputes should arise — and especially since, on the chief cause about which there was controversy there, they gladly made use of the authority of the Trullan synod.

Lest we seem to invent this, Nicholas must surely be cited as an authority, who, in his letter to the Emperor Michael, when he wished to use a certain canon of this Trullan synod to urge a particular point, discusses the matter in this manner: "It is plainly known that the Synod of Constantinople prohibits this in the sixth chapter of its canons — a chapter, however, which is not found among us, but is reported to be held among you. But we know, instructed by the Apostolic teachings, to use even the sayings of pagans, much more so those of Christians — and against these same men too, whose life we do not follow, nor do we imitate their erroneous mind. For the apostle Paul placed certain things from the books of the pagans in his own writings; must everything, then, that has been brought forward together with these, also be received?" Thus far Nicholas.

It is not the case, then, that if Innocent, or the Seventh Synod, or Nicholas, or the Council of Florence make use of the authority of these canons, they thereby approved the rest, having approved one or another. Although it entirely escapes me that the fathers of the Council of Florence cited these 102 canons. For what is related in action 5 was drawn not from the synod where these canons were issued under Justinian, but from the Sixth Universal Council under Constantine, his father, as is evident from action 17 of this same Sixth Council. But since this latter synod too was celebrated at Trullo, the imperial palace, what is said of this council has, through error, been believed to pertain to the Trullan canons.

Their authority I have undermined for this reason: lest anyone, deceived by a false error, should oppose them to true and legitimate councils. I see, however, that it could be doubted why, among the other canons contrary to the Roman Church, we have not also noted canon 82, where it is forbidden that Christ should thenceforth be painted in the figure of a lamb. But I did not wish to attack these Trullan rules in a hostile spirit. I deny,

then, that anything of this kind is forbidden in canon 82, according to the true reading. Rather, in it, that venerable image, in which the lamb is shown by the finger of the forerunner, is both received and ordered thereafter to be preserved in the Church. This can be gathered from Adrian's letter to Tarasius, Seventh Synod, action 2, and from action 4 of this same Seventh Synod. On the Trullan canons, then, and accordingly on the sixth argument, this much.

In the seventh argument, the stubborn contention of Pighius must be exposed, who, in order to defend an opinion he had once adopted, proceeded to undermine, with vain conjectures, councils received by the Church's decree. So much can a zeal for contention, once it has boiled over, and stubborn obstinacy, accomplish.

It is not necessary for me, here, to fight on behalf of the Sixth Synod, whence the controversy arose — a synod which Agatho convened, and Leo II confirmed, which Bede too, On the Reckoning of Time, chapter 65, and other catholics after him approved, which the Council of Florence too, session 5, receives, and Eugene IV, in his decree on the union of the Jacobites, venerates. Let others publish an apology for the Sixth and Seventh Synods, if Francis Turrianus's diligence does not yet satisfy them. For we assert the authority of councils in dogma of faith and in decrees necessary for the salvation of the faithful; we do not assert it in matters of historical judgment and order. Nor do we spend time and effort on matters which concern us little or, certainly, not at all.

To the eighth argument, then, Cajetan, in his treatise on the authority of the Pope and councils, chapter 8, responds that the Council of Constance, at the time it issued that decree, was not universal and complete. For there was then a schism in the Church under three pontiffs, John XXIII, Gregory XII, and Benedict XIII. Whence to assert that, at that time, that council was general is nothing other than to revive the old schism, and to condemn the others who followed Benedict and Gregory — a matter which was, and always remains, ambiguous.

But if you object that Martin V, in the final session, approved all and each of the decrees in matters of faith which had previously been issued by the Council of Constance, this same Cajetan responds that what properly pertains to faith, and is approved by Martin as a decree of faith, is what had been defined against heretics — as was done in sessions 8, 15, and 21. That Martin approved only these is plain, first, because that approval was made at the request of the orator of the king of Poland, who demanded only this — that the acts of the council against heretics be confirmed.

It is also plain, because Martin says he approves everything done in this conciliar manner — and not otherwise, nor in any other way. For he supposed that certain things had not been done in this conciliar manner. For in that fourth and fifth session, as this same Cajetan notes, no disputation or inquiry had yet taken place, nor had learned men yet been chosen to discuss and treat what was to be established in the doctrine of faith; rather, this was provided for afterward by the council in session 6. Thus, if anyone carefully weighs what was handed down in session 4, he will find that these do not have the form of a decree, by which the faithful would either be bound, or those holding the contrary opinion would be rejected. It is plain, finally, from the letters of Martin V, in which the errors of John Wycliffe, John Hus, and Jerome of Prague are expressly condemned, with no mention made of the question whether a council is above the Pope. But since the points generally doubted concerning the Council of Constance are most excellently explained by the disciples of Saint Thomas, especially by Cajetan, a most distinguished man in our own order, we shall not say a single word on this matter beyond what has already been said. On the eighth argument, then, this much.

In the ninth, indeed, I marvel at the blindness of those who wish to defend the Council of Basel, since it is manifest that, although at first gathered with Eugene IV's consent, it was afterward transferred by this same Eugene, first to Ferrara, then to Florence, where the attempts of the Basel party were repressed by the public authority of the Church. For the union of the Armenians and the Greeks with the Christian people, approved by consent, was effected not at the Council of Basel, but at the Council of Florence. And the Church considered Eugene the true Pontiff even after that sentence of deposition by Basel, while it despised that Felix elected at the synod.

What use, then, is there in stubbornly clinging to the Council of Basel? What use in favoring heretics, who contend that the judgments of councils against heretics are weak, because the Council of Basel condemned, under the name of heresy, those who are even now judged catholic? Whoever does not perceive this seems likely to perceive nothing at all. Wherefore I do not doubt that it is now a great sacrilege to wish to stand for the Council of Basel, since that schism, now extinguished, could be reignited by no method more effectively than this.

And Nicholas V clearly thinks that this Felix was not a true pastor of the Church, but merely a nominal one. Nor does he call it a true and general council, but one gathered under the name of a general council. Eugene, however, his predecessor, he calls "of happy memory," more honorably. Thus, in his letters, he approves only the conferrals of benefices and similar things, customarily spoken of in this way — matters which, if held invalid, would cause the people great inconvenience through changing pastors or

officials.

And Leo X, at the Lateran Council, session 11, plainly defines that the Council of Basel was not legitimately celebrated. And afterward, when a certain decree issued by the Council of Basel was under discussion, he says: "Just as Leo caused those things which had been rashly done against justice and the catholic faith at the Second Council of Ephesus to be afterward revoked at the Council of Chalcedon, so we cannot, with safe conscience and the honor of the Church, be held back from revoking so wicked a decree — since all those things, after the transfer of this same Council of Basel made by Pope Eugene IV, of happy memory, our predecessor, were done by the Basel conciliabulum, or rather conventicle, and therefore could have had no force at all. Since it is manifestly established, not only from the testimony of Sacred Scripture, the sayings of the holy fathers, and the decrees of other Roman Pontiffs, but even from the very confession of these same councils, that the Roman Pontiff alone, as having authority over all councils, has full right and power of declaring, transferring, and dissolving councils." Thus far the Lateran Council. He proves, moreover, what he had said, with many testimonies and examples, which we have omitted, lest we be too lengthy.

But the doctors of Paris appealed against the Lateran Council, and an appeal circulates under the name of the academy. Whose this was, I do not dispute here; I assert only that it circulates not without scandal and harm to the Church. There is an anathema of Pius II against those who appeal to a future council. And, setting aside the reasons Pius gave at length in his own letters, it is manifest that this is the chief refuge of all heretics, and opens a very great window for the ruin of ecclesiastical obedience and the harm of true piety. But it is not for this occasion or time to discuss this.

But you object that what was decreed in the second session of the Council of Basel was decreed by a legitimate council, as is evident from Eugene's letters, which were read at session 16 of this same council. But to this question we respond briefly: that Eugene did not approve the decrees issued, but only that the general Council of Basel had been legitimately continued from the time of its beginning. Then, in the second session, the council was not full, since the greater part of the bishops was absent — indeed, very few were present. Wherefore it was indeed general in its beginning, but was not yet, in fact, truly and perfectly general.

Moreover, the legate proceeded to issue those decrees without commission, as is gathered from Eugene's letters to Julian. Add that, since there had always been a grave and difficult disagreement among Catholics — some saying the Pope is above the council, others, on the contrary, asserting that the council is above the Pope — without any

inquiry made, without any preceding examination, that which was doubtful was simply asserted. Wherefore it was not a decree of faith, but a simple recollection of that doctrine which had been handed down at the Council of Constance. Seeing this, the partisans of this synod, again, in session 33, treated this same matter differently, defining it as a decree of faith to be embraced thereafter. But by then all the legates' power had been abolished, and the synod transferred to Florence. It is no wonder, then, if it erred shamefully and childishly, condemning as heretics those who are now, without controversy, held to be faithful.

To the tenth argument, the response is most easy: that plenary councils not confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff are corrected by other legitimate and approved ones. But that a plenary council confirmed by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff is corrected by another, later one — not even one example can be produced.

For Augustine does not undermine councils of this kind, but defends them, in this same book, chapter 4. Although Augustine does not seem to be speaking of a correction of faith, but of a correction of laws, which pertain, namely, to facts either already done or to be done. "The earlier plenary councils themselves," he says, "are corrected by the later ones, when some practical experience reveals what was closed." This can scarcely be applied to the truth of faith, which does not become known through practical experience. Certain laws, then, in which councils can err through imprudence, can certainly be corrected by later councils, without obstacle. To this Isidore too may be answered in the same way. For we need not explain each point separately.

To the eleventh, we have often said that those councils which are complete, and perfected with the authority of the head, are the ones we vindicate from error. Nor, if the Supreme Pontiff is a firm judge in a cause of faith, are councils gathered in vain. For first, as we noted in the previous chapter, the Roman Pontiff does not, rashly and foolishly, but with consideration and wisdom, settle controversies of faith — namely, by summoning counselors, whether more or fewer, according to the gravity of the matter under discussion.

For the fathers of a council assist the faith and doctrine of the Supreme Pontiff. Whence, at the council of Jerusalem, when a great inquiry had been made, and Peter had spoken his opinion, supported by no testimony of the Sacred Letters, James approved it, indeed, but by adding testimonies of the prophets. He also added, as if of his own accord, a most necessary law concerning abstaining from things sacrificed to idols, fornication, what is strangled, and blood. For divine providence so pours itself into the Church, that, though the chief members themselves depend on the head, they nevertheless support and assist

the head as well.

A council also makes the faith more plausible to the people, on account of the most well-received testimonies and judgments of many. For the people accept laws, which are asked for and passed by the common consent of the chief men, more willingly than if they were issued by the king alone. Wherefore Bede, in his retraction on the Acts of the Apostles, wisely noted that Paul conferred with the other apostles concerning the Gospel he preached among the Gentiles, carefully inquiring at the council whether he was teaching correctly on the cessation of the legal observances — "not that he himself," he says, "doubted anything about this matter, but so that the minds of the doubting might be strengthened by the apostolic synod's authority."

Gregory, however, was speaking of provincial synods, which could scarcely accomplish anything at all in a cause of faith, unless they were strengthened by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff. This Gregory had experienced; the other point he had not experienced. Although, even at that time, the usefulness of the Nicene council was not yet sufficiently established.

On the final argument, it is difficult to speak. I see what theologians generally think. This much, however, can truly be said: that this Roman council under Nicholas spoke in a manner far more accommodating to the sense of the faithful. Let us first hear the council's words, and afterward weigh whether they are true or false. "I profess," says Berengarius, "not only the sacrament, but also the true body of Christ, to be handled by the hands of the priests, broken, and ground by the teeth of the faithful." This is the form of confession prescribed for Berengarius by the synod. Here, on one point, there can be doubt — whether the body of Christ, by reason of the sacramental species, is truly said both to be handled and to be broken. On the other point, there can be no doubt — that Christ himself, in himself, is neither handled nor broken by the priests.

And others will perhaps say, each according to his own judgment; we, however, at this time, and on this question, shall chiefly follow Thomas Waldensis, who, in his book On the Sacraments, title 4, chapter 42, teaches that such forms of speech are both most true, and were also formerly used by the fathers. He cites, on this point, Dionysius, chapter 3 of his book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. He also cites Chrysostom, on Matthew, homily 83. And he had also cited, in the previous chapter, Paschasius, in his book On the Body and Blood of Christ.

Indeed, the faithful, when they have seen the sacramental species, testify that they have seen Christ, and that, when they have touched these, they have touched him. This is certainly a strong argument for why we should believe this to be so. "You draw this," you

say, "from the common run of the faithful." I feared you would say "from pimps." Unlearned Christians discourse in this manner. You report this excellently indeed. For, in a question of faith, the common sense of the faithful people produces no light conviction. For I ask you: when we dispute among ourselves about matters of the Christian faith, not about the dogmas of philosophy, ought we rather to seek what the philosophers and pagans think, or what men instituted in Christian doctrine and faith think? Especially since even the ancient fathers have agreed with this opinion, as has been shown a little before.

Moreover, when the sacramental species are moved, this is something nearly agreed upon among the more learned, that Christ too is moved — by accident, indeed, but nonetheless moved: nothing, then, prevents the body of Christ from being both seen and touched, when the species are seen and touched. For not even substance itself can be perceived by the senses, except through accidents. But this — that, when the species of bread and wine are mixed, the Church confesses that a mixture of the body and blood of the Lord occurs — therefore, when the species are seen and touched, the body of Christ is both seen and touched. What more is needed? Thus I have persuaded myself, thus I believe: that the body of Christ has so succeeded into the place of the bread, that, apart from those things which conflict with the faith of this sacrament, it claims for itself everything that the bread previously claimed by reason of its accidents.

Otherwise, he who would eat the species of bread would not eat the body of Christ, nor would he who drinks the species of wine drink the blood. And yet it is written: "Take and eat, this is my body." And again: "He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood..." And again: "He who eats unworthily eats judgment to himself, not discerning the body of the Lord." But if the flesh of Christ is eaten in the sacrament, it is certainly broken and ground by the teeth of the faithful. For both qualities are joined to, and proper to, that food which we eat. What of the fact that, through Luke — if the reasoning of the Greek language is taken into account — the Lord says, "Take, this is my body, which is broken for you"? Nor should Saint Thomas's fourth book of the Sentences be objected against us, since, in Part III, question 77, the seventh part, reply to the third argument, he was indeed the chief author of this very opinion of ours — and who would not prefer him to six hundred Oecolampaduses?

On the final argument, then, we have said enough, and accordingly enough on the fourth point as well. Let us pass on, then, to what follows.

Book VI

On the Authority of the Roman Church, which is Contained in the Fifth Position

Chapter I

In which the Arguments are Set Forth by which the Authority of This Topic is Attacked

We have come to that topic, extending far and wide, which theologians, especially the younger ones, are accustomed to treat abundantly, because not only the authority and weight of the Apostolic See, but indeed its entire force and power, though always attacked by heretics, is much more vehemently assailed in this present time by the Lutherans, whose stubborn contention and eternal hatred is directed against the Roman Church.

But I shall not pursue the endless questions concerning the power of the Roman Pontiff; let us look only at the authority of his dogmas. I do not wish to proceed confusedly, so let us explain in this disputation what is being sought. We shall, then, first set forth the arguments of those who attack this topic; then we shall establish the force and authority of this topic, together with the Catholic Church; after this we shall dissolve the adversaries' arguments. If this discourse should be longer, when compared with the magnitude of its usefulness, it will perhaps even seem shorter. Those, then, who proceed to weaken this topic accomplish this, as it seems to them, by these arguments.

The first argument. First, John XXII publicly taught that the souls of the just do not see God until the day of judgment, and took care that no one at Paris should obtain a degree in theology, unless he had first sworn to this opinion. The Supreme Pontiff, then, and accordingly the Apostolic See, can err in faith.

The second argument. Second, Celestine III defined that, when one of the spouses falls into heresy, the marriage is dissolved, as is evident "On Divorces," chapter "Quanto." Concerning this Hostiensis affirms that Celestine's decretal letter was once held in the body of law. Celestine, then, erred in faith, for that definition is contrary to the Gospel.

The third argument. Third, Alexander III, "On the Betrothed of Two Men," chapter "Licet," asserts that certain of his predecessors judged that, if, after a marriage contracted by words of present consent but not yet consummated, a new marriage is consummated, the first is dissolved and the second is valid. This error, however, is without doubt manifest in faith and morals.

The fourth argument. Fourth, this same Alexander III, chapter "Cum esses," "On Testaments," defines that it is foreign both to the general custom of the Church and to divine law and the institutions of the holy fathers, that testaments should be entirely rescinded unless confirmed by the subscription of five or seven witnesses. But it is established that civil law, which invalidates such less solemn testaments, is approved by churchmen today. Alexander, then, was mistaken in faith, in that he pronounced some law to be contrary to the divine, which is in fact not contrary.

The fifth argument. Fifth, Innocent I, in his letter to Rufus and Eusebius, chapter 1, says: "We recognize that those who married widows have attained the highest priesthood. That this is contrary to the precepts of the law, no one is ignorant, since Moses proclaims: let the priest take a virgin wife; against which precept, resting on divine authority, no defense is offered except your custom, which has proceeded from ignorance." And Innocent III, chapter "Per venerabilem," "Which children are legitimate," having cited a certain law of Deuteronomy, says: "Indeed, since Deuteronomy is interpreted as 'the second law,' it is proven by the force of the word that what is decreed there ought to be observed in the New Testament." But that we are bound to observe the decrees of the Old Law is contrary not only to the Council of Florence, but even to the Sacred Letters themselves.

The sixth argument. Sixth, Nicholas III, in the Extravagant "Exiit qui seminat," "On the Meaning of Words," decrees that Christ the Lord, both by word and by example, taught the renunciation of ownership of all things, both individually and in common. John XXII teaches that this is erroneous, in the Extravagant "Cum inter nonnullos."

The seventh argument. Seventh, Nicholas, in his response to the inquiries of the Bulgarians, cited "On Consecration," distinction 4, chapter "A quodam Judaeo," defines that, if anyone is baptized in the name of Christ, he ought not to be rebaptized. The opposite of this Pope Pelagius determines, in his letter to Bishop Gaudentius, cited in the same distinction, chapters "Multi" and "Si re vera," both of which chapters are taken from this same letter. And Pope Zacharias agrees with Pelagius, chapter "In Synodo," the same distinction. Either Nicholas, then, or Pelagius, decreed falsely on a question of faith.

The eighth argument. Eighth, Saint Gregory, in a certain letter to Augustine, Archbishop of Canterbury, and Gregory III too, in his letter to Bishop Boniface, pronounced, on the authority of the Apostolic and Roman Church, that if a woman is afflicted with some infirmity, and is unable to render the marital debt to her husband, the husband can indeed take another wife, on this condition, however, that he not withdraw the help of support from his former spouse. But that a husband can leave a

wife who, through infirmity, is unable to render the debt, and pass to a second marriage, is contrary to evangelical and apostolic doctrine, as Gratian says, question 31, the seventh question.

The ninth argument. Ninth, Gelasius, against Eutyches and Nestorius, defines that, in the Sacrament of the altar, even after consecration, the substance of the bread and wine remains. This is foreign to the catholic faith.

The tenth argument. Tenth, the Roman Pontiffs have often falsely expounded the Sacred Letters. For, to pass over those passages which Cajetan cites in his little work of 27 questions, the last question, certainly Pope Gelasius, with a council of seventy bishops — and this is cited under the name of Pelagius, distinction 21, chapter "Quamvis" — and Anacletus, distinction 22, chapter "Sacrosancta," prove that the Roman Church is preferred to the rest by that evangelical voice of the Lord Savior: "You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church." This same view is established to have been held by very many other Pontiffs too. It seems ridiculous, however, to wish to bend the evangelical testimony to this sense.

In the same manner, very many Supreme Pontiffs, to prove that the greater causes of the Church are to be referred to the Roman See, cite that from Luke: "I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail." How inept this is, they say, is clear from the very fact that there the Lord was speaking to Peter alone, not likewise to his successors. For he adds: "And you, once converted, strengthen your brethren." If these words are referred to his successors — namely, the Roman Pontiffs — it would necessarily follow that they had first been averted, in order that, once converted, they might strengthen their brethren.

Since, then, the Roman bishops falsely interpret the Sacred Letters, they can be deceived and deceive in a dogma of faith. For from a correct understanding of the Sacred Letters true dogmas are derived, but from a crooked one, false ones.

The eleventh argument. Eleventh, if the Apostolic See could not err in faith, this would rest chiefly on Peter's privilege, Luke 22: "I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail." But Peter's faith did fail, according to what Ambrose says: "Peter became more faithful, after he wept for having lost his faith." Much more, then, could the rest of his successors err in faith. As indeed Anastasius certainly erred, distinction 19, chapter "Anastasius." Honorius too erred, as is defined in the Sixth General Council of Constantinople, actions 13 and 18.

The twelfth argument. Finally, Jerome, in his letter to Evagrius, when the custom of the Roman Church was objected to him, says: "If authority is sought, the world is greater than the city. Wherever a bishop may be, whether at Rome, or Constantinople, or Alexandria, he is of the same merit, and of the same priesthood. The power of wealth and the humility of poverty do not make a bishop either higher or lower. Moreover, all are successors of the apostles. Why, then, do you bring forward to me the custom of one city? Why do you claim for the laws of the Church the small number from which arrogance has arisen?" Thus far Jerome.

And Ambrose, book 3 On the Sacraments, chapter 1, when the Roman custom was set against him, says: "In all things I desire to follow the Roman Church; but we too, nevertheless, are men with our own understanding; therefore, what is more rightly observed elsewhere, we too rightly maintain. We ourselves follow the apostle Peter; to this what does the Roman Church respond? Peter the apostle himself, indeed, who was a priest of the Roman Church, is our authority for this assertion."

But if Jerome and Ambrose easily reject the institutions of the Roman Church, there is certainly no reason why we should be bound to follow the prescribed rule of the Apostolic See in matters of custom. This is all the more so since the Trullan Synod, canon 55, asserts that the Roman Church fasts on the Sabbaths of Lent contrary to the handed-down ecclesiastical custom, and corrects this custom of the Roman Church, which had grown up contrary to canon 65 of the apostles.

By these arguments especially certain men contend that this topic is weak. For they believe that the Apostolic See can err, even when it judges on a question of faith. Among the Parisians, Gerson and Almain are held as the chief authors of this opinion. Adrian follows this same opinion, in the fourth book of the Sentences, "On Confirmation," the last question. And Thomas Waldensis, book 2, Doctrinale of the Ancient Faith, chapter 19, seems to follow this same view, although in his book On the Sacramentals, doctrine 10, he thinks quite differently. Gratian, distinction 19: "This, however, must be understood," seems also to assent to this same opinion. Nor does Cardinal Torquemada, book 4, part 2, chapter 16, appear foreign to this view — although, in book 2, chapters 109 and 110, he both held and demonstrated the contrary opinion.

Erasmus gladly embraces this, on Jerome's letter to Damasus on the term hypostasis. Indeed, in his book On the Method of True Theology, he says that those who teach that the Roman Pontiff cannot err, whenever he pronounces on morals or faith, open a window to the ruin of true piety. To this Luther subscribes, to this the Wycliffites, and indeed all heretics most gladly subscribe.

Chapter II

In which the Reason is Given Why the Apostolic See Occupies the Fifth Position

I am about to expel this opinion of theirs from the theological academies, and shall accomplish this, I hope, by the force of my arguments, if they are weighed with sincere minds, contention and hatred being set aside — for these usually blind every judgment.

But, so that the great error of this opinion may be understood more evidently, let us imagine in our mind that Luther is one man alone, against whom our pen here is sharpened. For a multitude of erring men does not lend patronage to error. Let him, then, be the first and only one who dares to affirm that the Supreme Pontiff and the Roman Church, in deciding controversies of faith, can err against the Gospel. Unless I prove this to be erroneous with more certain arguments than Catholics prove either that purgatory exists, or that papal indulgences rest on divine authority, this authority of mine, however small it is, will be at risk before the readers. But I show this better, if, for establishing this topic on a firm foundation, I lay its foundations more deeply.

But first, however, why we have made this the fifth topic must be briefly explained. For there will perhaps be some to whom a more fitting order would seem to be, if the previous topic, in which the authority of Councils is contained, had preceded this one. Even if they are mistaken in their conjecture, I nevertheless see what follows from it — namely, that, the authority of the Apostolic See being removed, any councils whatsoever would not only waver, but fall; but that the Apostolic See, of itself, even without councils, has its own authority; the authority of the Apostolic Church is, then, prior to that of Councils. Nature, however, commands that each thing preserve its own proper place, just as each element has its own proper place — that the earth hold the lowest, water flood this, the higher aether be given over to it, and fire occupy the highest region. To which we briefly reply that we, having regard for human understanding, often disregard the order of nature. For it is characteristic of men, as Aristotle repeatedly noted, to proceed from what is more familiar to what is less known. Wherefore, since the authority of Councils is more welcome and better known to most people, it is no wonder if we have set it before the natural order.

Besides, Councils represent the Church, and it was not sufficiently in keeping with order to separate catholic Councils from the catholic Church. Rightly, then, have we made Councils adhere to the Church. But enough on this. Let us now pursue what has been proposed.

Chapter III

Contains Three Pronouncements by which it is Established that Peter's Firmness in Faith Also Extends to His Successors

Although I am not unaware how displeasing the scholastic form of disputation is to some, I ought nevertheless not to undertake another method of disputing than that which I have understood to be approved by the most distinguished men, and which I have always judged most fitting for refuting every error. Certainly, what Augustine argued against the adversaries of the Church, although discovered more sharply and expressed more subtly than everyone could readily grasp, is nevertheless judged all the more apt for defeating heresies, the more finely it has been cut to the quick. Intending, then, to demonstrate that the Apostolic and Roman See cannot err in faith, I have, in the manner of the schools, three propositions to set forth, on which the hinge of this question turns.

The first proposition: that Peter the apostle was instituted by Christ as shepherd of the universal Church. This is openly proved by that testimony in John: "Feed my sheep." For he who did not distinguish between these sheep and those showed that a fold which did not recognize Peter as shepherd was foreign to his own — as Innocent, "On Majority and Obedience," chapter "Solitae," and Bernard, book On Consideration, to Eugene, chapter 6, most evidently argue. Nor can it be doubted that this care pertained especially to Peter, whom the Lord, before entrusting the sheep to him, questioned — not once or twice, but even a third time: "Simon, son of John, do you love me more than these?" Where he not only expressed Simon's own proper name, but also added the designation of his father, lest Peter's power could be evaded by any ambiguity, or perversely twisted to apply to another. And this same point is declared again from another testimony in Matthew: "Blessed are you," says the Lord, "Simon Bar-Jona, because flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven. And I say to you, that you are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth," etc. Where it must be noted, first, that although all the disciples had been asked, with the rest keeping silent, Peter alone answered. Then, it must also be noted that Christ preserved Peter's old name, saying, "Blessed are you, Simon," and added also his father's name, lest the words could be referred to the Canaanite. He also gave him a new name, which was not common to Peter with the other apostles, but proper to him. "And I say to you" — he says, not to John, not to James, but to you: "you are" — not merely "are called," but "are" Peter, that is, "rock." Whence also, in John chapter 1, he was called by the Lord "Cephas," that is, a huge rock or cliff, suitable for supporting a great building. "And upon this rock," he says, "I will build my Church" — that is, upon you, O

Peter, as Hilary explains on Matthew, Ambrose, sermon 47, on the faith of Peter, Cyprian, in his letter to Quintus, Jerome, book 1 Against Jovinian and on Matthew, and in a certain letter to Marcella, and on Isaiah chapters 2 and 16 (although in a certain sermon on Pentecost he explained it differently), Chrysostom, homily 55 on Matthew, Cyril, book 2 on John, chapter 12, Origen, homily 1 on Matthew and homily 5 on Exodus, Theophylact, on Luke 22, Gregory, in a certain letter to the Emperor Maurice and in another to Eulogius, bishop of Alexandria, book 6, letter 37, Leo, sermon 2 on the apostles Peter and Paul. And also, in his letter to Flavian, he says: "Peter has drawn solidity both of virtue and of name from the principal rock"; and in letter 67, to the bishops of the province of Vienne, he explains this more openly — distinction 19, chapter "Ita Dominus." Tertullian, book On the Prescription of Heretics, Epiphanius, in his book Ancoratus, Dionysius likewise, in his letter to Timothy, says that Peter was called by Paul the foundation of the Churches. And the Council of Chalcedon calls Peter the rock and the base of the catholic Church, and consequently confesses that the catholic Church was built upon Peter. Nor does it escape me that Augustine, on John, the last homily, and On the Words of the Lord, homily 4, seems to concede that this is true. But in book 1 of his Retractations, chapter 21, he does not reject this common opinion of the saints. Nor indeed could that opinion be rejected, which is approved not only by the Supreme Pontiffs, but also by Councils, as will be evident from what we shall say afterward.

But there is no need to illustrate a matter otherwise most clear with the aid of external lights. For why does the Lord say to Simon, son of John, "You are Petros" — that is, "rock" — unless it is that we should understand, since he immediately adds, "and upon this rock I will build my Church," that Peter himself is the very one upon whom the Church was to be built?

Since, moreover, what corresponds, by metaphor, to the foundation of a house is, preserving the analogy of the body, the head, it is manifestly gathered that Peter, as the head of the Church, is also its foundation. Why, indeed, should we shrink from the name "head" applied to Peter, if we cannot deny that he was the ruler of Christ's sheep? For the rulers of a people are called "heads," Amos 6; and Saul, since he was king, is called "head of the people," 1 Kings 15. But Bucer seeks testimonies of the fathers, and denies that Peter was ever called head of the Church by anyone. He denies this most impudently. For Evaristus, Alexander, the first of this name, Pius I too, Callistus I likewise, Gregory, Athanasius, Chrysostom, the fathers of the Council of Chalcedon, of the Seventh Synod of Constantinople, not obscurely called Peter and his successors the head of the Church. Their testimonies we shall cite a little further on. Let us confess,

then, that Peter was established by Christ as head, foundation, ruler, and shepherd of the universal Church. For all these are so bound together, that if you remove one of them, the rest must necessarily be removed too.

But in Clement's sixth book of Constitutions, it says: "Peter, James, and John, although they were preferred by Christ before almost all others, nevertheless did not claim for themselves the glory of primacy, but established James, who was called 'the just,' as bishop of the apostles." Peter, then, was not, for Clement, shepherd of the universal Church. Such testimonies, indeed, heretics hunt for here and there, so as to cast darkness over light. Dionysius, chapter 3, On the Divine Names, says Peter was the supreme glory and pillar of the theologians. Eusebius, book 2 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 14, writes that Peter was the most approved and the greatest of all the apostles, and the chief of the first men by the magnificence of his faith. Epiphanius, Heresy 51, affirms that Christ chose Peter to be the leader of his disciples. Leo, in his letter to the bishops of Vienne, says that the Lord willed that the sacrament of the evangelical office belong to the office of all the apostles in such a way that he principally placed it in the most blessed Peter, chief of all the apostles.

To these — for it would take too long to enumerate the others — to these, I say, so many and such fitting witnesses, heretics do not give credence; and they wish us to believe Clement alone, who says James was established as bishop of the apostles. James is recognized as bishop of Jerusalem; he is not recognized as bishop of the apostles. Although the apostles, for the sake of edification, when they were at Jerusalem, indeed deferred greatly to James — so that, by this example, later bishops might conduct themselves as subjects in another's church. But it is well that Clement does not assert that the Lord established this, but rather that the apostles did so out of modesty. We, however, in this first proposition, assert that Peter was instituted by the Lord as shepherd of the catholic Church.

Since Cajetan, in his little book On the Authority of the Pope and of the Council, and more fully still in another, On the Primacy of the Roman Church, has shown this with very many and very great arguments, let it suffice for us to have demonstrated it briefly.

The second proposition: that Peter, when he taught the Church or strengthened the sheep in faith, could not err. This is shown, first, from that testimony in Luke 22: "Simon, Simon, behold Satan has desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat; but I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail; and you, once converted, strengthen your brethren." Behold: when the Lord had said, "Satan has desired to have you," he does not say, "I have prayed for you" (plural), but "for you" (singular); nor did he say, "and

you, once converted" (plural), but "you, once converted, strengthen your brethren" (singular). Since Christ's prayer, however, as Paul attests, was always heard, that which Christ prayed for, he certainly obtained — namely, that Peter's faith would not fail, so that he could strengthen his brethren in faith.

Then, that passage of Matthew 16 also demonstrates this: "Upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." Explaining these words, Origen, homily 1 on Matthew, says: "It is manifest, even if not expressed, that the gates of hell shall be able to prevail neither against Peter nor against the Church. For if they prevailed against the rock on which the Church was founded, they would likewise prevail against the Church." Peter, then, stood firm in faith, lest the structure built upon him should collapse.

Moreover, if the keys not of one heaven, but of the heavens, were given to Peter for a special reason and privilege, as Origen noted, homily 6 on Matthew — and the keys open the heavens — it follows that they remove all obstacles to the heavens. But, on the part of the intellect, ignorance of faith impedes entrance into the heavens, just as, on the part of the will, a depraved affection does. Power was given to Peter, then, no less for removing ignorance than for removing sins. Whatever, then, he had loosed and whatever he had bound, whether they pertained to the intellect or to the affections, these would have been bound and loosed in the heavens.

Wherefore Peter could, by his own right, resolve difficult questions of faith, and could accordingly bind, by his own judgment, so that the faithful should hold what he himself decided. But the faithful cannot be bound by a false judgment concerning faith. But if divination is in the lips of the king, and his mouth shall not err in judgment, as is said in Proverbs 16, why should we suppose that Peter, established by God as prince of the kingdom of heaven, could err in the most weighty judgment concerning faith? And if Caiaphas, an impious man in the Synagogue, since he was high priest of that year, nonetheless prophesied because he was high priest, shall we not much more believe that Peter, given by Christ as Supreme Pontiff of the Church, was moved by the divine Spirit to determine the truth?

If, finally, Peter was established by God as shepherd of all the faithful, he was thereby made the supreme teacher and master of the Church. But if he did not give the sheep of Christ pastures of wholesome doctrine, and could instead feed them with false and pernicious errors, surely this would not have been provided for by Christ for his Church. But it was without doubt provided for, unless Peter himself deceived us, saying: "Men and brethren, you know that from the earliest days God chose among us, that through

my mouth the Gentiles should hear the word of the Gospel, and believe." Christ, then, chose Peter especially among the rest, so that the Gentiles, in a controversy of faith, would not only hear him speaking, but would also believe. Thus, when Peter had pronounced his opinion, the whole multitude was silent, agreeing with Peter's decision, as Luke relates in Acts 15.

The third proposition: that, upon Peter's death, it is by divine right that there be one who succeeds him in this same authority and power. For since Christ's sheep would exist all the way to the consummation of the age, it would be foolish indeed to think that Christ gave the perpetual flock only a temporary shepherd. What the Lord, then, in instituting the pastoral office of the Church, conferred upon the first shepherd, he is understood to have conferred, ordinarily, upon any successor whatsoever — as Cajetan, On the Primacy of the Roman Church, chapter 12, has most learnedly proven. Moreover, the kingdom of Christ was to be everlasting; therefore the leadership of the Church too was not temporal — which has also been proven in the previous book. Otherwise, if Peter's power was not transferred to his successors, we would not recognize the power of the other apostles as transmitted to succeeding bishops either. Thus there would now be no power at all in the Church, either of bishops or of priests — which is a manifest error in faith.

Bernard, too, in his letter to Eugene, book 2, chapter 6, uses this same testimony of Exodus in confirmation of this matter: "Be to the people, in those things which pertain to God, that you may show the people the ceremonies, the rite of worship, and the way in which they must walk. But provide, from all the people, able men, who may judge the people at all times. But whatever is greater, let them refer to you, and let them themselves judge only the lesser matters. If you do this, you shall fulfill the command of the Lord." Having heard these things, Moses did all that Jethro had suggested. But if it is established that Jethro's counsel was both excellent and most necessary for the Synagogue — that there should be one supreme judge, to whom the greater causes and questions should be referred — it is by no means likely that Christ the Lord lacked such counsel, which was equally necessary for the Church. This power, then, was not conferred by the Lord on Peter alone, but passed on to his successors as well, unless God had greater care for the Synagogue than for the Church.

This point is confirmed especially by that other testimony of the Old Law, which Innocent III used, chapter "Per venerabilem," "Which children are legitimate": "If you see that a judgment among you is difficult and ambiguous, and you see that the words of the judges are varied within your gates, rise up, and go to the place which the Lord your God shall choose, and you shall come to the priests of the Levitical line, and to the judge who

shall be at that time, and you shall inquire of them, and they shall declare to you the truth of the judgment. And you shall do whatever they shall say, who preside in the place which the Lord shall choose, and shall teach you according to his law, and you shall follow their sentence, and shall not turn aside to the right hand or to the left. But he who shall be proud, unwilling to obey the command of the priest who at that time ministers to the Lord your God, by decree of the judge that man shall die, that no one henceforth swell with pride."

In these words, this must first be noted: that not just any causes at all were to be referred to the metropolitan judge and the high priest, but the more difficult ones, too difficult to be resolved by the authority of lesser judges. Then it must also be noted that this supreme tribunal, from whose sentence, according to the norm of the law, there was absolutely no appeal, indeed had its own senate of Levites and priests, but that there was one first judge, and one high priest, who alone is signified to have authority in rendering the verdict: "But he who shall be proud," it says, "unwilling to obey the command of the priest who at that time ministers" — or "presides in ministering," as the Seventy translated. And again: "By decree of the judge that man shall die." It does not say "of the priests and judges," but "of the priest and the judge."

Nor should this be passed over — that the Lord does not command that a council be gathered from the whole Synagogue, but commands that a council of priests and Levites be employed, who would always be present, as a senate, to the high priest, in the mother city. For since it was ready at hand that such questions and controversies would repeatedly arise, a tribunal that was prepared and easily accessible was needed — which would not be the case, if a council had to be frequently gathered from the entire Synagogue to settle all such controversies.

But not even this must be neglected — that the lawgiver absolutely prescribes that, after the judgment of the presiding priest, all should yield to his opinions. "You shall do," he says... "and you shall follow their sentence, and shall not turn aside to the right or to the left." Nor does the lawgiver prescribe this unjustly, since beforehand, to reassure the disputants, he had promised that the judgment of that senate, to whom the consultation would be referred, would be the truth. "Who shall declare," he says, "to you the truth of the judgment."

But, says Bucer, these things will be true only if the judgment is pronounced according to the law. For so Moses says: "You shall do whatever they shall teach you according to his law." Here, first, I would like to recall these men, since they often do this against us, to the Hebrew truth. For the Seventy translated it this way: "You shall do according to

the word which they shall announce to you from the place which the Lord your God shall choose. And you shall diligently observe to do according to all that shall be enjoined upon you: according to the law and according to the judgment which they shall tell you, you shall do." And Sanctes Pagninus rendered it thus: "You shall do according to the word of the saying which they shall announce to you, and you shall keep, doing according to all that they shall teach you. According to the word of the law which they shall teach you, and according to the judgment which they shall tell you, you shall do." Here Moses does not command that they believe the priests only if they judge according to the law, but rather that whatever the priests teach be held as the law.

Otherwise, if it were permitted to those recurring to the senate on a controversy of law and religion to seize upon this pretext, no such question would ever be settled. For there would always remain room for doubt as to whether the priests spoke according to the law — a doubt for which no judge was appointed. But this has already been disputed elsewhere, sufficiently, I think, and with diligence. Now, however, we deal only with this: that God, even after the times of Moses, for as long as the Synagogue would exist, instituted a single supreme tribunal of the High Priest, upon whose judgment all private citizens, and even the lesser judges, would depend. What, then? Did Moses provide for the Synagogue, and did Christ not provide for the Church? Do we wish that, in these days, there be no judge in Israel, but that each person do and think whatever seems good to him? "We want," they say, "the liberty of the Gospel." But is it liberty for a city to have no one to govern it? Is it liberty for a ship to be left to the waves and winds without a helmsman?

It would be liberty, as someone has said, for there to be no teacher in a school, no head in the human body, no mind in a man — but everything thrown into confusion and mixed together by mere desires, according to whim. But not even beasts would want this, whose interest it is to have shepherds, by whom they are led into pastures and defended in these from the injury of wild beasts. Not, then — to return to our proposal — is one household left without a paterfamilias, one city without a ruler, one fold without a shepherd, once Peter has died; but there is someone who succeeds him in the authority of ruling and feeding the sheep.

But if you object that no fit argument is drawn from a type and a figure, remember that those things which, in that ancient people, pertained as a kind of outline to that people's own appearance and order ought to be referred to the appearance and order of the Church. Nor do we argue from figure and type, but from the lesser to the greater, by an evident reasoning. For it is incredible that the Synagogue should have had, with God as author, a judge and senate for settling controversies of faith, law, and religion, while the

Church has none — especially since this is much more necessary for the Church. Since she has arisen from such varied nations, languages, dispositions, and institutions, she must necessarily have more and graver controversies concerning faith and religion. If the leader of this commonwealth cannot settle these, then indeed the form and appearance of the Church is most shameful, and her lot much worse than that of the Synagogue.

But, setting aside the comparison between the Church and the Synagogue, the authority fitting for the leader in each society is certainly prescribed by its end. For equal authority does not befit every ruler; but one kind is fitting for a paterfamilias, another for a prefect, another for a king — and for each of these, as much as will be necessary for the end of that particular society. Thus we must grant to a paterfamilias that authority which right reason and doctrine prescribe as necessary for the end of domestic cohabitation — since, in one house and under one roof, where human nature varies and the duty of each person differs, life could not otherwise proceed at all. So great, then, is the authority which the Supreme Pontiff, instituted by Christ, has in the Church, as is necessary for keeping the citizens of the Christian commonwealth in faith, religion, and duty.

Controversies concerning faith and religion, however, must necessarily arise among us; and if no judge is given by Christ for settling these, to whom every such question could finally be referred, there would be endless and perpetual dissension, and as many and as discordant opinions concerning faith and religion as there are heads in the Church, and as different as they are numerous.

For these reasons, if the Church's unity, charity, and fellowship must be preserved, it is certainly necessary that Christ left one leader, who, no differently than Peter, could settle the disputes of those in disagreement and resolve their questions. For we see that it befits the leader of any other society too, if some controversies arise among its members — especially ones properly pertaining to that society's end — to be able to settle them, with the aid of the counsel of the elders and the prudent.

And, indeed, this third proposition was defined at the Council of Constance. For, in session 8, that error of Wycliffe's is condemned: "The Pope is not the immediate and proximate vicar of Christ." And, in session 15, the seventh error condemned is of this kind: "Peter was not, and is not, the head of the holy catholic Church." And the thirteenth: "The Pope is not the manifest and true successor of Peter." And the twenty-seventh error: "There is not a spark of appearance that there ought to be one head governing the Church in spiritual matters, one who should always be conversant with, and preserved together with, this same Church militant." And in the bull of Martin V, presiding over this same Council: "Whether he believes that the canonically elected

Pope, whoever he shall be for the time being, is the successor of Blessed Peter, having supreme power in the Church of God."

Nor was this at all new; rather, the Church has always recognized one Supreme Pontiff and shepherd of the whole Church, succeeding Peter. And if all the rest of the power granted to Peter — whether for remitting sins, or for whatever other offices are necessary to the Christian commonwealth — pertains not to Peter alone but to his successors, certainly what was said: "Upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it"; and again: "I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven"; and likewise: "Feed my sheep"; and, finally: "I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail" — must be referred to the Supreme Pontiffs who succeed Peter in the Church. The privilege of not erring in faith was, indeed, granted to Peter for the benefit of the Church. For this reason, when Christ had said, "I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail," he immediately added: "And you, strengthen your brethren."

These matters have been stated, then, in general; now, in particular, those points that pertain to this controversy will be explained more clearly.

Chapter IV

In which it is Shown that the Roman Bishop is the One Who, by Divine Right, Succeeds Peter Both in Firmness of Faith and in Settling Controversies of Religion

It follows that we should teach that the Roman See is the one where Peter's solidity and authority have, by God's design, been placed. Since this has been denied, not only impudently by heretics, but even imprudently by some Catholics, we must strengthen it with the greatest diligence. For it is not easy to overturn an opinion so diligently founded and constructed, though less than truly — if indeed it deserves to be called an "opinion," when it can be refuted by such certain arguments.

And indeed, on this matter, although much has been said by Cajetan, both in other places and especially in his little book On the Primacy of the Roman Church, yet, either on account of a certain inherent obscurity of style, or perhaps because it is read less attentively by most people, it has not yet persuaded learned and intelligent men; so it will be necessary for us to discuss these same matters again. These points, perhaps, will be explained more sparingly, since a wealth of language can scarcely be applied to them. Nevertheless, on the greater and more difficult matters to expound, whatever is said clearly is said excellently and admirably.

Intending, then, to explain this arduous topic, I shall first do so with witnesses, whose cited testimonies will leave no room for doubt. I do not wish, however, to burden the reader with as many testimonies as possible, but shall cite only the weightiest and clearest. I shall begin with the Supreme Pontiffs themselves, whose clear and certain judgments on this matter exist. These will be cited simply, without repeated interjections like "he says" and "he states."

Anacletus, in his first letter, "On the Oppression of Bishops": "The more difficult questions and greater causes are to be referred to the Apostolic See: since the apostles established this, at the Savior's command, that the greater and more difficult questions should always be brought to the Apostolic See, upon which Christ built the universal Church, as he himself said to the blessed prince of the apostles: 'You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church.'" And in his third letter, "On Patriarchs and Primates," he explains what he understood by "the Apostolic See," in these words: "This most holy Roman and Apostolic Church obtained its primacy not from the apostles, but from the Lord Savior himself, and has attained an eminence of power over all the Churches and the whole flock of the Christian people, just as he himself said to the blessed apostle Peter: 'You are Peter,'" etc.

Evaristus: "Doubtful matters are to be referred to the Apostolic See as to the head." Evaristus, indeed, said this to the bishops of the African region, when they consulted him on a question of faith. He also said that they, in this, followed the norm of the fathers. From the very beginning of the Church, then, the Roman Pontiff has been recognized as the master of the faith — which was Peter's proper office.

Alexander, the first of this name, in his letter to all the orthodox: "To the summit of this holy and Apostolic See, the settlement of the greatest causes, and the business of all the Churches, was entrusted by the Lord himself, as to the head." He proves this by this same testimony from Matthew: "You are Peter," etc.

Sixtus I, to the churches of Gaul, and Eleutherius, to these same churches, affirm that it was established by the holy apostles that the judgments of bishops be referred to the Apostolic See. Namely, because the greater causes of the Church, etc.

Pius I, in his letter to all the churches: "The Lord ordained that this holy Apostolic See be the head of all the churches, saying to Peter, prince of the apostles: 'You are Peter,'" etc.

Victor, in his letter to Theophilus, defines that the causes of all the bishops have pertained to the Roman bishop since the time of the apostles; and he proves this by this testimony: "Whatsoever you shall bind," etc. He also cites, on this point, an institution of

the apostles, in which the Roman See is called "the universal Apostolic Church." Sixtus II too cites this same apostolic canon, under the name of "the Church," to this same effect.

Zephyrinus, in his letter to the Sicilian bishops: "The greater causes of the Church are to be settled by the Apostolic See, and by no other, just as the apostles established," according to this: "Whatsoever you shall bind," etc.

Marcellus, to the bishops of the province of Antioch, confirms this same point from that: "You are Peter," etc. He also asserts that, by divine command and apostolic tradition, the greater affairs of the Church are to be referred to the Roman Church, as to the head.

Eusebius, to the bishops of Campania and Tuscia, having affirmed that the Roman Church was endowed with Peter's privilege, adds: "The first salvation is to guard the rules of right faith, and to deviate in no way from the fathers' establishments. Nor can the sentence of our Lord be passed over, who says: 'You are Peter,' etc. And these things which have been said are proven by the effects of history. For, in the Apostolic See, the catholic religion has always been preserved without blemish."

Melchiades, in his letter to the bishops of the Spains: "The Lord entrusted the privilege of judging bishops to the blessed key-bearer Peter alone, in his place. This prerogative he grants to his See, to be inherited by future times — a privilege which has been established, without doubt, to be preserved from the times of the apostles, and remains untouched to this very day, lest the members should ever be at variance with their own head, and schisms should arise."

Mark, to Athanasius: "The holy Roman Church, which has always remained immaculate, both by the Lord's providence and by the help of the blessed apostle Peter, shall remain in the future firm and immovable against every insult of heretics. This is the living tradition of the apostles. This is the holy Apostolic mother Church of Christ of all Churches, which, through the grace of Almighty God, is proven never to have erred from the path of apostolic tradition, but remains untouched to the end, according to the very promise of the Lord: 'I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail.'" By this same testimony, Lucius too proves the same, in his response to the inquiries of the Gallic and Spanish bishops, as does Felix, to Benignus.

Julius, in his letter to the Eastern bishops: "The rights of convoking councils, and the greater causes, ought, by evangelical and apostolic institutions, to be referred to the Apostolic See. This was defined by the holy apostles and their successors; this was defined by the Nicene Synod." This Pontiff, moreover, brings forward, to confirm this,

the testimony of Christ cited also by others: "You are Peter," etc., as well as that reasoning — lest the members be at variance with their own head.

This same Julius, too, in his letter to the bishops gathered at Antioch, says: "The holy Roman and Apostolic Church, the Lord himself fittingly addressed, saying: 'You are Peter,' etc. For it has power granted to it by a singular privilege, and consecrated by the Lord's own mouth, and exalted from above. And, just as blessed Peter was the first of all the apostles, so too this Church, consecrated in his name, by the Lord's institution, is the first and head of the rest, so that the greater causes of the Church are referred to it, as to their mother and summit."

He also asserts that it was defined at the Nicene Synod that neither councils should be celebrated in any way, nor bishops condemned, apart from the judgment of the Roman Pontiff, to whom the greater business of the Churches was handed down by the Lord himself, by special privilege. He cites, in confirmation of this matter, chapter 18 of the Council of Nicaea, in these words: "Let all bishops, in graver causes, freely appeal to the Apostolic See, and take refuge in it as in a mother, to whose disposition the ancient authority of the apostles has reserved all the greater ecclesiastical causes."

He cites again chapter 19 of this same Council of Nicaea, in these words: "Although it is permitted for the neighboring bishops of the province to examine the cause of an accused Pontiff, it is nevertheless not permitted to define it without consulting the Roman Pontiff, since it was said to the blessed apostle Peter by none other than the Lord himself: 'Whatsoever you shall bind upon earth,'" etc. Behold: the Council of Nicaea not obscurely asserts that the power given by the Lord to blessed Peter has been transmitted to the Roman Pontiff.

Nor does it matter that these chapters are not now found in our copies — both because Julius himself testifies, under a solemn oath, that they were held in the archives of the Roman See (and Julius, the first of this name, who gives this testimony, was a man of upright and uncorrupted faith); and because he was writing this letter against those, very many of whom had themselves been present at the Council of Nicaea, so it could by no means seem likely that he would cite canons against those who could easily prove they had been invented by the Pontiff; and because Athanasius, too, and the Pontiffs of the Egyptians of Thebaid and Libya, in their letter to Felix, who were also present at this same Council, attest to this: "We know," they say, "that it was established with the agreement of all at the great Synod of Nicaea, that Councils ought not to be celebrated, nor bishops condemned, without the verdict of the Roman Pontiff."

They also relate, in this same letter, that such chapters, and many other necessary ones, were burned by heretics and taken away from us. This same canon, too, under the name of the Council of Nicaea, was cited at the Sixth Synod of Carthage by Faustinus, Philip, and Asellus, legates of the Apostolic See, from the letters of Pope Zosimus. Athanasius too, in his letter to Pope Mark, attests that there were 70 chapters of the Council of Nicaea — which Mark himself, writing back to him, plainly confirms. And Pope Felix, in his letter to the Egyptian bishops, complains that heretics had expunged those chapters we are now discussing. But Pelagius too, distinction 17, chapter "Multis," says — this being what we are trying to prove — that the holy Synod established this, namely referring to the Nicene one. This was also expressed by Innocent I, to Victricius or Victorinus, chapter 3, and by Leo, to Theodosius the Younger. There can be no doubt, then, that our present opinion was defined by the Council of Nicaea, as Pope Julius asserted.

Damasus, to the bishops of the three African Councils: "It is not permitted for the highest causes to be settled without the authority of the Roman See, and it is not catholic for a Synod to be held without its authority. Nor are any Councils read to be ratified, that have not been supported by Apostolic authority. For the Apostolic See, established firm and immovable by God, is the foundation of all bishops and the summit of the Churches, upon which Christ built the universal Church; for he says: 'You are Peter,' etc." See the same author too in his letter to Prosper and the other orthodox bishops of Numidia.

Innocent I, in his letters to the two Councils of Carthage and Mileve: "Rightly do you consult the mysteries of the Apostolic See, following the form of the ancient rule, which you know has always been observed throughout the whole world, especially whenever a question of faith is under discussion."

In short, since it would be most tedious to relate everyone's words, this same point is confirmed by Leo, letter 54, to Anastasius, and letter 67, to the bishops of the province of Vienne; by Gelasius, to the Emperor Anastasius, and in the decrees which he issued with 70 bishops, and in his letter to the bishops of Dardania; by Vigilius, in his decrees, the last chapter; by Pelagius II, to the bishops who had assembled at the city of Constantinople; by Saint Gregory, in his letter to Augustine, bishop of the English, and by many other Pontiffs; whose testimonies you have in distinction 12, chapters 17, 19, 20, 21, and 22; and distinction 80, chapter "Urbes"; and distinction 96, chapter "Bene"; and question 24, the first question, in many chapters; and question 25, the first question; and "On Elections," chapter "Significasti"; and "On Privileges," chapter "Antiqua"; and "On Baptism," chapter "Maiores"; and "On Elections," in book 6, chapter "Fundamenta"; and

in the Extravagant "Unam sanctam." This Extravagant the Lateran Council under Leo X noted and approved.

Since, then, all the bishops succeeding Peter in the See of the Roman Church have asserted, with unanimous consent, that the solidity of faith conferred on Peter pertains to the Roman Pontiffs, as to his legitimate successors — certainly, if the rule of Irenaeus is true, that whoever denies this denies the authority of the Church itself.

This was a fitting reason why, if any Churches fell away from the Roman See, they were never received back into ecclesiastical unity by the Supreme Pontiffs except under this form of confession: "The first salvation is to keep the rule of right faith, and to deviate in no way from the establishments of the fathers. And since the sentence of our Lord Jesus Christ cannot be passed over, who says: 'You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church' — and these things which have been said are proven by the effects of history, since, in the Apostolic See, the catholic religion has always been preserved without blemish — we anathematize all who raise their necks against the holy Roman and Apostolic Church, following in all things the Apostolic See, in which is the whole and true and perfect solidity of the Christian religion; and we profess that those separated from the communion of the catholic Church — that is, those not agreeing with the Apostolic See — their names are not to be recited among the sacred mysteries, namely those who strive to nullify the privileges of the holy Roman and Apostolic Church."

This form of confession Boniface II prescribed in his letter to Eulalius, bishop of Carthage; John, bishop of Constantinople, followed this same form, when the Church of Constantinople, which, under Acacius, had fallen away, was reunited to the Roman Church. Pope Hormisdas sent this same form to the bishops of Spain, so that, if any coming from schism should demand ecclesiastical communion from them, they should be admitted according to this form of profession. Pope Adrian, finally, gave this same form to the Eighth General Synod. It ought, then, to be sufficiently persuasive, unless we are very obstinate indeed, that Peter's authority and firmness are situated in the Roman See.

Chapter V

In which This Same Conclusion is Shown by Manifest Testimonies of the Ancient Saints

Nor indeed should those be heeded who criticize and mock our citing here the testimonies of those whose judgment, as though in their own cause, the adversaries could, rightly and with best justification, reject. For this was not the private cause of the Roman Pontiffs, but the common cause of the Church and of all nations. And among these witnesses some were Latin, others Greek, some Spanish, some African, some Gallic and German — men for whom, in most cases, the cause of the Roman Church was not only not their own, but was even a foreign one. There were also, among these, very many men so grave and upright in doctrine, life, and morals, that their faith neither should nor indeed could be suspected. To this is added the fact that some of these were either disciples of the apostles, or certainly very close to that age, upon whom to brand any mark of fabrication is permitted only to impious and shameless men.

But, lest any room for evasion be left, let us also make use of the testimonies of ancient saints who were not Roman Pontiffs. For these certainly had no reason either to be mistaken or to invent.

Irenaeus, book 3 Against Heresies, chapter 5: "But since it would be a very long task to enumerate the successions of all the Churches, indicating the tradition received from the apostles, and the faith announced to men, which has come down to us, of the greatest and most ancient Church, known to all, founded by the two most glorious apostles Peter and Paul at Rome, we confound all those who, contrary to what is fitting, gather elsewhere. For with this Church, on account of its more powerful preeminence, every Church must agree — that is, the faithful who are everywhere — in which the tradition that is from the apostles has always been preserved." Thus far Irenaeus.

Moved by this consideration, Augustine, Against the Letter of Mani, chapter 4, says: "There are many things which most justly hold me within the bosom of the Church. There holds me the succession of priests from the very see of the apostle Peter, to whom the Lord entrusted his sheep to be fed, down to the present episcopate." This same Augustine also recognizes this apostolic seat and principate in the Roman Church, in his letter 162 to Glorius and Eleusius, and in letter 106 to Paulinus, and on John, tractate 56, and book 2 against Pelagius and Celestius, and book 2 against the Donatists, chapter 1.

Cyprian, book 1 of his letters, in his letter to Cornelius, and book 4, in his letter to Pupianus, and in his treatise On the Simplicity of Prelates, holds this same opinion most

openly. Ambrose too is a clear witness to this same matter, in his book On the Death of His Brother Satyrus, chapter 7, and sermon 47, on the faith of Peter.

Cyril, in Saint Thomas's little book Against the Errors of the Greeks, bears witness to this truth much more clearly than the other authors. Nor should you wonder that these passages, from the books of the Thesaurus from which they are cited by Saint Thomas, cannot now be found there. For heretics have mutilated that book, and erased everything in it that pertained to the authority of the Roman Pontiff. This same thing has, in fact, both been detected and made known by catholic men today concerning heretics' treatment of Theophylact's commentaries on John. Although not all the books of the Thesaurus have been translated into Latin — for, at the Sixth Synod, book 32 is cited, which has not come down to us.

Maximus too, as Saint Thomas relates, not only asserts this same opinion, but confirms it with this argument as well — that the apostle Paul came to Peter's teaching authority, presenting, namely, a model for future generations, that they should have recourse in a similar case to the Roman Pontiffs, successors of Peter.

Jerome, moreover, in his letter to Damasus on the term "hypostasis," is the most abundant witness of this matter. His words Gratian cites, question 24, the first question, chapter "Quoniam vetusto." As for the fact that, in this same cause and question, chapter "Haec est fides" cites from Damasus's explanation of the Creed, I deliberately pass over this, since Erasmus denies that this is Jerome's letter. But it is enough that that letter to Damasus on the term "hypostasis" is Jerome's without controversy. Add that, in book 1 of his Apology against Rufinus, he holds this same opinion — that whoever holds the Roman faith is catholic.

Bernard, too, is on our side, in letter 131 to the Milanese, and 166 to Innocent, and 189 to the same, and 237 to Eugene, and 242 to the Romans. I would cite others, were these not already abundantly sufficient for producing conviction of this matter. For what? Whom would the agreeing, harmonious, and continuous opinion of so many and such great fathers not compel to approve what has been said? Besides which, they think what the testimonies of the holy Synods also confirm — which will be demonstrated in the next chapter.

Chapter VI

In which the Clearest Testimonies of Councils are Cited, by which the Force and Authority of the Roman Church is Proven

In these two previous chapters we have not written out the words of all the Supreme Pontiffs, nor of the ancient saints, lest the discourse become too long and accordingly tedious. We have only indicated the passages, so that, when the reader sees them, he may plainly understand that we have brought forward nothing obscure, nothing inept, or irrelevant to the matter. Now we shall relate, on this matter, not only the judgments of synods, but their very words as well, so that the adversaries may be more heavily oppressed by the cloud of these witnesses too.

Let the first, then, be the testimony of the Council of Nicaea, which, since it was cited in the fourth chapter, is not worth repeating here.

Let the second be that of the Council of Chalcedon, which Saint Thomas cites in his little work Against the Errors of the Greeks, in these words: "We venerate, according to the Scriptures and the definition of the canons, the most holy bishop of ancient Rome as first and greatest of the bishops." And below: "If any bishop is charged with infamy, he has free right of appeal to the most blessed bishop of ancient Rome; for we have Peter, the rock of refuge, and to him alone belongs, by free power in the place of God, the right of judging, according to the keys given to him by the Lord: and let all things defined by him be held as though by the vicar of the Apostolic throne."

And indeed, in action 1 of this Synod, Leo is said to govern the apostolic throne, and the Roman See is called the head of all the Churches. And in action 2, when Leo's letter had been read, the fathers exclaimed: "Anathema to him who does not believe thus; Peter has spoken through Leo." And in action 3, they call the Roman bishop "our lord," and, acclaiming him, call him "apostolic" and "universal"; and they embrace his doctrine as that of blessed Peter, and desire all the dogmas of the Council to be confirmed by the authority of the Apostolic See. And when Leo had condemned Dioscorus, the Synod says: "The most holy archbishop of great Rome, together with the thrice-blessed Peter, who is the rock and base of the catholic Church, and the one who is the foundation of right faith, has stripped him of the dignity of the episcopate." And in their synodal letter to Leo, the fathers rejoice that the Lord has given so great a prelate to the Apostolic See, whence the source and origin of our religion flows. All this occurred at the Council of Chalcedon. But those passages which Saint Thomas cites are not found in present-day copies. But Gregory complains that they were erased by heretics, book 5 of his letters, letter 14, to Count Narses.

The third testimony is found in the Fifth General Synod, celebrated at Constantinople. For, in that sentence which Mennas, archbishop of Constantinople, pronounced against Anthimus, to which indeed all the fathers of the Council subscribed, this same Mennas himself added these words: "We follow the Apostolic See, and obey it, as your charity knows; and we hold, as ones we hold communion with, those with whom it holds communion, and we condemn those whom it has condemned, as we too condemn them." The Fifth General Synod, then, subscribing to Mennas's judgment, embraces the decrees of the Apostolic See as certain. For it would not otherwise consider those universally catholic who communicated with the Roman and apostolic faith, nor would it condemn all those the Apostolic See had condemned.

Another most weighty testimony you have in the Sixth General Synod, action 4, where the profession of faith is written which Agatho, the Roman bishop, sent to the Council. This same Agatho also repeats it in his synodal suggestion (for so it is called there), to which innumerable bishops subscribed. And this suggestion, lest anyone slander it, was approved by all the fathers of the Council, actions 8, 13, and 17. The words of the synodal profession run thus: "By the aid of the blessed apostle, this his Apostolic Church has never been turned aside from the path of truth into any part of error. Its authority, as that of the prince of all the apostles, the whole catholic Church of Christ, and the universal Synods, have always faithfully embraced and followed in all things: and all venerable fathers have embraced its apostolic doctrine, through which the most approved luminaries of Christ have also shone; which the holy orthodox doctors have also venerated and followed: but heretics have pursued it with false accusations and the hatred of detractions. For this Apostolic Church of Christ will be proven never to have erred, by the grace of God, from the path of apostolic tradition, nor has it succumbed, corrupted by heretical novelties: but, as it received from the beginning of the Christian faith from its founders, the princes of the apostles, it remains untouched to the end, according to the divine promise of the Lord Savior himself: 'Peter, Peter, behold Satan has desired to have you,' etc. 'But I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail. And you, strengthen your brethren.' That my apostolic predecessor pontiffs have always confidently done this is known." Thus far Agatho, the Roman bishop. And in action 18, this same Synod openly professes that the Roman bishop Agatho is the successor in the see of the prince of the apostles.

At the Seventh General Synod too, action 2, the synodal letter of Adrian I was read, in which he defines that the Roman Church is the head of all the Churches. This letter was indeed received and approved by the General Council, as is evident in this same action 2.

At the Eighth General Synod too, there is a little book by Adrian, the second of this name, received and confirmed by this same Synod, which contains that confession of faith which we placed at the end of the fourth chapter. The fathers of this Eighth Synod agree with the Roman Pontiff's doctrine in these words: "Following the Apostolic See in all things, we hope that we may deserve to be in that one communion, which the Apostolic See preaches, in which is the true and complete solidity of the Christian religion. Wherefore, the names of those not agreeing with the Apostolic See are not to be recited among the sacred mysteries." Thus far the fathers. At this same Synod, again, the letter of Ignatius, patriarch of Constantinople, to Adrian was approved, where this same matter is openly taught. Approved too was the little book of the Roman Church, and likewise the Synod of Nicholas, in which this same doctrine is found. And, in the final session, canon 21, the Synod calls the Roman See "the see of Peter, prince of the apostles."

The Roman Synod under Symmachus, moreover, agrees that the prelate of the Roman See deservedly obtains the primacy of the priesthood throughout the whole world, by the merit of the blessed apostle Peter, and is accustomed to confer firmness on synodal decrees.

Moreover, another universal Synod, over which Nicholas presided, says: "If anyone shall despise the dogmas or decrees promulgated for the catholic faith or ecclesiastical discipline by the prelate of the Apostolic See, let him be anathema." Lucius III adopted almost this same sentence, chapter "Ad abolendam," "On Heretics."

Leo, the ninth of this name, too, in his synodal letter to Peter, patriarch of Antioch, asserts that the holy Roman and Apostolic Church is the head of all the Churches, to which the greater causes are to be referred. "All the councils," he says, "and the holy of holies, the king of kings, confirm this."

Moreover, the Lateran Council, under Innocent III, runs thus: "We do not wish anything to be derogated from Abbot Joachim, since he has commanded all his writings to be submitted to the judgment of the Apostolic See, to be either approved or corrected, firmly confessing that he holds that faith which the Roman Church holds, which, by the Lord's arrangement, is the mother and teacher of all the faithful."

This same point the Council of Lyon under Gregory taught. By the Lord's institution, then, the Roman Church is the teacher of the faithful, and, accordingly, the Roman bishop succeeds Peter in the teaching office of the Church. The Council of Lyon under Innocent IV hands down this same point.

And the Council of Trent, session 7, hands down this same point entirely, in these words: "If anyone shall say that, in the Roman Church, which is the mother and teacher of all the Churches, there is not true doctrine concerning the Sacrament of Baptism, let him be anathema."

The Council of Lyon under Gregory says that the Roman Pontiff is the vicar of Jesus Christ, the successor of Peter, the ruler of the universal Church.

But the Council of Vienne under Clement asserts that it belongs solely to the Apostolic See to declare doubtful matters of faith.

Moreover, the fathers of the Council of Florence say: "We define that the holy Apostolic See and the Roman Pontiff hold the primacy over the whole world, and that this same Roman Pontiff is the successor of blessed Peter, prince of the apostles, and the true vicar of Christ, and the head of the whole Church and the father and teacher of all Christians; and that to him, in blessed Peter, full power of feeding, ruling, and governing the universal Church was handed down by our Lord Jesus Christ, as is contained in the acts of the ecumenical Councils." Thus far the Council of Florence.

But we have cited enough testimonies of Councils. Now we must strengthen what we have established with theological reasonings as well — and this all the more, since the Roman Pontiff, when he judges concerning the faith, cannot err.

Chapter VII

Proves, by Reasons of Theology, that the Roman Pontiff Cannot Err in Settling Controversies of Faith

That the Roman Pontiff succeeds to Peter's place, faith, and authority, the Church has always recognized since the time of the apostles. This, since it had been established by the consensus of the whole world all along, not even the Arians could deny, as Sozomen, Tripartite History, book 4, chapters 15 and 16, has related.

That the bishops of the Churches, moreover, appealed to the Roman See in every graver cause, that the faithful always sought the oracles of faith from its mouth, that all Catholics awaited its judgment in controversies of religion, and, finally, that all the sacred Councils demanded its force and authority — this is so certain and manifest that I would be foolish to want to demonstrate it. From these facts, since they cannot be denied, that very argument we seek is fashioned and produced — an argument than which, out of the many and great ones, one could hardly name a more evident or more certain one.

For if there is no sounder interpreter of Christ's laws than the perpetual usage of the Church, and the Church, in questions of faith and religion and other most grave controversies, has always, in every age, had recourse not to the bishop of Antioch, of Alexandria, of Constantinople, of Ephesus, of Milan, of Paris, of Cologne, of Toledo, or of Braga, but to the Roman one — who could doubt that this is the one whom we hold both as successor of Peter, and likewise as master of apostolic doctrine and judge of questions of faith? For if Christ left someone of this kind after Peter, to establish and preserve the Church in truth, then surely either this man is he, or there is no such man at all — since, concerning the bishops of the other Churches, there is no question but that they were not given by God, in Peter's place, as teachers and shepherds of the universal Church. The Roman bishop, then, according to the Church's own interpretation, is the one to whom the Lord said, in Peter: "Upon this rock I will build my Church"; and, "I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven"; and, "Whatsoever you shall loose," etc.; and again, "Feed my sheep"; and again, "I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail, and you strengthen your brethren."

What of the fact that we discover, even by the actual experience of events, that Christ's prophecies concerning Peter and his successors are more manifestly fulfilled in the Roman Church? For it is established that this Church, fixed and immovable, though the whole world assailed it with every kind of engine, has remained in the faith and authority of Peter. And whereas we have seen the other Churches of the apostles either occupied by unbelievers, without a trace of faith, or at times afflicted by heretics, yet against this one Roman See neither pagans nor heretics have been able to prevail.

There has, indeed, been vehement fighting — not only by the Greeks, but by very many other bishops of the whole world — to undermine this privilege of the Roman Church. And they had on their side both the arms of emperors and a greater number of Churches, yet they were never able either to abrogate the power of the Roman Pontiff, or to transfer it to another bishop.

Indeed, those who have fallen away from the Roman See have always been considered schismatics in the Church; but those who have rejected this See's judgments on faith, heretics. All of which certainly shows sufficiently that the Roman Church has been placed above the rest not by human, but by divine decree, and has claimed for herself, by her own right, the privileges of Peter, and is indeed that rock upon which Christ built the universal Church, against which the gates of hell cannot prevail.

Were this not so, how could the Roman Church have withstood so many and such great princes opposing her, so many heretics contradicting her, so many varied Churches

attempting to defect? But if theologians had asserted this privilege of the Roman bishop from a contrived and vain opinion, so stable an opinion would not have persisted, nor would it have been confirmed by the length of time, nor would it have grown old together with the ages and generations of men. For we see that fictitious and vain opinions, especially when learned men oppose them, wither away with the passage of time. For time destroys the inventions of opinion, but confirms the judgments of faith. Add that the sincerity of the apostolic traditions could not have been preserved down to us, with heretical bishops so often occupying the other Churches, unless one Apostolic See stood fixed and undefiled amid so many upheavals of the world.

To this: since both provincial and general Councils have sometimes erred without the authority of the Roman Pontiff, but have never erred if confirmed by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, it ought to be sufficiently persuasive that the firmness of Councils, and indeed of the whole Church, is derived from the Roman Pontiff. Since we have already said much on this in the previous topic, the reader may take from there what pertains to the explanation of this argument. And if the Roman bishop could err in defining a question of faith, the condemnation of many heresies would immediately be rendered uncertain for us — for very many of them have been condemned not by the judgment of a general Council, but by the judgment and decree of the Roman Church.

Moreover, if there is a controversy among the fathers of a Council, either concerning the understanding of the Sacred Letters, or concerning any single book, whether it is canonical or not, or concerning some other question of this kind, a judge must necessarily be set up to settle this dispute — but if he could err, his judgment would be uncertain. But no judge has been recognized in the Church, among the disagreeing fathers of a Council, except the Roman bishop.

Moreover, the custom of the Church declares this manifestly. For appeal from the Roman See has never been admitted in causes of faith; but those judged heretics by it, the Church has always likewise judged heretics. And certainly, if the judgment of the Roman See were fallible, while that of a Council were truthful and certain, then whoever should deny the appeal from the Pontiff to the Council would be acting against nature, reason, and true theology. By this one argument, Gelasius shows that the Apostolic See judges concerning the whole Church, but that it itself is subject to no one's judgment. Now such appeals, especially in a dogma of faith, the Church does not know — for only heretics make use of them.

But if, to condemn each individual heretic, it were necessary to gather a general Council, since this is often not only difficult but even impossible, it would certainly be permitted

for heretics to live with impunity in the meantime, until a Synod could be gathered from the whole Church. If this is established to be foreign to Christ's providence, let us rather confess that the authority of the Roman See is sufficient for refuting heresies. Thus it will happen that the judgment of this tribunal on faith is held to be entirely certain. What of the fact that we believe not only in the catholic Church, but also in the apostolic one? But the Roman Church, by the consent of the fathers and of the faithful, is called "apostolic," while all the other Churches have already, for many years now, lost this designation.

But you ask: will it be heretical to assert that the Roman Church too could degenerate, as the others can, and that even the Apostolic See could fall away from the faith of Christ? To this question we respond briefly. We do not wish, here, to anticipate the Church's own verdict; but if it were referred to a general Council, the mark of heresy would be branded on that error. Nor do I see why I should not dare to say what I myself think on this matter — which I think I perceive all the better, since I contemplate it both more closely and more diligently, and contemplate it without passion or perturbation. But if I err in this — that I defend the privileges of the Roman See, granted to it by Christ, and believe that those who contradict them should be condemned under the name of heresy — then I err not only safely, but gladly; nor do I wish to be forced, without a compelling reason, to give up an error that is useful to me, and even delightful. For it was not reason and disputation alone that impelled me to believe this, but also the distinction and authority of the most eminent theologians.

Jerome says that whoever has not followed the faith of the chair of Peter and the Roman See is profane and perjured. Cyprian says that whoever does not hold the unity of the universal Church — that is, the one light, from which there are many rays; the one root, from which there are many branches; the one fountain, from which there are many streams; the one rock, upon which the Church is built; the one Pontiff, who holds all the rest together by his force and authority — is foreign, is profane, is an enemy. From which, if you remove a ray, it is extinguished; if you break a branch, it perishes; if you cut off a stream, it dries up. For thus he declares it. But he who, in a controversy of faith, rejects the faith and judgment of the Apostolic See, can hold neither the unity, nor the light, nor the root, nor the fountain. And this same Cyprian says: "He who deserts the chair of Peter, upon which the Church is founded, let him not trust that he is in the Church." Ambrose holds entirely the same view — that to be catholic is to agree with the Roman Church.

Gregory considers that the authority of the Roman See in a cause of religion and faith is to be embraced in such a way that whoever refuses is torn away from the solidity of that

rock upon which Christ founded the universal Church. Leo affirms that he is deprived of the divine Mystery who has dared to depart from the solidity of Peter, and guilty of an impious presumption, who strives to violate the firmness of that rock, built by God's own construction.

Nicholas concludes that whoever attempts to take away the privilege of the Roman Church, handed down by Christ himself, the supreme head of all the Churches, falls, without doubt, into heresy. "For he violates the faith," he says, "who acts against her who is the mother of the faith." Do not, I beg you, reader, disregard this opinion of Nicholas, which was confirmed in the first and seventh actions of the Eighth Synod, where Photius and Michael, who strove to shake this privilege of the Roman See, were also condemned.

But if whoever denies that the Roman bishop succeeded Peter, and that the Roman Church is accordingly set above the rest, falls into heresy, what, then, should be thought of one who denies that the privileges granted to Peter by Christ, for the benefit of the Church — privileges, I say, granted to Peter as pontiff, teacher, and shepherd — also pertain to his successors? For to feed the sheep with sound doctrine, to strengthen the brethren in faith, that all nations should hear the word of the Gospel through his mouth and believe, to have the Church built upon him so that the gates of hell might not prevail against her — these were fitting not for Peter as a private man, but as the head of the Christian commonwealth. Wherefore it neither should nor indeed can be doubted, among Catholics, that the judgments of the Roman See on faith and religion are certain.

Moreover, whoever should deny that the same power of binding and loosing, which is believed to have been conferred by Christ on Peter, now resides in the Roman bishop, would rightly and deservedly be held a heretic; whoever, then, denies that the firmness of Peter, for strengthening the brethren in faith, extends to those who succeed Peter, must likewise be judged a heretic.

To this: let us suppose there is some doubtful controversy among the faithful concerning religion. We then ask: if the Roman and equally Apostolic See, in order to settle the disputes and disagreements of the quarreling Churches, pronounces from Peter's chair and tribunal, ought we to follow its verdict, or not? If we follow it, then, with the Roman See erring, the whole Church would be caught up in its error. If we do not follow it, then where is this: "Whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven"? Where again is this: "God has chosen among us, that through my mouth the Gentiles should hear the word of the Gospel and believe"? Whatever, then, at least in doubtful matters, the successor of Peter has bound, will be bound; and what he has taught in a proposed question of faith, this the nations ought not only to hear, but also

to believe.

I do not here cite what Leo says on this matter, distinction 20, chapter "De libellis," nor what Damasus and Adrian say, question 25, the first question, chapters "Violatores" and "Generali." This I shall cite: that, at the Council of Alcalá, confirmed by Sixtus IV, Peter of Osma was condemned, even under the name of heresy, on the grounds that he asserted that the Church of the city of Rome could err. This same error Sixtus likewise condemned, under this same name of heresy, in the Extravagant issued against Peter of Osma. Since we have said much on this in our lecture On Penance, the reader must be referred there. He was, then, compelled to recant his opinion in this form: "I consent to the holy mother Roman Church and the Apostolic See, and I confess with mouth and heart that I hold that faith which the lord Pope Sixtus holds by apostolic and evangelical authority. And all who come against this faith, I pronounce worthy of eternal damnation." Thus far from the Council of Alcalá.

And Martin V, at the end of the Council of Constance, says: "With the sacred Council approving, we command archbishops, bishops, etc., that whoever thinks and teaches otherwise concerning the Sacrament of the body and blood of the Lord, or concerning baptism, or the confession of sins, the enjoining of penance for sins, or the remaining Sacraments of the Church, or the articles of faith, than the most holy Roman Church teaches and observes, you shall judge him as a heretic." The Council of Constance, then, judged those to be heretics who resisted the faith and doctrine of the Roman Church.

This I shall add, finally. Since a firm and certain argument for refuting heresy is drawn from the traditions of the apostles, and since it is established — if you compare the testimonies and reasonings set forth here with those rules which we laid down in book 3 — that it has been handed down by the apostles that the Roman bishops succeeded Peter in the pontificate and the teaching authority of the whole Church, why should we not dare to condemn the contrary assertion as heretical? But, as I said, I do not wish to anticipate the Church's own judgment. Although I do not seem to be anticipating it, since the Church's own discourse has already approved my entire opinion by the authority of the Roman See. But I say this only with reluctance, on account of certain learned and pious men who have contradicted us. This I assert, and indeed confidently assert: that those bring plague and ruin upon the Church who either deny that the Roman Pontiff succeeds Peter in authority over faith and doctrine, or certainly assert that the supreme shepherd of the Church, whoever he may finally be, can err in a judgment of faith. Heretics, indeed, do both of these things; those, on the other hand, who resist them in both are held catholic in the Church.

Wherefore I do not indeed understand by what plan certain of the faithful should prefer to favor the opinions of heretics rather than of Catholics. For I see what heretics are pursuing — namely, license in living and teaching, and impunity in all these things. They want a body without a head, so that neither the foot nor the mind performs its own function. They want sheep without one shepherd, so that, though they themselves are wolves, they may nevertheless seem to be shepherds. They want lawsuits without a judge, so that there be no end of disputes — and so that, with the arbiter removed, they may fight against the learned, and be judged victors by the crowd. They want, finally, everything to be thrown into confusion, since, as the Spanish proverb has it, "a troubled river is the fishermen's gain."

We, however, should follow the common opinion of Catholics, for we follow it safely, since it is the common opinion of Catholics. Besides which, they think what the testimonies of the Sacred Letters also confirm, what the decrees of the Pontiffs settle, what the chorus of the ancient saints sings in harmony, what the fathers of the Councils affirm, what the tradition of the apostles proves, what the perpetual usage of the Church observes. Wherefore, if what I have said is clearer and more evident than the sun itself, if everything I have said has been drawn from the fountains of the Church and of Scripture, if my whole discourse confirms all its credibility with certain reasonings of theology and with whole and uncorrupted witnesses, let us finally agree that theologians may draw firm arguments from the authority of the Apostolic See, for proving the dogmas of faith and theology. On the firmness of the fifth topic, then, this much we have said. Now let us refute the arguments of the adversaries.

Chapter VIII

In which the Arguments of the First Chapter are Refuted

And, in those arguments set forth at the beginning, certain theologians — men not entirely bad, indeed, but not sufficiently sharp — evade the issue however they can. They distinguish, namely, between the Roman Church and the Roman Pontiff, and say that the latter can err in faith, but the former cannot. Thus they think they dissolve almost all the arguments. For most of these attack not the faith of the Roman Church, but of the Supreme Pontiff. But these men vindicate the Roman Church from error, not the Roman bishop.

But if we are speaking of error in a judgment and decree of faith — as indeed we are — I find no distinction between the Apostolic See and the one who sits upon the Apostolic See. First, because, when we approach the Apostolic See to seek oracles of faith, we do

not question the individual faithful of the Roman Church, nor do we gather this Roman Church itself into council, but we seek the judgment of the Supreme Pontiff, and await his verdict. Again, because it is not the Roman people who teach the universal Church what pertains to faith, but the Roman bishop. Nor is the power of judging causes of faith, of binding, loosing, and feeding, in the Roman people, but in the Roman shepherd, the vicar of Jesus Christ. Councils too require confirmation and strength not from the Roman populace itself, but from the prelate of the Roman people.

Moreover, the privilege of firmness, as has been proven above, was given specially to Peter. "I have prayed for you, Peter," he says, "that your faith may not fail, and you strengthen your brethren." And again: "You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church." Wherefore, if we follow the method of true theology, which was explained in the third chapter, we shall assert firm and certain doctrine first in Peter and his successors, and only then, consequently, in the Roman Church — of which Peter, together with his successors, is both head and foundation.

I also note this: that, just as, if all the bishops together were teaching false errors, the whole Church would necessarily be caught up in various error, so too, if the shepherd of the Roman Church should decide upon an error contrary to faith, the sheep too, with their shepherd erring, would be scattered. Finally, the testimonies we have cited prove, in general, that the Supreme Pontiff of the Church, successor of Peter and vicar of Christ, when he pronounces on faith, cannot err. All the more, then, do I judge those to be blameworthy who thought they would resolve the controversy by separating the Apostolic See from the apostolic prelate. Reason does not accept this response; it rejects it, it repels it.

It rather holds this: that error is twofold — one personal, the other judicial. Nor should we shrink from the proper terms of the schools, even if they are less than fully Latin, but should prefer, as Augustine says, to have open speech rather than polished. Personal error, then, is the private error of an individual; judicial error is public. Innocent, the fourth of this name, published commentaries on the books of the Decretals; if there is any error in these, it is surely the man's, not the Pontiff's, although these commentaries were published by a Pontiff. But if this same Innocent, in a judgment on a question of faith, were to define something which was actually false, then this error would proceed from the public censor of the Church, and would accordingly be judicial.

Response to the first. From this, the first argument is easily refuted. For no trustworthy history teaches that John XXII, after attaining the Supreme Pontificate, defined anything on this matter; indeed, rather, when he was preparing to settle this question, as

Benedict XI says in his Extravagant, he was overtaken by death and could not define it. Nor, if he held that error before he was Pontiff, is he to be considered a heretic — just as neither are Irenaeus, nor Chrysostom, nor Theophylact, nor Bernard, whom some contend held this opinion, the matter not yet having been expressly defined by the Church; whether they contend this truly or falsely is not for this day or occasion to discuss.

Response to the second. To the second, one may also respond in the same manner. For Celestine did not define anything. For the words of Innocent III run thus: "Although certain of our predecessors seem to have thought otherwise." "Seem to have thought," he says, not "to have defined." But not even Innocent defines anything, but explains his own opinion, saying: "We do not believe that, in this case, the one who is left can pass to a second marriage." This is certainly true, although it was not firmly defined by this decretal of Innocent's. For it is not immediately to be believed that, if something is contained in a volume of law, it is a dogma of faith — which was more fully explained in the second-to-last chapter of the previous book.

Response to the third. To the third argument, there is no difficulty in responding. For the word "iudico" ("I judge") is frequently used in the sense of "I think" or "I hold the opinion," in the same way Alexander uses it when he says that certain of his predecessors "judged" otherwise.

Response to the fourth. But the fourth argument is far more difficult, and cannot be so briefly resolved. For Alexander openly teaches that that custom — even confirmed by civil law — which rescinds less solemn testaments, is foreign both to divine law and to the institutions of the fathers and to the general custom of the Church. But that he pronounces this from pontifical authority here is evident from the fact that he forbids, under threat of anathema, that anyone dare to rescind such testaments. Whence, too, in the very next chapter, he commands judges that, in such causes, they require only two or three witnesses, and follow not the civil laws, but the canonical decrees. If, then, the Pontiff of the Church commanded — and commanded under threat of anathema — that no one should annul testaments confirmed by the testimony of two or three witnesses, surely he defined this question not as a private man, but as the public judge of the Church.

But it is not a precept of God and the Gospel, which Alexander nevertheless seems to assert, that all causes be settled by only two or three witnesses. Otherwise not only Leo IV, but Sylvester too, in the Roman Synod, chapter 3, would have published a law contrary to the Gospel and to God. For they decreed that a bishop should not be

condemned except by 72 witnesses. From this it is understood that the civil law, which, guarding against frauds being removed from the commonwealth, provides that testaments are not valid unless sealed by seven witnesses, is not contrary to the evangelical law — just as neither is that law which, to counter fabricated hatred against bishops, established that two witnesses alone would not be sufficient for the condemnation of a bishop. And if the life of mortal men were moderately well-ordered, and their morals composed according to nature rather than avarice, the testimony of two men would certainly be adequate for settling any cause in a trial. But just as an oath is "of evil" not for the one who swears, but for the one who does not believe the one speaking truth, so requiring more than two witnesses was "of evil" not of the law requiring it, but of the man defrauding others. But it is not for this occasion or time to discuss these matters.

What properly pertains here is whether Alexander erred. And indeed, in pontifical decrees, two things must especially be distinguished. One is, as it were, the intention and conclusion of the decree; the other, as it were, the reason and cause given by the Pontiff for what he established. In the conclusion, the Supreme Pontiffs cannot err, if they decide a question of faith from the apostolic tribunal. But if the Pontiffs' reasons are not necessary — not to say fitting, probable, or suitable — there is no need to dwell on this at all. For we are not fighting to the death for the reasons given by Pontiffs, as though for altars and hearths.

Alexander, then, does not define that such a custom is contrary to the divine law, but rather — which I see is generally the view held by legal experts — commands that, in pious bequests, judges require only two or three witnesses. This is the conclusion of this decree, its purpose; nor is there any doubt that the Pontiff could, by a certain right of his own, prescribe this matter. But if, to confirm this prescription, he uses the law of Deuteronomy — for he does call this "divine" — if he appeals to the statutes of the canons, if he brings forward the custom of the Church, there is no need to press these reasons too closely to the quick — just as, if certain Councils should define that there are two persons in the Godhead, the Father and the Son, and cite in support of this that testimony of Genesis too, "The Lord rained from the Lord," they would not immediately err in a judgment of faith, even though the Trinity is rather inaptly proven from that passage. There is likewise a Synod where a pronouncement was made on the perpetual virginity of Mary. To urge this point, the fathers cite the closed gate in Ezekiel. Let anyone mock this who wishes, but he will mock in vain. For the fathers do not always bring forward necessary reasons in a question of faith, but sometimes merely plausible ones. But if even Pontiffs are sometimes mistaken in giving such reasons, they

are not even to be blamed for this — far less should the authority of this topic be undermined thereby.

Moreover, if my judgment is worth anything, Alexander erred neither in his conclusion nor in his reasons. For, in both forums, he was giving laws to his own subjects — namely, to the citizens of Ostia and to the judges of Velletri. Alexander did not, then, wish to disapprove the civil law which emperors use in the regions subject to their dominion, but wished that even lay judges, within the patrimony of the Church, should judge concerning testaments not according to the laws of emperors, but according to the statutes of the canons. For he does not think it fair that, in adjudicating temporal matters, the sacred canons should be as careful as the civil laws, and he believes it more fitting that, in the cities and towns which are under the law and dominion of the Church, the custom of the canons, not of the civil law, be observed.

Whence it follows that, if the reasoning of this decretal is more closely maintained, this law of Alexander's ought to be observed not only in the lands subject to the Roman Church, but in whatever other lands are under the dominion of bishops and Churches — not only in these bequests which are left to the Church for the sake of piety, but also in any other legacies.

Alexander's law, then, is honorable, holy, and lawful. Nor did he err even in the reasons. For, though not necessary, they are nevertheless not entirely inept. "The custom," he says, "which demands more than three or two witnesses, is, first, foreign to the divine law" — that is, of the Old Testament, which required generally only two or three witnesses; "also foreign to the institutions of the fathers" — that is, to canonical custom and law, where, especially in temporal matters, two witnesses suffice; "finally foreign to the general custom of the Church," which is content, in such causes, with two or three witnesses. "Foreign," however, not as if "contrary," but as "new" and "extraneous," and accordingly little to be approved in the Church's judgment.

But if the princes of the age should be unwilling to follow this sincerity of mind and favorable opinion regarding witnesses — this custom of the Old Law and canon law — in their own tribunals, but, in order to remove frauds, require a greater number of witnesses in the testaments of their own citizens, they can indeed freely use their own judgment; for Alexander, through that decretal letter, impedes nothing at all — for it binds only those who are subject to the Church in both forums. But on the fourth argument enough and more than enough has been said.

Response to the fifth. The fifth is most easily dissolved from what has been said in refuting the fourth argument. For Pontiffs sometimes bring forward reasons that do not

compel, but rather persuade. For since the Synagogue once had certain laws from God, useful and fitting not only for governing, but also almost necessary for establishing the morals and religion of each people, the Church has claimed these as belonging to Christ for her own use. Wherefore both the Supreme Pontiffs and legal experts call "divine" certain ancient laws, approved by their authority, restored again and anew by the Church — not because they are now God's precepts, since that old law has been abolished, but because they were God's precepts, still to be observed by us — not, indeed, by force of the old law (which was falsely charged against the most learned Pontiffs), but by the Church's new institution. This new institution, or rather restoration, of the Church, however, is probably urged from the old divine law.

Response to the sixth. To the sixth argument, Torquemada responds, book 2, chapter 112, that there is no conflict between these Pontiffs. Indeed, John is explaining Nicholas. For, after the aforesaid words, Nicholas adds: "Nor should anyone here think that it presents an obstacle that Christ is sometimes said to have had a purse; for Christ took on the person of the weak in having purses." This, however, is what John XXII defined — namely, that it is heretical to deny that Christ and the apostles possessed anything in common, which would be established as the contrary from Luke 22, John 4 and 17, and Acts 4.

Response to the seventh. To the seventh, it is first said that neither Pontiff there defined such a controversy. For Pontiffs often respond to private questions of this or that bishop, explaining their own opinion on the matters proposed, not pronouncing a verdict by which they intend the faithful to be obligated to believe it. Certainly, to say nothing of Pelagius, Nicholas decreed nothing there that pertains properly to this question.

For the question posed to him was not whether baptism conferred in the name of Christ was valid, but whether one baptized by a pagan or a Jew had received the true Sacrament of baptism. In passing, however, in transit, when responding to this proposed question, he added, unasked, his own view that baptism is conferred in the name of Christ. In this matter he could, without doubt, have been mistaken. Indeed he was so mistaken that we showed with great arguments in book 4 of the Sentences.

Then, these two Pontiffs perhaps do not conflict. For Nicholas is understood to have taught that, in a similar necessity, such as existed in the time of the apostles, if other things are equal, baptism in the name of Christ will now also be valid. Pelagius, however, defines that, apart from such necessity, it is not valid — just as, if today there were lacking the balsam, or the book, or the chalice to be touched, and the sacraments of

confirmation and orders were performed by the imposition of hands alone, as was customary from the very beginning in the age of the apostles, but where there was no similar necessity, then perhaps neither the ordination nor the confirmation would be valid without such material of the sacraments.

But we have said this concerning baptism in the name of Christ, following the common opinion. For, first, as I myself think, baptism was nowhere administered in this form: "I baptize you in the name of Christ." This both Saint Ambrose and most others seem to have understood. But if the Apostles used any such form, it was this: "I baptize you in the name of Jesus Christ," Acts 2:38 and 19.

Then, it is not necessary that the apostles conferred the Sacrament of baptism under either of those forms. Nor, if Scripture says that anything was done "in the name of Christ," are we immediately compelled to think that the deed was performed and administered with these exact words spoken. There are very many examples of this in the Divine Letters. This is ready at hand: "In you we will winnow our enemies with the horn, and in your name we will despise those rising against us." Likewise: "Having beaten them, they charged them not to speak at all in the name of Jesus," Acts 5. Likewise, Paul is said to have acted with confidence in the name of Jesus, Acts 9. Among the Hebrews, moreover, something is done "in someone's name" when it is transacted by that person's authority and power. Wherefore he who acts in the king's place, and as his minister, is said to act "in the king's name."

Rightly, then, do we interpret that those who, as Christ's ministers, sanctified men in water and spirit, conferred the grace of baptism "in the name of Christ." It is not necessary, then, to think that the apostles changed the form of baptism prescribed by Christ. For today too we truly perform baptism "in the name of Christ" — that is, in his place, by his power and authority.

And even if the apostles baptized using that prescribed formula of the name of Jesus Christ, they are nevertheless not to be thought to have omitted the name of the Holy Spirit and the Father, but to have baptized "in the name of the Father, and of his Son Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Spirit." This, however, is a matter to be demonstrated elsewhere. On the seventh argument, then, enough.

Response to the eighth. On explaining the eighth argument, much indeed could be said, but we shall condense it into a few words. Gratian, question 32, the seventh question, says, indeed more boldly than fittingly, that this opinion of Gregory's is contrary to evangelical and apostolic doctrine. With this I strongly disagree. For, even setting aside the authority of the Roman Pontiffs, we cannot disregard the definition of both

Gregorys, the first and the third, since both were most learned as well as most holy men. They did not, then, err, as Gratian falsely supposed, but were rather speaking of a woman who, before the marriage, was through infirmity unfit for the marital union — that is, to use the schools' terms, who was impotent to render the debt. A similar example you have concerning the "frigid," chapter "Consultationi." And this same Gregory explains his own opinion in this manner, in his letter to the archbishop of Ravenna, cited by Gratian, question 33, the first question, chapter "Requisisti." Nor are there lacking other responses to this argument, but this one is both clearer and more direct. The Gloss too follows this, distinction 20, chapter "De libellis," on the word "iunioris."

Response to the ninth. In the ninth argument the Lutherans — especially Oecolampadius, Bucer, and Calvin — taunt us. But childishly, nonetheless. For I have observed, and shown with great arguments, that that book is not by Gelasius, the Roman Pontiff. First, the author of this little work says that the controversy over the truth of the two natures in Christ is recent. But it was not recent in Gelasius's time, but had been settled long before by Leo and the Council of Chalcedon, where the opinion of Eutyches and Nestorius was exploded. Again, in the whole book he mentions neither Leo nor the Council of Chalcedon — which he certainly would have done, had Gelasius been the author. For, in his letter to Faustus, he gladly makes use of the authority of this Council, and would have used it even more gladly here, where he could refute his adversaries by the testimony of so great a Synod. And certainly, since he cites Damasus against Arius, he would have cited, and much more so, Leo against Eutyches too, had he written after Leo's time. But Gelasius came many years after Leo. What of the fact that this author refers to Damasus only by the title "bishop of Rome," with no other title of honor? This is very foreign to the custom of later Pontiffs, when they cite the testimonies of their predecessors.

Moreover, the author of this work, to prove the truth of both natures in Christ, counts Eusebius Pamphili among the catholic masters of the Church, and uses his testimonies. Yet Jerome affirms, in his letter to Pammachius and Oceanus, whose beginning is "Schedulae," that this Eusebius was a most open defender of Arian impiety. Indeed, this Eusebius, as an Arian, was himself condemned together with his works, actions 5 and 6 of the Seventh General Synod. Likewise, in asserting the two natures of Christ, this author cites, among the Latin fathers, only Ambrose — whereas, if he were Gelasius, he would have used the testimonies of Hilary, Jerome, and Augustine, nor would he have cited certain Greek writers there, who have always been, and still are, less known to the Latins.

But Gelasius did write on the two natures of Christ against Eutyches and Nestorius. We do not deny this; but he is recorded to have written five books, not this small work, which circulates under a false title. Gennadius too wrote against Eutyches; why should we attribute this work to Gelasius rather than to Gennadius? There was also a certain Gelasius, bishop of Caesarea in Palestine, whom Jerome relates to have written certain things at that time, but to have kept them hidden. I myself would attribute this little work to him, except that Jerome says he had a pure and polished style, such as I do not recognize in this little book — unless a good and elegant author has had the misfortune of a bad and impure translator.

Those, moreover, are mistaken who attribute this work to Gelasius, the Roman Pontiff, from those words: "Since your affection unanimously holds the Apostolic See, constantly proclaims it, and wisely defends it" — where it must be read "the apostolic faith," as the reader will verify even without my demonstrating it. Nor is it indeed new for such books to be put forward under the names of Roman Pontiffs. For, in action 5 of the Seventh Synod, the Iconoclasts produced two little books, attributed to Vigilius, the Roman Pontiff. But falsely, nonetheless. And, for the work to be established as Gelasius's, nothing at all is offered.

For when Roman Pontiffs publish books on any matter whatsoever, they express their own opinion, as other learned men do, not pronouncing as judges of the Church on faith. The ninth argument, then, has been sufficiently and clearly refuted, I think.

Response to the tenth. In refuting the tenth, what Cajetan said in that work of 27 questions need not be repeated here, lest we do what has already been done, since we are forbidden this by the old proverb. What is now pressing must be carefully explained — namely, what follows from this: that if Christ built his Church upon Peter, the Roman See is immediately understood, by divine right, to be set above the rest. From this, too, that inference will become plain: if Peter's faith, according to Christ's prayer, did not fail, the greater causes of the Church are to be referred to the Roman bishop.

I see, however, that such matters cannot be plainly and clearly resolved except by a learned and intelligent man. I do not profess to have achieved the mastery of so great and difficult a matter; I claim only to have pursued it. For it is established that I undertook, in this work, to expound not what was accessible and worn smooth in everyone's mouth, but what could scarcely be understood by even the most learned men, applying diligence. If the attempt succeeds, it deserves to be praised; if it does not succeed, it should certainly not be blamed. But enough on this. Let us now explain the matter itself.

First, this must be recalled, which we have often said elsewhere: that what was said to Peter in the Gospel by Christ, not as to a private man but as to the prelate of the Church, pertains also to his successors, without any force or twisting of the letter — just as what the Lord commended to the apostles, equally fitting for all the faithful, is commended in the literal sense to all future Christians too, according to what Christ himself explained in Mark 13, saying: "What I say to you, I say to all: watch." For watching pertains equally to all. Wherefore, even if Christ had not explained this so explicitly, as he did explain it, we too would necessarily explain it this way. By the same reasoning, likewise, what the Lord spoke to the apostles, pertaining to them insofar as they were priests of the Church, we Catholics refer not to all the faithful, but to the other priests who would be in the Church thereafter. Such is that passage in Luke 22: "Do this in remembrance of me." For, since the Lord, having taken bread and broken it, and having lifted his eyes to heaven, gave thanks to God, and likewise both took and lifted the chalice, he undoubtedly offered a Eucharistic sacrifice — that is, of thanksgiving — according to Jewish rite; unless he was foolish and ungrateful, who, when he could have rendered the highest thanks to the Father by offering back to him the greatest gifts which he had received from him, would not have rendered them at all. Christ, then, commanding his apostles to do this same thing which they saw him doing, surely commanded that they offer the sacrifice of the Eucharist and of thanksgiving. This both Cyprian, to Caecilius, and Irenaeus, book 4, chapter 32, explained divinely. Since, then, offering sacrifice is the proper office of priests and sacrificers, what the Lord commended in that place to the apostles properly pertains to the future priests of the Church, not to the common run even of ordinary women, as heretics have believed. Furthermore, whatever we read Christ to have commanded these same men, since they were to be future pastors of the Church, let us believe was, in the literal sense, commanded to succeeding bishops and pastors. An example of this is that passage in Matthew 18: "Whatsoever you shall bind," etc. And likewise this, in John 20: "As the Father has sent me, I also send you: receive the Holy Spirit," etc.

If we hold to this rule in explaining the Sacred Letters, we shall without doubt avoid that mixed and murky confusion which heretics suffer in understanding Scripture. To what end is this said? Namely, so that we might aptly and prudently distinguish those things which were said to Peter in the Gospel — and if anything fits him as a private man, we should think it pertains to individual believers (such is: "If your brother shall sin against you, rebuke him between you and him alone," etc.); but if something fits him as prince of the apostles and shepherd of the Church, we should think this, without controversy, pertains to those succeeding him in the Church's pontificate, and in the genuine literal sense. For what a civil lawgiver prescribes to his own delegates is referred not only to the

one to whom he speaks with his own living voice, but to the rest who succeed him in this same office.

Then, this too must be greatly noted: that the fact that the Roman Pontiff succeeds Peter is not itself, indeed, revealed directly in the Sacred Letters, but is established otherwise — namely, from the fact that the most weighty histories have handed down that the apostle Peter finally established his chair at Rome, and there, while he was bishop, died. This Velenus denies, this Sebastian Franck denies, this certain other heretics deny; indeed, they even say that Peter did not so much as visit Rome. This is denied maliciously, since all serious historians have related it. For these men are not to be thought to hold, in mind, what they deny in words, unless we consider them children, and foolish children at that. For what could be said more foolish and more childish than for us to deny that things happened in the commonwealth of old, which every man of the greatest weight before us affirmed to have happened? But if you seek the authors of this matter we are discussing, one is Dionysius, in his letter to Timothy; a second is Dionysius, bishop of Corinth, in Eusebius, book 2, Ecclesiastical History, chapter 25; a third witness is Clement, in his first letter; a fourth is Anacletus, in his letter On the Ordination of Bishops; a fifth is Marcellus, question 24, the first question, chapter "Rogamus"; a sixth is Leo, in his first sermon on the feast of Peter and Paul; a seventh is Gelasius, with the council of 70 bishops; an eighth is Innocent III, chapter "Per venerabilem," "Which children are legitimate"; a ninth is Nicholas III, chapter "Fundamenta," "On Elections," book 6; a tenth is Leo IX, in his synodal letter to Peter, patriarch of Antioch; an eleventh is Constantine, in his edict before the Nicene Synod, distinction 96, chapter "Constantinus"; a twelfth is Epiphanius, Heresy 27, that of Carpocrates; a thirteenth is Irenaeus, book 3, Against Valentinus, chapter 3; a fourteenth is Tertullian, book 4, Against Marcion, and in his book On the Prescription of Heretics; a fifteenth is Ambrose, in his oration against Auxentius, on the handing over of the basilicas; a sixteenth is Jerome, in his book On Illustrious Men, under Peter; a seventeenth is Hegesippus, book 3, On the Destruction of Jerusalem, chapter 2; an eighteenth is Augustine, book 1 against Julian the Pelagian; the last is Eusebius, book 2, Ecclesiastical History, chapters 14 and 15, and also book 3, chapters 2 and 25, in which passages he also cites Origen, Caius, and Papias. Whoever does not believe so many and such uncorrupted witnesses shows himself to be either foolish or certainly heretical — to say nothing of the public voice of the city of Rome, and the very sites of the city itself, which even now bear witness to Peter's life and death.

These points established, a difficult and most obscure question is easily resolved — one which, as I said, so entangled even the most learned men that they could not extricate

themselves. For that the shepherd who was substituted after Peter, by Christ's own institution, in the Church, has Peter's ordinary power, and the other privileges granted to Peter for the Church's sake, is established from the Gospel, according to what we have noted and demonstrated in the first proposition. But that he whom Christ substituted for the deceased Peter was the Roman bishop is gathered from the historical fact. For if Peter had always resided at Antioch, as he began to do, without doubt the bishop of Antioch would have legitimately succeeded him in the pontificate.

But this too must finally be considered (for it is a great matter, and most worthy of careful attention): that it pertains to catholic doctrine not only what was explicitly revealed to the apostles, but also what is derived, by an evident syllogism and inference, from one revealed proposition and another certain by the natural light. Thus, that Christ the Lord has two wills and two intellects, and likewise both created and uncreated actions of each, or that Christ could even laugh, by his own nature, as other men can — this is perhaps not expressly found in the Sacred Letters. But since it is handed down in them that the Son of God is man, and it is established by natural reason that every man has a created will and intellect, and created operations of both faculties, and likewise that every man, just as he can weep, can also laugh — whoever should deny any of these will be judged a heretic, because, by denying the consequent — namely, that the Son of God has a created intellect and act of understanding — he thereby denies the antecedent, from which it was inferred, that is, that the Son of God is man.

Let there be another example. That the Council of Nicaea, or Chalcedon, or Ephesus did not err in faith is explained neither in the Sacred Books nor in the traditions of the apostles; but only this: that Councils legitimately gathered in the Holy Spirit cannot err. But that the Councils of Nicaea, Chalcedon, and Ephesus were legitimately gathered is not believed by divine revelation, but is nonetheless believed by human faith and trustworthy historical tradition, through which we know that these Synods, convened and confirmed by the true pastors of the Church, gathered from the whole world. Whence, although the certainty and truth of those matters which have been defined in such Councils seems to depend on two principles, as it were, one of which is revealed by God — namely, that Councils legitimately gathered are of most certain truth — while the other is believed only by natural certainty, through what grave and uncorrupted writers have handed down to memory — nevertheless whoever denies the decrees and decisions of these Synods will be a heretic, no differently than if he denied the Gospel.

Let there be another most evident example too. That the priests of this present age have been duly consecrated by true bishops is not handed down in the Sacred Letters, but is rather a matter of historical fact, depending on the words and intention of those

consecrating. From this principle, then, which we hold with human certainty — namely, that these priests were duly initiated — it necessarily depends whether there now exists in the Church a true Sacrament of the Eucharist. Whoever should deny this, the Church would consider a heretic. Although only that universal statement is received by revelation — that all true priests, if they have the right intention of consecrating, confect the true Sacrament of the Eucharist. But that those who are now living are of this kind, is proven not by the Gospel alone, but by a grave and constant reasoning of nature, together with the Gospel.

In this same manner, indeed, whoever should deny that the Roman Pontiff has the same power which Peter received from Christ must be judged an adversary of the faith — although, from the Gospel, nothing more is directly inferred than that Peter's successors have the same primacy as Peter. For if you add to this evangelical conclusion this fact — that the Roman bishop is Peter's successor, which we have received from histories, by the tradition of the most weighty men — it is manifestly gathered that the Roman bishop is both superior to the other bishops, and has the same power and authority in the Church that Peter had. Fittingly and prudently, then, have the Supreme Pontiffs applied those evangelical testimonies to the Roman bishop and the Apostolic See.

But if this opinion of ours should be less approved by learned men — though I hardly know why it should be approved less — we nevertheless have another way of explaining this matter, from which it becomes clear that the Roman Pontiff was, by divine institution, the successor of Peter in the pontificate of the whole Church, and that these testimonies, which prove Peter's primacy and faith, accordingly apply to the Roman bishops.

For we have said before that our faith is contained not only in writing, but also in tradition. Thus, although it is not found written in the Sacred Books that the Roman bishops succeed Peter, it has nonetheless been handed down by the apostles to the Church, as though from hand to hand. Now that this was the living tradition of the apostles is manifestly established from those ways which we either opened or indicated in the third book. For we need not explain everything individually, lest we burden the reader with a lengthy discourse.

Certainly this is evident proof of the matter: that not only before Phocas and Constantine, not only before the Nicene Synod, but even before any Roman emperor after Nero, before any Council of the Church, before any Supreme Pontiffs after Peter, the Roman bishop has always been recognized by churchmen as Peter's successor. And that this was apostolic tradition is not obscurely taught by Anacletus, Peter's disciple, in

his first letter, "On the Oppression of Bishops"; Sixtus I, to the churches of Gaul; Eleutherius, to these same churches; Victor, in his letter to Theophilus; Sixtus II, in his letter to Bishop Gratus; Zephyrinus, in his letter to the Sicilian bishops; Marcellus, to the bishops of the province of Antioch; Melchiades, to the bishops of the Spains; Mark, in his letter to Athanasius; Julius, to the Eastern bishops.

Nor is it likely that Christ the Lord did not reveal to his apostles a matter so necessary for preserving the unity of the Church. For if that place was revealed to Moses which the Lord had chosen, that the Jews might seek divine oracles from there, how much more should we believe that Christ made known to Peter what place he had determined to establish as the seat and center of his kingdom's principate? And if, so that the Church of Jerusalem might be transferred to the city of Pella, the apostles were warned by the Lord's own voice, as Eusebius, book 3, Ecclesiastical History, chapter 5, and Epiphanius, book 3, Against Heresies, last chapter, relate, much more shall we believe that, for Peter to emigrate from the city of Antioch to Rome, and transfer his chair from there, he was warned by the Lord's oracles.

If this is so, as indeed it is — and nothing else can be believed except most absurdly — the faithful may now understand from this whence came that Lutheran claim, by which, among the other articles proposed at Worms, they included this too: that the power of the Roman Pontiff, which he assumes for himself above the other bishops, should be abrogated; let them understand, again, what those men are contriving who assert that the monarchy of the Roman bishop arose after the time of Saint Jerome. For those who write that Phocas established the Roman Church as the head of all the Churches wrote this, perhaps piously indeed (for I do not judge anyone's intention), but nonetheless imprudently. Let them understand, too, why Saint Thomas, book 4 Against the Gentiles, chapter 76, affirms that the error of those is presumptuous who strive to withdraw themselves from obedience and subjection to Peter, not recognizing his successor, the Roman Pontiff, as pastor of the universal Church; let them understand, finally, for what reason Leo X condemned Luther's twenty-fifth article, in these words: "The Roman Pontiff, the successor of Peter, is not the vicar of Christ, established by Christ himself in blessed Peter over all the Churches of the whole world."

On the tenth argument, then, since there was the greatest difficulty in explaining it, I could not respond in fewer words.

Response to the eleventh. To the eleventh, then, I respond thus. It is certainly not to be admitted that even Peter's personal faith failed. For to falsely assert that Peter's public judgment on faith was wrong is manifest heresy. But since none of the apostles could err

in the doctrine of faith, it was Peter's peculiar privilege that not even his personal faith could fail.

For what some assert — that Christ the Lord reproached the eleven, as they reclined, for their unbelief, etc. — this does not touch the apostle Peter at all. For when Luke, chapter 24, had written that the women announced to the eleven apostles what they had heard from the Lord, but that these men did not believe the women, and judged their words to be idle tales, he immediately adds: "But Peter arose, and ran to the tomb." For he would not have run, had he not believed. And the adversative conjunction which the Evangelist used sufficiently shows that the women's words did not seem, to Peter, to be idle tales.

And Christ's prayer poured out for Peter openly demonstrates that Peter's faith did not fail. But the adversaries explain that the Lord prayed that Peter's faith should not fail finally. So they speak, but no disciple's faith failed in this way. Thus Christ's prayer would not confer any singular privilege on Peter — which is contrary not only to Chrysostom, Theophylact, Ambrose, and Bede, but also to the context itself.

But when Ambrose says that Peter lost his faith, he uses the word "faith" in the sense of "fidelity" — which, namely, he did not keep toward his friend Christ. Although it is also frequent that "faith" is used for "confession of faith." But it is ridiculous, if Christ is said to have reproached the apostolic college, to understand that each individual was reproached, as though a people were not often rebuked by the prophets, though many were among them to whom the rebuke did not in any way apply. On this matter, more has been discussed in book 4.

But that which is added concerning Anastasius and Honorius raises no small question. For if Christ's prayer is to be referred not only to Peter, but also to his successors the Roman bishops — by which reasoning neither Peter's public nor his private faith could fail — then, by this same reasoning, no successor's faith will ever fail either, neither in public judgments, nor in private discourse or agreement. But if, when that prayer is applied to his successors, it is understood only of public faith — namely, in deciding questions of faith — then it seems that we would, rashly and inconsistently, have claimed for that same testimony Peter's personal faith as well.

Albert Pighius of Kampen could meet this difficulty in no other way than by freeing all the Roman Pontiffs from the mark of error. Thus he contends that none of them ever fell into heresy. And, to establish Anastasius's freedom from error, he attacked Gratian most contumeliously, and slandered the legal experts most shamefully. But to defend Honorius, he strove, with many conjectures, to persuade us that forgers had corrupted the exemplars of the Sixth General Synod. Then he also inclined to the opinion that the

letter of Honorius to Sergius had been corrupted by the Greeks, as was their custom, and that the Synod had been deceived in that judgment. Indeed, he even slandered all the acts of both the Sixth and Seventh Councils, and, to the best of his ability, undermined both their authority and their credibility.

This opinion of Albert's is indeed novel in the Church; but it can be confirmed by this reasoning too — that it is not likely that the Lord entrusted the summit of faith to a man who could be a heretic. For the standard is straight, in relation both to itself and to the crooked, as Aristotle teaches. Wherefore, if the Roman Pontiff's own faith cannot guide him rightly, much less, it seems, will it make others right in faith. What of the fact that one weak in faith cannot strengthen his brethren in faith? If, then, the Roman bishop is, according to Christ's promise, to strengthen his brethren, he himself must be firm. Although Pighius says many things, in many places, quite probably concerning the authority of the Supreme Pontiff — as he does here too — nevertheless one should not look at what he says, but at what is fitting for him to say, whose stated purpose is to defend and maintain the truth. He says, then, many things in many places on this matter, but, as they say, "the water sticks."

Let Pighius defend Liberius, whom Jerome, in his Chronicle, records to have subscribed, overcome by the tedium of exile, to heretical wickedness. Let him excuse Marcellinus, who, broken by fear, is recorded to have offered sacrifice to idols. Let him vindicate Victor, whom the Paulianists falsely claimed as their own, as Eusebius writes, book 5, Ecclesiastical History, chapter 2. Let him free Anastasius, whom Gratian, without certain and probable testimony, accused of heresy.

But how will he vindicate Honorius from error? Whom Psellus, in his poem on the Seven Synods, records to have been a heretic; Tarasius, in his letter to the chief priests of Antioch, Alexandria, and the Holy City, as is written at the Seventh Synod, action 3; Theodore, with his Synod of Jerusalem, in the confession of faith found in this same third action; Epiphanius, responding to heretics in the presence of the Council, action 6 of this same Synod, tome 2; and, finally, the whole Seventh Synod itself, in the last action, and in its letter to all priests and clergy. Adrian too, the Roman Pontiff, in action 5 of the Eighth General Synod, says: "We do not read that anyone has judged concerning a Roman Pontiff: although, indeed, anathema was pronounced against Honorius by the Easterners after his death, it must nevertheless be understood that he had been accused of heresy — on account of which alone is it permitted for lesser men to resist the actions of their superiors." Thus far Adrian, where he also adds that the sentence against Honorius was pronounced with the consent of the Roman Pontiff. This is established at the Sixth General Synod, action 4, where Agatho, in his letter to the Council, anathematizes

Honorius himself. Bede too, On the Nature of Things, chapter 67, says that, at the Sixth Synod, Macarius, with his followers, and together with his predecessors — Cyrus, Sergius, Honorius, Pyrrhus — was anathematized. Moreover, in the Book of Pontiffs, it is related that Leo II received the Sixth Synod, at which Cyrus, Sergius, and Honorius were condemned. And at the end of the Sixth Synod is placed the letter of Leo to Constantine, where, after receiving and confirming the Council, he says: "We anathematize Cyrus, Sergius, and also Honorius, who did not illuminate this Apostolic Church with the doctrine of apostolic tradition, but tried, by profane betrayal, to subvert its immaculate faith."

Moreover, that chapter "Si Papa," distinction 40, which Kampen holds as nothing, we ought to hold as most important. Since that one case, in which the sheep can judge their own shepherd — namely, when he has become a heretic — is found, to pass over other passages, at the Fifth Roman Synod of 218 bishops, in these words: "It has been decreed and confirmed by synod, by many of our predecessors, that the sheep should not presume to reprove their shepherd, unless he has deviated from the faith." This same point Anacletus teaches, in his third letter, "On Patriarchs and Primates," saying: "The shepherd of the Church, if he shall have deviated from the faith, is to be corrected by the faithful; but for reprehensible morals he is rather to be tolerated than restrained, since the rulers of the Church are to be judged by the Lord." Eusebius teaches the same, to the Egyptian bishops, cited question 2, chapter 7, "Oves." Pope John teaches the same, in his letter to Zacharias. This same point was established at the Eighth Synod, as we were just now relating. Burchard too relates, book 1, chapters 13, 138, 139, that Callistus, Clement, and Caius held this same opinion.

It is not to be denied, then, that the Supreme Pontiff could be a heretic — of which matter one or another example will perhaps be produced; but that he has, in a judgment of faith, defined something contrary to the faith, not even one example can be produced.

To the objection posed, then, let this be the response. One thing pertains to Peter as it looks to the man's private excellence; another pertains to the common benefit of the Church. That he denied Christ was the man's own; that he strengthened his brethren was the Church's. The former was proper to him, the latter common. Similarly, that Peter's own personal faith should always be preserved interiorly was the man's own privilege; but that he should propose solid faith for confirming others, and not fail in a judgment of faith, was the public privilege of the Church. The Roman bishop, then, was not heir either to the privileges or to the personal faults of Peter, which were accidentally joined to Peter's public power, but succeeded to those things which pertained to the common and necessary benefits of the Church.

For the privileges granted by Christ to the apostles are referred differently to the apostles themselves than to their successors. For among the apostles there were also personal privileges of greater grace than exist among their successors. Thus, for example, by those words, "Whatsoever you shall bind upon earth," etc., and by these, "As the Father has sent me, I also send you," etc., we understand that the apostles received a general power over the whole world. Thus they are said to be equal to Peter, distinction 21, chapter "In novo," and question 24, the first question, chapter "Loquitur." But the later bishops did not succeed the apostles in extraordinary general power, but in the ordinary power which each apostle had in his own Church — as Simeon succeeded James in the Church of Jerusalem, etc.

Let there be another example. From those words, "I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you forever, the Spirit of truth," theologians rightly conclude that the apostles were, after the coming of the Holy Spirit, confirmed in grace. But this Spirit did not pass to succeeding bishops in such a way that he remains with them forever through a confirmation of grace, which was granted to the apostles as a personal privilege; rather, only that has passed to the successive pastors of the Church which was necessary for the common benefit of the Church.

Thus, entirely, the privilege of unfailing faith, which was also personal in Peter, was transmitted to the Roman bishops — not in that respect which was peculiar to Peter, but in that respect which was common to the Church. Whence the other objections too, which have been raised in support of Albert's opinion, are repelled.

For the interior faith of the Roman Pontiff is not necessary to the Church, nor can his hidden and private error of mind harm the Church of Christ. Wherefore it is not necessary that God always assist the Roman Pontiffs in the preservation of their interior faith. But that, while they decree what is to be believed by the faithful, and while they direct the Church of Christ in faith, they should not fail, but be held by the divine hand, is necessary for the Church, and will accordingly not be denied even to Roman bishops who are otherwise weak and privately erring — lest, through an error of public power, they should cause the Church to be caught up in ignorance of the common truth. The eleventh argument, then, unless I am mistaken, has been abundantly refuted.

Response to the last. In refuting the final argument, readers need not be warned of what is already at hand — namely, that it is not the task of this present topic to defend the bad morals of the city, if the city has any that are bad. We are not so unlearned and dull as the Lutherans slander us to be. We too have educated eyes, but modest ones nonetheless.

For it is written that the father's exposed nakedness was covered by his good sons, who approached facing away. Now we are said to "avert" ourselves from that which we reject. But what is it for the sons to have covered their father's nakedness, with a cloak thrown over their shoulders, facing away, except, as Gregory says, that good subjects should be so displeased by the faults of their superiors that they nevertheless hide these from others? "They carry the covering," he says, "facing away, because, judging the deed while venerating the office, they do not wish to see what they cover." Thus good disciples, keeping silent among themselves, rightly reproach the life of their masters, and yet venerate them, even when displeased. "The scribes and Pharisees," says Christ, "have sat upon the seat of Moses; whatsoever they shall say to you, do; but according to their works, do not." But enough on this.

The reader should rather be advised to observe that certain Roman customs are shared throughout the whole Church — those which are believed to have been received from the tradition of the apostles Peter and Paul, concerning which Augustine, in his letter to Januarius, number 118, discusses much, but Innocent I, in his letter to Decentius, discusses even more fully. Other customs, however, are those which the Roman Church either instituted privately for herself, or indeed received from the apostle Peter, but not to be promulgated throughout the whole world — concerning which Augustine speaks explicitly in letter 86, to Casulanus, and in letters 118 and 119, to Januarius.

The former customs, then, which the Roman Church not only maintains, but also teaches must be observed by the entire Church, we ought to maintain entirely — as Julius, distinction 2, chapter "Nolite," and Innocent, same distinction, chapter "Quis nesciat," and Callistus, distinction 12, chapter "Non decet," and Gregory, same distinction, chapter "Praeceptis docuerunt," teach. The latter customs of the Roman Church, however, private Churches need not follow — as Saint Augustine, in the passages cited, teaches, and Nicholas, distinction 12, chapter "Scit," and Gregory, same distinction, chapter "Novit." This same point is entirely taught, distinction 31, chapters "Quoniam" and "Aliter." For, in the unity of the faith, a differing custom of the Holy Church does no harm at all — as is found "On Consecration," distinction 4, chapter "De trina." And it is in this sense that both Ambrose and Jerome must be understood, in those passages which have been objected to us.

That point, however, which is brought forward from the Trullan Synod, is easily dissolved, since, as was explained more fully in the previous book, this Synod has no authority in the Church, especially in those matters where the Greeks raised themselves in contention against the Roman Church. Nor does the effort of Councils, in either establishing or abrogating laws, have any force at all, unless confirmed by the decree and

verdict of the Supreme Pontiff. And that custom concerning the Sabbath fast is established to be among those which we have placed in the latter category, as Ambrose too says, distinction 12, chapter "Illa." Wherefore the Roman Church is criticized in vain on this matter by the Trullan Council.

Thus, then, let the sixth book be brought to a close — which we have perhaps made overly long, although those things are not truly "long" from which nothing can be removed.

Book VII

On the Authority of the Saints

Chapter I

[Contains the Arguments by which the Authority of the Holy Fathers is Attacked]

We must now establish the authority of the saints, as our sixth topic — an authority which heretics, especially the Lutherans, strive to knock from its standing.

And first they urge, with very many testimonies, that whatever the ancient saints assert is uncertain — testimonies of Saint Augustine which Gratian has collected in their entirety, distinction 9, from the proem of book 3 of On the Trinity; from the book to Vincentius Victor, book 2; from letter 19 to Jerome; likewise from another letter, 7, to Marcellinus; again from letter 48 to Vincentius; also from another letter, 111, to Fortunatus; and finally from book 2, On Baptism, Against the Donatists, chapter 3.

For in all these passages Augustine, consistent with himself, says the same thing — namely, that, apart from the sacred authors who wrote the canonical books, all others are to be read in such a way that, however great their sanctity and learning, one need not therefore think what they asserted to be true simply because they themselves thought so, but only because they were able to persuade us of it either by the testimony of the sacred authors, or by probable reasoning; and that it is accordingly permitted to think otherwise than they did, and, while preserving the honor due to such men, to disapprove and reject something in their writings.

If we believe this testimony of Saint Augustine's — so constant, and repeated not obscurely in so many places — to be true, we must confess that no firm argument at all can be drawn from the holy authors for corroborating the dogmas of theological faith. This Saint Thomas, confirmed by Saint Augustine's authority, plainly attests, Part I,

question 1, article 8, reply to the second argument, in these words: "Sacred doctrine uses the authorities of canonical Scripture as arguing of necessity, but the authorities of other doctors of the Church as arguing only probably." And he also adds the reason for this — that our faith rests on the revelation made to those who wrote the canonical books, but not on whatever revelation, if any, was made to other doctors.

But if these two most distinguished witnesses are disregarded, if Saint Thomas's reasoning too is disregarded, this same point can certainly be confirmed by other, by no means negligible, reasonings. For if, in a canonical book, even a single falsehood were found — as we argued in an earlier place — the certainty of the whole book would perish. Since, then, in the books of holy writers one may find one falsehood, and then another, even in matters pertaining to faith, it follows that it is not necessary to place certain faith in holy writers. "I know," says Jerome (letter 82), "that I regard the apostles differently, and other writers differently. The former always speak truly; the latter, in certain matters, err as men do."

Moreover, lest the discussion turn on the authority of individual writers, which can certainly be considered established as uncertain, the adversaries wish to construct something greater by their argumentation. Namely, that holy writers, even if very many of them agree on the same opinion, can indeed produce probable faith, but not certain faith.

For very many of them have asserted that all the parts of this world were not produced, adorned, and completed on the same day, but rather over many days. Basil certainly asserted this, homily 2 of the Hexameron, and in the following homilies; Eusebius, at the beginning of his Chronography; Chrysostom, homily 2 on Genesis; Damascene, book 2 of his Theology; Ambrose, book 1 of the Hexameron, chapter 7; Gregory, Moralia 32, chapter 10. The Master of the Sentences too, book 2, distinction 12 and 13, cites Jerome for this opinion. One could easily also mention Bede, Rabanus, Strabo, and other men of this rank, who, with common consensus, understood that those works described in Genesis chapter 1 were established over six successive days.

But this common consensus of the saints supplies no certain argument to theologians, since Augustine's opinion alone, contrary to all the rest, has always been held probable in the Church. Not, then, from the common opinion of the saints is a firm argument produced, by which theological conclusions or even dogmas of faith might be confirmed.

And, to remain on this same point, we can produce another example too. For very many of the holy writers have handed down that Moses, while he lived in this mortal body, did

not openly see the nature of God, as is commonly said, "face to face." So Jerome hands down, to Pope Damasus, on Isaiah chapter 6; Gregory Nazianzen, book 2 of his Theology; Saint Gregory, Moralia 18, chapter 36; Chrysostom, homily 14 on John; Cyril, book 1 on John, chapter 22; Pope Evaristus, in his first decretal letter; Dionysius, in his book On Mystical Theology, chapter 1; Origen, book 1 On First Principles, chapter 4.

But Augustine's contrary opinion is not only not rejected, but is even held most probable among theologians. From the common consensus of the saints, then, nothing certain is established in theology — which can also be confirmed by this further argument.

For all the saints who happened to mention this matter asserted with one voice that the Blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin. This Ambrose asserts, on Psalm 118, section 6; this Augustine, on Psalm 34, on that verse, "But when they were troublesome to me," etc., and book 2 On the Baptism of Infants, chapters 24 and 10; on Genesis, literally, chapter 18; and book 53 against Julian, chapter 9; this Chrysostom asserts, on Matthew; this Eusebius of Emesa, in his second sermon on the Nativity of the Lord; this Remigius, on Psalm 21; and Maximus, in his sermon on the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin. Bede too affirms the same, in his homily on "Missus est"; Anselm, in his book Cur Deus Homo, chapter 16; Bernard, in his letter 174 to the people of Lyon; Erhard, bishop and martyr, in a certain sermon on the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin; Saint Anthony of Padua, likewise in a sermon on the Nativity of this same holy Virgin; Saint Bernardine, in the third work of his sermons, in the treatise on the Blessed Virgin, sermon 4; Saint Bonaventure, book 3 of the Sentences, distinction 3, question 1, article 2; Saint Thomas, Part III, question 27, article 2; Saint Vincent, in his sermon on the Conception of the Blessed Virgin; Saint Antoninus, part 1, title 8; Damascene, book 3 of his Sentences; Hugh of Saint Victor, On the Sacraments, part 2, chapter 4. And though none of the saints has come forward against this, yet a weak argument at best is drawn from the authority of them all — indeed, the contrary opinion is defended in the Church both probably and piously.

Behold that Achillean argument, by which Erasmus does not think himself overwhelmed even by the testimony of all the saints, should he ever oppose them all.

This opinion is also supported by the reasoning that all the saints, apart from the sacred authors who wrote the canonical books, published their books by a human spirit. For if they too had spoken under the Holy Spirit's inspiration, nothing would seem to prevent their books from being counted among the Canonical ones. This topic, then, in which the authority of the saints is contained, is weak. For human truth cannot be firm and

certain. Indeed, "every man is a liar."

Osiander, moreover, book 1 of his annotations on the Harmony of the Gospels, adds this argument: that all the ancient commentators, from the time of the apostles, refer what Matthew relates of Christ — "Out of Egypt I have called my son" — to Israel in the genuine sense of the letter, but to Christ according to allegory. Yet, as he says, an allegory, however contrived, cannot hold, for however you turn it, nothing similar appears, except that both were in Egypt.

He thus contends that the literal sense, from the beginning of the chapter, concerns Christ the Lord, who is the King of Israel, and rightly compared to the dawn. But if, in the exposition of the Sacred Letters, all the saints err, their authority certainly cannot present theologians with a firm argument.

Behold the arguments by which our adversaries strive to attack and overthrow this topic.

Chapter II

[Sets Forth the Various Ways in which One Can Dispute Concerning the Authority of the Holy Fathers]

We, for our part, must fight vigorously in its defense, and must lay down first that the authority of the saints can be disputed in three ways. First, concerning the private opinion of one or another, such as seems to be Augustine's opinion on the work of the six days. Again, concerning the common consensus of several saints, from which nonetheless one or another saint has dissented. Finally, concerning the unanimous and harmonious opinion of all — for mention has been made of all these in the arguments.

This too must be considered: that the testimonies of the saints can be applied either to confirming the dogmas of philosophy, or to proving assertions either of faith or of theology. For there were, among the holy writers, some learned not only in the Sacred Letters and other matters pertaining to Christian discipline, but also in those things which the philosophers taught, both concerning nature and concerning morals.

This, finally, must be noted most diligently: that among ecclesiastical authors too there are two kinds of disputation. One concerns matters which truly pertain to faith and catholic doctrine; the other concerns matters which, without loss to piety, can be unknown not only to the unlearned but even to the learned, since they are neither dogmas of faith nor derived from them.

These two kinds of matters, however, are not easy to distinguish, since, although certain things which otherwise, in themselves, pertained to faith — as revealed to the Apostles, Prophets, and Evangelists — can come into doubt before being defined by the Church, this nevertheless happens through ignorance, by which those are excused who call into question matters otherwise divinely handed down — as, before the Church's definition, certain Greeks could, without fault, deny the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son as from one principle, although the Gospel and the Apostles taught this. But we place these under the first category — since we here measure the dogmas of the catholic faith not by the accidental ignorance of imprudent men, but by divine revelation.

We were saying, then, that it is difficult to discern which matters fall, as it were spontaneously and by nature, under that first category, and which under this second one. And indeed, in general, and by a single comprehensive statement, it is easy to define that, under that first kind, are contained all those things which the apostles handed down to the Church, either in writing or by word; and again, those things which are proven to exist by a certain connection derived therefrom. Just as, under the second kind, are those things which we have received neither from Christ nor from the apostles, nor are certainly gathered from those things which we hold by the authority of Christ and the apostles.

But we can scarcely prescribe all these things individually by a certain definition, although we can indicate some of them by particular examples. As, for example: whether the grace by which we are justified is a certain quality impressed upon the soul, which grants to it both being and life, from which other qualities follow — that is, certain theological and moral virtues infused, through which the soul has divine and supernatural actions — this is indeed disputed among the scholastics.

Likewise, whether the Sacraments, which are said to be the cause of grace and the virtues, produce such effects by a certain force and quality inherent in them, divinely instilled, or not, is a matter customarily contested with great disagreement among many. I place questions of this kind in the latter category, nor do I think that the testimonies of the Sacred Letters concerning these qualities are to be so understood; nor do I think that the controversy of Catholics with the Pelagians concerning grace for believing, for hoping, for loving, for fulfilling the law, for persevering, is chiefly about qualities, but about God's gratuitous and special help.

Again, if anyone should wish, out of curiosity, to discuss whether John the Evangelist has already departed from life, or whether he remains alive with Elijah and Enoch, and

whether, having already died, his flesh saw corruption, or whether he was recently raised — he could bring forward reasons on either side, and, without loss to the faith, either prove or disprove either position. For although it is established that all men must die once, exempting one or another individual from that general law by privilege is not, for that reason, contrary to the Sacred Letters in such a way that it cannot be called into doubt.

These three principles, since they agree with each other by reason itself, need not be pursued more carefully; for concerning matters that are evident, in which there is no controversy, learned men are not accustomed to argue — for clarity, as Cicero says, is diminished by argumentation. These points, then, having been approved by everyone's consent, let this be the first conclusion.

Chapter III

[Defines and Defends the Authority of the Fathers by Certain Conclusions, and At the Same Time Answers the Arguments of the First Chapter]

[The First Conclusion] The authority of the saints, whether of few or of many, when applied to those faculties contained by the natural light, does not supply certain arguments, but has only as much force as reason, in accord with nature, has persuaded.

First, indeed, because the holy authors were not so concerned with investigating the dogmas of philosophy that they would either allow the books of philosophers to lie unused, in order to give themselves entirely to divine wisdom, or would even, at times, merely greet them from the threshold.

Gregory Nazianzen and Basil are related, by Rufinus, book 2 of his Ecclesiastical History, chapter 9, to have devoted thirteen years, all secular books set aside, to the volumes of Divine Scripture alone; and Jerome, in the proem of his third book of commentaries on the Epistle to the Galatians, says: "It is more than fifteen years since any author of pagan literature has come into my hands; and if perhaps something from that source slips out while I speak, I recall it as if through the mist of an ancient dream." And, on the studies of our own people, a little after: "How many now read Aristotle? How many know either the books or even the name of Plato? Scarcely do idle old men, in some corner, recall them. But the whole world speaks of our rustics and fishermen, the entire world resounds with them." Thus far he. I need not seek more examples, since this is more evident than that we should need many.

To this is added that some of the ancient saints either did not have physics and metaphysics at all, or certainly touched upon them lightly. Others, indeed, were, for the most part, Platonists before they were converted to the faith. Wherefore, when they encounter philosophical questions, they either follow the opinions of the common crowd and the rhetoricians, or even bring into the school of Christians those views which they had received from the Platonists. Thus learned men detect, in the ancient saints, certain errors perhaps (as far as concerns human philosophy). And examples of this would be most easy to produce, but I do not care, even in these small matters, to single out our forefathers.

The second conclusion. The authority of one or two saints, even in matters that pertain to the Sacred Letters and the doctrine of faith, can indeed supply a probable argument, but cannot supply a firm one. Thus to disregard it and hold it as nothing would be the mark of an impudent man; to look up to it and hold it as certain would be the mark of an altogether imprudent one.

And this conclusion is demonstrated by that evident reasoning, which can in no way at all be met. Since each of the saints, with the sole exception of those who published the canonical books, spoke by a human spirit, and sometimes erred even in matters which have already been shown to pertain to faith, it is openly established that established faith cannot be produced from such authority. On this point, those must be warned who, having received no precepts of theology after their so-called "humanities" studies, immediately turn their minds to reading the ancient saints. For not everything they read there is to be approved. Nor should anyone be led into this error, that, if Ambrose or Jerome did or said anything contrary to the custom and doctrine of this present age, he should think the same is permitted to himself.

First, because certain matters were not then so defined in the Church as we now see them to be. Then, because these men, on account of their great and divine merits, obtained a certain license for doing and saying, which is not to be granted indiscriminately to just anyone. And even if they had lived in our present age, they would certainly have done and spoken certain things differently. What of the fact that, as we said before, even in matters that pertain to faith itself, the saints have sometimes erred? If one is not to deviate from them by even a hair's breadth, one would necessarily, at times, fall into great errors, even ones contrary to faith.

But Gelasius, distinction 15, in his decree, chapter "Sancta Romana," approves the little works of Cyprian, Chrysostom, Gregory Nazianzen, Basil, Ambrose. Nothing, then, in these is found contrary to the catholic faith. Otherwise, why were Rufinus's works not

approved there in the same manner, but rather criticized — since Jerome noted him for certain points on the freedom of the will? Why, likewise, are Origen's books condemned, but not also Ambrose's or Cyprian's, if these too contradicted orthodox faith in certain matters? Either, then, all should be condemned in whom some error contrary to sound doctrine is found, or all should be approved, however much one or another error is sprinkled through them. By these arguments, indeed, the Gloss, distinction 9, in the decree, teaches that those testimonies of Saint Augustine, by which certain faith is withheld from the ancients, are to be understood as applying to those times when the writings of the holy fathers were not yet authentic — for it is worth citing the Gloss's own words. "But today," it says, "all things are commanded to be held down to the last iota." But this error, already refuted by others, does not require my discourse.

For what? Did Gelasius intend to establish that there is no error at all in the books of the ancients? But whoever should attempt this would, as they say, be "washing a brick." For God willed that this good fortune belong only to the Divine Volumes, as Augustine most weightily and truly taught. Otherwise, no one, however learned and holy, fails at times to be mistaken, does not sometimes go blind, does not occasionally stumble.

There was a holy man who believed those baptized by heretics should be rebaptized. There was a holy man who denied that there was any sense or feeling of pain in Christ's body. There was a holy man who descended into the doctrine of the Chiliasts. There was a holy man who allowed a second marriage to a man who had repudiated his wife for adultery. There was a holy man who denied true blessedness to the souls of the pious until the day of judgment. There was a holy man who thought the human soul comes from the seed (traducianism). There was a holy man who thought Adam's soul was created before his body. There were holy men who thought the angels were created many ages before the corporeal world. And the little works of these men were approved by Gelasius. These men, however, out of reverence, I do not name individually. For I prefer to spare antiquity and sanctity, rather than to satisfy an idle reader. We shall, then, read the ancient fathers with reverence indeed, but as men, with discernment and judgment.

But if anyone thinks otherwise, and does not acquiesce to sound counsel, he is now captivated not by devotion to the saints, but by love of himself, and tries to smuggle in new opinions under the name of the ancients. On this matter Vincent of Lérins says: "O marvelous reversal of things! The authors of the same opinion are judged catholic, but its followers are judged heretics. The masters are absolved, the disciples are condemned. This judgment seems to me to have been divinely promulgated, especially on account of the great fraudulence of those who, while contriving to fabricate heresy under another's

name, generally seize upon the somewhat obscurely published writings of some ancient man, which, by their very obscurity, fit their own dogma — so that what they put forward should not seem to be their own first or solitary opinion. Their wickedness I judge worthy of hatred, since they toss about, with a profane hand, the memory of each holy man, as though already buried ashes, and defame with a revived opinion what ought to have been covered in silence — following entirely in the footsteps of their author, Ham, who not only neglected to cover the nakedness of the venerable Noah, but even announced it, to be mocked, to the others. Far different were his brothers, who were unwilling either to defile with their own eyes, or to expose to others' eyes, the nakedness of their reverend father; but, turned away, as it is written, they covered him. This means that they neither approved nor spread abroad the holy man's error." Thus far he.

And again: "What," he says, "if even in antiquity itself the error of two or three is detected? We shall certainly take care that the ignorance of the few be subordinated to the decrees of a universal council. But if these are lacking, let the reader consult the opinions of the elders compared among themselves — those who, however different in time and place, yet remaining in the communion and faith of the one catholic Church, stood forth as approved masters. And whatever he shall recognize that not one or two only, but all together, with one and the same consent, openly, frequently, and persistently held, wrote, and taught — let him understand that this too must, without any doubt, be believed by himself." Thus Vincent of Lérins speaks, no less prudently than truly.

From these considerations Calvin's slander is easily blunted, by which, before King Francis of France, in order to excuse the impudence of the Lutherans, he traduced the innocence of Catholics. For when it was most truly and weightily objected to the Lutherans that they were everywhere despisers and adversaries of the fathers, Calvin says: "Those holy men were ignorant of many things, they often conflicted among themselves, sometimes they even fought with themselves." Then, he goes on to enumerate as many errors of the fathers as he could gather — even falsely fabricated ones — and asks why we should not likewise depart from the fathers. We, however, first employ Saint Augustine's distinction, who, in his book against Julian 1, chapter 2, says: "Some matters are those in which even the most learned and best defenders of the catholic rule sometimes do not agree with one another, without harm to the structure of the faith; but other matters pertain to the very foundations of the faith." In the former matters we sometimes depart from the fathers; the Lutherans do so in the latter. We indeed modestly and reverently avert our eyes from a father's error; the Lutherans, however, hold the fathers up to be

either mocked or certainly despised. Then, we sometimes dissent from one or another father; but the Lutherans often dissent from all of them in agreement. It is one thing to reject the private dogma of one or two saints — which, in this second conclusion, we say is sometimes permitted — but another to speak against the common faith and doctrine of all, the extent and manner of which will be shown in the following conclusions. Only, however, once it has first been explained what the Church means when she approves the books of the holy fathers. For this, indeed, is what this present disputation demands of us. For we have not yet dissolved the arguments which confirmed that Gloss's opinion.

Even the most approved ecclesiastical authors are not all of the same rank and standing. Nor need we strive greatly to refute the folly of those who would equate the little works of Jerome or Augustine with the canonical books. Just as all the things created by God were indeed approved together (for "God saw all that he had made, and it was very good"), but the varied and differing natures of things did not receive the same place, force, and stability — for there are heavenly bodies and earthly bodies, but the glory of the heavenly is one thing, and that of the earthly another; the brightness of the sun is one, that of the moon another, that of the stars another; for star differs from star in brightness, 1 Corinthians 15 — so too, indeed, ecclesiastical writers are approved, those, namely, who, illuminated by the light of the Holy Spirit, themselves illuminated the Church. But the brightness of Matthew is one thing, that of Jerome another, that of Isaiah another, that of Ambrose another. And the canonical authors, being celestial, heavenly, divine, preserve a perpetual and stable constancy. The other holy writers, however, are lesser and human, and sometimes fail, and sometimes produce a monstrosity contrary to the fitting order and institution of nature.

Why, then, is Eusebius of Caesarea not approved? Why not Rufinus? Why not Origen? For these too illuminated the Church of Christ with their writings. Surely it is one thing to err in obscure matters, not yet explained and defined at that time; another thing to err in clear matters, matters which were, at that time too, most firmly believed in the Church. The former happened to Cyprian, or Ambrose, or Augustine; the latter to Origen, Eusebius, and Rufinus. Cyprian, likewise Ambrose, Jerome, in no way deviated from the fellowship of the holy Roman Church, nor were they separated from its faithful proclamation, but were always participants in its communion — to use Gelasius's words too — but Origen deserted its unity, and was rightly and deservedly considered the source of Arius. Hence he is called schismatic by Gelasius. Hence too Eusebius is reproached, as an excessive admirer of Origen and a most eager supporter of Arius. For Rufinus, an otherwise devout man, besides erring on free will — a matter that was indeed most obvious — is proven to have vehemently favored Origen and Origen's

disciples. And the Church has always been not only cautious, but sharp and severe, against the Origenists, as those from whom she had experienced a great plague in ecclesiastical doctrine. But on the second conclusion, enough. Let us now proceed to the rest.

The third conclusion. The authority of many saints, even though a smaller number contradict, is not sufficient, nor able, to supply firm arguments to a theologian.

This is sufficiently shown from the second argument set out before. That the angels are corporeal, Augustine and a few other ancient saints too asserted; and although this opinion is false, it cannot be shown to be contrary to the faith merely from the common opinion of the ancients.

But Thomas Waldensis, in the proem of his Doctrinale of the Ancient Faith, teaches that whatever the greater part of the fathers held from the time of the apostles is the faith of the catholic Church. Vincent of Lérins too hands down this same point in his book Against Profane Novelties. These things are true, I do not deny it. But this applies when the Church has entirely rejected the contrary opinion of one man or a few — as of those who thought that those coming from heretics must be rebaptized, and also of those who said that Melchizedek was not some man, but the Holy Spirit. For both of these opinions the Church has always abhorred since those times. But if the opinion of one man, or of a few, has not been rejected by the Church, then the authority of the majority, as we have said, will not produce anything certain or firm. On the third conclusion, then, enough.

The fourth conclusion. The authority of all the saints together, in that kind of question which we have said does not pertain to faith, produces probable faith indeed, but does not produce certain faith.

This conclusion I judge to be abundantly proven by that final argument. That this controversy is not among those which can either promote or undermine the catholic faith is evident from this: that the Blessed Virgin was entirely free from original sin is nowhere found in the sacred books, according to the genuine sense of the letter. Indeed, a general law is delivered in them, which embraces, without any exception, all the sons of Adam created by carnal generation.

Nor indeed can it be said that this descended into the Church by the tradition of the apostles, since such traditions have come down to us through none other than those ancient and holy bishops, authors succeeding the apostles. But it is established that those ancient writers did not receive this from their forefathers, for they, in good faith, would

have handed it down to their own posterity as well. That, then, cannot pertain to faith which is found neither in the Sacred Letters nor in the traditions of the apostles, and cannot be established as a firm inference from these.

Moreover, that the opposite assertion too — that is, that the divine Virgin contracted original sin from her parents — is not among the catholic dogmas is most manifestly gathered from this: that to except the one Mother of God, by a singular privilege, from the universal law, is in no way contrary to the faith of the Sacred Letters. Otherwise, since the Sacred Letters universally proclaim, "No man shall see me and live," "No one has ever seen God" (John 1:18), whoever excepted Paul or Moses would have fought against the Sacred Letters.

And this is the reason, unless my mind errs entirely, why neither Sixtus IV, nor the Lateran Council under Leo X, nor the Synod of Trent, begun under Paul III and Julius III, defined this question. For they could not approve either of these opinions as a catholic dogma. Thus he erred who asserted it was erroneous to hold that anyone besides Christ was freed from that law of original sin. And the Council of Basel erred, and even more so, when it defined that the doctrine which teaches the Blessed Virgin Mary never lay under original sin was to be embraced as consonant with Sacred Scripture and the catholic faith, and that it was no longer lawful for anyone to teach the contrary. For they are caught up in an equal error, whoever believes that either position could pertain to the catholic faith.

This is difficult to say. I believe so, if it should be asked in a sermon; but in this place, in this disputation, it is most easy. For here we are not contending with the ignorance of the common crowd, but instructing those who wish to hold to the solid and clear form of true and genuine theology, and not to chase fleeting shadows. It is our purpose, for the sake of finding the truth, to speak both against our own side and for the other side; and, when the matter demands it, to reprove both, with no regard for persons. And in this work especially, which we forge for the public benefit of the Church, we ought not to serve private inclinations.

Nor will there be lacking, after this, even from among clearly learned men, some who will rebuke me; there will also be those who will criticize me, for having deliberately and knowingly entered into a question invidious under many names, in order to assert that a matter otherwise most grave is of no importance in the Christian religion. But I can both placate well-meaning critics and refute malicious detractors, so that the former regret having found fault, and the latter rejoice that they have learned something. There was no other way open to me, I confess candidly, for evading that argument of Erasmus's, by

which he skillfully attempted to evade the authority of the saints.

Nor was it an option, in the manner always peculiar to heretics, to corrupt the books of the ancient fathers, and mutilate a good part of their volumes, so that, with my mouth protesting while my conscience knew otherwise, I could deny that Bernard, Augustine, Ambrose, and other fathers likewise held this opinion. For what does it profit, if you wish to know the truth, to erase the testimonies of the saints inscribed on parchment, when you cannot erase them as engraved in the mind? Moreover, if, in order to defend the authority of the saints in catholic doctrine — something greatly necessary for the Church of God — we have asserted that the opinions of certain men, not to say factions, are not necessary for faith and morals, why, I ask before God, should anyone be entitled either to warn us amicably about this, or to attack us hostilely?

Let this much, then, have been said thus far in confirmation of the fourth conclusion. On this same point too we have a sufficiently fitting and weighty witness in Vincent of Lérins, in his book Against Profane Novelties: "The ancient consensus of the holy fathers," he says, "is to be sought and followed by us, with great study, not on all the small questions of divine law, but only in the rule of faith." This must be explained in the fifth conclusion. On which, since the hinge of this topic turns, although much must be passed over, much must nevertheless be said — matters most useful for the knowledge of the Sacred Letters, and necessary for the use of the schools.

The fifth conclusion, then, is this. In the exposition of the Sacred Letters, the common understanding of all the ancient saints presents the theologian with a most certain argument for corroborating theological assertions. For the understanding of all the saints is the very understanding of the Holy Spirit.

This conclusion I am about to confirm with great arguments — arguments which, unless my mind deceives me, can settle the controversy so thoroughly that the question can no longer be referred to among Catholics. I shall approach this matter, however, only after first saying a few words concerning Cajetan's reputation. I have always held this man, as I have often attested elsewhere, in the greatest esteem. For he greatly aided the Church of Christ with his writings. It would take too long to praise the man's learning or intellect; it would also be tedious to recount the whole of his works.

This much can be said briefly: that Cajetan could have been the equal of the greatest builders of the Church, had he not tainted his doctrine with certain errors, as though with an admixture of some leprosy, and, either moved by a desire for curiosity, or certainly trusting in the sharpness of his own intellect, expounded the Sacred Letters according to his own judgment — most successfully, indeed, in most cases, but, in a few

particular passages, far more ingeniously than successfully. For, insufficiently attentive to ancient tradition, and also insufficiently well-versed in the reading of the saints, he refused to learn the mysteries of the sealed book from those who opened it not by their own sense, but by the tradition of their forebears — that is, by the true key of God's word. Thus, although he had written very many things excellently, he turned, in the end, everything about with certain new expositions of Scripture, either weakening or certainly diminishing the authority of others' most weighty statements. I do so unwillingly indeed, to reprove so learned a man even by name; but since the celebrity of his name and reputation was being invoked by the Lutherans on this point, I thought his rashness needed to be noted. And the error into which he fell is such that I ought, by every method, to remove it, yet cannot do so without an explicit reproof of so eminent a man.

For at the beginning of his commentaries on Genesis, he says: "If ever a new sense should occur, consonant with the text, though foreign to the stream of the sacred doctors, let the reader show himself a fair judge." And a little after: "Let no one detest a new sense of Sacred Scripture merely because it is dissonant from the ancient doctors, for God has not bound the exposition of the Sacred Scriptures to the senses of the ancient doctors, but has bound the Scripture itself, whole and entire, only to the censure of the catholic Church. Otherwise, hope would be taken away from us and from posterity of expounding Sacred Scripture, except by transferring, as they say, from the book to the quire." Thus far he.

And indeed, to follow our forefathers in everything, and to plant our own feet in their footsteps, as children do in play, seems nothing else than to condemn our own intellects, to deprive ourselves of our own judgment and of the capacity to inquire into the truth. Let us follow the ancients — well and good — but as leaders, not as masters. For they are not to dominate our faith, nor ought we to be so bound and enslaved to them that we have no judgment at all in expounding the Sacred Letters. By this argument, indeed, Cajetan could have been moved to oppose the fifth conclusion.

For Luther is usually moved by cruder conjectures. In the prologue to the assertion of his articles, indeed, he says that no one is bound by the authority of the fathers, since in the writings of all of them many errors are found, they often conflict with themselves, often disagree among themselves, and twist the Scriptures. He admits no laws at all for interpreting the word of God, saying that the word of God ought not to be bound, but free, and that it belongs to the same authority to establish laws and to interpret them. Wherefore men can indeed be certain interpreters of human laws, but by no means of divine ones.

This same opinion Wycliffe held, according to Thomas Waldensis, book of the Doctrinale of the Ancient Faith, doctrine 3; Peter Abelard too held it, right from the very beginning of his disputations, as Saint Bernard attests, in his letter to Innocent, number 190: "Peter Abelard," says Bernard, "says that there is one opinion of all the ecclesiastical doctors on this matter, and this he sets forth and rejects, and boasts that he has a better one — not fearing, against the precept of the wise man, to transgress the ancient boundaries which our fathers established." In this same ship of error were also Arius, Nestorius, Eutyches, and Dioscorus, as Basil himself acknowledges, Seventh Synod, action 1, seventh anathema. Concerning Arius and his disciples you have the witness of Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, Tripartite History, book 1, chapter 14. Nestorius, moreover, being eloquent, and thinking himself learned, disdained to apply himself to the books of the ancient interpreters, and thought himself better than everyone else, as is related in Tripartite History, book 12, chapter 4. Paul of Samosata too entered upon this same path, according to Eusebius, book 7 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 26. The Severians too entered upon this same path, as this same Eusebius attests, book 4 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 29.

What Vincent of Lérins relates of Origen, in his book Against Profane Novelties, will not be tedious to cite — so that, from this one example alone, pious men may learn to be modest in expounding the Sacred Letters. When, then, this author had extolled Origen's talent, learning, eloquence, and other admirable virtues, he says: "This same man, so great and so distinguished, while he made too insolent a use of God's grace, while he indulged too much in his own talent, and trusted himself too much, while he made light of the ancient simplicity of the Christian religion, while he presumed himself wiser than everyone, while, despising ecclesiastical traditions and the teaching of the ancients, he interpreted certain chapters of Scripture in a new manner, deserved that it should also be said of him: 'If a prophet shall rise up among you,'" etc., Deuteronomy 13. This opinion of Cajetan's, then, seems to have been common to heretics and schismatics.

Nor do I wish, here, to defeat heretics by argumentation. For what could you do with those who, with the same impudence, have despised the judgments of the Apostolic See, the dogmas of Councils, the traditions of the apostles, and the doctrine of all the saints? My whole discourse is undertaken against Cajetan, who, being intelligent, would weigh our reasonings, and, being pious, would in no way resist them once he had heard our most weighty testimonies. And for us, one thing would have been enough — that our forefathers handed this down to us so. But Cajetan disregards authority, and fights with reason; he will, then, tolerate my reasonings contending with his own reasoning.

Although you might perhaps rightly demand of philosophers a reasoned account of a philosophical conclusion, in the understanding of the Sacred Letters you ought to believe our forefathers, even without any reason given, and to defend the opinions concerning law, faith, and religion which you have received from them. I, indeed, shall defend these, and have always defended them. Nor will the reasoning of anyone, learned or unlearned, ever move me from that sense I have received from the fathers. But come, let us reason together, and let us show that, in the exposition of the holy Scriptures, the concordant sense of the ancients must be held, if we wish to be catholic. But let us first explain what our forefathers thought on this matter.

Since, then, my discourse has led me to this point, I shall teach what I have learned, not only from the reasonings of theologians, but also from the testimonies of antiquity. Clement, first of all, to the disciples at Jerusalem, says: "It has been reported that certain men teach not according to the tradition of the fathers, but according to their own sense. For they draw, from what they read, many probabilities according to human ingenuity. Wherefore it must be diligently observed that the law of God not be taught according to one's own private understanding. For there are many words in the Divine Scriptures which can be twisted to that sense which each person has spontaneously presumed for himself. This ought not to be done. For you should not seek a foreign and extraneous sense which you have brought from outside, but should draw the sense of truth from the Scriptures themselves. And therefore one must learn the understanding of the Scriptures from him who preserves the understanding handed down to him truly by his forefathers, so that he too may fittingly assert those things which he has rightly received." Thus far Clement — who, in book 10 of his Recognitions (if this book is now accepted), attests that he received this teaching from the apostle Peter.

Dionysius likewise, chapter 1 of his book On the Celestial Hierarchy, says: "Let us proceed, as far as we are able, to contemplate the understandings of the most holy Scriptures as we have received them from the fathers." To this is added the trustworthy witness Irenaeus, who also writes, book 4, chapter 63, that the legitimate exposition of the Scriptures must be received through the tradition of our forefathers.

Epiphanius, again, when refuting heretics who called themselves "Apostolici," says: "Scripture needs contemplation, to know the force and capacity of each particular argument. But one must also make use of tradition, for not everything can be received from the Divine Scripture." Thus Epiphanius. By "tradition," moreover, he undoubtedly means the understanding and sense received from the fathers. That this is the key of the word of God, Peter attests, in Clement's book 10 of the Recognitions; but the legal experts are said to have possessed this key, to whom, that is, the traditions of Moses and

the elders had come, as it were, from hand to hand.

Clement of Alexandria, in Stromata, book 7, affirms that those who interpret the Scriptures against ecclesiastical tradition have lost the rule of truth. And afterward, in this same book, discoursing on heretics, he says: "Those are held captive by a desire for glory who corrupt, through other treatments, by a deceptive pretense of wisdom, and of their own accord, what agrees, by its own nature, with the divinely inspired discourses handed down by the blessed apostles and teachers — resisting the divine tradition with human doctrines. For among those men who were so eminent in ecclesiastical knowledge, what remained to be said by Marcion, Prodicus, and their like, who did not enter upon the straight path? For they could not surpass, in wisdom, those who preceded them, so as to discover anything beyond what had truly been said by them. But it would have gone well for them, had they been able to know what had already been handed down before."

And Origen, in his treatise on Matthew 29, says: "Whenever heretics cite the canonical Scriptures, in which every Christian agrees and believes, they seem to say, 'Behold, the word of truth is in these houses.' But we should not believe them, nor depart from the first and ecclesiastical tradition, nor believe otherwise than as it has been handed down to us through the succession of the Church of God." Thus far Origen.

Ambrose too, in his third book to Gratian, On the Faith, says: "Let us keep the precepts of our forefathers, and let us not dare, with unlearned rashness, to violate the hereditary seals. Who among us would dare to unseal the sacerdotal book, sealed by confessors, and already consecrated by the martyrdom of many?"

Jerome, moreover, in his letter to Evagrius, says: "I turned myself to the books of the ancients, to see what each one said, so that I might answer you as it were from the counsel of many.... And I found that the opinions of all of them ... came to a single reckoning, so that they said Melchizedek was a man, a Canaanite." And after much more, which would be too long to relate (letters 73, 55, 10, 22, 14), he says: "You have what I have heard, what I have read, concerning Melchizedek. It was mine to cite the witnesses; let it be yours to judge concerning the faith of the witnesses. But if you reject them all, you will certainly not accept that spiritual interpreter of yours either, who pronounced, with such great arrogance and authority, that Melchizedek was the Holy Spirit — thereby proving most true what is sung among the Greeks: inexperience breeds confidence, learning breeds fear."

And on Daniel chapter 12, he says: "The most unlearned men, above all, claim for themselves the understanding of Sacred Scripture, without the grace of God and the

teaching of their forefathers." And in that famous letter to Paulinus, he teaches, most elegantly, with many testimonies, examples, and reasonings, that no one can enter the Sacred Scriptures without one going before and pointing out the path. This Clement of Alexandria too had taught, Stromata, book 5.

And Cicero (to friends, 7.19) says: "In general, no art at all can be learned from books, without a teacher and an interpreter." He who, disregarding the sense of the ancient fathers, interprets the mysterious Scripture according to his own judgment, approaches the Sacred Letters without a teacher.

Augustine sings in harmony with these same points too, in his book On the Usefulness of Believing, to Honoratus, chapter 7. For when this man thought he could read and understand the sacred books without another's help, was this not so? Augustine says (On the Usefulness of Believing 7.17): "Untrained in the poetic discipline, you would not dare to approach Terence without a teacher. Asper, Cornutus, Donatus, and countless others are required, so that any poet might be understood; yet you rush into the holy books without a guide, and dare to pronounce judgment on them without a teacher." And chapter 17: "If every discipline, however lowly and easy, requires a teacher or master for it to be learned, what is more full of rash pride than to refuse to learn the books of the divine mysteries from their interpreters?" Thus far Augustine.

Gregory too, Moralia book 28, chapter 9, confirms this same conclusion, explaining, of the holy doctors, that on which its bases were made firm. To these I shall add only one more, Cassiodorus, in the proem to his book Divine Institutions, discoursing in these words: "Let us ascend to divine Scripture through the probable expositions of the fathers, as though through a certain ladder of Jacob's vision, so that, borne up by their understanding, we may effectively deserve to attain to the knowledge of the Lord." And in the same book, chapter 11: "There are some," he says, "who think it praiseworthy if they think something contrary to the ancients, and, in order to seem skilled, discover something new." And chapter 25 of the same book: "All that the ancient expositors have probably said must be held with a careful mind; but those matters left untouched by them must first be examined, lest we exhaust ourselves in fruitless labor, to see what virtues they have, or to what ends these institutions may lead us."

Add to this Gregory Nazianzen and Basil too, who, as Rufinus relates in book 11 of his Ecclesiastical History, followed the understanding of the Divine Scriptures not from their own presumption, but from the writings and authority of their forefathers — men whom it was established had themselves received the rule of understanding from apostolic succession. Thus far there.

And this would have been enough for a modest man, to be led into our opinion. For whom would antiquity, attested and sealed by the clearest monuments, not move? Certainly, when I hear Clement, Dionysius, Irenaeus, Epiphanius, Gregory Nazianzen, Basil, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, Cassiodorus, Bernard proclaiming the same one thing, I do not think I am hearing the opinion of so many men — most learned and most holy men, to be sure, but still men — but that of the Catholic Church, of which they were the chief pillars. For these men are not to be believed to have held, with such great consensus, anything other than what the catholic Church commonly held.

But we have, besides, weightier witnesses still for producing full and complete conviction of this matter. For someone might perhaps say that those testimonies which we have cited apply more against the Lutherans than against Cajetan. For he was not so insolent as to entirely disregard either the teaching authority of the ancients, or their commentaries on the Sacred Letters. He only denied that the common understanding of the ancients is a certain line, to which we must always direct our own understanding. This we do not yet seem to have refuted. But, however this may be, it pleases me to strike at the very throat of the matter, and to close in more closely, so that Cajetan's error may be refuted by the most certain arguments.

First, then, at the Sixth General Synod, session 11, the Origenists were condemned precisely for this reason: that they tried to introduce, against the tradition of their forefathers, those same expositions which Cajetan here brings forward as new. "They asserted many other things," says Sophronius, "outside the apostolic and paternal tradition — rejecting the planting of paradise, unwilling that Adam was formed in the flesh, criticizing the belief that Eve was formed from him, refuting the sound of the serpent." Thus far he. This letter of Sophronius's is, moreover, approved as synodal, action 13 of this same Sixth General Council.

Then, canon 19 of the Trullan Synod runs thus: "It is fitting that those who preside over the churches teach the clergy and the people, gathering understandings and judgments of the truth from Divine Scripture, and not transgressing the boundaries already established, nor the tradition of the divine fathers. But if any controversy concerning Scripture should arise, let them not interpret it otherwise than as the luminaries and doctors of the Church have explained it in their writings, and let them obtain greater praise from these than if they composed what is said from themselves — lest, hesitating on some point, they fall away from what is fitting." Thus far the Trullan Council.

To this: since a question arose among the faithful concerning the understanding of that testimony of John the Evangelist — "But when they came to Jesus, and saw that he was

already dead," etc. — and this was referred to the Council of Vienne, Clement, presiding at the Council, spoke thus: "We, turning the gaze of our apostolic consideration to the common opinion of the holy fathers and doctors, declare, with the sacred council approving," etc. The Apostolic See, then, and the Council of Vienne, when they pronounce on faith and the understanding of the Sacred Letters, hold to the common sense of the saints, as though to Theseus's thread, and follow them as guides to understanding.

The Lateran Council too, under Leo X, session 11, commands all who are to teach the evangelical truth to the people, that they explain Sacred Scripture according to the interpretation of the doctors whom the Church, or long usage, has approved. Nor should they add anything contrary or dissonant to this from their own private sense, but should always adhere to those interpretations which do not disagree with the interpretations of the aforesaid doctors.

This same point is, moreover, more openly defined at the Council of Trent, session 4, in these words: "The holy Synod has decreed, to restrain petulant minds, that no one, relying on his own prudence, in matters of faith and morals pertaining to the edification of Christian doctrine, should twist the Sacred Scripture to his own senses, or dare to interpret this same Sacred Scripture contrary to that sense which the holy mother Church has held and holds, or even contrary to the unanimous consent of the fathers." Thus far the Council of Trent. I could add to this the decree of the Fifth Synod, from Ivo, title 11, book 2, chapter 14; and another, similar decree of the Council of Meaux, chapter 11, from Burchard, book 1, chapter 61. But I omit much, lest a long disputation burden the reader.

But we also have, from the Sacred Letters themselves, not a few testimonies for confirming this same point. First, that from Ecclesiasticus, chapter 8: "Let not the story of the elders pass you by, for they too learned from their fathers; from them you shall learn understanding, and how to give an answer in time of need." Then, that of the Apostle to the Romans 12: "Not to think of oneself more highly than one ought to think, but to think soberly; and to each, as God has divided the measure of faith... having gifts differing according to the grace given us, whether prophecy, according to the analogy of faith," etc. It is established that the Apostle uses the term "prophet" not only of one who sees and predicts future things, but also of one who, by the gift of the Holy Spirit, understands and expounds the oracles of the prophets, of Christ, and of the apostles.

Paul commands, then, that whoever undertakes such an office in the Church should, first, not think more highly of himself than he ought, but think with modesty and

restraint; and, then, that he should have prophecy according to the analogy of faith. That is: he should not follow, in expounding the Sacred Letters, the sharpness of his own human intellect, or the force and reasoning of his own nature, but should interpret them according to the faith received from our forefathers, and in a manner proportionate to this faith. For you can perhaps expound the philosophers according to the reasoning of science, with no faith applied at all; but you cannot soberly interpret the sacred books without the faith and doctrine of our forefathers.

Indeed, even one who, in explaining Aristotle, held all the ancient Peripatetics as nothing, and, with them protesting in great agreement, prescribed for us, by a new interpretation, some paradox never before heard, based on the philosopher's opinion, would be considered scarcely sober. Much more, then, one who, in the books of the apostles, invents by his own wit certain new opinions, opposed to the disciples of the apostles and to all the ancient interpreters, has certainly no reason to be considered altogether sound of mind. But on the second testimony, enough.

The third. In 1 Corinthians 14, you have this: "Let the prophets," says the Apostle, "speak two or three, and let the others judge" — lest anyone rashly dissent from the rest. "For God," he says, "is not a God of dissension, but of peace" — that is, not the God of him who has fallen away from the unity of agreement, but of those who have remained in the peace of agreement, as Vincent of Lérins explained. "As in all the churches of the saints," he says, "I teach" — that is, of Catholics. For they are called "holy" precisely because they persist in the communion of the saints. And, lest anyone should finally refer the judgment of these matters to himself alone, disregarding the rest, he adds a little after: "Or did the word of God originate from you? Or has it come to you alone? If anyone thinks himself to be a prophet, or spiritual, let him acknowledge that the things I write to you are the commandments of the Lord."

It is commanded, indeed, that if anyone is a teacher of spiritual matters, he should be, with the greatest zeal, a cultivator of unity, so that he neither prefers his own opinions to the common ones of everyone else, nor departs from the understanding of all. This will happen if two precepts are held. One, that the interpreter of the Sacred Letters should always look to those who came before him, from whom the word of God has proceeded to those who came after. Of this matter the Apostle warns the Corinthians, saying: "Did the word of God originate from you?" The other, that he should not defend his own opinion with obstinate contention, but should first consult the other teachers of the Church, so that, if he sees that what he thinks is approved by all, he may hold it safely; but if it is rejected, he may safely abandon it. For this is what the Apostle means when he says: "Or has it come to you alone?" This, indeed, is how I plainly seem to myself to

interpret Paul's meaning. But if this testimony of the Apostle should seem to someone more fit for persuading than for proving conclusively, I would not think it should be contested with him in a contentious dispute. For not even we ourselves believe that all the arguments we use are winning ones.

The fourth testimony of this same Apostle, moreover, is most weighty. It is found in Ephesians 4, in these words: "And he himself gave some indeed as apostles, and some as prophets, others as evangelists, and others as pastors and teachers, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the building up of the body of Christ... that we be no longer little children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the wickedness of men, by cunning craftiness, in the deceit of error."

These words of Paul's, since they were explained more fully in book 3, we shall now touch upon lightly, and only as much as will be sufficient for confirming the matter now at hand. From these words, then, it is clearly understood that it was a matter of divine providence that we should have not only the codices of the prophets, apostles, and evangelists, but also the commentaries of the holy doctors upon them. For, indeed, it was for this reason that, after the prophets, apostles, and evangelists, teachers are given to the Church by Christ — that they might interpret these sacred books. Whoever, then, despises these men, divinely provided for the Church of God through the ages and places, agreeing among themselves on the same sense of Scripture, despises not man, but God — by whom they were destined for this purpose, that they should teach the Christian people the sacred letters of the prophets, apostles, and evangelists.

But if all the saints erred while interpreting these, then the Church, with God as its author, would have erred, in following the teachers given to it by Christ, and in adhering to their footsteps in the understanding of the sacred codices. Nor does it escape me that Paulinus and Augustine, in letters 58 and 59, do not take "prophets," in this testimony of the Apostle, to mean those who foretold future events before the Lord's coming — whose writings we hold as canonical and divine — but those who, in the Church of Christ, in the time of the apostles, were distinguished for the gift of prophesying. But since we cannot deny that both kinds were given to the Church by Christ, it should seem no wonder if we have excluded neither from the Apostle's words. But here someone might perhaps ask:

Since the canon of Scripture is perfect, and sufficient, more than sufficient, in itself for everything, what need is there for the understanding and authority of the saints to be joined to it? Because, indeed, Sacred Scripture, on account of its own depth and obscurity, is not received by everyone in one and the same sense, but is interpreted

differently by different people, so that it seems almost as many opinions can be drawn from it as there are men. Novatus, indeed, expounds it one way, Sabellius another, Arius another, Donatus another. Wherefore it is necessary that the line of prophetic and apostolic interpretation, because of the twists and turns of so varied an error, be directed according to some norm. For this reason, then, after the prophets, apostles, and evangelists, we have also received holy doctors, so that we might follow their catholic — that is, universal — understanding, as the rule of the Church prescribed by God. Excellently, then, is this added: "for the perfecting of the saints... for the building up of the body of Christ... that we be no longer little children," etc. And on the Apostle's words, this much.

Now let us add a single testimony of Solomon's, which, if weighed carefully, will greatly contribute to strengthening the matter we are discussing: "The words of the wise," he says, "are like goads, and like nails driven deep, which are given through the counsel of the masters, from one shepherd. Beyond these, my son, seek no further." On this passage, Jerome says: "Except for these words, which are given by one shepherd, and approved by the council and consent of the wise, claim nothing for yourself; follow the footsteps of your forefathers; do not depart from their authority." Thus far Jerome.

We, indeed, understand who this one shepherd is through Ezekiel: "I will raise up over them one shepherd, who shall feed them... he himself shall be their shepherd." And, lest you should think that Christ himself would always do this in person, he warns through Jeremiah, saying: "I will give you pastors according to my own heart, and they shall feed you with knowledge and doctrine."

That the words of the saints, moreover, were given by this one shepherd, so great and so unanimous a consensus of all shows. For they could not all understand the same thing with one mind, unless they were held together in that unity by one and the same Spirit of Christ. Whence Solomon divinely says that they were given, through the counsel of the masters, from one shepherd.

That the ancient saints were wise, no one denies; that they were teachers of the Church is certainly established; that they were given to the Church by God, Christ's providence toward the Church makes manifest; that they were given to expound the oracles of the apostles, prophets, and evangelists, Paul indicates; that so many and such different men, provided at different times and places, came from one shepherd, the unity and harmony of their opinion demonstrates. So that one can view them as nothing else than a council of masters, gathered by the one Spirit of truth.

Certainly, as Augustine says, in his book against Julian 2, if a synod of bishops from the whole world were to be gathered, to decide a controversy that had arisen concerning the sacred books, neither so many nor such men could easily be assembled — since the saints were not all of one time.

I now appeal to you, Father Cajetan, if it is permitted for a son to call a father by this name; I appeal to you, Cajetan, I say; I summon you to a council — not into a lyceum or an academy, but into the peaceful and honorable assembly of the holy fathers. Set before your eyes, I beg you, so numerous a series of most learned men, whom the consensus of so many centuries has approved down to this very day — men whom, beyond their admirable knowledge of the Sacred Letters, the piety of their lives also wonderfully commends. Look upon them, I entreat you, as they, in a manner, look upon you, and say to you, gently and mildly: "Is it so, son Cajetan, that all of us together err in expounding the Sacred Letters? Is it so that we, all of us whom Christ gave as teachers to the Church, lacked the spirit of understanding? Do you alone dare to fight against us, and do you believe that the Church will follow the opinion of one man, but will abandon the common judgment of this most weighty and holiest senate? Which do you judge deserves more weight — the prior judgment of so many learned men, saints, and martyrs, or your own singular and private judgment?" Will you answer to this, or will you even dare to open your mouth at all? I seem to see, Father Cajetan, your modesty and candor of mind, and, indeed, your religious reverence and piety toward the saints, and, as if you were present, I hear your voice sounding in my ears: "We have both won: each of us carries off the palm — you, of me; and I, of my error."

But I do not know, good reader, to what point the impulse of my mind and excessive warmth of discourse has carried me. For Cajetan has long since been in that place where he has overcome all errors without any disputation from me; and I am not accustomed to taunt the errors of those whose talents I admire.

But let us, as we have begun, continue, and let us refute this error with reasons of theology too. For although, in producing faith in theology, authority carries more weight than reason — since authority, without reason, has sufficient force, while reason, without authority, has little strength — yet reason joined to authority will have as much force as one could wish, for producing conviction. And we had promised, right from the beginning, to settle this case with Cajetan more by reason than by testimonies.

First, then, those who stir up this new method of expounding the Sacred Letters not only trample upon the praises of the ancients, but also set an example, for both vain men and, still more, heretics, to contaminate the true meanings of the Sacred Letters with new

and false inventions. If, indeed, this license were once admitted, that each person interpret the sacred books according to his own judgment, I shudder to say how great a danger to the abolition of religion would follow.

Indeed, once even a single particle of the Sacred Scriptures is entrusted to the freedom of human intellects, another particle, and then another, will also, as though by custom, all now come to be treated by human ingenuity. Furthermore, if it were permitted for the whole of divine Scripture to be expounded according to the judgment and will of whatever men, nothing firm would remain. But there would then necessarily be, as it were, a brothel of errors, where before there had been a shrine of chaste and incorrupt truth — as Vincent of Lérins asserted, no less truly than elegantly. Indeed, besides the many and great inconveniences which this opinion brings to future generations of the faithful in the Church, it cannot free the Church that preceded us from the mark of the gravest error. For, since either the preachers or the writers who succeeded the ancient saints have all handed down to the people the sense of Sacred Scripture according to the doctrine received from the saints, and the people have accepted this same sense in good faith, then, surely, whoever rejects the concordant exposition of the ancient saints is thereby proven to reject the understanding which the Church has held down to this present time.

Let something be given as an example, to make this more broadly evident. All the saints expounded that Eve, as the letter says, was fashioned from a rib of Adam. Since the priests who followed found this so expounded by the saints, they diligently made this known to the Christian people, and the people themselves, in good faith, believed it. Thus it results that, with the ancient saints erring in the interpretation of that passage, the whole Church would have been caught up in the same error. And that the ignorance of the saints is bound up with that of the Church, Nestorius plainly understood, condemned by the Council of Ephesus in these words: "We have inveighed against Nestorius's wicked presumption, in that he boasted that he alone, first among all, understood Sacred Scripture, and that all those had been ignorant who, before him, endowed with the office of teaching, had treated the divine words — and that even now the whole Church errs, since it follows, as it seemed to him, ignorant teachers." Thus far the Council of Ephesus is cited; and it is related by Vincent of Lérins in that truly golden little book, Against Profane Novelties.

Add, moreover, that, as we said before, in those matters whose knowledge does not pertain to the common people, the faith of the Church is the faith of our forefathers. Since, then, it does not belong to the common people to receive a true and sincere understanding of Sacred Scripture — unless we wish to follow the madness of the

Lutherans — the understanding of our fathers in the sacred books is, certainly, the very understanding of the Church itself.

Wherefore, if all the ancient saints erred in understanding the Divine Letters, the Church, without doubt, erred — and this by God's own command. For the people would sin if they resisted the Scripture as expounded according to the sense of all the saints — especially in those matters whose judgment pertains not to the common people, but to their elders.

Moreover, the word of God could not have departed from all the saints thinking the same thing with one common mind. That is, they could not all together, at once, either hold as canonical some Scripture that was not canonical, or, conversely, reject by common consent some Scripture that was canonical. Neither, then, could the true understanding of the word of God have departed from them all at once. For both the Spirit and the word were promised to the Church; and if either of these were lacking to all the holy doctors, it would equally be lacking to the Church as well. Now, that first point assumed, if it is less understood, can be grasped from other dogmas of faith, in which we shall show, by great arguments, that all the saints together cannot err — not much later, but a little further on. But that both the word and the spirit of understanding are joined together in the Church, as we assumed in the latter point, the Lord attests through Isaiah, in these words: "My spirit, which is in you, and my words, which I have put in your mouth, shall not depart out of your mouth, nor out of the mouth of your seed... from now and forever." Now no one who has had even a little practice in the Sacred Letters will deny that the "seed" of Christ is the Church of the faithful. Who, then, is he who dares to tear apart, by error, the things joined together by Christ in the Church, and to take away either the word, or the sense of the word, from all the saints — and accordingly from the Church?

Moreover, as Jerome says in his commentaries on the first chapter of the Epistle to the Galatians, the Church of God, which heard the faith from the successors of the apostles, did not receive the gospel of man, but of God. "For the teachers of the Church," he says, "do not so much teach themselves, as God teaches in them, who speaks to the saints: 'I have said, you are gods, and all of you sons of the Most High.' Those, then, who are gods hand down the Gospel of God, and not of man. Marcion, and Basilides, and the other plagues of the heretics, do not have the Gospel of God, because they do not have the Holy Spirit, without whom the Gospel that is taught becomes merely human." Thus far Jerome. And in this same place, immediately after: "Let us not think that the Gospel lies in the words of the Scriptures, but in the sense; not in the surface, but in the marrow; not in the leaves of the words, but in the root of reason. Otherwise even the devil speaks

from the Scriptures, and all the heresies sew their pillows from it. There is great danger in speaking in the Church, lest, perhaps, through a perverse interpretation, the Gospel of Christ become the gospel of man, or, what is worse, of the devil." This too Jerome says. Let us gather these together in a few words; here is their reasoning.

If the faithful received a false sense of Scripture from the ancient saints, the successors of the apostles, they certainly did not receive the Gospel of God, which does not lie in the words of Scripture, but in the sense; not in the letter which kills, but in the spirit which gives life; not in parchments, but in hearts. This not only Jerome, but Hilary too, in his book to the Emperor Constantius, has taught. And if the law is spiritual, and needs the Spirit to be understood — which we have already shown abundantly in the first topic of this work — what great madness, I ask, would it be to say that the Holy Spirit was present to me alone, but was lacking to all the saints?

For come, let our discourse flow now from divine to human reasonings. If, in the interpretation of Scripture, anything is attributed to talent and learning, what could be either sharper or more perceptive than the intellects of the Greeks? What more practiced in the Sacred Letters? Nor, indeed, was intellect lacking to the Latin saints, nor was skill in the Sacred Letters lacking to them. We do not, at present, wish either to prefer the Latins to the Greeks, or the Greeks to the Latins. It is established that both were distinguished in both intellect and learning. But if, in this judgment, holiness of life is especially considered, what modern man could excel those ancient, foremost men of the Church? "True," they say.

"But they were men." I too, however, consider these new interpreters to be men. I hear you. "What does the multitude have to do with the sense of the Spirit?" I respond: "What does a small number have to do with it?" But even in those matters which are believed on human trust alone, the multitude of witnesses is generally of some weight — especially of the elders. For the most ancient are generally the most weighty. The more recent, however, like children, if they present an appearance of truth, are not immediately to be rejected; but antiquity should nevertheless be preserved in its proper place. For the force and authority of antiquity is very great, and, where it competes with novelty, it is without doubt to be preferred. But I do not know how my discourse has slipped from the weightiest reasonings to these lighter ones. Let us now return to those, and finally conclude them.

We were pressing this point more urgently and insistently: that whoever asserts that all the ancient saints together erred in expounding any single passage of Sacred Scripture attributes this same error to the catholic Church. This can also be confirmed by this

further argument. For wherever the body of the Church is, there too is the Spirit of truth, as Irenaeus teaches — indeed Christ the Lord himself, saying: "I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you forever, the Spirit of truth." Paul too openly teaches this same thing, Ephesians 4 and 1 Corinthians 12.

The Spirit, however, does not grant the same functions to all parts of the body, as the Apostle most elegantly discusses, in Romans 12 and in the twelfth chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians. "To one is given, through the Spirit, the word of wisdom... to another, prophecy... to another, the interpretation of tongues," etc. "For not all in the Church are apostles, nor all prophets, nor do all interpret," etc. It is certain, however, that the understanding of the Sacred Letters was given to the holy doctors, if to anyone at all, through the Spirit. Whoever, then, denies the Spirit of truth to all the saints in the interpretation of Sacred Scripture thereby, without doubt, removes this same Spirit from the Church — just as one who takes away the function of seeing from the eyes darkens all the other parts of the body as well. For if the eye is not clear, the whole body will be full of darkness.

These, then, are the weightiest reasons for the fifth conclusion. There can be others, less weighty. Certainly the example of the best and wisest fathers is not entirely light — for although they were of the sharpest intellect, they nevertheless present their expositions of Sacred Scripture in such a way that they seem to have learned them from their forefathers, rather than to have discovered them from themselves. To this same rule ought we too be, not taught, but formed; not instructed, but imbued. On the fifth conclusion, then, enough has been said.

The sixth conclusion. All the saints together cannot err in a dogma of faith.

This is first shown by Saint Augustine, book against Julian, the first, chapter 2. For when he wished to refute Julian, by the testimonies of the saints, on a dogma of faith which was under dispute, he says: "I shall not recall the opinions of everyone on this matter, but shall set forth a few opinions of a few men — men, however, by whom our opponents will be compelled to blush and yield, if any fear of God or shame before men has overcome so great an evil of obstinacy in them." And later, he says: "Some matters are those in which even the most learned and best defenders of the catholic rule sometimes do not agree with one another, without harm to the structure of the faith, and one says something better and truer than another on the same matter. But this present matter, which we are now discussing, pertains to the very foundations of the faith." And in book 2 against this same man, he speaks thus: "We have proven this by the authority of

catholic saints, and, on this account, it does not follow that it is false. Such and so great men confirm this to be true according to the catholic faith, that your fragile and sophistical novelty is crushed by their authority alone — besides which, they speak in such a way that truth itself testifies through them. But now your obstinacy must first be restrained by their authority, so that... while you do not believe that such men of God could have erred in the catholic faith..., you might rein in your headlong daring."

And a little further on, he says: "I set you before these judges..., whom I have not appointed as witnesses in this our dispute out of empty conjecture, as my friends and your enemies..., nor have I invented, with empty imagination, men whose opinions on the matter under dispute are uncertain: but I have named, one by one, as was fitting, holy and illustrious bishops of God in the holy Church — not men of the Platonic, Aristotelian, or Zenonian schools (though some among these too were learned) — but all men trained in the Sacred Letters..., so that in them you should fear not themselves, but him who formed them as useful vessels for himself... Men who judged on this matter... when they were free from hatred, friendship, enmity, and anger... What they found in the Church, they held fast."

And afterward: "Has the long passage of time," he says, "so confused the highest with the lowest, that Pelagius, Celestius, and Julian should see, while Hilary, Gregory, Ambrose, and Cyprian are blind? But whatever kind of man you are, since you are nevertheless a man, I think I can see your shame (if indeed all hope of soundness is not yet dead in you), and I seem, in a way, to hear your voice, by which you answer: 'Far be it that I should dare either to think or to say that these men were blind.'"

And at the end of the book, he finally attests that those who reject the saints reject the whole Church of Christ. And Vincent of Lérins says: "It is necessary for all Catholics, who strive to prove themselves legitimate sons of the Church, to cling to, to be glued to, and to die in the faith of the holy fathers; but to detest, to shudder at, and to pursue profane novelties. For it pleased the Council of Ephesus, by divine inspiration, to decree nothing else to be believed by posterity, except what the sacred antiquity of the holy fathers, in consenting agreement, had held." Thus far he.

Nor did the Council of Ephesus alone hold this opinion, but the Sixth Synod of Constantinople too, action 12, in these words: "And the holy synod said: It is altogether necessary to follow the dogmas of the holy fathers, not only according to their sense, but even to use the same words as they did, and to innovate in nothing at all." And again: "They receive the dogmas of the holy fathers as the law of the holy Church of God." Nor does it matter that these sayings are Sergius's, not the synod's own. First, because, if

Sergius himself, a heretic, though defeated by the Church's public consensus, could not deny this our conclusion, then certainly our enemies are our judges. Then, because the synod, actions 17 and 18, itself follows the holy fathers themselves as a rule. And the Lateran Synod, under Martin V, canons 12 and 13, says that whoever rejects the fathers who are in agreement with the whole Church thereby rejects the catholic and apostolic Church, and rejects what they believe. This can be confirmed not only by the most weighty testimonies of Augustine, Vincent, and the Councils, but also by the most invincible reasonings.

For if the saints were mistaken in some dogma of faith, then the peoples too, who followed them, would have been mistaken. For it is established that the Christian people, before us, rested content in the faith of the holy doctors. Nor, indeed, could they have had faith in Jesus in any other way, unless they also had faith in his saints. "I give thanks to my God," says Paul to Philemon, "hearing... of the faith which you have in the Lord Jesus, and toward all his saints." On these words Jerome says: "Whoever has believed in God cannot receive his faith otherwise than by also believing in his saints. For faith in God is not perfect, if it is weakened by unbelief toward his ministers."

Moreover, since certain matters pertain to faith — a point which, although often said, must be said again — which the common people are entirely unaware of: if all the saints had been deceived in the faith of such matters, the Church certainly would have been deceived. To this: with the faith of all the saints rejected, the traditions of Christ and the Apostles too would, for the most part, be rejected. For we recognize very many of the apostolic traditions from nowhere more clearly than from the testimonies of the ancient saints. Whence, at the Seventh General Synod, first action, Basil the penitent's seventh anathema runs thus: "Those who despise the doctrines of the holy fathers and the tradition of the catholic Church, and who make excuses and boast of the words of Arius, Nestorius, Eutyches, and Dioscorus, saying that, unless we were sufficiently instructed from the Old and New Testament, we would follow the traditions of the holy fathers and the catholic Church — let there be a curse upon them." These two things, then, are so joined and connected — the doctrine of the holy fathers and the tradition of the Church — that they cannot be torn apart and separated.

Whoever attempts to undermine one of these necessarily shakes the credibility of the other as well. And, at this same synod, action 6, tome 5, Epiphanius says, on the synod's behalf: "But if he who published this exposition against the venerable images asserts that he was not accepted by the holy fathers who flourished around that time, how shall we, who are unworthy even to be called their disciples, accept what the holy fathers did not approve?"

Nor did this synod alone, but all the other councils, all the pontiffs, and all the holy doctors, refute every heresy by this same way and method. For they could not conveniently do otherwise, unless they had held to the opinion of their forefathers, as they had received it, both in the canonical Scriptures themselves and in the other decrees of faith. On this matter, I am pleased to cite the very words of Vincent of Lérins: "By the sacred authority of antiquity," he says, "we shall crush the audacity of profane novelty. Nor is this indeed new, since this custom has always flourished in the Church — that the more religious a man was, the more readily he opposed new inventions. All things are full of such examples. But, lest this become too long, we shall briefly and summarily touch on a few points, so that all may see, more clearly than daylight, by what path the blessed succession of the blessed apostles has always proceeded in refuting new doctrines. For holy and prudent men understood that the reason of piety admits nothing else, than that everything which had been received in faith from the fathers should be handed down, in this same faith, to the sons. And that this is the proper mark of Christian modesty and gravity — not to hand down to posterity one's own inventions, but to preserve what has been received from our forefathers. For religion provides guidance for us, not we for religion. Nor should we draw the sense of our forefathers wherever we wish, but rather follow it wherever it leads and draws us." Thus far he.

And he gives one and the same chief example of this matter, drawn from the Council of Ephesus, where, in disputing against Nestorius to establish the rules of faith, it was decreed that the opinions of the holy fathers should be brought forward. When this was done, Nestorius was condemned as contrary to catholic antiquity, while Cyril was approved as consonant with the most sacred antiquity. But, as he himself said, "All things are full of such examples."

Thus Jerome refuted Helvidius's dogma. Thus Basil, to Amphilochius, asserted the divinity of the Holy Spirit. Thus Augustine refuted the Donatists and the Pelagians. Thus Paul of Samosata was overcome by a certain famous writer. Thus Theodoret approved the definitions of the Council of Alexandria. Thus Pope Leo, before the Emperor Leo, confounded Eutyches and his followers, and asserted that none but the impious and heretics disagree with the consenting holy doctors. Thus Pope Agatho confirmed the ecclesiastical dogma concerning the twofold will and operation of Christ — namely, by the consenting testimonies of the holy writers. To these, heretics thought they could respond only by corrupting the books, and by bringing forward, from these same saints, other testimonies, either mutilated or even fabricated, in confirmation of their error. For not even to heretics did it seem an option to simply deny the authority of the saints. But why should we, after such ancient examples, now bring forward more

recent ones? From Bernard, letter 77 to Hugh; from Innocent, "On the Priest Not Baptized," chapter "Apostolicam"; from the Council of Florence; and from many others too, whom, lest this be too long, we shall now leave aside.

It should be enough for us, if we have made any progress in Christian philosophy, that, from the examples, reasonings, and testimonies set forth, we should be persuaded that the common sense of all the saints produces certain faith in catholic dogmas, and that, accordingly, from the authority of all of them, certain arguments can be drawn for confirming theological conclusions.

This was what we needed to establish, finally, as this sixth topic. And we have established it, indeed, at some length — for how could we explain so great a matter in fewer words? — but so clearly, nonetheless, that the darkness which the adversaries of truth tried to spread with their arguments now seems to have been dispelled by the light of the preceding disputation.

Certainly the first, second, and third arguments, after what has been said, need no response at all. Nor does that reasoning subsequently added either. For it holds no more force against the ancient saints than against all the fathers of the councils, and indeed against the whole Church. Thus we have already refuted it in two earlier places.

Only Osiander's and Cajetan's scruples now remain, and if these are removed, there will certainly be nothing further left to be desired in explaining this sixth topic.

Chapter IV

[Removes Certain Scruples of Osiander and Cajetan]

When, then, Osiander contends that all the expositors, from the time of the apostles, erred in understanding that prophecy, he first brings forward nothing contrary to us. For, as Vincent of Lérins rightly said, the ancient consensus of the holy fathers must be certainly followed by us not in all the little questions of divine law, but only in the rule of faith, and especially in those questions on which the foundations of catholic dogma rest — which we have also explained a little more fully in the previous chapter. Now, whether the prophecy of Hosea should be referred to Christ in the literal sense or in the allegorical sense does not pertain to a question of faith. Thus, even if the saints were mistaken in this, they would have been mistaken not in a grave matter, but in one of little importance in the Church.

Then, it is false that all the authors, from the time of the apostles, referred that passage only in the allegorical sense to Christ. They do indeed refer it to the people of Israel, and

also refer it to Christ, but not all assert that this is done through allegory. Indeed, some affirm that the same passage of Scripture sometimes has several literal senses. Finally, if we say the sense is allegorical, there is no error. For Jerome, in his commentary on Hosea, learnedly answers Osiander's objection. This empty reasoning, then, holds weight only with those who wish to be deceived and misled themselves.

But those more weighty and steadfast must be warned to take care that they not be caught by that other, more cunning reasoning. For no one, unless he is quite unlearned, fails to see one who sophisticates openly. But a clever and hidden sophist, lest he deceive by an appearance of truth, must be studiously guarded against. Nor is he easily recognized. Nor indeed would I wish it thought that Cajetan is to be counted among the sophists, or that he wished to deceive anyone with cunning, craft, or malice. But a talented and learned man was deceived only by a certain appearance of obscure reasoning. Wherefore, since this has greater force than the rest for deceiving, one must guard against it here with all the more care and diligence.

Cajetan argues, then: "God has not bound the exposition of Sacred Scripture to the senses of the ancient doctors," and so forth. But indeed he has bound it, if all of them, without exception, converge on the same opinion. For all Catholics are bound to follow the sense of the Church. Now that the sense of the Church has been that which was the common sense of all the ecclesiastical doctors has already been explained, sufficiently, I think, and with care. Nor does the Church now judge the sense of the Scriptures by divination, but interprets them from the tradition of our forefathers. For just as, if some other question of faith should arise, the Church's judgment brings nothing new to the ears of the Christian people, but inquires into and follows the ancient faith of our forefathers on that matter — so too, when some controversy arises concerning the sense of the Sacred Letters, we ought to expect no new understanding from ecclesiastical censure, but that which, after a great investigation has been made, is established to be the common understanding of our fathers.

"Hope," they say, "is taken away from us and from posterity of expounding the Sacred Letters, except by transferring from the book to the quire." By no means at all. For (to pass over the fact that there are many passages in the Sacred Bible, and indeed whole books, in which the Church desires further diligence from interpreters, and in which, accordingly, more recent scholars too could leave to posterity monuments of their own learning and talent), even in those matters already worked out by the talent and diligence of the ancients, we can, if we wish, offer no small and indeed most useful service to the Christian people. For we can give novelty to what is old, luster to what is faded, light to what is obscure, grace to what is tedious, credibility to what is doubtful — to all things,

their own nature, and to their own nature, all things.

But since Vincent of Lérins has most learnedly and elegantly answered this argument of Cajetan's, we shall cite his own words — words truly worthy of being written in letters of gold: "Be, O Doctor," he says, "as it were another Bezalel, and carve out the precious gems of divine dogma; fit them faithfully, adorn them wisely, add splendor, grace, and charm; let what was formerly believed more obscurely be understood more clearly, with you as its expositor. Yet teach the same things you have learned; so that, though you speak in a new way, you do not speak new things. But perhaps someone will say: shall there, then, be no progress of understanding in the Church of Christ? Let there be progress indeed, and the greatest — but such that it is truly progress of the faith, and not a change. For progress consists in each thing being amplified within itself; change, on the other hand, consists in something being transformed from one thing into another. Let the reasoning of souls imitate the reasoning of bodies: which, although in the process of years they unfold and develop their proper measures, nevertheless remain the same as they were. The small limbs of infants, the large limbs of young men, are still the very same limbs. However many limbs children have, so many do grown men have. And if there are any features that are born in a more mature age, they were already latent, in a kind of seed-form, beforehand — so that nothing new is afterward brought forth in old men, which had not already lain hidden in them as children. But if the human form should thereafter be changed into some shape not of its own kind, or if certainly something should be added to the number of its limbs, or taken away, it is necessary that the whole body either become a monstrosity, or perish, or certainly be weakened. Thus too the understanding of the Sacred Letters ought to follow these laws of growth, so that it is strengthened, indeed, by years, expanded by time, made sublime by age — yet remains uncorrupted and untouched."

And a little after: "Whatever, then," he says, "has been sown in the paradise of the Church by the cultivation of the fathers' labor, let this same thing be cultivated by the industry of the sons, let it flourish, ripen, progress, and be perfected. And let those ancient dogmas of celestial philosophy be refined, polished, and cleaned by their descendants. But it is a sacrilege for them to be changed, cut down, mutilated, or to receive additions foreign to them, as it were, from human ingenuity. Let them receive clarity, light, and distinctness, but let them necessarily retain their fullness, integrity, and proper character."

Thus far he — whose whole discourse seems to me all the more probable, the more it seems drawn from the Apostle's words in Ephesians 4. There he pursued that same analogy of bodily growth so openly and so fully that no further discourse of mine is needed. It was only necessary to remind the readers of it.

On the sixth topic, then, this much. Let us now pass on to the seventh — that is, the authority of the new school. On which, although I am perhaps about to say something new, it is nonetheless something which I trust pious readers will approve.

Book VIII

On the Authority of the Scholastic Doctors, which is Placed in the Seventh Position

Chapter I

[Who are to be Judged Theologians in the True Sense of the Name]

There follows a topic most especially necessary for this discussion, which contains the authority of the theological school — a topic which the younger heretics not only diminish and belittle, but even explode and hiss off the stage.

The standard-bearer of German impiety, Luther, a disciple of Wycliffe in this as in other matters, asserts, in his book against James Latomus, that scholastic theology is nothing other than ignorance of the truth and an empty deception, against which the Apostle warns in Colossians chapter 2. In his book On Abolishing the Private Mass, he calls the academies the brothels of the Antichrist. Philip Melanchthon, indeed, in his Apology against the Parisians, says that profane scholasticism was born at Paris, and that, once it was admitted, the Gospel was darkened and the faith extinguished. In short, the Lutherans, to a man, both marvelously despise and hostilely attack the authority of our school. And from this, perhaps, as from a primary source, the rest of their heresies have been derived. For, first — and this was easy — having despised the authors of the school, they soon despised the school's judgments too. These being neglected, it was necessary next that Jerome, Augustine, Gregory, Ambrose, and Basil be neglected, whom the more recent theologians had as authorities for their own dogmas. But once the ancient saints were set aside, their councils too were held in contempt. Whence it followed that the Lutherans cut down even certain canonical books, and ecclesiastical authority itself. So true is that saying: he who neglects the smallest things gradually declines. Let this be said without malice.

Nor indeed can the school's authority be a small matter, which no one can hold cheap without endangering the faith. For contempt of the school and the plagues of heresy have always been connected, ever since the school was born. Wherefore I shall defend this topic too — nor, as it seems to me, shall I dispatch it easily or briefly.

For although scholastic theology has amplified in us the capacity for discourse received from dialectical exercises — for we ourselves have spent no small effort and care on this study since our earliest years — yet here, though we are dealing with our own proper subject, we do not wish to exercise ourselves at length on both sides, but to discuss the matter briefly and concisely, in our own manner.

But remember throughout, reader, that I am defending that doctrine of the school which is established on the foundations of the Sacred Letters. From which it follows — and I see myself saying this with everyone's assent — that wretched is the doctrine of the school which defends itself by titles of mastery; wretched too, and perhaps far more so, is that which, once the authority of Sacred Scripture is set aside, philosophizes about divine things with twisted syllogisms. Indeed, not even about divine things, nor even about human ones, but about matters which concern us not at all.

I am aware, indeed, that there have been in the school certain nominal theologians, who have settled every theological question with frivolous arguments, and, detracting great weight from the gravest matters with vain and invalid little reasonings, have published commentaries on theology scarcely worthy of old women's late-night musings.

And since, in these works, testimonies of the Sacred Bible are most rare, mention of councils none at all, nothing smells of the ancient saints, nothing even of serious philosophy, but almost entirely of childish disciplines — these men are nevertheless called, if you please, "scholastic theologians." They are not scholastics, much less theologians, who, inserting the dregs of sophistry into the school, provoke laughter in learned men, and contempt in more refined ones.

Whom, then, do we understand by a scholastic theologian? In what man do we place this term? I think, in him who reasons fittingly, prudently, and learnedly about God and divine matters, from the Sacred Letters and sacred institutions. Although this must be discussed at greater length afterward, this much must briefly be admitted here: unless one is such a man, no one is a theologian of the school.

I am also aware that there have been in the school some men born, as it were, for discord, who think they have argued best precisely when they have spoken against more learned men — so that they seem to wish not so much to discover the truth as to overcome their adversaries, and to fill whole pages with contentions and quarrels. And there are many in the Church who, like hired soldiers, either defend or attack these men, and their whole theological disputation is nothing but partisan zeal, contention, and disagreement. These I neither ought nor am able to approve. For although the mutual reproofs of disagreeing parties are not to be blamed, yet stubborn contentions in disputing seem to

me unworthy even of profane philosophy, let alone sacred doctrine. For, as Cicero most eloquently said, one cannot dispute without reproof, nor dispute rightly with obstinacy. And it was truly said by Publius that truth is lost by excessive quarreling.

I by no means agree with those who think that stubbornness, and the irritation of picking at everything, has arisen from the disputations of scholastic circles. Rather, I judge the fault of such evils to lie in men's characters, not in the school. For moderate men, neither contentious nor obstinate, settle every matter soberly and with restraint. This ought to be done by everyone who professes any discipline whatsoever, but by no one more than by the theologian.

There have, without doubt, been many in the school who, avoiding these vices, treated theological matters gravely and modestly. For those whom these critics call "obstinate" and "carping" theologians can, if they wish to speak truly, refer only to a few — men who displease me too, if anyone. But because of the faults of a few, the whole crown should not be traduced. Even if most theologians had these faults, that slander would still be unjust. For just as no just and prudent man accuses all young men, though most are given to lust, since lust is not characteristic of all young men, but of the disreputable ones — so, since this scholastic obstinacy belongs to trivial theologians, not to all, the school is unjustly traduced, as I was just saying, on account of faults which are not the school's own, but belong to an idle, vain, and contentious school.

I wish, then, to assert and defend those scholastic theologians who are truly worthy of this name — and I shall do this, if I first show the school's own proper purpose and the method of teaching it has proposed, without which nothing can rightly be said either for them or against them.

Chapter II

[Sets Forth the Manifold Office of Scholastic Theology]

The proper office of scholastic theology — as we have both received from our forefathers, and as students of this discipline experience in almost daily encounters — is, first, that those things which are contained hidden in the Sacred Letters and the traditions of the apostles should be drawn forth into the light, as it were, out of darkness.

For the theologian gathers his conclusions from the principles of faith revealed by God, and explains, through argumentation consonant with nature, what is implicit within those very principles. For just as the musical faculty, from what is laid down in arithmetic, connects by reasoning what, among sounding numbers, is consonant or

dissonant, so scholastic theology, from what faith has established, produces, by natural reasoning, the consequences concerning God and divine matters.

But if astrology, music, the science of optics, and other such disciplines, although borrowed, as it were, from other faculties, are nevertheless held in esteem as useful and necessary, what evil spirit is it that would wish to destroy scholastic discipline, which teaches, not from arithmetic, not from geometry, not from physics, but from the sacred and divine letters and institutions, what follows and what conflicts?

Nor indeed should those be heeded who criticize scholastic questions as curious, and charge the school with rashness, on the grounds that it dares to pronounce on matters far removed from our grasp, and to define so many things which could, without loss to salvation, either have been left unknown or left in doubt. Examples of this kind they give: who can distinguish the Father from the Son, or either from the Holy Spirit; what is the difference between the Son's nativity and the Spirit's procession; whether the Holy Spirit, proceeding from the Father and the Son, has a single principle, or two. Thus they judge it to be the mark of a distinguished and great theologian to define nothing beyond what is handed down in the Sacred Letters — that is, to remain fixed on the principles of theology, and to withdraw the mind from what follows and conflicts. I do not understand what their opinion means. For could anything be more absurd than to have only the principles of a discipline defined, while wishing that the conclusions — which are produced from them by a certain and evident syllogism — should either remain unknown, or be left in doubt? If anyone asserted this in geometry, physics, or astrology, he would truly and rightly be considered most foolish. But enough on this. I do not care to argue for what is already established, as many, and learned ones too, have often done. Let us, then, proceed to the rest.

This capacity for discourse in the school has, again, another proposed goal: the defense of our faith against heretics. For it is the scholastic doctor's task, as the Master of the Sentences teaches in his proem, following Augustine, to know how the catholic faith may both aid the devout and be defended against the impious. But if the school's doctor cannot teach the faithful sound doctrine, and refute those who do not have sound doctrine, he may perhaps sometimes be called a theologian by the common crowd, but in fact he never will be one. And for this reason heretics are so hostile to scholastic disputations — because they understand that the catholic faith, which they strive to attack, is fortified by the zeal and learning of these men. Wolves recognize dogs indeed, and pursue them with hatred, and the name "school" is odious to those who keep wolves from the flocks, and further guard against their ambushes.

And in this category there is indeed nothing to marvel at; but I do not cease to marvel at that kind of men who, although held to be and actually being catholic, are nonetheless accustomed to stir up applause from those who do not know how to exhort the young to the study of languages, except by first branding the scholastic theologians with slanders, and demolishing them with entire volumes. But they slander most sweetly. Honey of the tongue covers the poison of the mind — and it is prepared all the more perniciously, the more sweetly it is drunk in.

But scholastic theologians are peevish and long-winded, if we inquire closely, even superstitious. But these, as I said, are faults of character, not of the school. Yet even the peevishness and those faults objected to theologians have some excuse — either a just one, or one that seems capable of being approved. For, discoursing on many and various matters, not only in general but individually as well, they could not accomplish this in a brief discourse. Hence come those myriads of articles which these critics reprove — which, had they been proverbs, they would not have reproved, but rather admired.

To this is added that clarity is not usually joined with brevity. For those who labor to be brief become obscure. Thus theologians, desiring to be clear, were somewhat longer. Add that difficult and obscure matters, which theologians discuss in great number, cannot be explained in few words. The school also adapts itself to the unlearned and inexperienced, and accordingly inquires into and defines many more things than would seem superfluous to learned men, even to those of great talent. Finally, theologians discussing both sides of a question, in the scholastic manner, must necessarily embrace whatever they teach in a longer discourse.

But that anxious "superstition," as they call it, is religion, not superstition. Surely it is not permitted among us for everything to be tossed about carelessly, but the school, by its norm and decree, requires that all who wish either to dispute or to write on theological matters be confined within certain limits and prescribed lines. Hence come those tears. They favor liberty — indeed, license — in speaking and writing; we, when disputing on theological matters, shudder at all license and rashness. But this whole scholastic manner of discoursing is thorny, and a foot pierced by thorns cannot then plant its step firmly. Surely their feet are most tender, and it is not errors that prick them, but discipline.

This discipline, as I began to say before, they pursue with hatred for this reason — because it is an art which teaches both how to defend the faith and how to overcome heresies. Since this we shall explain fully and diligently in the last book, it need only be briefly stated now, without dispute. For it is not fitting to demonstrate everything in the same place.

Finally, it pertains to the function of scholastics, as far as possible, either to illustrate or even to confirm the doctrine of Christ and the Church from human disciplines. For, as Augustine taught, the silver and golden vessels and the other furnishings of the Egyptians, even though received on loan, we can rightly make our own, as it were, and claim for the uses of the faithful; and, as Jerome advises, we can bring in the foreign woman, her hair shorn and her superfluities cast off, to the people of God. This, if done with fitting moderation and gravity, no one, I think, will be so foolish as to disapprove — unless he has never given the matter any thought at all.

Theologians learn from David to wrench the sword from the hands of the enemy, and to cut off the head of the most arrogant Goliath with his own blade. They learn from Paul to skillfully twist even a chance inscription into an argument for the faith, and to turn what was written for another purpose to the benefit of ecclesiastical doctrine. They learn, with Daniel and Moses, the wisdom of the Chaldeans and Egyptians — not to follow it, but at least to point it out and refute it. Nor is it fair that, if they dispute against philosophers, they should be ignorant of the philosophers' dogmas; for even if someone should wish to write against the mathematicians while unskilled in mathematics, he lies open to ridicule, distinction 37, chapter "Qui de mensa."

I could pursue many arguments on this matter, but I feel that even what I have already said has been somewhat lengthy. Let the reader forgive me. For I have been carried along by zeal for our own subject, and the school is a bit talkative, lest I seem to be claiming it free of all faults. On this, then, enough. For I have proceeded otherwise than I said at the beginning, and, in a confined and narrow space, I seem to have sought room to speak. But it was difficult to mend a matter torn apart by strangers, and badly handled by some of our own, even with a light touch.

Three ends of true theology, then, must be established. For I am arguing not only about scholastic theology, but about theology in its entirety. But the heresy of the Lutherans, if it wishes to be consistent with itself, can say nothing about the school's discipline, in which it itself confesses never to have exercised itself. No one, however, should be heeded who disputes about a matter of which he has knowledge neither by practice nor by reason. But if those three ends are common to true theology, and the school provides all of them, certainly the error of those who think the school is to be neglected is pernicious.

For this is true theology, in which are contained all the things required in a theologian: knowledge of God, understanding of heavenly matters, and prudence and practical skill in human affairs. So that, when these are present, the discipline of a Christian doctor is perfect, and cannot exist without them.

Since this is the best and greatest thing, if we wish to attain it, effort must be devoted to scholastic theology, without which we can attain no complete doctrine at all in the Church. But those who neglect this, who think themselves theologians, will finally realize their error, when either a disputation with heretics, or some grave and complex case of conscience, forces them to be tested.

Nor indeed should any student of Sacred Scripture fear that the study of the Sacred Letters is retarded by the study of the school. For, in bearing this fruit, the school not only does not retard it, but even invites and entices it. And we ourselves, whatever we have brought to the Sacred Letters — if indeed we have brought anything — have approached and adorned them, instructed by scholastic doctors and doctrine.

But now it is time to teach what is our chief purpose here: whether the authority of the scholastics presents firm arguments to the theologian, or weak ones.

Chapter III

[The Chief Arguments Against the School's Authority]

That all the arguments derived from the school's authority are weak is first urged by this reasoning: that the school's authority is proven neither by the Sacred Letters, nor by the institutions of the apostles, nor by the Church's definition. And since the Lord never promised the spirit of truth to scholastic authors, they can err as men do, and accordingly no argument from their authority will be firm.

Likewise, there is no certain dogma in the school, but everything is full of factional partisanship. Nothing certain, then, can be produced from the school's authority.

Moreover, all the theologians of the school asserted that matrimony, even contracted without a minister of the Church, is truly and properly a sacrament of the new law. But this common opinion of all does not merely fail to produce certain faith — it does not even seem probable. In no other matter, then, will the school's testimony be certain.

We, however, shall set forth both what we think, and why we think it, as briefly as possible. And we shall fight for the school's authority not with passion, but with reason. Although we are not unaware that many will speak eagerly against this — which we could in no way avoid, unless we wrote nothing at all.

Chapter IV

[Defends the School's Authority, Circumscribed Within Certain Limits]

What the beginning of the theological academy was, what its progress, what founders it had, what authors, although this pertains to the school's commendation, is not for this present occasion to relate — where we attempt only to explain how much force an argument drawn from the school's authority has for producing conviction. This matter to be explained, let this be the first conclusion.

The first conclusion. The testimony of scholastic theologians, even of many, if other learned men fight against it, carries no more weight for producing conviction than either their own reasoning, or a still weightier authority, has established.

Namely, in scholastic disputation the authority of the majority ought not to overwhelm a theologian; but if he has even a few grave men on his side, he may well stand against the majority. For these matters are judged not by number, but by weight.

This conclusion I need not prove with arguments. For if something is evident, on which all agree, I am not accustomed to argue it — for clarity, as Cicero says, is diminished by argumentation. Certainly, where the opinions of the most learned men are various and discrepant, we ought to imitate the moderation of the Academics, and withhold certain assent from uncertain matters. For what is so rash, so unworthy of a wise man's gravity and constancy, as this same Cicero most elegantly relates, than to defend without any doubt what has not been sufficiently and thoroughly perceived and known?

At this point certain scholastics must indeed be reproved, who, from the prejudices of opinions they received in the school, brand otherwise catholic men with graver marks — and this with such facility that they are deservedly laughed at. Our own school, indeed, gives us great license, to defend by our own right whatever seems most probable; but it is not permitted to condemn rashly and lightly those who differ from us. Some matters are the school's positions, of which we shall speak shortly; others are the precepts of the sect, of which we now speak. Those who dissent from the latter bear a mark; those who dissent from the former do not. For if something is contrary to Scotist or Thomist pronouncements, this is not immediately error. But enough on this.

The second conclusion. From the common opinion of all scholastic authors, in a matter that is indeed grave, arguments are drawn so probable that it would be rash to oppose them.

For reason shows that experts in any art whatsoever are to be trusted. Nor would one be considered sane who did not trust sailors on a matter of navigation. Whoever, then,

places no trust in those experienced and practiced in this art of discoursing on theological dogmas is either not quite sane, or certainly rash.

Then, in the Clementine "On the Supreme Trinity," the fathers of the Council of Vienne say that the opinion which holds that informing grace and the virtues are conferred in baptism upon infants as well as adults, being more probable and more consonant and concordant with the theology of modern doctors, is to be chosen by Catholics.

If, then, on a matter which had once been controversial even among the scholastic theologians themselves, the concordant opinion of the more recent ones carried such weight with the fathers at a council, how much more ought we to hold and revere matters prescribed by the school for all time? And if the very opinion of more recent theologians produces conviction for a council, and inclines it to define that such an opinion is to be held, what if theologians, all of them, had established something not out of opinion, but with a fixed and unwavering mind? Do you not think the Council of Vienne would judge, with even graver censure, dogmas of this kind firmly received in the school? We shall, then, reject the school's common consensus only impudently and rashly.

Moreover, since among the scholastic theologians themselves there is often great disagreement — such that they might perhaps rightly be reproved on this account — certainly they would not all assert the same thing, unless moved by this same divine spirit. Nor is it any less to be marveled at that the various factions of the school, and doctors so much in disagreement with one another, should converge on one and the same opinion, than that the seventy translators, enclosed (as they say) in separate cells, arrived at one and the same translation. That, then, cannot be true which is contrary to the harmonious chorus of scholastic theologians.

The third conclusion. To contradict the concordant opinion of all the theologians of the school on faith or morals, if it is not heresy, is at least close to heresy.

The school's positions, moreover, if we may so call them, fall into a twofold distinction. One kind pertains more to the reasoning of philosophy than to faith. The other pertains to faith and to the morals necessary for the Christian people. What is dissonant from the former is not heretical for a scholastic theologian. But what is contrary to this latter kind of matter, we here shun as poison. For we do not dare, openly and simply, to charge them with the crime of heresy — since heresy is, in itself, the most atrocious of crimes. In this matter, indeed, I often demand of theologians greater prudence. For it is absurd that so grave a charge should be leveled except in the gravest of matters. But to the point.

That conclusion, as I have stated it, is first shown by this: that no dogma will be found which all the scholastics, with one mind and voice, have certainly and firmly asserted, but that the whole Church holds the same, moved by their authority. For if heretics can find any such dogma, let them produce it, and we shall be silent. But if none can be produced, then, without doubt, whether they will it or not, whatever is confirmed by the authority of the whole school is true, if it pertains, as I said, to faith and morals.

Add that no decree is so proper to the school that it does not have a certain origin either in the Sacred Letters, or in the tradition of the apostles, or in the definitions of councils or pontiffs. Thus those who have refuted the school's decrees have always been found to have also repudiated the source from which they flow. And, to say it in a word, no one held to be catholic has rejected all theologians indiscriminately. This is a sufficiently great argument that such positions of the school cannot be denied without endangering the faith.

Moreover, if in some question all theologians agree with one another, then certainly, if they err in this, they expose the Church too to the danger of erring. For whether those who hear confessions, or those who deliver sermons to the people, both instruct the common people according to what they have received from theologians. Thus it happens that the Church, by concealing their common error in faith, would deceive the faithful of Christ by its silence. For an error which is not resisted is approved — just as truth, when not defended, is suppressed, as Innocent says (distinction 83, "Error"). And God himself, if he did not expose the error of all the theologians, would fail the Christian people in necessary matters. For what would the unlearned people do, except follow those whom, for that time, they had received as masters of ecclesiastical doctrine?

After all this, is scholastic theology, then, to be despised? I would believe so, unless the Church had defined very many matters by its authority. For, in the past three hundred years, whatever heresies the Church has condemned, whatever decrees she has issued on faith and morals, both were greatly aided by the assistance and diligence of scholastics. Since this is established among all who know either the acts of councils, or the business of inquiring into faith, we must confess that scholastic doctors, all together, cannot err in faith and morals.

Moreover, when the Lord said, "He who hears you, hears me, and he who rejects you, rejects me," he was not applying these words only to the first theologians — that is, the apostles — but also to the doctors who would be in the Church thereafter, for as long as the sheep would need to be fed with knowledge and doctrine. Just as, then, whoever despised the theologians succeeding Christ despised Christ the Lord too, so whoever

despises the more recent theologians succeeding the ancient ones must necessarily despise Christ himself as well.

Whence Chrysostom — or whoever else it was — in his unfinished commentaries on Matthew, homily 42, says: "When you hear someone calling certain teachers blessed, test how he behaves toward his own teachers. For if he supports and honors those with whom he lives, doubtless he would have honored those others too, had he lived with them. But if he despises his own, he would have despised those others too, had he lived with them." Thus far he, on Christ's words: "Woe to you, who build the tombs of the prophets, and adorn the monuments of the just, and say: If we had been in the days of our fathers, we would not have been their partners in the blood of the prophets. Thus you are witnesses against yourselves, that you are the sons of those who killed the prophets. Fill up, then, the measure of your fathers."

Surely, heretics reason in the manner of the Pharisees. "If there were scholastic doctors such as Hilary, Jerome, Basil were, we would follow them; if we had lived in the days of Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome, we would not have been companions of Mani, Novatus, Vigilantius, Pelagius, Jovinian." Thus they are witnesses that they are the sons of those who despised the ancient saints — since they hold the more recent theologians of the school as nothing.

Finally, as the Apostle teaches in Ephesians 4, "Christ gave some in the Church as apostles, some as prophets, others as evangelists, and others as pastors and teachers, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the building up of the body of Christ, until we all come into the unity of the faith, unto a perfect man, that we be no longer little children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine."

For as long, then, as the body of Christ — that is, the Church — shall exist, it will pertain to divine providence that those who are held to be teachers of sacred doctrine in the Church hold the truth in faith, as given by God, lest the people be carried about like children. Nor, when we say that this testimony of the Apostle applies equally to the ancients and the more recent, do we thereby immediately equate the more recent theologians with those ancient ones (for we know how much deference is owed to antiquity, and how much also to sanctity); but we contend, to the best of our ability, both from many other passages and from this testimony of the Apostle, that this topic too is firm.

Whether rightly or not, let the judgment of others decide. For, on a new subject, where we had no one to imitate, we have set forth to our readers what seemed most probable to us. If anyone should reject our views by bringing better ones, we shall embrace them

willingly and gladly. There is no need to say anything about myself to myself. Although I need not fear that, in proclaiming true and open things about myself, I seem either insolent or talkative. But however I have treated this topic of the school, I have, I think, done a most weighty service to theologians. For, since I have discussed this matter most fully, they will today learn from me by what most ready reasonings they can assert both the gravity and the authority of scholastic theology. And this much on this point. Now let us repel the objections raised against it at the beginning.

Chapter V

[Responds to the Arguments of Chapter Three]

And, in refuting the first argument, there is no need to add anything beyond what has already been said. For we have shown, I think, that the establishment of scholastic theology does not lack the testimony of the Church and of Sacred Scripture. The testimonies we have had, we have already produced; and others, perhaps more numerous and weightier, will be produced afterward.

The second argument too has been no less refuted. For we have said — and though it has often been said, it must be said again — that factions in the school, as though sworn together, zeal for contradiction, and other such evils, if they exist, have arisen from the fault of men, not of the school. Otherwise, there are many decrees among the scholastics that are certain and firm, and all the more so, the more that no faction has ever called them into question.

But the third argument is most difficult, and requires no small investigation. Wherefore, if the difficulty of this argument demands a longer discourse, this should not trouble the reader; for the length of the discourse will be compensated by the magnitude of its usefulness.

First, I would like all theologians to be warned that, setting aside not only their passions but also the prejudices of their opinions, they should decide causes of faith prudently and gravely. For if something has become established in the school, even in good times, it is not immediately to be considered a dogma of faith. There are, indeed, some who, through the persuasions with which they were imbued from the beginning, pronounce judgment on the gravest matters with a certain rashness, without judgment, moved as if by a sudden gust of wind — a judgment which would be far different, had it been rendered with deliberate, considered, and constant judgment.

These men, moreover, err first in this: that they do not distinguish the school's opinions from certain and constant decrees. Then, they err in this: that they confuse two kinds of matters — one, of those which pertain to religion; the other, of those which do not even touch upon it. And if the consensus of the ancient saints, as was defined in the previous book, is not to be followed and held by us in all questions of the law, but only in the rule of faith — and if not even their common opinion, even on a grave matter, binds the faithful, but only their firm and constant judgment — what, then, should be said of the more recent theologians of the school, whom those ancients far surpassed both in the merit of their lives, in their use of the Scriptures, and in the weight of their authority?

But on these matters I need not say what many pious men wish me to recall; although the cause demands it, since it does not urgently require it, I shall pass over it. Since, however, I have often given examples of both errors elsewhere, and shall add various ones also in book twelve, I shall now be content with one example — which will nevertheless be enough to warn those who are usually rash in theological censures of their own rashness.

The Master of the Sentences, then, said that the sacrament of baptism existed before Christ's death, and was instituted by Christ himself, and administered by the apostles. Saint Thomas and the other theologians of the school agreed with this. Surely the Master followed Saint Augustine, whose opinions the school gladly embraces. But if someone should perhaps have thought that the true and proper baptism of the new law — the first sacrament — was not published by Christ before he suffered on the cross, we ought not immediately harass him with grave theological censure. But we must first weigh whether the theologians here define anything plainly, with their own certain judgment, as though the matter were established and settled, or rather hold a probable opinion on a matter not yet sufficiently clarified. Then we must also investigate whether it pertains to the catholic faith that Christ published this sacrament before his passion, or not. And indeed the Master of the Sentences establishes nothing with certainty, but chooses the more probable opinion. "It is more fittingly said," he says, etc.

Augustine too says: "Christ baptized, not by himself, but through his disciples" — whom we understand to have already been baptized, either with John's baptism, as some think, or, what is more credible, with Christ's baptism. Behold, Augustine does not pronounce with certainty that the Apostles were baptized with Christ's baptism before they administered that baptism mentioned in John chapters 3 and 4. Indeed, he everywhere teaches that we do not know when the Apostles were baptized. But it is by no means likely, if the Apostles were already ministers of the true sacrament of baptism, that they had not first received this same sacrament themselves. From which it follows that both

positions rest on opinion, not on a firm and constant decree.

Moreover, the scholastics also disagree on the form of that baptism. For the Master and Adrian think the Apostles baptized even then in the name of the Trinity — a view I myself cannot persuade myself of. Others, however, hand down that they baptized in the name of Jesus Christ, which is more likely. But such great disagreement on the form of baptism is foreign to certainty of dogma. Theologians, then, did not wish to establish anything certain on this matter.

Nor do Saint Thomas's words, if one reads them attentively, suggest anything else. "It seems," he says, "that baptism was instituted before Christ's passion," etc. — a word which Saint Thomas is generally accustomed to use when the matter is not plain and settled. I think, then, that when Saint Thomas said "it seems," he meant exactly this — that it seems so, but is not therefore also necessary. What, indeed, would a man otherwise so prudent and grave have definitively established on a matter which he understood to have nothing to do with faith?

For it cannot be certainly gathered, either from the Sacred Letters or from the institutions of the apostles, that the baptism which was in use among the apostles right from their conversion remitted sins and conferred grace. For as to what Augustine relates — "He who is washed needs only to wash his feet, but he is clean all over" — this need not be understood of the cleanness of baptism, but of that other cleanness of which it is afterward said: "Now you are clean, because of the word which I have spoken to you."

And as to what is related by some — "I did not know him: but he who sent me to baptize with water, he said to me: Upon whomever you shall see the Spirit descending, and remaining upon him, he it is who baptizes with the Holy Spirit" — this compels nothing either, as even those who make use of this testimony freely admit.

But it is established that the apostles baptized, John chapters 3 and 4, and not with John's baptism, as is known — therefore with Christ's baptism. So the Master argues. But this argument is too weak and uncertain to establish anything firm or certain. For "the baptism of John" can be called such in two ways: either as administered by John's own institution and authority, or as a baptism of water, such as John's baptism was — which was nothing else than a certain meditation and preparation for the sacrament of the new law. Likewise "the baptism of Christ" can be so called either because it was administered at Christ's command and by his authority, or because it was instituted by Christ for washing away sins.

It could, then, not absurdly be said that this baptism of the apostles, mentioned in John chapters 3 and 4, was not John the Baptist's in the first sense, but only in the second. And that it was Christ's baptism, since the apostles baptized by his precept and authority.

Whence, if anyone should gather from this that it was already, at that time, the true sacrament of the new law, he would, by the same reasoning, argue that the anointing which the apostles used before the passion was, from the very beginning, the true and proper sacrament of extreme unction. Which, although some theologians have asserted, is nonetheless not settled. Among true and grave theologians, it is a dogma of faith that extreme unction is a sacrament; but whether it was instituted before or after Christ's passion, they judge to be of no relevance to the matter. They think the same of the sacraments of confirmation and penance. Nor do I see why we should think otherwise of baptism, or suppose it a question of faith whether this sacrament was instituted before Christ's passion. For it is indeed easy to say that it was instituted — and so theologians generally speak — but who, in the end, has shown this to be true by suitable arguments?

What of the fact that Theophylact, on John chapter 3, and Chrysostom, homily 28 on John, explicitly deny that this baptism we are discussing was a sacrament that remitted sins and conferred grace? What of the fact that Jerome, in his dialogue against the Luciferians, having distinguished a twofold baptism — perfect and imperfect — teaches, not obscurely, that there was no perfect baptism except in the cross and resurrection — wherefore John's baptism was imperfect? What of the fact that Leo, in his letter inscribed to the bishops of Sicily, seems entirely to subscribe to the opinion of those who contended that the sacrament of baptism was published and established not when Christ was baptized by John, but after the resurrection?

I have said these things, candid reader, not to disapprove the school's common opinions. For we ourselves make more use of that theology in which are said things not much different from the common opinion. What, then, is the point? First, we wish to separate and distinguish opinion from dogma. Then, we wish theologians to be warned not to pronounce on such matters from an emotional impulse — which is usually brief and temporary — but with mature judgment, especially in matters where it is not so easy to determine whether they pertain to faith or not.

For if, in the example we have just given, one wished to add those reasonings and scriptural testimonies by which the contrary side could fight against the school's common opinion, the question would perhaps become so doubtful on both sides that it would be difficult to judge which side agreed more with faith and religion.

But, as I said, I am not now disputing whether the school's common opinion is true or false — although this would perhaps not be entirely foreign to our undertaking — but I am arguing that scholastic opinions ought to be separated from decrees, and questions of faith from those matters which are sometimes carried this way, sometimes that, and which can, without loss to piety, be disputed on either side.

Decrees we ought to hold firmly, and defend accurately; opinions not so, but with, if not academic, at least Christian moderation. For the faith, let there be a fight even at the risk of life; for these other matters, which are not of faith, let there be a fight, if you please, but a bloodless one. One who observes these prescriptions may discourse magnificently, gravely, and spiritedly; may judge constantly, truly, and usefully both for the learned and the unlearned.

To what end, you will say, has this been repeated at such length, and with such long detours? Namely, to explain what was briefly indicated in the conclusions of the previous chapter — that we have sworn allegiance not to the school's opinions, but to certain and constant judgments on faith and morals. To defend these is the task of this topic; to defend those, of another place and time.

These matters having been explained, that third argument can, I think, easily be refuted. For I deny that it has been settled by a certain and constant decree of the school that matrimony contracted without a minister of the Church is truly and properly a sacrament. I deny that this matter pertains to faith and religion. I deny that all the theologians of the school have asserted this. When I have shown these three points, the argument as stated will be refuted in every respect.

I shall show, then, first, that this common opinion is not a dogma of the school and a firm judgment. How can this be understood? Because theologians, indeed, discuss this matter in such a way that they do not seem to wish to settle anything definitively. Read the Master, Saint Thomas, Scotus, Bonaventure, Richard, Paludanus, Durandus, and the other theologians of the school, and unless you immediately detect their wavering and hesitant minds, then indeed judge me either foolish or rash. For even when they ask whether matrimony confers grace — which is precisely what ought to have been settled at that point — they nevertheless do not settle it, but relate what is held in men's opinion. Likewise, in establishing the matter and form of this sacrament, they are so inconsistent and varied, so uncertain and ambiguous, that anyone would be inept who, amid such great variety and disagreement among them, tried to establish something certain, constant, and settled.

But if, on the matter and form of the sacrament — which is a most weighty point in the treatment of the sacraments — theologians speak ambiguously and inconsistently, and settle nothing at all, why should we admit that they have prescribed anything certain on a question which is both lighter and less necessary for the constitution of this sacrament? The Council of Florence certainly established nothing about the matter, form, or minister of the sacrament of matrimony — which it would undoubtedly have done, since it did so for all the other sacraments of the Church, had it seen that anything had been defined on these matters by the theologians of the school.

Moreover, whether matrimony without an ecclesiastical minister is a sacrament of the new law was never properly and expressly called into question by theologians, nor investigated by way and method, as is customary, nor concluded by any arguments. Whoever, then, wishes to say that they pronounced with certainty on theological matters without careful inquiry, without diligent treatment, without suitable arguments, should take care lest, by that same action, he both does them an injustice and withdraws faith from the gravest matters as well.

Add that, in the writings of councils and the decretal letters of the Supreme Pontiffs, this must be observed: that not just any simple affirmation or negation is a certain and settled judgment. Rather, there are certain particular marks by which we recognize the certain definitions of councils and Pontiffs, as was explained more fully in book five. These marks — and even more so — we ought to use for distinguishing the school's decrees as well.

Otherwise, if any simple assertion of the scholastics were a certain dogma of faith, then their authority would certainly be greater than that of the Pontiffs and Councils. But if this can be proven to no one, then certainly this must be proven to all: that theologians, on this point and question, defined nothing at all. For they neither called the contrary opinion heretical or erroneous, nor said that what they held must be firmly embraced by Catholics — in short, they inserted none of those marks which usually indicate certain and constant judgments.

Since this is so, what needed first to be established has been established: that theologians decided nothing certainly and constantly on this matter which we are now discussing, but that the rest followed the probable opinion of one man, in an uncertain and inconstant fashion. Thus a common consensus arose, as it were, by chance. For the opposite could just as well have happened — that if the first had asserted that not every marriage of the faithful is a sacrament, but only one contracted religiously and sacredly, the second, third, and the rest thereafter, since this too was probable, would have

followed this same opinion.

It follows that I should show that, whatever theologians happened to think, this nevertheless has nothing to do with faith — whether such a marriage is a sacrament of the Church or not. This I think I can easily and evidently show with this one argument. There are three things by which something is made to pertain to faith: either it is found written in the sacred books, or it has been handed down in apostolic institutions, or it is gathered from either of these by a plainly certain connection and inference. But none of these can establish that matrimony contracted profanely, without a minister, is a sacrament of the new law.

Here, even if all the Thomists should rise up with the Scotists, even if the more recent theologians should wish to fight against me together with the ancients, I must nonetheless prevail. For not everything, as some think, rests on the authority of theologians. There is, nevertheless, a certain truth so evident that nothing can undermine it. Let those who wish to speak against me here test their strength as much as they can; and when, in this cause, the Sacred Letters, the traditions of the apostles, and the syllogisms of the school have abandoned them, then, unless they are unlearned and slow, let them understand entirely with me that this question does not pertain to faith at all.

But someone will argue: the marriage of the faithful is a sacrament of the new law; there is no greater reason for one marriage than for another; therefore every marriage of the faithful is a sacrament. Should this man be called a theologian, or thought worthy of this name? While he argues thus, he should be considered not only not a theologian, but not even a philosopher or a dialectician at all. Do grave theologians reason in this manner? Are they moved by such arguments to pronounce on matters of faith?

I myself indeed know that baptism is a sacrament; but if it lacks the sacred form or the minister, it will be a washing, not a sacrament. I also recognize the sacrament of anointing; but without the sacred form, without a minister of the Church, there can indeed be an anointing, but there cannot be a sacrament. Finally, I embrace the sacrament of penance; but without the sacred form and the minister, I find penance, but I neither ought nor indeed can find a sacrament.

Thus, then, although matrimony is a sacrament, we are not therefore compelled to venerate every marriage whatsoever, but only that which has the sacred form, and has been consecrated by a true minister of the Church. Otherwise, if every marriage of the faithful is necessarily a sacrament for theologians, who will defend Scotus, who denies that marriages contracted by mere nods are sacraments? For not only the Master and

Saint Thomas, but even the Council of Florence, teach that all sacraments consist of words, without which no sacrament at all is confected.

But if we once admit that the form of a sacrament can sometimes be nods substituted in place of words, we shall by no means be able to avoid admitting that a mute priest can absolve from sins, and a mute bishop can initiate into the sacred rites. And marriage is sometimes contracted by no other nods than carnal union. For when, after the betrothal, the groom and bride come together with marital affection, both jurists and theologians agree that a true marriage is thereby confected. But it is absurd to call carnal union, properly speaking, a sacrament of the new law. For the Holy Spirit and the grace of the sacrament are not given through coitus, question 32, question 2, chapter "Connubia."

The Church, then, does not teach that every marriage of the faithful is a sacrament — unless someone is foolish enough to condemn Cajetan, who, most probably, and, in my own judgment, most truly, denied that a marriage contracted between absent parties through letters and proxies is a sacrament. For those who cry out that Cajetan erred in this understand neither what they say nor what they assert. But if they proceed to refute others' opinions with no suitable and necessary argument, but with foolish and turbulent shouting, and thus condemn what has been probably and truly said, then we, quietly and in silence, shall laugh at their folly and madness.

Let them grant that one takes one sacrament for another, when contracting for another. Let them grant that the sacraments of Christ are administered to the absent, and that these same sacraments confer grace and remit sins upon them. For it is not because these are absurd that we would rather concede that such contracts, made between absent parties, are indeed most true marriages, but by no means true sacraments.

From these briefly discussed matters, it can be understood not only that it is not a dogma of faith that every marriage of the faithful is a sacrament, but even that the entirely contrary opinion is more probable. And if it was permitted to Scotus and Cajetan, as it truly was, to exempt from the sacraments of the Church those marriages which are contracted either not by verbal but by physical signs, or through proxies, what religious scruple binds us to confess that a marriage contracted civilly and profanely, in the manner of Jews, Saracens, or pagans, without sacred ceremonies and without a minister of the Church, is properly a sacrament? Especially since the contrary opinion is not only more probable, but also easier for defending the catholic faith, and more solid for repelling the weapons of the Lutherans.

Come, then, since my discourse has led me to this point, let me attempt to persuade the reader, by the same arguments that persuaded me, that such a marriage is not properly a

sacrament — that is, one that is both a sign of sanctification and a worthy cause of that same sanctification in those who receive it. I hope this labor will not be undertaken in vain, since I see that reasonings, testimonies, and, finally, the whole nature of the sacraments agree wonderfully with me.

I have first persuaded myself of this: that sacraments properly so called are sacred ceremonies of religion. For the use of sacred things pertains to religion, by which we worship God. Wherefore a sacrament is a work of religion. In the sacraments, too, we profess that we seek salvation from God the savior; and this profession, which is the external testimony of interior faith, pertains to that virtue by which we render worship to God. And the sins which occur in the abuse of the sacraments are contrary to the virtue of religion. And Augustine does not define a sacrament as any sign of a sacred thing, but as one that is a sacred sign. From these considerations it follows that the sacraments of divine worship and religion are certain sacred works.

Since, then, matrimony contracted civilly and profanely by the mere words of a man and a woman, although it is a sign of a sacred thing, is nevertheless not a sacred work of religion, it is certainly not properly a sacrament. Otherwise, if it were enough for things to have signification attached to them for them to be called sacraments, the bronze serpent and the manna would properly be sacraments — indeed, universally, everything instituted for the purpose of signifying sacred things would be. Since this is absurd, let us agree that what we have proposed is true: that marriages entered into without a sacred minister, and without any sacred ceremony of religion, are not sacraments of the Christian religion.

Then, the Council of Florence, having enumerated the seven sacraments of the new law, says: "All these sacraments are perfected by three things — namely, by things, as matter; by words, as form; and by the person of the minister conferring the sacrament. If any of these is lacking, the sacrament is not perfected." But in the marriage we are now discussing, there is no minister of the sacrament; no sacrament, therefore, is confected.

Nor indeed should those be heeded who think that the man and woman are, in turn, ministers of the sacrament to one another — a view I could refute with manifest arguments, were my discourse not hastening on to graver matters.

Moreover, the faithful do not consider themselves sacrilegious if they are not in a state of grace at the time they contract in this profane manner — in the minds of the faithful, then, it is inscribed that such a contract is not a sacrament of the Church. For if it were a sacrament, whoever took a spouse in mortal sin would, without doubt, commit sacrilege. And if an excommunicated person should contract such a marriage, he would be

sacrilegious twice over — as one who unworthily intrudes himself into the sacraments of the Church, from which he has been deprived by the Church. How much all this repels the common sense of the faithful is easily understood, even without my pointing it out.

To this, Augustine, in his letter to Boniface, hands down that the very corporeal things of which the sacraments consist must bear the image and likeness of that sanctification of which they are said to be the signs and causes — just as baptism, by the exterior administration of washing, has the image and figure of the spiritual cleansing which it effects; the Eucharist, by the visible refreshment of food and drink, shadows forth an invisible refreshment. And in exactly the same manner, in the other sacraments, interior sanctification is outlined and, as it were, set before our eyes by some exterior action and representation. But such civil and profane matrimony bears neither the image of sanctification, nor is it presented for the purpose of sanctifying under some exterior appearance of holiness. It is not, then, properly a sacrament.

Moreover, the Council of Florence teaches — and this is the decree of all theologians — that all the sacraments consist of words, as the form by which the sacrament is perfected. It is incredible, however, that a sacrament should be perfected apart from a form. For just as human form makes a man, and whiteness makes a white thing, so it is altogether necessary that any sacrament exist by virtue of a sacred form. But in a marriage contracted in a civil and profane manner, there are no sacred words at all; there is not there, then, even the least appearance of a sacrament.

Nor indeed can it be said that the words which the contracting parties use — namely, "I take you as mine," etc. — are the form of this sacrament. First, because the words of the one who receives a sacrament can be the matter of the sacrament, but cannot be the form. For the form, indeed, proceeds from the agent into the recipient through the mediating causes of the ministers. The forms of the sacraments, then, proceed from God, through the sacred ministers, into those who receive the sacraments. This is most manifestly evident by induction in all the sacraments which are, without controversy, sacraments.

Then, because, although in all the sacraments the matter is some material thing, one that is customarily employed even before for human uses, the form must nevertheless be supernatural — one whose force and signification arise not from nature, but from some higher cause. For since a sacrament is something supernatural, the form by which it is constituted must be received by faith, not by nature. But those words, "I take you as mine," are entirely natural, and used by all peoples, even those who contract without faith.

Add that the form of a sacrament signifies that spiritual effect of which the sacrament is said to be the cause. For sacraments, as the school's proverb has it, effect what they signify. But the significative power of a sacrament shines forth especially in its form. Those words, however, "I take you as mine," are signs of no spiritual effect at all. The words, moreover, which are the forms of the sacraments, are prescribed and determined by divine institution, and cannot be changed by human will, as Saint Thomas demonstrates in the Third Part. But the words by which matrimony is to be contracted are not defined at all, but such a contract can be made with countless forms of words, not synonymous, but varied and dissimilar. Those words, then, which the groom and bride use to contract marriage, are not the form of the Christian sacrament.

Moreover, when certain words are the form of a sacrament, if a nod, or writing, or some other sign whatsoever is substituted in place of the words, the action is certainly void. But if the contracting parties substitute a nod or writing in place of words, they confect a marriage just as much as if they had used a thousand words. This, indeed, if anyone considers it rightly, is no light argument — since the words of the contracting parties are the matter of this sacrament. For besides the fact that the one who receives a sacrament can administer the matter of the sacrament, but not the form — since, when in some particular sacrament words happen to serve as both matter and form, signs such as nods can be substituted in place of the words that function as matter, but cannot be substituted in place of the words that function as form. This can easily be seen in the sacrament of penance.

The words of the contracting parties, then, for which any other signs whatsoever may entirely be substituted, could perhaps be the matter of the sacrament, but could not be the form. This can also be confirmed by this argument: the name of the sacrament is usually taken from the matter, not from the form — as Saint Thomas excellently and explicitly teaches, book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 1, question 1, article 1; question 5, article 1; and distinction 3, question 1, article 1, reply to the second. For "baptism" — that is, the washing — is the sacrament, not those words, "I baptize you," etc. Likewise for anointing, confirmation, and penance. But the words of the contracting parties are the sacrament, as this same author attests in the Supplement, question 44, article 1, reply to the first. For we say that matrimony is a sacrament. But matrimony is that contract which is constituted from the words of both parties. The words of the contracting parties, then, are the matter of the sacrament, not its form.

Now who does not see that those things are false and fabricated, which more recent theologians have invented in order to defend this civil and human contract as a sacrament of Christ and the Church? Most of these are quite trivial to unbelievers, and

rather insubstantial to the faithful. One tells you that the contracting parties themselves are the matter of the sacrament; another, that not they themselves, but their consent, is; another, that the gestures and nods used by the man and woman apart from words are the matter; yet another affirms that the words of the one speaking first are the matter, and those of the one speaking second are the form. Would that these things were said with gravity, truth, and probability, so that they would not rightly be laughed at by heretics!

To what end, indeed, does it serve to philosophize thinly, not to say ridiculously, on so grave a matter? To what end such great variety and inconsistency on a matter necessary for faith and religion? For, as Jerome says, that which is different can never be asserted to be true. And again, he says: that what varies is not true is proven even by the testimony of slanderers.

What of the fact that we seek the matter and form of a sacrament — that is, certain things sacred by religion — while these men respond concerning the matter and form of a profane and natural contract? For if, among the pagans, there were a controversy about the matter and form of that pact and agreement, our theologians would certainly speak no differently than they would. Thus Luther, in his own manner, mocked the theologians rather amusingly, on the grounds that they had constituted the sacrament of our religion, whole and complete, from these same things which are found entirely in the marriages of the pagans.

And certainly, that the matter and form of a civil and natural contract — which all peoples, under every law at all times, have used, and which has always accompanied both the faithful and the unfaithful — are the very same matter and form by which the whole and perfect sacraments of our religion are constituted, will scarcely be able to persuade anyone — I will not say Luther, but scarcely anyone at all — except one for whom a preconceived opinion has such force that it prevails even without reason.

Indeed, when I prepare myself to respond to Luther's arguments, by which he attempts, in various ways, to overturn this sacrament, I do not take it upon myself to defend that such a marriage is a sacrament, in which no appearance of anything sacred is apparent, and which cannot even be conceived, without contradiction, as univocally a sacrament along with the others. But whether our opinion is true or false — for I care little whether the Lutherans wish to dispute about this kind of marriage — let them understand that they have run into the disputes of the school.

Nor is it necessary for a Catholic to respond to their arguments on this point. But if they should argue that marriage — with sacred ceremonies, with sacred matter, with sacred

form, administered by a sacred minister, just as it has always been administered in the Roman Church since the time of the apostles — if, I say, they argue that this is not a sacrament of the Church, then let the Catholic respond confidently, defend it spiritedly, and fight against it securely. For he will be able to give fitting reasons to anyone who asks, concerning that firm, perpetual, and constant doctrine which exists in the Church. He will also be able to both sweetly instill our faith in the faithful, and gravely defend it from the slanders of unbelievers.

This disputation with the Lutherans I would now most gladly undertake, if the plan of this book permitted it. But I see that I have digressed further than the reasoning of the argument stated required — if indeed it should be called a digression, where what can be so probably disputed on both sides is something we contend should be referred not to the catholic faith, but to the opinions of the school.

But this matter could have been settled in fewer words. It could, indeed — but it is difficult for words to correspond exactly, as if measured out, to matters in every place. And I have finally chosen to devote as many arguments as possible to showing that there is no sacrament of matrimony without a minister of the Church, so that it might thereby be clear that this question in no way pertains to faith — which I promised to show as my second point.

Attend now, reader, while I complete what remained last: I say that not all the theologians of the school agreed on this opinion, as is assumed in the argument. Indeed, certain grave authors think along with us. And first of all, William of Paris, in his book on the sacraments, treatise on Matrimony, chapter 9, question 1, denies that matrimony is a sacrament in the true sense of the name, and has sacramental power, unless it has been consecrated by priestly ministry. I do not cite the Master and Durandus, who think, in general, that matrimony does not confer grace. They certainly would not have erred on this point, had the common opinion, placed at the extreme, not been strongly disapproved by them.

The fathers of the Council of Cologne, likewise, openly deny that a clandestine marriage is properly a sacrament, and these same fathers also not obscurely assert that the word by which marriage is contracted is one thing, and the word which effects the sacrament of marriage is another. Nor is it enough for a sacrament to have those words by which mutual consent is expressed; but another word is required, which, as in the other sacraments, when it approaches the element, makes the sacrament — and this word, surely, must be one of faith, not of nature.

Their opinion on this point is difficult not to approve. I do not approve of this: that they do not seek that word, in which the form of the sacrament is contained, from the source from which it has always been sought by Catholics. For indeed, by what rites and by what words the sacraments of the Church are to be confected can be sought from nowhere more truly, safely, and constantly than from the perpetual custom of the Roman Church. But this is not the place to discuss this. Elsewhere, perhaps more opportunely, we shall explain the proper matter and form of this sacrament. Now let us return to what we had proposed.

Not only those we have mentioned agree with our opinion, but Peter Paludanus too, book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 5, question 2, though imprudently, comes down to this same view. For when a man and woman contract civilly, even if they are sinners and do not do penance, he does not believe they are guilty of sacrilege — which would by no means be probable, if such a marriage were a true sacrament of the Church. For all, without controversy, are sacrilegious who receive the sacraments of Christ after mortal sin, without penance.

Saint Thomas, moreover, although in his writings he generally followed the common opinions, was finally compelled by truth and reason to subscribe to our opinion. For when, in book 4, distinction 1, question 1, article 3, he had taught that words are necessary in every sacrament, he attacked this teaching himself with a fifth argument, in this manner: "Penance and matrimony are sacraments; but there are no words necessary for their integrity," etc. To this argument he himself responded that matrimony, insofar as it is an office, and penance, insofar as it is a virtue, do not have any form of words. But insofar as each is a sacrament, consisting in the dispensation of the ministers of the Church, each has certain words. Thus far Saint Thomas.

And in book 4 against the Gentiles, chapter 78, he teaches no differently — that marriage is a sacrament only if, in the manner we have described, it is dispensed to the people through the ministers of the Church. "Those things," he says, "which are dispensed to the people through the ministers of the Church, are called sacraments. Matrimony, then, insofar as it consists in the union of a man and a woman intending to generate and educate offspring for the worship of God, is a sacrament of the Church. Whence also a certain blessing is applied to those marrying, through the ministers of the Church." Thus far he.

And indeed, within the memory of the fathers, matrimony has been handed down as properly a sacrament only on this condition: that the ministry of a priest intervenes. So Callistus responded, in his letter to all the bishops of Gaul. So Cyricius, to Himerius,

bishop of Tarragona, chapter 4. So Nicholas, question 31, question 2, chapter "Lotharius." So Hormisdas, Evaristus, Isidore, whom Gratian cites, question 30, question 5, have handed down. So the Fourth Council of Carthage, chapter 13, cited question 30, question 5, chapter "Sponsus." So the Council of Lyon, cited question 35, question 3, chapter "Nulli." So the Lateran Council, on simony, chapter "Cum in ecclesiae corpore." So the Council of Constance, under Martin V, at the end of the council. So Clement, "On the Privileges of the Religious." So Ambrose, book 1, letter 1, written to Vigilius. Their testimonies I neither cite nor weigh, since, as I said, this is a discussion for another place and time.

Certainly Evaristus is so far from confessing a clandestine marriage, contracted without a priest, to be a sacrament of the Church, that he even calls it an adulterous cohabitation. To this add that legal experts, almost universally, also subscribe to our opinion. For when they deny that matrimony confers grace, they undoubtedly understand this of the civil contract, which they call, using the term rather loosely, a "sacrament." But when priestly administration is added, jurists not obscurely teach that grace is conferred through the act of the priest consecrating the union — and that it is therefore not permitted to accept money for this, since it is an ecclesiastical sacrament. Here jurists speak more probably, as I myself judge, than theologians — although certain theologians too, indeed learned and grave ones, are found to have disagreed with that common opinion of the rest.

If some should still oppose us on this matter, they do not thereby have grounds to immediately condemn our position, but should refute it with some fitting argumentation. For I, although not the kind of man who never approves anything false, nevertheless do not prejudge arrogantly what I discuss, nor do I refer it to my own judgment, but confirm it either with the testimonies of the saints, or with probable and fitting reasoning. Thus I can rightly and deservedly demand of learned men that they not judge me except after examining the cause. If they show, by reasonings that guide me, that I hold a false opinion, I shall receive this most gratefully. But that anyone should defeat me by mere assertion, without arguments, can certainly scarcely happen. But on the school's authority, enough has been said.

Chapter VI

On the Authority of Those Skilled in Pontifical Law

And here, indeed, this book could already be concluded, were it not that the prudence of pontifical law is joined to theology, and it must accordingly be explained here too, how much the authority of those skilled in such law contributes to the theologian for argumentation.

For there are some so hostile to the learned men of that faculty that they think their authority entirely removed from the use of theology. We, however, shall show in a few words how much such doctors' authority ought to be esteemed by the theologian, taking as our starting point this principle: that theologians who are ignorant of the canons of the pontiffs lack too much for the necessary uses of theology.

For first, if the care of souls is not foreign to theologians, but rather ruling souls is, as it were, their peculiar office, the knowledge of canon law is without doubt necessary to them. For just as no one is to be elected abbot, unless he has first been competently instructed in the rule, so too the care of governing the Church ought not to be entrusted to one who is ignorant of ecclesiastical rules.

The theologian, then, who is going to be either a bishop or a parish priest, unless he has first learned the canons by which the faithful must be instructed in the Christian religion and the ceremonies of the Church, will certainly not have his theological workshop sufficiently equipped for conducting this public business. And hence come those passages from Celestine, Leo, Augustine, the Seventh Synod, the Council of Carthage, the Fourth Council of Toledo, the Fourth Council of Orléans — which are related, in part by Gratian, in part by Burchard. In all these passages the same thing is entirely prescribed — namely, that priests ought to be skilled in the ecclesiastical canons. That knowledge of canon law is likewise necessary for bishops is easily shown from the chapter "Accedentibus," "On Excesses of Prelates," where the Pontiff defines that it belongs to the bishop to hear matrimonial causes, to impose or lift public penances, and to grant indulgences. But unless he knows how and to what extent these are permitted by law, he can accomplish none of these rightly by any means.

On this matter, since Innocent, Hostiensis, Antonius of Butrio, the Cardinal Abbot, and other legal experts discuss it at length — chapter "Cum in cunctis," "On Elections"; and chapter "Nisi cum pridem," "On Renunciation"; and chapter 1, "On Consanguinity and Affinity"; Gratian too, distinction 21; Cosmas, in the Pragmatic Sanction of Gaul, title "On the Bestowal," chapter "Taliter"; John de Anania, chapter "Quia nonnullis," "On

Masters"; Augustine of Ancona, in his book On Ecclesiastical Power, question 108, article 3; Antoninus, part 3, title 5, chapter 2 — we shall add nothing here.

We shall only argue that the knowledge of canon law is most necessary for a theologian. For since it is the proper function of the theologian to exhort the faithful in sound doctrine — indeed these same theologians, who are called masters of souls, and since the teacher of the Church ought to teach the people not only divine laws, but also ecclesiastical ones — it is absurd, indeed, to remove the discipline of the canons from the theologian's office. For although the precepts for living are handed down for the most part in Sacred Scripture, yet, as Cardinal Torquemada teaches in the proem to his Decree, the doctrine of morals in particular — according to each individual rank and order of ecclesiastical office — cannot be had without knowledge of ecclesiastical law. But moral discourses cannot be complete if given in general and not specifically, as Aristotle notes in his Ethics. For the fullness of ecclesiastical discipline, then, the theologian must surely also learn the sacred laws of the Church.

This is, moreover, especially confirmed by the Lateran Council under Innocent III, chapter "Quia nonnullis," "On Masters." For it prescribes that the theologian appointed to teach in a cathedral church should teach priests in Sacred Scripture, and instruct them especially in those matters known to pertain to the care of souls. But there are very many matters instituted in the canons which pertain to the care of souls; the theologian, then, must not be ignorant of the canons.

Moreover, all doctrine divinely inspired is useful for teaching, for reproving, and for correcting, that the man of God may be perfect, equipped for every good work. But the ecclesiastical canons were published by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, as Damasus says, question 25, the first question, chapter "Violatores."

Moreover, theologians are enlisted by the Supreme Pontiff and by bishops as helpers and fellow ministers, not only in the office of preaching, but also in hearing confessions and enjoining penances, and other such things pertaining to the salvation of the soul — as we are taught both from the chapter "Inter caetera," "On the Office of the Ordinary Judge," and also from the experience of actual events. But scarcely anyone can hear confessions and enjoin penances without skill in law. For as to what Cajetan says — that penitents, in cases of excommunication, suspension, irregularity, and other such penalties, should be referred to legal experts, so that the confessor himself not be burdened with the weight of another's field of expertise — I do not at all know how this could be done without great inconveniences.

For first, women sometimes incur legal penalties, and it would be absurd for them, seeking a remedy for their conscience, to visit the houses of legal experts — and certainly little fitting to womanly modesty. Then, too, since legal experts are usually accustomed to charge for both their knowledge and their words, access to the sacrament of confession would only be possible after payment has first been made. Add that people fear to reveal their sins even to a priest. But if they were also referred to legal experts, the burden of this sacrament would be made heavier than could be borne by weak souls.

But why should I go on enumerating the inconveniences into which confessors, and accordingly penitents too, would necessarily fall, if the confessors themselves were ignorant of the canons? These are more evident than that we should need to point them out. It must be admitted, then, that legal expertise will be of great use to theologians.

Nor is it necessary to seek out far-fetched arguments for this, when we ourselves everywhere see how great a multitude of canons fills the volumes of theologians — especially of those who wrote indexes of questions, which we are accustomed to call "summae." Here, how much canon law contributes to theologians, they themselves can be judges — for, however outstanding their learning may be, they read and love these epitomes. But even Cajetan's own Summa, if you remove what it contains from canon law, will be found largely incomplete in great part.

Moreover, since no causes are more frequently referred to the theologian than those of matrimony, if he does not respond, he will be considered unlearned; but if he responds without legal expertise, not to say impudent, he will be imprudent. For, as Alexander teaches, matrimonial causes are not to be handled by just anyone, but by discreet men, who are not ignorant of the statutes of the canons.

To this: the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs are believed to have flowed from divine law — that is, from the books of both Testaments. Since, then, theology draws its little streams from these same sources, the theologian will surely act inaptly, unless he wishes to make use of the work of the Supreme Pontiffs, who, both with the counsel of many wise men sought out, and by the suggestion of the Holy Spirit, have gathered dogmas and laws — whether pertaining to faith, or to the morals of the faithful, or to ecclesiastical rites and ceremonies — from the divine oracles.

Likewise, the theological faculty is not such that it only perceives a matter in the mind, but also accomplishes and does something. It is, indeed, to use the school's terms, partly speculative, partly practical, as Saint Thomas demonstrates. But the discipline of canon law is a certain practical theology, as Alvarus Pelagius teaches — both because the end of that faculty is to direct souls, through canonical laws, toward eternal salvation, and also

because, in the single volume of the Decretals alone, many cases and articles are contained, useful and necessary both in the counseling of souls and in the forum of penance, and in ruling and disposing of churches and ecclesiastical matters.

For that book treats of baptism, of holy anointing, of the celebration of Masses, of matrimony, of orders and the other sacraments; of the monastic state, of clerical honesty, of vows, of oaths, and other such matters; of simony, of perjury, of usury, of theft, and other crimes of this kind; of irregularity, suspension, excommunication, interdict, and similar penalties. If a theologian is ignorant of all these things, he will not only be, as Innocent calls him, chapter "Ex multa," "On Vows," an "idiot," but will hallucinate in many matters, especially those pertaining to action and to Christian morals.

And would that theologians who are utterly ignorant of canon law would either abstain from deciding cases of conscience, lest, unskilled, they be laughed at, when they sometimes answer on these matters as masters what they never learned even as students; or would certainly be endowed with the modesty to consult legal experts, rather than answering by divination from their own private sense. If we wished to show into how many errors certain theologians have fallen through their ignorance of pontifical law, this would indeed be most easy — but it would be tedious, and our discourse hastens elsewhere.

Let us hold, then, to what has been established: that the doctrine of canon law is very necessary for the theologian — this all the more, since the authority of the Supreme Pontiff and of councils, which is contained in the volumes of this doctrine, supplies theologians with arguments proper to the theological faculty, as has been abundantly demonstrated in the two previous books.

Chapter VII

[What Use Canon Law Has in the Theological Faculty]

But this being established, it is not yet apparent what use interpreters and professors of law can be to theologians discoursing, or what and what kind of arguments their authority supplies to theological disputations. Since no one has even lightly touched on this, I shall say what I can — inelegantly, perhaps, but so that the matter may be understood.

The volumes of pontifical law deal with various kinds of matters. First, they both profess and explain the catholic faith, as in the title "On the Supreme Trinity." Then, they make definitions concerning morals and the Christian religion, as far as this is permitted either

by the evangelical law or by natural reason — as can be seen in the titles "On Usury," "On the Oath," "On Divorces," "On Simony." Moreover, they also discuss ecclesiastical customs and the ceremonies of religion and the offices of the Church's ministers, insofar as all these are arranged by positive laws.

For I willingly use the scholastic term, and do not fear the censure of grammarians. Otherwise, as Aristotle says, the gravest matters are sometimes deformed by an ostentation of words and an immoderate diligence for ornament. And this is my reason for using, when I do, that speech which is familiar to the school — lest, like certain most Latin-speaking men, I be rightly mocked by the school's theologians. Since, however, I know that grave opinions expressed in crude words offend the ears of more refined readers, I am accustomed to employ a certain cleanliness of speech — not odious nor overly refined, but only such as avoids some people's rustic carelessness. But to the matter.

Human laws concerning ecclesiastical rites and morals I have called "positive," since this is the customary term. Such are many found in the title "On the Celebration of Mass," "On Clerics Traveling and Married," etc.; the chapter "On the Age and Quality of Ordinands," "On the Observance of Fasts," and, briefly, in book 1 of the Decretals, "On the Offices of Judges," and in book 2, "On Judicial Order." Finally, such pontifical laws prescribe penalties for those who have transgressed either evangelical, or natural, or even ecclesiastical laws, as can be seen in the titles "On Food," "On Abduction," "On Apostasy," "On Heretics."

The first conclusion. This foundation being established, let this be the first conclusion. In those matters which pertain to faith, the theologian does not need the authority of legal experts. Rather, the legal expert ought to borrow the exposition of those titles which pertain to faith from the theologian.

The reason is at hand. For whether Pontiffs or Councils, gathered into the volumes of law, define anything that seems to pertain to faith, they must certainly, as we have already explained elsewhere, gather this not from their own sense, but from the Sacred Letters and from the traditions of Christ and the apostles. Since, then, the principles from which Pontiffs and Councils proceed in deciding a question of faith are proper to the theological faculty — whose task it is to know what has been revealed by God, and what is either consequent or contrary to these things — it plainly follows that, in such matters, the understanding of the sacred canons is to be sought not from legal experts, but from theologians. This the fathers, to whom the knowledge of faith is entrusted, freely acknowledge. For they never condemn anyone for the crime of heresy until

theologians have determined that what has come under judgment is indeed heresy.

Since this is so, I do not indeed understand by what plan, among our own people now, the last role — not to say none at all — in the business of examining faith is left to theologians, while the first, or even the entire role, is given to legal experts. And since the chief labor in this business is to decide what heresy is, what constitutes a heretic, what the faith holds, what conflicts with the faith, and to what extent what the accused asserts is contrary to sound and catholic doctrine — for deciding the penalties of the accused, which is the later matter, judges have been appointed in the commonwealth; but for that earlier matter, which is both more grave and prior in the business of faith, the commonwealth has no theologians as conscript fathers, whose judgment concerning guilt the legal experts might follow when they judge concerning penalties.

May Christ, whose cause this is, grant that Christian princes, who are most willing to favor this work, in which faith and religion are contained, complete what they have once begun, and join the most approved theologians — the most approved, I say — to that most weighty tribunal, for the most perfect regulation of this divine business. For if this is granted to the Church, there will be nothing left to be desired in this most holy and most necessary office of inquisition. But on the first conclusion, enough. Let us now proceed to the rest.

The second conclusion. In those matters too which pertain to morals, insofar as either the evangelical law or philosophical reason prescribes concerning them, the authority of legal experts can contribute little, or certainly nothing, to the theologian. Rather, legal experts will receive the right and sound knowledge of these matters on loan from theologians. For just as the musician takes the reasoning for his conclusions from the arithmetician, since these conclusions are derived from the principles of arithmetic, so too, whatever dogmas concerning morals the pontifical law gathers, either from the Gospel or from philosophy, the theologian will certainly recognize as received from his own proper principles, and will understand and interpret more correctly. From this it is an easy conjecture that certain legal experts are caught up in the gravest error and great ignorance of the truth, when they assert that, in the matter of usury, simony, and other such matters, in which mortal sin is at issue, one should have recourse to legal experts rather than to theologians.

In this error were Anchoranus, in his disputation whose beginning is "In ancient and modern times"; and John de Anania, chapter "In civitate," "On Usury"; and Alexander, in his first consultation; and Alvarus Pelagius, book 2, article 20; and Hostiensis, chapter "Penultimum," "On the Age and Quality of Ordinands." These are nevertheless not

difficult to refute. For since knowledge of the Sacred Letters is the theologian's own proper domain, whatever moral matters are either contained in the Sacred Letters, or produced from them by a certain connection, the theologian will claim as his own, wherever he finds them, while the legal expert will borrow them as foreign.

And since, moreover, the principles of philosophy too are held by theologians — who discourse far and wide on the virtues and vices, on the end of human life, and on the actions by which this end is attained, and who build the structure of morals upon the foundations thus laid — certainly whatever is rightly prescribed in matters of morals from principles established by natural reason, the theologian will claim as his own by right, and will hand it down, explained and worked out, to the legal experts.

The third conclusion. In this third kind of matter, then — where, namely, matters concerning the morals and institutions of the Church and religion are decided only by pontifical laws — and also in that last kind, where legal penalties are established — the common and concordant opinion of all legal experts ought to produce great confidence in the theologian, if a question should ever arise concerning such matters. As, for example, if it should come into doubt whether this or that man is irregular, or excommunicated, or subject to interdict or suspension. Likewise, whether a delegate can subdelegate; whether a bishop can dispense in this or that matter — to use the school's terms — whether the pastor of the Church has been duly elected; whether an ecclesiastical judge has legitimately settled a cause in a trial. In these and six hundred other matters of this kind, the theologian will be most insolent if he judges what he does not know; more insolent still, if, after consulting legal experts, he resists the authority of them all.

For, as we have often said elsewhere, expertise in any matter belongs, more certainly and better, to no one else than to men expert in that same matter. Thus it is necessary to trust the most learned men, each in his own art. It would, then, certainly be rash not to trust those skilled in pontifical law in matters proper to that faculty.

Then, in the interpretation of such canons, the judges and ministers of the Church embrace the concordant opinion of all legal experts. For whoever, in ecclesiastical actions or trials, were guided by his own private sense rather than the common one of all legal experts, would without doubt be restrained by the Church's own judgment. Thus the Church, by approving the practice of judges, seems also to approve the understanding of those whom these judges follow in the administration of the Church.

Nor is it foreign to true conjecture that Christ the Lord is, in a certain manner, also present to those skilled in this law, in the interpretation of ecclesiastical laws. For since

the sacred canons, at the instigation of the Holy Spirit, were published for the benefit of the Church, as Pope Damasus defines, it is consistent to think that the Church, for whom those canons are necessary, so that she may be kept within religion and ecclesiastical morals, has received from God sound interpreters of those laws and institutions by which she must be administered. For it would have profited little to have dead laws written on parchment, unless the Christian commonwealth also had living interpreters, who could grasp the right sense of those laws.

God, then, since he does not fail in necessary matters, has poured out the spirit of truth not only upon theologians, but also upon those skilled in pontifical law. Wherefore the theologian can draw a most probable argument, from the concordant opinion of all, for deciding those questions which arise concerning those two kinds of matters placed in the latter category.

Very many such questions will arise in both kinds, whose determination it is not permitted for theologians to be ignorant of — especially for those who either hear the confessions of laity and clergy, or teach theology in the academies. For these men, since they bear a great burden of responding on many matters that depend on law, will, if they neglect the responses and decrees of legal experts, sometimes err dangerously and shamefully. But matters which are consulted with men expert in their own particular art are answered with either the least risk, or certainly none at all.

And on the seventh topic, I think I have said enough.

Book IX

On the Eighth Topic, which Contains the Arguments of Natural Reason

Chapter I

[The First Error to be Avoided in the Use of This Topic: that More Than is Fitting Should Not be Attributed to Natural Reason in Theological Matters]

It follows that I should teach what kind of arguments natural reason supplies to the theologian, which I promised to treat as the eighth topic. I shall treat it, however, as briefly as the matter itself will allow. For this topic extends widely, and, although it is not proper to theology but foreign to it, it is nevertheless great, and has been most richly cultivated, both by the rest of the scholastics and especially by the family of Saint Thomas — not because any theologian of the school has yet disputed on the force or use of this topic itself, but because they have all either brought philosophy and the other disciplines gained by natural reason into the Christian school, or certainly cultivated what others had brought in — each according to his own ability, but, in the company of theologians, so to speak, Saint Thomas excelled without controversy.

First, however, in treating this topic, we must avoid two contrary errors. The first is that of those who have devoted themselves so entirely to arguments drawn from reason that, whether they dispute or write, they seem not even to have read Sacred Scripture or the books of the holy fathers. These are not very different from those whom Eusebius, book 5 of his Ecclesiastical History, the last chapter, mentions — men who had fallen into such folly that, if anyone proposed a discourse on the Scriptures, they would counter by proposing whether the argument under discussion made a conjunctive or a disjunctive kind of syllogism. Of whom Eusebius again says: "Abandoning the Holy Scriptures of God, they occupy themselves with geometry, and, being truly of the earth, they speak of the earth; and therefore they are ignorant of him who is from above and comes from heaven. Indeed, Euclid is held in the highest esteem among them in the disciplines of geometry. Aristotle and Theophrastus too are held by them in admiration. Galen, indeed, is even worshiped by some of them."

That there were once, in the Church, some who, preferring reason to authority, settled theological matters with syllogisms, Augustine, in his letter to Dioscorus, number 56, and Bernard too, letter 189, are most abundant witnesses. That there have also been, in this age, in the academies, many who have conducted almost every theological disputation with sophistic and inept reasonings — would that we ourselves had not experienced this. The devil accomplished — and I cannot say this without tears — that,

at the very time when the theologians of the school ought to have been equipped with the best weapons against the heresies pressing in from Germany, they had nothing at all except long reeds — the light weapons, that is, of children. Thus they were mocked by most, and deservedly mocked, since they held no solid image of true theology, but used shadows — and would that they had even followed these shadows properly! For shadows are borne from the principles of Sacred Scripture, whose very shadows these men had not even attained. Wherefore these men, masters of theology in name only, fought indeed against the enemies of the Church, but most unhappily.

For matters go badly, when what ought to be accomplished by talent and learning is attempted by men who have little talent and are not especially learned. These men, moreover, erred right from the very beginning of their studies. For, having marvelously neglected those faculties which polish the tongue, and having sharpened themselves for too long in the sophistic art, when they finally turned to theology, they pursued not theology, but the smoke of theology.

But if those who erred through ignorance are to be blamed, what should be thought of those who fell into error knowingly and deliberately? For when they ought to have restored, by their own authority, a matter that had been ruined and collapsed, "serving the times," as they say, they not only did not overthrow sophistries, but even increased them. These, surely, must be removed both from philosophy and, still more, from theology — the art of quibbling, which indeed wants to appear to be dialectic, but is far distant and removed from it. For dialectic consists in the skill and practice of dividing, defining, and arguing — which is most necessary for the theologian; but sophistry has nothing but vain quibbles, from which theology gains no fruit at all. Indeed, no greater harm can be found for theology than a pretense of theology in the dregs of sophistries. From which those absurdities arise, that sophists seem to be theologians. And if anyone even delights in these things — lest I seem to have declared total war on sophistries, of which there is perhaps also a certain proper measure — I do not understand what reason learned men had for introducing into the school, under the name of dialectic, "exponibles," "obligations," "insolubles," "reflexives," and other such monstrosities, while saying not a single word about the use of dialectic itself. Are these things not useful for boys? Let them be — for we too were once sophists — but, I beg you, let them be held useful not as ornaments for men, but as exercises for boys. And let boys themselves understand that sophistries ought to be a brief kind of game, and that another use is to be sought from dialectic — one most necessary for philosophy and especially for theology. But enough on this. Let us now return to our proposal.

Those, then, who measure the dogmas of theology by human arguments, and do not wish those drawn from reason to be outweighed by authority — these first lose all the force and gravity of theology; then they make it so that, with authority set aside, theology is not only despised, but is not even theology at all. For if it is true and legitimate theology, it must descend from faith, where the proper principles of this faculty reside, as we established at the beginning of this work. Faith, however, is entirely contained in the authority of the Scriptures and of the Church. Wherefore we can hold it sufficiently established how poorly those fare, whether writing or disputing on theological matters, who either reject or ignore the Sacred Books, the traditions of the apostles, the dogmas of Councils, the decrees of pontifical law, and the doctrine of the ancient saints.

This kind of opinion, then, must be driven from our midst — for it is entirely improbable and impious — the opinion of those who think that arguments drawn from reason are more fitting for the theologian than those drawn from authority. For from what has already been said, it is plainly understood that, especially when a disputation arises concerning God and divine mysteries, arguments pertaining to faith in God — than which nothing ought to be more ancient for the theologian — must be preferred to arguments of philosophy. But since the frivolity of this first error is easily detected, it need not be refuted at greater length.

Chapter II

[Sets Forth the Extreme Error of Others Who Entirely Shun the Reasonings of Nature; Sets Forth Their Arguments Too]

The other error, however, is that of those who settle everything by the testimonies of the Sacred Letters alone, or sometimes also of ancient writers, shrinking from arguments of nature no differently than if they were opposed and hostile to theology. This error they urge with very many witnesses.

The first argument. The first witness cited is Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 1 against Julian, where he says that our discipline is Pythagorean. But among the Pythagoreans, prejudiced authority alone had such force that it prevailed without reason. The second is Jerome, on Matthew chapter 10, where he does not wish the teachers of the Gospel to rely on the supports of human reasoning — because such reasoning, as he says, is a "reed staff," which, if you lean on it even slightly, breaks and pierces the hand of the one who leans on it. And on Jeremiah chapter 31, he says it is sacrilegious to argue about the words of God by human sense.

The third is Augustine, book 1, On the Proceedings against Felix the Manichaean, chapter 10. For when Felix the Manichaean boasted of having taught his disciples the beginning, the middle, and the end, and how or why the world was made, and about the course of the sun and moon, and other such physical matters, Augustine, on the contrary, says that the Paraclete Spirit does not teach these truths. For he wishes to make Christians, not mathematicians. It is enough, he says, that men know, for human uses, what they had already learned in school — that is, before they were converted to the religion of Christ. "For human uses," he says; for the use of theology, then, human doctrine's reasoning will profit the Catholic nothing.

Two testimonies are also cited by Gratian, distinction 37, one from Ambrose, the other from the Fourth Council of Carthage, by which it seems to be urged that human disciplines, as pernicious, or certainly as useless, should be rejected from theology. For the Fourth Council of Carthage forbids bishops to read the books of the pagans. Ambrose says that astrology and other such disciplines are of no worth for salvation, but lead into error. Epiphanius too, Heresy 76, disputing against Aetius, says that God does not reveal the Father and the Son through the Holy Spirit to those who reason about him through syllogisms. Those, then, who bring human reasonings into theology cannot be partakers of divine revelation.

The second argument. Nor do they abuse only the testimonies of the fathers, but also of the Sacred Letters, in confirming their error. First, they cite that passage from Ecclesiastes 1: "I set my mind to seek and investigate wisely concerning all things that are done under the sun. This most wretched occupation God has given to the sons of men, that they should be occupied with it. I saw all things that are done under the sun, and behold, all is vanity and affliction of spirit." If, then, the study of human literature is a most wretched occupation, if it is vanity and affliction of spirit, it certainly ought not to be sought after by theologians.

The third argument. Then they argue from Proverbs 5: "Do not attend to the deceit of a woman: for the lips of a harlot drip like a honeycomb," etc. And afterward: "Why are you seduced, my son, by a stranger?" etc. This they interpret as human wisdom — which the Apostle indeed attests to be deceitful, Colossians 2, in these words: "See that no one deceives you through philosophy and empty deceit."

The fourth argument. They add that from 1 Corinthians 1: "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the prudence of the prudent I will reject. Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this age? Has not God made the wisdom of this world foolish?" They also add that from this same Apostle, 1 Corinthians 8: "Knowledge

puffs up"; and another, 1 Timothy 6: "If anyone does not agree to sound words, and to that doctrine which is according to piety, he is proud, knowing nothing, but sick about questions." Here they wish the Apostle to signify that human disciplines are diseases, and that only Christ's doctrine is sound — this being "according to piety," that is, conformed and consonant with religion, while the others are not.

The fifth argument. Moreover, the apostles did not have philosophy; it is not, then, necessary for the theologian. For if the Holy Spirit taught the apostles all truth, according to the Lord's promise in John 16, and did not teach these disciplines, it follows that they are not useful to the Christian teacher, and accordingly do not even concern the truth at all. Moreover, either philosophy is necessary for the theologian while he instructs the imperfect in the Church, or while he addresses the perfect. To the imperfect, Paul gives milk, and does not think he knows anything among such people, except Christ, and him crucified. To the perfect, however, he speaks wisdom — not of this age, nor of the princes of this age, that is, of philosophers. The theologian, then, does not need philosophy, whether he holds discourse with the little ones or with the more advanced.

The sixth argument. They also proceed to argue that, if philosophy were useful and necessary for the theologian, this would be especially because there is no better way or method for defeating philosophers who resist Christ. But this is established as most vain — first, because, as the Apostle says, the cross of Christ would be emptied of its power, if he triumphed over philosophers and sophists by human wisdom; again, because, as this same Apostle attests, 2 Corinthians 10, the weapons of Christian warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God for the destruction of fortifications, destroying counsels and every height that exalts itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing every intellect into captivity, unto the obedience of Christ.

The theologian, then, the soldier of Christ, does not need the supports of human disciplines, in order to overcome the adversaries of the faith. This is easily shown by the example of the Council of Nicaea, where, for overcoming a philosopher, the sincere faith of a simple man availed more than all the quibbling of every dialectician and philosopher. Certainly Jerome, to Pammachius, against the errors of John, says that arguments drawn from reason, and flowing from the source of the pagans, must be laid down by the Christian, as being the weapons of the pagans. Finally, they also argue that the doctrine of Christ is perfect; it does not, then, need the supports of philosophy.

Chapter III

[Lists the Architects and Followers of This Aforementioned Error]

By these arguments those relied who held this error. For Clement of Alexandria, book 1 of the Stromata, attests that there were some, in these words: "It has not escaped me that certain unlearned men, causing a tumult, assert that one ought to occupy oneself only with those things which contain the faith, and pass over external matters, and those that are superfluous — matters which wear us out to no purpose, and hold us fast in things that contribute nothing to faith. Others, moreover, think that philosophy itself entered into human life from evil, for the ruin of men, as having proceeded from some malicious inventor."

And again, in this same book: "Certain men, who think themselves clever, wish to touch neither philosophy nor dialectic, nor even to learn natural contemplation, but demand only bare, naked faith — just as if, having taken no care at all of the vine, they wished to gather clusters of grapes right from the beginning. But the Lord is called, allegorically, the vine, from whom fruit must be gathered with diligence and by the art of cultivating the field, which is done by reason and discourse," etc.

Luther too, who caused all the heresies of all heretics to flow together into one Charybdis, not only asserted that philosophy is useless and harmful to the theologian, but even that all speculative disciplines are errors. Namely, this new Socrates has marvelously embraced moral philosophy; only that which concerns contemplation does he condemn. Cornelius Agrippa too, a man most vain beyond human memory, in that book of his entitled On the Vanity of the Sciences, declared war — not like that Zethus of Pacuvius, only on philosophy, but on all human disciplines, and even on the divine ones too.

It is not necessary to discuss what the character of these men's intellect usually is, for this is evident. For it is easily understood why these men wish their disciples to be estranged from the faculties that rest upon reason. For just as Epicurus rejects dialectic, and the Alfaquins of Mohammed lead the Saracens far from all disciplines — since they understand that all rational disciplines and arts are contrary to a perverse doctrine — so too the Lutherans, lest their disciples should ever detect the most absurd errors of their sect, wish to withdraw them from every way of knowing. But since truth is never opposed to truth — but always agrees with it and serves it — the most distinguished authors of our own school have, rightly and deservedly, summoned all the human sciences, as handmaids, to the art and ministry of true wisdom. This is what Julian, out of envy, forbade to Christians by law — the studies of the liberal arts — as Socrates

relates, book 3 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapters 12 and 16, and Sozomen, book 6 of the Tripartite History, chapter 37.

Wherefore I do not cease to marvel that the practice of expelling human reasonings, when discoursing on theology, has crept into certain catholic gymnasia too — no small loss to ecclesiastical discipline, if this custom should gain strength. For, if things proceed this way, the best and most outstanding theologians will be those who have memorized the most passages, and, as is objected against legal experts, those who are indexes and tables of contents of books. This happened in Germany, when Luther reigned, that cobblers who had committed the New Testament to memory were held to be great and distinguished theologians; and indeed little women, since they could recite the Gospels and Paul's epistles from memory, would challenge the theologians of all the academies to disputation, and would dare to compete with men — not virgins, but the most corrupted women.

Such, indeed, is Lutheran theology, in which, since there is no sharpness, no specimen of talent, every man of the best and most brilliant intellect — however keen his mind and perception of truth, however well he grasps the order and connection of all things divine and human, however thoroughly he not only surveys but comprehends the causes, effects, antecedents, and consequences of all things — is nonetheless held in no esteem at all among them. But this will perhaps be said more opportunely elsewhere. Let us now return to what we had proposed.

Chapter IV

[In which the Error Just Reviewed is Refuted]

We hold it, then, to be a very great error to close our ears to the reasonings of nature, whenever they are brought forward by theologians. For if it sometimes falls to a theologian to philosophize about human matters — which indeed it does, unless we suppose humanity has been entirely uprooted from him — what reason, I ask, is there to expel natural argumentations from theology, lest theology, being divine, should seem to have needed human supports? Let it not need them, granted — since it is contained within its own, that is, divine, lines. But do we wish the theologian, who is skilled only in divine matters, to err, stumble, go blind, and hallucinate in human ones? What difference, indeed — reason of mind being removed — is there, I do not say between a peasant and a theologian, but between a theologian and a beast, or even a stone or a stump, or anything else of that kind? What kind of mind, or rather what kind of human reason, would that be, if it had neither philosophy, nor dialectic, nor any discipline of human reason at all?

It must be understood, moreover, that professors of Christian doctrine are clothed, as it were, in two persons: one common, arising from the fact that we all share in reason, from which every natural argumentation is drawn, and by which the method of finding a natural argument is sought; the other, however, properly attributed to theologians, from which arguments proper to the theological faculty are expected. Let the theologian, then, if he pleases, set aside the person of a man when he treats divine matters; but when he treats human matters, what folly, I ask, would it be to remove the man from the man? Although, indeed, in any disputation whatsoever, whether discussing human or divine matters, it would be most foolish to set aside either person entirely. For what could be more foolish than either to cast off the foot, when the head performs its function, or to remove the head, when the foot performs its function? For the foot does not hinder the head, nor the head the foot; indeed, as the Apostle warns, the head cannot say to the feet: "I have no need of you." Thus, surely, since neither does the understanding of human affairs hinder knowledge of divine ones, nor does knowledge of divine affairs hinder understanding of human ones, we ought not to cast off either in its own proper function, unless we wish to be fools.

Moreover, whoever establishes theology in such a way that it has nothing at all connected with natural reason, but measures all the dogmas of this excellent discipline solely by the faith of the Scriptures — this man, if he persists in this opinion and is not sometimes overcome by the goodness of nature, can preserve and defend neither

theology, nor faith, nor humanity itself.

Not humanity — for this must often be said, since humanity is uprooted without reason; and those who take rational disciplines away from the theologian thereby snatch away his own reason as well, since if you remove reason from the truth which is perceived in the disciplines and from human understanding, that truth will surely lie prostrate — or rather, will be nothing at all.

Nor, again, can faith safeguard itself, alone, without doctrine and reason. For, with philosophy and every method of disputing removed, there remains, together with holy faith, a rusticity which — as Jerome writes to Paulinus — insofar as it profits by merit of life, so it harms by its simplicity, if it does not resist adversaries. Thus faith will waver, unless the faithful man, as Peter says, is prepared to give a reason — something which cannot be done by faith alone, without reason. Theology, finally, cannot stand apart from natural reason. For since man is a rational being, reasoning is innate in him, whether he deals with himself, or with another, or whether he wishes to know human or divine matters. Wherefore, when men discourse, they neither ought nor indeed can reject natural reason, unless they have ceased to be men. For reason contains all things; wherever you turn, it is ready at hand, excluded by no disputation.

Wherefore those who wish natural reason to be removed from the use of theology thereby exclude every disputation from theology — without which, however, what is true in any particular matter cannot be discerned and understood. Wherefore this much, I think, is established: that reason — which is the naturally established fount of every disputation — is necessary for theologians among theologians. What of the fact that grace does not remove nature, but perfects it, nor does nature reject grace, but receives it? Sacred theology, then, will not cast off the reason of human nature.

Many things, too, are contained in the principles of theology, as we said in another place, which cannot be understood and explained except through the intervention of natural reason and discourse. To remain fixed on the principles themselves, and to withdraw the gaze of the eyes from what follows and what conflicts, would be foolish. Likewise, if you remove reason from theology, theology itself loses both its substance and its very name. For theology is nothing else, if you wish to interpret the term, than discourse and reason about God. But if you seek the thing itself, it is, as defined by the ancient theologians, the science of divine matters. But science, as Aristotle demonstrated, is sought only through syllogism.

If we also add this — which can rightly be added — that there is scarcely anything of which mention is not made in Sacred Scripture — not angel, not soul, not air, not fire,

not water, not heaven, not earth — it must certainly be granted as true that, if the theologian wishes to explain these matters elegantly and learnedly, he will need to have philosophy — that is, understanding of such matters. He, then, who removes philosophy from theology thereby removes theology's greatest ornament, by which even Divine Scripture itself, let alone human reason, is cultivated. And, in my own opinion, every branch of theological instruction requires the aid of human reason — but especially that in which the matters of nature are discussed. And such matters are, indeed, discussed very often.

And — to pass over the fact that sacred doctrine prescribes morals consonant with the moderation of nature, and refutes vices contrary to reason, in which matter, whether you define something in the school, or persuade the people in a sermon toward the right and dissuade them from the wrong, it would be madness to despise the help of nature, reason, and philosophy — this much, at least, is settled: that very many things are contained in the Sacred Letters which cannot be explained without the aid of philosophy, arithmetic, geometry, geography, and astronomy. The Sacred Books are full of examples, often elsewhere but especially where the near-miracles of natural things, which are explained in human disciplines, are brought forward by Solomon, David, Job, and the other prophets, in commendation of God's power or wisdom. Since we shall pursue this fully and diligently in book thirteen, I do not care to set it forth at present.

For now, it is enough to have shown that human reasonings are not only useful, but even necessary, for the theologian as a man. For a man who removes all reason, a theologian who establishes everything from authority alone, certainly cannot exist at all. Wherefore this reproof of so necessary a matter is all the more to be censured, since it is so harmful. For there is one philosophy in human affairs, on whose usefulness all the Church's writers agree with one voice — though it is despised by the Lutherans themselves, and said to be a certain deceit and pretense. Those who say this, however, either think they are saying nothing contrary to reason, or think themselves warring against the gods in the manner of the giants — that is, fighting against nature. If they think they are teaching nothing dissonant with reason, what would you discuss with those who do not understand that snatching natural reason from the theologian is contrary to reason itself? But if they do think they are opposing reason, they err shamefully in this — believing that they can persuade a rational man of an error contrary to reason. Let them, then, depart — and since, being men, they do not wish either to reason or to philosophize with men, let them insinuate themselves and their theology to one who belongs to the race of beasts (for there are certain men who are men not in fact, but only in name).

Chapter V

[Shows that Philosophy is Necessary for the Theologian]

Now, to return to what we said about the consensus of ecclesiastical authors: Clement of Alexandria, book 1 of the Stromata, sides with us, and also gives many reasons why philosophy is necessary for the theologian. One, for instructing philosophers — for like is taught by like. Just as the Apostle became a Hebrew to the Hebrews, and indeed all things to all men, that he might win over all, so too the professor of theology must become a philosopher to philosophers, to win them over more fittingly and easily. For each person must be presented with what suits him and is familiar to him, so that he may come, through what is his own, to the truth of the faith. This same reason he also takes up again in book 5 of the Stromata.

He gives another reason for refuting the sophists. For by what method can we refute the fallacious quibbles of philosophers, except by pursuing the art of arguing and refuting? A third: that varied and manifold learning both delights the teacher and produces admiration, and accordingly captivates the listeners. For what is urged by a varied and manifold argument clings more firmly in the minds of disciples.

The Apostle too says that he teaches in all wisdom, in order to present every man perfect in Christ. "In all wisdom," he says — that is, divine and human — so that he might affect and perfect men of every kind in Christ. Moreover, the Queen stood at the right hand of Christ, surrounded with variety. To this: just as fire is produced by the striking of iron and flint, so, by the clash and disputation of the most learned men, truth is elicited. For this reason, Cicero says that he was pleased with the peripatetic custom of discoursing on all matters from both sides. But disputations among men unskilled in human disciplines are usually most inept.

But if philosophy were useless for the wise man, why did God instill philosophy in Solomon? For God gave him true knowledge of the things that are, that he might know the arrangement of the world and the powers of the elements, the divisions of times, the arrangement of the stars, the natures of animals, the force of the winds, the differences of shrubs. If, then, the Lord teaches knowledge of these things, and God, as Isaiah says, is the one who teaches what is useful, then certainly that knowledge cannot be harmful to the theologian, but will rather be fitting for him. And if this science is true, as Solomon says, what will Luther say, who affirms that all speculative disciplines are errors and empty deceptions?

Clement continues to argue also from the fact that an athlete who has not first trained himself for the contest is rightly held in contempt. Whoever, then, is not equipped with manifold discipline for contending with the manifold adversaries of the faith is not worthy to be counted among perfect theologians. Moreover, he says, it will be necessary for the theologian to distinguish ambiguous expressions found in Scripture, lest he both deceive and be deceived by ambiguity. This, however, he cannot accomplish without the help of the grammatical art. But if grammar is once admitted, why not dialectic? Why not philosophy? Do they wish grammarians alone to claim theology for themselves, and to exclude all others — dialecticians, physicists, astronomers, geometers — from participation in it? Since this is established as most vain, we must confess that human disciplines are most useful to the theologian. But if they are not, says Clement, it is still necessary to learn them, so that they may be duly condemned. For with what face do we pronounce judgment on matters we do not have thoroughly examined and known?

Thus far we have followed Clement of Alexandria — not as interpreters, but, as we usually do with the rest, drawing from their sources according to our own judgment and discretion, to whatever extent seems fitting.

Origen, moreover, as Eusebius attests, book 6 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 15, responds to those who disparage the pursuit of philosophy that he himself had indeed applied diligent effort to this, but not without the example of the most weighty men — Pantaenus, Heraclas, and others like them, who, though they were apostolic teachers, nevertheless read the books of philosophers and were accustomed to exercise themselves in philosophical studies. Eusebius also relates that this was Origen's custom — that if he saw any of our talented young men, he would hand down to them also those things with which philosophers are accustomed to imbue their disciples, as with first elements; and he used to say that no small benefit for understanding the Scriptures was conferred on the faithful, if they were exercised in liberal and philosophical letters — for the parts of our philosophy had preceded those of the Greeks; nor should truth abandon its own parts, because falsehood, anticipating it, had claimed them for itself. See also Eusebius, book 4, chapter 7, and Sozomen, book 3 of his History, chapter 15.

Theodoret too, book 8 of the Tripartite History, chapter 8, relates that Didymus learned grammar, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and the syllogisms of Aristotle, so that these might become weapons of truth against falsehood. For enemies are strongly conquered when we use their own weapons against them — so Socrates, book 3, chapter 16, and Damasus, book 4, chapter 18. Nor should you immediately be deceived into the depraved opinion that, because this is permitted against enemies, it should be avoided in other disputations — since, as Jerome says to Magnus, almost all the books of almost all

the doctors of the Church are most full of such erudition. As for what Theodoret says in this same place — that truth, namely of faith, is not taught by such disciplines — this signifies that the Gospel is not, as it were, propped up by these, or that the proof of catholic truth depends on them.

Otherwise, most weighty men have also inserted natural arguments even to persuade of those matters proper to our faith and religion. We have as examples Eusebius, book 3 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 25, and book 9, chapter 8; Melito again, in this same author, book 4, chapter 26; Justin too, this same Eusebius relating, book 4, chapter 8; Tertullian moreover, in the Apology, which Eusebius also relates, book 2, chapter 24; Lucian, finally, martyr and man of the highest erudition, this same Eusebius attesting, book 9, chapter 6. I do not cite here Damascene, book 4, chapter 4; nor Epiphanius, Heresy 76; nor Augustine, book 1, On the Morals of the Church, and the entirety of the first book against Cresconius, who, as a grammarian, condemned dialectic in Augustine; and On the Usefulness of Believing, chapter 97, and Against the Fundamental Letter, chapter 4, and The City of God, book 18, chapter 41; nor Bede, distinction 37, chapter "Turbatur"; nor Jerome, same distinction, chapter "Si quis artem" and chapter "Qui de mensa"; nor the Synod of Pope Eugene, chapter "De quibusdam"; nor Clement, chapter "Relatum."

These, I say, and many others I do not cite, since I shall pursue this argument more diligently in the books that follow. This much only is established: that the most distinguished men used human reasonings not only to persuade of what agrees with the reason of nature, but even of what surpasses the light of nature, and used these same reasonings to defend the Christian religion from the slanders of the pagans.

Chapter VI

[Shows that the Apostles and Other Holy Men Also Used the Reasonings of Nature]

But since heretics are prone to despise the practice and authority of the ancient fathers, I shall next show that natural reasonings were brought into theology by the doctrine and examples of the apostles themselves — by these, outsiders were drawn to the faith, brothers confirmed, the teachable invited, the resisting refuted. Outsiders, first, are drawn to the faith by reason, and, as it were, prepared for it.

God, indeed, uses the incitements of nature to induce faith in the minds of mortals, as was explained more fully in the first topic. Hence he both produced eyewitnesses of his resurrection, and joined miracles to his doctrine — surely so that the apostles might

persuade their hearers of the faith not only through the word, but also through the deed itself, as Epiphanius teaches, book 2, Heresy 51, and Ambrose, in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, chapter 1: "The power of the doctrine is its witness," he says, "so that, because what is preached is incredible to the world, it might be made credible by deeds." And Bede, book 3 on Luke, chapter 7: "The power of signs having first been granted, he sent them to preach the kingdom of God, so that the power shown might give credibility to the words." By signs and miracles, then, the path of faith is paved through the senses and through reason.

Thus Sergius Paulus, a prudent man, when he saw what had happened, believed, marveling at the doctrine of the Lord. Thus the Centurion, seeing what had happened, glorified God, saying: "Truly this was the Son of God." Peter too, and Paul, in order to more sweetly entice their hearers to faith in the resurrection, show, by natural reason, that this passage of Scripture — "You shall not allow your Holy One to see corruption" — cannot be understood of David, and must accordingly be understood of Christ. Peter himself, again, on another occasion, insinuates Christ's resurrection to his hearers, first by the most certain testimony of eyewitnesses, then by the evidence of a miracle performed. "We," he says, "are witnesses of this." And soon after: "In his name," he says, "this man, whom you see and know, God has confirmed, and has given this complete healing in the sight of you all." Behold Peter, citing the very senses as the clearest witnesses, striving to prove Christ's resurrection. Nor was this in vain — for many of his hearers believed.

The brethren are then confirmed by natural reason. For it does not say "with signs preceding," but "with signs following"; nor "the word inserting itself," but "confirming it," Mark, last chapter. Thus Jerome notes, on Matthew chapter 8, that the Lord, after that sermon on the mountain, produced an outstanding miracle, so that, through this, the sermon just delivered might be confirmed among the hearers. Peter, moreover, in order to persuade the faithful of that conclusion concerning the observances of the Law, on which there was controversy at the Council, says: "Men and brethren, God, who knows the hearts, bore witness to them, giving them the Holy Spirit," etc. And immediately the whole multitude fell silent, and heard Barnabas and Paul relating how many signs God had done among the Gentiles. Behold: external events that had occurred, and the testimonies of the senses, are cited even in settling a controversy of faith among Catholics. And, at that council, the apostles would in no way have made that law about abstaining from blood and what is strangled, from things sacrificed to idols, and from fornication, unless they were following natural reason — for there were no testimonies at hand that would seem fitting to prove such a law.

It is permitted, then, for the theologian to use human reasonings not only toward outsiders, who have only nature as their guide, but also toward those who are within the Church. This is all the more so, as we said before, where he desires to persuade of matters knowable by the light of nature, whether to strangers or to our own. By this path Barnabas and Paul proceeded, as is read in Acts 14. For when the priest and the people wished to sacrifice to Barnabas and Paul — which was contrary to the reason of nature — they too, by natural reason, contradicted this: "Men," they say, "why are you doing this? We too are mortals, men like you, announcing to you that you should turn from these vain things to the living God, who made heaven and earth and sea and all things that are in them. And indeed he has not left himself without testimony, doing good from heaven, giving rains and fruitful seasons," etc. Since, then, natural things bear testimony to God, as the Apostle asserts in this passage, it is not absurd — indeed it is most fitting — that the theologian too, when discoursing on divine matters, should also use such testimonies of natural things.

For also in Acts 17, this same Paul proves that God needs nothing, since he is Lord of heaven and earth, and himself gives to all life, breath, and all things. He also proves that God is not far from each one of us, since in him we live, move, and have our being. And the Prophet, Psalm 138, shows that God knows us and our inmost being, since he formed us and laid his hand upon us. This same natural argument you have also in Psalm 93.

From these briefly discussed matters, it can be understood — as we said before — that the teachable, if they are unbelievers, are indeed enticed and invited to faith by reason; but, if believers, are confirmed; and that both are persuaded in matters that are natural. But if they are unteachable and resisting, reason of nature also has force for their refutation. For the rulers and elders, seeing the boldness of Peter and John, and having learned that they were unlettered and uneducated men, marveled; and, seeing the man standing with them who had been healed, they could say nothing against it. That blind man in John too eludes the Jews opposed to Christ by natural reason, saying: "In this it is marvelous, that you do not know where he is from, and he opened my eyes."

The Lord too, in Matthew 12, refutes with natural reasoning and example those who slandered him for having healed a sick man on the Sabbath; and, in Matthew 22, refutes the Sadducees, having laid down two principles. One of these was that testimony from Exodus: "I am the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob"; and this being established, and approved by the adversaries' own consent, Christ took up the other from natural reason — namely, that God is not the God of the dead, but of the living. By this syllogism he concluded that the souls of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob live — which the Sadducees, in rejecting, consequently denied the resurrection of the dead.

Natural reasonings, then, have great force against the adversaries of faith. Nor are they the arms of Saul, which would burden the champion of Christ more than aid him, as some inaptly argue by allegory; but, if we must proceed by allegories, they are rather the sword of Goliath, which, once you have wrenched it from his hands, you use to cut off his own head.

But they say: if I believe what has been handed down, what need is there for laborious disputation? If I do not believe, no human reasonings will persuade me. With this fine dilemma they wish to obscure a matter otherwise most clear. I do not believe — I am drawn in; I believe — I am confirmed; I resist — I am confounded. Reason not as mistress but as servant, syllogism not presiding but serving. In short, do we not see, both in the letters of the other apostles, and especially in Paul's, that adversaries are cut down, and the household of the faith instructed, not only by the testimonies of Scripture, but also by natural reasonings? Since this is not in doubt, let it remain established that this manner of discoursing — proceeding from Christ the Lord, taken up by the apostles, confirmed by the holy authors — is employed by theologians not only usefully, but even necessarily.

Chapter VII

[Certain Extreme Vices of Some Theologians in the Use of Philosophy are Censured]

In this kind of discipline, honest and necessary for the professors of theology, there are nonetheless two vices, mentioned by Cicero, which must especially be avoided. One is that we should not hold the unknown as known, and the uncertain as certain. In this matter, much is sinned even in theology — as by those who embrace the opinions of Saint Thomas and Scotus even without discussion, and fight for them no differently than for altars and hearths. Although those who thought nothing could be certainly comprehended said many absurd things, this they said admirably: that the wise man ought to follow what seems probable to him, and disapprove the contrary, and, avoiding the arrogance of affirming, should flee rashness, which is most at odds with wisdom. But whoever wishes to avoid this vice, it is not enough to apply time and diligence to considering matters, unless he also applies care and modesty in inquiring, from the most learned men, into what he does not know.

Those, however, who learn letters in the distinguished academies of the Christian world, being instructed by the frequent disputation of most erudite men, and tested by the daily contention of most well-exercised young men, can more easily avoid such a vice.

And it will go excellently for one who has the good fortune of an erudite and pious teacher — one who, separating the certain from the uncertain, and, avoiding vain questions, selects the useful and necessary ones, and teaches his disciples that there is a certain learned, so to speak, ignorance, and that it is wiser not to know certain things than to know them.

The other vice is that certain men devote too much study and effort to obscure and difficult matters, which are also unnecessary. In this category I see that many even of our own have sinned — pursuing at great length even those questions from which Porphyry abstained, an impious man, but prudent in this respect at least, so that you could recognize a disciple of Plato and Aristotle; for these men treated nothing except at the fitting time and place, nor did they pursue questions that would overwhelm the minds of young men, rather than aid them.

Our own theologians, however, discourse at inconvenient and improper length on matters which neither young men can bear nor old men endure. For who could bear those disputations on universals, on the analogy of names, on the first thing known, on the principle of individuation (for so they entitle them), on the distinction of quantity from a quantified thing, on the maximum and minimum, on the infinite, on intension and remission, on proportions and degrees, and six hundred other such matters — which I myself, though not of too dull a talent, and though I had devoted no little time and diligence to understanding these things, could not even form in my mind? I would be ashamed to say I did not understand, if those who treated these matters understood them themselves.

But why should we now recount those other questions? Whether God could make matter without form, whether he could create many angels of the same species, whether he could divide a continuum into all its parts, whether he could separate a relation from its subject, and many other much vainer ones, which I neither care nor think it fitting to write here — lest anyone who has happened upon this passage should judge all the school's authors by the talent of a few. These vices, then, being avoided, whatever care and effort is devoted to natural matters worthy of knowledge will not only, as that author says, be rightly praised, but this will even be most necessary, if we wish theologians to be perfect and fully wise. For Jerome prudently advises Pammachius that, if he has fallen in love with a captive woman — that is, secular wisdom — he should shave her head, and cut off the alluring locks and the ornaments of words, along with her dead nails. For then the captive will give birth to many offspring, and from a Moabite woman she will become an Israelite.

Chapter VIII

[What is the Firmness of This Topic in Theological Discipline]

These matters having been explained, it remains for us to teach whether this topic is firm in theology, or rather weak. Here I see nothing that needs to detain us, since it is established that some argumentations of nature are certain, others uncertain. Certain, indeed, are those which dialecticians call demonstrations — that is, those which produce something certainly and evidently from clear and established principles. Uncertain, on the other hand, are those which, though probable, are nonetheless drawn this way and that by conjectures, and have no compelling necessity of persuasion.

This is a firm argument: "God is not far from each one of us: for in him we live, move, and have our being," Acts 17. Likewise this: "He who planted the ear, shall he not hear? Or he who formed the eye, does he not consider?" Psalm 93. And this too: "Eating and drinking what is set before you, for the laborer is worthy of his wage," Luke 10 and 1 Corinthians 9. This is a probable argument, which Peter uses in Acts 2: "For these are not drunk, since it is the third hour of the day."

Thus it is clear that the argumentations of nature, which come into use in theology, are sometimes weak, sometimes firm. For those who wish there to be an infinite question about all things, and hold that truth stands fixed and constant nowhere, are impious both toward nature itself and toward God. For the Apostle, wisely, having said that the reasonings proceeding from nature are manifest, then finally traced them back to God as their author. "What is known of God," he says, "he has manifested." Through angels? Through prophets? Through apostles? By no means. "But the invisible things of God," he says, "from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." Manifest and certain, then, are the reasonings of nature, at least sometimes.

"For all men are vain, in whom there is not the knowledge of God, and who, by attending to the works, have not known who was the artisan. From the greatness and beauty of the creature, the creator of these things may be knowably seen." Evident, then, and accordingly firm, are certain natural argumentations. The speculative disciplines, then, which are constructed and produced from such argumentations, are not errors and empty deceptions — which Luther asserted, not only foolishly but even impiously.

For that all human knowledge and wisdom is from God is shown not only by that testimony of the Apostle which we have just cited, but also by others which Clement of Alexandria relates. One is this: "All wisdom is from the Lord God." The other this: "I

have called by name Bezalel, and I have filled him with wisdom and understanding, to devise whatever can be crafted," etc. The craftsman's art, then, and accordingly every human discipline, must be referred to God, as to the source and first principle of all wisdom.

From this, and from many other considerations, it must be understood that those who say philosophy is an error and an empty deceit are to be condemned not only for folly but even for impiety. For God is truth, and from him there is no error at all. From this it is also easily understood that, since the reasonings of philosophy are taken and sought from divine truth, those who reject them thereby oppose the truth of God, on which those reasonings rest. Nor can what rests on such a foundation be weak or infirm. Wherefore vain men will strive in vain to overturn the reasonings of philosophy and of nature. For both lights — that of nature and that of faith, by one of which we are said to see natural things, and by the other supernatural ones — are from God. For that saying, "It was the true light, which enlightens every man," and, "The light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us," are also referred to the natural illumination of the mind.

Thus we would be no less deceived by God, erring in the light of nature, than if we erred through the light of faith. To reject, then, the guidance, investigation, and arguments of natural light is not only foolish, as Augustine teaches, book 4 On the Trinity, but even impious, which we have abundantly taught in this present chapter. This topic could now be concluded, were it not that we must first respond to those arguments which the heretics have raised against it. Let us, then, look first at the first argument, and thereafter, in order, at the rest.

Chapter IX

[Answers the Arguments Proposed in Chapter Two]

Response to the first. First, then, they object to us the authority of the ancients. In doing this, they do the ancients an injury. For what else is it to say that all human sciences are condemned by the fathers, than to say that they were not only unlearned, but even estranged from humanity itself? For since man is a partaker of reason, he perceives consequences, sees the principles and causes of things, investigates their progressions and, as it were, antecedents, compares similarities, and joins and connects invisible things to visible ones. By this inquiry and investigation of the mind, the natural disciplines in man are produced — and whoever criticizes the study of these, I certainly do not understand what he thinks should be praised instead.

Since it would be tedious to cite other passages from these same fathers in which human learning is commended, I care to cite only one, from Augustine, in that very book Against Felix the Manichaean, whose testimony these men themselves especially object to us. Augustine, then, although he had reproved those heretics who dared to overcome the authority of the Church by a mere promise of reason, nevertheless commends natural reasonings in their own proper place and rank, saying: "The most merciful commander of the faith has both fortified the Church, through the most crowded assemblies of peoples and nations, and through the very seats of the apostles, with the citadel of authority, and has also, through a few piously learned men, armed it with the most abundant equipment of even most invincible reason. But this is the most correct discipline — that the weak be received into the citadel of faith, so that, for them, now placed in safety, the battle may be fought with the strongest reason." From this passage, readers see what pleases Augustine. For, when reason is compared with authority in his view, the appearance of reason indeed lies prostrate, while authority prevails. But nowhere does he separate these two powers of argumentation in such a way as to suggest that anyone could be a theologian who does not rely simultaneously on both reason and authority. Indeed, he arms the unlearned with faith, but also arms the learned with reason.

The most learned men, then, do not condemn human disciplines or their natural reasonings, but rather those who, though not in catholic unity, and yet glorying in the Christian name, dare, as it were, to traduce the unlearned by reason — because they feel themselves lying most abjectly prostrate, if their own authority is compared with catholic authority, as Augustine wrote to Dioscorus.

They also condemn those who prefer philosophy to the Gospels — for whom Averroes is their Paul, Alexander of Aphrodisias their Peter, Aristotle their Christ, Plato not divine but God — such as we ourselves have seen many, especially in Italy, who, neglecting Sacred Scripture, clung to the doctrines of these philosophers as to the rocks of the Sirens, and who, even after donning the biretta and the mitre, resounded not with the prophets, not the apostles, not the evangelists, but with Ciceros, Platos, and Aristotles.

Our fathers also reprove those priests who indulge too excessively in the books of philosophers. For they did not wish those who ought to be devoted to the gravest and most necessary occupations to be impeded by the pursuit of philosophy. Basil and Gregory certainly, for thirteen years, in order to devote themselves entirely to the Sacred Letters, bade farewell to all the books of secular wisdom. Jerome too attests of himself, in his letter to the Galatians, that for fifteen years no book of the wise pagans had ever come

into his hands.

Clement of Alexandria, moreover, permits such men — who ought to be perfect and complete teachers in the Church — the pursuit of philosophy only as a means of relaxing the mind, in leisure; and, since he sent wisdom as a handmaid, as it were, to summon them to the citadel, the fathers have warned that the disciplines called "liberal" ought to serve theology, not to dominate it. He who is devoted to such disciplines, then, will take care not to neglect his mistress — that is, true wisdom — delighted by the amorous charms of the handmaids; indeed, he will take care that, if Hagar the Egyptian grows insolent in the embraces of Abraham, she be cast out and exiled, and that Ishmael not be allowed either to mock the simplicity of Isaac, or Hagar the goodness of Sarah. Let the mistress afflict and correct the handmaid, keep her in hand, use her as she pleases. For if modest, she will be useful; but if indulged beyond measure, she is also pernicious.

For our life is fleeting, and whatever more time we give to human studies, we must necessarily take away from the divine ones, to which the religion of Christ has consecrated us. Those, likewise, who devote themselves too excessively to the liberal disciplines usually imbibe errors that can scarcely be washed away. On this matter, provision is also made by law at the Lateran Council under Leo X, session 10. There is also a most holy law among our own people, which exercises in such disciplines only the young — and not all of them, but the talented — while it forbids these studies to those more advanced in years and slower of intellect.

But if some do break this law, or spend more time and care on philosophy and dialectic than is fitting, it is not on account of these men's fault that speculative philosophy, or the scholastic theology that claims it for its own use, ought to be contemptuously abused. For not even those sayings escape us, which are worn smooth even in common speech: "Nothing to excess"; "Moderation in all things is best"; and what Horace pursued in verse: "There is a measure in things, there are certain fixed limits," and the rest, most weightily — for the poem is well known to readers. We reprove, then, both vices: that of those who spend day and night turning the books of Aristotle or Plato, and that of those — and much more so — who, being entirely devoid of any knowledge of natural things, once they have tasted the Sacred Letters, so to speak, with the tips of their lips, then profess themselves the most complete theologians, and neglect philosophy as unfit for treating theological matters. But on the testimonies of the saints, I think enough has been said.

Response to the second. From the Sacred Letters, first, the testimony of Ecclesiastes is objected. Its true and genuine understanding, however, we shall easily attain, if we hold

to the purpose and intent, so to speak, of the whole book. Solomon's chief purpose in this book is to declare what that end of man is, for the sake of which he was created — that is, in what location human happiness is situated. For all the other matters which Ecclesiastes discusses in his sermon finally pertain to this, and everything revolves around it. He lays down, then, right from the beginning, that general pronouncement: "Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity" — by which he signifies that none of the goods of this age are such as could present man with his own end and provide him with true happiness. For in this sense the Wise Man calls all things "vain." Nor is this absurd, indeed. For that is usually defined as "vain" which lacks an end, or is idle with respect to the end that is sought. Rightly, then, are those things called vain, since, if a man seeks rest in them, he does not find it; if he expects happiness, he expects in vain; if he desires to pursue and grasp his own end in them, he becomes vain himself.

The theme, then, having been laid down in this sense at the beginning of the discourse, by which Solomon has embraced all the goods of this world, he then pursues each individually, and shows that man's happiness is situated neither in wisdom, nor in power, nor in riches, nor in pleasure. He shows, in the first chapter, that man is not made happy by human disciplines. How aptly and divinely he proves this is not for this occasion to explain.

Readers need only be warned not to be caught up in that varied error of Aristotle's, who placed man's supreme good in the contemplation of the highest things. If he were speaking of minds freed from the body, and seeking the happiness of the life to come, he would certainly be telling us something — that is, telling the family of Saint Thomas. But since, on the immortality of the soul, he says now this, now that, and does not always say the same thing, nor is it easy to understand what he chiefly thought, it is difficult to understand what a man — impious, or certainly inconsistent and wavering, and deprived of the support of the senses, upon which he relied as instruments in every judgment of things — was going to say about that other life, of which he either had no established view, or was entirely ignorant. He speaks, then, of the happiness of the present life.

Hence, in the Ethics and Politics, he requires wealth, riches, friends, health, and other such perishable and temporary goods, as aids to happiness. And in his book On Good Fortune, he denies that anyone can be happy without exterior goods, of which, as he says, fortune is the mistress. On this account, there can be no doubt about Aristotle's judgment; but whether he spoke rightly or not is perhaps a matter that can be doubted.

But whoever has understood this first chapter of Ecclesiastes will now, without doubt, be able easily to detect Aristotle's error. For what kind of happiness will the mind have, contemplating things above and beyond the heavens, when it is not merely burdened but overwhelmed by so great a mass of body? "The thoughts of mortals," says the Wise Man, "are fearful, and our providence uncertain. For the corruptible body weighs down the soul, and the earthly dwelling depresses the mind that thinks many things. And we can scarcely guess at the things that are on earth; and what is in our sight we find with labor: but the things that are in heaven, who shall investigate?" Ecclesiastes too, in the first chapter, says: "All things are difficult, man cannot explain them by speech."

A truly admirable opinion, and worthy of Solomon — which declares what Aristotle himself too said, severely and prudently: that the gaze of our mind is blinded by the most manifest things, no differently than the eyes of an owl are blinded by the brightness of the sun. Wherefore some — and rightly — admire Aristotle's counsel all the more: that, although he was not unaware how weak were the powers of our intellect, how narrow, fleeting, and unreliable our memory, how blunted, impeded, and feeble our sharpness of mind, how sluggish and slow our diligence — he nevertheless placed happiness in something so slight and meager in this life, so obscure and imperfect, so weak and unstable, so unfit in itself to make one happy, so, finally, the possession of only a very few men, that it seems to have almost nothing of what the definition of true happiness contains.

For what kind of happiness is this, which is most frequently intercepted, and gives way to the most abject circumstances? which is not the common good of the human race, but which very few can attain and hold? which, if all men, as is fitting, strove toward it as their end, the entire commonwealth would perish? which, when increased, does not increase man's rest, but his labor? which does not satisfy man's desire, but excites it? For the human mind, as long as it lives here, can be tormented by the knowledge of things, but cannot be satisfied.

Let it remain established, then, that the happiness of this life does not consist in the use of first philosophy — that is, in the contemplation of immaterial things — since this is something which sickness can remove, sorrow can interrupt, and poverty can disturb. For if a kind of harmony of other goods too is necessary for this Aristotelian happiness, then Aristotle imagines for us a happy man such as, I think, no one will ever be — and, as I can affirm, no one certainly ever was. What of the fact that, as this same Aristotle relates in his book On Good Fortune, where there is the greatest intellect, there is the least fortune, but where there is the greatest fortune, there is the least intellect?

Ecclesiastes chapter 9: "I have seen," he says, "that the bread does not belong to the wise, nor the riches to the learned, nor favor to the skilled, but that time and chance happen in all things." By what reasoning, then, shall we say that the goods of fortune are necessary for happiness — goods which are subject to chance, and which befall the foolish more often than the wise?

How much more wisely did Solomon establish man's end, as far as it can be sought in this mortal life, in the fear and love of God! "Fear God," he says, "and keep his commandments" — that is, every man. And with this saying the rest of Divine Scripture entirely agrees. "Blessed is the man," it says, "who fears the Lord, he shall delight exceedingly in his commandments"; and: "Blessed are all who fear the Lord, who walk in his ways"; and: "Blessed are the undefiled in the way," etc.; and, in Matthew, the Lord says: "Blessed are they who hunger and thirst for justice"; and: "Blessed are the pure in heart."

Surely, in the present age, either this is happiness, or there is none at all. For through this we attain true and perfect happiness; through this too we approach most closely to him who is supremely happy — that is, to God. For just as, the closer and more similar something is to what is hottest, the hotter it is, so, the closer and more similar someone is to God in this life, the happier and more fortunate he will be. Paul the Apostle too — not only Saint Thomas — said that love of God, in this life, surpasses cognition and knowledge. In the love of God, then, is situated the happiness of this life, not in cognition.

Nor, if the knowledge of earthly and heavenly things, which the natural disciplines produce in man, cannot make anyone happy, is it therefore immediately condemned by Solomon. But he calls the pursuit of human knowledge a most wretched occupation, because it is most troublesome. For "evil," in the Scriptures, is sometimes used not for guilt, but for punishment. This same pursuit he also calls vanity, because it neither presents man with his own end, nor is it of any use for attaining true happiness. But if we abuse this testimony against the liberal sciences, we must equally condemn power, riches, kingdoms, arts, and, finally, everything that is done under the sun. For the Wise Man said the same of these too. Since this is most foolish, we must confess that nothing at all can be established against human disciplines from the words of Ecclesiastes.

Response to the third. Much less, indeed, is anything established from Proverbs; for those words are plainly to be understood of blind pleasure, which, in Cicero, Plato calls "the bait of evils" — since men are caught by it, as fish by a hook. Philosophy is not that wandering, garrulous harlot, impatient of rest, wanton, flattering, adulatory, prepared

for deceiving souls; but, if there is any such comparison, she is rather Tamar, who, for the sake of offspring, sat at the crossroads, to whom the devoted and faithful Judah turned aside, and from whom he begot Perez and Zerah, who are remembered in the Gospels. The muses are not sirens, as they are in Pythagoras; they are chaste, not harlots; they are truthful, not deceitful. Those who delight in the songs of the sirens are in vice; those who love the muses are not in vice. In the letter to the Colossians, moreover, on the authority of this same Clement, the Apostle does not reprove true philosophy — that is, that which truly perceives the things of nature — but the Epicurean kind, which removes providence and counts pleasure among the number of the gods, and believes there is nothing beyond corporeal things.

Such philosophical doctrines, then, and others like them, does Paul condemn — doctrines which their own authors sell under the name of "philosophy," although in truth they are nothing of the kind, but rather the traditions of ignorant men, as the Apostle calls them. True and natural philosophy, however, is held not by human tradition, but by God's revelation, as we showed above, also from this same Apostle's testimony.

But since, in this very chapter, it is written: "I say this, that no one may deceive you with sublimity of speech," it is astonishing why Luther, Philip, and others whom, since they are still held to be catholic, I do not wish to name here specifically alongside heretics, did not reprove eloquence and every lofty character of speech. For it is absurd that those pleased by the discipline of words should be displeased by knowledge of things. But "dangerous curiosity" (for so one of them says) "and excessive audacity in defining obscure matters were born in us from the pursuit of philosophy." And this same man, with an excuse of the greatest folly, deprecating the hatred of the greatest wickedness, adds that he does not think philosophy should be entirely condemned.

What kind of slander this is, and of what sort of man, who does not see? Certainly it is not that of an open, simple, candid, just, or good man; but rather of a crafty, obscure, cunning, deceitful, malicious, sly, and wily old trickster.

Believe me, vices are not born from the pursuit of philosophy, but from error and ignorance. For what could be more contrary to philosophy than either to pursue vain and dangerous things, or to define, without any doubt, what is not sufficiently examined and known? What, indeed, does that statement mean — that he does not think philosophy should be entirely condemned? Which part of philosophy, then, does he condemn? Is it, like Luther, the part that contemplates and perceives? Let him explain and shake out his understanding, so that we may see what appearance, form, and notion

of philosophy is in it. For we do not, in the manner of the common crowd, call "philosophy" the Stoic, or Platonic, or Pythagorean, or Aristotelian doctrine, but, as men skilled in defining things, if we wish to interpret, "the pursuit of wisdom" — if we seek the thing itself, "the science of human and divine matters, of things terrestrial and celestial." To condemn this, not in whole, but even in part, is either the mark of remarkable folly or of manifest malice. Augustine, moreover, book 1, On the Morals of the Catholic Church, chapter 21, understands that a curious inquiry into nature, and a certain excessive love of earthly wisdom, must be guarded against — not true philosophy, which is a moderate love of wisdom.

Response to the fourth. Now, as to what is objected from the first Epistle to the Corinthians, this can move us not at all. For what he says — "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise" — is equivalent to saying: "I will obscure the wisdom of the wise." How? Namely, by illuminating the world with a greater light of doctrine, in comparison with which all the doctrine of philosophers seems to be nothing — just as the sun too is said to have destroyed, by its brilliance, the light of the stars and lamps. But God rejected the prudence of the prudent, because he chose only what is foolish in the world, that he might confound the wise. In this sense he is said to have rejected the strong and the powerful, because he chose the weak and the ignoble as apostles, so that God's power might shine forth all the more in the preaching of the Gospel. Although Clement, books 1 and 5 of the Stromata, teaches that this passage perhaps does not refer to those who are truly wise and prudent, but to those who seem wise and prudent to themselves — just as the Gospel is not called "foolishness" because it is foolishness, but because it seemed so to the wise of this world.

As for that saying, "Knowledge puffs up," this is most easily understood. For the Apostle does not condemn knowledge here any more than he would condemn wealth, kingdoms, beauty, strength, abstinence, and virginity, if he attested that all these things "puff up." Clement of Alexandria, book 2 of the Stromata, explains this of those who consider themselves wise, while nevertheless being proud, knowing nothing in reality, but sick about questions. This understanding is made more probable by the fact that the Apostle immediately adds: "But if anyone thinks he knows something, he has not yet known as he ought to know." It is not true knowledge, then, that puffs up, but that which seems to be, and is not — this puffs up. But, in book 7 of the Stromata, he explains "puffs up" in a new way, as meaning to make those who possess it think grandly of themselves. He refers, in this connection, to that passage of Ecclesiasticus chapter 4: "Wisdom has puffed up her sons" — for so the translator renders it, though others render it "has exalted," and Jerome, "has inspired life." The word, however, means "to

raise up" and "to lift."

But as for that testimony from 1 Timothy chapter 6, Saint Jerome, in his commentary on the Epistle to Titus, chapter 1, responds in these words: "It is asked why, to what the Apostle says — 'according to the faith of God's elect, and the acknowledgment of the truth' — he added: 'which is according to piety' — whether there is some truth that is not situated in piety, and now, for the sake of distinction from this, 'the acknowledgment of the truth which is according to piety' is introduced. There plainly is a truth that does not have piety — as, if someone knows the art of grammar or dialectic, so as to have a method of speaking correctly, and to discern between what is false and true. Geometry too, and arithmetic and music, have truth in their science, but that science is not the science of piety. The science of piety is to know the law and understand the prophets, to believe the Gospel, to not be ignorant of the apostles. Knowledge of truth without piety delights for the present time, but does not have the eternity of rewards." Thus far Jerome. "Sound words," then, the Apostle calls those which produce salvation of the soul; "pious" ones, those which make men pious and religious. This human knowledge does not provide — but it is not therefore useless to the theologian.

Response to the fifth. But the apostles were not learned in human letters. I admit this. Christ did not teach them geometry, astrology, physics. This too I admit. The Holy Spirit taught them all truth, but did not teach philosophy, arithmetic, or geography. This too is true. Christ, to us and to the apostles, handed down not the dialectical art, but bare knowledge, which is preserved by faith and good works. I do not resist this. These disciplines, then, are not useful to the Christian teacher. This, indeed, is what I most steadfastly deny.

For, to the apostles, as Clement says, the Holy Spirit fully suggested everything necessary both for understanding Sacred Scripture and for teaching men of every kind. We, however, who do not have this special gift of the Spirit, if we are unskilled and ignorant of human letters, certainly cannot properly grasp divine matters, nor be perfect teachers in the Church. Christ and the apostles, too, did not teach us human disciplines, so that our faith might not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God. Nor did they wish to teach anything except what was necessary for salvation.

Otherwise, if this example pleases, let us be ignorant of grammar, since the apostles were not grammarians. Let us be barbarians, because the apostles were not eloquent. Let us bring forward nothing carefully meditated and prepared beforehand, since the apostles spoke, with the greatest wisdom, suddenly and extemporaneously, in overcoming heretics, philosophers, and tyrants. How, however, they were taught all truth, Augustine

explained on John. There are, without doubt, certain human truths, which, although the apostles were not taught them, we nevertheless learn usefully.

For that truth underlies the human disciplines, which they treat and in which they are occupied, is so manifest that it would be foolish for me to wish to prove it, and for others to deny it. But at what time, in what place, and with what kind of men the theologian should employ human disciplines — for this too is asked in the argument — we shall explain fully and diligently in another book. We therefore now pass over these matters, whose full treatment is greater, and is to be discussed at another time.

Response to the sixth. Only that final argument, then, remains, to which we must respond. This Clement of Alexandria does skillfully, book 1 of the Stromata, saying: "Truth is not destroyed by the removal of philosophy, but is found to be its co-worker and helper — just as the first and second steps are for one ascending to the upper room, and grammar for one who is going to philosophize. For sight and hearing also contribute to truth, but it is the mind which knows it fittingly and naturally. Clarity too brings help toward transmitting truth, and dialectic, lest we be overthrown by heresies. And indeed the doctrine of the Savior is, in itself, perfect, and in need of nothing, since it is the power and wisdom of God. But philosophy, when it approaches, does not make truth more powerful, but rather renders weak the sophistic argumentation against it, and, driving back the deceitful ambushes against truth, is the hedge and rampart of the vineyard. And the truth which is from faith is, as it were, bread, necessary for living. But the discipline that precedes it is like a side dish and sweetmeats. When the meal is finishing, a sweet little cake is pleasant, as Pindar the Theban says." Thus far Clement.

Thus far, then, let us also have said, on this eighth topic. And if there is anything remaining, it will be discussed in the ninth, which immediately follows.

Book X

On the Authority of the Philosophers Who Follow Nature as Their Guide

Chapter I

[Explains the Necessity of Treating This Topic]

How arguments would be drawn for the theologian from philosophy, and from every reasoning of nature entirely, I think has been sufficiently explained in the previous topic. It follows that I should pursue the remaining matters, which pertain to the authority of the philosophers and of human history. For these alone remain, of the topics proposed at the beginning, on which I shall now proceed to speak — if I first say a few words about my plan and judgment.

For although our books deal not only with scholastic combat and contention, but also contain much else useful to those who search into deeper and more hidden letters, I nevertheless sometimes fear that the name "school" may be odious to certain good men, and that they may wonder that I devote so much effort and time to illuminating it.

I, however, for as long as the scholastic enterprise was conducted by those accustomed to incite the young toward the theology of the school, directed all my care and thought toward freeing myself, by whatever way and method, from scholastic conflicts. For I did not think my own effort in any way necessary to the theologians of the school. But since the Academy has lost those great men, and since certain of the others, who ought to have been companions in defending this cause, have abandoned these studies as arid and contentious, or certainly have shunned them as laborious and tedious, while the Lutherans have even reproved them as harmful, I judged it unworthy to give myself over to that leisure which I had long desired with many great longings. Thus, having been engaged in these studies from the beginning of my life, I judged that I could most honorably serve the Christian commonwealth, if I kept my mind devoted to the school, even reluctantly.

Having devoted much time to this in my youth, for the sake of learning, after I began to teach theology publicly, and gave myself to my disciples, almost all my time was consumed in teaching; there was no leisure for writing. For I bore the great burden not only of instructing my disciples in daily lectures and disputations, but also of responding to many matters, both orally and in writing. There were added, too, not infrequent sermons to the people, to which either necessity or my own will assigned me. But we cannot do — indeed cannot even think of — many things, especially great ones, at the

same time.

Wherefore, on completing this work, in which we saw so great a difficulty that it would require a man not only outstandingly learned but also unencumbered by any other business, I very often gave up all hope entirely. But, partly compelled by the entreaties of my disciples, partly overcome by the reproaches of friends, but rather, indeed, at your own command, best of fathers — whose wishes, especially in so just a cause, it is both difficult and not even fair to resist — I decided to sketch out this work in what are called "stolen hours," so that, if by some chance we should be unable to complete it, we might at least seem to have begun it.

I regret my undertaking all the less, since I easily perceive that, even if I accomplish nothing else, I stir men who are not indolent to a desire for investigating a great matter. For if we have not attained our goal, we have certainly pursued this — to explain, in these books, matters which were not sufficiently known to our own people, and were most worthy of knowledge.

But now let us proceed to what has been proposed. For care must be taken that, even if our discourse should sometimes begin to wander to other matters, it be recalled to this.

Chapter II

[Sets Forth the Arguments by which the Authority of Philosophers is Diminished]

That there were once, in the Church, some who rejected the authority of philosophers from the Christian school, Clement of Alexandria, a most weighty authority, relates. He also relates that they adopted this persuasion because the Lord, in John chapter 9, said that all who came before him were thieves and robbers, and the sheep did not hear them. They were called "thieves," they say, because they were deceptive sophists. For Aristotle himself too called sophistry a certain art of stealing.

And Justin, having taught that philosophers are like robbers, and having refuted them as deceivers, was killed through the treachery of the philosopher Crescens, as Eusebius writes, book 4 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 16. Philosophers, then, are not to be heeded — especially since they have always resisted our doctrine.

For, as Rufinus relates, book 1 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 2, men skilled in disputation, and for this reason opposed to the simplicity of the faith, favored Arius. And Epiphanius, book 2 Against Heresies, heresy 69, criticizes the Arians on the grounds that they were new Aristotelians, and had rubbed themselves with the poison of hurled darts from this philosopher, and, abandoning the Lord's gentleness, had put on

Aristotle. Thus they were made unworthy of even having the gift of the Spirit within them. And Jerome, against the Luciferians, says that the Arian heresy borrows its streams of argumentation from Aristotle's source.

Paul, finally, says that the philosophers, saying they were wise, became fools, and were handed over to a reprobate mind. Their authority, then, ought to be of no weight among us.

By these and similar arguments that old error rested. Luther, however, has attempted to revive it, long since buried, with no argument at all, and to condemn, one after another, both the other scholastics and, still more, Saint Thomas himself, as though he were the author of a reigning, devastating Aristotle, ravager of pious doctrine — so he speaks against Latomus. Indeed, in the manner of Domitian, he believes philosophers should be expelled not only from the city, but from the world. We, however, shall briefly and without dispute teach what the catholic faith and sound reason hold.

Chapter III

[Which Philosophers are Useful to Theologians]

The authority of those philosophers who held false opinions cannot aid our doctrine, or make hidden things known — as Augustine, to Dioscorus, wrote truly and wisely. "What is it to us," he says, "for the defense of the Christian religion, to seek what Anaximenes, Democritus, Epicurus, Parmenides, and Melissus thought, and other philosophers of this same stripe, whose doctrine was full of errors contrary to the reasoning of nature?"

Not all philosophers, then, are approved by our school, but only those of whom Socrates, in Plato, says: "In the mysteries there are many indeed who carry the wand, but few Bacchants." A magnificent saying, worthy of a great and wise man, by which we are taught that many were philosophers only in beard and cloak, but few in reality. These few, then, who investigated, by way and method, the force and effects of nature, and the norm of morals and life, and, for the most part, attained them — we assert, in this discourse, to be useful to theologians.

I do not indeed see why the Lutherans pursue such philosophers with such great hatred, unless it is because they neither wish nor indeed are able to thoroughly master authors who are obscure and difficult to understand. For the commentaries of even the best philosophers, and especially those of Aristotle, demand a disciple not only talented, but also devoted to labor. These men, however, since they have little talent, are and have

been occupied with removing labor from Christian life as well. Wherefore, whatever they see to be difficult and arduous in the books of philosophers, they both shudder at, and estrange the minds of the young from it.

But what Theophilus of Alexandria means, I do not entirely understand, when, in his second Paschal book, he criticizes Origen for having mixed the quibbles of philosophers into his treatises, and thus, from a bad beginning, proceeded into fables and delirious ravings, and made theological dogma a game and a jest. How much more truly, and how much more brilliantly, is that saying in Porphyry — though spoken by an impious philosopher — that Origen converted all the riches of the Greeks to enrich Christian dogma!

But these matters are perhaps obscure, when explained slowly, with no arguments applied. They must first be illustrated by the deeds of the greatest men. Then by the testimonies of our fathers. Then by reasonings — most evident ones, indeed, but as few as possible.

For, in such matters, which are proper to the school, since I am wary lest my discourse seem to some to be drawn from scholastic disputations rather than from the Church's own sense, I sometimes touch lightly on arguments drawn from reason, and urge the truth we follow chiefly by the authority of our forefathers. It must be understood, moreover, that, of the ten proposed categories from which arguments and reasonings could flow, that which rests on the tradition and examples of the ancients seems most splendid.

And if matters were well established, which are conducted according to custom and the institutions of the Church, there would be nothing to argue about these — for they are the most certain arguments. But the whole discourse of the Lutherans would soon have to be cast out. For it is hostile to the ecclesiastical rule, without which nothing can be right, nothing constant, nothing true. But more on this elsewhere. Now let us pursue what is pressing.

Furthermore, there were once, among the highest doctors of the Church, men who were also philosophers: Didymus, Justin, Origen, Gregory Nazianzen, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine. That such men were customarily placed in charge of the ecclesiastical school, Eusebius writes, book 5 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 10, in these words: "A custom handed down from antiquity was preserved — that only men most approved in knowledge and learning should be considered teachers of the divine Scriptures in the ecclesiastical school. The author and leader of this office was then held to be the sufficiently illustrious Pantaenus, who had previously flourished nobly among the Stoic

philosophers."

Origen too relates, in Eusebius, book 6, chapter 15, that the books of philosophers were customarily read not only by Pantaenus, but also by Heraclas and very many other apostolic doctors. If we should wish to cite the passages of the saints in which they use the testimonies of philosophers — not only those who wrote on morals, but also those who wrote on nature — we would be in danger of using, in a matter little in doubt, witnesses that are by no means necessary.

Let these men read their commentaries, in which the discussion of the six-day work is undertaken, and, in these alone, they could see both how great was the diligence of our forefathers in reading through the philosophers, and how great is the use of philosophers in explaining the Sacred Letters.

See also Jerome, on Jeremiah chapter 17, and book 2 against Jovinian, where, even while disputing with a heretic, he uses various testimonies of philosophers and many examples drawn from the philosophers' commentaries on natural things, clearly teaching how much their authority contributes to the theologian for argumentation. But more on this a little later. Now let us pursue what has been proposed.

Indeed — to pass over the others, whom our adversaries do not doubt are on our side — Epiphanius himself, whom they object to us, uses the authority of philosophers not once. For, intending to teach, in heresy 51, by what method heretics were to be put to flight, he says: "Those who have this in their practice say that reptiles and venom-spitting creatures are put to flight by the odor of dittany, storax, frankincense, southernwood, bitumen, incense, jet stone, or deer's horn." Likewise, in heresy 78, having urged with many arguments that the Blessed Virgin preserved her virginity after childbirth, he adds: "But if it is fitting to receive these matters also from some other consideration, we shall touch also on kinships of natural reasonings. They say that the lioness gives birth only once, and to a single cub." And, having added the reason the natural philosophers gave for this matter, he concludes that the Blessed Virgin, who gave birth to the Lion of the tribe of Judah, gave birth only once, and to a single child. Behold Epiphanius, both instructing Christians and contending with heretics over faith, citing the testimonies of philosophers.

Indeed, Paul too not only persuades pagans, but also, when instructing the faithful, is accustomed to cite the testimonies of poets and philosophers, and to draw arguments from them. For, speaking to the Athenians, he uses that saying from the Phaenomena of Aratus the astronomer: "For we too are his offspring"; to the Corinthians, that from the tragedies of the poet Euripides: "Evil communications corrupt good manners"; but to

Titus, that from the oracles of Epimenides the philosopher: "The Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, lazy bellies." And here he immediately adds: "This testimony is true."

If, then, the Apostle confirms what he says with the testimonies of philosophers, we too, following the example not only of the other saints but of Paul himself, both can and ought to do the same.

The second point proposed was to show, from the testimonies of the fathers, that philosophers are useful to theologians — where I see there is no labor at all, since very many attest this, not obscurely but most openly: Augustine, book 2 On Christian Doctrine, chapter 40; Socrates, book 3 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 16. Do you seek more abundant authorities? I would cite others, were my discourse not hastening elsewhere.

Certainly Jerome, in his letter to the orator Magnus, does not merely attest this, but confirms it with great arguments too.

The third point proposed was to demonstrate this same thing by reasonings. This I shall do plainly, and more briefly than so great a matter could be treated.

Whoever should deny that many things were prudently and gravely disputed by philosophers, many things also briefly and fittingly said, many things, finally, ingeniously and brilliantly explained — such men need not be wearied with words and reason, but with chains and prison.

And if this too is prescribed by the reasoning of nature — that what grave, talented, and learned men have transmitted with sharpness and diligence should be committed to memory by the young, and that they should strive to become learned in that same knowledge and prudence — it necessarily follows that the doctrine of philosophers is useful not only to the young, but to all those who will ever have any dealings with human wisdom and prudence.

If this is so — and we have shown above sufficiently that theologians will have dealings with many such matters — then, surely, as far as they can and are permitted, they will not depart from the side of those who think rightly about morals and nature.

And if this is so, theologians certainly ought to devote effort to the books of philosophers. For they will not find others today who philosophize more aptly and wisely on such matters. But the first premise is true; the last, then, is also true.

For that which certain men say is indeed absurd: that everything which seems fitting and necessary for instructing human reason has been handed down in the Sacred Letters.

Their error, since it is abundantly exploded by what we have said above, need not be refuted at greater length here. For what could be more foolish than either to believe that all the liberal disciplines are handed down in Sacred Scripture, or to think that human reason is not well and usefully instructed by such disciplines?

But if philosophy is useful and good for the theologian, and yet he cannot attain it except with the aid of the philosophers' books, then he certainly ought not to neglect the philosophers. Since, moreover, knowledge of herbs, stones, animals, trees, elements, and other terrestrial and celestial things is greatly necessary for understanding the Sacred Letters — as Augustine teaches in book 2 On Christian Doctrine, and as we too shall demonstrate more fully in book thirteen of this work — surely he will be truly mad who, in acquiring knowledge of these matters, neglects those authors who have labored, with the greatest talent, extensive investigation, and long experience, in coming to know them.

Since, then, there is no doubt on this point — that philosophers are of very great use to theologians — we must now establish that other point, on which even learned men can doubt: whether arguments sought from the authority of philosophers are certain, or rather uncertain.

Chapter IV

[What Certainty the Authority of Philosophers Has in Theological Matters]

The one and same consensus of all philosophers produces certain conviction of a philosophical dogma. For what holds in other arts — that approved authors have such authority among those who follow that art, that one does not usually depart from them except rashly — ought to hold in philosophy too, and even more so, lest disciples be caught up in various errors in the knowledge of natural things, and never have anyone to follow.

"It is well," says Aristotle, book 2 On the Heavens, "for each person to persuade himself that the opinions of the ancients, and especially of our forefathers, are true." And if, in every discipline and art, the learner ought to believe — as Aristotle himself prudently advised, and as Theodoret showed and made evident with a great array of examples — then certainly, in thoroughly learning philosophy, we ought to place trust in the professors of this science, especially when they converge upon the same opinion.

How great would be the arrogance, how great the rashness, not to disagree with Plato, I say — with Aristotle, Hippocrates, Galen, Theophrastus, Themistius, Alexander,

Dioscorides, and the other philosophers of this chorus, singing one and the same tune, whose writings, elaborated with great care and study, have been approved by posterity not only through examination, but even through consensus — but to speak against the learned men of one's own time, and to prefer one's own singular opinions to the common ones. This is surely, as that author says, to war against the gods — that is, to fight against nature, for the greater part is usually carried along wherever nature itself leads.

From this it is understood that it is not foreign to theological practice to employ learned men — and, if it is a question of morals, men experienced in practice — for conjecturing on matters that raise doubt in nature, and to seek their opinion on each kind of question. And if painters, and sculptors, and even true poets each wish their own work to be considered even by the common crowd, so that, if anything is criticized by the majority, it may be corrected, how much more ought the prudent theologian to change and correct very many opinions on natural matters, according to the judgment not of the common crowd but of wise philosophers — even though they may seem true to him?

But in matters pertaining to morals, the authority not only of the most learned philosophers, but even of the best men, will avail nothing, if no reason is given. For what Aristotle taught learnedly, as he taught almost everything — that just as a healthy palate rightly judges tastes, while an infected one does not, so too a good and just man excellently discerns good from evil, and right from wrong, while, on the contrary, every disturbed passion of the mind destroys the judgment of truth, and corrupts it. So true is that saying: whatever each man is, such judgment too will he render.

And this same Aristotle plainly attests that we ought to give heed no less to the opinions of those who are experienced, and of the elders and the prudent, than to demonstrations themselves. "For, having, as it were, an eye through experience," he says, "they perceive the very principles of things to be done, and, guided by these as though led by nature, discern rightly." Wherefore Innocent, holily and prudently, wished us to follow the examples of the saints in judgments concerning morals. Most weightily too, Plato, in the Timaeus, says: "It cannot happen that faith should not be placed in the sons of the gods, even if they speak without probable and necessary demonstrations." And Ecclesiasticus says: "Establish with yourself a heart of good counsel. For the soul of a holy man sometimes declares truths better than seven watchmen sitting on a height to observe."

This has always been my reason, most holy and excellent father, for expecting your most weighty judgment on such matters no less than that of any other most learned philosopher or theologian. For I understood that all those virtues which I had

experienced in you would, without even the intervention of any dialectical syllogism, follow what was right and turn away from its contrary. But this discourse I have undertaken is not about you, but about the whole class of upright men.

Nor would I wish this to be understood of dogmas of science, but chiefly of judgments of prudence. For the judgments of prudence, when morals change, are changed too; but the decrees of science are not. From these, however, I greatly dissent from those who, in deciding cases of conscience (as they call them), abandon the most learned philosophers and theologians, and consult I know not what "spiritual" men, who speak the vision of their own heart, not from the mouth of the Lord. Much exercise of the virtues, too, is needed, as Origen says on John chapter 4, so that we may be able to judge good and evil, true and false. Rare, indeed, are those who, as the Apostle says, have their senses exercised for discerning good and evil.

But enough on this. Let us now return to the point from which we digressed. It is established, then, that the judgment of philosophers — those, namely, who excelled in great learning and outstanding talent — ought to be held by us in great esteem, if we do not wish to be considered rash.

Indeed, if anything is probable, nothing certainly is more so than that the prince of nature has provided mortal humankind with certain doctors of natural discipline. For who would be so unwise as to establish any single academy at all without teachers? Certainly, since God, known in Judea, erected, as it were, a gymnasium of divine science there, he also provided rabbis for it. And, since he willed that there be academies of evangelical doctrine among Christians, he also gave Apostles, Prophets, Evangelists, and Doctors, to profess this doctrine in the Christian commonwealth.

Wherefore, since he has published the laws and disciplines of nature for the instruction of all nations, it is not likely that he established no teachers at all of such laws and disciplines. And also, if it is fitting to argue from another similarity, Clement of Alexandria says that philosophy was given to the Greeks by God as, so to speak, their own proper testament. Just as, then, he did not leave the testaments either of the Jews or of the Christians without an interpreter, so too he did not leave the testament of the Greeks without one.

Wherefore it was, here too, a matter of divine providence, that not all the philosophers together should hallucinate — either in the knowledge of God, or in the rule of morals and life, or even in the understanding of natural things, which was indeed necessary for those two earlier matters. This is what made the Greeks, according to Paul's own judgment, inexcusable. They could, however, have been excused, if their teachers had

not been sufficiently instructed and informed toward the truth of goodness, with nature herself as their best guide and teacher. This the divine Scripture too attests — for it is written of God, in the Psalm: "Who teaches man knowledge." And again, in the book of Job: "Who teaches us above the beasts of the earth, and instructs us above the birds of the heaven."

Indeed, just as certain animals, given by nature as princes and leaders of the rest, have been granted certain instincts by which each is carried toward the right and useful guidance of its own herd, and drawn back from what is crooked and harmful, so too, in the minds of those men who are by nature leaders of the rest, certain notions must be believed to have been implanted, by which they are led to those matters which pertain to instructing unlearned and uncultivated peoples. For the condition of beasts is no better than our own.

And Boethius, a man of great talent and especially learned, holds the common conceptions of the wise (for so he calls them) in no less regard than if they were common to all men. We ourselves too, in the sixth and seventh topics, showed by this same reasoning that the common prejudgments of ecclesiastical doctors must be received no differently than if they were the common and agreeing opinions of all the faithful. Wherefore this indeed is not in doubt — that what the reasoning of all philosophers agrees upon is true and established. For how could men, ambitious for honor and glory, and generally blind with a desire for finding fault, and separated by very many ages and the greatest intervals of place, converge upon one and the same opinion, unless they were driven by some instinct toward this, as it were, conspiracy of nature?

From this it can again be understood and perceived what was said a little before — that philosophers received from some one master of mortals what they wrote down, with common consent, for peoples and nations universally. The common positions of philosophers, then, are most true, nor is it permitted to dissent from them, if all, to a man, hold the same view.

But Jerome, in his book against the Pelagians, when his adversary objected that common opinion of the philosophers, that whoever has one virtue has them all, responds that this was indeed the opinion of the philosophers, but not of the apostles; and that it was not his concern what Aristotle teaches, but what Paul teaches.

But what Jerome's manner is in that dialogue, and what his figure of speech in dodging arguments, lest I be too long, I shall pass over here. For this argument is easily answered: that Jerome agreed with, and approved by the authority of philosophers, this same true opinion elsewhere — as, on Ezra chapter 16, he says: "It is the opinion of philosophers,

and of the apostle James, that the virtues cling to one another, so that whoever lacks one lacks them all." And, on chapter 56 of this same Prophet, he says: "The virtues follow one another in succession, such that whoever has one has them all, and whoever lacks one lacks them all."

In that dialogue, then, Jerome does not wish anyone to press him, in a dogma of faith, with the authority of philosophers — though he himself uses it in other places.

Chapter V

[Within What Limits the Authority of Aristotle Ought to be Circumscribed]

When, however, one discusses the sect of one or another particular philosopher, this is a far different question. And the more learned and grave each philosopher is, the more probable his authority, and the more worthy of trust his testimony. But no theologian ought to devote himself so entirely to one philosopher that he thinks he must not depart from him by even a hair's breadth. For it is not fair that, among the disciples of Christ, the authority of a single pagan should prevail even without reason.

It certainly matters, in any art, to read especially one author excelling in it, to whom you might chiefly devote yourself. But no one, however learned, will be the sole authority for you in agreeing and disagreeing. For there was no one at all who did not, as a man, sometimes hallucinate.

Indeed, as to who holds first place among philosophers, and who, accordingly, deserves the greatest devotion of effort, there are various and discrepant opinions among the most learned. For — to pass over others in such a matter — one view is generally held by Saint Augustine, than whom you should beware of preferring anyone (for there was no man more learned than Augustine, nor more distinguished); another view is held by Saint Thomas, the greatest and most weighty theologian and philosopher. For Saint Augustine, Plato is supreme; for Saint Thomas, Aristotle is supreme. Thus it generally happens that each person most approves that kind of doctrine to which he has been most accustomed from his earliest years.

Augustine's reasoning arises, on the one hand, from the fact that no philosophers agree more with Christian doctrine than the Platonists. For Plato, indeed, was a philosopher derived from the Hebrews, as Clement of Alexandria attests. Indeed, says Thomas, the doctrine of the Peripatetics agrees most fully with Christian dogma. For Clement of Alexandria, book 5 of the Stromata, also relates that Aristobulus proved, in many books, that Peripatetic philosophy depended on the Mosaic law and the other Prophets. And

Saint Thomas's opinion, indeed, is approved by the usage of almost all nations and many centuries. For men have, for many years now, scarcely read Plato even in the corners, while academies resound Aristotle with the great consensus of the whole world. Toward Aristotle too, all nations agree in this unique tribute — that he was called, by antonomasia, "the Philosopher" — that is, the foremost of philosophers.

Rightly, then, do we embrace him, of whose praise there is unanimous report among all. The scholastic theologians too have so assented to Saint Thomas that Plato does not even have a place in the theological school — so entirely has Aristotle occupied it. This is established: that no one can be fully learned in natural matters if he reads only Plato. Aristotle alone, however, is fully sufficient for a man to be learned in all three parts of philosophy. Indeed, lest anyone should object that Aristotle pleased theologians only in a wretched age, while Plato pleased in a better state of the Church, let him, whoever he may be, know that the Aristotelian school flourished at Alexandria precisely when the apostolic doctors flourished there most.

But, as it seems to me, neither Augustine's nor Thomas's opinion is to be despised. For concessions must be made both to those who love Aristotle, and perhaps also to those who are friends of Plato. Their judgment — in that they assert Plato spoke more openly and constantly on the immortality of the soul, on divine providence, on the creation of things, on the ends of good and evil, and on the reward or punishment of the other life — is difficult not to approve. Saint Thomas's opinion is more to be approved, but with a certain moderation applied, without which it cannot be approved. For Aristotle pleases us too, and rightly pleases us — provided we do not always wish to turn even his resistant passages toward Christ's dogma. This interpreters generally do — they often force the meaning on the text, and compel Aristotle, willing or not, to pronounce for the catholic faith.

Let us take the risk, then, if you please, with even those examples in which the common crowd of theologians perhaps does not think Aristotle erred. For this is not the place to discuss the eternity of the world, or the predetermined number of minds. Nor even the immortality of the soul. For those earlier matters are obvious to everyone, while this latter question has been most accurately discussed by Cajetan, in his commentaries on the soul. But let us consider these matters, which are more difficult, and which Aristotle seems to have expressed obscurely, with words cunningly and deliberately composed to deceive — so that, if he were sometimes rightly and truly criticized by learned men, he might have a way to slip out, and be excused by his friends.

Nor do I here bring an accusation against Aristotle, a most learned man, and one deserving well of all human letters. But since most people now seem to depend on him no differently than on an oracle, and to read all his works without caution, this opinion must be diminished, lest it become a sin to disagree with this philosopher's positions.

For we have heard that there are certain Italians who give as much time to their Aristotle and Averroes as those who most delight in sacred doctrine give to the Sacred Letters; and as much faith, indeed, as those most devoted, in religion, to Christ's doctrine give to the Apostles and Evangelists. From this were born, in Italy, those pestilent dogmas concerning the mortality of the soul and the divine lack of providence over human affairs — if what is said is true, for I have nothing beyond hearsay. Since men, puffed up with Aristotle's opinions, shamefully flatter themselves, and are thereby caught up in the greatest error. But enough on this. Now let us return to our proposal.

The first passage, then, where I think Aristotle erred against the faith of the Scriptures, is found on sleep and waking, where he denies that God sends dreams, and gives as the reason for this that, if God were their author, they would be sent especially to the wise, and to these while awake.

The second example is in the treatise On Good Fortune, where he removes chance events from divine governance and direction, persuaded by two arguments: one, that favorable circumstances befall wicked men, of whom it would not be likely that God has care; the other, that God would rather direct wise men toward the effects of fortune, whereas, on the contrary, we generally see that the most imprudent men are the most fortunate.

The third passage is in book 1 On the Heavens, where he asserts that whatever has come into being is corruptible, and that nothing incorruptible is that which has not come into being. He had, however, set out beforehand the various meanings of these terms, lest the matter be obscured by ignorance of the word. Thinking, then, that he had a good case against Plato, and accordingly promising himself certain victory, he taught, contrary to his usual manner not obscurely but as openly as could be done, that whatever is incorruptible must be uncreated and eternal — that is, must never in any way have begun. For so he interprets that term. From this it would follow that the rational soul is either subject to corruption, or is certainly uncreated and everlasting.

The fourth passage is in book 5, and again in book 12, of the Metaphysics, where in these passages he defines god as an everlasting and most excellent living being. He calls "god," however, by a common name, any celestial and divine substance whatsoever. For after this he begins to inquire whether that eternal substance is one, or many. And in this same book 12, he agrees that the ancients rightly called those most excellent things "gods."

He plays, however, on an ambiguity — for sometimes he calls the mind itself "god," sometimes the heaven, whose soul is the mind — which can also be seen in book 2 On the Heavens.

But lest anyone marvel that Aristotle here calls the celestial substances "living beings" (animals), note that, in the manner of the ancients, he calls an animated substance — whether by a sensitive or an intellective soul — an "animal." Thus he thinks that this one God, chief of the rest, fixed to the outermost heaven, moves it by himself directly, just as the other minds move their own spheres — and, for Aristotle, these are the souls of these same spheres, as Saint Thomas too admits, book 2 Against the Gentiles, chapter 70. Nor does Aristotle, whether in book 8 of the Physics or book 12 of the Metaphysics, trace man's intellect back to any other principle than that first mind, which, by an everlasting force, moves the first mobile sphere.

The fifth passage is in this same book, where he attributes an infinite power to the intellectual substances that move the heavens, on the grounds that they move for an infinite time.

The sixth passage is likewise in this same book, where, as it seems to me, he signified that divine providence, and the rewards and punishments that await the good and the wicked in the future life, were fables, invented for the sake of keeping the common people in their duty. "The rest," he says, "have already been brought in as fables, for the persuasion of the common people, and for the use of laws and the benefit of human life." What, indeed, I ask, are those things believed by the ancients, in which both these apply — that they were handed down both for the use of laws and for the benefit of human life — except those matters we have chosen to explain, which Aristotle was unwilling to state openly, lest he stir up the envy and hatred of upright men, especially those who bore responsibility for the commonwealth?

For that Aristotle removes providence over human affairs from God, theologians of the greatest authority affirm — Clement of Alexandria, book 5 of the Stromata, and Epiphanius, book 3 Against Heresies, the last chapter. What more abundant authorities could we seek than saints learned and especially versed in the doctrines of the Greeks?

Do we even await Aristotle's own testimony about himself? Indeed, in book 12 of the Metaphysics, in words artfully contrived — lest even here he should depart from his usual manner — he taught that it is absurd for God to understand certain things, since it would be better for him not to see other things than to see them. Here he does not say it is absurd for God to understand certain things, but "to understand concerning certain things," or "to meditate," as the old translator rendered it — so that not so much a simple

understanding of base things would be signified, as their providence and care. He thinks, then, that God cares for great things, and neglects small ones.

And in the little book On the Universe — if indeed this work is his — he makes God similar to the great king of the Persians, Xerxes, or Cambyses, or Darius, who himself personally attends to the greatest and most splendid duties of the kingdom, while entrusting the lesser and sordid ones to others.

And in book 10 of the Ethics, he says: "But if the gods have any care for human affairs, as is thought and believed, it is reasonable that they should favor those who love and honor the mind, as being the caretakers of what is dearest to them, and as acting well." Note "as is thought and believed," and the rest. Diogenes Laertius, moreover, plainly relates that Aristotle restricted God's providence entirely to the celestial realm.

As for the fact that Aristotle denies liberty to God in matters of nature, learned and grave men urge this with such great arguments that it is superfluous for me to repeat those reasonings here, which are readily available to learn from their own books. Certainly, wherever he contends, hell-bent as they say, with Plato over the eternity of the world, he would seem ridiculous if he made the author of nature free.

What of his indignation over the prosperous outcomes of the wicked, which he affirms, in book 2 of the Rhetoric, to pertain to good morals? What of the fact that, in book 7 of the Politics, he prescribes that nothing mutilated, diminished, or deprived by nature should be reared — namely, lest, through too great a multitude of children, that commonwealth of his lose its fitting form and appearance? For this same reason, he thinks the pregnancies should be terminated in advance, and abortion performed before ensoulment — for once they have received life, he thinks it wicked to touch them.

What of the infinite multitude of souls, which he must necessarily admit, lest he fall into Pythagoras's transmigration of souls? But once this is admitted, since he thinks there cannot be infinite bodies, he will not admit the demonstrated article of the resurrection.

What of the fact that Aristotle posited two principles, God and matter — for he did not recognize the creation of things from nothing? Of this matter, do not, reader, disregard as insignificant witnesses — indeed, I do not know whether they are not the weightiest — Clement of Alexandria and Epiphanius.

And I assert that these were indeed Aristotle's own views, with some reserve, out of respect for Saint Thomas, who is generally the patron of this philosopher; but the most learned doctors prove that he held these views — doctors whom I have followed in this matter. If, however, anyone should wish to compose an apology for Aristotle's true

meaning, I would not greatly contend against this. I ask only this of the reader — that he grant me, if he can, that Aristotle erred in these passages; but if this is not permitted, out of deference to Saint Thomas, he will certainly grant this much at least — that Aristotle should either be read cautiously, as a variable and slippery author, or certainly should be rejected in certain of his positions. Either is enough for me, and now one, now the other, seems more probable — and nothing else besides seems probable at all.

How much force, then, philosophers have for producing conviction — whether all together, or individually, separately — has, I think, been sufficiently and carefully explained.

Chapter VI

[In which the Arguments Set Forth in Chapter Two are Answered]

It will be no great task to repel the objections raised at the beginning.

First, indeed, it is easily understood that it is not those who were sent, but those who came of themselves — either pseudo-prophets or pseudo-philosophers — who are rejected by the Lord. "I did not send them," he says, "but they ran of their own accord." That true philosophers, however, were divinely provided for, we have, I think, argued sufficiently above.

Then, Clement contends that the philosophers of Greece were called "thieves" for another reason — because, beyond what they had stolen from wisdom from Moses and the Prophets, they were accustomed to boast of it as their own, for the sake of hunting after a little glory. Pythagoras, indeed, was the disciple of a certain Jewish man from Nazareth, as Alexander writes in his book on the Pythagorean symbols. Indeed, Saint Ambrose not obscurely relates that Pythagoras was, by race, a Hebrew. Certainly, Clement of Alexandria attests that he was circumcised.

Clearchus the Peripatetic, moreover, in his first book On Sleep, says that he knew a certain Jew, most weighty not only in eloquence but also in mind, with whom Aristotle himself associated. For that Plato received doctrine not only from Pythagoras, but also from our own people, both Augustine and Clement have attested, and Ambrose urges with many arguments. Plato himself, indeed, candidly admits this in the Timaeus.

When, then, we insert into our own disputations what has been rightly and wisely said by the philosophers, we shall then be reclaiming what is our own, not borrowing what is foreign. On the first argument, then, this much. For the rest are of such a kind that we would burden the reader, if we now proceeded to refute them.

Chapter VII

[On the Authority of Civil Law in Theological Controversies. the Arguments by which it is Attacked]

Since, moreover, the authority of civil law does indeed pertain to this topic — and pertains to it in such a way that it is discerned not by some hidden reasoning, but is readily apparent — a few words must also be said on this matter. For the expertise of law and statutes is, without doubt, the correct discipline of morals and life; philosophy, moreover, is the law and reasoning of life. From which it follows that experts in civil law must be reckoned as philosophers — namely, those who, as that author says, profess true philosophy.

That civil law, however, can be of no benefit at all to theologians is first urged from this: that priests, and accordingly monks too, are forbidden to learn such laws. That faculty, then, from which the canonical law prescribes that clerics should shrink, is opposed to theology.

And since theology, moreover, concerns divine matters, while civil law is occupied with the administration of human and temporal matters, it can scarcely be understood what use a science that administers temporal matters could offer to a theologian discoursing on eternal ones.

Cyprian, indeed, admits that pontiffs use the laws of emperors, but only for the course of temporal matters. Churchmen, then, when they wish to treat theological — that is, divine and everlasting — matters, ought not to make use of imperial laws. The edicts of emperors too, which contain civil law, sometimes conflict with the laws of God.

The theologian, then, will receive no suitable argument from these for confirming the conclusions of theology.

Chapter VIII

[Proves that the Study of Civil Law is Most Useful to the Theologian]

But it is truer that the faculty of human law can, in many respects, be advantageous to the theologian. For if canonical science is necessary to him, and expertise in the laws is so joined and bound to it that one can scarcely be separated from the other, the theologian certainly ought to claim civil law, connected as it is to canon law, no less than the canon law itself.

That the statutes of the sacred canons are aided by the constitutions of princes, and in turn aid them, Lucius III attests ("On the Announcement of New Work," 1). Whence that saying among the Italians — "The legist without the canon is worth little, but the canonist without the law is worth nothing" — has already become a proverb worn smooth by common speech.

Again, the laws of the Pontiffs generally make use of civil authority and reasoning. Knowledge of civil law, then, will not be foreign to the theologian, to whom pontifical law ought to be familiar.

Augustine, moreover, does not disapprove if heretics take up the laws of the earthly empire for their own aid — for the Apostle did this too. The theologian, then, is to be approved all the more, if, against heretics, whether he discourses rightly on the disposition of temporal matters, or on morals either to be established or already established in the commonwealth, he claims the authority of civil laws. This same Augustine often does this against the Donatists. Nor do I care to cite any particular passage, since this has already been used by Saint Augustine in many places.

To this: the theologian must sometimes fall into a disputation on justice and law. Here he will certainly be inept, if he wishes to neglect what has been gravely said on law by the most distinguished men.

Moreover, in pacts, stipulations, other contracts, in the ownership of property, prescription, testaments, donations, witnesses, judges, and six hundred other matters of this kind, how often does the theologian need to distinguish white from black, and the just from the unjust from the very outset? Very often indeed — if it is believed to be his office to guard against dangers to souls and provide for their salvation. Injustice, indeed, is mortal sin. Wherefore it is no wonder if, from one who must both hear the confessions of many and respond to very many on matters of injustice, I myself require some knowledge, whatever kind it may be, of the laws. For with what will the theologian discourse, in aptly and precisely treating the matter of restitution, on such matters? Will he be able to be a right arbiter of justice and equity, even in the forum of conscience, unless he borrows much from legal experts and civil prudence? By no means at all. For although the theologian, aided by the books of philosophers and of Saint Thomas, can distinguish just from unjust, he will do this only in general; but in particular, he will not do it without some skill in law.

But these matters may seem rather obscure, when discussed at length without the application of examples. They must be illustrated with examples — matters which seem to be discussed more subtly by reasonings than is sufficient. I shall bring forward, then,

some examples out of many, for to give them all would be an infinite task.

Let this be the first: If a penitent says he has a scruple concerning this or that property, which he possesses by prescription of long time, or which he has from the donation of another man's wife, or from a less solemn testament, or which came to him from intestate succession.

Let this be the second example: If a penitent says he has a lawsuit over this or that cause, and does not know whether he ought to yield in the suit, or rather may justly pursue it.

Let this be the third: If a firstborn son should ask the theologian whether he sins mortally unless he settles his sisters in a just marriage, unless he pays a debt his parent contracted, unless he cares for and defends the birthright.

What of a donee? Is he bound to the debts? What of a lord? Can he exact certain customary dues from his subjects, and bind them to accustomed burdens, whether real or personal? For we are pleased, at least here, to use those terms of the legal experts, nor do we always need to discourse with precise diction; rather, it is better to be little concerned with terminology, and sometimes easygoing and unconcerned, as Plato has already warned us, in the Theaetetus and the Statesman. But this in passing. Let us now return to our matter.

But what need is there for more? Does defining, in particular, when injustice is committed in trials, in contracts, in last wills, and sometimes even in crimes, not exceed the theologian's powers — since innumerable cases arise, which cannot be defined by the law of nature? If this is so — as it certainly is — it will be a matter of the greatest insolence to despise legal expertise in such questions.

Legal expertise, however, can be investigated more advisedly, and discovered more certainly, nowhere else than in the volumes of law — which no other volumes of the philosophers surpass, whether in eloquence or in prudence. I speak of the fifty books of the Pandects. For the later laws have, in both respects, entirely declined a great deal from these.

But if the little book of the Twelve Tables alone seemed to Cicero to surpass the libraries of all the philosophers, both in the weight of its authority and in the abundance of its usefulness, what should we think of those fifty books, in which are contained not only the laws of the Twelve Tables, but also very many others, prescribed prudently and holily concerning the agreements of men, and concerning law and equity?

It is a holy volume, I say, and Justinian rightly called it the temple of justice. And since it is established that civil law arose from sacred moral philosophy, the theologian will

certainly cultivate the little streams, as he cultivates the source — lest he be too little devoted to religious philosophy itself.

Indeed, whoever thinks civil law ought to be neglected by the theologian tears down a good part of moral philosophy, whose aid, if anyone should deny it to one discoursing on morals, would seem foolish. Since the theologian, then, often uses the aid of law in theological disputation, I have accordingly joined this science of law to theology as a little handmaid and attendant.

Chapter IX

[What Force and Power the Argument Drawn from Civil Law Has]

And although the argument drawn from civil law is perhaps neither certain nor established, it is nonetheless most probable — every such argument, indeed, but especially that which the theologian will receive from the laws of the Christian commonwealth, approved by usage.

For it must not be believed that such laws were given to the Romans without a divine nod: indeed, John VIII proclaims that they were promulgated divinely, through the mouths of princes. And Augustine says that God distributed human laws to the human race through emperors and rulers of the age. Demosthenes too thinks that laws are the invention and gift of the gods. And Cicero says that the law of a prince, fit for commanding and forbidding, is the right reason of highest Jove. And Solomon says: "Divination is in the lips of the king, his mouth shall not err in judgment."

It pertained, then, to God's own providence, that the lawgivers of the Romans should be inspired by a certain divine power, by which they might prescribe, for the governance of the commonwealth, statutes that were just and lawful. Wherefore, if the theologian takes an argument from these, it will not at all be foreign to the purpose of his profession, and, even if not with certainty, he will argue probably.

Nor can I approve of Ludovicus Vives in this — that he strives to break the whole force of the Roman laws and diminish their authority. He indulges himself sometimes more than is right, while pursuing corrupted disciplines, and attempts to overturn not only new errors, which have either crept in or invaded, but also the received positions of the ancients — always, indeed, with the greatest expansiveness of words, but sometimes with the least force of argument. He said, indeed, in his books on corrupted disciplines, many true things, many excellent things; yet he sometimes pronounced with confidence, as if he had descended from a council of the gods. He would be approved much more by

learned men, if, with the same diligence and eloquence with which he set forth the causes of the corrupted arts, he had also restored what had collapsed; but he grew languid in transmitting the disciplines, though he had been vigorous in criticizing errors. Nor is this surprising. For it is easy enough to criticize others' errors, even probably; but to recall to the right line those arts which certain unlearned and barbarous men have, for many years now, distorted — this, surely, is the work, this the labor. And this is precisely where all effort ought to have been directed, if anything worthy of great praise was to be accomplished.

But it is one thing to criticize civil laws, especially in a well-instituted commonwealth, approved by long usage; another to rebuke the errors of their interpreters. Although Ludovicus, as far as concerns legal experts, held the same view as we do. For he says: "The ancient interpreters of civil law were once held in the highest honor, rightly and deservedly, and for great reasons — since civil law, having been gravely and prudently issued by distinguished philosophers, was interpreted by philosophers. But after this faculty began to be in the hands of those who had approached it and adorned themselves for it with no prior philosophy, no grave discipline, all the splendor of this science was destroyed, nor are its professors held in esteem except by the common crowd, which is entirely full of lawsuits."

Just as the Egyptian priests were marvelously honored because they had devoted much effort to mathematics — while all Egypt needed geometry, since the boundaries of the fields were confused year after year by the flooding Nile — so, since lawsuits have invaded, mixed up, and confused the boundaries of the Christian world with their own flooding, it is necessary that those who are said to be skilled in settling disputes be shown the highest honor. Whether they settle them or not, let them see to that; this much we certainly see: that there are fewer lawsuits where there are fewer men of letters of this kind.

These novice legal experts, then, not even I wish to claim for the use of theology. For a legal expert is not some pettifogging lawyer — cautious and sharp, a hunter of formulas, a catcher of syllables, an advocate of injustice equally with justice. But this I do teach — that civil laws, especially those long observed by the usage and custom of the Christian people, are useful to the theologian for argumentation. But enough on these matters.

Now let us speak of the authority of history. For the arguments we have set forth to diminish the authority of civil law are easier than that our discourse should need to linger in refuting them.

Book XI

Chapter I

I had scarcely finished the previous topic when word came that my most distinguished father had died at Vienna. Upon hearing this news, whether I should deny being moved — let the wise judge how rightly I would do so — but I would certainly be lying. I was moved, having lost such a father as, I think, remains unmatched among mortals. Since I had dedicated these nocturnal labors of mine to him — undertaken, indeed, especially for his sake — work ceased for some time.

For before, the composition of this book was so pleasant to me that it not only wiped away all the troublesomeness of labor, but even made the labors themselves gentle and pleasant. But afterward there was nothing at all by which tedium and care could be relieved. For, while my father lived, whenever I wished to write something on the theological topics, he would come to my mind — not only worthy of this dedication, but one in whose very name my nightly labors would appear more welcome. Now, however, whom shall I find like him, to substitute in my father's place?

I used to set before myself my father's most dear countenance. And whenever I had to write, either I was with him, or he was with me. He added the spur, he roused me when sluggish; he did not even let me yawn. Such was my reverence for my father, even in his absence. But now, wishing to pursue the work begun, the water sticks, as they say, nor do I attempt anything without my mind faltering, overcome all too quickly. For he, separated from me by so great a distance, left me, by dying, no less grief than he had brought me joy while living.

But since, with the wound received, a great and unhoped-for leisure has befallen me, and my mind neither ought nor could do nothing at all, I had to turn entirely to this final topic — lest a work well and usefully begun should be cut short by the death of him who, even now from among the blessed above, demands the office of my labors. Nor indeed would I hesitate, if asked to whom I write, to respond: "I write to my father, who wished me not only to give these things to himself alone, but to publish them for others too." How great, then, is the usefulness and authority of human history among theologians, we are now about to explain. My father, without doubt, will pray that, the same journey we undertook there on earth at his urging, we may now complete under his favor from the heavens.

Chapter II

On the Usefulness of Human History for Theology

I have now emerged from the shoals, and my discourse has sailed past the rocks. For I have descended from the most difficult matters to easier ones, and neither my talent nor my theology can be endangered in explaining the authority of human history. Much less so, indeed, when I explain this: how useful and necessary human history is to the theologian. For here we have no adversaries at all, no arguments against the truth.

For all learned men agree that those theologians are entirely unrefined in whose writings history is mute. To me, indeed, not only theologians, but no one seems sufficiently learned, to whom past events are unknown. For history supplies us with much from its treasuries, without which we would often be found impoverished and unlearned, both in theology and in almost every other faculty. But since it is evident that the hinge of a theological disputation sometimes turns on some past event, who would deny that, sometimes even in scholastic disputation, it is necessary to summon, from the monuments of the annals, the clearest witnesses of truth?

Indeed, that history is necessary for the discoursing theologian, I have noticed both often elsewhere, and especially in this very work — where those who have touched on the previous books will easily judge how great a use of human history I have made. For how much greater a use it will be later on, I do not now dare to say, lest I seem to promise golden mountains. Certainly, how much the theologian needs knowledge of history is abundantly shown by those who, through ignorance of it, have fallen into various errors. Of this kind, some cite the example that Trajan, freed from hell by Gregory's prayers, was persuaded not only by the common crowd, but even, once, by Saint Thomas himself in his youth. This was persuaded, moreover, on the authority of John of Damascus, whom Saint Thomas certainly deferred to greatly. But no one, they say, would be moved by the argument of that little fable, if he understood, from the reckoning of the times, that John of Damascus could not have been the author of that account, since he preceded Gregory by more than a century, according to their opinion. For Raphael of Volterra, Vincent of Beauvais, and Saint Antoninus relate that he flourished under Theodosius.

But this example is inept, since that John of Damascus, who published four books on the orthodox faith, flourished under Constantine and Leo — that is, after Saint Gregory had already died. Nor, in so clear a matter, is it necessary to summon John, patriarch of Jerusalem, or the writer of Roman history in books 21 and 22, or other historians too, since John of Damascus himself indicates, not obscurely, at what time he existed.

For, first, he often cites Cyril, who lived after Theodosius. He also mentions the Council of Chalcedon on occasion. Indeed, in book 3, chapter 10, he mentions a certain Peter the Fuller, who was condemned under Justinian at the Fifth Synod. And in book 4, chapter 17, he writes against the Iconoclasts, and calls them, in his book on heresies, Iconoclasts and Thymoleontes — from Leo, that is, who was the chief author and supporter of that sect. Moreover, in this same book on heresies, he mentions the Monothelites Cyrus, Sergius, and Eustathius, who were condemned at the Sixth Synod under Pope Agatho — against whom he also wrote copiously, book 3 on the orthodox faith, chapters 14 and 15. Whoever weighs all these facts will easily understand that John of Damascus existed after Gregory.

For as to what Trithemius says — that there were two of this name, one under Theodosius, who composed those books of theology, the other under Leo, who fought for images — this is entirely fabricated, as is evident from the passages just cited. Nor indeed do I approve of that story. For it is astonishing that a Greek man should have handed down to his fellow Greeks a matter that was our own too, and, as he himself says, known throughout the whole world — yet the whole history of the Latins is ignorant of it. Let them be fables, then, I do not resist, those things related about Trajan and Gregory. But not for that reason — because Damascene preceded Gregory.

But in this same category, our own Spaniard Ginés de Sepúlveda recently erred — a man not unlearned in my judgment, and very learned in his own, certainly distinguished in the art of eloquence, and not averse to theological study. When he wished to persuade that there was a just cause of war for attacking the barbarians of the New World, he leaned on this argument: that Gregory, in letter 73 of book 1 — which is cited, question 23, question 4, "Si non" — commends Gennadius, who undertook wars for the sake of extending the Christian commonwealth, so that the name of Christ might spread everywhere among the subject nations through the preaching of the faith.

But how inept this testimony of Gregory's is for proving the proposed matter, this same Sepúlveda would easily have judged himself, had he learned from histories that those against whom Gennadius waged war were enemies not only of the Roman empire, but even of the Church and of Christ. This can be seen more clearly than daylight from another letter to this same Gennadius, which is in this same book, number 72. Nor can it be doubted that the Vandals, whose remnants still survived in the African province, were afflicted with the Arian plague; nor is it unknown that the Donatists, with whom Africa was then also full, fought against Catholics not only in disputation, but with rewards and force. But this is not the place to discuss these examples, where we briefly and in passing warn the theologian not to neglect ecclesiastical history, whose knowledge

produces great fruits, and whose ignorance produces errors.

Now Augustine, book 2 On Christian Doctrine, chapter 28, hands down that even pagan histories contribute greatly to the understanding of Sacred Scripture, and shows that certain men erred concerning the Scriptures through ignorance of them.

Indeed, Irenaeus and Tertullian were caught up in varied errors concerning the age at which Christ suffered, but for this same reason — for they neglected human histories on this point, which, once known, resolve this matter most easily. Although each could also have been warned of his error from the Gospel itself.

And Erasmus understands that darkness, which the Evangelist plainly writes was made over the whole earth, to have been spread only over Judea, and gives as the cause of this false understanding — one that is neither true nor, if it were true, sufficiently adequate — that, if this darkness had occurred over so great an interval, throughout the whole world, some writer, either Latin or Greek, would certainly have mentioned this event. For the letter in which Dionysius asserts that he had diligently observed this eclipse with his own eyes and considered it in his mind, he treats as fabricated under Dionysius's name, and offers it up for ridicule.

But I do not, in this work, undertake to defend that praise for philosophy and learning which Erasmus tries to strip from Dionysius the Areopagite, nor do I even reprove that he makes Saint Jerome the author of this interpretation — an interpretation which no other interpreter of Scripture contradicts more openly. This I do assert: that, unless Erasmus were ignorant of human histories here, he would certainly have interpreted that darkness differently, and more truly.

Phlegon, indeed, an outstanding calculator of the Olympiads, writes thus in his fourteenth book: "In the fourth year of the 202nd Olympiad, a great and, of all that had happened before it, most extraordinary eclipse of the sun occurred. The day was turned, at the sixth hour, into such dark night that the stars were seen in the sky, and an earthquake in Bithynia overturned many buildings in the city of Nicaea."

Eusebius, in his Chronicle, makes clear that this year coincided with the Lord's Passion. Lucian too, presbyter of Antioch, a man distinguished in character and learning, disputing with the pagans on the Christian faith, says: "Search in your own annals, and you will find that, in the times of Pilate, when Christ suffered, the day was interrupted by darkness, the sun having fled." Eusebius attests this, book 9 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 6.

Tertullian, finally, says: "At that very moment, the day was withdrawn, the sun marking the middle of its course." They indeed thought it an eclipse, those who did not know that this had been foretold concerning Christ; and yet you have that cosmic event recorded in your own archives. Thus far he, in the Apologeticus, chapter 21.

From these considerations it is easily understood that even the histories of the pagans are necessary for explaining the Sacred Letters. Although these matters are so readily at hand that the discussion needs no further argument, we shall nonetheless explain them more fully in book thirteen. Since, then, we shall illustrate these points there with the clearest examples, there is no reason why we should inappropriately anticipate here what will properly be the doctrine of that book. And just as geometers are accustomed not to demonstrate everything by arguments, but to postulate that certain things be granted to them, so that they may more easily explain what they wish, so too I, meanwhile, ask of the reader that he grant me that there are very many passages in the sacred books that cannot be resolved without knowledge of human history.

That the monuments of past events are most opportune for the theologian in disputation against the enemies of the Christian faith, the practice of the most distinguished men openly confirms. Tertullian argues, from the Romans' own histories, that the very worst men have always been cruel and savage toward Christians. It is good, then, that wicked men should persecute what is good. And in his book To Scapula, how many examples of past events does he use, to persuade that, because they persecuted Christians, many pagan governors met sad ends? Wherefore those who fought against our people undoubtedly fought against God too.

With what knowledge and citation of histories does Cyprian expose the vanity of all idols? How many and how varied histories does Jerome, against Jovinian, cite in commendation of virginity and chastity? Lucian the presbyter, as we said above, cites the very annals of the nations, to establish the dogmas of our own faith by their testimonies. Eusebius often refutes Jews and pagans from human histories.

Not only ecclesiastical history, then, but also that written by pagan authors, is most useful to the theologian against the adversaries of the faith. Wherefore to be entirely unrefined in pagan histories is either the mark of the most inert sloth, or of the most delicate fastidiousness. Indeed, that a theologian, aptly and prudently, not only in sermons, but even in disputations, cites examples, while urging that something is just or unjust, because it has been employed by upright or wicked men — Tertullian, Jerome, and other most weighty men have shown this sufficiently, who not infrequently delight in this kind of persuasion.

But how can probable examples be produced without knowledge of history? How widely, then, the usefulness of history extends is apparent: for wherever we theologians go, whether preaching or disputing, or expounding the Sacred Letters, we set our foot upon some history. Since, then, the books of history are very useful to the theologian for these many purposes, they ought certainly to be read by him with diligence — lest he err shamefully in matters that especially pertain to him, and be ignorant of what cannot be unknown without imprudence, and indeed without unlearnedness.

History, indeed, as Cicero most truly said, is both the teacher of life and the light of truth. On the usefulness of history, then, we have now said enough; let us now look at its authority.

Chapter III

Contains the Arguments by which the Authority of Human History is Attacked

Although, as we were saying a little before, my discourse has sailed past the rocky places, and although what must be discussed in explaining this topic does not require great force and sharpness of talent, some of these matters nonetheless require grave and mature judgment. From this it happens — scarcely credible — that in an easy and well-explained topic, most difficult and slippery questions arise. First, it must be established what kind and how great the authority of human history is, and what conviction it produces in theology — which is not so easily settled. Then, who ought to be considered a probable and trustworthy author — a matter most difficult of all.

For since the explanation of the truth involved in a theological disputation must often be dug out not from recent human discourse, but from the memory of our forefathers and the antiquity of the annals, it will surely be necessary to judge concerning history, especially ancient history, to distinguish among all the historians, and to separate the liars from the truthful. Since I neither claim nor owe myself such a capacity, I confess that I have undertaken this province not without a certain fear and shame, discharging it as a duty of necessity, not of choice — not because I lacked care for so great an office and so weighty a cause, but because I see it dangerous to wish to become a judge especially in this field, where surely that man is required who both has innumerable memory of antiquity, and is endowed with the highest prudence and gravest judgment.

But so that we may accomplish more quickly this not inconsiderable task we have undertaken, setting aside any plea of ignorance, or rashness, or both, let us come to the explanation and discussion of the matters we have proposed. First, then, we shall attack the authority of human history with the arguments raised against it. Then we shall teach

what kind of arguments are drawn from such history for the use of theology. Third, we shall show who those authors are whom theologians ought to approve in history. Finally, by refuting the arguments raised against it, we shall bring this book to its end.

The first argument, then, by which the credibility of human history can be undermined, is of this kind. That Joseph was, according to nature, the son of Jacob, but, according to the law, the son of Eli — Africanus, in his letter to Aristides; Justin Martyr, question 66 to the orthodox; Eusebius, book 1 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 7; Nicephorus, likewise book 1, chapter 11; Ambrose, on Luke, book 3; Jerome, on the first chapter of Matthew; Augustine, book 2 On the Harmony of the Evangelists, chapters 3 and 2, and book of Retractations, chapters 5 and 16; Damascene, book 4, chapter 15; Bede, book 1 on Luke chapter 10; Theophylact, on Luke chapter 3; and almost all the fathers, have written. Nor were these matters suddenly discovered by them, or invented without authors, but were handed down by the Savior's own relatives and kinsmen, as Africanus affirms.

But Osiander, in book 1 of his Harmony of the Gospels, proves with many arguments that these are fabricated — and, as it seems to him, proves it in such a way that he not only mocks Saint Thomas and the other theologians as if dreaming portents, but even calls insane those who first published these matters.

The second argument is that Joseph, the husband of Mary, had previously had another wife, by whom he had sons, who are called "brothers of the Lord" in the Gospel — Eusebius, book 2 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 1; Nicephorus, book 2, chapter 3, where he also relates that Hippolytus was the author of this same opinion; Ambrose, in his book On the Instruction of a Virgin, chapter 6; Epiphanius, book 2 Against Heresies, chapters 51 and 78; Hilary, canon 1 on Matthew, openly agree.

But Jerome, on Matthew chapter 12, dismisses this account as the ravings of the apocrypha; indeed, against Helvidius, he asserts it was fabricated with audacious rashness.

The third argument: Jerome writes that an ancient history relates that Herodias, whom Matthew mentions, was the daughter of King Aretas. This same point Bede too asserts, in his second book of commentaries on Mark, and Eusebius, in Rufinus's translation, book 1 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 13. But that this is false, both Josephus, book 18 of the Antiquities, chapter 5, and Hegesippus, book 2 On the Destruction of Jerusalem, chapter 12, are most abundant witnesses. Nicephorus, book 1, chapter 20, also agrees with them.

Nothing at all, then, can we assert with certainty — nor even probably — from the public commemoration of ancient events. For if it is permitted to reject and hold as nothing the histories cited in these three arguments, no human history at all will be found that has any force for producing conviction.

The fourth argument: that the Magi, who came from the East to worship Christ, were kings, and not merely philosophers, is handed down by Cyprian, in his sermon On the Baptism of Christ and the Manifest Trinity; Athanasius, question 2 to King Antiochus; Jerome, on Psalm 71; Augustine, sermon 43 to the brothers in the desert, and On the Marvels of Sacred Scripture, if indeed this work is Augustine's; Chrysostom, homily 6 on Matthew; Tertullian, Against the Jews; a certain ancient doctor named Christian, on Matthew chapter 2; Isidore, in the preface to the Mass commonly called Mozarabic; Saint Thomas, on Matthew chapter 2, and on John chapter 11 — for also, in Part III, question 36, article 3, he says they were not only wise but also powerful. Of this same opinion were Albert the Great, Saint Vincent, Nicholas of Lyra, Denis the Carthusian, Simon of Cascia, the Unknown Doctor on Psalm 71, Titelmans, John Eck, Saint Antoninus, and other more recent authors, whom it would be tedious to enumerate. And certainly this seems to be a history received by hand from our forefathers.

But this common tradition nonetheless settles nothing at all in the Church. Indeed, it is most probably asserted by Baptista of Mantua and other more recent authors that the Magi were not kings. For the Evangelist would certainly not have passed over in silence a matter of such great relevance, nor would Herod have received them so imperiously and rudely, if they had been kings.

The fifth: that the Magi came to Jerusalem thirteen days after Christ's birth is recorded not only by Jerome and Augustine, but by almost all authors, both ancient and modern.

But Epiphanius, in heresy 51, constantly affirms that the Magi came from the East two years after Christ's birth. There are two reasons for his opinion, neither entirely worthless: one, that on the day of the Purification, Christ's mother offered not a lamb but a turtledove or young pigeon — she could not, then, find the price of a lamb in hand, and had accordingly not yet received the treasure from the Magi. The other reason is that Herod killed all the boys from two years old and under, according to the time which he had diligently inquired from the Magi. It is not likely, however, that Herod would kill two-year-old boys, based on the time of the star — whose appearance he had diligently inquired about from the Magi — if only thirteen days had elapsed between the rising of the star and the coming of the Magi.

Add to this that they themselves attested that they had seen the star in the East. These words certainly signify something more than merely that the region from which they set out was, in comparison to Jerusalem, an eastern one. If, then, as the Evangelist plainly writes, they came from the East — and it is not unclear that Jerusalem is separated from the East by a very long distance — then to have seen the star, communicated their plan for the journey, prepared for the trip, and traveled from the regions of the East, through so many lands and peoples, to Palestine, all within so few days, is entirely at odds with human judgment and reason.

The sixth: that the miracle of the wedding was handed down to posterity as having occurred on the anniversary day of Epiphany — this "faithful antiquity has entrusted to us," as Maximus says. But Epiphanius teaches the contrary — that on this same day on which Christ was born, thirty years having already been completed, the Son, together with his mother, was present at a wedding banquet. Nothing certain, then, can we accept from the public commemoration of dates.

The seventh: it is a true law of history, as Jerome often said, to write what the common crowd thinks, even if this is false in reality. For thus Joseph too was called "father of Jesus" even by Mary herself, and the Evangelist says Herod was troubled — not because Joseph was in truth Christ's father, or Herod was truly troubled in mind, but because this was at that time so believed by the common crowd, and this is what the reclining guests thought — since it should rather be believed that this crafty murderer concealed the malice of his mind, having sadness in his face while having joy in his heart. For this reason he was called a fox by the Lord. Whence Josephus too, book 18 of the Antiquities, chapter 17, asserts that John was killed by Herod, because he feared that the people would stir up a rebellion at John's instigation.

Every argument, then, drawn from history is ambiguous. For the opinion of the common crowd is generally false, and every such argumentation can be refuted on the grounds that the historian expressed not the truth of the matter, but the crowd's own opinion.

The eighth: Augustine, sermon 71, On the Sacrifice of Isaac, says: "It is related, by the account of the ancients, that Adam, the first man, was buried in that very place where the cross was fixed." And Cyprian, in his sermon On the Resurrection of Christ, says: "Adam is handed down by the ancients as having been buried beneath the place where the Lord's cross was fixed." Paula and Eustochium, too, in their letter to Marcella, relate this same history, as celebrated by the mouth of the inhabitants. Epiphanius, book 2 Against Heresies, the last chapter, relates it as though scarcely doubtful.

But Jerome, on Matthew chapter 27, and on chapter 5 of the letter to the Ephesians, mocks this as a fable — since, in Joshua chapter 14, Adam is said to have been buried in Kiriath-Arba. Isidore followed Jerome's opinion.

The ninth: Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius of Caesarea, Theodoret, Jerome, and Augustine, from the reckoning of the annals, conclude that the seventy years of desolation were completed in the second year of Darius Hystaspes.

But this is not only false and fabricated, but even contrary to the Sacred Letters themselves — which state, not implicitly and hiddenly, but openly and clearly, that those seventy years were completed right from the beginning of Cyrus's reign. No suitable argument, then, is produced from the reckoning of the times.

The tenth: Jerome, a most weighty historical authority, relates that, in the second year of Darius, the temple began to be built. But it is established with certainty and known that Zerubbabel laid the foundations of the temple under Cyrus. Weak, then, is any argument drawn from human history, however weighty the author of that history may be.

The eleventh: Very many historians, and distinguished ones at that, have handed down that Artaxerxes impeded the building of the temple. But, on the contrary, Scripture hands down that the temple was built at the command of Cyrus, Darius, and Artaxerxes.

The twelfth: That Joshua ruled for 26 years after Moses's death is asserted by Josephus, book 5 of the Antiquities, chapter 1; Sabellicus, first Enneid, book 4; Nauclerus, in his Chronography, generation 28. For Eusebius, in his Chronicle, and those who followed him — Isidore, Sulpicius Severus, and Johann Carion — attribute 27 years to Joshua's rule. If these were true, the total of 480 years, which is derived from 1 Kings chapter 6, from the exodus of the children of Israel out of Egypt to the building of the temple, would not be true.

The thirteenth: If any history should be approved by the theologian, it will especially be that celebrated by the mouth of all the churches. But very many such histories produce no conviction in theology. For, to pass over what is ridiculously and falsely related concerning Cyricus and Julitta, Gregory, Catherine the martyr, and the eleven thousand virgins — certainly the history of Thomas the Apostle is apocryphal and fabricated, not only according to Gelasius, distinction 15, chapter "Sancta Romana," but also according to Augustine, book 22 against Faustus, chapter 79, and his single book against Adimantus, chapter 17, and book 1 On the Sermon on the Mount, chapter 38. Add to this the fable of Martha and Mary Magdalene, which narrates that Magdala came to

Mary by hereditary lot, and Bethany to Martha — while, on the contrary, John writes that Bethany was the town of Mary and Martha.

The fourteenth: That history seems to excel the rest which has been approved by the Supreme Pontiffs. But the donation of Constantine, his leprosy, baptism, and healing, are not only celebrated in ecclesiastical histories, but even approved by Supreme Pontiffs. But many most learned men have contended that all these are fabricated. No ecclesiastical history, then, supplies the theologian with suitable arguments.

The fifteenth: There is no one among ecclesiastical writers who can be held a trustworthy author of history. Not Philo, in his epitome of dates — for in that little book, small though it is, there are so many falsehoods that they would be most difficult to number. Not Josephus — first, because he hands down many things that vehemently conflict with the Sacred Letters; then, because he follows the third book of Esdras in his history, which Jerome rejects as nothing but dreams; finally, because he was caught up in various errors in noting the dates of events.

Who, then, will be held a certain author of history in the Church? Africanus? But his history is apocryphal for Gelasius. Eusebius? But this same Gelasius also rejects his history as apocryphal. But in the Tripartite History, Sozomen is held foremost. But Gregory condemns him, saying: "In Sozomen's history, certain things are related about a certain Eudoxius; but the Apostolic See refuses to receive this history, since it tells many falsehoods, and praises Theodore excessively, proclaiming that, up to the last day of his life, he was a great teacher of the Church."

If, then, those who hold the chief place in ecclesiastical history are uncertain and mendacious authors, surely the theologian will draw no suitable argument, either from these or from others of lesser authority, for corroborating his conclusions.

The sixteenth: Innocent, distinction 20, chapter "De quibus," approves only ecclesiastical histories for settling ecclesiastical causes. The monuments of the pagans concerning past events, then, can avail little in theology. This the Council of Florence, session 7, confirms, in these words: "We ought by no means to use the history of the Romans or the Greeks in a synod."

The seventeenth: In the history of the Assyrian monarchy, Berossus is generally commended above the rest. But no history of this author survives. For that history published under the name of Berossus by Annius has been discovered, by learned men, to be fabricated.

In relating the affairs of the Persians, Metasthenes is preferred, who is said to have followed the true and public annals of the Persians. But the monuments of this author too were published, with an even more false title, by Annius. For this Annian Metasthenes hands down that there were only eight kings of Persia, whereas there were in fact fourteen, whom both Jerome, on Daniel chapter 7, and Eusebius, in his Chronicle, list in order.

Now what does the history of Greek affairs contain but fables, which they publish everywhere as true histories? For Cicero is a weighty authority that the Greek nation did not cultivate a reverence for testimony. Scipio, too, in Livy, relates Greek histories no differently than fables. Fabius too truly said that Greek histories generally have a license similar to that of poetry — so that this is rightly worn smooth even in the common speech of the crowd, in the saying: "and whatever lying Greece dares in history." And Josephus, in the proem of his book On the Jewish War, is a witness that truth is neglected by the Greeks in history — which he confirms in his first book against Apion. But Jerome too, one of our own, when Greek histories were objected to him, said: "We ought not to acquiesce in the authority of those whose lies we detest." Indeed, to say nothing of the rest, Herodotus and Xenophon, whom the Greeks hold as the fathers of history, generally abuse fabricated narratives.

What of the empire of the Romans? Are there any public annals at all which we ought to believe? By no means at all. But each man wrote of their past deeds according to his own bias. Moreover, as Tully says, the history of Roman affairs has been made more mendacious by funeral eulogies. That certain things in Livy, certain things in Sallust, certain things in Cornelius Tacitus, certain things in Trogus, whose credibility can be undermined by manifest testimonies, Flavius Vopiscus most truly said.

No trust, then, is to be placed in the histories of the pagans — since they have no authority at all, not only certain, but not even probable.

The final argument attacks all histories generally, both ecclesiastical and secular. It is of this kind.

Aristotle exempted human faith from the number of the intellectual virtues, precisely because it inclines equally toward the false and the true. Theology, then, which is entirely weighed by truth, will not accept aid from human faith, nor will the truthful contract an association for argument with the fallacious — since such an argument, in that part where it rests on human faith, would rest equally on falsehood as on truth. This is confirmed, moreover, above all by the fact that men are liars, and all, to a man, can deceive and be deceived.

Whether, then, few or many historians assert something, every such argumentation, resting and leaning on the testimony of men, will be weak. Wherefore any argument at all sought from human history is too weak to produce any conviction at all in theology.

By these arguments the authority of this topic is attacked. For if there are other arguments — and there will perhaps be more — they are similar, and will accordingly be similarly refuted.

Chapter IV

That the Authority of Human History is Sometimes Probable, and Sometimes Even Certain

It follows that we should explain what kind and how great the authority of human history is among theologians — for this is what we promised to treat as our second point. That this may be better understood, this must first be established: that it is necessary for men to believe men, unless life is to be led in the manner of beasts. Since Theodoret, in his work On the Cure of Greek Maladies, book 1, and Augustine likewise, in his book On the Usefulness of Believing to Honoratus, chapter 12, and On Faith in Things Unseen, chapters 1 and 2, have pursued this matter most diligently, we need not labor greatly on it here.

And Augustine indeed plainly asserts that not only friendship, but all human society whatsoever, would perish, unless friend trusted friend, husband wife, children their parents, brothers their brothers, citizens their fellow citizens, allies their allies. He brings forward many arguments to show that necessity and piety — the two most sacred bonds of the human race — would be violated and dissolved, and nothing at all in human society would remain intact, if we resolved to believe nothing that we cannot, as it were, touch and grasp with our own hand. Human life, then, requires that men believe, without any doubt, what other men say.

Theodoret, moreover, plainly proves that faith is, as it were, the primary basis of the arts, and the foundation of all disciplines. For, to say nothing else, elementary schoolboys cannot attain any capacity at all in the discipline of childhood, unless they receive, by faith, from their teachers, both the names of the letters and the combinations of syllables — so that Isaiah's saying is proven most true even in every art and stage of life: "Unless you believe, you will not understand."

Excellent, then, is that saying of Aristotle's — that in every faculty and doctrine, learners ought to believe. For we learn this by daily experience, without anyone needing to point

it out — that faith precedes cognition and understanding of things, but knowledge of any truth whatsoever follows faith.

From this it follows that the author of nature has impressed a natural inclination toward believing in the minds of men — since faith is no less necessary to man's life and learning than the highest place is necessary to fire, or the lowest to earth, for these to be well-disposed. Nature has, moreover, implanted in these certain propensities and, as it were, appetites toward their necessary ends and perfections. Wherefore those who strive to uproot human faith from men's minds are not only foolish, but war against the gods in the manner of the giants — that is, fight against nature. For could anything more childish and foolish be said than for us to deny that things others have seen exist, because we ourselves have not seen them? It is necessary to believe, then, unless we wish to be more foolish still. These points established, this is the first conclusion.

The first conclusion. Apart from the sacred authors, no historian can be certain — that is, suitable for producing certain faith in theology.

This, since it is obvious and manifest to everyone on its own, need not be proven by our own argumentations. Flavius Vopiscus, moreover, truly and wittily said that there is no historian who has not lied about something — whence he confidently undertook his history, knowing he would have lies for companions.

The second conclusion. Grave and trustworthy historians — such as there have, without doubt, been some, both among ecclesiastical and secular writers — supply the theologian with a probable argument, both for corroborating what is his own, and for refuting the false opinions of his adversaries.

This conclusion, too, seems sufficiently self-evident. For it is not the mark of a well-instructed man, rightly disposed for human life, to disbelieve a grave man asserting a credible matter. I say "credible matter," since certain things are related by Pliny and other historians, even most weighty ones, which, though scarcely credible, we do not for this reason undermine the authority of history if we deny them. Both, then — he who believes too quickly, and he who is too slow to believe — are rightly reproved. Much more so, indeed, if he disagrees with several approved and grave historians. For if every word stands on the mouth of two or three witnesses, why should the theologian withdraw his faith from a matter attested by very many witnesses of an ancient event, contrary to this rule? Especially since testimonies drawn from antiquity are more powerful for proving, precisely because, as Fabius says, they alone are free of the charges of hatred or favor.

Indeed, Innocent, a weighty authority, asserts that there is no little probability in human histories, since, by promulgated law, he prescribed that, in settling ecclesiastical causes, ecclesiastical judges should use their authority, even if other arguments were lacking.

But most people in this present age, perversely, not to say impudently, call into doubt matters which the most weighty authors have attested to have happened. If they gave suitable and probable reasons, they would perhaps deserve to be heeded. But since they give none at all, they are to be despised — as men who have cast off common human sense, rejected the chief instruments of human judgments, that is, testimonies, and neglected history, the teacher of life, the aid of prudence, the light of truth.

The third conclusion. If all approved and grave historians agree on the same past event, then a certain argument is produced from their authority, so that dogmas of theology may be established with firm reasoning too.

There are many examples of this, but I shall add only a few: that Peter both established his see at Rome and was crowned with the glory of martyrdom for Christ, all grave histories relate — whence we established, with certain argumentation in book five, that the Roman bishop succeeds Peter in the pontificate. Likewise, that the Council of Nicaea was convened in the time of Constantine by Sylvester, the true Pontiff of the Church, the gravest of historians have handed down. From this we gather that the definitions of the Council of Nicaea are certain. For it is certain that a general synod of the Church, approved by the Roman Pontiff, cannot err; and it is also certain that the Council of Nicaea was of this kind — one lacking neither the presence of the universal body of the Church's pastors, nor the approval of the Roman bishop.

There are very many such matters, handed down by the common consensus of historians. To deny these — indeed even to doubt them — is most foolish. For what could be more foolish (to press this same point further) than to say that there are no such things as the whale-kinds born in the Red Sea or in India, because we have never seen them? Let us, then, if you please, remove everything that either history, or grave and approved witnesses, bring to us. Thus it happens that inland-dwellers do not believe there is a sea, nor do those born on an island where they have only seen little hares and little foxes believe there are lions and panthers; and if anyone should speak of an elephant, they would even think themselves mocked.

Certain trust, then, must be given to history, when all its authors agree on the same point. For those things are held certain among men which cannot be denied without obstinacy and folly. Excellently, then, did Josephus, in his first book against Apion, say that this is a certain sign of a history's truth: if all writers record the same things about the

same events.

But on these matters, though we have spoken briefly, we have nonetheless said enough. For, from these few points explained, unless I am mistaken, what kind and how great the authority of human history is will be easily understood. History, indeed, though it is written, as Quintilian says, not for proving but for narrating, nonetheless proves something without doubt — probably in most cases, but sometimes even necessarily. Let us now dissolve the arguments raised against the credibility of history.

Chapter V

In which the Arguments of Chapter Three are Answered

It is not easy to shake off the contrary objections, but they must be shaken off nonetheless. And on the first argument, not only Osiander, but even certain Catholics, contend with all their force and reasoning that what is related concerning Joseph's two fathers, natural and legal, is a fabrication, a portent, a monstrosity, a dream. For with these names they think Africanus's opinion ought to be marked. Certainly the author of the book of Questions on the Old and New Testament, whether it be Augustine or someone else, asserts that this opinion is neither probable, nor of any use — lest anyone think that the ancient account has displeased only the more recent authors.

These men, moreover, use these arguments to weaken Africanus's tradition: first, that neither testimony nor example can be drawn, either from the sacred or the profane Hebrew literature, in which a firstborn son is so named after a deceased father — this dead father, then, will not be called the firstborn's father. Then, they say, even granting — however unjust the condition — that such a firstborn son had two fathers, this still does nothing to remove the scruple of the evangelical discrepancy. For no one could produce a legal son from the wife of a deceased man, unless he had been the deceased's own brother, and had dwelt together with him — as is most evidently handed down in Deuteronomy 25. But this did not occur except among those born of the same father; for those who have different fathers also take different inheritances, and accordingly do not dwell together. But Jacob and Eli, they say, were neither born of the same father, grandfather, or great-grandfather, nor could they have dwelt together, since one is reckoned among the descendants of Nathan, the other among the descendants of Solomon. As for the further argument — that Joseph was not called by the name of his legal father, which was necessary according to that law of Deuteronomy — this is a slight and beggarly argument indeed, to which Augustine, both in book 5 of Questions on Deuteronomy, question 46, and book 2 of the Retractations, chapter 12, responds

without difficulty.

I myself, however, prefer the common opinion, although that opinion is not displeasing to me either, which asserts that Eli was Joseph's father-in-law — the same as Joachim, the parent of the Virgin Mary — so that Luke wove Christ's genealogy through the mother, but Matthew through him who was thought to be his father. Nor did the Evangelist accordingly weave the genealogy through the women, contrary to Scripture's usage. For when he says "who was of Eli," the relative should be referred back to Christ, so that the sense is: "And Jesus himself was thought indeed to be of Joseph, but in truth was not his, but Eli's." For since he was born, without male agency, from a virgin mother, he had no one on earth of whom he could be called son, except Eli, who was, namely, his maternal grandfather. Let no one wonder, then, that, in weaving Christ's genealogy, he immediately leapt from grandson to grandfather; he has already interjected the reason — that Joseph, whom he ought to have called Christ's father, was not truly his father, but was only thought to be.

Although the relative can also be referred to Joseph — so that you understand him to have been not the natural son of Eli, but in the way a son-in-law is said to be the son of his father-in-law. Thus the evangelists traced Joseph back to his parents — one to those from whom he was naturally born, the other to those he acquired by marriage.

Augustine mentions this opinion in book 2 of Questions on the Gospels, question 5. This was held by the author of a certain little book On the Birth of the Virgin, which is falsely attributed to Jerome. This too was embraced by Johannes Annius, Johannes Lucidus, Georg Witzel, and other more recent authors too. The signification of the names also agrees with this — for Joachim, Eliakim, and Eli mean almost the same thing, and are used almost interchangeably in 2 Kings 23 and 2 Chronicles 36.

Let this be a probable opinion. Who denies it? But it is not certain either.

For Osiander's arguments, which he thinks firm, are certainly most weak. He objects, first, that it is nowhere found in the Sacred Letters that a firstborn son is named after the deceased. But this he objects with customary impudence. For if Obed is said to have been born to Naomi and to have been born to her, why should he not be said to have been born to Mahlon, and accordingly to be his son too? Likewise: "His brother shall take her, and shall raise up seed for his brother, and shall call the firstborn son from her by his name." Moreover, what, I ask, is "to raise up seed for one's brother," except to beget a son for him? What of the fact that this is manifest: "He, knowing that the son would not be his, spilled his seed on the ground, lest children should be born under his brother's name"? Genesis 38. But Osiander himself cited these same passages. He cited them,

indeed, but in such a way that he could not respond to their plain testimonies, except in heretical fashion, either by accusing the standard edition, or even twisting the words and sense of Scripture. For to hold the common understanding of all the saints as nothing is familiar to him, and — common to the other Lutherans as well — a hereditary trait.

Now, as to what he takes up second — that the brothers of whom the law speaks must dwell together, that is, on the same paternal inheritance, and accordingly must be full brothers, born of the same father — this has perhaps an appearance of truth, but certainly has no truth in it. "Brothers," in that law of Deuteronomy, must be understood not only as full brothers, but even as blood relatives, who, by the usage of Scripture, are called "brothers." This can be proven not only by the common opinion of all the saints, but by the open testimony of Scripture itself. For Boaz was not Mahlon's full brother, but a relative. Nor do we confuse the matter of redemption with the matter of the levirate, as Osiander slanderously suggests. But we contend — and contend with entirely the best right — that the example of the book of Ruth pertains to that law of Deuteronomy.

Otherwise, if we interpret "dwelling together" as those who dwell on the same paternal inheritance, why not rather — since this is simpler — those who dwell in the same house? Thus, even full brothers, unless they hold the same house in common, would by no means be bound by that law — a point which not even Osiander himself, however shameless, would concede. Let us explain, then, what both Hebrew custom and the reasoning of the law require: that brothers "dwell together" when they dwell in the same town or city. This could happen not only to two brothers of the same womb, such as Jacob and Eli are said to have been, but also to other relatives, whether close or distant. Osiander's arguments, then, move us not at all from placing faith in Africanus.

This, perhaps, might move someone: that we asserted, in the third conclusion of the previous chapter, that the common tradition of all writers is to be held certainly, and not merely probably, as true history. But all the ecclesiastical historians bear testimony to this tradition of Africanus's. That doctrine, then, which posits two fathers for Joseph, legal and natural, will be not only probable, but certain. By no means at all. For it matters much with what assertiveness historians relate past events. For if the very author who was the first source of the history wrote the matter not as something seen and certain, but as something heard and uncertain, then those who, with similar reserve, relate the matter as merely probable, however much they all agree, do not thereby produce firmness of history.

Moreover, Africanus, from whom the rest received this history, had nothing but hearsay, nor did he place certain faith in those relating it. For after he had related the matter, just as he had received it from certain Jews, to Aristides, he added these words (Musculus's translation): "Whether, then, the matter stands in this way, or otherwise, no one, in my judgment, will be able to find a clearer explanation of that discrepancy of the Evangelists which was objected. Whoever, indeed, is endowed with a fair mind will take the same care that we do, even if a certain testimony is lacking — precisely because he will not be able to produce a better and truer explanation. The Gospel, certainly, hands down, through all its parts, what is true." Thus far Africanus. By these words he sufficiently indicates that, if some other more probable method of reconciling the Evangelists should appear, he would gladly embrace it. This entire matter seems to have compelled both Augustine and Thomas to investigate other methods, besides this one, for removing the discrepancy. But on the first argument we have already said much.

To the second, it must be said that such matters too depend not so much on the credibility of history, as on the probable conjecture of those who interpret the Sacred Letters. For there is no approved author who asserts that he either saw, or received on certain testimony, any wife of Joseph's besides Mary. But since "brothers of the Lord" are read in the Gospel, and religion forbade suspecting them to be sons of Mary, the expositors of Scripture had to conjecture by what method this could have happened, so that the truth of the Gospel might agree with Mary's perpetual virginity. Thus certain ones introduced sons of Joseph from another wife, and accordingly interpreted Christ's "brothers" not as true brothers, but as those thought to be such — for Joseph too was not the true father, but was only thought to be.

Nor was their conjecture vain and fabricated, nor devised with no reasoning at all, merely to respond to heretics; but they had probable reasons, which also rested on the testimonies of the Scriptures. First, that James, bishop of Jerusalem, would not have been peculiarly called "brother of the Lord," if the "brothers of the Lord" were called such merely by kinship — since James the son of Zebedee, from whom this James is distinguished by his surname, would also, in that manner, be "brother of the Lord." Then, someone would not simply have said in the Gospel, "Behold, your mother and your brothers stand outside, seeking to speak with you," if he were defining fraternity by general blood relation. For James and John were, at that time, in the house with Christ, who were "brothers" in that manner too.

To this is added that, in Mark, it is said by certain men: "Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary, brother of James and Joses and Judas and Simon? Are not his sisters here with us too?" "Son of Mary," they say, "brother of James and Joses," etc. — so that the

"brothers" are understood not from Mary, but from Joseph. Whence, according to Luke, they ask: "Is not this the son of Joseph?" And that the "sisters" are to be understood as Joseph's daughters, Esther and Tamar, Hippolytus and Nicephorus — most weighty authorities — assert. Similarly, then, the "brothers" James, Joses, Simeon, and Judas are to be understood — whom these same authors relate that Joseph had, as four sons, from an earlier wife, whose name was Salome. To this is added that Epiphanius, not once, asserts that Joseph, when he took Mary as his wife, was an old man of eighty years. But at such an advanced age, it is certainly not likely that he had existed without a wife.

These matters those authors could argue and assert without endangering the faith. But Jerome, nonetheless, examining the matter more diligently — as he was especially versed in the Sacred Letters — found a far more probable explanation, by which, without either corrupting Mary's virginity or introducing a second marriage for Joseph, the "brothers of the Lord" could be understood in the Scriptures.

For that James, commonly called "brother of the Lord," was not Joseph's son, seems clearly established from the Gospels. For Mark, having written, in chapter 6, that they were called "brothers of the Lord," writes, in chapter 15, that they were sons of a certain Mary — who certainly could not have been Joseph's wife, unless you grant that he had two wives at the same time, the Virgin Mary and another Mary — a claim no reasoning proves, no history relates. Indeed, it would be an argument of both imprudence and incontinence for a poor man, who could scarcely feed and support one wife, to have taken on the burden of two spouses. That it would be foolish, not to say impious, to attribute such vices to a righteous man need not be argued at length.

Add that this same woman was called, by John, "Mary of Clopas." Clopas, moreover, was Joseph's brother, as Eusebius, book 3 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 11, relates from Hegesippus — for which reason, unless my conjecture deceives me, she is called "sister" of the Virgin Mary. For brothers-in-law are commonly called "brothers," and the wives of brothers, "sisters." Not, then, as I think, did that Mary receive this name as a mother, but as the wife of Clopas. She was not, then, Joseph's spouse, and accordingly her sons were not sons of Joseph, but of Clopas.

But just as Joseph was thought to be Christ's father, so too the sons of Clopas — James, Joses, Judas, Simeon — were thought to be Christ's cousins, and Clopas Christ's uncle. By this reasoning, this Mary can be called Christ's aunt — not because she was truly the Virgin Mary's own sister, but because she was both held and called a "sister" in this sense. And that cousins too are called "brothers," all Scripture demonstrates.

Nor is it necessary to refute the arguments of the first opinion. For it assumes certain things which, for certain reasons, were thought otherwise by most people — such as that the sons of Zebedee were Christ's blood relatives, and accordingly, in Scripture's usage, "brothers"; likewise, that Joseph was 80 years old when he took Mary as his wife. These claims can be made, but cannot be proven. For in Acts chapter 1, Luke, having mentioned James the son of Alphaeus, Simon, and Jude, adds: "All these were persevering in prayer with Mary, the mother of Jesus, and his brothers." It is established, moreover, that James the son of Alphaeus, Simon, and Jude were called "brothers of the Lord."

But these matters have been discussed more diligently by others. We are not, at present, occupied with this. We say only this: that, from the diverse opinions which the orthodox follow in interpreting the Scriptures, the credibility of history is by no means endangered. This alone was the discourse necessary for refuting the second argument.

But the third is dissolved thus. Herodias was not the daughter of King Aretas, but of Aristobulus, as Josephus attests in many places. This the name itself also indicates. For it is, as it were, a patronymic from Herod, and accordingly signifies nothing other than a daughter, or granddaughter, or some other descendant of Herod. Wherefore it seems to have nothing in common with Aretas, king of the Arabs, but shares its lineage with Herod the Great, whose granddaughter she was.

As for what Jerome relates from the ancient history — with all due respect to so great a man, I would say — he is without doubt mistaken in this matter. It is apparent that he came upon either some history by an uncertain author (for this is precisely why some wish to call it the "ancient history"), or certainly upon Eusebius's Latin version, which Rufinus corrupted with his own rendering. So that the matter may become clearer, let us cite the words of that passage. "But Josephus too writes of this matter, with concordant testimony, mentioning Herodias by name too: as having been violently torn away from her marriage to the still-living Philip, and joined to Herod in incestuous nuptials, his own proper and legitimate wife having been driven away — whom he says was the daughter of Aretas, king of Arabia." Thus far Eusebius, in Rufinus's translation.

If you remove, from these words, the name "Herodias" placed in the latter position — which is found in neither Eusebius nor Josephus — the reading will be true, and will accordingly be the genuine conversion of the Greek Eusebius into Latin. For the relative "whom" is to be referred, not to Herodias — as Rufinus wrongly understood — but to the "own proper and legitimate wife" driven away. This Musculus rightly did, in his now-new translation. Let this, then, be what we have said on the third argument.

To the fourth argument, I respond thus: Whatever the truth about the Magi — whether they were kings or not, which is the matter in controversy — this at least is certain: that the credibility of history is not undermined by the fact that very many authors have handed down that the Magi were kings. This matter, indeed, is of a kind that no historian claims to have either seen himself, or heard from trustworthy men who saw it. Those authors, then, rely not on any established authority of history — which they had none of — but on probable conjectures, of which they had several.

Such is that the passage seems fulfilled in the Magi: "The kings of Tarshish and the isles shall offer gifts, the kings of Arabia and Sheba shall bring gifts." Likewise: "Kings shall walk in the brightness of your rising," etc. — which the ancient chorus of the Church has always intoned at the Epiphany of the Lord, not merely today's common crowd.

To this is added that, as Tertullian says, the East generally had kings as its Magi. To this is added that this phrase fits kings especially well: "Opening their treasures," etc. There is also extant an epigram of Claudian's, where he calls the Magi "Chaldean kings." If this is not Claudian's, it is certainly that of a most elegant poet.

This opinion, as being plausible and popular, the faithful of Christ have long since gladly embraced. Nor do I think it worth the effort, if anyone should attempt to dissuade them of it in a public sermon. For dissuasion is of no use here; and to strive in vain, and accomplish nothing but earn hatred through the effort, is the mark of extreme madness. For if you should perhaps persuade a few by your argument, you will nonetheless bring on many complaints, dissensions, and quarrels among the people. Let the common people, then, retain, along with their forefathers, that most probable opinion — especially since it has become deeply and firmly settled.

But if, moved by other conjectures, you hold the contrary opinion, as far as I am concerned, I do not resist. This is my point: that, whether this opinion or that is true, the authority of history is neither raised nor diminished thereby, since neither of these opinions rests on the authority of history, but on probable conjecture. For that the Evangelist suppressed the title "kings" means nothing at all. For he did not think the Gospel's testimony needed to be augmented with royal pomp, since he had already most amply adorned the Magi's wisdom and gravity. In confirming a truth that was hidden, indeed, the royal title would have been obscure and superfluous; the term "Magi" was distinguished and fitting.

As for the fact that Herod received the Magi with little honor, this is either a sign of Herodian arrogance, or of Roman glory and majesty. It would be unworthy, indeed, to turn the pride of a great king into envy and hatred of lesser men. On the fourth

argument, then, this much.

Now let us respond to the fifth. Not only Jerome, Augustine, Thomas, and almost all the other authors, but even the ancient tradition of the Church, holds that the Magi worshiped Christ on the thirteenth day after his birth. Seeking a reason why this has been received by the Church in such great agreement — although much trust is generally owed to ancient tradition in such matters, even without an underlying reason — I nonetheless found these two reasons, both gathered from the Gospel itself. One is that Matthew says: "When Jesus had been born, behold, Magi came from the East." Certainly, if the Magi came at a time when Christ was a year or two old, as Epiphanius, Zacharias, Faber, and Osiander think, the Evangelist would not have said, "When he was born, behold, the Magi." For this phrase is not usually said of a matter so delayed, but of something sudden and unexpected, or certainly proximate and, as it were, present. "She had not yet finished her words within herself, and behold, Rebecca came forth." And the Poet: "Let someone hear this — or, who comes? Behold, Palaemon." Hence, when the angel said to Mary, "Behold, you shall conceive," etc., understanding that she would conceive immediately, she says: "How shall this be, since I know not a man?" The infant, then, was newly born when the Magi arrived.

The other reason is this: the Magi found the boy in Bethlehem, therefore they came before the day of the Purification, since Christ was not in Bethlehem beyond that time. For Luke, having described what pertained to the Purification, adds: "As they had performed all things according to the law of the Lord, they returned into Galilee, to their own city Nazareth." He does not say "to Bethlehem," but "to Nazareth." Why, then, would they have returned to Bethlehem, where they had so little furniture that there was no place for the virgin to lay the infant except a manger, in the inn? Nor does the Evangelist teach that they came in order to stay, but to be registered in their own city. They remained, then, there only as long as was necessary to fulfill the law, which commands that, after the infant boy is circumcised, the woman should remain thirty-three days in the blood of her purification. Within these days, we rightly believe, the Magi came to Bethlehem, and, guided by the star, worshiped the boy they found.

In that reasoning which is first opposed, some note the liberality and beneficence of the Virgin, who quickly distributed the gold she had received to the poor. Others note her prudence, in that she prepared travel money for Egypt. For whether Joseph was warned of the flight by the angel before the Purification, according to that passage — "When the Magi had departed, behold, an angel appeared in a dream," etc. — or the Magi communicated to the Virgin the oracle concerning returning by another way, it is certainly credible that a most prudent woman would already have provided, from that

point, what was needed for the flight and journey.

There are those who note her modesty. And this reasoning seems to me most holy and prudently established. For it was not fitting that a poor woman should suddenly bring forward the offering of the rich. The Virgin was far removed from all pride and ostentation, nor did she wish to change the condition which she knew had pleased the Son of God. What of the fact that she perhaps thought that the gold offered to God by the Magi should be consecrated for sacred uses? The first reasoning of the adversaries, then, is easily dissolved by these various means.

The second seems to press more urgently. For if Herod diligently learned the time of the star from the Magi, and killed all the boys from two years old and under, according to the time which he had inquired from the Magi — then the star appeared to the Magi two years earlier. They did not, then, come immediately after Christ's birth. For Herod killed the boys immediately upon the Magi's departure. For that particle "then" signifies a present or immediate matter no less than the word "behold," whose force we weighed a little before. The Evangelist says: "Then Herod, seeing that he had been mocked by the Magi, sent and killed." But this knot can be untied in two ways.

First, as Euthymius noted, that phrase, "according to the time," etc., does not refer to what precedes — "from two years old" — but only to the particle "under," to which it is most closely joined. Thus it is to be read continuously: "he killed all the boys who were in Bethlehem and in all its borders, from two years old" — and there, a division being made, it is added: "and under, according to the time which he had inquired from the Magi." He is not, then, to be understood to have killed two-year-olds according to the inquired time, but only others, the very youngest, to whom alone, namely, the time of the star applied. But you say: why did he kill two-year-olds, if not according to the time of the star? I respond: Why in all the borders of Bethlehem, if Christ was born in Bethlehem according to the prophet? Just as, then, out of his own malice, he expanded the place, so too he expanded the time.

Then, it is probable — and this seemed more likely to me — that Herod, summoned to Rome to answer an accusation concerning his sons, delayed that massacre of the boys, which he carried out afterward, when he had returned to Jerusalem. But even if it were necessary to grant two years for the Magi to make their journey — which is nonetheless absurd — it would not immediately and necessarily follow that they arrived two years after Christ's birth. For it can be said much more easily and readily — what I see pleased Chrysostom and Augustine — that the star appeared to the Magi as long before Christ's birth as was necessary for them, having traversed so many regions and provinces, to

worship the boy not long after his birth.

But when it is finally asked how it could happen that the Magi arrived from the East in so few days, this question has an easy and ready answer. For it is not necessary, as Remigius does, to attribute this matter to the power and strength of the newborn boy, who brought the Magi to himself in so brief a span of days. But "the East," in the Sacred Letters, is frequently taken for lands which are eastern relative to the land of those who are speaking. As in that passage: "Lot chose for himself the region around the Jordan, and departed from the east." Likewise: "From Aram, Balak king of the Moabites brought me, from the mountains of the East." Whether, then, the Magi were descendants of Balaam, and accordingly came from Mesopotamia of Syria, as seemed likely to Chrysostom, Jerome, and Ambrose, or whether they came from Arabia, which was Justin Martyr's constant opinion, or were other wise men, either Persians or Chaldeans, which the name "Magi" itself suggests — it cannot be doubted that they could complete the whole of that journey, whatever it was, in ten days.

For Jerusalem is distant from Aram by 172 Persian and Spanish parasangs; from Ur of the Chaldeans, indeed, by 212. And when Laban pursued the fleeing Jacob from Mesopotamia into Judea, he overtook him on the seventh day, at Mount Gilead, which is the beginning of Lebanon. And yet Jacob was carrying his flocks, wives, and children. But Laban had not discovered the flight before the third day. What of the fact that that region abounds in dromedaries, which Philostratus, in his Life of Apollonius, writes can complete a journey of a thousand stades in one day? Aristotle too, book 9 of the History of Animals, the last chapter, attests that they run faster than Nisaean horses. Nor should it trouble you that Jerome, on Jeremiah chapter 25 — indeed Jeremiah himself — says that Chaldea is situated to the north, near Jerusalem. For, since it is situated between north and east, it is called, sometimes, "northern," sometimes "eastern."

These matters, I know, will be tedious to a fastidious reader; but it was necessary to show how rashly certain men have dissented from the sincere credibility of history, and the common opinion of the saints. But on the fifth argument, enough. Now let us refute what follows.

Indeed, when Epiphanius's opinion is set against the credibility of history in the sixth argument, this ought to move us not at all. First, because he is not generally accustomed to follow weighty authors in reckoning past events and dates, and is accordingly sometimes mistaken in remembering these matters. Then, because, at least on this point, he contradicts the ancient practice of the Church with no probable argumentation, and no ancient monuments cited.

For if it is true — as it certainly is true — that Christ suffered in the thirty-third year of his life, begun and continued for perhaps three months and ten days (for on this matter we do not wish to raise any question now), but that he taught for three years — as both Ignatius, in his first letter to the Trallians, and Eusebius, in his Chronicle, have handed down — then certainly Epiphanius's opinion seems unable to be true. For from the completed thirtieth year until the Passion, only two years remain. Although Epiphanius could untie this knot, if he began Christ's time of teaching not from the wedding, but from the baptism. This we too ought to say, who defend Maximus's opinion and the ancient practice of the Church. For we believe the wedding took place a full year after the baptism.

On this point, certain men disagree with us — not, however, without reason. For, first, they say, we would have nothing written of Christ's teaching for that whole year — indeed, in that year he would have taught nothing at all. This is by no means credible. For, at his baptism, he was declared, by the Father's testimony, to be the Son and Wisdom of God, the leader and teacher of the people. Nor, after undertaking the office of the Gospel with the most evident commendation and testification of the Trinity, would Christ have idly spent so many days of his life in silence. Rather, he would immediately have pursued this task, as was fitting. This is confirmed not only by our own conjecture, but by John's Gospel too.

John, moreover, notes the times of the events after the baptism so explicitly, that it seems not so much as a year, but not even a few months, intervened before the wedding: "The next day," he says, "John saw Jesus coming to him." And again, a little further on: "The next day, again John stood there, and two of his disciples," etc. And afterward: "The following day he wished to go into Galilee, and found Philip," etc. Finally, right at the beginning of the second chapter: "And on the third day, there was a wedding in Cana of Galilee."

And when John had responded to the legates of the Jews, "the next day he saw Jesus coming to him." At this time, Jesus was neither known, nor had he acquired disciples, as is most manifestly clear from this first chapter of John. But on the next day — that is, three days from the legation — two of John's disciples followed Jesus; and on the day next to this, Jesus himself, going out into Galilee, found Philip. But when the Evangelist adds, "And on the third day, there was a wedding in Cana of Galilee," he indicates clearly enough how brief a time flowed between the baptism, the calling of the disciples, and the wedding. Not a full year, then, intervened. Moreover, after his second coming into Galilee, Jesus began to preach, as is said in Matthew chapter 4. He had not, then, preached before the wedding. For that wedding took place when, after his baptism, he

first came into Galilee. But if a full year had elapsed from the baptism to the wedding, then the three years of Christ's preaching could in no way be found.

Add that, from this opinion, it would follow that Christ suffered in the 34th year of his life, begun. This is gathered not obscurely, since, if it were true, five Passovers would have intervened between the baptism and death. The first would be one of which we have nothing written in the Gospel, between the baptism and the wedding. The second, which John mentions immediately after the wedding, in chapter 2, where Christ first cast out those buying and selling from the temple. The third, mentioned in John chapter 5, when he healed the paralytic. The fourth, which this same Evangelist mentions in chapter 6, saying: "Now the Passover was near," etc. The fifth, in which Christ suffered, of which John speaks in chapters 12 and 13.

For as to that third Passover, about which there could be doubt, whether it was the feast of Passover, both Rupert and Irenaeus too attest that it was. And indeed the term "feast," used simply, is generally taken for Passover in the Gospels — as in this passage: "Not on the feast day," Matthew 26; likewise, "according to the custom of the feast day," Luke 2; likewise, "buy what we need for the feast," John 13. Since, then, Christ was baptized in the thirtieth year of his life, begun, on the thirteenth day — for he was beginning to be about thirty years old, as Luke affirms — if five feasts of Passover intervened, he certainly died in the thirty-fourth year of his life.

Although Bede and other more recent authors too have asserted this, it can nonetheless be defended by no reasoning, as Paulus, bishop of Fossombrone, book 9 of part 2, and book 4 of this same part, and John Lucidus too, in his book On the True Day of Christ's Passion, have shown. But no such reasonings will be able to move me from the ancient tradition of the fathers, which the common custom of the Church, in the divine office, in hymns and antiphons, confirms — not because these matters greatly pertain to faith or religion, but because, in matters probable on both sides, or even ambiguous, the common credibility of ancient ecclesiastical history delights me. But let us look at the arguments in order:

To the first argument of the other opinion. In the year that flowed between the baptism and the wedding, Christ taught nothing at all: he was, then, the greatest idler, since, after receiving his mission, he remained idle for so long. Indeed, in that year, Christ did not preach publicly, nor did he preach the Gospel to the crowds. But he was not idle in the meantime. Rather, he frequently visited John, so that John too might frequently bear testimony concerning him, and privately taught certain individuals too, lest he should suddenly appear as the Church's public preacher. For John's disciples would not have

called him "Rabbi" — that is, "master" — unless he had already begun to teach, as our own Cajetan diligently noted.

To the second argument: for as to what they say — that it is gathered from John's Gospel that only a few days intervened between the baptism and the wedding — this is by no means true, since John never at all narrates Jesus's coming to the baptism, as this same Cajetan established with manifest argumentation. Although he is mistaken in this, in that he asserts for certain that, of the four testimonies of the Baptist which the Evangelist relates in chapter 1, the third was given on the day next after the second. For the second, as it seems to me, concerns the future, and, although it follows in Scripture's order, nonetheless preceded even the first testimony in time — as even Cajetan himself admits.

For that testimony which was given by John to the legates of the Jews was entirely the same as that which the Baptist recalled himself having spoken before. And it is much more likely that, at that time, Christ had not yet received baptism from John. "In your midst stands he," he says, "whom you do not know. He it is who is to come after me." When, then, the Evangelist says, "The next day John saw Jesus coming to him," he does not mean the coming to baptism, nor does he write what happened on the day after the legation of the Jews. Rather, he teaches that the third testimony was given on the day after that which he had written first. For the second is inserted, in passing, between both — that is, between the first and the third — by the Evangelist, to explain that the Baptist was always consistent with himself in his testification, and had said beforehand nothing other than what he was, at present, testifying. Thus, in the order of time, as we said, that testimony was first which the Evangelist mentions in the second position. Then follows that which is placed at the beginning. After this, on the next day, the Baptist gave the third testimony, when he saw Jesus coming to him — for he often came to John after his baptism, as was said above. On the following day, moreover, he added the fourth testimony, when two of his disciples were present, one of whom was Andrew. Since, then, it is not established how much time flowed between the baptism and these three testimonies concerning the present — although all these were given after the baptism — it certainly cannot be gathered from John's Gospel that only a few days intervened between the baptism and the wedding.

What of the fact that, when he says, "The following day he wished to go into Galilee, and found Philip," the Evangelist perhaps means not Christ, but Andrew, whom he had said, just before, had found Simon; now he says he found Philip on the following day, having gone out from Christ's dwelling into Galilee? For this reason the Latin translator says, "And Jesus says to him," although the name "Jesus" is not found in the Greek. How many days, however, intervened between that last testimony of John's given before two

disciples, and this day on which Andrew found Simon, is uncertain.

To the third argument: for that passage in Matthew is understood of public preaching to the people, since it is clear that, at Christ's first coming into Galilee — which John alone narrates, in chapter 2 — Christ already had disciples. Matthew, however, speaks of the second coming, when John was already in prison. It can, then, be understood not of private teaching, but of public and popular teaching.

To the fourth argument: how long, indeed, was the time of Christ's preaching? This has not been sufficiently settled by the ancients. Eusebius himself too seems little consistent with himself on this matter. For in his Chronicle, he writes that the Lord preached for three years after the fifteenth year of Tiberius, and asserts that this too was written by John in the Gospel. But this same author, in his book Evangelical Demonstrations, the eighth demonstration, second book, confirms, likewise on John's testimony, that Christ preached for three years and six months. But if he came to the Passion in the eighteenth year of Tiberius, as Eusebius says in his Chronicle, how could he have preached for three years and six months after the fifteenth year of Tiberius? And yet it is clear, from Luke chapter 3, that the doctrine of the Gospel began after the fifteenth year of Tiberius. We, however, if we wish to fill out three years of teaching, shall allot one year to private teaching, and two to public teaching. For no reasoning compels us, and no authority proves, that the whole three years should be given to public teaching alone.

To the fifth argument: Indeed, we deny — and probably deny — that the feast which John mentions in chapter 5 was Passover. Chrysostom and Cyril, moreover, affirm it was the feast of Pentecost. This, I frankly confess, does not seem likely to me. First, because, after the Passover, Jesus remained in Judea with his disciples, as John writes in chapter 3; but "remaining," by Scripture's usage, cannot be understood of these few days that flowed between Passover and Pentecost — especially since, after Christ remained in Judea, he departs again, leaving that place, into Galilee, as is said in John chapter 4. And again, he comes from Galilee to Jerusalem, which you have in chapter 5. All these events, in so brief a time — unless we make Christ a runner — can scarcely be accomplished. Cajetan, indeed, on John chapter 4, computes, with not absurd reasoning, that Christ, after the Passover celebrated in Judea, at which he cast the sellers out of the temple, interposed a long delay of many months. That feast, then, which is mentioned in chapter 5, was not the solemnity of Pentecost.

Then, that the Evangelist should narrate, in chapter 5, one miracle performed at Passover, and immediately, in chapter 6, pass to another Passover, with all the deeds and words of an entire year omitted, does not seem very probable. That feast, then, at which

the paralytic was healed, was, as Cajetan rightly thought, a winter feast. It matters not, however, whether you say it was the feast of the dedication of the second temple under Zerubbabel, which is celebrated on the third day of the month of Adar — that is, February — or rather the feast of Purim, which was solemn for the Jews on the 14th and 15th days of this same last month. For then, in excellent order, chapter 6 follows: "Now the Passover was near," etc. But on refuting this argument, we have already said too much.

We think we have already responded to the seventh argument, in book 2, chapter 18. But there briefly; now, since this is its proper place, this argument must be refuted at greater length.

Jerome's words are not to be understood in the sense that we should think it is enough for the truth of history if what the author asserts is believed true by the common crowd — even when it is false. Otherwise, if it were permitted to interpret the histories of Scripture by this rule, we would say that, when the Apostle says Saul reigned 40 years, he wished, speaking in the common manner, to say only what was the more frequent report — a claim Bede asserts on Acts chapter 13, whether rightly or wrongly, let others judge; I do not care to judge, at present, so great a man. We would likewise say that Matthew called Mary's husband "Joseph," not because he truly was, but because he was believed to be so by the common crowd. We would also say that Herod and all Jerusalem with him were troubled — not in fact, but in the crowd's opinion; and, finally, if you please, that Christ died not truly, but only apparently, according to the crowd's judgment.

Certainly, if it is the practice of the Scriptures that the historian narrates the opinion of the many, exactly as it was believed by men at that time, then anyone could deny that everything Scripture relates about Nebuchadnezzar, Darius, Cyrus, Alexander, Samson, and the Maccabees — namely, that the sacred authors related what was commonly believed, not what they themselves believed to be true. How horrible and fearful this is to hear, every one of the faithful sees.

Jerome's sense, then, is another, much sounder and truer, which the reader will easily grasp from the following distinction. False opinions of the common crowd fall into two categories: some can be signified and expressed only in false words — as that Christ was John the Baptist, or Jeremiah, or one of the earlier prophets. Such opinions the sacred authors always relate in such a way that they seem to relate them not from themselves, but in the crowd's own name. Others are false opinions of the crowd, indeed, but expressed in words which, in some popular sense, are true — as that Joseph was Christ's father was, in the crowd's sense, entirely false, but he was nonetheless truly, and without

falsehood, called "father" — both because he was Christ's foster-father, and because he was the husband of his mother. And just as, in common speech, a stepson is truly called "son," a stepmother "mother," a stepfather "father" — in these matters, I confess, the true law of history is to express the crowd's opinion. For if the discourse concerns the first kind of matter, this is absurd in profane history, and even impious in sacred history.

Wise men, indeed, generally speak with the crowd, but do not think with the crowd. Nor are they, however, guilty of lying, since they understand that what they say is true according to some sense of the word. Thus the Virgin Mary said, "Your father, and I, sorrowing, sought you" — in the crowd's manner of speaking, indeed, but truly nonetheless. Thus too, even if Christ had had no inner astonishment, he could truly be said to have "marveled," since he displayed the appearance of one marveling, as Bede explains, book 2 on Luke, chapter 24. Thus Matthew and Mark said Herod was "troubled," since he had sadness in his face. In this sense the Lord too called hypocrites feigning sadness "sad." For, in common usage, the names of things are used for the images of things. Although, in the examples given, both Christ, if we believe Saint Thomas, in some manner inwardly marveled, and Herod was truly troubled. For sinners simultaneously grieve and rejoice in their vices, both delight and sorrow. And on this argument, enough. Let us now proceed to the rest.

Jerome certainly need not have laughed so much at Adam's burial in the place of Calvary; nor should we, following the example of a most holy man, laugh at such histories. The common crowd, I see indeed, is too easy in believing such matters. Credulity, too, most easily creeps into the mind even of the best men. But certain distinguished men, when they turn away from the crowd's easiness and credulity, sometimes fall into the contrary vice — becoming incredulous, even when there is no fault in believing, while there is some fault in disbelieving.

The testimony, however, which is objected from Joshua chapter 14 against the ancient history, presses nothing at all — since the name "Adam" in that passage is not proper, but common. For Scripture gives the reason why that city, which after Hebron was called "Kiriath-Arba" — that is, "city of Arba" — was so named: namely, because Arba, whom the Seventy called "Arbea," was a man great among the giants there. This sense, besides fitting most aptly with Scripture's context (for which reason it was expressed by the Chaldean interpreter, Pagninus, and other most distinguished men), can also easily be proven from the fact that, in chapter 15 of this same book, Arba is said to have been the father of Anak — so that it is easy for anyone to understand both that "Arba" was the proper name of a giant, from whom Kiriath-Arba was named, and that Arba was the father and first of the giants of that land.

I pass over here the version of the Seventy, who, although they referred the greatness not to Arba but to the city — so that this city was understood as a metropolis — nonetheless sufficiently indicated that "Arba" was the proper name of a giant, from whom that city once received its own surname. That the first parent's tomb was in the city of Arba is gathered neither from this passage, nor from elsewhere. Rather, it is much more probable, as the public memory of ancient things has handed down, that the first Adam lies buried where the second was also buried. On the eighth argument, then, this much.

The ninth argument raises a most difficult question, not only in chronography, but in the understanding of the Scriptures — one which has drawn the most distinguished authors into various opinions. Josephus, certainly, computed those 70 years of the Jewish captivity to the first year of Cyrus. He was followed by Africanus, in his fifth volume of Chronology; our own Tostado, on the second chapter of Matthew, question 91; Annius, with his Philo, book 14; John Lucidus, book 2, chapter 11; and other grave authors, both ancient and modern. These, moreover, rest on the clearest testimonies of Sacred Scripture. The first is Jeremiah chapter 25, which says: "These nations shall serve the king of Babylon for 70 years. And when the 70 years shall be completed, I will visit the king of Babylon," etc. The 70 years of the Jewish captivity, then, had already been completed at that time when Babylon was captured and laid waste by the Persians. But no one is unaware that this event occurred in the first year of Cyrus.

Likewise, Jeremiah chapter 29: "When 70 years shall begin to be completed in Babylon, I will visit you, and will raise up my good word over you, to bring you back to this place." That this prophecy was fulfilled in the first year of Cyrus is not obscurely handed down in 2 Chronicles 36 and 1 Esdras 1. And Jerome himself, although he thought otherwise in other passages, could not fight against the manifest truth on this passage of Jeremiah's. "Unless," he says, "the 70 years have been completed, with Cyrus, king of the Persians, releasing the captives, you shall by no means return to your homeland."

On the contrary side, this is the first point: that the angel who was speaking in Zechariah says: "How long will you not have mercy on Jerusalem and the cities of Judah, with which you have been angry? This is now the seventieth year." This year, moreover, Zechariah attests, in chapter 1, to be the second year of Darius; not, then, in the first year of Cyrus, but in the second year of Darius, were the 70 years completed. Clement, Theodoret, Eusebius, Jerome, and Augustine rest on this argument. As for what some interpret — "This is now the 70th year," namely, "already long since past" — this can scarcely be heard without discomfort, since the pronoun "this" most evidently excludes this understanding; if the pronoun were removed, this interpretation would perhaps be probable.

Then, those 70 years which Jeremiah had predicted are understood not of the deportation of the Jews, but of the desolation of the temple and city. But the 70 years of desolation are to be referred not to the first year of Cyrus, but to the second year of Darius. The seventieth year, then, of which Jeremiah's prophecy speaks, was completed not in the first year of Cyrus, but in the second year of Darius. That earlier point, which we assumed in this argumentation, can easily be proven from 2 Chronicles 36, where these words are written: "All the days of its desolation it kept sabbath, until 70 years were completed," etc. And Daniel 9: "In the first year of Darius, son of Ahasuerus, of the seed of the Medes, I, Daniel, understood the number of years, concerning which the word of the Lord came to Jeremiah the prophet, that the desolation of Jerusalem should be completed in 70 years." And Jeremiah 25: "And the land shall be in solitude and in astonishment, and they shall serve the king of Babylon for 70 years." The 70 years, then, are to be understood not of the deportation, but of the desolation — as Josephus too attests, in his book of Antiquities, book 10, chapters 10 and 11, and book 1 against Apion.

That the years of desolation, moreover, were completed not in the first year of Cyrus, but in the second year of Darius — this, taken as the latter premise — is proven by Ezra's testimony, according to Jerome. For Ezra, in words by no means obscure, attests that the temple remained cast down until the times of Darius. The seventy years of the overthrow, then, we ought to compute not to the first year of Cyrus, but to the second year of Darius.

From these considerations it is certainly sufficiently understood how great a darkness this present question casts even over the Sacred Letters themselves. But in the reckoning of the dates too, it is so tangled and complicated that it can scarcely, or by no certain method, be resolved and untangled.

Clement of Alexandria, moreover, computed only thirty years from the beginning of the desolation — which is written, in 2 Kings 25, to have occurred in the nineteenth year of Nebuchadnezzar and the eleventh of Zedekiah — to the first year of Cyrus, in which the captivity of the Jews was released. To this number, as I said, Eusebius, Theodoret, Jerome, and Augustine agree.

Another argument for this matter is this: that, if 70 years elapsed to the reign of Cyrus, Mordecai would certainly be found to have accomplished such great deeds at an age at which, through extreme old age, he could not, I will not say administer the commonwealth, but could not even be numbered among the living. For he was among that number of captives whom Nebuchadnezzar deported along with Jeconiah, king of Judah. Wherefore, even according to those who wish to compute the 70 years not from

the desolation, but from the deportation, once the captivity was complete — that is, in the first year of Cyrus — Mordecai was already nearly eighty years old, unless we believe he was deported to Chaldea at the age of two or three. But let us suppose he was one year old. He was then, at the very least, seventy-one years old when the captivity was released by Cyrus. Cyrus, moreover, as every most distinguished historian relates, reigned either thirty, or nearly thirty, years; Cambyses and the Magi reigned nine. At the beginning of the reign of Darius Hystaspes, then, Mordecai's years amounted to 110.

Let us suppose, then — which seems to conflict less with reason — that Darius was he under whom Scripture includes Mordecai's deeds. For that these occurred under Artaxerxes Longimanus, or even under Xerxes — both of whom were many years later than Darius — is far more incredible. It is by no means probable to attribute these same events to Cambyses, son of Cyrus, who held the empire for only eight years. But the history relates that certain deeds of Mordecai's occurred after the twelfth year of Ahasuerus. That Ahasuerus, then, was not Cambyses — especially since his acts by no means cohere with Cambyses's acts.

It remains, then, that Mordecai, even at that time when he had lived to his 122nd year, was not weak, declining, or worn out by age, but solid, robust, and strong in accomplishing great and distinguished affairs. This can scarcely be believed in those ages — since, much before, when men's lifespans had not yet declined so much, the prophet already said: "If men reach eighty years of power, still their toil and sorrow" is theirs.

For these reasons, the thirty years which Augustine, Jerome, Eusebius, Theodoret, and Clement of Alexandria gather to the first year of Cyrus seem to fit and agree with the history of the book of Esther better than the number 70, which is gathered by others' opinion — unless we delight in the fables of Philo Annianus, who says Mordecai exceeded Isaac's age by eighteen years.

But truly, Josephus, from the nineteenth year of Nebuchadnezzar — in which year, the Sacred Letters relate, the temple was overthrown and cast down — to the end of the reign of Belshazzar, when Babylon was captured by Darius and Cyrus, counts not only 70 years, but many more. For he writes that Evil-Merodach, son of Nebuchadnezzar, reigned 18 years; then Neriglissar, 40 years; then Labashi-Marduk, nine months; finally Belshazzar, 17 years. Thus, apart from the years during which Nebuchadnezzar lived after the temple's destruction — which were not few — 76 other years, if Josephus speaks truly, intervened until the first year of Cyrus.

Berossus, however, in book 3 of his Chaldean History, computes only 48 years from the desolation to Cyrus. For he says Nebuchadnezzar held the empire for 43 years; his son

Evil-Merodach, two years; Neriglissar, whom he relates to have been the husband of Evil-Merodach's sister, four years; Labashi-Marduk, son of Neriglissar, nine months; Nabonidus, of this same lineage, 17 years, in whose last year Babylon was captured by Cyrus. This same computation, almost, is found in the histories of the Phoenicians, which Josephus cites in his first book against Apion.

But Metasthenes computed 70 years from the devastation of Jerusalem to the first year of Cyrus, in this manner: Nebuchadnezzar, who devastated the temple and the city, held the empire for 46 years. Evil-Merodach, his son, 30. Regassar, his son, 3. Labassar-Dach, his brother, 6. Balthassar, also their brother, 5. For if you take the 26 years during which Nebuchadnezzar lived after the temple's destruction, and add to these the 44 years during which Nebuchadnezzar's one son and three grandsons reigned, you produce the stated number, 70.

In the reckoning of dates, then, the question is greatly complicated — so complicated that it seems it cannot be resolved even by men skilled in history. For the Jews, since they...

Among whom is Lyra too, who, at his own discretion, counted 70 years from the eighth year of Jehoiakim, father of Jeconiah, to the fourth year of Cyrus — merely to state his own opinion, resting on the testimony of no weighty author, proven by no reckoning of the annals, persuaded by no arguments, and estranged even from the Sacred Letters. But this can be tolerated in a doubtful matter.

But who could tolerate this? That some, in Eusebius, asserted that those 70 years, about which there is controversy, ought to be computed from the 13th year of Josiah to the first year of Cyrus.

What of the fact that, in this same question, that too is variable and entangled which was especially necessary to explain, in order to resolve the difficulty of this question? Namely, whether Belshazzar was Nebuchadnezzar's son, or grandson, or great-grandson. For if what Eusebius says is true — that Belshazzar was Nebuchadnezzar's son, brother of Evil-Merodach — it seems no absurdity to say, as he denies, that more than 30 years intervened from the destruction of the temple to the first year of Cyrus. But if he was not Nebuchadnezzar's son, nor grandson, but great-grandson, then it is by no means credible that only thirty years intervened between the overthrow of the city and the first year of Cyrus. But Jerome affirms, on the authority of Berossus and Josephus, on Daniel chapter 5, that he was a great-grandson. This is also cited under the chapter "On the Meaning of Words," "Nam et Rem." Although Josephus, book 10 of the Antiquities, chapter 13, writes that Belshazzar was Nebuchadnezzar's grandson. This too Metasthenes Annianus

asserted.

All these matters I have set forth at such length so that the reader may understand, first, with what great difficulties this argument's question is bound; then, so that, in a difficult and most obscure matter, which no one has yet been able to explain, he should not expect from me a clear, certain, constant opinion, but a probable, likely, and by no means absurd one.

First, then, I lay this down — which, unless I am mistaken, has been sufficiently and abundantly proven — that the beginning of the 70 years must be taken from the desolation, not from the deportation; that is, not from the 8th year of Nebuchadnezzar's reign, when Jehoiakim, surnamed Jeconiah, voluntarily surrendered himself, 2 Kings 24, but from the nineteenth year of this same Nebuchadnezzar, when Nebuzaradan overthrew the temple, houses, and walls of the city, 2 Kings 25. Since this, as I said, has been shown from 2 Chronicles 36, 1 Esdras 1, and Jeremiah 25, I think it superfluous to resume these same points again.

But Cajetan, on 2 Chronicles chapter 36, argues on the contrary that the 70 years ought to be computed from Jeconiah's deportation, since Jeremiah, in chapter 29, says to those who were deported with Jeconiah: "When 70 years shall begin to be completed in Babylon, I will visit you and raise up," etc. But it is sufficiently established that these words spoken in chapter 29 are to be referred to the sense of chapter 25. For he does not say, "When 70 years shall begin to be completed among you," but "When 70 years shall begin to be completed" — those, namely, which he had predicted. This is confirmed both because he speaks to the whole people of Judea, as is clear from the beginning of the chapter; and because that whole land was not made a solitude and astonishment through Jeconiah's deportation alone; and because it is immediately added: "And all these nations shall serve the king of Babylon for 70 years." But if only those who were deported with Jeconiah served for 70 years, how is it said of all — "and all these nations shall serve," etc.? Surely even the neighbors of Jerusalem too, etc. What of the fact that, even if there had been 70 years of solitude, they were nonetheless not years of desolation, if we compute from Jeconiah's deportation? For "solitude" is one thing, "desolation" another. The 70 years, then, are not to be numbered from Jeconiah's deportation. Wherefore those who begin computing the 70 years either from the 13th year of Josiah, or even from the 8th of Jehoiakim, or from his third year, I judge should be removed from this discussion all the more. The first foundation, then, has been excellently laid.

Then, it does not seem likely to me that only thirty years intervened from the desolation to the first year of Cyrus — the number which Eusebius, and those who agree with

Eusebius, Theodoret, Jerome, and Augustine, must necessarily count, if they draw the completion of the seventieth year to the second year of Darius Hystaspes. For it is established that Nebuchadnezzar, father of Evil-Merodach, carried his reign to the forty-fifth year — the number which Metasthenes Annianus indeed attributes to him. For from Jeconiah's deportation to the first year of Evil-Merodach, 37 years elapsed (2 Kings 25 and Jeremiah 25). Nebuchadnezzar, then, reigned these thirty-seven years already. If to these you add the eight years he had reigned before (2 Kings 24), you produce forty-five years.

Nor does Jerome conflict with this opinion, who, on Daniel chapter 5, says Nebuchadnezzar reigned for 43 years. This opinion he received from Josephus, book 1 against Apion; Josephus, in turn, from Berossus, book 3 of the Chaldean History. For he computes whole years, not excluding the incomplete ones.

This is a custom familiar to both profane and sacred authors. Thus, in Jeremiah 25, it is written that Nebuchadnezzar's first year was the same as King Jehoiakim's fourth — although, in the third year of King Jehoiakim of Judah, Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, came to Jerusalem and besieged it (Daniel 1). Eusebius too, in his Chronicle, attests that Judea was captured by the king of Babylon in this same third year of Jehoiakim. The third year of Jehoiakim, then, was Nebuchadnezzar's first — but not a complete one; but Jehoiakim's fourth year was this same Nebuchadnezzar's first complete year. We, moreover, count Nebuchadnezzar's 45 years, although not all were complete — and thus we speak, throughout this whole discussion, of incomplete years.

Whence the error of Eusebius is exposed, who assigned Nebuchadnezzar only 38 years of reign. For he places his death in the 19th year after the desolation, when it should have been placed in the 26th — if it is true, as it certainly is true, that Nebuchadnezzar held the empire for 26 years after the desolation. For from the 19th year, in which the temple was devastated, to the 45th, to which Nebuchadnezzar carried his life and reign — 26 years are counted. Likewise, if from the 37 years which Nebuchadnezzar lived after Jehoiakim's deportation, you subtract the eleven years during which Zedekiah reigned, you will likewise compute 26 years. And from this, another error of Eusebius's too is refuted, who left Evil-Merodach and Nebuchadnezzar's other successors only four years of empire, or six at most — and not even those complete. Certainly, if 30 years are counted from the desolation to the first year of Cyrus, since 26 of these belong to Nebuchadnezzar, only four or five remain, which we must allot to Evil-Merodach, Neriglissar, Labashi-Marduk, and Belshazzar. That these succeeded Nebuchadnezzar in this order, not only Josephus affirms, but Jerome too agreed that Berossus handed this down. This matter causes me great wonder indeed. For what reason Jerome had — I

truly do not understand — for believing, in agreement with Berossus and Josephus, that Belshazzar was Nebuchadnezzar's great-grandson, and yet, together with Eusebius, computing so few years from the end of Nebuchadnezzar's reign to the first year of Cyrus.

For Eusebius, perhaps, can be excused, who thought Belshazzar was Evil-Merodach's brother, and indeed Nebuchadnezzar's son. But why should I excuse Eusebius? Since Matthew says that Jeconiah, after the deportation to Babylon, begat Shealtiel, and Shealtiel begat Zerubbabel. This Zerubbabel, moreover, was already fairly grown in the first year of Cyrus, since he was leader and prince of the Jews. But it cannot even be understood how Jeconiah, in so few years as Eusebius computes, could have had so grown a grandson. Not, then, only 30 years intervened from the desolation to the return.

To these two conclusions I add this: that 70 years intervened from the desolation to the first year of Cyrus. This conclusion I cannot deny, when I carefully weigh chapter 25 of Jeremiah and chapter 36 of 2 Chronicles. If anyone should respond to these scriptural testimonies aptly and probably, I would not greatly contend against him. To me, indeed, as I said, no way of explaining these testimonies appears, except by plainly agreeing that 70 years of desolation intervened to the first year of Cyrus.

I understand, moreover, that certain men distinguish the sum of this matter in this way: that they compute the seventy years of captivity from the deportation to the first year of Cyrus, but complete the seventy years of desolation in the second year of Darius. If this were true, a probable reconciliation of the discrepant opinions would indeed have been found. But I find nothing more false, when I begin to test this reasoning against the truth. For the deportation occurred in Nebuchadnezzar's eighth year, as is written in 2 Kings 24. But the desolation occurred in this same king's nineteenth year, 2 Kings 25. The devastation, then, followed the deportation by eleven years. But from the first year of Cyrus to the second year of Darius, without controversy, more than thirty years intervened. It can, then, in no way happen that 70 years be numbered from Jeconiah's deportation to the first year of Cyrus, and another 70, likewise, from the desolation to the second year of Darius.

Wherefore, setting aside the various opinions of the disagreeing authors, let us respond to the arguments contending against this third conclusion. It is first objected that the angel in Zechariah, speaking of the second year of Darius, says: "This is now the seventieth year." To this argument, we respond, above all, that this passage was translated, by the Chaldean interpreter and by holy Pagninus, in a quite different manner — one perhaps more fitting to Scripture's sense. Their version, moreover, runs

thus: "How long, O Lord, will you not have mercy on Jerusalem and the cities of Judah, with which you have been angry, these seventy years?" For among the Hebrews, indeed, an interrogation is not broken off in the middle of that discourse, but can be extended, in continuous speech, all the way to the end. From this it follows that, in our own edition, although the discourse is divided, two questions are nonetheless to be understood in the angel's single complaint. Of these, the first would be: "How long, O Lord, will you not have mercy on Jerusalem and the cities of Judah, with which you have been angry?" The latter would be: "Is this the seventieth year?" — as though the angel were complaining in this manner: "Has the Lord, then, forgotten his promise? Is this now the seventieth year — the one you had promised us with such great kindness, and which we, with such burning longing, awaited from you? What good does the released captivity, the granted ability to build both temple and city, do us, if the former remains overthrown, the latter devastated?"

Nor indeed is it unusual for certain passages to be presented here and there without a mark of interrogation, which would more correctly be pronounced otherwise. You have an example — to omit the rest — in the letter to the Romans, chapter 8, a portion of which we are accustomed to pronounce thus: "Who shall accuse against God's elect? God, who justifies. Who is he who condemns? Christ Jesus, who died, who rose again, who is at the right hand of God, who also intercedes for us." But Augustine most correctly indicates that it ought to be read and pronounced thus: "Who shall accuse against God's elect? God, who justifies?" — so that "no" is tacitly answered. And likewise: "Who is he who condemns? Christ Jesus, who died, who rose again, who is at the right hand of God, who also intercedes for us?" — as if to say, "Far be it." In this passage you see that two questions joined to two interrogations have both great charm and great sharpness.

This same thing I think of the angel's complaint in the present case. Indeed, greater force will be in it, if it is contained in two questions. But suppose nothing at all is sought here by way of interrogation. Is it, for this reason, nothing that is not expressed by grief? I think, indeed — and think not absurdly — that these are the words, as it were, of a grieving and downcast mind, which signify nothing less by a depressed complaint than they would by a raised interrogation.

That this may be better understood, it must be illustrated by examples from Scripture too, which seem to me to explain the whole matter openly. Jeremiah, first, also makes two parts of the same complaint: one of which contains an interrogation, the other does not. "Why," he says, "does the way of the wicked prosper? Is it well with all who deal treacherously and act unjustly? You have planted them, and they have taken root; they

prosper and bear fruit." I shall bring forward a very similar example from Habakkuk. "Why," he says, "do you not look upon those who do iniquity, and are silent while the wicked devours one more righteous than himself? And you make men like the fish of the sea, and like a creeping thing that has no ruler." Did these prophets denote anything other, by complaint and by question? Did they assert anything more, while they complain, than while they question? Certainly not more than while they ask.

In this same manner, then, I understand the angel in Zechariah to have made two particles of his complaint: of which the first is expressed by interrogation, the second by complaint. He does not, then, assert that the year in which he speaks is the seventieth from the desolation, but complains that this so-promised, so-longed-for year has already, for a long time now, passed by. For he expresses nothing by complaining, as we just said, that he would not have expressed by asking. That God's anger, namely, was drawn out beyond the appointed time, he complained of by that question: "How long will you not have mercy?" That mercy, likewise, was delayed too much, he complained of by adding that lament: "This is now the seventieth year." This is to be pronounced not with the face of one asserting, but of one weeping — with a complaining voice, that is. But on Zechariah's testimony, enough.

It is objected, then, that the seventy years are not to be counted as of the captivity, but of the overthrow. This we most gladly concede. But that the seventy years of the overthrow were completed not in the first year of Cyrus, but in the second of Darius, we most constantly deny — relying not on our own opinion, but on the testimony of Scripture. But, you say, the temple remained cast down and overthrown until the second year of Darius. If you mean that nothing at all was done to the temple, this is false — since, in the first years of Cyrus, an altar had been built, and the foundations of the temple laid, as is written in 1 Esdras, chapters 3 and 5. But if you say the temple was not completed during Cyrus's reign — this is indeed so. But it was not completed even up to the sixth year of Darius, as we read in 1 Esdras chapter 6. Indeed, Josephus has recorded that the temple was not entirely completed until the ninth year of Darius. The Jews, agreeing with this opinion, say the temple was 46 years in building. And this same Josephus relates, book and chapter 5, that the temple was not fully completed in all its measurements even by the 25th year of Xerxes. Wherefore, if the demolition of the temple is understood to have lasted as long as it remained unformed and incomplete, then surely the seventy years will be numbered not to the second year of Darius, but to the sixth or ninth of Darius, or even the 25th of Xerxes.

What of the fact that the 70 years of devastation are to be understood not only of the temple, but of the city too? "I understood," he says, "the number of years, concerning

which the word came to Jeremiah the prophet, that the desolation of Jerusalem should be completed in 70 years." If, then, we take the years of devastation in this manner — since Jerusalem still remained deserted even in the 20th year of Artaxerxes, its walls scattered, its gates consumed, as you have in 2 Esdras chapter 2 — we shall certainly say that those 70 years must be extended even to Nehemiah's time, since the city was restored by him through Artaxerxes's reign.

We, then, although we believe the building of the temple was begun in the second, or at least the third, year of Cyrus, nonetheless think the seventy years of the overthrow were completed not when the temple was either begun or completed, but when the captivity was released to the Jews, and, accordingly, the ability given for them to return to their native land, build an altar, construct the temple, restore the city, fill in the ruins. This is entirely the sense, as we have said, we seem to have received from the Sacred Letters — which have handed down that Jeremiah's word was fulfilled in the first year of Cyrus.

But Mordecai's age — or rather, his distinguished deeds — conflict with our opinion. For if it was as great as the adversaries gather from us, it was not only the highest, but even decrepit and failing, and not fit for accomplishing such great affairs. To this argument, the response received from the most learned men is not entirely to be despised. For what absurdity is there, if, in those ages, one man or another exceeded, in age, temperament, and vigor of body and mind, far beyond the rest of the old men of his time — since even now there are certain men whose talent, memory, and other powers of mind, in extreme old age, seem not only not undermined, but not even diminished?

And by this same response, that argument too is dissolved, which can be drawn from Haggai 2. "Who among you," he says, "is left, who saw this house in its first glory?" etc. In the second year of Darius, then, certain men still survived who were 116 years old, and more. For if, to the 70 years of desolation, you add the 30 of Cyrus, the 9 of Cambyses and the Magi, and 2, or 5, or even 7 of Darius, and, in addition, the years they had lived before the devastation, if they could have seen the temple and remembered its glory after so many years — you will certainly produce that total of 116 years. This response, moreover, will be judged less absurd, if the 30 years of Cyrus are counted not from the capture of Babylon, but from the defeat of Astyages. For then he first received the kingdom of the Persians and Medes.

Finally, this too I think should be responded: that Mordecai is read to have been of that number of captives whom Nebuchadnezzar deported with Jeconiah, king of Judah — this need not be taken as if he himself, at that time, was actually numbered among the captives, but as if he sprang from those captives, and derived his origin from them. This,

indeed, Scripture placed in Mordecai's praise: that he was not of those parents who contradicted the prophets, but of those who obeyed Jeremiah. This interpretation of this passage is gathered from 1 Esdras chapter 2, where those are numbered who went up from the captivity which Nebuchadnezzar had carried away, and returned to Judea — although some of these had not themselves come to Babylon, but their fathers had. For it is established, from Matthew, that Zerubbabel was born in Babylon. And in 3 Esdras chapter 5 you read thus: "These, moreover, are those who went up out of Judea," etc. We do not, then, do violence to Scripture, if we interpret that Mordecai was deported from Jerusalem in the sense that his father was deported.

But if anyone should still contend that this interpretation is forced, we can respond thus too. That Ahasuerus, of whom perpetual mention is made in the book of Esther, was perhaps Astyages, father of Darius the Mede. For Daniel, chapter 9, calls him "Ahasuerus." Or certainly, Cyaxares his father — whom Herodotus relates was the first to divide the peoples of Asia into provinces. He also says he was, when held by great anger, most fierce. All these traits fit Ahasuerus excellently, who, in the book of Esther, is painted in these same colors. Nor does it matter whether these or other kings of the Medes ruled Asia before Cyrus. For we know that Ctesias of Cnidus, in Diodorus, book 3, has set down others than Herodotus wrote. But Eusebius follows Herodotus. To this is added that this Ahasuerus is nowhere called king of Babylon, but of the Persians and Medes. Before Cyrus and his uncle Darius, moreover, there was a single monarchy of the Medes and Persians; Babylon had its own proper king ruling it, as Herodotus writes in book 1.

To this is added, too, that everything agrees with this exposition, and nothing absurd emerges from it. For that Mordecai first was deported to Babylon, and then appears in Susa, presents no contradiction. For it is established that this could have happened — that the Babylonians sold certain of their Persian and Median captives — to omit other causes, which could have been many, for such a thing. Daniel certainly is established to have first been deported to Babylon, but we read, in chapter 8 of this same Prophet, that he was afterward present at Susa.

How much more urgently, indeed, does this press against the adversaries: that, if the events which the history of Esther narrates had occurred in the time either of Darius Hystaspes or of Artaxerxes Longimanus, Ezra and Nehemiah would in no way have passed over them in silence. For to refer these to the time of Artaxerxes Mnemon, if Mordecai came with Jeconiah, is most like a dream.

Nor does it escape me that Pliny, book 6, chapter 27, writes that Susa, the royal city of the Medes and Persians, where Ahasuerus arranged that banquet, was founded by Darius Hystaspes's son. If this is true, that opinion about Astyages or Cyaxares cannot be true. But Pliny's authority cannot press us here. Rather, Strabo, book 15, writes much more probably that Susa was the construction of Tithonus, father of Memnon. And Herodotus, book 5, says the city was customarily called Memnon's — not Artaxerxes Mnemon's, but that of that most distinguished young man who came from Syria to aid Priam, and who also built, at Susa, a royal palace called "Memnonian" after him, as Diodorus wrote in book 3.

But that Susa was founded before Cyrus, Daniel is a most certain authority. "In the third year," he says, "of the reign of Belshazzar, while I was in Susa," etc. This city, that it was the metropolis of the region of Elam, Jerome truly interprets — but wrongly thinks that Daniel built a tower there. Josephus, indeed, in the last chapter of book 10, says Daniel built this tower at Ecbatana of Media; but at Susa, the chief city of Persia, he saw what is narrated in Daniel chapter 8. Although Susa, properly speaking, is a city neither of Persia nor of Media, but of Susiana, neighboring both Persia and Media. Since this region bordered not only these two provinces, but Babylon too, and was situated in the middle of these three regions, the kings of the Persians and Medes accordingly placed the seat of their empire there. That Cyrus did this, Strabo affirms; we believe others before him did too. Now, if Susa was the beginning of Ahasuerus's reign, as is said in the first chapter of the book of Esther — but Susa was not the beginning of the reign either of Darius Hystaspes, or of Longimanus, or of the other Artaxerxes surnamed Mnemon, but rather of Tithonus, or of that other king who first ennobled Susa, and from there took the beginning of his empire — then certainly it is not absurd to understand Ahasuerus, the husband of Esther, to be Astyages, or Cyaxares his father. For each ruled the Medes and Persians too, as Herodotus writes in book 1.

It remains that we finally explain how it could happen that Josephus says the 70 years which Jeremiah predicted were completed in the first year of Cyrus, while he himself computes many more years in the reign of Nebuchadnezzar and his successors. But there are innumerable textual corruptions in Josephus's numbers. These corruptions I neither wish nor ought to assign to so diligent and weighty a man. It must be believed, then, that it happened through the fault of the copyists, that, in the reign of Neriglissar, 40 was substituted for 20, and in Belshazzar's, 17 was placed for 7. For if you correct these two numbers, the 70 years will stand which Josephus wrote had elapsed from the desolation to the first year of Cyrus. Thus, however, the total of 70 years will stand, if you attribute only 25 years to Nebuchadnezzar after the desolation — since the 26th year had begun

but was not complete — if you likewise exclude Belshazzar's final year, since Babylon came under Cyrus's rule at its beginning. And if he gave Belshazzar five years, but, through the copyists' error, seventeen were substituted, then 70 years are produced, and there will be no need to exclude those that were not complete.

But in explaining these minor points, I too displease myself. But it was necessary, once, to satisfy those curious about these matters. And this Gordian knot, however much labor and many words it required, nonetheless had to be untied clearly and distinctly.

The tenth argument is indeed easy, but necessary to explain for the understanding of Scripture. For not only Jerome, but Haggai too, writes that, in the second year of Darius, the foundations of the temple were laid. And that which we objected from the commentaries on Daniel has no difficulty at all — since Jerome himself, on Isaiah chapter 44, interpreted his own words: "While Cyrus lived," he says, "the foundations of the temple were laid. But under Darius, in his second year, the temple began to be built." This, then, is most easy.

This is more difficult: that Jerome, indeed Haggai himself, says, in these words: "Set your hearts from this day forward, from the twenty-fourth day of the ninth month, from the day on which the foundations of the temple of the Lord were laid," etc. And Jerome: "From the twenty-fourth day of the ninth month, in which the foundations of the temple were laid," etc. The prophet, moreover, is speaking without doubt of the ninth month of the second year under Darius.

To this argument, various responses have indeed been given by many. Lyra thinks that "foundations," in this passage, refers to the lower part of the building which sustains and bears the rest, even if it is not the lowest part, but foundations laid upon the lowest ones. Bede believes — and this is more widely received — that the foundations of the interior temple were laid while Cyrus lived, but those of the exterior court, of the porticoes and treasury, in the second year of Darius. This too can be said: that, under Cyrus, the foundations were begun and roughly shaped, but under Darius, perfected and completed. Add that, from Cyrus to Darius, in the space of 40 intervening years, the foundations were, through both the injury of time and the work of enemies, nearly overturned and undermined, but were repaired and restored under Darius. Whence Josephus too, in Rufinus's translation, wrote that, under Darius, with the foundations restored, building continued upon them.

And, as I understand the passage, Haggai does not seem to me to assert that the foundations of the temple were laid in the second year of Darius. Rather, the prophet's sense is this: "Attend, not only from this day" — which is, namely, the twenty-fourth of

the ninth month — "but from the day on which the foundations of the temple were laid, and you will find that, since my temple was begun, your fields have borne no fresh fruits." Surely, for those neglecting God's religion and worship, nothing prosperous has yet happened. "But from this day I will bless," etc. And this sense had been explained a little before, in these words: "And now set your hearts, from this day and above, before a stone was laid upon a stone in the temple of the Lord," etc. — as if, from that time when they first came, at Cyrus's command, from Babylon, he had cursed their crops, and the earth had produced nothing prosperous for them, because they had been idle in God's work and the temple's construction. But on the tenth argument, this much.

In the eleventh, it is not easy to resolve who this Artaxerxes was, who, together with Cyrus and Darius, commanded that the temple be built. Rabbi Samuel believed Darius and Artaxerxes were the same — this being not a proper name, but a surname of all the kings of Persia, just as "Caesar" was for the Romans, "Pharaoh" for the Egyptians. Not, then, three commanding, was the temple built, but two: Cyrus and Darius Artaxerxes.

Against this opinion the conjunction strongly resists — which joins the name "Darius" with "Artaxerxes," not only in Latin, but in the Greek and Hebrew exemplars. Certainly inept forms of speech would be, "Julius and Caesar," "Marcus and Tullius," "Chencres and Pharaoh." This opinion is also opposed by the fact that, by the same reasoning, the surname "Artaxerxes" ought also to have been added to Cyrus, who was certainly the most distinguished king of the Persians. And this same Rabbi, in the case of the "Artaxerxes" of whom mention is made in chapter 4, understood, truly, in my view — not Cambyses, but Cyrus. Why, then, would Scripture add this common surname to one king, and remove it from the other? This opinion, finally, is made less probable by the fact that, if "Artaxerxes" were the surname of all the kings of Persia, this would be absurd, which is written in 1 Esdras 7: "But in the reign of Artaxerxes, king of the Persians, Ezra," etc. For no one in particular would be understood, no more certainly than if he had merely said "king of the Persians," without the word "Artaxerxes." But on this opinion, enough. Let us proceed to the rest.

Josephus, moreover, in Lyra, interprets this Xerxes as the son of Darius. For, in book 11, chapter 5, of the Jewish Antiquities, he writes that Xerxes, son of Darius, was heir of his father's piety, no less than of his kingdom, and changed nothing in his father's institutions concerning divine worship, but treated the Jews with the greatest benevolence. He adds, moreover, that, in his time, Ezra adorned the temple with silver, gold, and precious vessels, which he had brought from the whole province of Babylon, and increased the worship of God; and that Nehemiah, with this same king's permission, not only restored the city and walls, but also supplied what was lacking for the fabric of

the temple.

But this opinion has two scruples. The first is that it attributes 38 years of reign to this king — which conflicts with the reckoning of all the chronographers, who allot Xerxes, son of Darius, only twenty years of reign. The second scruple is this: it is said, in the sixth chapter of 1 Esdras, that the Jews built, constructed, and completed the house of God, at the command of Cyrus, Darius, and Artaxerxes — but that they completed it, nonetheless, in the sixth year of Darius. It is necessary, then, that this Artaxerxes, whoever he ultimately was, existed before Darius's sixth year. Otherwise, how could the Jews have constructed and completed the temple by the sixth year of Darius, while Cyrus, Darius, and Artaxerxes were all still living? Not, then, under the name "Artaxerxes" is Xerxes, son of Darius, understood. This same reason also presses against those who understand, in this passage, Artaxerxes Longimanus, son of Xerxes, in whose days, as Eusebius attests, both Ezra and Nehemiah supplied what was lacking to the temple, the city, and the walls.

Nor is it true either, what some say — that "Darius the Mede" must be understood in this passage, for they take "Darius Hystaspes" under the name "Artaxerxes." For, first, it is nowhere read, either in the Sacred Letters or in any approved historical author, that Darius the Mede either aided or commanded the building of the temple. For Daniel alone mentions this Darius, and assigns him nothing of the kind. Then, since this Darius was Cyrus's uncle, as has seemed likely to most, and much older in age, as has seemed to all, Sacred Scripture would in no way, contrary to the custom of all other passages, name Cyrus before Darius. "By command," it says, "of Cyrus and Darius and Artaxerxes." This same reasoning forbids that this Darius the Mede be understood under the term "Artaxerxes." Although the Seventy translators, on Daniel 7, rendered "Artaxerxes" for "Darius," as our own Jerome has noted.

Moreover, no history, either human or divine, calls Darius Hystaspes "Artaxerxes." There is no reason, then, why we should understand, in this passage, Darius Hystaspes under the name "Artaxerxes" — especially since, in this entire book, no one else at all is understood under the name "Darius" except the son of Hystaspes. But why would Scripture toy with us through an ambiguity of name, if, in the same clause of the sentence, it distributed the name "Darius" into various meanings? "They built," it says, "by command of Cyrus and Darius and Artaxerxes, and completed this house of God, up to the third day of the month of Adar, which is the sixth year of King Darius."

Two paths for resolving this question appear to me. One is to defend what has just now been attacked: that "Artaxerxes Longimanus" ought to be understood here, who is the

first of this name found in profane histories. This same was Bede's opinion. Scripture, moreover, speaks by anticipation — something the sacred authors have often done elsewhere. For it need not be understood that all three of them both built and completed the temple by Darius's sixth year. Rather, those three completed the work, whom it is established favored the Jews in accomplishing and completing the task; but it was built, and in some part completed, up to Darius's sixth year, by Cyrus and Darius's command. Although, in that year, the temple was not entirely finished in every part — since, as Josephus says, Ezra and Nehemiah later, under Artaxerxes, completed the temple's construction, adornment, and worship.

This alone differs in our opinion from Josephus's: that what Scripture relates Ezra and Nehemiah accomplished, he contends occurred under the reign of Xerxes, son of Darius, while we contend it occurred by the command of Longimanus. This much, however, is without controversy true: that Cyrus, and Darius, and that Artaxerxes with whom Nehemiah and Ezra were pleasing, built, completed, and adorned the temple.

There is also another method of resolving this scruple: if we say that these two particles, "and Artaxerxes," were added by some Hebrew scribe, first in the margin, then, as often happens, inserted into the text. Nor is it necessary to seek an example of this error from elsewhere than this same book. For, in chapter 4, the Latin edition reads thus: "But in the reign of Ahasuerus, he himself is Artaxerxes," etc. — where those three words, "he himself" and "Artaxerxes," are not part of Scripture, but were placed, perhaps, by some unknown expositor in the margin, and, through the copyists' error, inserted into our text — since they are found neither in the Hebrew exemplars, nor in the Greek of the Seventy translators, as Lyra too noted before us. This same error also occurred in the Latin codices, 2 Kings chapter 8, where those words — "of which Solomon made all the bronze vessels in the temple, and the bronze sea, and the pillars and the altar" — are found neither in the Hebrew exemplars, nor in the Greek Seventy, etc. That this defect crept into the Latin edition could equally have happened to creep into the Hebrew exemplars too.

On this matter, I have said much fittingly in book 2, and I shall say certain things not inopportunely in explaining the following argument. This much I now say: that I have not been led by a light conjecture to think this about the error in this passage. For Josephus, indeed, in book 11 of the Jewish Antiquities, chapter 4, citing this very passage of Ezra's, says thus: "The building of the temple progressed with the great zeal of all, according to the mandates of Cyrus and Darius, while Haggai and Zechariah prophesied in the meantime; it was completed within seven years." And, in the last chapter of book 15, Herod makes no other founder of the temple besides Cyrus and Darius. No other

third figure, then, was found in the true Hebrew exemplars. But this much on this matter. Let us dissolve the rest.

The twelfth argumentation is so extremely difficult and obscure that it can either not be resolved at all, or resolved only with much greater difficulty. For, indeed, both in sacred and profane history, the numbers have so often been corrupted through the copyists' fault, that whoever wishes to bring them back to the true reckoning must, I will not say merely traverse rocky and arduous places, but must necessarily enter a labyrinth of inextricable questions, from which he cannot exit, even with Theseus's own thread.

To relate such errors in human histories would be superfluous, for they are readily encountered everywhere. In sacred history, I shall mention a few, which will nonetheless be enough for everyone to understand how slippery and easy it is for copyists to substitute one number for another, even in Divine Scripture.

Let us bring forward, then, first, an example of this matter from 2 Chronicles chapter 15, where we read thus: "But there was no war until the thirty-fifth year of the reign of Asa." And immediately, at the beginning of chapter 16: "But in the thirty-sixth year of his reign, Baasha came up," etc. In both these passages, "twentieth" ought to be read instead of "thirtieth." For Baasha began to reign in the third year of King Asa, and reigned only twenty-four years, as is related in 1 Kings chapter 15. He did not, then, carry his reign and life to the thirty-sixth year of King Asa. This is also made evident from 1 Kings chapter 16: "In the twenty-sixth year of Asa, king of Judah," he says, "Elah, son of Baasha, reigned over Israel," etc. And afterward: "in the twenty-seventh year of King Asa, Zimri reigned" — who, namely, had killed Elah. This error John Lucidus noted, in his second book of Times. Lest anyone, however, unlearned, should attribute the corruption of this passage to hatred of the Latin edition, let him know that the Greek and Hebrew exemplars too are corrupted here.

This same thing also happened in 2 Chronicles chapter 36, where all the exemplars I have been able to see agree on these words: "Jehoiakim was eight years old when he began to reign, and he reigned three months and ten days in Jerusalem, and he did evil in the sight of the Lord." In this passage, some copyist, either unlearned or negligent, substituted "eight" for "eighteen." For, thus, in 2 Kings 24, you read truly: "Jehoiakim was eighteen years old when he began to reign," etc. Otherwise, how could he have "done evil in the sight of the Lord"? How could he have "gone out to the king of Babylon," and, though naturally good, have voluntarily surrendered himself, lest the city be endangered? (2 Kings 24; Josephus, book 10 of Antiquities, chapter 9.) And this same error Cajetan first detected. For I do not wish to detract anything from either the diligence or the talent of

others.

But I myself too, sometimes, am led by conjecture to suspect that the sacred authors placed, in certain passages, other numbers than are now found. For example, let us set forth something in which this conjecture's argument appears. In 1 Kings chapter 13, it is written that Saul was a "son of one year" when he began to reign. If this is understood as "a son of one year" — that is, an innocent boy of one year, who did not know how to distinguish between right and left — how shall we take this: "Zedekiah was a son of twenty-one years when he began to reign"? What if, here too, that number, "twenty," was omitted through the copyists' error? Does it not seem to you that, if they did this through carelessness and negligence, they would give rise to false expositions by interpreters? Again, what, I ask, is this — "David was a son of thirty years when he began to reign, and he reigned forty years" — if we interpret "a son of one year" as an innocent one-year-old?

In a similar form of expression, then, a similar interpretation arises. But it cannot be similar, if Saul is said to be "a son of one year." Wherefore it is likely that the author of the book of Kings wrote him as "a son of twenty-one years," but that, through the writers' fault, the greater number was omitted in the Hebrew exemplars. This same error was thereafter transmitted, either by others or even by the translators themselves, into the Greek and Latin exemplars. The same thing occurred in 2 Chronicles chapters 15, 16, and 36, as we demonstrated a little before.

And since it is not my intention to discuss each individual passage, I shall add only one more example, from Rabanus's opinion, so that, finally, those matters properly belonging to this argument may be settled. Jeremiah chapter 52, in the standard reading, runs thus: "This is the people whom Nebuchadnezzar led captive: in the seventh year, three thousand and twenty-three Jews. In the eighteenth year of Nebuchadnezzar, he deported from Jerusalem eight hundred thirty-two souls. In the twenty-third year of Nebuchadnezzar, Nebuzaradan, the captain of the guard, deported seven hundred forty-five souls of Jews. All the souls, then, were four thousand six hundred." From this reading, rather difficult and most obscure questions arise, some of which Lyra raised — but how well he responded, let others judge.

Rabanus, on Jeremiah, writes that the Jews were captured three times by Nebuchadnezzar, and that the number of these three captivities is reckoned here by the prophet. The first was when Nebuchadnezzar led Jehoiakim, son of Josiah, bound in chains to Babylon (2 Chronicles 36). For it is not likely that he did not also deport many others together with Jehoiakim to Babylon. For Daniel too, in chapter 1, signifies, in

words not very obscure, that, in the third year of Jehoiakim, certain men were deported from Judea to Babylon. But Cajetan denies that Jehoiakim came to Chaldea. Indeed he denies it — but with a weak reasoning. "Jehoiakim," he says, "was killed in Judea, and was buried with the burial of an ass, according to Jeremiah's prediction, and was cast out beyond the gates of Jerusalem." What of it? As if it could in no way happen that he was first led to Babylon, then sent back to Jerusalem, where, having violated the trust given to the king of Babylon, he perished by an inglorious death. Let us not, then, deny that Jehoiakim, along with many others, was led to Babylon. This not only Rabanus, but the divine Scriptures too, hand down.

Rabanus places the second captivity at Jeconiah's deportation, which is expressly related in 2 Kings 24. The third too is expressly related in this same book, chapter 25, when Nebuzaradan devastated the temple and the city too.

Of these three captivities, then, as Rabanus supposes, Jeremiah writes here the number individually. If this is the true opinion, three numbers must be changed: so that, instead of "seventh year" in the first captivity, "first" should be written. For that occurred in Nebuchadnezzar's first year, which was also Jehoiakim's third — as we said a little before. But, in the second captivity, instead of "eighteenth," "eighth" should be written. For it is established that Jeconiah migrated to Babylon in Nebuchadnezzar's eighth year (2 Kings 24). Instead of "twenty-third," in the final captivity, "nineteenth" ought to be read. For, as is written in 2 Kings 25, and likewise in Jeremiah 52, Zedekiah was led into Chaldea in Nebuchadnezzar's nineteenth year. Nor does it conflict with this opinion, that, in 2 Kings chapter 24, ten thousand Jews are said to have been deported with Jeconiah — since Jeremiah is not counting the common crowd, or just any soldiers, but the princes of Judah and those established in some dignity, as Josephus notes, book 10 of the Jewish Antiquities, chapter 8. Or Jeremiah may even here be reckoning those who had not been counted in the books of Kings: for the author of the book of Kings had entirely passed over the number of the first and last captivities. But in the second, he had placed the greater number — that is, ten thousand — but had omitted the smaller, which Jeremiah supplies here — that is, eight hundred and two souls.

Understanding this, Josephus, in book 10 of the Jewish Antiquities, chapter 9, encompasses both numbers, and asserts that those led with Jeconiah were ten thousand in number, and additionally eight hundred and thirty-two. Although he refers the first captivity to that year in which the king of Babylon killed Jehoiakim, and commanded that he be cast out, unburied, beyond the walls. For then he writes that three thousand Jews were led into captivity at Babylon — which year was, without doubt, Nebuchadnezzar's seventh. For, in the eighth, Jeconiah was established in his father's

place (2 Kings 24). If we accept this, the number of the first captivity, in Jeremiah, stands most correctly, without any correction at all.

I understand, however, that this whole passage of Jeremiah's can be vindicated from the mark of error — if we say the second captivity occurred in Nebuchadnezzar's eighteenth year, counting complete years, of course — just as the first, too, is to be ascribed to the seventh year in this same sense. Otherwise, if the discourse concerns incomplete years, the first occurred in Nebuchadnezzar's eighth year, the second in his nineteenth. But the third occurred in his twenty-third year, when, in the fifth year after the destruction of Jerusalem — which was Nebuchadnezzar's twenty-third year of reign — he invaded Coele-Syria, subdued the Ammonites and Moabites, conquered the Egyptians, and led away captive to Babylon the Jews found there, as Josephus attests, book 10 of the Jewish Antiquities, chapter 11.

But since Jeremiah seems to be numbering not those deported from Egypt, but those from Judea; and since, again, he seems to be recounting those captivities which are gathered from the sacred histories; and since, finally, he seems to write, in the third position, that captivity which occurred under Nebuzaradan, the most celebrated of all, and especially distinguished by the burning of the temple and city — so that he returns to where he had digressed a little before — in order to bring the number of years in the second and third captivities back to conform with the fourth book of Kings, I would not greatly resist this. For if you prefer to follow Josephus rather than Rabanus in the first captivity, I shall not disapprove.

I myself, however, to speak candidly, have never been less pleased with myself than in this digression — although this happened more from my desire to explain this most difficult argument than from any fault of my own; for, while wishing to show that questions of numbers are slippery and difficult, because error in numbers is easy and slippery, I have almost forgotten myself, and have done, moved by a sudden impulse, what I would not even have deliberately planned to do in this work: to dispute, in the course of refuting arguments, about matters of the greatest business.

But this, nonetheless, fell out most opportunely for me: that the whole difficulty of the twelfth argument lies in that number of years which is prescribed in 1 Kings chapter 6, from the exodus of the children of Israel out of Egypt to the temple begun by Solomon. This number, in all the Greek, Latin, and Hebrew exemplars, is entirely the same: four hundred eighty. That this number was changed from the true one through the copyists' error, you can be persuaded by these arguments.

First, that Josephus, in book 8, chapter 3, of the Jewish Antiquities, writes that Solomon began the building of the temple 592 years after the Israelites departed from Egypt, but 1020 years after Abraham migrated from Mesopotamia into the land of Canaan. For if you add 430 — which, according to Exodus, elapsed from Abraham's migration to the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt — to 592, from the exodus to the beginning of the temple's construction, you will produce that same total of Josephus's, 1020 years — so that each of his numbers will be self-consistent, and mutually consistent with each other.

Then, this same Josephus, book 11 of the Jewish Antiquities, chapter 4, says: "Before Saul and David, the Judges administered the commonwealth. This state of the commonwealth lasted more than five hundred years after the rule of Moses and Joshua." Not, then, only 480 years intervened from the exodus of Israel from Egypt to the beginning of the temple.

Moreover, Moses ruled for forty years. For he was eighty years old when he led Israel out (Exodus 7), and died in the 120th year of his life (Deuteronomy, last chapter). Moses, 40.

Add eight years of interregnum, during which the Israelites served the king of Mesopotamia after Joshua's death (Judges 3). Josephus, book 6 of the Antiquities, chapter 5, writes that these were eighteen — of which he had said, in book 5, chapter 7, that eight were of servitude. Interregnum, 8.

Othniel judged the people for forty years (Judges 3). Othniel, 40.

Add eighteen years of interregnum, during which they served the king of the Moabites (Judges 3). Interregnum, 18.

Ehud judged the people for eighty years (Judges 3). Ehud, 80.

Add twenty years of interregnum, during which they served the king of Canaan (Judges 4). Interregnum, 20.

Barak and Deborah judged the people for forty years (Judges 5). Barak and Deborah, 40.

Add an interregnum of seven years under the Midianites (Judges 6). Interregnum, 7.

Gideon judged the people for forty years (Judges 8). Gideon, 40.

Abimelech, three years (Judges 9). Abimelech, 3.

Tola, twenty-three years (Judges 10). Tola, 23.

Jair, twenty-two years (Judges 10). Jair, 22.

Interregnum of eighteen years under the Philistines and Ammonites (Judges 10). Interregnum, 18.

Jephthah judged for six years (Judges 12). Jephthah, 6.

Ibzan, seven years (Judges 12). Ibzan, 7.

Elon, ten years (Judges 12). Elon, 10.

Abdon, eight years (Judges 12). Abdon, 8.

Interregnum of forty years under the Philistines (Judges 13). Interregnum, 40.

Samson, twenty years (Judges 16). Samson, 20.

Eli, forty years (1 Samuel 4). Eli, 40.

Saul reigned forty years (Acts 13) — for Josephus, in the last chapter of the book of Jewish Antiquities, says he reigned eighteen years while Samuel lived, twenty-two after Samuel's death. Saul, 40.

David reigned forty years (2 Samuel 5 and 1 Chronicles 3). David, 40.

Solomon began the building of the temple in the fourth year of his reign (1 Kings 6). Solomon, 4.

These, added into a total, produce the number of five hundred seventy-four years. If to these you add the years of Joshua, Shamgar, and Samuel, and also the interregnum which Scripture says occurred between Samson and Eli, an even greater total than Josephus's will certainly result. More than 480 years, then, intervened from Israel's exodus from Egypt to the temple's construction. There is, then, an error in this passage of Scripture, and, accordingly, the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin codices must be corrected to the true reckoning.

To this: if all the Greek exemplars produce any conviction — as is fair in such ambiguous matters, where the reckoning of numbers is disputed — Paul certainly defined the time of the Judges, after the land of Canaan had perhaps been distributed to the children of Israel by lot, up to Samuel, as not much different from four hundred fifty years. For the Greek runs thus: [Greek text], which Erasmus translates thus: "And, having destroyed seven nations in the land of Canaan, he distributed their land to them by lot. And after this, for about four hundred fifty years, he gave them Judges, up to Samuel the prophet." Pagninus translates in this same sense, and all the other more recent interpreters too. For that Greek cannot be rendered otherwise.

If, then, to the four hundred fifty years which Paul allots to the Judges, from the distribution of the land to Samuel, we add Moses's forty, likewise Saul's forty, David's another forty, and, finally, Solomon's four — we shall certainly produce this same total as that produced a little before from the certain testimonies of Scripture: five hundred seventy-four years — so that the New Testament entirely agrees with the Old.

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But Cajetan says that all the Greek and Latin exemplars are corrupted, and that in Greek "triakosiois," not "tetrakosiois," should be read — in Latin, "three hundred," not "four hundred." Why so? "It is proven," he says, "since otherwise the number of years which the third book of Kings, chapter 6, defines, will not agree." As if this were not precisely the point of controversy — whether that number, or this one, was introduced by the copyists' error. Certainly, with the number of the third book of Kings, all the rest of Scripture disagrees. With the number of Acts of the Apostles, all of Scripture agrees. Not this number, then, but that one, has been corrupted through the copyists' fault.

This opinion is finally confirmed by the fact that those who wish to hold the contrary view, and retain that number of four hundred eighty years, produce so many absurdities in their calculation that they can scarcely be heard without offense to the ears. Nicholas of Lyra, moreover, and Tostado, who are held distinguished in the exposition of Scripture, in order to establish that total of 480 years correctly, first say that Joshua's years should not be computed at all, but should be included within Othniel's forty. In this same manner they judge concerning Samuel, whose years they likewise include within Saul's forty. Then they add that the years during which the Jews served the king of Mesopotamia, and other kings afterward in the following period, are included within those years during which the land is said to have had rest, or even in which this or that Judge is said to have presided over the Israelites. Only one interregnum of eighteen years do they admit into the computation, so that, with Solomon's three years, they produce the sum of 480 years, according to their own convenient discretion.

But, as I said, this method of computation has a great deal of absurdity in it. For, to omit other points, lest I be excessive and unusual in a matter that is known and clear, I would wish this above all to be resolved: by what method can the years of interregnums be reduced and contracted into those years in which, under the Judges, the land is said to have had rest from battles? Surely, in the interregnums, either there was perpetual war for the Jews against their enemies, or wretched servitude without a Judge, afflicted affairs, everything in turmoil, no rest. Moreover, what will these men say about the forty-year interregnum which Scripture mentions between Abdon and Samson? Will

they include those forty years within Samson's twenty? Or rather within Abdon's eight? Moreover, why do they accept one interregnum of eighteen years, but reject the rest? If they can give no suitable reason at all, then certainly either let them reject this interregnum along with the rest, and the total will be smaller — or let them admit it along with the rest, as is fair, and the total will be greater.

To this: the book of Judges clearly teaches that the land, under Judah's leadership — who succeeded Joshua — had no rest at all, but was agitated by many wars, by which the Canaanites and Perizzites were conquered and oppressed. For that Joshua's leadership was turbulent, with frequent battles, the book of Joshua itself makes manifest. But when the king of Mesopotamia, after the deaths of Joshua and Judah, defeated the children of Israel in battle and compelled them to serve for eight years — to describe this as peaceful times, and a quiet land, is entirely contrary to common sense. If you drag the years of Joshua and Judah, and those too during which the king of Mesopotamia conquered and oppressed the Israelites, into that time in which the land is said to have had rest — will you not confuse turbulent and unquiet years with tranquil and peaceful ones? Will you not also assert manifest violence against the open narrative of Sacred Scripture? For it plainly relates that, after Joshua's death, after the Canaanites and Perizzites were defeated, after the children of Israel were freed from servitude through Othniel, the land had rest for forty years. What of Paul? Does he not allot forty years to Saul's reign, after Samuel? By what reasoning, then, shall we include Samuel's years within Saul's years — which Josephus relates were thirty-eight, but which Paul relates were forty? By no reasoning, then, as it seems, can that number 480 be defended.

For from that time when the children of Israel began to inhabit and hold the promised land, to the first year of Jephthah, three hundred years intervened — Jephthah himself is a most abundant witness. If to these three hundred you add the forty during which the people tarried in the desert, and the twenty years of Samuel, which some gather from the first book of Kings, and, finally, those which we numbered above from Jephthah to Solomon's fourth year — this same total will be produced which was established twice above: five hundred seventy-four years.

So that, however you turn — whether attempting to establish the true and certain number of years from the exodus of Israel out of Egypt to the temple's construction from the times of the interregnums and individual Judges, or from Paul's own calculation and reasoning, or from Jephthah's testimony and the judgment of a blameless defense — you will always find this same number, five hundred seventy-four. Moreover, those who wish to reduce the total of each particular number too meagerly and slightly to their own reckoning, judge that number to be truest and most correct which, when

many calculations are completed, is found consistent, coherent, and agreeing with itself and with the rest from every direction — since these calculations, often gathered together into one, produce entirely this same total.

By these arguments, that number in the third book of Kings can be weakened — although it is nonetheless confirmed not only by all the exemplars, but by all the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew authors agreeing. But truly, in defending and preserving the total of this number, you can scarcely find any support fully fortified in every respect.

Eusebius, indeed, who is without controversy most diligent in the reckoning of dates, does defend this total of 480 — but defends it in such a way that his defensive reasoning seems to have been neglected. For, first, he removes Elon's ten years from the number 480, since he says the Seventy translators omitted this Judge. For this reason he was compelled to give Joshua twenty-seven years, so that the number 480 would be completed. But if he included Elon's ten years within the 480, since he attributed twenty-seven to Joshua, the total of 490 years would be produced. He fell, moreover, into more corrupted codices. For the Complutensian copies include this Judge in the Seventy's version. His codex, too, was similarly corrupted regarding the time during which, according to the Seventy, Eli judged the people. For he writes, in the Seventy's interpretation, that twenty years are found. And in the Spanish copy, "tessarakonta" — that is, "forty" — is found. This error of Eusebius's I have often marveled at. For if it pleased him to follow the Seventy's interpretation, why did he not likewise remove twenty years from Eli, just as he removed ten from Elon? But if it seemed right to retain forty years for Eli, why did he remove Elon's ten from the total?

This inconvenience too befell Eusebius: that, when he included all the interregnums within the times of the later Judges, and saw that some of these events, though earlier, were most inaptly joined to what followed, he attributed this matter to the traditions of the Hebrews, lest he himself should seem to be the first author of so absurd a claim. Concerning Samuel's and Saul's years, he is stuck in the same mire with the rest. For he assigns no more than forty years to both together. But Paul allots this same number, forty, to Saul alone; Josephus, however, allots twelve to Samuel alone, eighteen to the time of Saul's reign while Samuel lived, and twenty to Saul after Samuel's death.

On this point Bede affects me with great wonder — first, because he permits Paul's discourse to be both popular and even false; then, because he asserts that the book of Judges indicates that the Judges presided for three hundred ninety-six years before Samuel — although, in the book of Judges, only three hundred thirty-nine are found. Wherefore, to fill out that total, it is necessary to add Moses's forty years, and Joshua's

seventeen. But Joshua's seventeen years are held not from any truth of history, divine or human, but only from the opinion of those who proceed to reduce all sorts of numbers to that total of 480 years — and, in order to do this, they do not hesitate to contravene all the histories. What of the fact that Bede says Josephus allots twenty years to Samuel, and this same number of years to Saul — when he undoubtedly allots fifty to both together, as is most manifestly established from the passages cited above?

Cajetan, moreover, entered upon an entirely different path. For he distributes forty years to Saul alone; but, so that the total of 480 years may stand for him, he allots ten years to Joshua, and seven to Samuel. This he does, contrary to the credibility of history, purely at his own discretion.

What, then? Am I always to be a mere relator of others' opinions? Shall I never offer my own view? Certainly, I owe the reader something of my own too — if, indeed, any approved coin can be paid. First, however, I do not think it a question of faith or religion whether that number 480 — this number of years, which is found in the standard codices — was written through the copyists' fault, or was rather placed thus by the sacred author himself in his own exemplar. For we have shown that error in numbers is most ready and easy. We have shown that certain numbers in the sacred books have been corrupted through the copyists' error. We have shown, finally, that there are many reasons why this number, 480 years, which we are now discussing, seems to have been corruptly introduced.

And Josephus, and Sabellicus — one a Hebrew, the other a Latin — when they cited this passage from 1 Kings chapter 6, placed not 480 years, but many more. It seems incredible, indeed, that Josephus, if all the Hebrew exemplars had had the number 480, would have departed from that certain and prescribed number. Nor did Cardinal Hugh, when he cited Josephus's opinion, think it should be rejected. If, then, someone should say that more than five hundred years intervened from the exodus of the children of Israel out of Egypt to the temple's beginning, he is not immediately to be refuted, as if this matter pertained to faith or religion.

This, finally, I hold: that the years of the interregnums truly flowed among the years of the Judges. It is not, then, the case, as the Hebrews falsely hand down, that these should be computed within the times either of the earlier or the later Judges. Wherefore Josephus, since he wished to compute not only those times during which the Judges presided, but also those which elapsed in the interregnums without a Judge, truly produced the total of five hundred ninety years. But the author of the book of Kings, omitting the years of the interregnums, reduced into his number only those he

understood to have intervened while the Judges administered. More years, then, elapsed from the time Israel departed from Egypt to the temple's beginnings. But of leaders, judges, and kings, only four hundred eighty elapsed.

It must also be noted that, of those who presided over the people from Moses to Solomon, there are four whose times ancient Scripture nowhere marks — namely, Joshua, Shamgar, Samuel, Saul. For the certain number of years of all the rest is designated in the very books of the Old Testament. From these a total of 419 years is gathered. If to these you add Solomon's three — for he began building the temple in the fourth year — the remaining years will be 58, which you may distribute among Joshua, Shamgar, Samuel, and Saul.

Shamgar, indeed, since he died in the same office and life before a year had turned, is rightly excluded from this total. But since Paul allotted forty to Saul, there will be no doubt that eighteen are to be distributed between Joshua and Samuel. But whether ten of these should be assigned to Joshua and the rest to Samuel, or, on the contrary, fewer to Joshua and more to Samuel — this can be doubted. Cajetan preferred the former; I too have the same view. Since, according to Josephus and other approved historians, Joshua's leadership was longer than Samuel's judgeship. Nor is it contrary to our opinion that the Ark remained at Kiriath-Jearim for twenty years under Samuel's time. For, during these twenty years, Samuel was not, as some have falsely thought, judge of the Israelite people, but prophet. Indeed, Scripture itself, unless I am mistaken, sufficiently openly signifies that only after that twentieth year did the people begin to be judged by Samuel.

But in computing Joshua's time, there is such great variety and discrepancy among the authors that the authority of history is undermined in no respect at all — if, where the opinions of historians vary and disagree, we allow ourselves not to be pressed or constrained by any one of them. Josephus, in Gelenius's translation, numbers Joshua's years as twenty. Eusebius, twenty-seven. Bede, John Lucidus, and certain others allot seventeen. Cajetan, ten.

Wherefore, when we say eighteen should be distributed between Joshua and Samuel, we certainly say nothing absurd. Although reason bids us, without prejudice to Scripture's truth, to add eight or nine other years to these two judges. Why so? Would not the years, with eight or nine added, produce more than 480? They would, indeed. It will be false, then, you will say, that the temple began to be built in the 480th year from the time Israel departed from Egypt. By no means at all. Rather, nothing prevents both from being true. For Scripture is sometimes accustomed to pass over small numbers.

An example of this we gave a little before, from 2 Kings chapter 24, where ten thousand Jews are said to have been deported — to whom, nonetheless, Josephus added eight hundred thirty-two, indeed Jeremiah too, as we explained above. And Scripture says that Nineveh would be overthrown after 40 days — and yet the Seventy translators have handed down, in Greek letters, "43," which are, in reality, computed from the beginning of Jonah's preaching. These extra three the sacred author omits, who, for a full three days, kept thundering out those same words of the prophet: "Yet 40 days," etc. — although, from the beginning, if Nineveh were to be overthrown, 43 would elapse. That the Seventy wrote 43 days, Justin is authority, in his dialogue with Trypho. But since Augustine read not 43 but only 3, he extricated himself with difficulty from this question, in book 18 On the City of God, chapter 44. This same cause of error befell Jerome too. For if he himself had read, in the Seventy, not "three days" but "43 days," all occasion for wonder would have ceased.

Thus, then, although there were more than 480 years, since they did not reach 490, Scripture rightly said, in its own manner, that 480 years had intervened. If this is probable — as it certainly is — we shall now be able to distribute twenty-seven years between Joshua and Samuel: ten to Samuel, seventeen to Joshua, which Bede and other grave men allotted to him.

But let those grim and rugged questions of numbers pass. In these matters I could have simply confessed my ignorance, and disregarded the whole desire of curious men. But I judged it a lesser fault to say so much, at length, in explaining a most difficult argumentation, than to say nothing at all.

The thirteenth argument entangles us in little difficulty. For it is not my intention to defend all the histories which are read everywhere in the Church. I see only that it is common, not only among the laity, but even among churchmen, to receive, very willingly indeed, even those fables which the Church has long since rejected. In these matters, certainly, not only the diligence, but even the prudence, of the pontiffs is wanting. For some, while treating a hangnail, harm the head. Namely, they render grave histories as apocryphal, but so alter the divine office of the Church beyond its usual custom that scarcely any form of ancient religion seems left in the daily prayers. From this, how many and how great evils befall the Church of God is not for this occasion and time to say.

But grant that certain matters in the Church's public prayers are held ambiguous, certain even false. Will you, for this reason, proceed to withdraw trust from all the Church's histories, merely because some of them have been circulated and believed by the

common crowd — in which, especially whenever the discourse falls upon miracles, you might perhaps find more fabricated matters, rightly and deservedly to be disapproved? To me, certainly, that counsel of Gelasius's is pleasing — that, when Catholics read histories of this kind, blessed Paul's saying should go before: "Test everything; hold fast what is good." But to mock bishops, to jest at theologians of the school, to insult the ignorance of monks — as if such fables were foisted upon the unlearned crowd merely for the belly's sake — this, I certainly do not think, is the mark of a well-bred man, one composed toward goodness by nature, much less of one whom Christ formed to be simple as a dove according to the law of the Gospel. For if we should assess the histories of the nations by certain fabricated and false narratives, there will be none at all that we would not mock in the same way.

If this is the mark of imprudent and, accordingly, foolish men, let it stand that the deeds of the saints, which are customarily read in the Church, ought in no way to be despised. Although some of these are uncertain, apocryphal, trivial, false — for very many too are credible and true, some even certain. On the thirteenth argument, then, this much.

In responding to the fourteenth argument, many points must be briefly noted. First, those men are caught up in the greatest error who accept the memories of past events as though oracles of the Church, if pontiffs have sometimes used them in their letters and decrees. It is not the same thing, believe me, to approve a history and to make use of it. A pontiff, indeed, sometimes uses, if he wishes to persuade of something, received opinions, sentiments, and popular matters; but he does not, by this same act, approve everything he has brought forward for this purpose with the judgment of the Apostolic See. It is one thing, indeed, to be the office of persuading, another of defining. He who pronounces brings forward true matters; he who persuades, sometimes even likely ones too.

I heard, from my teacher, as a boy, that no argument at all should be neglected, in which some indication of truth appears. But each thing should be embraced only to the extent that it is most fitting for producing conviction. According to this precept's form, not only dialecticians and orators, but even the ancient theologians too, shaped their disputations. For each has, at times, used, for his own cause, whatever arguments were available, even the credulity of the common crowd. It will, then, be the mark of imprudent men to embrace histories brought forward by a pontiff for a present cause, even incidentally, no differently than those which have been approved by the Church's certain judgment.

As for what pertains next to Constantine's donation, I do not care to discuss this at present. Let others discuss it, to whose heart it is perhaps dear to diminish the majesty and greatness of the Roman Church. We know that Lorenzo Valla declaimed, in an entire book, against the opinion received by common consent. Legal experts sufficiently indicate that the formula of this donation, which circulates commonly, is fabricated, since they mark it with the title "Palea." Eusebius, Rufinus, Theodoret, Socrates, Sozomen, Eutropius, Victor, and other authors of good faith, who wrote most diligently of all Constantine's deeds, not only make no mention of this donation, but even relate the Roman world distributed among his three sons in such a way that Italy fell entirely to one of them. Ammianus Marcellinus, book 15, is an authority that Constantius held dominion over the city, and established Leontius as prefect there. That certain later emperors reigned over Italy, and accordingly over Rome, all historians have recorded to memory. Who is unaware of these and other such matters?

But what does it matter whether that donation was made by Constantine, or by later princes? They call it a fictitious and fabricated fable, brought forward by Nicholas and Clement — as if, indeed, a pontiff either defines, by his own decree, that this donation was made, or defends the city only on this title. They deny the city was donated by Constantine — although they cannot indeed prove this either. But I ask: for what reason do they deny it was donated? If it were not donated, what would they do? Would they concede the city to Caesar? They press their point rather crudely, indeed. For they deny it was donated, and insist on this. We, however, apply, as it were, certain instruments of torture. So that, if they respond that, because it was not donated by Constantine, it therefore now belongs by right to Caesar, they thereby admit themselves to be fools. For it could have been donated by another. The Roman Pontiff could have possessed the city under some other just title. Certainly he could have, by prescription of long time. But if they deny Caesar has any right at all to the city, let them concede that everything they dispute about Constantine's donation is vain. But now, lest we too be vain, let us pursue the rest.

That Constantine suffered from leprosy, I have never read in reliable authors — but rather another of this name, surnamed Copronymus. Whence, perhaps, the error was introduced through ambiguity of the word. Unless that rumor about leprosy could be thought to have arisen from the fact that he is reported to have gone from Byzantium to hot springs for the sake of his health. Saint Thomas, Part III, question 69, in the fourth argument, takes up the common history, and, it seems, approves it. Cajetan does not. This latter has as his authorities Platina, in the Life of Mark; Ludovicus Vives, book 2 On the Corruption of the Disciplines; Alciato, book 7 of the Parerga, chapter 19 — who

openly deny it. That one has all the ancient writers of that age, who were silent — who would not have omitted it if they had known, and who certainly would have known the matter if it had occurred.

For as to the edict that circulates under Constantine's name — although it has been attached to the Council of Nicaea, it nonetheless does not have the Council's authority. These are their arguments. I myself dare neither to affirm these as certain, nor to refute them as false. Gelasius does not reject the Acts of Sylvester, in which this event is recorded. This same event is related at the Roman Synod under Sylvester, canon 1; and again at the Seventh Synod, action ?. Nicephorus, finally, book 7, chapter 33, relates this same event as true history. Wherefore we can neither rightly mock nor accuse the two pontiffs, Clement and Nicholas — nor Saint Thomas either — for having made use of this history. Although, as I said, there is no grave and approved witness of Constantine's leprosy among the ancients. Thus, if we deny it, we do not undermine the authority either of the pontiffs or of the historians.

Concerning the baptism, the most distinguished historians themselves speak variously too. Jerome, in his Chronicle; Eusebius, book 4 On the Life of Constantine; Socrates, book 1 of his history, chapter 39; Theodoret, likewise book 1, chapter 31; Sozomen, book 2, chapter 34; Cassiodorus, who compiled ecclesiastical history from these three; Pomponius Laetus and other writers of this rank — relate that Constantine received holy baptism not at Rome from Sylvester, but at Nicomedia from Bishop Eusebius, and indeed an Arian one.

On the contrary, Damasus, in the Book of Pontiffs, hands down that he was washed at Rome by Sylvester in the holy lustral waters. With this entirely agree Marianus Scotus, Sabellicus, Platina in the Life of Mark, Nicephorus, book 7, chapter 35, and book 8, chapter 54 — not to repeat Saint Thomas, Nicholas, Clement, and finally the two Synods, as witnesses to this matter. And Nicephorus, in asserting this and refuting the contrary opinion, used a discourse indeed quite sharp. For he attributes his own opinion on Constantine's baptism to the Church's consensus, and assigns the contrary to the inventions of the Arians. "Those," he says, "who were once of the Arian sect in the East, related that Constantine, about to die, received baptism at Nicomedia from Eusebius, bishop of that city, saying that he had delayed the sacred washing for this reason — that he wished to complete it in the Jordan. But this is easily refuted from the fact that the Church certainly proclaims that he was baptized at Rome by Sylvester. Wherefore I wish it to be attested to all, that they should thus safely both think and believe. For the Arians, thinking wickedly and by diabolical counsel, fabricated this — asserting that he was not baptized at Rome, or perhaps asserting that he held the same views as they did, as though

he had, for that reason, received the grace of baptism from them. This is full of absurdity and falsehood. For if he had not yet partaken of the sacred washing, it would follow that he neither met with the fathers at the Council of Nicaea, nor participated in the mysteries with them — as history relates." Thus far he. And a little before: "That he was consecrated at Rome by Sylvester, the baptistery sufficiently shows, which, to this present time, is preserved at Rome, as a most certain testimony of this matter."

These two reasons, certainly, make me not rashly join those who report Constantine was washed in the sacred bath at Rome. For if a baptistery, built with such distinguished construction, if the public commemoration of ancient events — inscribed not only in the minds of the inhabitants, but even in the stones themselves — is no argument to us, then, indeed, I will not say what monuments of antiquity exist in that city, but whatever things at all are received in the world by the tradition of our forefathers, we shall be able to deny — however manifest the indications of the facts, places, and times may be.

And unless he had first been raised up from the font of baptism, who could believe that bishops presented Constantine with little books of accusations and complaints, or that he was permitted to be present at the Synod and its disputations? Constantine, then, had been baptized before the Council of Nicaea. Here I cannot sufficiently marvel at the industry and diligence of heretics in propagating their views. For they mix up and confuse everything, so that men distinguished for piety, especially if they are kings or emperors, seem to have favored their own party. And they accomplish this with such great skill that they deceive even learned men, let alone the unlearned.

Eusebius Pamphili, moreover — either because he showed himself credulous toward Eusebius of Nicomedia and his other friends, or because he wished to adorn, with this praise and glory, the sect of which he was the most open champion — was the first author of this fable to the Christians. For Jerome, and the other authors, believed him as he wrote. But more on Eusebius's credibility afterward.

For that Constantia insinuated an Arian presbyter to her brother Constantine, by whom this most religious man was seduced — to believe this, as much as Constantia's levity and inconstancy urges it, so much do Constantine's piety and gravity restrain it. And if that Arian presbyter deceived an emperor otherwise pious, but made more insolent by power, wealth, honors, triumphs, merits, and, finally, every prosperous circumstance, so as to recall Arius and repel Athanasius — for good men are easily imposed upon in such matters — he is not, nonetheless, to be believed to have proceeded so far into error as to receive a second baptism at Nicomedia by Arian rite. Although there are those who think that those who, through his sister, portray Constantine as false in faith, attributed falsely,

by similarity of name, to the father what was accomplished by the crime of his son.

But whether the matter stands in this way or another, this must be held: that the sinews and joints of wisdom consist in not believing rashly — especially not those historians who, since they have violated divine faith, have lost the authority of human faith. But we shall discuss these matters more accurately in the following chapter.

Chapter VI

Who are Authors of Approved Credibility, and Who are Not

Fourteen arguments were individually refuted in the previous chapter. Now the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth must be refuted — since these three seek one and the same thing, which we indeed promised, in our fourfold division above, but, distracted by many and varied considerations, we have, through a certain willful forgetfulness, worn away the third member of that division. For I wrote that I would speak, in the third place, of who is an approved author of history — nor have I discharged what I promised. Indeed, I had become almost forgetful of the plan of the work itself. For men generally strive either to set aside from memory, or to draw out at great length, that task which they undertake not gladly and willingly, but reluctantly and against their inclination. Yet, though not at the appointed time and place, I shall nonetheless now repay — and perhaps with interest — what I do not deny that I owe.

Before, however, I state my own opinion concerning both kinds of historians, ecclesiastical and profane, it is worthwhile to ask whether there are any rules, and certain judges, as it were, of history, by which the credibility and truth of each historian may be examined.

For Johannes Annius lays down three rules, and confirms them by Metasthenes's testimony — rules by which we ought to weigh and examine all books of chronicles, no differently than by the Lydian touchstone:

"The first rule," he says, "is this: all who have written with public and approved credibility are to be received without resistance.

"The second: the deeds and annals of the four monarchies cannot be denied and rejected by anyone, since they were recorded solely by public credibility, and were preserved in libraries and archives. Whence too we read in Ezra that controversies about rebuilding the temple were settled from the annals of the Persians preserved in the libraries.

"The third rule: those who write from mere hearsay, or from opinions, are not to be received as private authorities, unless they do not dissent from public credibility."

From these he concludes that no one is to be received in the Chronicles, unless he agrees with the annals of the four monarchies. And in the Assyrian monarchy, since Berossus the Chaldean wrote with public credibility, it follows that he should be given the palm for the times of this monarchy — and those who followed him too, namely, among the Persians, Metasthenes; among the Greeks, Xenophon in equivocal matters, and Archilochus and Eusebius. Rejected, for the times of this monarchy, are, among the Greeks, Herodotus, Hellanicus, Acusilaus; among the Latins, Justin, Gellius, and Orosius, who wrote contrary to public and approved credibility.

In the second monarchy, of the Persians and Medes, the author of public credibility was Metasthenes the Persian and Ctesias of Cnidus, as Diodorus noted in his third book. Rejected are Josephus among the Hebrews, and Clement, Tatian, Africanus, and Eusebius among the Greeks — since, following private opinions, they mark, contrary to public credibility, kings and dates which were not found in the libraries and annals, and write, against all public credibility, that Cyrus had already released the Hebrew captives in Babylon and died, before Darius, his uncle, took possession of Babylon.

Accordingly, this same Eusebius, since, in the third monarchy of the Greeks and the fourth of the Romans, he follows the public credibility of the annals, is received in both. Philo the Hebrew too is received, who alone had a chronography of the four monarchies — and is accordingly the only one received for these times among Hebrew writers. He, not through opinions, as Josephus did, but relying also on the testimony of the seventy elders, writes most certain matters.

These are Annius's views, in books 11 and 14 — that is, concerning his Metasthenes and Philo: confidently indeed, as such men are wont, fearing nothing so much as that he should seem to doubt anything at all. But we must see whether there is as much truth in this censure as there is confidence. Nor indeed do I gladly detect the faults of writers, especially of my own order. But in a public matter of scholarship, one must in no way play false. Since, then, I saw that certain learned men were hallucinating over these precepts and examples of Annius's, I judged it necessary both to show that his rules are vain, and likewise that his examples of these rules are false.

First, then, Annius seems to affirm that certain scribes were customarily kept only in the four monarchies — whom the commonwealth appointed for the purpose of recording deeds and dates. That their annals were preserved in safe places — just as we see, in a well-instituted city, that public instruments of writing, sealed by notaries, are entrusted

to safe custody. But that this was customary not only in the four monarchies, but in the commonwealth of the Phoenicians and Egyptians too, Josephus is authority, book 1 against Apion of Alexandria. Nor did all four of those monarchies have such scribes and public annals of past events, by which disputes over facts and dates, if any arose, would be settled.

Indeed, it is much more probable that the Greeks lacked such writers and annals. Eusebius certainly writes that Greek history concerning dates, before the Olympiads, is believed false — since each historian, as it seemed fit to him, produced different accounts. But after the Olympiads, he does not assert that annals of this kind were recorded by appointed ministers of the commonwealth; rather, he asserts that true Greek history concerning dates is believed to have begun from that point at which the Olympiads began to be used. And Marcus Varro, in Censorinus's book On the Birthday, chapter 17, hands down nothing other than what Eusebius accepted — that, before the Olympiads, time was "mythical," that is, fabulous, since many fables are related in it; but that, with the Olympiads, "historical" time began, since the events recorded from that point are contained in true histories. Thus, after the Olympiads, the Greeks began to write truly past events, and there existed thereafter, among them, a certain method of history, an agreement of dates, and some consensus among the historians.

But that the Greek commonwealth established certain administrators of history from that time — Annius can say this; he cannot prove it. Indeed, on the contrary, Josephus, an especially good authority, writes that the Greeks handed down nothing firmly known, but sought to explain "what each one thought." Whence their books contradict one another too, and, in many matters, Hellanicus disagrees with Acusilaus; Acusilaus corrects Hesiod; Ephorus shows Hellanicus to be mendacious in very many matters; but Timaeus shows this of Ephorus, and those who came after him of Timaeus, and all of Herodotus. But neither those who wrote of Sicilian affairs, nor, again, those who wrote of Athenian affairs, nor those who recorded Argive affairs, agree among themselves. For Thucydides too is accused of falsehood in many matters, even though he wrote the most scrupulous history of his time. The chief cause of this discord is that there was no zeal, among the Greeks, for producing public records of ongoing events. For it is not only that public recording was neglected among other Greeks; even among the Athenians themselves, cultivators of learning, nothing of this kind is found. Thus far Josephus.

From this it is clear that Annius falsely used Josephus's testimony, to prove that public Greek annals were kept in the libraries of the temples. For Josephus argued nothing of the kind that Annius attributes to him. Rather, he argues this: that the Greeks, though they boast of having received letters from Cadmus, cannot prove this — since no

inscription is left from that time, either on temple walls, or on vessels, statues, or other gifts dedicated to the temple. And yet, in these, after the discovery of letters, it was customary always to inscribe either the names of the gods to whom these gifts were offered, or the names of the offerers. Plutarch too, himself a most weighty authority, affirms that no public Greek annals existed in his own age, apart from certain so-called "temporal canons," whose authority carries little weight with him — since the discrepancies found in them concerning many matters could not be removed, however much effort and study very many devoted to this matter. It is vain and fabricated, then, that historians of this kind were assigned and appointed with public authority in the kingdom and monarchy of the Greeks, after the Olympiads.

Even more vain, moreover, is the claim that only Philo and Eusebius should be received in this monarchy — as having followed public and approved annals. For if Eusebius could have added this authority to his Chronicle, he would in no way have kept silent about his reliance on such annals. Philo the Jew, however, neither had the annals of the four monarchies — which Annius falsely and without reasoning or testimony attributes to him — nor, had he had them, would he have brought us any advantage. For Philo left no monuments at all, either of past events or of dates. For the little book entitled On the Times, since it is full of fables, belongs to no weighty author at all, still less to Philo. The author of this book certainly not only pursues falsehoods, but is even so unlearned in history that he seems to have read only the Hebrew writers, and none of the profane ones besides. But this we shall show sufficiently and abundantly, not much later.

Now let a few words also be said about the annals of the Romans too. That they once had public annals, Cicero, in his second book On the Orator, is authority. "From the beginning of Roman affairs," he says, "down to the pontificate of Publius Mucius, the Chief Pontiff committed to writing all the events of each individual year, and brought them forth onto a whitened board, and set up the tablet at his house, so that the people might have the ability to learn of them — these are what are even now called the Great Annals." Likewise, in the first book On the Laws, he introduces Atticus speaking thus: "For after the annals of the Chief Pontiffs, than which nothing can be more artless — if you should come to Fabius, or Cato, or Piso — nonetheless, what could be so meager as all of these?" These annals of the Chief Pontiffs, then, were discontinued from the time of Publius Mucius; and, in history, Cato, Fabius Pictor, Piso, and other authors succeeded them — grave authors indeed, but without public authority nonetheless.

Nor indeed should those be heeded who assert that such annals of the Chief Pontiffs continued even after Publius Mucius too, since Atticus, in this passage in Cicero, indicates that he had seen them. But he could in no way have seen them, unless they had

been continued — since Livy says that the annals of the pontiffs, from earlier times, perished when the city was burned by the Gauls. For he does not say all perished, but most. From this it does not follow that, if these pontifical annals did not come into Livy's hands, since few survived the fire, we should also think they did not come into Atticus's hands, who perhaps applied greater diligence and care in seeking them than Livy did. Although such codices are not always subject to men's diligence, but to fortune. There was, then, a discontinuation of the annals of the Chief Pontiffs after Publius Mucius.

Indeed, if that diligence of the pontiffs had persisted, either these public annals would exist in the libraries and temples of the gods, or Livy would not be so uncertain in so many places, and would not allege the uncertainty of the annals, nor would he err so often even in noting the consuls and the years of the consuls. That he erred, Heinrich Glarean has shown most diligently; that he was doubtful about persons quite frequently, Quintilian says. And in the first decade, book 6, Livy himself, having explained, in five books, what happened from the founding of the city of Rome to the capture of this same city by the Gauls — that is, to the 97th Olympiad — complains that these matters are obscure and rather inconsistent, both because writing was most rare during those times, and because even what was in the pontiffs' commentaries and other public and private records was, for the most part, destroyed when the city was burned. And again, in book 8, having set forth the various discrepant opinions of the Roman historians, he says: "Nor is it easy either to prefer one matter to another, or one author to another. I think the memory has been corrupted by funeral eulogies and false inscriptions on family images — while each family draws to itself, by a deceptive lie, the fame of deeds and honors. From this, certainly, both the deeds of individuals and the public records of events have been confused; nor is there any writer contemporary with those times, on whose sufficiently certain authority one might rely." In books 9 and 10 too — to pass over other passages — he teaches quite openly how he had no certain and approved annals to follow in writing.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus too, not obscurely, indicates that he did not obtain such public annals. For when he wished to gain credibility for his history, and attested that he had consulted the old histories of the Roman writers — especially those who were held most weighty and distinguished — he nonetheless made no mention at all of these public annals, which he would undoubtedly have done, had he been able to add so great and certain an authority to his work.

What more? Julius Caesar, on Suetonius's authority, upon entering his consulship, was the first of all to establish that daily records, both of the senate and of the people, be

composed and published. To this pertains that saying of the Satirist's: "They will even wish to be recorded in the Acts." And that of Pliny's too: "While Milo was pleading his case, it is recorded, in the Acts of that year, that it rained baked bricks." Julius Caesar, then, was the first of all to renew that ancient custom of the Chief Pontiff, which had long since been interrupted.

Nor does it escape me that the Romans also once had "linen books," which contained almost nothing but the names of consuls and magistrates. But Livy did not see these either — since, when the city was burned, these too perhaps perished. Nor was he so moved by their authority that he did not sometimes disregard them, even when cited by others. Indeed, he sometimes exposes Licinius Macer, along with his linen books. Indeed, he relates that both Tubero and Licinius, with disagreeing opinion, each produced linen books — so that you understand how slight and meager Livy's trust was in these linen books.

From these considerations, Annius is easily refuted, who, toward the end of his commentaries on his Philo, asserts that Titus Livy followed the public annals of the Roman monarchy, and that this Philo of his followed in his footsteps. Here he entirely demotes his own Philo — for if he had the public annals of all the monarchies, as Annius had said a little before, he followed Livy quite imprudently and lightly. For it is established that Livy, first, had no public annals at all; then, that he was doubtful on most points; finally, that he erred in many matters, and erred in such a way that he is refuted by others in some of these errors, and even accuses himself of others.

Nor will I permit anyone to object to me Flavius Vopiscus of Syracuse, who, in his Life of Probus, admits that he used books from the Ulpian library, the registers too of the scribes of the porphyry portico, and, finally, the acts of the senate and the people. In his Life of Aurelian, he writes that Aurelian ordered his daily acts to be written down in the linen books which were in the Ulpian library. Much less indeed shall I tolerate someone objecting to me Diodorus, who, in his first book, asserts that he learned the deeds and leaders of the Romans from ancient annals. For Vopiscus offers only the restored linen books, and the diligence of the Chief Pontiffs — not an ancient one, but one first restored by Julius Caesar; but Diodorus does not affirm that he had obtained public Roman annals, but ancient ones. And these could have existed in private records. They accomplish nothing, then, who say that there were public annals in the Greek and Roman monarchies, to which all other histories ought to be referred — approved if they agree with them, rejected if they disagree.

For it has been shown that no public annals exist, either of the Greeks or of the Romans; and, accordingly, that there are no authors who wrote either the deeds or the dates according to such Greek or Roman annals — unless, perhaps, in one place or another, some author asserts that he took the matter he writes from linen or ivory books, or from public acts.

But it would be most foolish to judge an entire history on the basis of one such passage. Besides which, if anyone should say that his history agrees with the public annals of this or that monarchy, this does not immediately mean he has the public authority of the monarchy. Otherwise, it would be easy and ready for anyone, by telling one lie, to win credibility for readers even for an entire fable. This is what the historian Philo achieved with many people — who, in his histories, persuaded most people, without any reasoning or testimony at all, that all his dates fit the true annals of the four monarchies. I say "the historian" — for the true Philo, that most weighty philosopher and most learned theologian too, was as free from impudence and lying as he was from writing history. For Eusebius, Jerome, and Suidas, who most diligently enumerated Philo's works, have no work in which Philo recorded the past events or dates of any kingdom. Thus, to entirely learned men, that book On the Times seems to be spurious, its title plainly lying. This is also proven by manifest arguments.

The first is this: that the author of this little book writes that Solomon's line failed in Ahaziah, and that Joash, who succeeded him in the kingdom, was not of Solomon's, but of Nathan's, lineage. How false this is, the Sacred Letters easily make evident. For, in 2 Kings chapter 2, we read thus: "But Athaliah, mother of Ahaziah, seeing that her son was dead, killed all the royal seed. But Jehosheba, daughter of King Joram, sister of Ahaziah, took Joash, son of Ahaziah, and stole him away from among the king's sons who were being killed, and hid him from the presence of Athaliah, that he not be killed." And chapter 12: "Joash, king of Judah, took all the things which Jehoshaphat and Joram and Ahaziah his fathers had consecrated," etc. And chapter 13: "In the twenty-third year of Joash, son of Ahaziah, king of Judah," etc. Likewise, 2 Chronicles chapter 22: "Nor was there any hope left that anyone of the lineage should reign."

There is, finally, a most excellent testimony on this matter, against which there is no room to evade — from 1 Chronicles chapter 3, where, among Solomon's descendants, in words not at all obscure, Joash, son of Ahaziah, is enumerated. This Matthew explicitly confirms, saying: "Jehoshaphat begot Joram, and Joram begot Uzziah, and Uzziah begot Jotham, and Jotham begot Ahaz, and Ahaz begot Hezekiah." By generation and by nature, then, Hezekiah was the son of Jehoshaphat, and accordingly of Solomon, as Matthew says — not reckoned as a son by David's decree, as Philo asserts. Who, then,

could tolerate those who, against the most open testimonies of Sacred Scripture, assert that Solomon's line failed in Ahaziah?

But not even here does that pseudo-Philo make an end of lying. For he relates this too — that those whom Scripture called sons of Jehoshaphat and brothers of Joram were not truly sons of Jehoshaphat and full brothers of Joram, but descendants of Nathan. That you may wonder at this — indeed, even loathe it — the words which are read in 2 Chronicles chapter 21 must be cited: "Jehoshaphat," it says, "slept with his fathers, and was buried with them in the city of David; and Joram his son reigned in his place, who had brothers, sons of Jehoshaphat — Azariah and Jehiel and Zechariah and Azariah and Michael and Shephatiah. All these were the sons of King Jehoshaphat of Judah. And their father gave them many gifts of silver and gold and payments, together with the most fortified cities in Judah. But he gave the kingdom to Joram, because he was the firstborn. And Joram rose up over his father's kingdom; and when he had confirmed himself, he killed all his brothers with the sword."

In this passage, what evasion could there be, what such great license of interpretation, what such great desire for fabrication — indeed, what such notorious impudence — that we should deny that these were true sons of Jehoshaphat and true full brothers of Joram, whom Scripture not only calls such, but even gives the reason why they must be understood as full brothers? "Joram," it says, "had brothers, sons of Jehoshaphat" — lest you should think the brothers were from elsewhere. And, so that you could not even doubt this, it repeats, again and again: "All these were sons of King Jehoshaphat of Judah. And their father gave them many gifts, but he gave the kingdom to Joram, because he was the firstborn."

Why, indeed, should I recall those other claims which this false Philo invents, without any sacred or profane testimony, and without any reasonable conjecture whatsoever? That a dispute arose between the sons of David and Bathsheba. David's edict on his descendants succeeding to the kingdom in a certain order. That, from King Joash on, all his successors had two or even three names. That twenty years intervened from the desolation to Joachim's imprisonment. That Mordecai exceeded Isaac's age by eighteen years. That the Maccabees usurped, along with the pontificate, the leadership too from the house of David — whence enmities arose. And many other such claims, which are partly fabricated, partly contrary even to the Sacred Letters.

What of the fact that, even in human history, this Philo raves so often that you would easily believe him when he himself says that he wrote this little book in the last year of his decrepit old age? For he writes: that, in Cyrus's second year, Haggai and Zechariah

prophesied; likewise, that, on account of Darius Hystaspes's death, the work was impeded, and Cyrus could not be approached, since he was entangled in a war with the Tamyrican people; likewise, that Priscus Artaxerxes Ahasuerus succeeded Cyrus, who reigned more than twelve years and sent Holofernes into Judea; likewise, that this same man had two sons, who contended for the empire, but that, when one of them — that is, Darius Longimanus — had won the victory, in his first year, Jesus, urged by these same prophets, undertook the building of the temple.

Who does not see that all these claims are false, and vehemently contrary to all approved historians? I marvel, then, at what came into Annius's mind, that he should attribute that book entitled On the Times — in which many things are said falsely, most things absurdly, and some things even contrary to Scripture — to Philo, a most learned and most prudent man. For who would believe that Philo was ignorant of that Xerxes, most celebrated among the Greeks of all the kings of Persia? That he confused Darius Hystaspes with Darius the Mede, Cyrus's uncle? That he thought that Ahasuerus, who impeded the work of the temple, was the father of Longimanus? Surely only one utterly unlearned and unskilled in both sacred and profane literature could fall into such errors.

Not Philo the Jew, then — whose talent, learning, and eloquence antiquity celebrated — was the author of this little book, but some man without any good art, without eloquence, without talent, without letters. Certainly, this false Philo does not, in any passage, "Platonize"; rather, everywhere, he speaks not only unlearnedly and inarticulately, but even crudely and without refinement.

But, so that my discourse may return to where it digressed, since no public annals now exist of the Greek and Roman monarchy, and no authors at all whose histories agree and accord with such annals, surely, in these two monarchies, Annius's rules will be of no use at all.

But in the first two monarchies too, they seem to me idle, and entirely unfit for any use. For although the Sacred Letters have handed down that the Medes and Persians had public annals preserved, and although not only Josephus, but other most distinguished authors too, have attested that the Babylonians too had histories of public authority, we nonetheless lack such annals today, and any historian too, whom it might be certain and established followed these annals. Berossus I concede — since it is very probable that he published a history of the Chaldeans by public authority. But that Metasthenes was a public historian of the Persians, I do not see why I should concede — for I have read, both in Pliny and in Josephus, that he wrote of Indian affairs, but not that he wrote of Persian affairs. But since the sum of the contention does not hang upon this, let us grant

it to Annius gratis. Just as we should also accept that Ctesias of Cnidus is to be received for the affairs and dates of the Persians. Namely, Ctesias himself, in Diodorus, book 3, attests that he brought to the Greeks the true and certain annals of the Persians and Medes. This, then, since Ctesias says it of himself, let us believe him. For Lucian says Ctesias of Cnidus wrote of Indian affairs which he himself had neither seen, nor heard from another's narration — and that these are, accordingly, fables. Let us grant these points meanwhile — for we need not contest everything. Let us do this: show that those books which Annius produced, inscribed with the names of Berossus and Metasthenes, are neither Berossus's nor Metasthenes's.

That the Annian Berossus is not genuine, but fictitious, Raphael of Volterra noted, book 14 of his Anthropology. Ludovicus Vives and many other most learned men too agree with him. This matter, it seems to me, can be established by suitable arguments. First, that this Annian Berossus writes that Noah, besides his three first sons, Shem, Ham, and Japheth, begot several others after the flood — which seems contrary to the Sacred Letters. "These three," it says, "are the sons of Noah, and from these the whole human race has been spread over the whole earth." There were not, then, other sons of Noah, who, at Noah's command, established the chief colonies of the world. He relates, then, that, when Noah lay drunk, Ham seized his father's genitals, and, quietly murmuring a magical incantation while mocking his father, made him sterile, as if castrated. He writes, moreover, that Noah came into Italy, and left behind for the Italians books written on natural and divine matters that he had composed; and that this same Noah was that Janus who first ruled in Italy. Likewise, that Nimrod devoted himself more to peace and the religion of the gods than to opulence, and accordingly, having been suddenly transferred by the gods, did not appear again. That all these claims are fabricated, I could easily show, except that the size of this volume has already grown more than enough. Likewise, he says that this same Nimrod sent Assyrius, Medus, and Magog into Asia, who founded the kingdoms of the Assyrians, Medes, and Magogites. But since these were sons of Japheth, it is more credible that they led out colonies at the command either of their father or grandfather; or certainly, as is said in Genesis chapter 11, it was God himself, who divided the languages at Babel, who then dispersed them over the face of all the regions.

Moreover, he narrates that Semiramis made the great city of Babylon out of a town, and rather built it than expanded it. But the true Berossus, on the contrary — in Josephus, book 1 against Apion of Alexandria — reproves the Greek writers who falsely handed down that Babylon was built by Semiramis, and that wondrous works had been constructed by her around this city.

To this, the Annian Berossus relates that Cenchres, king of Egypt, perished in the sea by the magic of the Hebrews. This would certainly in no way have been omitted by Josephus, who, striving to demonstrate the antiquity of the Hebrew nation against the Greeks, could cite no earlier or more ancient explicit testimony of Berossus than from book 3 of his Chaldean History, where he writes that Nebuchadnezzar devastated the temple and city of the Jews.

Moreover, the Annian Berossus makes no mention of Abraham, neither open nor obscure. But that true Berossus, as Josephus attests, mentions Abraham implicitly, in these words: "But, after the flood, in the tenth generation, there was among the Chaldeans a certain man, a worshiper of justice, a great man and skilled in astral science." Moreover, Berossus commemorated the deeds of Sennacherib, king of the Assyrians, as both Josephus and Jerome attest.

But in the Annian Berossus there is no mention of Sennacherib at all. Moreover, this fictitious Berossus ends his history with Ascatades, the eighteenth king of the Assyrians. Yet, after him, twenty other kings ruled over the Babylonians up to Sardanapalus. But that Berossus did not omit these; rather, he even enumerated those who succeeded Nebuchadnezzar, son of Nabopolassar, up to Cyrus, in the Babylonian empire — as both Josephus, in his first book against Apion, and Saint Jerome, on Daniel chapter 5, affirm. And the Annian Metasthenes, having numbered thirty-eight kings of the Assyrians, from Saturn to Sardanapalus, and having also given the length of each of their reigns, attested that, in all these, he followed Berossus, and indeed copied out his very words.

Nor indeed can it be said that this little book on antiquities is a fragment of Berossus's, not a complete work — since even Annius himself sold it to us as a complete little work. The Annian Manetho too openly says that he begins his own history precisely where Berossus ended his. Thus, in his supplement, Manetho added fourteen other kings to Berossus's eighteen — which, if he had received them from Berossus, he would in no way have failed to acknowledge. This Annian Berossus, then, is fabricated, not merely incomplete.

What of the fact that, among the ancient authors, Berossus wrote a history not of the Egyptians, not of the Libyans, not of the Celtiberians, not of the Italians, not of the Germans, but of the Chaldeans — while this Annian one presents himself as an equal historian of all these kingdoms? Certainly you will find no approved author who cites Berossus as a witness of truth, except in Chaldean matters. But surely, if this most weighty author had written of other matters, he would without doubt sometimes be

cited on these by some Hebrew, Greek, or Latin author.

But I do not know whether it would not have been better to refute this Berossus without any argumentation at all. For he relates such ancient matters that, although you can, through your own mind's conjecture, understand them to be false, you nonetheless cannot argue against them through their very antiquity. For, in such matters, the more shameless a man is, the greater license he has for fabrication — so much so that, indeed, as Fabius says, he can lie safely about entire books and authors, since those who never existed cannot be found; but about the matters themselves, he can lie most safely of all, since no witnesses can be produced who are not mere children, if brought forward against most ancient authorities.

On this matter, when a certain bishop of ours was caught having often erred — for he had sometimes cited authors whom no age ever knew, and had written of events long past which no men ever recorded — he responded that it made no difference whether you think this way or that in history. That everything was ambiguous, except what was contained in the Sacred Letters. An opinion unworthy of a bishop, and indeed of a theologian too. For it would be no wonder if I said this of a rustic and foolish man.

But let us return to where we departed: I say it is easier to disregard this Annian Berossus than to refute him. For, to learned men, the mere reading of the little book itself is quite persuasive enough; there is no point persuading the unlearned. Let them enjoy their own Berossus, if they please. Annius says Pliny touched on the fact that this alone computed, of certain inscriptions concerning the times, 480 years before Ninus and Phoroneus. But Pliny, in fact, relates nothing else than that Berossus so excelled in astrology that the Athenians, in honor of his divine predictions, erected a statue to him in the public gymnasium, with a gilded tongue. Let them enjoy their own Berossus, then, as I said — but let them not enjoy Pliny's authority. Indeed, let them not enjoy any probable testimony at all, or any consistent reasoning. For it is ridiculous that Jerome sometimes uses the words of this Berossus — as if a fabrication could have any place, unless this fictitious Berossus had compiled certain words of the true Berossus.

But now let us explode Annius's Metasthenes as briefly as possible. I shall not, however, pursue the minor errors, of which there are many in this small volume. Let us look only at the major ones.

He writes, then, the kings and dates of the Persian monarchy in this manner. Balthassar having been killed: Cyrus and Darius reigned together for two years; then Cyrus alone for twenty-two. Darius's son, Priscus Artaxerxes Ahasuerus, for twenty years — vengeance meanwhile having been taken for the Tamyrican faction, which had

treacherously betrayed his uncle to Tamyris. This man's two sons, Cyrus Artabanes and Darius Longimanus, fought for the empire for seven months, and in the seventh month victory fell to Longimanus, who reigned for thirty-seven years. His son Darius Nothus, for nineteen years. Great Artaxerxes Darius Memnon, for fifty-five years. Artaxerxes Ochus, twenty-six; in our own age, Arses, four years; Darius, the last, six.

These same kings and dates, in this same order and in almost these same words, Annius's Philo noted too — so that you would suspect, or rather understand, that the same craftsman was behind both fabrications. Philo adds this alone — namely, from the Hebrew workshop — that this Ahasuerus is Nebuchadnezzar, whose deeds the history of Judith describes.

But I first ask this: who is this Priscus Artaxerxes Ahasuerus, who had Darius as his father, Cyrus as his uncle, who reigned twenty years, who was also Nebuchadnezzar, whose army and general Holofernes a single woman overthrew, who, finally, had two sons allotted to him, Cyrus Artabanus and Darius Longimanus? Certainly they answer that he is Cambyses. For Metasthenes had written a little before that Cyrus and Darius, six years before they captured Babylon, having waged war against Queen Tamyris, had resigned the Persian kingdom to their son Cambyses. It is also handed down, by the consensus of all historians, that Cambyses held the empire of the Persians immediately after Cyrus. This Ahasuerus, then, was the same as Cambyses. But indeed, what is attributed to Priscus Ahasuerus, whether joined to him or preceding and following him, is so foreign to Cambyses that it seems even contrary.

For, first, Darius was not Cambyses's father, but Cyrus was. This not only Herodotus, Josephus, and Jerome, but all Greek and Latin writers universally, attest. And a further argument for this same matter is that Cyrus's father was named Cambyses — as all the historians say with one voice. But Darius had no ancestor called Cambyses. It follows, then, that Cambyses was the son of Cyrus, not of Darius. Moreover, if Cambyses were Darius's son, he certainly would have succeeded to his father's kingdom upon Darius's death. But, upon Darius's death, Cyrus alone ruled the Persians and Medes for twenty-two years, as even Metasthenes and Philo agree. Cambyses was not, then, Darius's son, but Cyrus's, whom he succeeded in the empire. Moreover, since the monarchy was transferred from the Medes to the Persians through Cyrus, how is it likely that the son of Darius the Mede succeeded to the monarchy, while the son of Cyrus the Persian did not succeed? But why do I, foolishly, try to demonstrate by arguments a matter which, since it depends on the credibility of history, has been handed down to memory by the agreement of all historians? There is certainly no need to fight with reason against one whom the authority of all authors, both ecclesiastical and profane,

defeats.

Similar is what he then adds — that Cyrus was this Ahasuerus's uncle. Cyrus the Persian and Darius the Mede would then have been full brothers — which conflicts even with reason. And all authors write that Darius the Mede had one set of parents, and Cyrus the Persian another.

What he adds, again, in the third place — that this Ahasuerus reigned for twenty years — this too is contrary to all historians. It appears, however, that this was fabricated so that the history of the book of Judith might seem to have been written under him — a claim Eusebius, in his Chronicle, relates rather than follows. It is, indeed, a Hebrew tradition, which rests on neither suitable testimony nor probable reasoning. Josephus certainly conflicts with this, who, in book 11, chapter 2, of the Jewish Antiquities, says Cambyses met his death in the seventh year of his reign. Eusebius too allots Cambyses only eight years of reign. Herodotus, seven years and five months. But Nebuchadnezzar, who is mentioned in the book of Judith, reigned more than 13 years, as you have in chapter 2. Cambyses, then, was not that Nebuchadnezzar. Moreover, all histories relate that both Cambyses and Cyrus, whom he succeeded in the kingdom, were kings of the Medes and Persians. But the Nebuchadnezzar of the book of Judith is nowhere said to have been king of either the Medes or the Persians, but everywhere is said to have been an Assyrian, and to have reigned in the great city of Nineveh.

To this: if Cambyses was king of Media, as he truly was, how was he that Nebuchadnezzar who defeated Arphaxad, king of the Medes? For, although one might like to fabricate, as Philo Annius does, that Arphaxad, a supporter of the Tamyrican faction, drove the Assyrians, Medes, and Persians to defection, Scripture would not accordingly call him king of the Medes. For, by the same reasoning, this Arphaxad would be called king of the Persians and Assyrians too. What of the fact that Nebuchadnezzar is also said to have been king of the Assyrians precisely when he defeated Arphaxad, king of the Medes? What kind of fabrication, then, is Philo's — that Arphaxad, together with the Persians and Medes, drove the Assyrians to defection too?

Moreover, that Arphaxad, against whom Nebuchadnezzar fought, founded the most flourishing city of Media, called Ecbatana, as is read in Judith chapter 1. But this city had been built many years before Cambyses, by Deioces, indeed, the fifth king of the Medes, as Eusebius attests in his Chronicle, and Herodotus too in book 1. Nor does it escape me that Diodorus wrote, in book 3, that Ecbatana was founded before Semiramis, in which she also built a royal palace; but that, according to Pliny, book 6, chapter 14, it was the construction of Seleucus. But since I have come upon this mention not deliberately, but

by chance, I shall satisfy both matters most briefly, in passing.

Diodorus, first, often and greatly trifles in history. He certainly had, like the other Greeks, the same desire for lying. For what is lighter in lying than the Greek nation — vain, and moved by every impulse? Unless perhaps the title of his book — of which one now survives, entitled On the Fabulous Deeds of the Ancients — defends Diodorus, since it corresponds to its own title, and deceives no one. For what he had promised, he delivers. As for Pliny's assertion, in the proem of his entire work, that Diodorus was the first among the Greeks to cease trifling — this, easily understood from the context of Pliny's discourse, pertains not to the falsity of the histories, but to the vanity of the titles. For Greek authors generally put empty and bombastic titles on their books. But Diodorus, as Pliny relates there, made his book invidious not by any light and vain heading, as the earlier ones had, but entitled it Library of History. Diodorus's authority will not press us, then, if what has been celebrated in Greek fables about Semiramis's magnificence, and the royal palace built at Ecbatana, is something he himself either related, or even followed; while Pliny, moreover, is often mistaken about who built famous cities, in giving them credit. But to the matter. Since it is certain and established that Arphaxad, who built Ecbatana, existed before Cambyses, it cannot be that Cambyses is understood as that Nebuchadnezzar, who won victory over Arphaxad, founder of Ecbatana.

Moreover, Nineveh, in the time of the Persian kingdom, had been devastated by the Babylonians, as Nahum's prophecy indicates. Nor, when the Persians occupied the monarchy, did this city have its own king. But the Nebuchadnezzar mentioned in the book of Judith reigned in the great city of Nineveh; the events, then, which the history of Judith relates did not occur under Cambyses, but, as Carion truly thinks, before the empire of the Persians. Nor, so that I should not depart from this opinion, do the words of Achior move me, which are related in chapter 5: "Since, before that notable Babylonian captivity, the Lord afflicted all the seed of Israel several times, and handed them over into the hands of plunderers — now the Egyptians, now the Syrians, now the Assyrians, now the Moabites and Ammonites — until finally he cast them away from his presence." Since, indeed, they were led captive into various regions, but the Lord soon brought them back into their own land, such lesser-known captivities are consequently passed over in silence in the books of Kings. For, in Judges chapter 18, mention is made of a certain captivity too, which Cajetan, truly, as I think, says was passed over in the books of Kings. "For not everything is written," he says. Achior, then, is not speaking of that notable Babylonian captivity, but of some other one. Moreover, in Judith's age, the temple of Jerusalem was not yet overthrown, nor was the city itself devastated. "Again,"

he says, "they possess Jerusalem, where the holy of holies is." But under Cambyses's reign, the temple was both overthrown, and the city not yet restored. It remains, then, that the history which the book of Judith itself narrates is not to be referred to Cambyses.

Rightly, then, do certain men deny that this Priscus Ahasuerus Artaxerxes ever existed at all — since, indeed, such a man as Metasthenes and Philo describe never existed. And even had he existed, if he had ruled immediately after Cyrus, he certainly would not have been the parent of Longimanus. For who would doubt that, after the reign of Cyrus and Cambyses, Darius Hystaspes acquired the dominion of the Persians, and that Xerxes his son succeeded him in the empire? This, indeed, Herodotus, Justin, Orosius, and the other profane writers have handed down — and all the ancient churchmen too: Josephus, Clement, Africanus, Hippolytus, Eusebius, Jerome. Jerome certainly handed down this matter, not as doubtful and uncertain, but as clear and consistent, on Daniel chapter 7, saying: "Some think that the three orders which were in the beast's mouth were three kings of the Persians after Cyrus, but they keep silent about their names. But we, since we know that, after Cyrus, who reigned for 30 years, there reigned among the Persians his son Cambyses and his brothers the Magi; and, thereafter, Darius, in whose second year the temple began to be built at Jerusalem; fifthly, Xerxes, son of Darius; sixthly, Artabanus; seventhly, Artaxerxes Longimanus; eighthly, Xerxes; ninthly, Sogdianus; tenthly, Darius Nothus; eleventhly, Artaxerxes Memnon; twelfthly, Artaxerxes Ochus; thirteenthly, Arses, son of Ochus; fourteenthly, Darius, son of Arsanes, who was defeated by Alexander — how shall we say there were three kings of Persia?" Thus far Jerome.

Certainly, if in the series of Persian kings either Thucydides, or any other historian, passed over the brothers the Magi, or Artabanus, or the second Xerxes, this should be no wonder at all — since they either ruled for a very brief time, or certainly, even in that brief time, contended with others for the empire. But to pass over in silence Darius Hystaspes and Xerxes his son — who was a most powerful and wealthy king, who led an innumerable army against Greece, and did those things which the histories of the Greeks and Latins, pagan and faithful alike, narrate — to pass these two so distinguished and illustrious kings over in silence, I say, is extreme ignorance, not to say impudence. Indeed, whoever denies that these reigned in Persia could equally deny that Constantine and Theodosius reigned at Rome. For no more, nor weightier, historians affirm the latter than the former.

And Herodotus and Thucydides, moreover, speak of these kings of their own age in such a way that they seem to narrate not things heard, but things seen. Nor, if Herodotus mixes fables into his history, is credibility on that account to be withdrawn from him in

matters of his own time that are public and manifest — in which there was no room for fiction. Otherwise, Plutarch, who pursued even Herodotus's smallest errors with reproof, would have attacked this one most especially, since it would have been the greatest. Let us, then, rather believe Herodotus, Thucydides, Justin, Orosius, Africanus, Eusebius, Jerome, Josephus, and other most approved authors, rather than this Metasthenes — not an ancient and learned one, but a recent, crude, senseless, tasteless, ignorant, and even impudent one. Surely one who promises to write the dates of the Persian kings just as they are clearly and truly arranged in the public annals, and the kings and names too, splendidly reigning among them, and yet omits those kings who reigned most magnificently and gloriously among the Persians.

Nor does it escape me that Johann Carion too has laboriously contended that there should seem to be no contradiction between Eusebius, Jerome, and the other grave authors, and this Persian Metasthenes. Thus, amid the greatest discord and disagreement, he strives to reconcile peace, and to make those things which most disagree, agree most fully. First, then, Carion says that this Priscus Ahasuerus ought to be understood as Darius Hystaspes. From this one point alone, learn all of Carion. For what could be more foolish than to say that Darius Hystaspes had Darius the Mede as his father, Cyrus as his uncle, Longimanus as his son? For these are the traits Metasthenes heaped upon that Priscus Ahasuerus. And what could be more foreign to Darius Hystaspes than a public edict forbidding the restoration of the temple at Jerusalem, which the Annian Philo assigns to this Priscus Ahasuerus?

For the reasons Carion gives, as to why Xerxes was omitted by Metasthenes, are so ridiculous and inept that they need not be related by me at present. And all these, one by one, Juan de Vergara, Canon of Toledo, a man most skilled in the Greek and Latin languages, refuted more accurately in a little book of eight questions published in Spanish. His work and diligence have greatly aided me in this passage. For I prefer, as Pliny warned us, to repay entirely what is owed, rather than be caught in theft. For that precept of Basil's has always seemed sound to me: that whatever is learned from another should by no means be concealed, in the manner of a depraved woman who secretly substitutes a bastard child. Wherefore the father of one's discourse and doctrine ought to be candidly acknowledged.

These matters having been demonstrated, it appears clearer than any light — which was the plan of this discourse — that Annius's rules cannot be useful in judging history. Since not even from these later monarchies, of the Chaldeans and Persians, do any public annals remain, nor the monuments of any author who composed his history according to the true and certain form of those annals. Wherefore, to reject Josephus, Eusebius,

Jerome, and the other authors of approved credibility, in matters of Persian deeds or dates, because they do not cohere with this Metasthenes and the Susian annals that are pretended alongside him, is a great mark of ignorance, indeed even of rashness.

On this point, Johannes Driedo erred vehemently — a man clearly learned as far as concerns theological diligence, but very unrefined as far as concerns knowledge of human history. When he had come upon these volumes of Annius's, and the citation of Berossus the Chaldean, Metasthenes the Persian, Ctesias of Cnidus, Philo the Jew, Diodorus of Sicily, the Susian library, and the seventy elders had filled his ears with an empty noise of words, he became entirely deaf to the most weighty voice of Eusebius, Josephus, and Jerome.

How much more prudently the Church acted, which, when certain little books were produced under the names of Adam, Enoch, and Noah, refused to receive them! Since, as Augustine says, "their extreme antiquity brought it about that they lacked authority, on account of which they seemed rightly held suspect, lest false things be put forward as true. For certain works are also produced, said to be theirs, by those who, according to their own inclination, believe here and there whatever they wish." Thus far Augustine, book 18 of The City of God, chapter 38.

To a prudent man, then, the more a book is put forward under the name of antiquity, the more it ought to be suspected by him. Following this same prudence, we would hold these little books of Berossus and Metasthenes suspect, precisely for their excessive antiquity, even if they contained nothing that conflicted with the most weighty men. From these considerations it follows that Annius's first reason, why Josephus and Eusebius should be rejected in the Persian monarchy, is futile and vain.

For his second is most false. For neither Eusebius, nor any other approved author, writes that Cyrus had already released the Hebrew captives in Babylon and died, before that Darius the Mede took possession of Babylon. Eusebius, moreover, nowhere mentions Darius the Mede in his Chronicle — neither under this name, nor under the name Cyaxares, by which Xenophon calls him. Eusebius, then, did not write that Cyrus was killed before Darius the Mede had captured Babylon, since he entirely omits Darius the Mede in his Chronicle. Herodotus, moreover, wrote nothing of the kind that Annius foists upon him.

Eusebius and Herodotus mention Darius, son of Hystaspes — the former, as usual, briefly, noting the times of his reign; the latter, more fully, describing his deeds. Among these, Herodotus relates that Darius Hystaspes both besieged and captured Babylon again, when it had revolted from the Persian empire. And hence arose Annius's shameful

error. For, having heard Herodotus write that, after Cyrus's death, Babylon was captured by Darius, he thought this was understood of Darius the Mede — when Herodotus, without doubt, expressed Darius Hystaspes. For, in book 1, he had said Babylon was captured once by Cyrus. Then, in book 3, he affirms that, when this same city was captured again, Darius Hystaspes seized it, circumcised its walls, and demolished all its gates — neither of which Cyrus had done before, on capturing this same city. Let Annius, then, now depart, and say that Herodotus and Eusebius were dreaming. Rather, Annius himself truly dreams, who, from two men, Darius the Mede and Darius the Persian, makes one; and, from two captures of Babylon, likewise one. This is properly the mark of those sleeping and dreaming.

But you say: Daniel, chapter 11, prophesied, after Darius the Mede, only four kings of Persia to come, up to Alexander. There were not, then, 14, as we said we have followed Eusebius and Jerome in asserting. This argument's reasoning seems to have moved Tertullian, in the book he wrote against the Jews, to place, between Darius the Mede and Alexander, only four intervening kings of Persia: Artaxerxes, Ochus (who is also Cyrus), Argus, and finally Darius the last, who was also named Melas.

Into this same error Nicholas of Lyra, although warned by Jerome, fell knowingly and deliberately — following the dreams of the Hebrews, who are entirely ignorant of human history. Since they have no monuments of any foreign kingdom in their own language, they recognize no other kings, either of the Persians or the Greeks, except those Scripture mentions. Those who fail to see this follow the Jews in the exposition of these Scriptures, whose understanding, if the histories of the Gentiles are unknown, can scarcely, or certainly by no means, be had. Thus the Hebrews often twist the reasonings of the histories, and try to fabricate what they cannot prove. Their error must be removed, and every opinion brought to that standard — that, in interpreting Sacred Scripture, especially in those passages which touch on the external affairs of the nations, we should follow the monuments of the nations. More rightly, then, and more truly, does Jerome understand that fourth king, whom the Prophet mentions, to have been Xerxes, son of Darius Hystaspes — for such is the man described by the histories of the pagans, as the prophet describes him.

As for the fact that Daniel, having enumerated four Persian kings, passed over nine others who came after Xerxes — this works not only against us, but against Annius's Metasthenes and Philo too. Nor was it, as Jerome says, the concern of the prophetic spirit to follow the order of history, but to touch on the most distinguished matters. And if anyone should carefully examine the traditions of the prophets, he will find that many intermediate matters are most frequently passed over — which, if he should judge,

from the prophets' silence, never to have existed, he necessarily proceeds in great error and in ignorance of many matters. In this passage, however, there was a particular reason why the prophetic spirit should dwell on the Persian king Xerxes. In him, indeed, the Persian monarchy stood out most against the Greeks — to such a degree that, from an innumerable multitude of an army, Greece seemed likely to be devastated and emptied out even in a brief moment. Thus Alexander the Greek was suddenly shown to Daniel, who could not only rescue the Greeks from the Persians, but even triumph over the Persians too.

But on Annius's rules, and the examples of these rules, and finally on the whole of Annius's censure, enough, I think, has been diligently discussed. What, then? Someone will perhaps say: will there be no way or method by which we can distinguish and discern truthful historians from deceptive ones? There will indeed be — and even a manifold one:

The first law is drawn from men's honesty and integrity. This matter is entirely applicable when historians attest that they either saw, themselves, what they relate, or received it from those who saw it.

Such are most of the accounts in the letters of Ambrose, Cyprian, Jerome, Augustine; in this same author's books On the City of God; in Gregory's Dialogues; briefly, in almost all the writings of the most approved doctors of the Church — in which it would be a sin to suspect a lie, regarding what they wished, by writing, to transfer to everlasting memory. For these most holy and excellent men have, by great and distinguished virtues, deserved to attain this: that, in such matters — which they have attested either to have witnessed themselves, or to have heard from trustworthy men who did witness them — complete trust should be placed in them.

On this matter, Erasmus of Rotterdam, and certain other more recent men too, have often erred with excessive license. For what could have been said more freely, more licentiously, more immoderately, than to assert that Jerome — a man of the greatest weight and holiness — lied, in claiming that he had the opportunity to transcribe Matthew's Gospel in Hebrew? Rightly, then, did this excessive and rather free license of certain more recent men displease pious men; rightly too was it called into accusation.

This first law, moreover, applies to profane authors too. For Julius Caesar relates certain things, Suetonius certain things, Cornelius Tacitus certain things, Plutarch certain things, Pliny certain things, which these authors themselves partly saw with their own eyes, partly received from those who had witnessed them in person. In these authors, although one cannot expect piety and the complete duties of virtue, one can nonetheless

expect a certain honesty and goodness of nature. Some of them, indeed, moved either by love of truth, or by a sense of upright shame, shrank so much from lying, that it might now perhaps be shameful that certain pagan historians were more truthful than our own.

I say this with sorrow, rather than with reproach: that the lives of philosophers were written much more strictly by Laertius than the lives of the saints by Christians; and that Suetonius set forth the affairs of the Caesars far more incorruptly and completely than Catholics have set forth — I do not say the affairs of emperors, but of martyrs, virgins, and confessors. For those pagan authors, in the case of upright men, whether philosophers or princes, conceal neither their vices, nor even suspicions of vices; but even in wicked men, they reveal the colors of virtue. Our own authors, however, mostly either serve their own inclinations, or even deliberately fabricate so much that I am not only ashamed of them, but even wearied by them. For I understand these to have brought nothing more useful to the Church of Christ, and very great inconvenience. I spare their names, since the judgment here concerns morals too, not learning alone — in which a freer censure is possible. For that which concerns morals ought certainly to be more cautious regarding the living, and more reverent regarding the dead.

It is certain, however, that those who fabricate ecclesiastical history falsely and deceitfully cannot be good and sincere men; and that their whole narration was invented either for profit or for error — of which one is shameful, the other pernicious. Ludovicus's complaint about certain fabricated histories in the Church is most just. He rightly, and gravely too, accuses those who thought it a matter of piety to fabricate lies for the sake of religion. This is both most dangerous and least necessary. For we are not accustomed to believe even the truth, when it comes from a liar. Wherefore those who wished, by false and mendacious writings, to stir men's minds to the worship of the saints, seem to me to have accomplished nothing else than that trust be withdrawn from true accounts on account of false ones, and that even what has been strictly and truly published by authors should be called into doubt.

In Herodotus's work, there was very much room for fabricated and shadowy matters. But he forewarned, by the very title, that the method of history was not to be pressed too closely in that book. For he entitled it after the Muses — to whom fables are sometimes permitted, so that they might charm the minds of listeners more pleasantly and sweetly, which they would not achieve to the same degree by the severity of straightforward narration. Xenophon, who, as Fabius says, is to be reckoned more among the philosophers than among the historians, attempts to portray, in Cyrus, the perfect form of the best and most complete prince. It is not to be expected from him, then, what

Cyrus truly was in reality — a king excellent and distinguished, indeed — but rather what kind of ruler he would be, in a commonwealth, if fashioned to the standard of a most perfect exemplar.

But in Christian history, which, as we said, is entirely weighed by truth, not by pleasure, what is the point of extending the name of "history" over inventions and fables? As if, indeed, the holy men of God needed our lies — men who accomplished so many true deeds for Christ that false ones, however constructed with the artifice of learned pretense, however harmless, are nonetheless useless — and, like cowardly soldiers, are more a burden than a help. Our heroes' true deeds, indeed, as I judge, were not only ample and magnificent, but even greater than fame reports. Nor should the virtue of those who performed them be reckoned as great as our writers could exalt it in words, but rather so great that both distinguished talents fell short of the deeds themselves, and words too fell short of the most distinguished talents. But since certain writers indulge too much in their own inclination, and write what the writer's mind dictates, not truth, they sometimes present us with such saints as the saints themselves, even if they could, would not have wished to be.

For who would believe that Saint Francis was accustomed to throw fleas, once shaken off, back onto himself? What the writer thought pertained to the man's holiness, I certainly do not — knowing that poverty always pleased this most holy man, but filth never. This too, how ridiculous: that the Devil, once, hindering our father Dominic, was compelled by the saint to hold a lamp in his hands until it was consumed, causing him not only discomfort but even incredible pain. Such examples cannot be counted in number, but from these few, most of the other things that have obscured the histories of the most distinguished saints will be understood.

But it was not fitting that the true deeds of the saints be contaminated with false and fabricated fables. This was Gelasius's reason for rejecting many histories of this kind at his council of 70 bishops. This pontiff's words are most worthy of being read and known, and are accordingly worth citing: "The deeds of the holy martyrs," he says, "who shine with the manifold cruelties of their tortures and the marvelous triumphs of their confessions — who among Catholics doubts that this is so, and that they endured greater sufferings in their contests, and bore everything, not by their own strength, but by God's grace and help? But, according to ancient authority or custom, they are, with singular caution, not read in the holy Roman Church — since the names of those who wrote them are entirely unknown, and they were thought to have been written by unbelievers, either superfluously, or less aptly than the order of the matter required — like the passion of a certain Cyricus and his mother Julitta, and, likewise, that of George and

others of this kind, which are known to have been composed and approved by heretics. Wherefore (as has been said), lest even a slight occasion for mockery arise, they are not read in the holy Roman Church. We, nonetheless, along with this aforesaid Church, venerate with all devotion all the martyrs and their glorious contests, which are known better to God than to men. Likewise, the lives of the fathers — Anthony, Paul, Hilarion, and all the hermits — which, nevertheless, the most blessed man Jerome wrote, we receive with all honor. Likewise, the acts of the blessed Sylvester, prelate of the Apostolic See — although we do not know the name of the one who wrote them, we know that they are read by many Catholics in the city of Rome, and, by ancient custom, many churches imitate this. Likewise, the writings on the finding of the holy Cross of the Lord, and other writings on the finding of the head of Blessed John the Baptist, are indeed novel revelations, and certain Catholics read them; but when these come into Catholics' hands, let the saying of the blessed apostle Paul go before: 'Test everything, hold fast what is good.'" Thus far Gelasius.

But if Paul teaches that prophecies, which are usually delivered by divine inspiration, are indeed not to be despised, but nonetheless are to be tested — who will now dare accuse us, if we test histories delivered by human sense? Gelasius, indeed, a most weighty authority, together with his council, holds that what was said by the Apostle concerning prophecy fits history aptly too. The Pontiff commands, then, first of all, that we should in no way embrace those histories which are published without a certain author's name. For they smell either of the imposture of profiteering men, or, as Gelasius himself says, of a heretical brood.

This same reason, entirely, underlies the fact that those histories too are very much to be suspected which, although they bear the name of some author, it is nonetheless obscure and uncertain who or what kind of man he was. Of this kind, a few days ago, certain fables were published, whose authors and locations are separated by such a great interval that it cannot be discovered whether they are lying; whether these events even occurred at all can also be doubted. But it is well that the whole body of the narrative appears fabricated — so that what is worn smooth in the Spanish saying can also easily be proven true in this matter: "From long roads, long lies."

But let us return to Gelasius. He then warned us of that error into which not only the common crowd, but even Gratian, once fell — deceived by the indices of books, they believed that everything inscribed with the names of Jerome and Augustine was truly Jerome's and Augustine's. Thus the common crowd circulated, under Jerome's name, that book entitled On the Lives of the Fathers — although he in fact wrote only very few lives of the fathers, which are, for the most part, mentioned in this passage by the Pontiff

too. By Gelasius's testimony, then, we shall blunt the impudence of those who have circulated Jerome's name as the author of matters which no one but an unlearned and inarticulate man would produce. Of this kind too is that fable, equally insipid and barbarous, on the Nativity of Holy Mary, addressed to Bishops Chromatius and Heliodorus. Of this kind are many other things too, which Erasmus refuted both most diligently and most correctly.

I also note this, in these words of Gelasius's: that we ought by no means to marvel at and look up to "new revelations" — for so he calls them. For these are now published everywhere, not according to the Church's necessity, but according to men's own inclinations — so that, on the subject of the Immaculate Conception, on both sides, if you please, contrary revelations are even produced. This matter offers the impious no small occasion for mockery, and the pious an occasion for tears. God's gifts and miracles must necessarily be despised, if they serve our opinions or inclinations. Those, then, greatly harm the Church of Christ, who think they cannot excellently expound the distinguished deeds of the saints unless they adorn them with fabricated revelations and miracles. In this matter, the impudence of men has spared neither the holy Virgin nor Christ the Lord — indeed, what was done regarding other saints, they did likewise in writing the history of Christ and his mother, and, in accordance with the levity of human ingenuity, invented many vain and ridiculous things.

When I was present, in past years, at the Council of Trent, I heard from certain people that Luigi Lippomano, bishop of Verona, was remedying this evil with a history of the lives of the saints published with a constant and grave method. But I have not yet had the opportunity to see this, nor any other that could please me, among those that have come into my hands on this matter. It will indeed be a dense and laborious work, but greatly useful to all Christians, if anyone should produce one worthy of the saints, the Church, and Christ. This, without doubt, no one will accomplish, except an upright, whole, and incorrupt man — one who would dare say nothing false, would not fail to dare say anything true, who would harbor no suspicion of favor in writing, nor of enmity. Since it is known that these pertain to the duties of honesty and integrity, I marvel that all these have been preserved by Suetonius alone, while abandoned by most of our own.

Those, moreover, who think that human affairs are foreign to the saints whose histories they undertake to write seem not even to believe that the saints themselves were men. How much more wisely, indeed, do the Evangelists act — who, even in the apostles themselves, whom we were to have as an example for our whole life, conceal neither the weaker impulses of nature, nor even the graver falls. This was the divine wisdom of the Evangelists, indeed, but it was also the goodness and integrity of their nature — such

that nothing was lacking in them, in writing their history, that even a pagan would have required by the law of history. But the honesty and integrity of a writer — for someone will ask this — in those who lived long ago, although sometimes it shines forth even in the writings themselves, will be known by reputation, and by the grave and frequent testimony of past men.

For there are, as I said, among the profane authors, not a few whose candor and modesty have been so celebrated in men's speech that no one has ever thought them liars, or shameless in fabrication. Such are Caesar, Valerius Maximus, Terentius Varro, Livy, Cornelius Tacitus, Ammianus Marcellinus, Eutropius, Flavius Vopiscus, Paulus Diaconus, Lucius Florus, Polybius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Julius Capitolinus, Cornelius Nepos, Strabo, and several other authors, especially Latin ones. For the credibility of the Greeks has, for the most part, been broken and weakened. Thucydides is scrupulous, and, as Josephus says, among all the Greek historians, especially meticulous. Appian of Alexandria, though a Greek author, since he recorded the recent civil wars of Rome, was not mendacious in matters foreign to himself — though he would have been in his own, had he followed the custom and character of the Greeks. Their boasting and vanity has been increased all the more impudently, since they began to contend with the Latins over empire, over deeds, over the truth of learning. Latin splendor and glory, indeed, obscured the brightness of Greece, and so dazzled the Greeks' eyes that even Plutarch, an otherwise truthful writer, seems, in illustrating Greek matters, sometimes even to go blind and to fabricate. This Ludovicus Vives noted, both in the work on the lives of illustrious Greeks and Romans, and in the Parallel Lives.

But in our own — that is, ecclesiastical — authors, the method of recognizing virtue and good faith is easier. For not only human speech and estimation cultivate the best of our own authors, but the Church's own decree places them in the council of the heavenly ones. To accuse these, then, of lying and impudence, as we said above, is a mark not only of rashness, but even of impiety. Among these saintly and righteous men I judge should be numbered Hegesippus, Paulus Orosius, and certain other ecclesiastical historians too, whom I pass over for brevity's sake. For we are not here shaking out entire libraries, but sampling categories. Let no one accuse us of negligence, if we pass over some without either praise or blame.

But you say: Sallust, amid utterly ruined morals, was held to be a truthful writer of history. Certainly indeed. But when you object Sallust to me, you object a man in whom, if not shame of dishonesty, at least fear of infamy existed — which the Romans, especially, avoided, lest they, like the Greeks, be held liars in their histories. Then, Sallust does not seem to me to have been free from the faults of favor and rivalry. Certainly,

when he writes about Cicero, he passes over in silence many things which he would most gladly have related in favor of others. But these two faults, although common to almost all historians, are, in some, almost their proper trademark. Among these is Paolo Giovio, who is excessive, in either direction, from hatred and love, from favor and rivalry. And since he loved money, he was, in writing history too, a slave to money.

Finally, it is one thing to say that all good men are truthful; another to say that all wicked men are liars. We have said the former; we have not said the latter. Although I do not know how it happens that the mind is nowhere secure except in the testimony of a good man. But truth is so joined to duty that it can, perhaps, exist in a vicious man, but can scarcely be believed to exist. This was the reason for the Chaldeans and Egyptians, why they approved no historians except those who held the priesthood — since they thought that holy and religious men would in no way lie. "A man," they say, "a certain priest, has come from the Jews; he will not deceive us." But let this be enough concerning the first rule for judging history.

Let the second law be established in the judgment of history: that we should prefer, to the rest, those historians who joined a certain prudence, both in selecting and in judging, to a strictness of talent. This law applies in those matters which the writers themselves neither witnessed, nor heard from trustworthy men who saw them. In this category, it is worthwhile to recall the levity of those who, in the manner of little women, easily believe what they too much desire. For even our own age has seen a priest who was thoroughly persuaded that nothing at all could be false, once it had been printed. For, as he used to say, the administrators of the commonwealth would never commit so great a crime as to allow lies not only to be spread abroad, but even to fortify them with their own privilege, so that they might more safely circulate among men's minds. Moved by this argument, indeed, he brought himself to believe that the events truly happened which are related in the story-books of Amadis and Clarian. But how much this reasoning applies against the administrators of the commonwealth is not for this occasion and time to discuss. This, certainly, I pronounce for myself, and from the feeling and grief of my own mind: it is a great calamity and ruin for the Church, that the only precaution taken in publishing books is that they not be tainted with errors contrary to the faith — not also that they be harmless to morals. Nor am I most tormented about those fables I just mentioned, however unlearned, and contributing nothing at all — I will not say to living well and blessedly, but not even to thinking rightly about human affairs. For what do mere and vain trifles contribute, invented by idle men, handled by corrupted minds? But the most bitter grief, and one scarcely consolable at all, is that, while certain men — would that as prudently as fervently! — desire to reject and avoid this inconvenience, they do not,

instead of fables, publish true and grave histories, which would be most useful to the common people, but rather books full of the Church's mysteries, from which the profane ought to be kept away — which is, in my own opinion, most pestilential, all the more so, since the common crowd reads these little books more securely, because it sees them approved not only by the civil magistrate, but even by those who are appointed censors of doctrine in the Christian commonwealth. But more on this elsewhere; now let us pursue what is pressing.

Truly pitiable, rather than to be mocked, is the ignorance of that man, who was so good, or so foolish, that he immediately believed every narration, provided only that it had been published in print. But you will find others, not of equal ignorance, but of almost equal imprudence, who seek truth not from where it is customarily found, but from those sources in which it is rarely to be found — namely, from scattered and widespread rumors. This generally happens to those of an inconstant and fickle nature. For grave and strict men are not accustomed to chase after empty popular talk.

Although we cannot deny that even the most weighty men, especially in describing the prodigies of the saints, have sometimes both received scattered rumors, and even related them in writing to posterity. In this matter, as it seems to me, they indulged either too much themselves, or certainly the common crowd of the faithful. For they understood that the common crowd not only easily believed such miracles, but even earnestly demanded them. Thus even holy men have recorded certain signs and prodigies to memory — not because they gladly believed them, but lest they should seem to fail the wishes of the faithful. This, moreover, they thought all the more permissible, since they understood that it had pleased the most distinguished authors to hold that the true law of history is to write what is commonly held true.

Nor do I here excuse the author of that book entitled The Mirror of Examples, nor of that history called the Golden Legend. For, in the former, you may read monstrosities of miracles more often than true miracles; the latter was written by a man of iron mouth, leaden heart, and certainly of a mind not very strict or prudent. I excuse ancient, holy, and learned men, whose books and names, shame and religious scruple would forbid me to cite, willing though I am, were I not otherwise afraid that this silence of mine might cause many either to condemn what they do not understand, or to wander in various error concerning the histories of all the saints.

And it is worthwhile to warn the theologian too, lest he immediately be persuaded that everything great authors have written is perfect in every respect. For they too sometimes stumble, as that author says, and yield to burden, and indulge the pleasure of their own

talents, and, as I said, sometimes indulge even the common crowd; nor do they always apply their attention closely, and sometimes grow so tired that Demosthenes seems to Cicero to be dozing, and Homer himself, sometimes, to Horace. For they are the greatest — but men nonetheless.

This same thing I can, perhaps, rightly and truly, say of Bede and Gregory too. Of these, the former, in his history of the English, and the latter, in his Dialogues, write certain miracles, widely spread and believed, which the Aristarchuses especially of this present age will judge uncertain. Indeed, I would approve these histories more, if their authors had, according to the prescribed norm of strict judgment, applied greater care in selection. But since one must pronounce on such great men modestly and with circumspect judgment, not even in these two are most matters to be rejected. For you could find fault with only a few things in them, even if you strive to recall ecclesiastical history to stricter judgments. And if it is necessary to err in one direction or the other, I would rather that readers approve everything of theirs, than that many things be rejected.

Concerning Vincent of Beauvais and Saint Antoninus, I judge more freely — since each of them applied effort not so much to describing true and certain matters, as to omitting nothing at all that was found written on any scraps whatsoever. Thus, in weighing and valuing each history according to its own worth, they used neither the scales of craftsmen, nor even a common balance. Wherefore, although they were good and by no means deceptive men, since they neither carefully examined the authors from whom they copied their books, nor recorded matters weighed with just balances, they lack authority among grave and strict critics. A historian, however, who is to be approved by theology's decree, will neither pick through all scraps unworthy even of reading, nor devote effort to old wives' fables, nor write down what he has read and heard before weighing and selecting it with prudence and careful judgment. But on the explanation of the second rule, we have said enough.

Let the third rule be this: if the Church attributes authority to any historian, this man is without doubt worthy to have us too add our authority to his. On the contrary, however, whomever the Church has withdrawn credibility from, we too shall rightly and deservedly withdraw credibility from.

Gelasius, moreover, received, with all honor, the history of the lives of Anthony, Paul, Hilarion, and the other hermits, which Jerome nonetheless wrote. He received again, though not with equal veneration, but received nonetheless, the acts of blessed Sylvester. He praised Orosius. Eusebius's Chronicle — that is, On the Times — he did not reject, as

far as I can gather from conjecture. He rejected the eight books of the Itinerary of Clement, the acts of Andrew, Philip, Peter, Thomas, published falsely under these names, the book on the infancy of the Savior, another likewise on his nativity, the book of the Shepherd, the acts of Thecla and Paul, which Epiphanius sometimes uses, the Revelation of Paul, the book entitled the Passing of Mary, the little books on the penance of Adam, of Origen, of Cyprian, the letter of Jesus to Abgarus, the passions of George and of Cyricus and Julitta, and, finally, the history of Eusebius Pamphili.

In refuting this last, Gelasius used, it seems to me, great prudence. For as to what Rhenanus said — that these final words of Gelasius's are not his own, but were rather added by some ass — he said this insolently, crudely, and unlearnedly. First, indeed, the Pontiff had, in this manner, judged: "The Chronicle of Eusebius of Caesarea, and the books of this same author's ecclesiastical history, although he grew lukewarm in the first book of his narrative, and composed one entire book in praise and excuse of the schismatic Origen, we have nonetheless said should not, on account of the singular knowledge of events they contain, be entirely rejected." Afterward, however, he judges thus: "The history of Eusebius Pamphili is apocryphal." Since these two judgments are not contrary, they are also both most true, and pronounced with rather great gravity and severity.

Why Gelasius pronounced Eusebius's history apocryphal — the reasons are certainly many and weighty. First, in the first book, Eusebius relates a letter of Jesus's, written to Abgarus, which Gelasius, in this same passage, explodes. There was also a second reason for Gelasius, why he defined Eusebius's history as apocryphal: namely, that many things there are confirmed by the testimony of Clement of Alexandria, whose little works are judged apocryphal in this same passage. Moreover, Eusebius also composed his sixth book in praise and excuse of Origen. But since Origen's disciples had stirred up great tragedies in the Church, and Origen himself, as a schismatic, and one frequently deviating from the path of the catholic faith, had been condemned by the Church's judgment, his history is rightly refuted — since it not only immoderately praises Origen, but exalts him to the heavens, as if he were a father of the Church.

Moreover, at the Seventh Synod, action 5, when the Iconoclasts had cited Eusebius as a witness on their behalf, and his letter, in which he agreed with Arius, had also been read, Tarasius asked: "Shall we receive this?" But the holy Synod said: "By no means. This one must be pursued with greater hatred by us than the rest." And the legates of Pope Adrian said: "The very reading indicates that it savors of the Arian opinion. For the book of Eusebius, read before, has other blasphemies too, which the synod refused to hear." The most holy patriarch said: "Let us reject his books." The holy synod said: "We reject and

anathematize." And again, in action 6, Epiphanius, responding to Eusebius's testimony, says: "Eusebius is summoned by them as a witness, though he is known, by the whole catholic Church, to have been a defender of the Arian heresy — as is made manifest in his commentaries and in all the books he published." And afterward: "Who among the faithful," he says, "doubts, in the Church, that Eusebius Pamphili, given over to a reprobate mind, agreed with Arius's tenets? For, in all his historical little books, he calls the Son a creature, a subordinate minister, to be adored in the second place." Having proven this from many of Eusebius's books, he finally asserts that Eusebius was of double mind, and inconsistently subscribed to the synod. For nowhere did he either repel the errors of his books, or make an apology for himself — while Arius, not obscurely, attested that he had Eusebius as a zealous supporter and patron of his own opinion. And Jerome, to Pammachius and Oceanus, says: "Eusebius composed his ecclesiastical history beautifully, but is the most open champion of Arius's impiety." And to Ctesiphon: "There is no one," he says, "who does not know that Eusebius of Caesarea was an Arian."

Certainly, in the first book of his ecclesiastical history, he calls the Son the executor of the Father's will, who, after the Father, is the cause and origin of all things. Likewise, having cited that verse of the Psalm — "He himself spoke, and they were made; he himself commanded, and they were created" — he adds: "By these words, the prophet introduces the Father as the maker, commanding by his royal nod, as it were, as the universal ruler; but he places the Word of God in the second position, added to him — not as one different from him, who is preached among us, but as one obeying the paternal commands." And, in chapter 2, he first affirms that the Son administered to the Father in the making of all things; then he says that the Son was the Father's minister in all good things.

Rightly, then, did Pope Gelasius take away the authority of the history of Eusebius of Caesarea. What of it? Is it not also absurd that the Church should place trust, in ecclesiastical matters, in one who was unfaithful to the Church? We certainly find that heretics adapt not only the dogmas and precepts, but even the past events, of their own sect — indeed, they twist and even fabricate them, so that their sect seems to have been thoroughly both approved and adorned. Hence, as we said above, Eusebius fabricated the claim that Constantine was baptized by Eusebius of Nicomedia, so as to attach greater credibility and authority to the Arian faction. Hence too, when he touches on the mention of the Council of Nicaea, he craftily concealed the dogma of faith by which Arius was condemned, suddenly digressing into the question of Easter. But he does not even mention Arius in his history — cunningly passing over the man's memory, whom,

overwhelmed by the synod's authority, he did not dare praise, but, bound by the law of friendship, was unwilling to condemn.

These same reasons entirely underlie why all the faithful of Christ reject Carion's history. For his discourse tears apart and bloodies certain distinguished and truly excellent Supreme Pontiffs, while it commends and glorifies certain German emperors, who were enemies and foes of the Roman Church. Thus you will recognize the lion by his claws — that is, the Lutheran by his praise and blame. Although it is not necessary to persuade by conjecture that Carion adhered to Luther's errors. For, in many passages, he openly betrays himself. Wherefore it is a wonder why his history has not been rejected, along with the other books of the heretics, by the Church's judges — since most people, nonetheless, read it without concern, warned by no mark or censure at all.

But let us return to Eusebius. In his ecclesiastical history, Gelasius sufficiently shows that the rest pleased both him and the council, while indicating that certain matters displeased him. Thus, if you removed the fable of Abgarus and the praises of Origen from Eusebius, his history would be worthy of complete trust — especially if, in the Church's battle against Arius, he had stood not with Arius, but with the Church.

And on the books of his ecclesiastical history, this much. For in the Chronicle, the man's diligence was admirable, his labor entirely great, his reading varied and almost incredible, and his judgment quite grave amid such variety of reading. I do not know whether any other author among the churchmen, Latin or Greek, striving with the greatest force, resources, and effort, could have left us more distinguished monuments of the dates. Although, through the negligence of the copyists, they have been corrupted in so many places that it cannot be said without grief of mind.

But not even everything Eusebius relates there is true. Indeed, you would find certain things you might rightly and truly criticize. Such is that he writes that Sennacherib, who besieged Jerusalem in Hezekiah's time, was the same as Shalmaneser, who had captured Samaria. This Jerome taught to be contrary to the Divine Letters, on Isaiah chapter 6. And Tobit chapter 1 says Shalmaneser was Sennacherib's father. But, as that author says, nothing is entirely blessed in every respect. In an immense work, so to speak, it was easiest to err rarely. But this much on Eusebius.

Sozomen follows, on whose credibility and authority Saint Gregory compels us to speak. He disapproved Sozomen's history for two chief reasons: one, that he often lied in it; the other, that he immoderately extolled Theodore, who is established to have been both a heretic, and condemned by the Church at the Fifth Synod. I myself do not excuse Sozomen's lies. For he was a Greek, and this nation, as we said, has always been rather

prone to lying. But, in the nine books of ecclesiastical history which we recently received, in Musculus's translation, Sozomen writes nothing of the kind that Gregory objects to him in the second point. He says only that Theodore was a disciple of Libanius, to whom, when he lapsed, Chrysostom gave a letter, and who was afterward also established as bishop of Mopsuestia.

Andrew, certainly, at the Council of Florence — where he responds on behalf of the Latin Church — not only uses this historian's testimony, but even approves it. For when Emperor Palaeologus had asked whether it was fitting for a synod to rely on the authority of history, Andrew responded to him that a synod ought to use history for learning past events. Then the emperor said: "We ought to receive that history, in our religion, which our forefathers approved, but by no means any other." To this Andrew said: "We ought by no means to use the history of the Romans, or of the Greeks, or of the wars of kings, in a synod; but since this history — namely, that of Hermias Sozomen — is ecclesiastical, in which the acts of all the synods and the definitions of the holy fathers are set forth, why should it not be believed?" Thus far, at the Council of Florence, session 7. This council, then, does not seem to have withdrawn trust from Sozomen, but to have held it. But this argument has an easy and ready response.

To that other one, however, I do not see how a response could be given — unless we say either that Gregory read other books of Sozomen's, which have not come into our hands, or that, his memory failing, he wrote "Sozomen" for "Theodoret." For those words which Gregory relates are Theodoret's. Indeed, in book 5 of his history, chapter 27, he writes that this Theodore was a distinguished doctor. And in chapter 40: "Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia," he says, "dies — both a doctor of all the churches, and a rooter-out of the heretical faction." Theodoret, then, was condemned under that same name. And indeed, he was condemned for that same reason, at the Fifth General Synod, action 5, canons 13 and 14. But Theodore, in canon 12. Theodoret too deserved to be condemned, for this reason: that he wrote impiously against Cyril and the First Council of Ephesus, and reproved the twelve chapters of Cyril's, which contained the right faith. Nor indeed should anyone despair of Theodoret. For, as Bessarion, in the oration he delivered for the union at the fathers' meeting at Florence, affirms, he afterward recognized his error, and, at the Council of Chalcedon, recanted it.

But, however these matters stand, such patronage of erring men diminishes both the authority and the credibility of history. For this reason, to pass over other things, I like Socrates Scholasticus's history less. For he too is a patron of Origen, and excuses Nestorius, and bites at Cyril, and plucks at Alexander, and, in the rejection of the penitentiary presbyter, defames the innocence of the Homoousians. But on the third

rule to be observed in judging history, this much.

These matters are indeed evident, and lie within common prudence. For those in whom there is a certain greater force of mind and sharper prudence in judging will, without these rules, sharpen that keenness of talent, and choose the true, and reject the contrary. To me, indeed, sometimes both the truth itself shines forth in the sincerity and candor of the writer, and, on the contrary, a certain anxiety and cunning of the author reveal a lie. Sincere truth, believe me, is what it is, and, if it finds a purified mind, flows in of itself rightly. Falsehood seeks circumlocutions and windings, and anxiously surrounds and protects itself with a circuit of words. And also, when I consider, in the manner of history, what befits each person, I easily understand that historians have recorded certain matters not only falsely, but also imprudently.

For who, even moderately prudent, does not see that what is related of the deeds of the apostle Thomas and John the Evangelist is at odds with their character — that either the former sought vengeance for an injury, or the latter, with his robe torn and beating his own head, took a horse, hurried as fast as he could out of the church, and, an old man, pursued a young man in a youthful manner?

I have not, then, given to the prudent and talented these precepts for judgment, elaborated with diligence, but, as they say, to cruder and thicker minds, in a rough and ready way, for the less refined. Nor indeed am I so foolish as to think all judgments of history are enclosed and comprehended in these formulas. But if any formulas were to be prescribed, these seemed, above all, most fitting and appropriate.

Chapter VII

In which Arguments 15, 16, 17, and 18 are Refuted

Although, from what we said in the previous chapter, the refutation of these arguments — placed at 15, 16, 17, and 18 — is already apparent, they must nonetheless each be refuted in order, so that we may also accommodate the school's more minor theologians.

And in the 15th argument, indeed, Philo's authority is first sought. This was certainly great — but that little epitome of dates was not Philo's, nor was that other little book on antiquities, which is established to be of the same stripe.

Josephus's credibility in history, however, not only Roman princes, but churchmen too, have celebrated. Hegesippus, an especially good authority, a man of approved credibility and altogether a grave historian, excellently praises Josephus — as far as concerns the authority of history, indeed, for as far as concerns religion, he makes him a partner in the

perfidy of the Jews. Jerome does not hesitate to give him a place among ecclesiastical writers, and accordingly to reckon his records of past events among ecclesiastical histories. Eusebius of Caesarea, Sozomen, Nicephorus — to omit others — commend Josephus's history in wonderful ways.

Indeed, Josephus himself commended his own history with grave and probable reasonings. These produce no less trust than if they had been set forth by Jerome, or by some other author. But he interprets the punishment of the serpent too crudely; he relates the power of the tree of knowledge of good and evil falsely and fictitiously; he writes that Herodias was not Philip's wife, but Herod's — who was also brother of Herod the Tetrarch; he says the temple was completed in the second year of Darius's reign; he refers the elders' laments, when they recalled the size of the old temple, not to the newly founded one, but to the already completed one; and, finally, he says other things that are contrary, partly to Sacred Scripture, partly to other true and approved histories.

Plainly, I do not deny it. But these were the errors of an ignorant man, not the lies of a deceiver. Nor is it fair to sprinkle a stain upon the whole body of the narrative from a few blemishes. Josephus, then, was a distinguished historian, as Hegesippus affirms, and attentive to the investigation of facts and to sobriety of language. But whether certain men are right or wrong to reproach him for his marking of dates, I would not easily say. Indeed, I readily and gladly assign such errors to unlearned and negligent copyists.

Julius Africanus's five volumes on dates have not come into our hands. Wherefore we ourselves cannot always judge concerning the credibility of his history. But there exists Gelasius's prejudgment, which was objected in the argument, and theologians ought to follow this in judging such matters. "The little works of Tertullian or Africanus," he says, "are apocryphal." In this passage, whether Gelasius meant to disapprove of Julius Africanus is not entirely clear. For, first, none of the ancients held a bad opinion of Julius Africanus. Eusebius and Jerome, indeed, everywhere cultivate his testimonies on past events. Nor is this Julius reproved in the doctrine of faith. For, as to the fact that he believed the history of Susanna to be fabricated, in this he followed the error of the most learned men.

But that all of Julius's little works should be condemned by Gelasius for one fault, of which there is even a probable excuse, does not seem likely to me at all. For this same fault, if it was a fault, was common to Julius along with the doctors of the Church. For you would scarcely find anyone who did not err in something. Then, why would Gelasius, as though it made no difference whether this one or that one were condemned,

pronounce judgment in this form: "The little works of Tertullian or Africanus are apocryphal"? And if these two authors were distinct, both in name and in reality, Gelasius, by his own custom, would have condemned the works of each individually. But when he marks "Tertullian or Africanus" with a single condemnation, he is not to be thought to have understood different authors, but the same one. To me, indeed, such a conjecture suggests that the passage is corrupted, as in many other places in this chapter, and that the particle "or" was added through the copyists' fault. It should be read, then: "The little works of Tertullian Africanus are apocryphal" — unless perhaps some attributed the surname "Africanus" to Tertullian, in which case Gelasius framed his judgment in such a way that, whether called by his proper name or by his surname, by anyone at all, we would understand him to be condemned.

There remain Eusebius and Sozomen, whose authority was finally pressed in the fifteenth argumentation. But what I have thought and judged concerning these authors, you have in the previous chapter. In the fifteenth argument, no scruple was raised that has not been shaken off.

In the sixteenth, Innocent's decree is first objected. But he, if he approves the Church's monuments, does not immediately disapprove of the histories of the pagans. These, I admit, are ill-suited for the use of the ecclesiastical forum and of common lawsuits — though, even for this purpose, they can sometimes be useful — but in which places and questions, since this is foreign to our present undertaking, it is not worth discussing. In the exposition of the Sacred Letters, however — as we discussed at length in the second chapter of this book — profane histories are of great value indeed. Wherefore, if a question arises concerning the divine letters, councils and other ecclesiastical judges neither ought nor can neglect such histories. Nor are the histories of the pagans applied only to these uses of Scripture. They are otherwise necessary to theologians too, as has been explained above, and will be explained in the following books as well.

Andrew, moreover, at the Council of Florence, teaches nothing else than that knowing the wars of the Greeks or the Romans by no means pertains to a synod. He could have said "of the Trojans," or even "of the Florentines." For knowledge of certain wars of the Greeks and Romans is most useful for explaining the prophets' predictions. But these matters are most easy; let us pursue the rest — which, too, after what we have discussed above, present no difficulty.

To respond to the seventeenth argument, I think not even a single word need be added — since, unless I am mistaken, it has been accurately and diligently resolved in chapter 6.

The eighteenth, then, which is also the last, I shall dispatch as briefly as I can, so that this topic may finally come to its end. The theologian, then, employs two kinds of arguments. One is certain, the other probable. Both are to be discussed more fully in the next book. Now I shall confine myself to a few words. It is not necessary that the theologian always take certain principles. From uncertain matters — provided they are probable — he sometimes constructs argumentations, suitable not for compelling, indeed, but for persuading. That theologian, however, will be foolish, who wishes, in every syllogism of his, to attach necessary matters to necessary matters alone. For there are certain matters so intricate and obscure that it is the theologian's prudence not to wish to demonstrate them, but to persuade of them; not to illuminate them more clearly, but to resolve them however possible.

In this kind of argumentation, then, if anyone should use the probability of human faith, he could, without doubt, sometimes be deceived, but could not, without injustice, be reproved. And also, as we said above, human faith hands down certain matters so certainly that to call them into doubt is a mark of the most certain folly. If the theologian claims these for his own use, he will produce nothing deceptive, nothing weak or inept, but a matter true and firm, and consonant with both human and even divine reason. From these parts of history, which have been explained, how an argument is drawn seems sufficiently set forth.

That all theological arguments flow, then, from ten sources, was said in the first book. And, in the following ten books, it has been shown what kind of arguments can be drawn from each individual topic. What has been said has perhaps been said at greater length than the proposed cause required — but certainly more briefly than I had thought so great a matter could be treated by me. In explaining the authority of human history, I confess my discourse ran to great length. But there was no topic of theology where either a broader material for discussion presented itself, or where I needed to labor with greater care, diligence, and industry. And although I have accomplished less than the greatness of the matter demanded, I have nonetheless not labored in vain. For I have been able to warn the rest to write more accurately — and to add either better material, or remove what is superfluous, or draw together, more tightly and concisely, what has been said too diffusely and at scattered length — briefly, if they know anything better than these matters, to share it candidly.

Book XII

Proem to the Twelfth Book

Excellent reader, I have heard that Brother Francisco de Vitoria—whom Spain received by God's singular gift as the greatest teacher of Theology—was accustomed to say, after I had left his school, that he was indeed greatly delighted by my talent, but feared this: that, elated and exulting immoderately by reason of a certain excellence in it, and having grown somewhat too great, I might not merely advance joyfully and freely but might even rashly and licentiously trample upon the footsteps of my teacher. For he had heard that I had not approved one and then another of his opinions. I would wish that those things were truly said of us which he, out of excessive indulgence toward a son, used to say. But if we cannot attain so great an excellence of talent by imitation, certainly by will we come very close, and we strive to express our master. Surely if anyone approves my learning—which I wish were worthy of the opinion of the learned!—if he approves my prudence in judging matters—which I wish were worthy of our surname!—if he approves the elegance of my style—which I am accustomed to employ more elegantly than the scholastics were wont to use in their books—in this we are learned, prudent, and eloquent: that we follow this man as the best leader of all these things and obey his precepts and admonitions.

But as for that moderation of mind which this man, most modest toward me, desired in me, in that matter I took pains to deceive his fear. Whether I have succeeded or not, others will judge more incorruptly than I. Indeed, if there is in me any fault of rashness, I can scarcely cover and shade it with any excuse, since I know that talent, however excellent and outstanding it may be, avails little unless it is governed by the rein of prudent understanding and by a definite moderation of mind.

However, I am not accustomed to approve those who, as if bound by an oath or even constrained by superstition—to use Fabius's words—consider it a sin ever to depart from an opinion once adopted. The theologian has no need to swear allegiance to anyone's laws. For the work to which he himself aspires is greater and more excellent than that he should always have to tread in his teacher's footsteps, if indeed he is to become perfect in the praise of Theology.

I remember hearing from my own teacher, when he had begun to expound to us the Second Part of the Second Part, that so much weight was to be given to the opinion of St. Thomas that, if no better reason presented itself, the authority of that most holy and most learned man would be sufficient for us. But again he warned that the words of the

holy doctor ought not to be accepted without discrimination and examination; rather, if he had said anything either too harsh or too improbable, we should imitate his modesty and diligence in a similar matter—he who neither withdrew credence from ancient authors approved by consensus, nor went over to their opinion when reason called him to the contrary.

This precept I have most diligently kept. For I have not recalled to my own judgment any opinion, I do not say of St. Thomas, but not even of my own teacher; nor was it in my heart to swear by the words of my teacher. For that man was himself by nature moderate, yet he sometimes dissented even from St. Thomas, and—in my judgment—gained greater praise by dissenting than by agreeing: so great was his reverence in dissenting. But enough of this. For we shall often speak in praise of our teacher. Now let us return to the remaining parts of the proposed work.

I promised three books on the use of the loci: one on scholastic combat, another on the exposition of sacred Scripture, and the last specifically against the individual enemies of the Christian faith: heretics, pagans, Jews, and Saracens. To these matters I have allotted the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth books.

And, to return to my teacher, had he wished to treat especially of the use of the loci in scholastic contention, he could have written most gravely and most copiously. But since no monuments of his genius have been committed to writing, no work of learning, no gift of doctrine survives, we have turned all our zeal and care to the labor of writing this matter. For since the whole of Theology is fruitful and productive, and no part of it is uncultivated or deserted, no place in it is more fertile or more abundant than that concerning the use of the loci and the arguments drawn from the loci of Theology. Wherefore, as much as I am able to strive in mind, as much as I am able to contend in labor—if the writing of these things is labor rather than pleasure—so much shall I do, that I may bring it about that, since all the beginnings of these matters have been supplied to me by my teacher, I myself may not seem to have failed my own teacher in turn. For we hand down to memory the erudition of this most illustrious man, and to him, though by no means equal to his genius, yet according to our own zeal, we render deserved and owed gratitude. Although I ask of those who shall take these pages into their hands that they suppose something greater about my master than what I myself am able to express.

Chapter I

What Theology is, What is its Object, What is its End

It is proposed to us in this book to speak of the use of the theological loci in scholastic disputation. That this may be done correctly and in order, it will be best at the outset to define what Theology is, what is, as it were, its subject matter, and toward what goal all the theologian's studies ought to be directed.

Theology, indeed, if we translate the Greek word into Latin, is reason and discourse concerning God. Now every inquiry that is undertaken methodically and rationally concerning some matter investigates the essence and the powers—as they are called—and all the other things that are peculiarly and properly attributed to that matter. In Theology, therefore, is understood a certain faculty which inquires into the nature, power, and properties of God. Nor indeed is it enough for the theologian to attribute to the powers and rights of his faculty those things which belong to God absolutely in Himself, unless he also claims those things which, as it were, accrue to God in relation to creatures. For he investigates the notion of God from every side.

The treatment of Theology is therefore twofold: one concerning God in Himself, the other concerning the same God insofar as He is the principle and end of things. Nor does the theologian mix the highest and the lowest, the divine and the human, but he so articulately, clearly, and skillfully combines these with those, and joins those to these, that not only do they bring no mutual obscurity to one another, but each also lends light to the other. What of this? Just as we cannot look directly at the sun, and our sight and senses are overcome by its rays, so at the sight of the divine light the eyes of our mind grow dazzled and dim.

Wherefore it is necessary that we discern God, invisible by His own nature, in His effects as in a shadow, in a mirror, in an image, in signs and traces. For His invisible things are perceived by the creation of the world, being understood through the things that are made: His eternal power also and divinity (Rom. 1). Since, moreover, among all the things we perceive by the sense of our eyes, the rational creature is most similar to God—for man was made in the image of God—you would find nothing in which the divine goodness, power, and wisdom shine forth more. Wherefore the discipline of theology, although it is chiefly about God Himself, nevertheless is very much occupied with men and human affairs, and seeks the knowledge of the divine nature both from man and from those things which God has made and done for man.

But if it is the proper office of Theology to investigate and set forth the power, goodness, and providence of God, then the discussion, however lengthy, that the theologian conducts concerning the end which God (none other than Himself) has provided for men, and concerning the means necessary to this end—virtues, laws, grace, the Incarnation, the sacraments—is not foreign to the purpose of Theology; not only for the reason which St. Thomas indeed made weighty, lest Theology—which is also productive of action, not merely contemplative—be left maimed and diminished by the omission of this part, but much more because these matters signally and splendidly disclose and illustrate the probity, equity, virtue, integrity, beneficence, liberality, mercy, patience, and long-suffering of God Himself. Ignorance of this matter was for some the cause of that error, whereby they supposed this discipline was invented not for the sake of contemplation but for action. But let us see what arguments they use.

First, they say, the treatise of contemplation is far smaller than that of action. For to the former St. Thomas gave the first part of his Summa, but to the latter the second and third, which in the size of the volume each individually exceed even that first part. Again, to discuss the end and the means clearly pertains to that faculty which undertakes and does something. Indeed, these things are referred not to the mind but to effect. Since, therefore, the theologian institutes very much disputation concerning the end and means of human life, it seems to follow that the force of Theology lies not chiefly in discerning but in acting. 19. Moreover, Theology and the divine Scriptures have the same end. For the principles and conclusions of the same discipline do not have a different end. But the end of all the divine Scriptures is love, as Augustine (On Christian Doctrine, Bk. 1, ch. 35 and 36) and Gregory (Homily 10 on Ezekiel) testify. Theology, therefore, does not chiefly tend toward contemplation but toward loving.

Moreover, that doctrine which is speculative and a hunter of nature demands eyes chiefly for discerning, not strength for acting, nor does it charge with folly those who are sluggish in action but those who are slow in speculation; but Scripture demands works of all its disciples from every side, and reproves those who are sluggish through idleness as vain and idle; therefore this doctrine is not chiefly handed down for the sake of speculating but of acting.

To this add that faith is referred to charity, not conversely charity to faith, as is gathered from Matthew (ch. 22) and from the Apostle (1 Cor. 13). The knowledge, then, of the principles of Theology—which knowledge we take under the name of faith—was given first of all to the faithful for the sake of loving. For the final cause (which we may interpret as "final") is the same, both first and principal. But if the knowledge of the principles of this doctrine is active—that is, faith which works through love—it follows

that the doctrine itself too pertains primarily to morals and to the action of life.

Likewise, if faith is a certain speculation, and not a moral discipline, whence comes that saying, "Faith without works is dead" (James 2)? Whence again that saying, "To give knowledge of salvation to His people for the remission of their sins" (Luke 1)? For the knowledge of bodily salvation looks chiefly to practice, not to contemplation. What of this: "He gave him the knowledge of the saints" (Wisdom 10); "The knowledge of the saints is prudence" (Prov. 9); "All Scripture inspired by God is useful," etc., "that the man of God may be perfect, equipped for every good work" (2 Tim. 3); "But these things are written that you may believe ... and that believing you may have life in His name" (John 20); "He who says he knows God and does not keep His commandments is a liar" (1 John 2); and six hundred other things of this kind that are found throughout the divine Scripture?

From all these it seems altogether to follow that Theology is not speculative but productive of action. And so its chief end is not contemplation but action. This was the opinion of certain scholastic theologians, among the foremost in fame and nobility, who in this matter perhaps follow the Master (Sent. I, dist. 1), who divides this discipline according to use and enjoyment. Nor do these most learned men (for it is most modest of me to call them so) understand that the end of the doctrine is one thing, and the end of the teacher another; or, to express nearly the same thing in different words, that the primary end of the doctrine is one thing, and the final end another. As, for example, if we say wine has two ends: one for drinking, the other for medicinal use. The charity of God who teaches is, then, indeed an end of this very doctrine, but not the first, rather the second. For even the cognition and contemplation of nature—as Cicero elegantly says—is in a certain way maimed and incomplete, if no action of things follows. "Vain," says the Wise Man, "are all men in whom there is not the knowledge of God," etc. (Wisdom 13); and another likewise: "Because, when they had known God, they did not glorify Him as God ... but became vain in their thoughts," etc. (Rom. 1). Wherefore, if you consider the nature of a discipline from its secondary end, then Physics too will be numbered among the active sciences.

What of the fact that our first end, as St. Thomas most truly holds, is the clear and manifest vision of God? Because we attain that end by mind and will, by knowledge and love, it follows not that knowledge is referred to love, but that both are referred to vision. But if the knowledge of the wayfaring state is of itself to be referred only to the knowledge of the homeland, although that knowledge is not fit in itself unless affection and love are joined to it, yet the vision of God, of which faith is the seedbed, is chiefly contemplation, not action; it follows that Theology is chiefly speculative, not practical

(let it be allowed, since the discourse concerns scholastic disputation, to use scholastic terms).

Add that Theology inquires into the nature, power, and property of God. God, therefore, is the proper object of this science, and thus it is ordered for the sake of speculation. And Augustine (On the Trinity, Bk. 12, ch. 14 and 15) openly teaches that the wisdom of which the Apostle speaks (1 Cor. 12) is an intellectual notion and contemplation of eternal things.

There is no doubt, moreover, that sacred doctrine is wisdom, and thereby it is established to be speculative. 30. This, to pass over other things, even the name "Theology" itself declares. For just as it is most foolish not only to assert but even to doubt whether Physiology and Astrology are speculative or productive sciences—since the very names signally and distinctly declare that they concern contemplation of things, not morals and action, although physicians, sailors, and others devoted and destined to public affairs spurn and flee the idle notion of nature and the stars, embracing and cultivating only that which is active—so it is likewise removed from common and even mediocre intelligence and sense to doubt whether Theology is speculative or productive, inasmuch as it is nothing other than reason and discourse concerning God; although prudent men do not wish it to be idle and inactive, but accommodated to the use and end of human life.

Moreover, Theology hands down all knowledge concerning God, whether that knowledge is had through the light of nature or solely by divine gift and illumination. Since, then, it contemplates whatever human minds can know concerning God, surely either it is speculative, or no science concerning God can be speculative. Although some have granted this argument, it is nevertheless so absurd that it ought not to be refuted at length.

What of the fact that our theology is a certain impression of divine wisdom, which itself has both the power of contemplating and of acting? Nothing, then, prevents that same light of God's countenance, which is signed upon us, from displaying both what ought to be contemplated and what ought to be done. Just as the rational soul, since it is the most excellent of all forms, indeed excellently possesses the powers both of sensing and of vivifying, yet in it the power of understanding is the first and chief power. Nor does it exercise the other powers except that it may at length fulfill its own proper office of intelligence. In this manner, then, St. Thomas knowingly and skillfully said that Theology fulfills both offices, of contemplating and of acting, although it contemplates more than it acts. For it does not act except because, by acting, it tends toward the perfect

knowledge of God.

Having briefly explained these matters, those three things are now sufficiently clearly and plainly understood which I undertook to expound at the beginning of this chapter: namely, what is the proper notion and definition of Theology; what, again, is the subject matter about which it is concerned; and finally, what is its end, both first and second. Theology is a science which teaches what the divine nature is and what are the powers and properties of that nature. God Himself is the object, subject, and, as it were, the matter to be treated, proposed to this doctrine (for by these names philosophers call the thing which any faculty proposes to the mind to be handled and known). Its primary end, indeed, is the notion and contemplation of the divine nature, explained through the powers, virtues, and properties of God; its final end, however, is the action of those things which are necessary for morals and for living well and happily.

And indeed, what use the theological loci have that is accommodated to the morals and actions of life, I do not undertake to say at present, although that use is altogether great, and would furnish us very useful and abundant material for discourse. That use only, as I said above, must now be set forth by me which the theologian can derive from the loci if he turns and treats them in scholastic disputations—that is, when he takes care to know as much as he can concerning God and divine matters.

Nor has it escaped me that I wrote in the fifth book, when speaking of the authority of the Church in the judgment of morals, that there is a twofold question concerning theological matters: one which pertains to contemplation, the other which is situated in morals and the practice of life.

This might be taken by some as though what I now have in hand were different from the prior undertaking. That, indeed, will be far from my intention. For it is one thing for a preacher to teach the use of the loci in a sermon, where morals are treated either by exhortation or dissuasion, and another for the theologian to be instructed in the use of the loci when he falls upon a question of morals, whether it be of those things which it is necessary to know for salvation, or of those which are merely expedient. And how preachers ought to employ the theological loci, I have judged it should be passed over at this time. But since questions of faith and of morals are treated by the theologian in the same way and by the same method when they come into theological disputation, this is not to be doubted: that whatever precepts held for the prior questions pertain also to the following ones. For this is truly one and the same matter, so that there is not much difference between decrees of faith and judgments of morals, and both are to be treated from the same loci and in nearly the same form.

Nor indeed would I wish that anyone should again detain me with so cold and so jejune a calumny, on the ground that I have called Theology, simply and without any qualification, a science. As if I did not know that Aristotle requires an evident and clear knowledge of the conclusion in a science; and since Theology does not have this in its principles, it cannot have it in its conclusions either. For it is contrary to reason that a conclusion should be rendered lucid, open, and manifest, if the things from which it is gathered are obscure, veiled, and involved. Moreover, if we speak not as Aristotle but as the sacred authors, we certainly do so, who have called this doctrine, absolutely, a science.

"To know," says Augustine, "how faith may both be of help to the pious and be defended against the impious, the Apostle seems to call by the proper name of science" (On the Trinity, Bk. 14, ch. 1). But that, without doubt, is the proper task and office of Theology. And Jerome, to omit others, everywhere calls the doctrine of sacred Scripture, which we theologians profess, science and wisdom. Indeed, the sacred letters, where a matter is certain, do not in any way shrink from the word "knowing." Well known are those words: "I know that my Redeemer lives," etc. (Job 19); likewise: "I know that you will most certainly reign," etc. (1 Kings 24); likewise: "He gave him the knowledge of the saints" (Wisdom 10); likewise: "You will find the knowledge of God, because the Lord gives wisdom, and from His mouth come prudence and knowledge" (Prov. 2). And the Apostle: "To one indeed is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge" (1 Cor. 12).

Moreover, Aristotle demands evidence in the sciences, so that the cognition of things can neither deceive nor be changed. For the word "science" demands a firm and unchangeable notion. Since, then, the matters which fall under faith and theology, by the very manner in which they fall under them, are stable and immovable, and the theologian cannot err, slip, or be deceived in them, it follows that even without perspicuity Theology properly claims for itself the name of science.

The same reason underlies why this discipline is concerned, without loss or detriment to its name, even with contingent matters—that is, matters not necessary by their own nature. For Aristotle required necessity in doctrine on the ground that without it neither the stability nor the immutability of things or of knowledge would appear.

But causes that come about by chance, and their effects, though by their own nature little firm and constant, insofar as they fall under Theology and faith, are not mutable and shifted now here now there, but remain certain, unchanged, and, as it were, perpetual. Wherefore God is properly said to know both alike: both the things that happen of necessity and those that are placed for us in chance and fortune. Rightly, then,

do we call Theology a science, in which there is immovable certainty, firm constancy, and, so to speak, infallibility of knowledge.

What of the fact that Music and Astronomy are called sciences by most, and yet scarcely one or another has explored by his own instrument or experiment the revolutions of the heavens and the wandering stars, on which those disciplines now depend? Indeed, the younger astrologers for the most part follow the experiments of the ancients as certain prejudgments of those matters which they themselves undertake to treat and judge.

Theology, therefore, will rightly also be called a science, especially since it happens that the principles of this doctrine are obscurely known to us. For surely, if they were perspicuous and clear to us, this discipline would nonetheless maintain both its name and its rational ground. And in truth, if Aristotle were alive, he would find no other name by which to call theology more aptly and fittingly. For to call it faith, which does not rest immediately upon authority but upon reason and syllogism, is absurd. Otherwise, if the prior proposition were certain from faith, but the latter probable from natural reason, the conclusion would be faith, not opinion—which is plainly false. Let us, then, since nothing better presents itself, call Theology by the name of science. For it is a firm and stable perception and comprehension of those things which are linked together by manifest connection from certain and constant principles.

Nor indeed can it truly be said that the consequences of theology are probable and obscure, not evident and firm. The argument they bring for this is by no means acute but rather quite dull: that if the connection were certain and clear, the conclusions would no longer belong to theology but to faith. But this reasoning is ridiculous; and it is rightly rejected by most. For the distinction between faith and theology is easy and clear: that faith rests proximately and, so to speak, immediately upon authority, but theology rests proximately and immediately upon reason. For faith and theology stand, as I said above, in the same relation as the habit of principles and the science of conclusions. And just as the light of nature, without the medium of reasoning, produces knowledge of natural principles, so the light of faith, with no argument of reason applied, produces persuasion of those things to which we the faithful assent, relying solely on divine authority. Therefore the evidence and firmness of the consequence does not remove theology but makes it; it does not take it away but brings it in.

Although there are in this discipline, as in others, certain opinions mixed in with things known and established. And just as physical doctrine, though itself congruent and consonant with nature, does not establish all its conclusions with certainty, but persuades of some by probable argumentation, so the theologian pronounces very many

things constantly, certainly, confidently, but in certain matters he considers it excellently done if he has found what is likely. Nor does he suppose himself to know what he does not know, or, as if all the dogmas of theology were certain, does he fear nothing, doubt nothing; rather he takes care and provides against this: that, by rashly assenting to everything and asserting all things very confidently, he not lose the authority even of those things which are more certain and illustrious. But to the matter.

When the connection is uncertain, or the other proposition, which is taken along with the principle of faith, is uncertain, the conclusion will be an opinion; it will not properly be theology. But whether both principles of the syllogism are of faith, or one is certain from faith and the other evident from nature, the conclusion will belong to theology, provided the consequence is known either by the clear light of nature or by the illumination of faith. For (though I have said it, I shall say it again and again) the science of such a conclusion is no differently referred to faith than to the habit of principles of the natural sciences. Since these matters are so ready at hand that the point needs no argumentation, let us, having omitted them, proceed to the rest.

Chapter II

What are the Principles of Theology

Since indeed every discipline has certain sources which we call the principles of the science, and then certain rivulets which, as it were the ends of the science, we call conclusions, it is necessary that the theologian, preparing to use the loci, should first of all learn what are the causes and principles of his own faculty, and what are the effects connected with those causes and principles.

The principles of theology must be known first, for once these are known, we shall much more easily understand the extremes. But since, having proposed ten kinds of loci, we have also added the causes proper to each kind, and have established beforehand those things in which the power and nature of each consist, someone perhaps will not fail to contend that this treatment is superfluous, indeed even all that we have undertaken to say about the use of the loci. For he will argue that theology has no other sources and loci than those we have pointed to with our finger, and that we have explained so openly and clearly the powers and nature of each that we can easily, unless we are very slow, gather arguments from each locus.

What? (for someone will say this too): did not theologians, even before this art of ours (if indeed this is an art), both discover arguments and, weaving one from another, treat theological matter by method and reason? Would St. Thomas, a perfect and complete

theologian, if he had judged this part of Theology necessary, have left it entirely untouched? It is not likely, since the other parts of Theology are well described, that this final act should have been neglected as if by a lazy poet. Why, then, is there need to labor, or in what should we exert our care and thought, if indeed by explaining the use of the loci we can produce nothing of the sort—nothing that would be greatly useful and necessary to theologians?

But such subtleties will not be able to move my mind from its seat and settled position. For I have persuaded myself of this, I feel this: that these our precepts concerning the loci contain very many things, ready at hand wherever the theologian turns, excluded by no disputation. For whether the firmest argument is sought to prove the dogmas of theology, or the aptest reasoning is sought to explain the sacred letters, either this is the art through which we attain these things, or there is no art at all. But to say that there is no art of the greatest matters, when there is no matter so small as to lack an art, belongs to men speaking without much consideration and erring in the greatest matters.

But these things by which we exhort to the knowledge and use of the loci might perhaps be argued more accurately. Which indeed we have done in other books.

(To the 3rd argument) At this time, however, we had only to make clear why St. Thomas, the most diligent and most complete theologian, left behind this treatise on the loci, if it is as necessary to the theologian as we say. And indeed St. Thomas (I part, q. 1, art. 8, ad 2) indicated the loci of Theology restrictedly and briefly, as is his custom—not all, but most of them. Indeed, that I, as a man by no means ungrateful, may give myself over to him—to whom I owe so much—and bind myself in the servitude of this office by everlasting testimony, St. Thomas was to me both the author and master of the composition of this work.

But he explained the nature of the loci in a compressed and narrow way, and, so to speak, in his own manner. For he does not expand the argument, but effects what he proposes almost in points. But the method of treating the loci themselves neither St. Thomas nor, as far as I know, anyone else has attempted to explain.

The same thing Aristotle had done in the dialectical topics, who indeed treated the topics themselves variously and diffusely, but did not show how one is to find arguments from them, nor did he demonstrate their use, which in this matter would have been the greatest and most important thing; instead he handed down to writing some use or other for the discovery of probable and common arguments, which the learned can be ignorant of without great loss to their learning. Although (Topics, Bk. I) Aristotle himself boasts, perhaps more ambitiously than truly, that the things handed down by

him in the Topics have four uses.

What then? If St. Thomas passed over the use of the loci in silence, would he have pursued it had not some accident or occupation forestalled his purpose? Or if he did not undertake to pursue these matters deliberately and by judgment, surely either we cannot all do everything, or it was of divine providence that earlier writers should leave something to later ones, in which they too might usefully exercise not only memory but also talent.

This part, then, left undone, we shall complete with the help of no one, but—as they say—by our own effort. For nothing concerning the loci of theology has been explained after St. Thomas that would satisfy me, among those things that have come into our hands.

As therefore is customary in military matters, where a commander does not think it enough to give arms to the soldiers, but teaches them how these are to be used, fits their hands, arranges their steps, instructs them when they ought to flee the enemy and when to pursue, when to trust in strength and when to use skill, when to strike the enemy and when to evade his blows, and finally leads them into battle-line, prescribes the order, assigns the place from which they may not depart without his command: so it seems to me I shall act, if I wish to inform and instruct my pupils toward the likeness of a certain complete erudition.

Nor do I have only to prescribe these things in words, but even, weapons taken up, to descend into a mock contest as an example for posterity. Which, although they seem to serve appearance rather than the wound, will nevertheless not be useless. For whatever in these matters is graceful to look at is also useful for true combat, if ever it should be joined with adversaries.

(To the 2nd argument) But if someone has accomplished without art what belongs to art, let him permit—I beg—me and those like me to employ art and precepts. There are meadows into which a native and inborn moisture has been infused from within. There are others that cannot be irrigated unless moisture flows in from outside. But indeed certain theologians before me have discoursed quite happily. First, the very same men would have done so more expeditiously and more surely if they had tasted this kind of exercise of ours. However fertile a field may be, the farmer will nevertheless make it more fertile if he cultivates it diligently and studiously. So, then, even if certain men, endowed with great talents, have attained abundance in theological disputation without art, art nevertheless, as Tully says, is a surer guide than nature. For it is one thing to heap up arguments, or rather to scatter and disperse them, another to press the same by way and

by skill. For he who knows where each thing is placed, and by what way one comes to it, will be able, even if something is buried, to dig it out, and will always be master of himself in disputing.

Therefore, if there have been none who have artfully composed the loci in general arrangement, none who have glued together and bound by reason this dissolved and scattered part of Theology, it does not follow that our little work will at once be superfluous; rather, it will be for that reason all the more necessary—to the learned and talented, perhaps, and without doubt to the slow and cruder minds.

Next, the scholastic theologians do not seem to me (for I must confess what I feel) to have distinguished the disputations of theology in a very composed and orderly manner. I always except St. Thomas, in whom the connection of matters is marvelous, the order of questions and articles is supreme, and the composition of the discipline is incredible. So much do the extremes correspond to the beginnings, the middle to both, all things to all. For what need is there to speak of the abundance of arguments? Since in almost infinite questions his facility and abundance in disputing on both sides was so great that, although he did not always argue against everything, as Arcesilaus disputed, yet in all matters he expressed whatever could be said on either side.

The other authors of the school erred greatly in disturbance of reason and order, following, that is, the Master, in whose four books of Sentences much reading of the saints indeed appears, and for that time no mean learning; but apart from the names of the distinctions into which those books are divided, you would see almost nothing distinct and rightly and orderly distributed. You would call it rather a heap of testimonies than a disposition and rational order of a discipline. His first discussion is on the Trinity. Thus he pursues the prior matter after the later; for he disputes on the justice and mercy of God almost in passing in Book 4 of the Sentences; on the virtues in the third; on certain vices likewise in the fourth. Innumerable are the things of this kind treated confusedly and in disorder by him. Wherefore the scholastics who have followed his footsteps have almost all their matters confused and disordered too.

Nor do I wish to defraud the Master of his old name—a great man indeed, for that age, and one whom posterity has justly honored; nor do I wish to detract anything from the praise of the scholastics, which the opinion of many centuries has established. But I say frankly and freely what is lacking in them, and what men outstanding in talent and doctrine would have accomplished, had they not neglected the art of reasoning. For as regards the method of discovering arguments, they seem even to have been ignorant of certain sources: so much so that from some of those sources they bring forward no

arguments at all. For how few of them argue from the traditions of Christ and the Apostles? And rarely from the Councils, not very frequently from the Sacred Letters, scarcely once from History. But in my opinion no one will be able to be loaded with every praise as a Theologian unless he shall have attained knowledge of all these loci and shall have prepared from them a ready and expeditious use for arguing.

For concerning the nature and force of the loci, I confess I have said enough above. (To the 1st argument) But we shall not now be occupied with them in vain, when we teach what is the use of these loci and how arguments are to be drawn from them. This is not so easy for everyone that they need neither our precepts nor our examples. But enough of this. Let us now proceed to our undertaking. And, lest I pursue further things that are nearly innumerable, let me briefly comprehend what are the principles of Theology.

The distinction between natural and supernatural theology (for from here we must begin) is easy and expedite. I call natural Theology, Metaphysics, in that part where it inquires into the nature of God through the reasons of nature. This is common to us, that is, to Christians, with the philosophers of the gentiles. I call supernatural, however, that theology which investigates the nature and properties of that same God through those principles which have been divinely revealed to men. Revelation, moreover, I here take in the manner of theologians, as that which exceeds man's capacity and talent. For Paul (Rom. 1) attributes even those things which are known by natural reason and light to the revelation and manifestation of God. And this supernatural theology is proper to the faithful and to Christians, so much better than other disciplines as divine authority, on which it rests, is superior to and more ancient than all human reason.

Rightly, therefore, does St. Thomas (I, q. 1, art. 8, ad 2) teach that to argue from authority is most proper to this doctrine, because the principles of this doctrine are had through revelation, and thus it is fitting that credence be given to the authority of those to whom the revelation was made. Nor does this derogate from the dignity of this doctrine. For although the argument from authority which is founded upon human reason is the weakest, the argument from authority which is founded upon divine revelation is the most efficacious. Thus far he.

Since, therefore, all our discourse here is instituted concerning that theology which is above nature, only the principles of this must be set forth—what and of what kind they are. That this may be done in accordance with the schools, I think the knots must be both brought forward and untied that bind and impede this whole matter.

The first is that St. Thomas seems, in a few words, to fall into many errors. One, that he contradicts himself. For now he says the articles of faith are the principles of theology (I,

q. 1, art. 7–8), but now says all those things which are contained in the sacred letters (I, q. 1, art. 8, ad 2; II-II, q. 1, art. 5, ad 2), and sometimes even everything that has been divinely revealed (I, q. 1, art. 5, ad 2 and art. 8, ad 2), among which are indeed the traditions of the Apostles, although they are not found written in the canonical books. Can he contradict himself more?

The second fault is that, whereas Paul (Heb. 11) numbers among the things one must believe two: that God exists, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him, St. Thomas (I, q. 2, art. 2; II-II, q. 1, art. 5, ad 3) on the contrary teaches that these are not comprehended in the articles of faith but are rather presupposed by faith. These, then, are not, for St. Thomas, principles of Theology, since indeed they are not revealed propositions which we believe by faith, but are known by men through the light of nature, and for that reason precede faith itself, whose decrees alone we ought finally to have as the proper principles of Theology. St. Thomas seems opposed not only to the Apostle but also to reason itself, which clearly proves that God's existence is properly and indeed the first principle held to be of Theology. For God is, as I said above, the matter properly subject to this discipline. But every discipline posits first both that its subject matter exists and what that matter is. That God exists is therefore a proper principle of Theology, because it is speculative. For, because it is also productive of action, it has this first principle: that God is a rewarder of those who seek Him.

The third fault of St. Thomas, common with most theologians, is that, although very many things have been revealed by God not only to those who wrote the canonical books but also to other holy men of God—Martin, Nicholas, Benedict, Dominic, Francis—he asserts that faith and theology rest not upon whatever revelations of God, but only upon those which the authors of sacred Scripture had. But it is established that divine revelation, generally, is the formal reason of faith and theology, and that faith assents to whatever God says. For it is a virtue which believes God speaking. And this is the first knot in the very words of St. Thomas.

For the second knot binds not only St. Thomas but nearly all the rest. For no discipline whatsoever proves its own principles by reasoning, but posits them: for this reason they are called positions or postulates; but Theology concludes by reasoning the things which faith holds; therefore the principles of this discipline are not the same as the decrees of faith. But that Theology does prove the dogmas of faith by argument can be shown in many ways. 83. First, because that God is one, immortal, the procurer of human affairs, and other such things received by Christians through faith, we demonstrate by clear arguments of Philosophy. Then again, because that God is the Creator is an article of faith; but natural reason also shows this. 85. Add that the Apostle Peter (1 Pet. 3) bids us

be ready to render an account of the hope that is in us, and therefore of the faith that is in us. Add also that to this science is attributed that by which the most saving faith is begotten, nourished, defended, strengthened—which, taken from St. Augustine (On the Trinity, XIV.1), is on the lips of all theologians. If, therefore, the knowledge of natural things, as Augustine says, both begets and nourishes and strengthens faith, surely theology discloses by natural reason those things which belong to faith.

Faith, therefore, does not hand down its principles to the theologian, unless he himself proves his own principles; which is understood and perceived to be so alien to every discipline whatsoever that it need not now be confirmed by me.

The third knot is likewise tied from the very words of St. Thomas (I, q. 32, art. 4). For he teaches that something pertains to faith in two ways. In one way directly, as those things principally handed down to us by God. In another way indirectly, as those things whose denial entails something manifestly contrary to faith. As if someone should deny that Samuel was the son of Elkanah; from which it follows that divine Scripture is false. Thus far, not in the same words indeed, but in the same sense, he speaks. And again in another place (II-II, q. 2, art. 5) he affirms that all things handed down in the sacred letters, except those by which man is made blessed, pertain to faith only accidentally—as that Abraham had two sons and David was the son of Jesse. But if things of this kind, though expressly written even in the sacred books, pertain to faith only indirectly and accidentally, they are surely not principles of Theology. For the foundations of no discipline constitute the fabric of that discipline accidentally and indirectly.

I could have entangled this question with other arguments too, but I feared that even these few might seem too many to the delicate reader. And yet, though few, these press hard and yield nothing, so that we must explain all that is necessary for setting forth the beginnings of theology. We shall first, then, set forth what is the formal ground of this doctrine; then what are its native and genuine principles, and among these, which are capital and which legitimate but secondary; finally, which are extraneous and foreign, that is, borrowed and fetched from outside disciplines.

The formal ground of Theology (since this I undertook to explain first) is not one and simple, but twofold and bipartite. For there is a formal ground of the object as object, in virtue of which deity is called the ground of Theology. There is also a ground of the thing insofar as it moves the mind to assent; in this way the first revealing truth is held to be the ground of Theology. Thus we understand the reasons for seeing both color and light: color indeed in the former way, light in the latter. Some call the former the "ratio quae," the latter the "ratio sub qua" (I think it should be granted us to use scholastic

terms, when Latin ones are less ready to hand; indeed, Latin terms must sometimes even be abandoned, lest in scholastic disputation we seem to have affected words rather than explained matters). Since, concerning the formal ground of the object as subject to this doctrine, insofar as it is a thing, there can be no controversy among learned men, I lay down the following conclusions concerning the formal ground on the part of the habit and the knowing power.

(First conclusion) The first: The formal ground of Faith is not the formal ground of Theology. For if the principles of theology were known by the light of prophecy, or even by the light of glory of the blessed, the conclusions would nonetheless belong to Theology. For Christ the Lord was by far the foremost of all who ever were in theology and in the knowledge of the divine nature, and yet He assented to the conclusions of theology without faith. For faith demands, in its formal ground, something obscure and unseen, since it is the substance of things to be hoped for and the evidence of things not appearing, whereas theology can also be evident and clear. For it is reason and discourse concerning God. 93.

And between prophecy and faith, if we believe St. Thomas, there is some difference, nor are the lights the same by which prophets are illumined for prophesying and the faithful for believing. 94. But if a prophet should know, by his own illumination, those principles of theology, and should gather by reasoning what follows from and is repugnant to them, he will surely be a theologian, although the formal ground of such theology is not the light of faith but of prophecy.

(Second conclusion) The second conclusion is: To be revealed by God, or a light divinely infused, is the formal ground of Theology, whether that light be of faith, of prophecy, or of glory.

For supernatural theology, of which we now speak, requires generally some light superior to nature itself for knowing its principles, but the specific nature of what that light shall be is defined neither by the name "theology" nor by its proper notion. But because theologians dispute not about the theology of the blessed but of wayfarers, and inquire not what is fitting to the discipline itself but to our nature, they generally assert that the principles of theology are understood by the theologian through faith. For the light of prophecy, either because it is rare, is believed not to stand in the way of the general perception, or, because it is, like the light of faith, obscure, it is commonly and confusedly understood under the light of faith. Following this custom, not at all averse to it, we too have often granted that the principles of our theology are received through faith.

(Third conclusion) Whence arises that third conclusion: That the formal ground of our Theology is the same as that of faith.

Although it moves differently to assent to the principles than to assent to the conclusion. To the former, I say, without an intervening syllogism and reasoning; to the latter, with reasoning and an intervening syllogism. By this distinction, as we have said, Theology and Faith are distinguished not in words and thought but in their whole reality and entire kind, although the formal ground of both is the same. 98. Indeed, St. Thomas in many places seems to think that the name of faith flows very widely and consists in all the things said and revealed by God, whether through sacred and canonical authors or through any others breathed upon by a certain divine spirit. If this is true, the formal ground of faith will extend very far and wide, so that it will contain not only the revelations made to the prophets and apostles but also those made to other saints of the Church of God, indeed even those which sometimes wicked men had divinely, as Balaam and Caiaphas, whose predictions there can be no doubt pertain to faith. The same reason, then, underlies the fact that other things too, revealed by God to whomever, should be referred to the ground of faith.

But indeed, in I, q. 1, art. 8, ad 2, as we objected in the course of arguing, he teaches in no obscure words that our faith does not rest upon other revelations besides those which the Apostles and Prophets, that is, the authors of the canonical books, published. 101. This Paul confirms where he says that the faithful are built upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets, Christ Jesus Himself being the chief cornerstone. No other doctrine, therefore, than that of the Prophets, Christ, and the Apostles founds the faith of the Church, no other contains the principles of Theology. For the principles and foundations of disciplines are the same.

Add that faith is a theological virtue joined and allied with the religion of the Church toward God. Not, therefore, whatever things are revealed by God pertain to the virtue of faith, but only those which will also pertain to the religion of the Church. But since it matters nothing to the Church whether one believes or not those things seen by Bridget and Catherine of Siena, they certainly in no way pertain to faith. Add also that faith, of which we here speak, is not a private virtue but a common one. For that reason it is called catholic, that is, universal. Wherefore private revelations, of whatever kind and to whomever made, do not pertain to catholic faith, nor to the foundations and principles of ecclesiastical doctrine, which is true and genuine Theology.

Of this matter there is also no light argument, that whatever things are not proposed to the faithful through the Church and its public ministers, catholic faith does not believe.

Namely, it was fitting that things which generally pertained to the Republic should not have been referred to it by private individuals, but by its common ministers altogether. "Its foundations," he says, "are in the holy mountains." Which he immediately added, explaining: "The Lord shall tell in the writings of the peoples and of these princes who have been in it." Private writings, therefore, are not the foundations of ecclesiastical faith, but the writings of the peoples, which the princes of the Church have handed down to us. Wherefore, among the principles of our theology, we ought not to hold those things which have been signified by God privately and singularly to certain men, but those which God has spoken commonly and publicly to His Church. If this is consonant with reason, as it certainly seems, it necessarily follows that the formal ground of faith and theology is not as diffuse and ample as it appears to some, but much more restricted and contracted, so as to be understood as the first truth revealing to the Church those things which pertain to religion. This, without doubt, the constancy, certainty, and firmness of faith required. For it would stand firm and stable in no place, if it followed private revelations.

Nor let anyone object to me the faith and religion of the angels in the wayfaring state, of whom we do not know whether God proposed to them by Himself the things they had to believe, or through some public minister, a superior angel. I say this: that even among the angels the faith was common, the revelation common, which was not of private usurpation but of public religion. As for what was objected concerning the prophecies of Balaam and Caiaphas, this is easily rejected. For their words do not pertain to faith because they said them, but because the sacred authors wrote them.

And thus I have briefly, but not carelessly, set forth what is the formal ground of Theology.

It follows that I explain what are the proper and legitimate principles of this discipline. In this matter I see we need not labor much. For it is easily understood from what has been laid down that all things divinely revealed by the Church's sacred authors are to be held among the proper principles of theology. I do not mean only those things which the sacred authors handed down in their writings, but also those which they commended to posterity by word. This has been most diligently explained in the third book of this work. Moreover, I call sacred authors not only those who wrote the canonical books, but also Christ the Lord, who is the first author of both catholic life and doctrine, and the apostles who were ministers of the word.

Nor, if the authority of the Councils and of the Apostolic See makes certain the faith of a catholic dogma, or the consensus and unanimous agreement of all the Saints, do we for

that reason either accumulate the principles of Theology or extend its formal ground. Since, as we have often said elsewhere, neither the councils nor the pontiff of the apostolic see nor the holy interpreters of the scriptures publish new revelations to the faithful, but either hand down to posterity, whole and undamaged, those which the Church received from the apostles, or express and interpret them, or certainly gather what is consequent and connected, and manifest what is contrary and repugnant. The number of the principles of Theology, then, is most completely constituted from the sacred books and the traditions of the apostles.

Wherefore all things that are to be numbered among the true and genuine beginnings of theology are contained in the first two loci. But with these beginnings, as it were seeds given by the Church—which Christ gave to the apostles, the apostles to the Church—the pastors and doctors and theologians of the universal Church all water and cultivate them, and bring forth and display the plants, shoots, and offshoots that arise from them. Those are the foundations of theological and ecclesiastical doctrine which Christ laid through the apostles; upon them the rest—whether the fathers of a council, or the supreme pontiffs, or the holy doctors of the Church—build entirely. For no man can lay another foundation besides that which is laid, which is the Apostles and Prophets, Christ Jesus Himself being the chief cornerstone.

Indeed, the principles of disciplines are not all situated on the same level. For some are simply first, which by their general force contain the rest, as in Metaphysics that principle: "It is impossible simultaneously to affirm and deny." Such in Theology are these: "God exists" and "He is a rewarder of those who seek Him"; in which, as in the first credibilia, all the articles of faith are implicitly contained, as St. Thomas himself affirms in the same words (II-II, q. 1, art. 7).

Other principles are indeed foremost and immediate, but more contracted than those common ones which were, as it were, the sources of all the rest. Of this kind in Physics are these: "Natural things consist of matter and form," "Nature is the principle of motion and rest." In Theology, however, these are the capital articles of faith, which, as St. Thomas himself says, are proposed to the faithful to be believed first and per se. For, indeed, concerning God, who is the subject matter of Theology, the articles enunciate those things which either exist in God from perpetual eternity, or have been disposed and dispensed in time for the sake of human salvation. For we believe that the same God who is three and one, who created the world, who makes the impious just and the pious blessed, that same God—I say—we believe was made man, and was born, and died, and was buried, and rose again, and was raised into the heavens.

Rightly, therefore, are these the first and proper pronouncements of theology, which are most especially presupposed by us concerning the subject of our discipline. For, these principal beginnings not being granted, the theologian cannot advance even a finger's breadth. And these prior ones are similar to what the Philosopher calls "dignities." For one approaching God must believe that He exists and is a rewarder of those who seek Him. Whoever, then, prepares to learn any supernatural discipline, must necessarily have preconceived in mind those two general preliminary notions. This is the proper and distinguishing mark of "dignities." But these latter, later principles will not unjustly be called the suppositions of theology. For these the theologian is able, in a certain way, to persuade his pupil of, or even to explain.

But besides these two kinds of principles there are others, sought not chiefly for their own sake but, as St. Thomas holds, for the sake of explaining the most important things. Of this sort are, he says, besides the articles of faith, all the things assumed in the sacred letters either for explaining the nature and majesty of God, or for setting forth His benevolence toward men and His providence over all things that would be useful and necessary to them. These, although they are not of faith nor the chief heads of theology, but joined to it accidentally and, as it were, secondary principles, the theologian nevertheless accepts them no differently than the philosopher accepts self-evident principles, without a medium and without argument, just as he had accepted the articles of faith. For there is in the minds of the faithful, as it were, a natural and inborn notion, that whatever has been written and handed down by the apostles is true. And these are the legitimate and genuine principles of Theology.

For whatever it adopts from Metaphysics, or from Physics, or from Mathematics, or finally from the other natural disciplines—self-evident and clear principles—it does not take from its own force and nature, but borrows for its own use, found outside itself, or certainly claims by a certain right of its own.

Perhaps someone will say: Will there not, then, be many and various formal grounds of theology, if indeed the principles of many disciplines are various? By no means. For the formal ground of doctrines is not sought from adjuncts and extrinsically attributed things, but from proper and native principles. And in Theology, of all these there is one and the same formal ground: namely, the supernatural light of faith. What, then, are the principles of Theology, both genuine and foreign, and among these which are first, which second, and among the first, which are general and which, as it were, contracted into a species, we have, I think, sufficiently and clearly taught.

From which it is understood that of the ten loci, the first two contain the proper and legitimate principles of Theology, the last three are external and foreign, for the five intermediate ones either contain the interpretation of the proper principles or the conclusions that have arisen and proceeded from them. What sort of thing these are in theology I shall explain at once, if I first refute the arguments I used above, when I inquired about the principles of the same theology. To these very argumentations enough has been answered from what has been said above, so that one may perceive that, against St. Thomas, whom they chiefly attack, they have no force. So great is the power of truth that it obscures the appearance of falsity, provided that truth has been disclosed and illuminated. But I wish nevertheless to answer each individually, that I may accommodate myself to the understanding of the less experienced.

Chapter III

He Refutes the Arguments of the Preceding Chapter

The first argument, then, objects three false faults to St. Thomas, one of which has already been entirely repelled. For how do these things clash: that the articles of faith are the primary principles of our theology, while the sacred letters contain secondary ones as well? And because they do not contain all but most of them, this too agrees and is quite consistent with the fact that divine truth, even unwritten, is the formal ground of faith. For there are certain things handed down to the Church only by word, which are held among the true and genuine principles of theology. The first calumny, then, brought forward, has no force.

That which is brought forward in second place presses more closely. But if you attend carefully, you will see that we can speak of God in two ways, and then this calumny too will be crushed.

It must be understood, then, that discourse about God is had in two ways. Either because He is the principle and end of nature, or because He is above nature both as principle and as end. Indeed, as long as we understand an excellent and eternal mind, freed from the body and unbound, separated from all mortal admixture, which perceives and moves all things, which watches over and rules heaven and earth, toward which all things, however they can, strive and struggle to come—so long we understand God naturally, so long we speak of Him naturally.

But if we consider God Himself as shown to us by a certain more excellent light, in which He appears three in one deity, admirable in effects above nature, both the first efficient cause and the last end of all such supernatural effects, and thus the one and

highest happiness of the rational creature, then the notion of God is much different, the discourse far different. When, therefore, Paul places among the things one must believe those two, that God exists and is a rewarder of those who seek Him, he understands God not as He is discerned by the eyes of nature, but as He appears by a higher illumination, the first principle and last end of supernatural things. In which sense St. Thomas (II-II, q. 1, art. 7) says that all the articles are contained in those first credibilia, namely, that one believe God exists and has providence concerning the salvation of men. But when he affirms in other places that those two are not in the articles of faith but are rather presupposed by faith, he speaks of God according to the light of nature. For just as grace presupposes nature, so gratuitous knowledge presupposes natural knowledge, as St. Thomas himself relates.

It is vain, indeed, to try to imbue with the doctrine of faith one who does not have those two natural anticipations: that God exists and has providence over men. No nation is so wild, as Cicero says, that even if it is ignorant of what kind of God it ought to have, yet knows one ought to be had. But whoever has not foreknown God to be the procurer of human affairs, and thus the ruler and judge of men, is very far removed from our discipline. But if God is the judge and ruler of men, and cannot be understood otherwise except as endowed with the highest wisdom, justice, and power, it follows that He has rewards prepared for virtues and punishments for vices. For no commonwealth at all, as Solon most truly said, can be maintained except by two things: reward and punishment. This was the reason that moved Plato, since he saw the best men often deprived, for their splendid deeds, of any reward of virtue in this life, of any distinguished honor, of any monument of praise, to assert that souls are immortal, one day to receive the reward and fruit of duty; for it seemed absurd that true, just, and honest labor should lack honors, rewards, splendor, if there is any piety in heaven, if any divine power that cares for such things; and so not only the Elysian Fields, or the rock of Sisyphus, the wheel of Ixion, the thirst of Tantalus, are the subject of poetry alone but of history. For though these things were feigned by the poets, they were feigned for the sake of signifying truth, that this most useful and truest opinion might be inscribed in the minds of men: that rewards are owed to right deeds, punishments to sins.

Wherefore I wonder the more at Cajetan, who in his commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews departed much, or altogether, both from the sense of the Apostle and from the true institution of nature. And certain men, not attending carefully enough either to Paul's intent or to the force of reason, followed him in this error. But that the reader may perceive whence this whole error arose, I shall lay open the entire matter and subjoin the very words that were spoken by the inventor and, as it were, architect of this opinion:

"He who does not believe that God exists," he says, "will never approach Him. But if you object that this does not agree with those who evidently know by demonstrative science that God exists—for such persons, since they see that God exists, cannot believe that God exists, since faith is the evidence of things not appearing—the solution is that this doctrine is given in general, and therefore it is said in general that one ought to believe that He exists. It would indeed be far better if one did not believe but knew that He exists. But this is rare or very rare. The other point, however—that God is a rewarder of those who seek Him, namely in the future life—must be held by faith, since no speculative science can attain to this, and without faith of this matter no one approaches God." Thus far he.

At this point I think my whole reasoning must be joined in combat with the whole of his. First, then, if you please, let us look at what Cajetan says concerning that first principle, "God exists." And that point I knowingly and prudently pass over—that it is far better to know than to believe; which would be true, if he were speaking of human faith; but the faith which rests upon God speaking is much more certain and powerful than that science which rests on the reasoning of our own minds. But to show this is not the business of the present place and time; it is properly the business of this disputation, if we understand Paul's statement in general and concerning things that happen frequently, to elude the Apostle's whole argument thereby.

For the Apostle was trying in that chapter to show that all the ancients, as many as were approved by God, were approved by the testimony of faith. When, in the enumeration, he had introduced Enoch too among the rest, he shows him to have been approved by faith in no other way than because, before his translation, he had testimony that he had pleased God. Having laid down this proposition from the sacred letters, he at once subjoined the conclusion: "Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he who comes to God must believe," etc. This argument, then, by which the Apostle proves that conclusion, is vain and feeble, if we grant that it is not always necessary to believe, when approaching God, that He exists, but sometimes, though rarely, it is enough to know. For we shall refute the arguing Apostle with this response: that it can happen, and it is better, that one should know that God exists; in which case it will not be necessary to believe that God exists. And so it will follow that it is not impossible to please God without faith; and that Enoch is one of those who did not believe but knew that God exists.

Therefore, just as when the Apostle says that without faith it is impossible to please God, he is not to be understood as speaking in general and for the most part, but always and of individual wayfaring men, so, when he assigns the cause of this, saying, "He who

approaches God must believe that He exists," it is to be understood in the same way, excepting no one at all, but speaking of all men and of every time—if his argument is to have any force at all in producing faith.

Now as to the following principle, Cajetan is to be defended in this: that he said no speculative science can evidently know that God is a rewarder of those who seek Him, if he means supernatural reward. That in no science is it shown that any reward awaits the just and wise after death—this Cajetan seems to assert generally, and this I am compelled to disprove.

Chrysostom, moreover (Homily 4 on Providence), holds that those who call the immortality of the soul into doubt are doubting whether it is day at noon. For, he says, if they deny that souls are immortal, they deny the punishments of the wicked after this life, they deny the rewards of the just. They deny, then, providence in God, and thus divinity, which cannot be understood without providence. For if those who worship God rightly depart afflicted with injuries, while the impious on the contrary attain unjust felicity, then there is no justice in God, if He can bestow honors and rewards on His own. But if you take from God either power, or justice, or eyes for discerning, the word "God" will be empty. For by every reasoning it is concluded that, if He gives no reward to those who seek Him, God does not exist at all in any way, unless we hold God to be either blind, or weak, or unjust: blind, if He does not see His own; weak, if He cannot give rewards; unjust, if He is unwilling. Whoever, therefore, denies the one must necessarily deny the other too, and, if he does not have a rewarder of those who seek Him, he must not have a God either.

I scarcely understand, moreover, what Cajetan means when he says that no speculative science attains to this—whether God is a rewarder of those who seek Him—from which he concludes we must hold it by faith. What, then, if no speculative science attains it? Will it not be enough, if some productive-of-action science attains it? I, for my part, am persuaded that, just as speculative natural science declares that God, that is, the first efficient cause, exists, so too the same discipline, insofar as it is productive of action, shows that God is the ultimate end of all things. Nor this alone, but also this: that the laws of nature have some author and judge, unless perhaps this law alone is so forsaken as to have no legislator, or, if someone has prescribed these laws to the world, no care is taken for the keeping of this law. But if he is so ignorant as not to know that rewards and honors nourish virtue, and that virtue always languishes if deprived of rewards and honors, he is surely unworthy to be the author and judge to whom we refer the most sacred laws of nature.

Wherefore, if we make discourse of God and divine recompense insofar as the light of nature shows it, we recognize both in this light: both that God exists and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him. But because, in order that we may be able to please God, it is not enough to know Him as the principle and author of nature, but it is necessary to be borne toward God because He is a supernatural end and thus eminent and excellent above the powers of nature, the Apostle most rightly said, universally, that one approaching God—that is, the supernatural end—must believe that He exists, etc. For what natural reason teaches is not sufficient for this supernatural approach. For we have access to God through faith (Rom. 5). That Paul was speaking of the approach to a supernatural end, and thus also of a supernatural recompense, is clearly shown by these words (Heb. 11): "He looked for a city having foundations, whose builder and maker is God." And afterward: "But now they desire a better country, that is, a heavenly one; wherefore God is not ashamed to be called their God, for He has prepared for them a city." And again: "He had respect unto the recompense of reward ... for he endured, as seeing him who is invisible." And finally: "Not accepting deliverance, that they might obtain a better resurrection ... and all these, having obtained a good report through faith, received not the promise, God having provided some better thing for us, that they without us should not be made perfect." But the accusation, which was leveled against St. Thomas in second place, has, I think, been sufficiently dissolved.

As for the third fault, there is no need to clear him of it, since we have already explained plainly that theological faith, of which we now treat, does not assent to whatever things are said by God, but only to those which pertain to the common religion of the faithful and are proclaimed by the common ministers of the Church. And so we have resolved the first knot; the second will be untied in this way.

The things that pertain to faith are of a twofold difference: some are simply and universally of faith, as those which surpass natural reason; others are said to be of faith not per se, but as, in a manner, revealed by God accidentally, on account of those who do not have demonstration and evidence of them, as that God exists and is one, the same eternal, wise, just. Though we see all these things by the light of nature, God has nevertheless most providently revealed them to the unlearned people, as St. Thomas himself (II-II, q. 1, art. 5 and q. 2, art. 4) has explained.

Of God, again, we can speak in two ways, a distinction we used in resolving the first argument: either because He is the principle and end of nature, or because He is the principle and end above nature. In the former way, that God exists, is one, immortal, wise, and other things of this kind, the natural light shows; in the latter way, faith alone holds these same things. Whence St. Thomas too (II-II, q. 1, art. 8), when in the first

argument he had objected that "God is one" need not be reckoned among the articles of faith because it can be known by demonstration, replies that we hold many things about God by faith which the philosophers could not investigate by natural reason, for instance concerning His providence and omnipotence and that He alone is to be worshipped. All of which are contained under the article of the unity of God. Thus far he. But he speaks of the providence and omnipotence of supernatural things too. And (q. 2, art. 2, ad 3): "To believe that God exists," he says, "does not belong to unbelievers under that aspect under which the act of faith is posited," etc.—which perhaps will not escape calumny unless we recall it to the standard of this distinction.

Having set forth these things, St. Thomas openly teaches that the things which are properly and per se of faith can by no means be disclosed by natural argumentation. Indeed (I, q. 32, art. 1) he charges as enemies of faith, and even harmful to our religion, those who try to show by reasons of nature the things that are of faith. For whatever arguments the holy doctors bring forward to prove the decrees of faith are, he says, congruent, not evident; probable, not necessary; persuasive, not compelling; leading, not conclusive.

For natural light discloses and illuminates that which is congruent and consonant with nature. Since, then, faith, as we have often said, is properly concerned with those things which exceed the nature and talent of men, it follows that such things can neither be shown by any light of nature nor established by any reasoning of nature. But if faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, as the Apostle says to the Hebrews; and hope, moreover, that is seen is not hope, as the same author teaches to the Romans; it necessarily follows that the things which faith believes—since hope too hopes for the same things—these neither eye has seen, nor ear has heard, nor have they entered into the heart of man, and thus are not even demonstrated by human reasonings. Unless perhaps either human reasons support and sustain divine things, or else Paul deceives and is deceived, who asserts that faith is the evidence of things not appearing, and that our wisdom, hidden in mystery, no prince of this age has known.

The principles of our discipline, then, philosophers can show probably, they cannot demonstrate necessarily. Wherefore no one ought to fear that he will lose the merit of faith if he also applies reasons to explaining and adorning the truth of faith. For he will not, however much he strives, apply reasons of the sort that furnish the experience of the senses, but such nevertheless by which both those who do not believe may be more sweetly led to faith, and those who believe may be more gladly kept in faith. Faith, indeed, does not fight with nature but agrees with it, nor do human and divine reason dissent, but cohere. Both are true, and truth is not opposed to truth; both are from God,

nor is God contrary to Himself. Men, then, overturn the foundations of nature when they separate it from faith.

Indeed, natural reason is to be directed by faith, and indeed in such a way that these two words do not seem to differ in reality from each other. And since human things are similar and akin to divine things, he who renders to God the office of man, and makes nature serve grace, properly fulfills the office of theologian.

This matter St. Thomas often proves, and we too, both elsewhere in many books, 8, 9, 10, and 11, and copiously in the fourteenth book, shall discuss. Now, however, those arguments must be refuted by which it seemed to be shown that theology proves the decrees of faith. To the first argumentation, indeed, sufficient answer has been given.

But the second is refuted thus. It is not an article of faith that the world existed from God; but that God created heaven and earth in the beginning of time—that indeed is an article of faith, which can be demonstrated by no reason, as St. Thomas (I, q. 46, art. 2) discusses. For what is objected in third place from the testimony of Peter accomplishes nothing else than to show that the Christian religion and discipline is not in every respect similar to the Pythagorean, whose disciples, with no rational preparation given beforehand and no cause rendered at all, held to the authority of their teacher tightly and doggedly. This is the custom of the unlearned, and of Saracens, pagans, heretics: to embrace blindly and rashly the dogmas of their sect without judgment, and to receive without any examination the things that need examination most. Such men are not, believe me, educated, but constrained; they are not taught by way and reason but are driven, as if by potions and incantations, into madness.

Indeed, though all the things we are taught in the Gospel move minds most keenly to embrace supernatural things, Christ Himself nevertheless clothed them with the gentler reasoning of nature, lest He seem to hold His disciples devoid of reason. For the wisdom of God, although it reaches from end to end mightily, disposes all things sweetly, and instructs and educates men in a human manner, that is, rational beings by rational means. Nor indeed does God wish His disciples to be so composed for the teaching of others otherwise than He Himself taught them. (Isa. 50) "He gave them a learned tongue, that they should know how to sustain by a word him that is weary; He also opened their ear that they might hear as a master teaches." Just as, then, we hear Christ's disciples as one hearing a master who teaches, not as one enchanted by a sorcerer, so too we have a tongue not one that is carried this way and that by the fluency of words, but a learned and educated tongue, which knows how to render the causes and reason of its own doctrine.

Eusebius (Bk. 9, ch. 6) writes that Lucian of Antioch, asked by the governor why, since he was a rational and prudent man, he followed a sect of which he could give no reason, answered in these words: "We Christians are not, as you suppose, bound by the error of some human persuasion, nor are we, like others, deceived by an undiscussed tradition of our parents. Our authority concerning God is God Himself. For that sublime majesty could not glide into the senses of the human mind, unless either brought by the power of His own Spirit or made known by the interpretations of His Word and Wisdom. I confess, we too once erred, and thought the images which we ourselves had fashioned were the gods, authors of heaven and earth. But the fragility of their own substance, granted them by our consecration, convicted them, in which there was as much veneration as beauty the mind of the craftsmen had bestowed.

"But truly the omnipotent God, whom it was fitting we should be the figment of, not He of ours, having pity on human errors, sent His wisdom into this world clothed in flesh, to teach us that the God who made heaven and earth was to be sought not in things made by hand but in the invisible. He established for us laws of life and precepts of discipline: to keep frugality, to rejoice in poverty, to cultivate gentleness, to be studious, to suffer, to embrace purity of heart, to guard patience. And He also foretold to us all these things which you now do against us. Whence He who was immortal offered Himself to death, that He might give us an example of patience. But neither did He deceive us by His death, for after the third day He rose again, that He might conquer death by rising.

"But the things I say were not done in an obscure place, nor do they need witnesses: already almost the greater part of the world attests to this truth. Or, if anything here seems suspect, even the unlettered rustic hand, ignorant of fiction, testifies to it. If it is still doubted, I shall bring you also the testimony of the very place in which the deed was done. This same place in Jerusalem attests to it, and the rock of Golgotha, split under the weight of the gibbet, and also that cave which, its infernal gates torn away, gave back the body reanimated. But if earthly things seem to you less worthy, receive also from heaven a faithful witness. I bring you the sun itself as witness of these things, which, seeing these deeds done by the impious on earth, hid its light at noonday in the sky. Search your annals: you will find that in the time of Pilate, while Christ suffered, the day was interrupted by darkness, the sun having fled. But if you give no credence to earth, to heaven, to the blood of the martyrs, how will you believe my words and allegations?"

And when he had almost persuaded his hearers by these words, he was ordered seized and put into prison, and there killed without a tumult of the people.

Such reasons, then, Peter bids be rendered by the teachers of the faithful—reasons which, when they precede faith, do not compel but induce unbelievers; when they follow it, do not force but add strength to believers. In this sense Augustine says that the knowledge of natural things begets, nourishes, and strengthens faith. For he also holds—since, once natural things are clearly perceived and known, it is at once understood—first, that faith in no way fights with nature but marvelously agrees with it; and second, that all arguments which attack the truth of faith are captious and vain.

But in resolving the second knot we have interposed a great deal of delay. It is well, however, that the third and last needs no dissolution. For what should we add worth reading, after St. Thomas's opinion has been so clearly, carefully, and thoroughly explained above? So much, then, for the principles of Theology.

Chapter IV

What are the Questions or Conclusions of Theology

The causes of Theology having been set forth, it follows that we set forth the effects, which, when called into doubt, are questions; when compelled by reasoning, are conclusions. Let us first explain, then, what a theological question is and what its parts are, since around it turns all the labor of the theologian. How it is to be treated we shall then set forth.

Lest the ambiguity of this name deceive anyone, it must be understood that a theological question is sometimes called any pronouncement whatsoever that has been doubted by a theologian, however casually or even rashly. But if we so broadly extend the matter and questioning of Theology, a theological question will be judged not by the nature of this faculty but by the whim of men, even foolish ones. Thus it would happen that we should place among theological questions such as: "If the form of water were separated from its matter by divine power, would baptism be effected in the matter or in the form separately?" "Can a donkey drink baptism?" and other similar ones, which for brevity's sake I omit, lest I cause disgust in the reader's stomach. It is certainly not my wish to include foolish and undisciplined questions, which the Apostle bids us avoid (2 Tim. 2), within the bounds of Theology.

Now, I call the ends and extremes of disciplines "conclusions." The matter is the same, as I lightly touched at the beginning of this chapter, whether question or conclusion. But when raised by way of interrogation it is put into controversy, it is a question; when gathered by argumentation, it is a conclusion. So that, if the theologian by his own arguments establishes and completes the very same matter that had been brought into

question, those foolish so-called theological questions ought not and indeed cannot be called theological, since they cannot be settled and resolved from the principles of Theology, and thus are not even conclusions of its doctrine, but rather the fanciful chimeras of unlearned men.

What, then, do we understand a theological question to be? I think it is that which is truly relevant, that is, which pertains to Theology. Not vain, foolish, harmful things pertain to it, but solid, apt, and fitting ones. "I," He says, "am the Lord your God, teaching you profitable things" (Isa. 48). Theology, therefore, which is the doctrine of God, gathers nothing useless in any way. Rather, upon the foundation of faith, which has been laid by the Apostles, it builds gold, silver, precious stones; for those who build wood, hay, stubble (1 Cor. 3), do so not from theology but from error.

Let it remain, then, that that is properly a theological conclusion which arises from the principles of Theology, as effects from their causes. Whence this corollary follows: that no question of Theology is to be considered such which cannot be referred to such beginnings and defined from them by apt and congruent argumentation. Although there are questions that are, as it were, appendices, which, because they are aptly and gravely joined for the sake of explaining those that are truly and properly theological, you might, by a certain right of similarity, propinquity, or even order, not absurdly call theological too. But here and now we speak of a theological question according to the nature and order of the discipline.

For it happens sometimes, not only in Theology but also in almost all the other human disciplines, that things which by their own nature are principles, and therefore ought to be supposed by the pupil if the matter proceeded by way and order, are, as men's talents are, both called into doubt and proved by argumentation. Thus the order of things becomes disturbed and preposterous, so that the later causes become prior, and the prior effects are taken as later.

This is why St. Thomas and the other theologians place among Theological questions even this one: "Does God exist?" and other altogether similar ones, in which there is no doubt—first and certain principles being turned into doubt, and, as if they were connections of this discipline, woven together as if from other principles. And this was also the reason for Aristotle to introduce into all the sciences four kinds of questions, namely: whether a thing is, what it is, of what quality it is, on account of what cause it is. The latter two questions can rightly and in accordance with the order of nature be terminated; the former two cannot, unless perhaps when there are two definitions of the same thing, of which one explains the defined thing's nature through the material cause,

the other through the final cause. Then indeed the later definition is demonstrated through the prior one by reason, in a manner preserving the order of nature. But the definition of the thing, which answers the second question, becomes known nearly from its effects, which, although posterior in nature, are nonetheless prior to us, that is, in our knowledge.

This also occurs, both in other matters and more so in the doctrine of Theology, that the principles themselves are either disposed and ordered among themselves, just as the causes themselves, distributed into four kinds, have an order of prior and posterior, or at least are connected and linked so that from both being granted it is possible to arrive at either doubtful matter. Wherefore, if an adversary admits certain principles, though he denies the rest, we shall be able, from what he has granted, to gather what is not granted, especially if they are joined and coupled by mutual connection. Hence the ancient theologians prove the Old Testament from the New, and conversely the New from the Old; they assert the authority of the Church from the sacred books, and again the authority of the sacred books from the Church. Thus there is not even one principle in theology which theologians have not turned into a question, so that, if it should be denied by someone who will perhaps grant other principles, we are prepared, from what he has granted, to overcome the man and, as it were, run him through with a drawn sword. This matter has been explained diligently in the second book and will be explained more diligently in the last.

Nor do theologians make a question of their own principles only for these reasons, but also the more to explain and set them forth. For, as we learned as boys from the rhetoricians, a question is proposed to every one who discourses—not only to him who tosses about doubtful matters in disputation, but to historians and poets too, who resolve the questions proposed to them not so much by argumentation as by exposition. Exposition, moreover, often produces belief in the hearer; argumentation produces it too.

Here I have often laughed at certain members of our own family who labor mightily at this: to defend the reasons which St. Thomas repeatedly adduces as congruent for explaining the faith, as if they were certain and evident demonstrations. For I am also accustomed to laugh at the adversaries themselves, who attack St. Thomas as an enemy in that very matter in which he showed himself an outstanding minister of the faith. Nor do these men, more prompt for contention than for teaching, understand that questions of faith are proposed most gravely and most holily, not because we strive to make faith for a doubting hearer, but because we try to expound to a believer those things which he less perceives and understands.

What, then, a theological question is if we define it by the order and nature of the discipline, and what it is again if it is judged by our own ingenuity; which questions in theology are primary, which appendices; which are chiefly resolved by argumentation, which chiefly by exposition—enough has been said. Now the question must be divided so that things which seem in reality scattered and infinite may be set under one aspect by reason and distribution.

Of theological questions, then, whatever their subject matter, there are two kinds: one of knowledge, the other of action. Of knowledge are those whose end is science; as if it be asked: Are the Father and the Son one principle of the Holy Spirit, or two? Are the Divine Persons distinguished by relative properties or by absolute ones? Of action, examples of this sort are: Is penance necessary for salvation as a means, or also as a precept? Do the sacraments of the new law confer grace and virtues?

Questions of knowledge, speaking generally, are fourfold: when it is asked either whether God, or an angel, or the rational soul exists, or what it is, or of what quality it is, or why it is such. Of these, the first and second, as we have said, are explained from the condition of our own intellect; the second and third, from the nature of things and of the discipline itself.

Of action, moreover, there are two kinds: one necessary for salvation, the other of matters that seem useful. Of the former kind are these questions: If, for example, the honor of Christ were in peril, or also the spiritual salvation of one's neighbor, ought a Christian man undergo death for these things or not? Is receiving baptism a precept of the Gospel? Of the latter kind, as when it is asked: Does the holy water, which the scholastics call blessed, wash away venial sins and take away entirely the penalties of sins by its own power, and, as they say, from the work worked (ex opere operato), or rather from the merit of the one working (ex opere operantis)? Does the Sacrament of the Eucharist make the attrite contrite? Likewise: does baptism and penance, when the pretense is removed, obtain its effect? The Summa of St. Thomas is full of such questions. For the theologian does not always discourse of necessary things, but sometimes also of those things without which salvation and religion nonetheless stand.

And since we are pursuing everything, it must also be said that a theological question, whether it pertains to contemplation or to morals, is either natural or supernatural. I think one may call supernatural a question that is defined only from supernatural principles; and I call natural a question the reason for which can be rendered from the constancy of nature. And there is a middle question, which depends partly on a supernatural principle, partly on a natural one.

An example of the first kind is: Have we all died? Which question Paul settles with this argument: "If Christ died for all, then all have died; but Christ died for all." Likewise: "Shall we all rise again?" Which the Apostle concludes thus: "Christ has risen, therefore we too shall rise." Of the second kind are these examples: Is God everywhere? Is He immutable? Is the human soul immortal? Can it be divided and cut into parts? The proofs of all of these, although they may be sought from the sacred letters, insofar as they do indeed pertain to faith, are nevertheless clear and evident in the light of nature, and for that reason are not per se questions of faith but, as we have said, only accidentally so. Of the third kind, as: Is Christ capable of laughter? Does He have two wills and two intellects, and likewise two operations of each power? These become clear from both principles. The first from these: Christ is man, and every man is capable of laughter. The rest from these: Christ has two perfect natures, divine and human; but every perfect nature claims for itself its own operation and power.

There is, finally, another division of theological questions, to whatever kind they pertain. For there are certain questions of faith, that is, which, since they concern faith, the theologian must come even to the peril of his head for their truth. Others, however, are those which can, on either side, be ignored and denied without loss of faith. This division Augustine mentions, both elsewhere often and especially in Book 2 Against Julian on Original Sin, against Pelagius and Caelestius, ch. 23. And this division must not merely be committed to memory but always kept before the eyes, if we wish to be complete theologians.

Examples of both kinds are these, of the former sort: Did Christ's soul, as soon as it was joined to the Word, see God clearly? Likewise: Is there, in the places below, a purgatorial fire, where the souls of the faithful pay the penalties of sins? Of the latter, Augustine indeed says there are various and innumerable ones, and difficult to comprehend and define under any single kind; but the ones he gives are these: when it is asked of what sort or where paradise is, where God set the man He had formed from dust—although Christian faith does not doubt that this paradise exists. Or when it is asked where Elijah or Enoch now is, whether there or elsewhere, though we do not doubt that they live in the bodies in which they were born. Or whether the Apostle was caught up into the third heaven in the body or outside the body—though this is an impudent inquiry into what he who was granted this himself testifies, with faith preserved, that he does not know; or how many heavens there are, of which he mentions himself caught up into the third; or whether the elements of this visible world are four or more; what causes the sun or moon to suffer those eclipses which astrologers are accustomed to predict by a certain reckoning of times; why the ancients lived so long as holy Scripture testifies, and

whether, in proportion to their longer age, they began to beget sons at a later puberty; where Methuselah, who was not in the ark, could have lived, who, as the years are numbered in most Greek and Latin manuscripts, is found to have survived the flood; or whether we should rather believe the very rare manuscripts in which the number of years is written so as to show that he died before the flood.

Thus far I have set out Augustine's examples. In this kind St. Thomas (Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. 2, ch. 70) reckons the question whether heaven is animate, which Jerome, in his letter to Avitus, enumerates among the other errors of Origen, but St. Thomas seems to agree with Augustine in the Enchiridion, ch. 57. But lest I detain the reader further, I shall very briefly set forth what I think about this whole kind of question and what precepts I think should be given.

No firm and stable precepts of a theological question can be handed down except by those who have exercised themselves much and long in the school. And so the precept is properly one for the scholastics, since among those who think the school is to be neglected there is no fit, exquisite, excellent disputation about a theological question; so far are they from being teachers of matters they have no experience of. This matter reminds me that I would here also lament the intermission (not to say the death) of scholastic theology, were I not afraid that, while complaining of other academies, I should immoderately extol my own Spain, in which at this time the theology of the schools is greatly flourishing. But even among us we see how, once the theologians are extinguished, hope is found in how few, ability in still fewer, and boldness in how many. But I shall speak most gladly not of myself, but of my teacher, who so signally illustrated the Spanish academies by his own genius and doctrine, and made them so notable and lovable to our own people, that men not only flocked to them but broke in upon them in rivalry. Had he written for the French, the Germans, and the Italians, given the man's perspicuity, elegance, and sweetness in disputing, the studies of the schools would not now lie so prostrate among those nations. For I believe it happens to some, through this very cause, that they are averse to the school, because they have fallen upon certain uncultivated and rough matters, badly investigated concerning bad questions, worst of all discovered and concluded.

But, these things set aside, let us pursue what we have undertaken. Nor is it, however, necessary that we separately equip easy matters with theological precepts: for they lie before the eyes. Nor again is it worthwhile to lay down laws about those things which greatly disagree with reason; for these are easily apparent and do not much need admonition and precepts. But concerning those which seem difficult and cannot be understood by many, more diligent precept is needed.

I think, then, the first duty of a theologian who is disputing is that he often examine the question he is about to treat, and repeatedly ask himself of what kind it is. For questions which come into theology by the order of nature and of the discipline must be resolved differently from those which either the weakness or indeed the malice of human ingenuity moves. Nor is the same method of discourse to be used concerning those things which we inquire into in order to expound them, as concerning others which are inquired into in order to demonstrate them. And a very different disputation is to be instituted concerning a natural and a supernatural question, and different theological loci are to be accommodated to the one and to the other. For questions of knowledge and of action, as we have said elsewhere, are to be treated and resolved in nearly the same way and from the same loci.

But when each kind of question must be diligently investigated, this above all: whether it is outside faith, or rather pertains to faith and religion. With those, moreover, who err in a question of faith, one must fight, as they say, tooth and nail; but with others who dispute concerning matters in which, with faith preserved, men can be deceived, err, and slip, the theologian can and sometimes even ought to fight, as I have noted elsewhere, but a bloody fight is altogether forbidden to them. For how ridiculous it is to strain all the sinews of body and mind in resolving a question whose ignorance carries no danger, whose error carries no crime! But concerning this whole latter kind of questions, how much moderation the theologian ought to employ, I have not carelessly explained in the eighth and ninth books. Here I say as much as suffices for the purpose and brevity of the formula; the rest may be sought there. For I do not wish to resume the same matters at this time and place. It is proper to this place and time to admonish the theologian to avoid not only foolish questions and genealogies and contentions and strivings about the law, which are sometimes even harmful, but also any and all useless and vain ones, which cannot be summoned by the theologian into the service of either knowledge or action.

Among these Jerome reckons these questions (Commentary on the Epistle to Titus, ch. 3): "How many years did Methuselah live?" "At what age of his life did Solomon undertake marriage?"—lest perhaps Rehoboam be believed to have been born in the eleventh year of his father's age. In his letter to Vitalis too, having answered the latter of these two ways, at the end he says that the Apostle forbids questions of this kind; and after a little: "Read again," he says, "all the books both of the Old and New Testament, and you will find such a discrepancy of years and numbers between Judah and Israel, that is, between the two kingdoms, so confused, that to cling to such questions seems the mark not so much of a studious man as of an idle one." But it is well that he did not say "to touch upon," but "to cling to." For if it is idle and useless to explain such questions

briefly, then not I alone, who have explained many of this sort in the preceding book, but Augustine and Jerome himself too will be found guilty. One should not, then, linger over such questions, which are by no means necessary, although they may seem in some way to pertain to the truth of sacred history; but, both in every disputation and especially in one that has nothing to do with faith and salvation, a certain facility must be exercised, lest, if we linger long and much over the discussion of such matters, we fall into a useless and hateful moroseness.

But St. Augustine judged it superfluous to ask where and how the Lord's body is in Heaven (On Faith and the Creed, ch. 6). But he was instructing novices in the faith and the creed, though before the fathers of a synod. Otherwise, Cajetan, whom I dare to call not only the most outstanding in genius and learning of our own family, but also the most modest in raising questions of this kind, did not hesitate, when interpreting the sacred letters, to ask this very question and even to explain it briefly. But the same Augustine by no means tolerates those questions which he says arise from sickness of mind (Confessions, Bk. 11, ch. 30): "What was God doing before He made heaven and earth? Did it come into His mind to make something, since He had never made anything before?" But, doing penance and confessing his sins, he scarcely bears with necessary questions, much less useless, curious, unimportunate ones. The same rule of disputing, then, is not to be prescribed to the theologian when he is contending in the schoolroom and when he is mourning in his chamber or even in the temple.

But this rule will be most consonant with reason and with the authority of the saints: that every theologian about to dispute concerning a supernatural matter (for this is his proper disputation) should reflect within himself on the name "Theology," should frequently read his own title—that is, "theologian"—should ask himself not once but often where he has begun to dispute, and should know that no question is to be adopted by him except one that can be referred to the true philosophy, above nature, of Christ, the Apostles, and the Prophets. Certain men, forgetful of this precept, have been most unimportunate and long-winded in explaining innumerable questions, especially dialectical, physical, and metaphysical ones. But no one is long-winded who lingers on his matter, if he brings in and draws to himself something that is congruent and consonant with his own purpose. Nor, however, do I think such questions, though not so necessary, ought to be exterminated. For it is a certain exercise of minds and talents, full not only of acuteness but also very useful to the theology of the school.

For as to what Augustine says (On Genesis according to the Letter, Bk. 2, ch. 9 and 10)—that it does not matter to him whether heaven encloses the earth on every side like a sphere, poised in the middle mass of the world, or covers it from above on one side like a

disc, likewise "whether heaven stands still or rather moves"—this he says either to the reproach and hatred of the Manichaeans, who boasted of having learned many such questions from their teacher, or he indeed reproves those who, in raising and resolving such questions, occupy much time that should be devoted to profitable matters (for we gladly use his words). Moreover, as if in passing, he himself resolves this kind of question, though, as he says, for their undertaking and treatment there was time enough neither for a bishop nor for those whom he desired to be informed for their own salvation and the necessary benefit of the holy Church. Nor is this dissimilar to what the same Augustine (Letter 56 [= 118]) reproves in the most curious questions of Dioscorus, and he writes nevertheless that he does not say this because such things are learned, but because they are learned for a vain purpose. Thus he answered some of them briefly, others at length. I, indeed, if I were questioned by a friend about such matters, would either pass over them dissemblingly or openly refuse to answer. Nor would I consider them questions worthy of even the smallest portion of my time. But Augustine was either more generous with friends or more indulgent with Dioscorus.

To what purpose have I said these things? That those who stir up perpetual hatred against the school may understand that the controversies which have arisen concerning Aristotle are not unworthy of a theologian's inquiry, if Augustine did not disdain to explain matters that were doubtful even in Cicero. What of the fact that this same man (On Order, Bk. 2, ch. 16) asserts that one who does not know what nothing is, what formless matter is, what formed but lifeless is, what body is, what species in a body is, what place is, what time is, what is in place, what is in time, what motion according to place is, what motion not according to place is, what stable motion is, what eternity (aevum) is, and what it is neither to be in place nor to be nowhere, and what it is to be beyond time and to be always, what it is both to be nowhere and to be nowhere not, and never to be and never not to be—that such a person, not knowing these things, can rightly neither inquire nor dispute concerning either God or his own soul? These questions, then, physical and metaphysical, are not to be expelled from our school, not even those which have seemed curious and even sophistic to Erasmus and others like him. But of this, more elsewhere.

Now I return to the question of faith. Unless this is first firmly established for the theologian, he can teach nothing by reason or by method. In this matter, then, we must labor mightily, if we seek what degree of truth and falsity there is in theology. This, indeed, as it is most proper to Theology, is also the most difficult of all things. Wherefore no one is able to accomplish this except a perfect and consummate theologian. Someone will say: What? Are there not some marks by which questions of faith can be separated

from those that are not of faith, and be distinguished? Certainly there are. But it is not given to everyone to go to Corinth, nor are these matters common and well-worn precepts for all. And it does indeed pertain to the establishment of every question of faith always to have ready at hand such marks and, as it were, indices of the questions of faith; but this is a very great matter indeed and requires no small doctrine and exercise. These, then, if we are able, we shall set forth, and not much later, but a few things must be said first.

The question of faith, moreover, is understood in two ways. One, which pertains immediately to faith, as truly pertain all the things God has given forth to His Church either by word or by writing. The other, which pertains to faith mediately, such as are all the conclusions which we can gather and define, by the order of the discipline, from those prior things; which, since they are revealed by God not in themselves but in others as principles, are said to be mediately of faith, and he who denies them is said to deny faith in this manner. And indeed I also observe this: that not without reason, perhaps, are those questions called questions of faith which pertain very much to the doctrine of the Church and are, on account of affinity, appendices of faith. Not that faith depends on them, or that, they being removed, faith is utterly destroyed, but that it is affected and made sick, if the truth of these matters, which cling and are joined to it, should totter. For sound doctrine and sound speech must indeed be in the Church, as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1 and 6; 2 Tim. 2 and 4; Titus 1 and 2). And just as certain diseases are lethal, while others do not indeed kill a man but nevertheless afflict his health, so certain errors do not extinguish faith but obscure it, do not overthrow it but weaken it, and bring sickness, not destruction. As, then, what is harmful to salvation is harmful also to life, so whatever is opposed to sound doctrine is in some manner opposed also to faith. From which it is understood that those questions which regard the health of ecclesiastical doctrine pertain, in their own way, to faith. But we say that controversies of this kind are not properly in the faith, but outside the faith. Nor do we consider those who err in these matters to err in the faith, but outside the faith. And thus, these matters having first been simply laid out, we shall pursue the rest more subtly hereafter.

Chapter V

By What Marks Questions of Faith Can be Judged

By what methods, moreover, we may attain this power of judging, lest we err in establishing the causes of faith, must now be set forth carefully and diligently. And Cardinal Torquemada indeed (Summa de Ecclesia, Bk. 4, part 2, ch. 9) sets forth in order seven degrees of catholic propositions, which, when called into controversy and disputation, are called questions of faith.

The first of these is of those propositions which are expressly contained in the sacred books. The second, of those which follow from these by a certain and necessary consequence. The third, of those which Christ handed down to the Apostles, and the Apostles to the Church, by word alone. The fourth, of those which have been defined in universal Councils. The fifth, of those which have been proposed to the faithful for belief by the Apostolic See. The sixth, of those things concerning the faith and the refutation of heresies which the Holy Doctors have taught with one mind and one voice. The seventh is of those which are derived by firm and necessary consequence from the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth kinds. From which, in the following chapter, he also distinguishes seven kinds of heretical propositions, which are opposed to those seven kinds of propositions of faith.

But these things have been handed down after the manner of jurists, and are perhaps cut too minutely into the tiniest particles. For us, however, who profess a summary way and method of teaching, all things must be reduced to a shorter number and to a certain complete formula of the discipline. Since, then, the truth of faith, as we said a little before, is twofold, and this pertains to faith mediately, that immediately, it is necessary to lay down, from the very beginning, two general degrees of propositions of faith. The prior of these will be those which are the legitimate principles of theology, of whatever kind they are, whether primary or secondary, that is, all those things which God has revealed in themselves to the Church. The latter degree of these will be those which are necessarily gathered from those prior ones. For this kind of conclusion, since it is bound up with matters of faith, pertains also to faith. For the reason of connection, when you have granted the superior, compels you to grant the inferior, and, when you deny the inferior, compels you likewise to deny the superior.

Again, in that superior degree we understand two: one of those propositions of faith which the sacred authors left written in the canonical books; the other of those which the Church received, handed down by word, from Christ and the Apostles, to be believed. In the latter degree likewise two kinds are understood: one of conclusions of this sort which

arise from the principles of faith alone; the other of those which faith alone does not produce without the aid of external disciplines, but which are formed by adopting either one principle or several known by the reason of nature.

And indeed these, although not all in the same place and degree, can nevertheless simply and without qualification all be called questions of faith, namely when the truth of faith depends on both, when it is joined and coupled with both. For those questions which are, as it were, appendices of faith, as I said just now—and what do I say "just now"? indeed, rather, a little before—are of faith in a certain manner, not simply. For they do not so adhere to faith that they cannot be separated from it. Faith is sick, so to speak, in their error, but does not perish.

But since the native and genuine senses of sacred Scripture are sometimes obscure and involved, nor is it always explored and known what those things are which the Apostles committed to memory without writing, it is also often impeded, and, as it were, wrapped in darkness, whether a controverted conclusion is necessarily drawn from matters of faith—this we now wish to unfold and explain, by what marks and signs the truth of faith can be known and distinguished, both that which is written in the sacred books, and that which was handed down by the Apostles by word, and finally that which is drawn from either one or both of these.

We undertake this task the more zealously because we understand that it will be most useful not only to the theologians of the school, but also most necessary to those upon whom the Apostolic See has imposed the knowledge and censure of the faith. For a certain and constant art of discoursing in Theology has in itself no small fruit, and without this art the errors of those who fall away from the faith of Christ and the ancient institution of the Church cannot be evenly noted. For, as is truly said by the philosophers, there is the same discipline of contraries. Wherefore if we establish the truths of catholic faith, we likewise designate the opposing errors. Come, then, let us gather our step, as they say, and approach the matter more closely.

Concerning clear matters, as I have said, nothing need be prescribed. And so if a passage of divine Scripture, to begin from there, has a plain and open sense, either from the context, or from another passage of the same Scripture, or from the clear light of the words themselves, there is no precept of ours needed. For the open sense of Scripture itself bears a certain mark of catholic truth. Whence it happens that a theologian even moderately imbued with the sense of divine Scripture can most easily brand most of the heresies of the Lutherans. For it is no trouble at all to brand as errors those which manifestly conflict with Scripture. As these: That the universal Church can err in faith.

Likewise: That all human actions are criminal. Likewise: That sorrow for sins is not necessary but useless. And many others, which it would take long to enumerate.

But indeed we wish these things to be understood of sacred Scripture which the Church has constantly defined to be canonical. For, as we taught in the second book, the Church did not place the little book of Baruch so firmly and explicitly among the sacred books that it is a settled matter of catholic faith's truth either that it is sacred or that it is not sacred. This little book, then, or any other that could be called into question without the crime of heresy, however clear and open the senses it conveys, will not immediately establish certain and constant truths of the catholic faith.

But let us pass to other matters, and in the judgment of more difficult things let us gather the chief points from the previous books. For from that time this matter has been worked out, from which we established the firmness of the theological loci.

Let this, then, be the first precept: When the sense of Divine Scripture has been obscure, then the understanding of the Church is the same genuine understanding of Scripture from which it will be obtained—let the heretic gnash his teeth as he will—and it is a certain mark of catholic truth and, for proving the conclusions of theology, a certain selection of the argument we seek.

For if the Church has the most certain right of discerning the words of God from the words of men, as was established for us in the second book, she will likewise have the same right to discern, in the words themselves, the sense of God from the sense of men. Unless we believe that Scripture is granted to the Church just as it was to Ptolemy and the Egyptians, or as it is now granted to the Jews, whom Augustine not inelegantly called the "book-satchel-bearers" (scriniarii) of the Church of Christ (Against Faustus). We know, moreover, that both deposits have been committed to the Church, so that she may preserve both with perpetual fidelity and render back together what she received: both the Scripture and the understanding of the Scripture. "My Spirit that is in you," He says, "and My words which I have put in your mouth, shall not depart out of your mouth, nor out of the mouth of your seed, from henceforth and forever" (Isa. 59). Both things of Christ, then, the Church guards and will always guard: the word, and the spirit of the word. Likewise: Christ promised the Spirit of truth to the Church, who, remaining with her forever, would suggest to her all the things that had been told her by Christ (John 14, 15, and 16). Likewise: Since the true Gospel of God, as Jerome most elegantly said (Commentary on Galatians, ch. 1), does not lie "in the Scriptures but in the sense, not in the surface but in the marrow, not in the leaves of the words but in the root of reason," if the Church had the Scripture but not the legitimate sense of the Scripture,

she would surely not have the true Gospel of God, and thus not even the faith of Christ, which does not exist without the true Gospel of God. For faith is referred not to the words but to the meanings. Otherwise both heretics speak Scriptures without meaning, and the devil too cites Scriptures; but in a false understanding they have a false Gospel—certainly not divine but human, indeed, what is worse, diabolical.

Since, moreover, between Catholics and heretics there is very great controversy not about the Scripture but about its sense, if the Church's interpretation is not the certain norm of understanding, who indeed will be the judge of such controversy? For each will defend his own sense with all his might. But if in exploring the sense of Scripture there is no certain judge of the Church, I dare say that no commonwealth was ever more foolishly constituted (see Bk. 3, ch. 2 and ch. 3, foundation 4). For there would be no end of discords, no agreement of the faithful, no unity of faith. Which being removed, not only charity and peace but faith itself is utterly destroyed, and the very name of the Church altogether.

Moreover, that Christ opened the sense to the Apostles that they might understand the Scriptures (Luke 24), He did not do this for their sake alone, but much more for the sake of the Church. From which we understand that Christ perpetually opened the sealed book to His Church. The Apostles, moreover, handed down the understanding of Scripture to the churches. For if they had handed down only the words and not the sense, they would surely not have preached the Gospel to every creature, nor taught all nations to keep whatsoever had been commended to them by Christ. For what kind of preaching or teaching of the Gospel would there be without understanding? Surely such as that of children or of parrots, who give and receive sound without meaning. But of the apostolic tradition no witness is clearer than the Church. For who will testify more clearly and evidently to what she has received than she herself who received it? The sense of Scripture, then, handed down by the Apostles to the Church, resides with the Church.

Moreover, the Church is the pillar and ground of truth; but truth truly and properly resides in the understanding of Scripture, while in the Scripture itself it resides improperly, as in a sign. Just as urine is figuratively called healthy, though it is properly the animal that is healthy. If, then, the Church is the ground of truth, she certainly has a firm and certain knowledge of those truths which are contained in the sacred letters. But what need is there of more? For the fourth previous book has already established the whole true and faithful opinion concerning the authority of the Church. It has been shown, moreover, by many both testimonies and reasons, that the Church cannot err in faith. But nothing pertains more to faith than the true knowledge and sense of the divine sayings. In the Church, then, resides the explored sense of Scripture, from which

knowledge, indeed, we can have both the mark of catholic faith, and by that same mark designate the contrary errors. Indeed, the clearest example of this first precept is in the earthly paradise, in the fashioning of Adam from the slime of the earth, in the formation of Eve from Adam's rib, and finally in the temptation of the serpent (see Bk. 6, ch. 3, concl. 5). All of which the Origenists perverted by allegorical and figurative interpretations. But since the Church has always taken these things not as figuratively said but properly as history, the sixth Synod, in its eleventh action, rightly rejected them.

Second precept: In the name "Church" is understood not only the assembly of all the faithful, but also the pastors and doctors of the Church, especially when gathered in council.

This has been shown to us in Bk. 4, ch. 4, concl. 4, and Bk. 5, ch. 4, concl. 3. There are many examples of this precept, but we shall give a few. From that command of the Lord, "Do this in memory of Me" (Luke 22), all the priests of the Church have always understood that this same thing was prescribed, that they should do this very thing that Jesus Christ was then doing, that is, that they should offer the sacrifice of the Eucharist. For after those words pronounced in the person of Christ, "Wherefore, mindful," they say, "we Thy servants ... offer to Thy majesty, of Thy own gifts and bounties, a holy victim," etc. The Wycliffites, therefore, who said it is not founded in the Gospel that Christ instituted the Mass, and likewise the Lutherans, indeed much more so, who deny that there is in the Church a sacrifice of the Eucharist, are rightly held by us to be heretics. But of this matter more later in this same book.

Again, the Council of the Lateran understood the Father and the Son to be truly and properly one and the same thing from that saying (likewise the Synod of Ephesus): "I and the Father are one." In this Abbot Joachim was condemned, who had referred this passage not to a unity of the same reality and nature but to a mere agreement of one will. For by a like error he interpreted that other passage: "The glory which Thou gavest Me I have given them, that they may be one, as We are one" (John 17). Moreover, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, the Council of Ephesus derived from that Scriptural passage: "He shall receive of Mine" (John 16); and also from this: "Whom I will send unto you from the Father, the Spirit of truth," etc. (John 15).

Finally, that the rational soul is indeed a subsisting form, but essentially and truly per se informs the human body, the Council of Vienne, as I indeed think, derived from that passage: "He breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul" (Gen. 2). For in the fact that God is said to have breathed the soul into man, the fathers interpreted that it came from outside, just as breath comes from outside. Thus the spirit

of man is not drawn out of matter, nor does it depend on it, but subsists entirely through itself. But in the fact that, through that same spirit, man became a living soul, they recognized that it indeed makes the body truly alive, and thus is the substantial form of the human body. Likewise they drew this from that passage: "For nowhere doth he take hold of the angels, but he taketh hold of the seed of Abraham" (Heb. 2). For if the soul of man were not the true form of the body and altogether part of human nature, but were present to the body as a sailor to a ship, according to the opinion of Plato and Origen, it would without doubt be, as far as its natural condition is concerned, a separate substance, which we call an angel. Wherefore God, in assuming a rational soul, would have assumed an angelic nature.

These things, then, and others of this kind, although contained more obscurely in Scripture, the Church nevertheless explains by her own right and expounds to the faithful for belief. And while she does this, her decree ought not only not to be false, but ought to be as stable, fixed, and ratified as if it were held more openly in the sacred books. The ecclesiastical pastors, then, whom we commonly understand in the voice of the Church, when they prescribe a certain and constant understanding of Scripture, both exhibit an absolute formula of catholic truth and provide certain marks by which the contrary heresies may be judged.

Third precept: If the Apostolic See has defined some sense of Scripture, that same sense is to be reckoned catholic truth.

This precept, indeed, unless opinion deceives us, we have most diligently demonstrated in the sixth previous book. For there, with many and necessary arguments, we established that the Apostolic See cannot err in the judgment of faith; but the interpretation of the Scriptures, when they come into dispute, is a judgment of faith; the Apostolic See, therefore, does not err in the understanding of the Scriptures, if she interprets them by prescript. For if she has set forth an interpretation not with a constant judgment and fixed decree, but from her own opinion, as it were in passing—which has often been said elsewhere—she establishes nothing at all that is certain and settled. Wherefore, if she should then err, by interpreting Scripture either not quite aptly, or even by twisting it to an alien sense, this precept is in no way affected. For it does not prejudge all those senses which the Popes have adduced from sacred Scripture to persuade of the matters they were dealing with, but it teaches that those things must be held firmly which are prescribed to the faithful by the Apostolic See. By what marks the firm judgments of the Apostolic See and of Councils may be recognized has been explained in the fifth book (ch. 5, q. 4).

And indeed that such judgments, which are concerned with interpreting Scripture, pertain peculiarly to the Apostolic See is today so clearly defined in the Clementine, unique chapter, "On the supreme Trinity and the catholic faith," that there is by no means room to hesitate whether the opinion of the Pope is the same as that of the Council of Vienne. What of the fact that Peter holds the keys, to open the sealed book? What of the fact that whatsoever he shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven? What of the fact that it was established from the beginning that the nations should both hear and believe the word of the Gospel from his mouth? What of the fact that against this rock not even the gates of hell can prevail? What of the fact that Christ prayed for him, that his faith should not fail, that he might confirm the wavering and tottering faith of his brethren? But why, foolish that I am, do I go against the old proverb and act already-done deeds, and prick the reader with subtle and minute little questions as with goads, and bring forth as newly and first arising things which have been established in the sixth book with roots so deeply fixed that they can never by any force be shaken?

An example of this precept you have in the extravagant Constitution of Benedict XI, which begins "Benedictus Deus in donis suis." In which the Pope pronounces that those will be heretics who deny that the souls of the just, as soon as they have departed from the body, see the divine essence clearly, provided that they have nothing that must first be purged by the pains of purgatory. This, without doubt, he took from that passage: "That which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation worketh for us an eternal weight of glory" (2 Cor. 4). Lest anyone, led by a false error, should suppose this operation of eternal glory to be referred either to the present time of mortal life or to the future universal judgment, Paul immediately subjoins (2 Cor. 5): "For we know that if our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." And again, lest anyone should interpret that eternal glory otherwise than as happening to man through the clear vision of the divine essence, he presently, expounding the same matter more openly, adds: "Knowing that while we are in the body we are absent from the Lord; for we walk by faith and not by sight; but we are confident, and have a good will to be absent rather from the body, and to be present with the Lord." Which passage St. Thomas, in the fourth book Against the Gentiles (ch. 91), presses more closely. Where, although he cites other testimonies of Scripture as well, yet to my sense—indeed to a sincere and subtle judgment—no other testimony is more outstanding than this one, by which both that truth of faith can be proved and the contrary heresy refuted. I seem to myself, then, to judge excellently well if I suppose that the Supreme Pontiff drew that dogma of faith from these very words of Paul. To twist those words, then, into another and alien false sense will be the mark of heretics.

Fourth precept: The consenting and agreeing understanding of Scripture held by all the Saints is the very truth of catholic faith itself.

This precept has been so fully and broadly explained, and confirmed by examples, reasons, and testimonies, in the seventh book, ch. 3, concl. 5, that I should be inept to add anything at present.

Fifth precept: If, from the tradition of the Apostles, the common usage of the Church has favored some one interpretation of Scripture, that is to be held as the truth of faith.

As the perpetual custom of the Church has expressed in those words, "Whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven," that the faculty of both dissolving vows and relaxing oaths has been given to Peter and Peter's successors. Whoever shall deny this faculty of the Church will truly and rightly be judged a heretic. And this precept too I need neither prove by arguments nor illustrate by examples, since I have disclosed it by both means in the third book.

Sixth precept: Whatever dogma of faith either the Church has held, or a Council strengthened by the authority of the Pontiff, or even the Supreme Pontiff himself has prescribed to the faithful, or certainly all the Saints have held with the greatest agreement and constancy—this is to be held by us for catholic truth in such a way that we should consider the contrary opinion heretical, although it is contained neither openly nor obscurely in Sacred Scripture.

I have indeed taught more fully in the third book that the dogmas of faith are not to be sought from Scripture alone, but from Apostolic Tradition. What the traditions of Christ and the Apostles are cannot be better investigated by any other way and method than under the leadership and mastery of the Church herself, as has been explained above more than once. That the authority of the Church, moreover, consists not only in the assembly of all the faithful, but also in the decrees of Councils, in the judgment of the Apostolic See, in the agreement of the Holy Doctors, has also been sufficiently, I think, diligently set forth in the previous books. That the doctrine of Christ and the Apostles descended into the Church partly by writing, partly by word, I have shown both elsewhere often and more fully in the third book. I have also shown very often that nothing pertains per se to the faith of the Church except what she has received from Christ and the Apostles revealing it.

Since, then, neither the Church, nor a Council, nor the Apostolic See, nor all the Saints together, can be deceived in the judgment of faith, as has been shown in their proper places, certainly whatever dogma of faith they have handed down to us, if it is not held in

the Sacred Letters, has come into the Church from Christ and the Apostles handing it down. It is, therefore, to be held in the same degree as if Scripture openly delivered it. I now omit many examples of the most well-known heresies, upon which the mark of this precept has been branded. For in the third book the examples are almost innumerable.

Seventh precept: If either the Church, or a Council, or the Apostolic See, or even the Saints, with one mind and the same voice, have both formed and prescribed to the faithful some Conclusion of Theology, this truth will be considered catholic in such a way as if it had been per se revealed by Christ, and he who opposes it will be equally a heretic as if he opposed the Sacred Letters and the Traditions of the Apostles.

I call a Conclusion of Theology here properly that which is drawn by certain and firm consequence from the principles of this faculty. Of this matter there are very many examples at hand. The sixth general Synod gathered that there are two wills in Christ and likewise two operations, both from that saying, "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt," and from the fact that Christ is God and perfect man.

The Council of Lyons under Gregory X demonstrated, also by a constant theological reasoning, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son not as from two principles but as from one, not by two spirations but by one. For the Father and the Son, according to the faith, are one God, one power, one wisdom, in short, one in all things in which there is no relational opposition; for otherwise the unity of the divine nature could not be preserved in two persons. Since, therefore, in spirating there is no distinction of the Son from the Father, it follows that the Father and the Son are not two principles of the Holy Spirit but one, just as they are not two principles of the creature but one. From this it is understood that both erred greatly: Erasmus, namely, who believed this conclusion pertained in no way to faith; and Ambrose Catharinus, who, though it is properly a conclusion of Theology, numbered it among the first principles, that is, the articles of faith.

Likewise the Lateran Council under Innocent III, by theological reasoning against Joachim, established that the divine essence is neither begotten nor begets; namely, that a thing begotten and a thing begetting must be really distinguished; wherefore, if the divine essence begot the essence, it would be distinguished from itself not by thought alone but in reality too. Likewise the fathers, to a man, reasoned from that principle, "This is My body," that the conversion of the bread into the body of Christ takes place, without which they could comprehend neither the truth of those words nor the other things which the catholic faith confesses concerning the true inclusion of the body of Christ under the species of bread. Thus the Lateran Council, by the consensus of the

ancient Fathers, established that bread is transubstantiated into the body and wine into the blood (for so the Council speaks). This matter being established, those consequences followed which the Council of Constance decreed: that the bread does not remain after the consecration, and thus that the accidents remain without a subject. For in any mutation and conversion whatsoever, the term from which the mutation and conversion takes its beginning does not remain; wherefore, if by the words of consecration the bread passes over into the body, then it does not remain, but its accidents remain.

Likewise the Synod of Complutum, confirmed by Sixtus IV in his extravagant Constitution, established, by a certain theological argument, from that testimony of John, "As the Father hath sent Me, I also send you ... whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them, and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained," that not only the institution of the sacrament of penance is contained therein, but also the precept of confession. This we have most evidently deduced in the Relectio on Penance. From there, then, the proof of this example may be sought. For the rest we merely touch upon and skim, as they say, with the fingertips, matters which we have pursued more fully and at greater length elsewhere in our former daily lectures.

Eighth precept: If the Scholastic Theologians likewise, with one voice, have established some conclusion as firm and stable, and have taught it constantly and perpetually as a certain decree of Theology to be embraced by the faithful, we the faithful shall duly embrace it as catholic truth.

We have established this precept, I think, firmly and necessarily in the eighth book—not merely as my own opinion, but plainly as truth. And it may be that I err in the judgment of others, but in my own I hold it thus altogether. That the soul of Christ, as soon as it was enclosed in the body, saw God openly, the Scholastics to a man teach most confidently. From what source they persuaded themselves of this is not readily apparent to all; but that it is so is scarcely doubted, except that Erasmus calls it into question; but by what reasons and testimonies that conclusion was established will be explained later. I only lay this down now: that all the theologians of the School cannot err in establishing the certain and constant decrees of Theology, any more than in matters of faith, since for discerning matters of this kind the Church has no eyes but those of the theologians, who, if they were deceived, would make the whole body of the Church share in their error.

But, as I have said, after what has been disputed in the eighth book, it is not worth the effort to labor over establishing this matter now. But lest anyone wonder why, since it is agreed among almost all theologians, and I myself have often affirmed, that conclusions of this kind, which are derived from faith by explicit consequence, properly belong to

theology, not to faith, I should now so confound the two, as if theology and faith were the same virtue—for if the error of a theological conclusion is an error of faith (as indeed it is), if to deny it is heresy, it follows that faith and theology pertain to the same virtue, since the errors contrary to each faculty pertain to the same vice. For both are heresies.

But it will not be difficult for one who reviews what has gone before to break and crush this calumny. For we have said that faith, though not immediately, nevertheless is concerned with those conclusions which are gathered by evident and necessary consequence from the articles of faith. Wherefore it is necessary that unbelief also mediately concern the contrary conclusions of theology. Since, moreover, from such contrary errors follows not merely a sickness of faith but even its corruption, it results that their opposition to faith, though indirect and consequent, is nevertheless true and natural. Wherefore, although the Church understands that conclusions of this kind depend not on faith alone but also on the principles of nature, yet, because she does not think a rational man denies things that are perspicuous and manifest to reason, she judges heretical him who has denied them. For she assumes, and assumes for the greatest reason, that he is limping not in the reasoning of nature, which was evident, but in faith.

But if someone were either ignorant of a connection otherwise clear, or even of a natural principle which, together with an article of faith, is taken to gather a conclusion of theology, he would certainly not be a heretic. As if, for example, an unlearned man should think this proposition false—"Every man is capable of laughter"—whence, although he believed Christ to be man, he did not therefore think Him able to laugh: such a man would properly not be an unbeliever but a fool, who conflicts not with the supernatural light per se but with the natural. But since such foolishness, although accidentally and indirectly, nevertheless corrupts and depraves, as a consequence, the judgment of faith, it is rightly held by the Church not as folly but as crime.

And these seem to me the highest and best precepts, in which, as it were, are marked the distinguishing signs both of catholic truths and of the contrary heresies. If anyone has brought forward more certain and better ones, I shall be greatly grateful to him. Although there will perhaps be those who will reprove, generally, all that they notice in these books of mine contrary to their own opinion, and separately, when they observe in individual matters certain points in which I depart either from common opinion or from the appearance of clemency and leniency. For the judgments of the third and the last precept will perhaps seem to someone harsh and severe. But let him first weigh, I would wish, those reasons which we used in the sixth and eighth books to strengthen these two precepts, and also the moderation and temperament with which, unless our own judgment deceives us, we have indulgently softened the harshness of this our judgment.

Then, if he wishes to be so indulgent toward the rash insolence of this age that a stricter correction of discipline displeases him, let him take care, I beg, lest, while he leads the minds of ecclesiastical judges from severity and vehemence to remission and indulgence, he not merely relax the forum of the Church but extend it all the way to the courtyard of shameless and thus intolerable license. It is cruel, I confess, that saying, "Censure vexes the doves," but that other is also dissolute, "It grants pardon to the ravens": which of the two is more pernicious in this time and age, I could not easily say.

But since I have, in many places, only very briefly touched and brushed upon the fact that the errors of those who think somewhat incorrectly about the doctrine of the Church are not all of the same degree, let a few words also be said about these degrees of errors. For we have received, especially from the Council of Constance, that some propositions are heretical, others erroneous, others savoring of heresy, others rash, others scandalous, others offensive to pious ears.

Chapter VI

On the Various Degrees of Errors, and First on Heresy and the Heretical Proposition

Before, however, I define these kinds of propositions and their marks, this must be explained: whether all those things which are necessary for constituting a heretic are required for heresy. For there are distinguished authors who think every proposition contrary to the truth of faith is heresy, even if defended by an ignorant person without any obstinacy; but a heretic, unless he is obstinate, is in no way understood to be one. They try to give many reasons for this opinion of theirs.

The first is that, unless it were so, some proposition affirmed by one man would be heresy, but not by another. As if a learned man, knowing the contrary to be contained in the sacred books, should assert that Moses was not a Jew but an Egyptian — then it cannot be doubted that this proposition is heretical. But if the same thing were affirmed unknowingly by some rustic and unlearned man, it would not be heretical. Thus it would happen that the proposition would depend on the one asserting it — which, they say, is manifestly erroneous even to a moderately learned person. For if a proposition is false, it will always be false, by whomever it is said; therefore, if it is a heretical proposition, it will always be heretical, by whomever it is asserted.

They give another reason: that catholic truth does not depend on the one asserting it, for it to be catholic truth. For whether a Jew, a pagan, or a Christian affirms that God is one and three, that assertion is certainly catholic; therefore neither does the contrary

falsehood claim for itself the name or reason of heresy from the one by whom it is asserted, but is absolutely and in itself heretical, since it absolutely and in itself conflicts with catholic truth. The other reasons I either do not understand, or certainly judge unworthy of being related by us. That one seems more forceful, which they omit: that theologians, when asked whether some proposition is heretical or not, simply respond either that it is or is not, with no regard to the one who asserted it. It would, however, be a new and unheard-of thing if theologians were unwilling to designate those propositions whose marks are sought, unless the talent, condition, learning, and fault of those asserting them were first known to them.

From this they gather that every proposition which is now heretical has always been heretical, and that the Church, by her definition, does not make heretical what was not heretical, but declares what was, in fact, already so, though unknown and hidden. This opinion Ockham held (part 1 of the Dialogues, book 2, chapter 11), and Cardinal Torquemada (book 4, part 2, chapter 3), and Adrian (book 4 of the Sentences, question 1, "On Confession"), and Alfonso de Castro of Zamora (book 1, "On the Just Punishment of Heretics," chapter 1).

But other authors, no worse (in my own opinion, indeed, for many believe them better), disagree greatly with these, among whom is Cajetan (II-II, question 5, article 1) and Saint Thomas too (on 1 Corinthians, chapter 11, lecture 4). They bring forward very many arguments in confirmation of this opinion.

The first is that the Council of Constance distinguishes heretical, erroneous, and heresy-savoring propositions — matters we would altogether have difficulty separating, if every error in a matter of faith is heresy even before it is defined by the Church.

Then (question 24, question 1, chapter "Quod autem" and chapter "Achatius," and question 24, question 3, chapter "Notandum") certain heresies are said to be new, others old — heresy cannot, then, be spoken of absolutely and without any regard to the one asserting it.

Moreover, obstinacy is required for the notion of a heretic, insofar as he is a heretic; obstinacy, then, belongs to the notion of heresy. Just as, if we understand "dinner" only as an evening meal, "dinner" too will be understood only as evening. And certainly, just as "white" is named from "whiteness," so "heretic" is named from "heresy": wherefore he who asserts heresy is a heretic, as he who has whiteness is white. For what could be said more absurd than that there is true fornication in one who is not a fornicator? True and proper homicide in one who is not a murderer? It is absurd, then, that heresy exist truly and properly in one who is not a heretic. To this: heresy is a vice not only of the intellect

but also of the will — namely, a crime which cannot be understood except with the will's consent; where, then, there is no crime, and no opposition of the heart against faith, there is no heresy at all either.

Add that an act of catholic faith is only present if we assent to a catholic proposition defined by the Church; for as long as the matter is doubtful, and the Church has not yet determined either side of the controversy, the assent of neither opinion is a judgment of catholic faith. From this it is understood that there is no heresy unless someone resists a catholic truth which the Church has certainly prescribed. Add also that to call "catholic truth" what neither the Church has proposed to be believed, nor the faithful believe through infused faith, but which each individual holds by probable opinion, seems foreign even to the very name of catholic truth. And no one would dare call an opinion denying that the divine persons are distinguished by relations "heresy" — nor the opposite view "catholic truth" — before it was defined by the Church.

My own counsel, however, has always been either to avoid controversies over names entirely, or to explain them briefly. Thus, if we speak of heresy properly, I do not doubt that the more received and more frequent opinion is also the truer one: namely, that nothing else is required for constituting a heretic than that by which heresy is constituted; for heresy is a crime in some man, and it names him in whom it is established to be. Whoever, then, can truly and rightly be branded with the mark of heresy will truly and rightly be a heretic — which certain of the arguments just set forth manifestly prove.

But just as urine is improperly called "healthy," being a sign of health, even if sometimes deceptive, so a proposition, in speech or writing, is called "heretical," since it is customarily a sign of heresy, although sometimes the one who said it is excused from heresy because he was ignorant. In this sense the opinion of those is true who think some proposition is heretical even when the one asserting it is not a heretic. Or they speak also of heresy "by genus and object." As if someone should call that first union of Jacob with Leah "fornication" — not because it truly was fornication, but because it is such by genus and nature, even though ignorance intervened. But the theologians of the school, who hold more strictly to the meaning of terms, say neither that Jacob's union with Leah was fornication, nor the taking of another's property theft, nor the killing of a man homicide, except when another's property is wrongfully handled through injury, and a man is unjustly killed against right. Let it remain, then, and be permanent, that, if we follow the true and proper reason of the term, there is no heresy to which obstinacy is not joined, and entirely all the other things without which the crime of heresy does not truly and properly stand. Nor, if those things pertain to faith of themselves which have been

revealed by God to the Church — although we may perhaps be in ignorance of them — shall we immediately judge the contrary errors heresy. For if some color is contrary to white, it is not immediately black; nor, if something is opposed to liberality, does it immediately bear the name of avarice. Thus, then, it can happen, as we shall show a little later, that there be, even in a Christian, some error contrary to faith in a certain way, and yet not be heresy — the greatest vice, indeed, among those that conflict with faith. For just as (this example must be pressed again and again) tawny, grey, and pale are contrary to white color, but imperfectly, so too there are certain errors of Christians which, being begun and unformed, do not attain the appearance of heresy, though they come very close to it.

Since heresy conflicts not only with faith, but conflicts with it supremely and to the greatest degree, it follows that an error is then, properly, heresy, when it opposes faith not materially but formally (for I choose here to use the school's terms; but I shall try, and shall say it better, if I can). If some faithful person errs, through ignorance, in matters of faith — viciously indeed, and even shamefully ignoring one catholic truth or another — he does, by the dialecticians' rule, contradict the faith, and, by the standard of morals, is guilty of mortal fault; but unless he perishes, as they say, "alive and seeing" — that is, unless he prudently and willingly separates himself from catholic dogma — he neither forms a sect nor commits heresy. For he does not yet conflict, simply and absolutely, with the form of faith, if the discussion concerns moral conflict. For we now have no question concerning dialectical conflict.

Such errors are, nonetheless, certain formations and beginnings of heretical depravity, to whose appearance they are reduced indirectly, as the imperfect to the perfect — just as a human embryo is a certain unformed and incipient man, though not simply a man, but in a qualified sense. Not, then, if some error contrary to faith creeps upon a believer through blameworthy ignorance or negligence, will it immediately be named heresy — which is a certain supreme species of unfaithfulness, and an error opposed to catholic faith not in some way, but perfectly, absolutely, formally. This perfect, absolute, formal opposition, since it is moral as well as dialectical, is not taken from the object and genus alone, unless the subject and human will too are taken into account. For who does not know that moral acts, from the varying condition, state, inclination, and diversity of knowledge in men, receive various different names and species as well? That error, "Christ is not true God," although it conflicts with faith in whatever man of whatever condition, is nonetheless, in a Jew, Jewish unbelief, in a pagan, pagan unbelief, in a Christian, heretical — unless we are so unskilled in speaking as to call the fault of such error in a pagan "heresy." Among us, then, who distinguish many and various species of

unbelief according to men's varied worship and profession, nothing prevents such kinds of things and of terms from depending on those asserting them.

These matters explained, it is easily understood, I think, that heresy is poorly defined by the reasoning that it is an error contrary to catholic truth — since this single definition would apply to all the errors of Jews, Saracens, pagans, and heretics alike. But this, indeed, has been excellently said, as by men skilled in defining, by the theologians of the school: that heresy is the pertinacious error, manifestly contrary to that truth which is certainly catholic, of one who has professed the faith.

Chapter VII

Certain Arguments Against the Definition of Heresy

But so that this definition may appear more illustrious, it must be tested by certain arguments. First, Christian doctrine and institution is "heresy," as Philo attests in his little book On the Contemplative Life of the Suppliants (in Eusebius, book 2 of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 17); but it is not error, but rather catholic truth itself, etc. Then, one who apostatizes from the Christian faith and religion openly opposes the catholic truth which he once professed, and yet is not a heretic. Moreover, as Jerome says, heresy is incurred "from words spoken disorderly" — this crime, then, is found without error and obstinacy. Moreover, "one doubtful in faith is unfaithful" ("On Heretics," chapter 1): if, then, he was previously Christian, he will become, through such doubt, a heretic. For nothing is in a genus that is not constituted in some species of that genus. But if that hesitation is heresy, then he who hesitates, suspended and uncertain in mind, and assents to nothing at all, would mean that heresy sometimes exists without error. For error, conflicting with truth, has assent.

To this, Saint Thomas (Part I, question 32, article 4) teaches that to think falsely concerning those things principally handed down to us by faith itself induces heresy, especially if obstinacy is joined. Heresy can, then, exist without obstinacy. This the Church's practice confirms, which, from a single act of worshiping idols or of circumcising a boy, judges a man virtually a heretic — which it would not judge, if obstinacy and that excessive persistence in error were required for heresy. Add that unbelief and hardness of heart cannot exist without obstinacy: the eleven disciples, then, whose unbelief and hardness of heart the Lord rebuked, had obstinacy in error. But error concerning the article of resurrection, which the Lord himself had manifestly foretold, was openly contrary to catholic faith: wherefore, if that definition is true and complete, the disciples fell into the crime of heresy. If this is most absurd, let us say rather that

something is both superfluous and lacking in that definition.

These arguments we shall dispatch as briefly as possible. For we do not, here, undertake an institution on heresy, which could in no way be completed except by a most lengthy discourse; but we wish, as it were in passing, briefly and concisely, to explain what heresy properly is, whence what error makes a heretic may become clear, and what a heretical proposition is — which no learned man can fail to know is, in speech or writing, a sign of heretical error.

(To the first argument) First, then, "heresy" is derived, in Greek, from "choice," as Jerome attests (question 24, question 3, chapter "Haeresis"; on chapter 5 of the letter to the Galatians, and chapter 3 of the letter to Titus), Isidore (book 8 of the Etymologies, chapter 3), Saint Thomas (II-II, question 11, article 1, and on chapter 3 of the letter to Titus). This Greek term the Latin translator of the New Testament sometimes preserves (1 Corinthians 11), sometimes renders as "sect," as in Galatians 5, where our edition has "sects" among the works of the flesh, but the Greek has "heresies"; and in Acts 28, the Jews say to Paul, "For as concerning this sect, we know that it is spoken against everywhere" — Luke said "heresy" in Greek. "Sect" and "heresy" are, then, the same thing, but just as "sect" is named from "following," so "heresy" is named from "choosing" — from haireomai, "I choose" (Isidore, book 8 of the Etymologies; Thomas II-II.11.1 ad 3).

Then, this too must be noted: that the term "heresy," among the ancient Greek and Latin authors, is general, and designates any sect whatsoever — as the Platonic, Stoic, Peripatetic. But Christian writers, by a contracted term, call "heresy" that sect and division by which someone separates himself from the Church's common faith, and, choosing a private opinion, departs from catholic institution. Moreover, this too, although it is ready at hand and worn smooth in many people's speech, must nonetheless be mentioned: that evangelical doctrine ought properly to be called neither "heresy" nor "sect." Both because we do not follow it by our own choice — for it is not our own invention or discovery, but we have it from divine tradition, so that no option of thinking otherwise is given to us, but we follow wherever God leads and draws us; and also because the doctrine of the Gospel has always been catholic and universal, has pertained equally to all, and has been held by all, at every time, who thought rightly concerning God and truth.

Since, then, "heresy" and "sect" signify a certain private discipline which each individual chooses and follows according to his own judgment, surely catholic discipline, handed down by God to all men, to a man, ought to be called neither "sect" nor "heresy," however much the tenets of the philosophers are called "heresies." Authorities for this are

Jerome (on chapter 3 of the letter to Titus), Isidore (book 8 of the Etymologies, chapter 3), Theophylact (on chapter 2 of the letter to the Colossians), Tertullian (in his book On the Prescription of Heretics). That Philo, then, calls our religion "heresy" — though not in a bad sense — he does so according to the custom of that age; for it was generally so called by men then.

(To the second argument) But whether apostasy is heresy is contested with great disagreement among the most learned. Sylvester (under the word "Haeresis," question 2) affirms that an apostate is not, properly, a heretic; but, under the word "Apostata," 1 and 2, he seems to conflict with himself. Cajetan (II-II, question 11, article 1) teaches that apostates are truly heretics, since, although they do not believe in Christ — as he says — by an elicited act, they nonetheless profess him by the Christian character; they fall, then, into heresy, since they desert the catholic faith which they held by profession. But in the Summa, under the word "Apostata," he seems to think the contrary, saying: "Apostasy is worse than heresy, as exceeding it by entirely removing faith." Cardinal Torquemada (book 4, part 2, chapter 13) openly confirms that an apostate is not a heretic. This same is Saint Thomas's opinion (II-II, question 11, article 1, and question 12, article 1, reply to the third), where he expressly says that apostasy does not import a determinate species of unbelief, but receives its species from the terminus toward which the movement of one departing from faith tends.

And certainly, by the usage and manner of speaking of the saints, "heretic" is only he who, after professing the Christian faith, under the Christian name, resists Christ's doctrine — as Augustine says (City of God 18, chapter 51), and, in book 16, chapter 2, hands down that Ham, the middle son of Noah, was a type of heretics, being, as it were, neither among the firstfruits of the Israelites nor in the fullness of the Gentiles, but distinguishing himself from both and remaining between the two. And Origen (on chapter 3 of the letter to Titus) says: "A heretic is one who professes to believe in Christ, but believes something else concerning the truth of the Christian faith than the tradition of the ecclesiastical definition holds." And, lest I be prolix and tedious in citing each individual's words, Ambrose (on chapter 3 of the letter to Titus), Gregory (Moralia 5, chapter 11), Bede (on Luke chapter 17) think the same as Saint Thomas and Augustine, nor did any of the ancients, in the very lengthy disputations against Julian, call him a heretic, but an apostate.

But not even Saint Thomas's reasoning is bad: for he who rejects Christ's whole doctrine seems to choose nothing, but to depart entirely from faith. Likewise, apostasy imports a certain motion of one departing from faith; but motion does not have its species from the terminus from which, but from the terminus to which: since, then, an apostate

approaches the superstition and error of the Jews, he is guilty of Jewish unbelief; but when he approaches paganism, he contracts the fault of pagan unfaithfulness. Thus it would happen that apostasy, if it is heresy, would be placed in two species of the same proximate genus. Saint Thomas, then, philosophizes more correctly, when he says apostasy carries no determinate species of unbelief, but is reduced and brought back to that toward which the apostate has approached. For, from the fact that he has withdrawn from the Christian faith, apostasy has no species, but a certain aggravating circumstance, according to that saying: "It would have been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than, after having known it, to turn back" (2 Peter 2). I marvel all the more, then, at those who twist Saint Thomas's own words and reasonings to the contrary opinion.

But let us look at their arguments. One is that a heretical man would, through the multiplication of heresies, cease to be a heretic. For if he fell, day by day, into one heresy after another, until he entirely abandoned the whole catholic faith, then, the former name having been lost through the increase of heresies, he would become an apostate. The other argument is that the penalties decreed in law against heretics comprehend apostates too — which would not be the case, if they were not heretics, since there is no canon law that punishes such apostates unless they are contained among heretics. The final argument is much weightier than the rest: that Boniface VIII defined apostates to be heretics, in these words: "Against Christians who have gone over to the rite of the Jews, one must proceed as against heretics" ("On Heretics," in book 6).

But the first argument is not difficult to evade. For however many heresies are heaped up, if that man generally professes Christ, and, under the Christian name, attacks his faith, he will always be a heretic, not an apostate. But once he has decided to abandon both the name of Christ and the whole religion entirely, he becomes an apostate, and loses the name of heresy — not through a heresy added to the earlier ones, but through a new apostasy, which is not heresy, but something greater than heresy. Who, indeed, doubts that lesser things are abolished by greater ones, and, their names changed, pass over into the later ones? Dispositions are changed into habits, and the name of "disposition" ceases. The knowledge of the wayfarer is turned into the knowledge of the one who has attained, and this earlier knowledge, and faith, and the name of faith, is dissolved. An incontinent man, through repeated acts of incontinence, becomes depraved, and that old name vanishes, or certainly is changed into another, graver one.

Wherefore it is no wonder if we assert that a heretic, through apostasy — which is a new crime, separate from heresy, and much graver a crime than heresy — loses the old name and acquires a new one, especially since, among the ancient saints, a heretic is not that

open enemy, but a false prophet who comes in sheep's clothing; a leper too, who, while mixing wrong with right, sprinkles a healthy color with blemishes; Pharaoh's magician, who, bearing the image of truth, resists truth; finally, a fountain and cloud without water, an autumn tree, a wandering star — all of which display the fruit of water and the appearance of light. Since, then, the name "heretic" connotes a certain general profession of Christ, it is not absurd if, when this connotation is absent, the term "heretic" is absent too. Just as, if someone should prolong dinner into the following day, with as many varied cups and as much varied conversation as possible, that dinner, its time changed, would now be turned into breakfast or even lunch, and would no longer properly retain its former name.

The second argument, however, is refuted thus. There is no doubt that apostates fall into the penalties for heretics. This has been perpetually observed since the earliest Church, as is especially clear from Cyprian's little works. But most people are mistaken in this matter, in that they think all the Church's laws must be sought from the volumes of law, into which Raymond, or Gratian, or anyone else, gathered a great many decrees. Hence our own Cajetan could scarcely establish the precept of the Lenten fast, since it does not appear in the pontifical decrees that circulate widely, and was almost worn out by the same labor while seeking the law by which clerics professing the monastic religion are bound to discharge the prescribed divine prayers. There are many, believe me, laws of the Church which not Scripture, but custom, has inserted. Nor does the whole worn-out volume of law comprehend everything written by Councils and Pontiffs. The penalties for apostates, then, the Church's custom had prescribed before Boniface VIII. But since someone doubted, the Pontiff resolved that doubt in that chapter, defining that one must proceed against apostates no differently than against heretics. But it is not established, from the Pontiff's words and definition, that apostates are heretics. For that particle "as" sometimes brings similarity of a matter, not always truth. Examples of this matter need not be cited at present, since they are readily found in both sacred and profane literature. But on this argument, since it involves a controversy of terminology too, too much has already been said.

(To the third argument) That testimony, moreover, which the theologians of the school and the legal experts commonly wear smooth under Jerome's name, is not Jerome's; but, taken from the Master of the Sentences, Saint Thomas and the rest afterward employed it, as usual. But if that Hieronymian letter to Damasus, on the term "three hypostases," is read again more carefully, Saint Jerome is rather of the opinion that heresy is to be judged from sense, not from words. What else does he mean when he speaks thus? "From the Arian prelate and the men of Kampen, a new term of 'three hypostases' is demanded

of me, a Roman man... We ask what they think can be understood by 'three hypostases.' They say: three subsisting persons. We reply that we believe this. The sense does not suffice; they demand the very term itself, since I know not what poison lurks in the syllables... And because we do not proclaim the terms, we are judged heretics." And many other such things afterward, from which you may understand that Jerome, holding a right and sound understanding, feared no charge of heresy at all for himself, but rather dreaded the new term, where he suspected poison lurking under honey.

Otherwise, Jerome had read that saying of Hilary's: "Heresy arises from the understanding, not from Scripture, and the sense, not the wording, constitutes the crime." Thus, from "words spoken disorderly," we can perhaps fall into a suspicion of heresy — but we cannot fall into heresy itself, if there is no error in faith. For since faith is in the intellect, unbelief too — of which heresy is a species — must necessarily be in the intellect as well. Likewise, nothing is contrary to truth except error; since, then, heresy is opposed to the truth of faith, it is, without doubt, error. But since lawgivers and judges sometimes pursue crimes, in the external forum, by a fiction and presumption of law, external words and deeds, which are customarily testimonies of heresy, they call "heresies," and punish as heresies — just as they also punish those who outwardly desert the faith, or show worship to an idol by an outward act, even if they do this out of fear, no differently than if they had inwardly fallen away from faith and religion. But as far as terms are concerned, I do not much care. For just as the outward testification and profession of faith is sometimes called "faith," so too the outward testification of heresy has this same designation too. For signs and images of things are often called by the names of the things themselves. In this sense, that old and celebrated proverb — to which I have scarcely ever assented — is true in common speech: "Heresy is incurred from words spoken disorderly." But in proper speech, as we have said, heresy, among Christians, is the error of one who generally professes to hold Christ's faith, and yet does not truly hold it.

But I have thought those who exercise judgment on matters of faith and religion ought to be warned, as far as concerns the matters themselves, not to render the same judgment on words and deeds. In deeds which are, in themselves, foul and shameful, there is no danger at all, if they should punish, with the penalties for heretics, one who circumcises after the Jewish rite, or performs rites to an idol or demon. Although I am not unaware that it has pleased men most learned in both theology and law — and this does not displease me either — that, since such men are neither heretics nor apostates except by fiction of law and probable presumption, judges of faith should, in these very external offenses, inquire diligently and carefully whether they truly proceed from interior

unbelief. If it is established that such crimes were committed and completed not through error of intellect, but through greed, fear, or some other perturbation of mind, then they are to be punished not as heresies, but with a lighter censure. But since words, however disorderly spoken, are often free from the crime of heresy — and sometimes even from any crime at all — while the judge may exercise the greatest diligence in investigating their sense and meaning, if a right opinion of the speaker, and a sound and pure faith, appear even in perverse and tainted words, the man should be admonished, corrected, even frightened, but punished mercifully and moderately nonetheless. Sometimes, indeed, the whole penalty should be overlooked and forgiven, out of consideration for mortal ignorance and weakness — although a more excessive license of speech, in the most frivolous men, though it contain no error, must be vehemently restrained, as it sometimes brings danger to the hearers.

But these matters, foreign to our present undertaking, we have given as though tasted with the tips of our lips. What follows is our own, and pertains properly to this present occasion and place. Wherefore, so that these matters may be explained briefly but clearly, I shall apply as much talent as I can, and nearly more labor than I can.

(To the fourth argument) Legal experts and theologians, then, contest whether one doubtful in faith is a heretic; and likewise (for it is the same question) whether to doubt concerning any one catholic truth whatsoever is heresy too. For that reasoning laid down seems, first, to show that it is; then also that testimony of Augustine's (Enchiridion, chapters 17 and 19): "To err is to think true what is false, and false what is true, or to hold as certain what is uncertain, and as uncertain what is certain, whether it be false or true." But he who doubts concerning any single truth of faith holds what is certain as uncertain; he errs, then, against faith: for faith, as Bernard says, admits no ambiguity — for, if it has this, it is not faith. Such hesitation is, then, an error conflicting with faith. Wherefore, if obstinacy is joined to it, it is, without doubt, heresy.

Moreover, the Council of Vienne rejects, as erroneous and hostile to the truth of catholic faith, every doctrine that either rashly asserts, or calls into doubt, that the substance of the rational soul is not the form of the human body. Not only, then, does he err against and conflict with faith who asserts a heretical proposition, but he too who calls a catholic truth into doubt. Why else, moreover, would that chapter, "One doubtful in faith is unfaithful," be placed before all the other chapters entirely, in the title "On Heretics," unless we are to understand that men of this kind are to be held heretics, and punished as heretics? Moreover, he who doubts loses faith — otherwise he would not be unfaithful; but faith received in baptism is lost only through heresy. Add that constant and certain firmness belongs to the nature of faith; but wavering and pertinacious doubt corrupts

the firmness of faith; it is, then, at least indirectly contrary to faith, and accordingly is heresy. For an error is contrary to a theological conclusion as heresy, precisely because it is an indirect corrupter of faith.

These arguments are used by those who judge that doubt in faith, if it is obstinate in doubting, is heretical. For if it wavers and limps out of weakness, not obstinacy, everyone agrees this man is not a heretic: "O you of little faith," it says, "why did you doubt?" (Matthew 14). The doubt of a weak man, then, does not entirely remove faith, which the Lord calls "little" in the weak man, not "none."

But other authors, themselves most learned too, think the contrary: that doubt in faith is opposed to faith privatively, not contrarily, while heresy is opposed to faith positively (for so the scholastics speak); thus doubt is not, properly, heresy, even if a prudent and knowing man doubts. This opinion they too try to persuade with many arguments.

First is Saint Thomas's testimony, on 1 Corinthians chapter 11, lecture 4, where he teaches that it belongs to the nature of heresy that someone obstinately clings to a private teaching. For "choice," he says, imports firm adherence, from which he gathers that only he is a heretic who despises the doctrine of faith divinely handed down and obstinately follows his own error. This is the same opinion as Jerome's, on chapter 5 of the letter to the Galatians and chapter 3 of the letter to Titus, saying (question 24, question 3, chapter "Haeresis"): "'Heresy' is derived from 'choice,' namely because the heretic chooses for himself the teaching he thinks better." And Augustine, in his book On the Usefulness of Believing to Honoratus, chapter 1 (question 24, question 3, chapter "Haereticus"), says: "A heretic is one who either begets or follows false opinions." But he who doubts has neither firm adherence, nor does he choose either side of the question, nor does he beget or follow a false opinion: he is not, then, a heretic.

Again, heresy is opposed to faith contrarily, and not by negation or privation; but doubt, since it has neither assent nor dissent, is not opposed to faith contrarily, for faith carries assent with it; doubt, then, is not heresy. Moreover, heresy is an error contrary to catholic truth; error, however, is a false assent or dissent; since, then, hesitation is neither assent nor dissent, it is not heresy either. To this: doubt is a certain mean between the two extreme sides of a controversy; but faith and heresy are two extremes, supremely and to the greatest degree conflicting: doubt, then, which is intermediate between heretical dogma and catholic truth, is not heresy, but is a participant in, and a neighbor of, it.

Behold the reasons by which distinguished authors are generally moved to hold this opinion. Nor do the adversaries' arguments press them to depart from their opinion. For when it is first objected to them that one doubtful in faith is unfaithful, they repel this

thus. Unbelief, they say, can be taken in three ways. In one way, according to pure and simple negation, so that someone is called "unfaithful" merely from the fact that he does not have faith — and in this way, as Saint Thomas says (II-II, question 10, article 1), in those who have heard nothing of the faith, it has the nature not of fault but rather of punishment. Second, unbelief is taken according to contrariety to faith, whereby someone resists faith once heard, or even scorns it — and in this, properly, as Saint Thomas affirms in this same passage, the notion of unbelief is completed. The third mode of unbelief is intermediate between the two aforesaid modes, and is a certain wavering between two sides, adhering to neither one nor the other — in which manner Pope Stephen speaks in that first chapter, "On Heretics." Three species of unbelief, then, are understood to belong to that which is properly contrary to faith — that is, not the first or third mode, but the second.

That those err who hold what is certain as uncertain is, they interpret, so only if they either affirm that certain things are uncertain, or even deny that they are certain. For error is a false proposition, whether affirmed or denied in words. But he who neither affirms nor denies anything does not, properly, err — unless perhaps he is also said to err who does not hit the mark, though he has not shot an arrow, but would have if he had shot. In this sense sinners generally err, not only those who do evil, but also those who do not do good. But this is improper. Otherwise, to return to our proposal, if, because faith must be certain, whoever is uncertain has error, then he who merely holds an opinion that Christ is God will also, properly, err and be a heretic — since he does not have that firmness which the truth of faith requires. For just as doubt drives out faith, so too does mere opinion. For the fear joined to opinion equally conflicts with the certain assent of faith as the ambiguity of doubt does. But is there anyone so misled by such error that he thinks a true opinion to be error, because it cannot exist simultaneously with the certain assent which faith demands? Whoever, then, holds certain things as uncertain, neither asserting nor denying anything, but, with a wavering mind, choosing neither the catholic truth nor the contrary dogma, will perhaps, by a fiction of law, be a heretic, but certainly will not be, by the propriety of the term, since he is not contrarily and positively unfaithful — though he is unfaithful negatively, or even privatively, since faith is understood to be true only without any error, and with all fear and hesitation cast aside; but if he has fear or hesitation, it is not faith.

As for the testimony cited from the Council of Vienne, it is not only not against these men, but confirms their cause and opinion most fully. For when the synod had rejected, as erroneous and hostile to catholic faith, every doctrine, whether asserting or calling into doubt, that the substance of the rational soul is not the form of the human body, lest

anyone should think that doubt and assertion should be held at the same rank and place, it adds: "Defining that whoever shall thereafter presume to assert, defend, or pertinaciously hold that the rational soul is not the form of the human body, is to be judged a heretic." In these words it is clear that those who called this matter into doubt were not condemned by the council as heretics, but only those who pertinaciously asserted the contrary of this matter. Nor is it, without cause, to be thought that the council passed over those who called it into doubt. This doctrine, then, which calls catholic truths into doubt, is hostile to Christian faith not completely and absolutely, but imperfectly and incipiently — for, in a certain manner, intermediate colors too are hostile and contrary to white, and not only the extreme color black. From this it is sufficiently understood that mere hesitation, without assent or dissent, is neither properly error, nor entirely hostile to faith.

Now, as to that chapter, "One doubtful in faith is unfaithful," being placed before the rest in that title inscribed "On Heretics" — this does not prove that doubt in faith is truly heretical, but that it is so by fiction of law. This the second chapter of this title shows: "He who," says Leo, "does not recall others from error when he can, shows himself to be erring." But those who favor heretics and connive at their error out of an enticing affection, not an erring intellect, are heretics by the suspicion of law, but not truly and properly so. "An error which is not resisted," says Innocent, "is approved, and truth which is not at all defended is suppressed" (distinction 83, chapter "Error"). Why so? For he who ceases to oppose a manifest crime is not free from the suspicion of secret complicity. And Gregory says: "He who does not come forward to cut off what ought to be corrected seems to consent to the one erring" (same distinction, chapter "Consentire").

Nor does Pope Stephen himself, whose decree this is said to be, interpret it otherwise. Indeed, he wished to teach by what witnesses trust ought to be placed, and rejects, among others, from the trust of testimonies, those who either are ignorant of the truth of faith, or are without doubt doubtful in faith. These the Pontiff rightly assumes to be both unfaithful, and liars in bearing testimony. Wherefore that first chapter perhaps does not intend that men be judged heretics from its own statement, but rather that judges of faith should understand who they will have as legitimate witnesses in a cause of faith; for it is absurd for the unfaithful to testify concerning faith against Christians, whether the unfaithful are so through ignorance or doubt of the truth, or, much more so, through contrary error.

But that one who doubts not from weakness but from obstinacy loses the habit of faith seems to me most probable indeed. For every act of faith is removed by either obstinate or weak doubt — for it, indeed, admits no ambiguity, and if it has ambiguity, it is not an

act of faith. But that faith received in baptism is lost only through heresy, the authors of this opinion easily deny. For white color is expelled not only by black, but also by tawny and grey and all the other intermediate colors entirely. Faith, likewise, is excluded not only by unbelief, but also by clear vision. For "when that which is perfect has come, that which is in part shall be done away." Nothing, then, prevents faith itself from being removed both through heresy, which is perfectly contrary, and through doubt and opinion, which are partly opposed to faith.

Indeed, that argument added in the last place is most easy. For an error contrary to theology, since it has both a false assent and, in its falsity, obstinacy — albeit indirectly — is nonetheless hostile to faith on every side, both from the intellect and from the will. Obstinate doubt, however, from the will, is indeed perfectly opposed to faith, but not from the intellect, since, as long as he doubts, he has neither error nor assent. In this respect, whoever admires or hesitates limps in the reasoning of the contrary, and would confess himself, if he were learned, not to know it. Since, then, heresy is contrary to faith not partially, but on every side, it follows that doubt is not, properly, heresy, however obstinate that doubt may be.

What, then? Is it enough that those who obstinately doubt concerning the truth of faith should not seem to be heretics? To me it does not seem so, although I approve one of these opinions as a metaphysician, and I do not reprove the other as a moral philosopher. For, according to the standard of metaphysics and the laws of contraries prescribed by dialecticians and physicists, doubt has neither species nor form. For it contributes nothing, posits nothing that is either a thing or has the character of a form. It is established, moreover, that things which are properly contrary are two forms most fully opposed to each other. In this manner it is sufficiently proven that doubt is neither heresy nor contrary to faith. But if we follow the laws of Moral Philosophy, which looks to what is most frequent, then it is entirely incredible that a man obstinately doubting a catholic truth should have no error at all truly contrary to faith. For that someone should doubt concerning some conclusion, or even concerning any one principle of theology, is no wonder. But that he should call into doubt not only the certain conclusions in the Church, but even all the principles of catholic doctrine, agreeing with none, resisting none, is by no means likely, unless we wish to imagine some man wavering and nodding on everything, for whom there is an infinite question about all things, with no truth constant and fixed in any place. But suppose such a man were found, always hanging in a doubtful step; now, if he generally professes Christ, he also generally approves Christ's doctrine. Suppose, then, that he admits the Sacred Scriptures, or certainly the Church's authority. Since, then, he has doubted concerning any single dogma found in the

Scriptures or defined by the Church, if you should show him either the Church's definition or the open dogma of Scripture, he must necessarily either abandon his doubt, or believe the testimonies of the Church and Scripture to be uncertain. For if they are certain to him, they will drive away all hesitation. Rightly, then, do ecclesiastical judges, confirmed by the authority of theologians and legal experts, condemn under the name of heresy all those who have pertinaciously doubted concerning a catholic dogma.

(To the fifth argument, and its confirmations, in which was chiefly sought what pertinacy is, and whether heresy can exist without it.) But now it must be explained, as briefly as possible, what pertinacy is — that which especially completes a heretic. That heresy cannot exist without pertinacy (for this is the first question) is not difficult to show, both from the common consensus of all theologians and legal experts, and from the most weighty testimonies of the ancients, among which those excellent ones are cited from Augustine (letter to Glorius and Eleusius, and City of God book 18, chapter 51, and against Mani): question 24, question 3, chapter "Dixit Apostolus," and chapter "Qui in ecclesia." The same is gathered from the chapter "Damnamus," "On the Supreme Trinity": for no one is condemned as a heretic unless he presumes to defend a doctrine contrary to faith; and presumption (for so the common people call arrogance) is the root of pertinacy. And in the unique chapter, "On the Supreme Trinity," in book 6: "those are held heretics who have presumed or asserted with rash daring," etc. And in the Clementine, "On the Supreme Trinity," more openly: "Whoever shall presume to assert pertinaciously," etc.

Saint Thomas too is so far from being alien to this opinion that he not only thinks heresy cannot be found without pertinacy, but even contends that it is included in the very notion of heresy (II-II.2.6 ad 2 and 11.2 ad 3, and on 1 Corinthians 11, lecture 4). This matter he urges especially from the etymology of the term, for — as has been explained — "heresy" is derived, in Greek, from "choice." He is not, then, a heretic, except one who, seeing and knowing, chooses a doctrine contrary to faith — which does not happen without pertinacy. He then uses that testimony of the Apostle's (1 Timothy 6): "If anyone teaches otherwise, and does not agree to the sound words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to that doctrine which is according to piety." He, then, who resists the Church's doctrine, and is accordingly obstinate, is only to be held a heretic. Moreover, heresy, as we have also said above, conflicts with catholic faith most fully and supremely; but there is no complete faith unless the intellect's true assent is confirmed by the right agreement of the will's consent; therefore neither is heresy absolute and complete, unless the wicked choice of the will confirms the intellect's false error — so that, just as constancy of truth is required in faith, so too obstinacy of falsehood must be present in

heresy, its contrary.

But it is well that, in asserting this matter, we have no adversary. Wherefore, even if the reasonings were neither probable nor sufficiently suitable for producing conviction, that particle of the definition would nonetheless be approved by common sense of all. For no one thinks any man to be a heretic unless he is also obstinate in error.

But what pertinacy is has indeed been doubted by many, but resolved by few. Whether one is called "pertinacious," as if too tenacious, or as extending his mind even beyond what is fitting (for I willingly omit these minute and overly detailed points), it is nonetheless clear that one is now called "pertinacious" who remains, excessively and too much, in error, and holds and defends a false opinion tenaciously and tightly. Thus it is defined by some, in this manner: "Pertinacious is he who strives to hold what he ought to abandon." To which definition this is akin, or certainly the same: "Pertinacious is he who persists in error which he is bound to abandon."

These things are most easily said, who doubts it? But if that pertinacy is explained which, joined to error, makes a heretic, then indeed more will be held heretics who are not heretics. For, first, if an error is against faith, I ought to flee and shun it, whether I see it to be contrary to faith or am even ignorant of this. For those err greatly who think that ignorance removes the binding force of precepts. This, believe me, ignorance does not accomplish — that we are freed from the obligation — but only that another otherwise forbidden matter is not imputed to us as fault. Every man, then, even if caught in ignorance, ought simply and absolutely to avoid errors contrary to faith, if he does not yet have them, and, if he has them, abandon them. Thus, if he persists in them even in ignorance, he indeed holds what he was bound to abandon.

But let us set aside these matters, which are discussed too subtly for anyone to easily grasp, and pursue those that even the unlearned will easily comprehend. Indeed, when an unlearned man is warned either by his bishop, or by judges of faith, or by theologians of some distinguished academy, or even by learned and pious friends, if he still does not abandon the error, he certainly persists in what he ought to abandon. He is, then, truly pertinacious, if nothing is lacking or superfluous in the definition of this word. Nothing, then, will be lacking that is necessary for constituting heresy. For that man has an error contrary to faith, in which he is also pertinacious. But it is not at all doubted that such a man, although he sins entirely, is nonetheless not a heretic, if he does not think his opinion contrary to the Church, but thinks either his bishop or the inquisitors (as they are commonly called) or the academy's theologians mistaken. Wherefore it does not yet seem, from what has been said, that that pertinacy by which heresy is constituted has

become clear.

But not even this matter is made clear by those marks of pertinacy which very many have sweated to produce without cause. For it is well known that some have produced seven marks of this matter (Gloss on the Extravagant "Cum inter nonnullos"), others twelve (John Gerson, part 1, alphabet 14), others even twenty (Torquemada, book 4, part 2, chapter 16). And since some of these signs are doubtful, it can happen that some doubtfully given sign is accepted as certain by judges of faith; thus it will happen that one is judged pertinacious and heretical who is not truly a heretic. But since legal experts treat these and similar matters differently than theologians — legal experts insofar as they can hold matters in hand, theologians insofar as by reason and understanding — let us first explain, according to the theologians' laws, what pertinacy is that completes heresy; then, if it can be done, let us hand down to the legal experts too the marks and signs of this pertinacy — not those so many, so varied, so ambiguous, but a very few, fixed and constant.

(The first confirmation of the fifth argument is refuted.) Reason, then, demands, in this matter of theology, that the pertinacy which makes heresy not be measured by length of time — namely, that he be pertinacious who persists long in error. Certainly, if it were established that someone defended, from the heart, even for only one hour, that God is not triune, he would be judged a heretic by the Church — which is accustomed to judge men, from a single act, however brief, of worshiping idols or circumcising a boy, as if they were heretics; it would by no means judge so, if the crime of heresy required that long and lengthy time. Again, if someone, knowingly and prudently, should deny the whole faith, even though he interposed only the briefest delay, he will truly and rightly be judged an apostate by the Church: therefore that man too will be judged a heretic who has resisted a manifest article of faith, even if that resistance was not long and lengthy. Moreover, for an act of faith to be complete in all its respects, no length of time is necessary: therefore neither does the contrary act of heresy claim and require length of time for itself.

(What kind of pertinacy heresy requires.) Reason, again, teaches this: that he is a heretic who willingly assents to any dogma whatsoever, even when he understands it to be contrary to the Church's faith. As, if someone, after it is established to him that the matter he believes conflicts either with the Sacred Letters or with the Church's open definition, is still of his own judgment and opinion — this, indeed, is true heresy, and complete in its species. This Cajetan demonstrated with an excellent argument (II-II, question 11, article 2). For faith is completed by the intellect's assent, from the will's consent, in one who recognizes the matter he believes to be catholic truth: therefore

unbelief too is completed by the intellect's dissent, from the will's consent, in one who recognizes the matter to which he assents to be against the Church's common faith. For contraries must have contrary notions. This is confirmed, moreover, especially by that excellent testimony of Augustine's, saying (book 4 against the Donatists, chapter 6): "Let us suppose someone thinks concerning Christ what Photinus thought... believing this to be the catholic faith itself. I do not call this man a heretic yet, unless he has preferred to resist the manifest doctrine of the catholic faith, and has chosen what he held." Moreover, whoever holds an error contrary to faith in such a way that he is not prepared to be corrected by the Church is, without doubt, a heretic, as this same Augustine affirms in his letter to Glorius and Eleusius (question 24, question 3, chapter "Dixit Apostolus"). But he who sees his own opinion to be contrary to the catholic faith, and yet still remains in it, is not prepared to be corrected by the Church, whose authority he plainly rejects and despises: he truly, then, admits the crime of heresy.

From this it is understood that that pertinacy which makes a heretic is always and only found in him who continues to hold some dogma which he knows the catholic opinion opposes. This the very notion of the term declares. For "pertinacious" is said of one who clings, more than is fitting, to his own opinion. But he who understands his opinion to conflict with the Church's common sense and faith, and persists in it excessively, certainly perseveres in a private opinion: he is, then, truly pertinacious — indeed, this alone is complete pertinacy, which absolutely conflicts with the constancy of faith, and accordingly this alone, simply, produces heresy. For just as, as was said a little before, faith is completed by that choice, where one who wishes to assent to the truth understands it to be catholic truth, so too the contrary heresy will be completed entirely by the choice of one who, with catholic faith opposing him, embraces his own opinion knowingly and willingly. Who, indeed, can be more pertinacious than one whom no force of the Church, no authority of Catholics, drives from the cause and opinion he has undertaken? Excellently, then, does Jerome interpret that a heretic is subverted and condemned by his own judgment, since, by his own decision, he has departed from the Church's institution — which departure seems to be a condemnation of his own conscience.

These matters established, these are the corollaries. First, if some dogma is not yet certain and established as pertaining to catholic faith, even though most learned men think it to have been revealed by God, one who conflicts with that dogma does indeed sin gravely, and is pertinacious too, who despises the authority of the very many and most learned, and rejects it with a certain obstinacy of opinion, but is not a heretic — since that pertinacy, though impudent and vicious, is not directed against the Church, but against

those learned and pious men whom he arrogantly despises and holds as nothing. This, then, is the next corollary: if it is certain and established that some single dogma is a truth of faith, and someone is ignorant that such a dogma pertains to catholic faith, and, even when warned by his bishop and again by those to whom knowledge of faith has been granted, and finally by learned and pious men, defends his own position too obstinately and stubbornly — this man may be marked as rash, defiant, headstrong, insolent, savoring of heresy, and by whatever other such names — but will nonetheless not yet have the mark of heresy, since (for it must be said again) his pertinacy does not yet conflict with the truth of faith and the Church's authority, but with the opinion of those who can both deceive and be deceived.

Rightly, then, did Saint Thomas assert (on Titus 3, lecture 2) that he who is prepared to be corrected according to the Church's determination is not a heretic, since he errs not from malice but from ignorance. This I take to be said even of crass ignorance — for affected ignorance does not remove the sin from being of the same kind it would be if committed by one knowing and seeing. Surely affected error proceeds from choice, and he is not prepared to be corrected who deliberately avoids the Church's admonition and doctrine. But he who errs from unaffected ignorance is, in a way, unwilling and resistant, not willing and voluntary. Wherefore he neither chooses the error, nor bears it heavily when, corrected by the Church, he corrects his own error himself.

But this, chiefly, is objected to our teachings here: that this error of vicious ignorance is mortal sin, especially after admonition by a learned bishop, by prudent judges, by wise theologians. Mortal sin of this kind, however, is contained only under the genus of unbelief; but Saint Thomas defined only three species of unbelief. Since, then, such a crime is neither paganism nor Judaism, it will certainly be heresy. Add that if someone, through vicious and negligent ignorance, killed a man, he would truly and properly be a murderer, and would incur those penalties which the law prescribes for murderers. This same reason underlies the case of those who violently lay hands on clerics, and in all other sacrileges generally. Whoever, then, after receiving Christ's baptism, holds an error contrary to faith through crass ignorance, will truly be a heretic. For the act which proceeds from such ignorance is, simply and absolutely, both of one willing and consenting: it can, then, be excused so as not to be so grave a fault, but not so as not to be a fault of heresy, and entirely of that same kind it would be if it proceeded from one not ignorant.

Add too Saint Thomas's testimony, in these words (1 Corinthians 11, lecture 4): "From error concerning the articles of faith, certain persons cannot be excused, on account of simplicity, from being heretics — especially concerning those matters which the Church

solemnizes, and which are commonly current in the mouths of the faithful. But concerning other matters which pertain indirectly to the discipline of faith — such as that Isaac was the son of Abraham — no one is judged a heretic unless he does not withdraw from the error even when he has seen what follows from it." Thus far he. These words seem to conflict so openly with our present teaching that no argumentation is necessary. But Chrysostom too (homily 6 on the letter to Titus) seems to conflict with us, who takes that passage of Paul's — "with meekness correcting those who oppose the truth," etc. (2 Timothy 2) — to refer to those who resist truth not out of a hostile disposition, but out of zeal to learn truth. But Paul was speaking of heretics, whom, in another place (Titus 3), he commands to be admonished and corrected once and twice, but to be avoided after one or two corrections.

To these arguments I respond briefly thus. We said above that some sin can be placed in a genus and species in two ways: in one way, formally and directly; in another way, materially and by reduction (may the Latin scholars forgive me, I beg, if I use terms less than fully Latin). Thus we have received from the dialecticians that matter is placed in the category of substance, a point in the category of quantity, an embryo in the species of that living being for whose sake it is prepared by nature — placed, I say, not perfectly and properly, but accidentally and, as it were, improperly. Likewise, in morals, certain sins are complete in their species, which men commit knowingly and deliberately, and these are properly, in themselves, and formally placed in their own species too. Others, however, are imperfect, which men, ignorant, commit beyond their intention, and such are reduced to a species and genus by accident. That error contrary to catholic truth, then, when it is a fault of ignorance, will be referred to the species of heresy, but will nonetheless not be complete heresy, nor complete unbelief — which, as has also been said before, is distinguished by Saint Thomas into three species. The first objection, then, is dispelled with the least effort.

That other one is more difficult, where it is asked why he who kills a man in ignorance is truly a murderer, and accordingly incurs the penalties for homicide, if his ignorance is vicious — but he who errs against faith, after receiving faith in baptism, neither truly commits the crime of heresy, nor falls into the penalties for heretics. This question, indeed, is resolved thus. He is not a heretic, either by theologians' or legal experts' usage, who falls into that imperfect heresy, nor is that imperfect heresy, in frequent and common speech, simply and absolutely heresy — but only he is called a heretic who, formally and by choice, as if by deliberate effort, conflicts with the common faith. Wherefore, unless we call no one a heretic except from complete and finished heresy, we will not preserve the frequent and proper usage of this term. Since we showed this

matter a little before, both from the etymology and notion of the term, from the testimonies of the ancients, and from the common sense of everyone, there is no need to do again what has been done. Hence this: "We excommunicate every heresy that exalts itself against catholic faith" ("On Heretics," chapter "Excommunicamus"). Not "error," it says, "exalting itself against a bishop," not against inquisitors, not against theologians, whether of Paris or Salamanca or Alcalá or Bologna, but "against catholic faith." Hence too this (1 Timothy 6): "He does not agree to the sound words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to that doctrine which is according to piety." He did not say "the sound words of his bishop," not of those who inquire into faith, not even of many theologians, but "of our Lord," etc. If, then, someone does not agree either with the divine books or with the Church's doctrine, he is a heretic, even if he has not been warned by friends, by theologians, or by judges of faith. Conversely, however, if, having rejected the warnings and precepts of all these, he nonetheless rejects the words of God and the Church not through deliberate effort but through ignorance, he is not a heretic.

Nor indeed do the same reasons underlie the fact that other vices, when they proceed from crass and negligent ignorance, lose their name and species. For "murderer" is said not only of one who kills a man by deliberate effort, but of one who kills unjustly, even if he did this out of perturbation of mind or even imprudently. And likewise in the rest. Now, Saint Thomas either prudently warns judges of faith and instructs them in what they ought not merely to suspect, but even to assume and judge; or he does not think that matters current in the mouths of all Catholics can be unknown to any believer at all, unless he has affected the error; or he speaks of imperfect heresy, which neither requires pertinacy nor makes one absolutely and simply a heretic, but in a certain manner. And this same response applies to those words too which we cited above from Part I. But Chrysostom stands with us, not against us. For one who resists doctrine not out of a zeal for contention but for learning truth, when he is prepared to be taught — him neither Chrysostom nor anyone else would properly call a heretic. And yet it cannot be called into question that those of whom Paul was speaking to Timothy had sinned gravely. It is found, then, on Chrysostom's authority, that an error contrary to faith, although it is a fault, is nonetheless not heresy, because it is the error not of a malicious man but of an ignorant one. But if we follow Chrysostom's interpretation, Paul was not speaking of heretics — who, since they are obstinately combative, are not to be admonished, but avoided.

This sense the judges of faith seem to follow, when they generally command that heretics, even omitting brotherly correction, be denounced. This precept, given generally, is most full of prudence — although not all heretics' ears are, as some falsely

think, so closed to truth that they cannot hear truth from a friend, especially a learned and wise one. This hope, I confess, concerning heretical friends, is not to be held indiscriminately by the unlearned: this confidence will belong to the few, and to those most prudent, wise, and closely bonded ones, who both prudently understand for whom salvation is not to be despaired of, and can wisely and amicably recall their own back to the Church's faith. It is not absurd to understand Paul, too, in his letter to Timothy, to be speaking of these not-very-obstinate ones (Saint Thomas, II-II, question 33, article 7). I do not, however, wish anyone — however learned and friendly — in this most dangerous age, where heretics are, for the most part or entirely, most obstinate, to abuse brotherly correction, unless he firmly and certainly judges the heretic can be converted from the heart. For one ought not, on account of conjectures, however probable or even likely, expose so weighty a matter to danger — especially since it has been established by experience how much harm attempted correction in a charge of heresy has brought to our own people.

A learned and prudent man ought to remember that Paul counsels a woman to remain with an unbelieving husband — since, namely, among the Gentiles to whom he was then writing, there was hope that a wife might entice her husband to the faith. But when the Church discovered that, especially among the Jews, wives were rather corrupted by their husbands, it most prudently decreed that a wife converted to the faith should not remain with an unbelieving husband. By this law it did not overturn Paul's counsel, but confirmed it. Thus judges of faith, when, having received many and great experiences, they establish a law for denouncing a heretic, even a hidden one, do not violate the law of brotherly correction prescribed by Christ, but stabilize it. Nor did the lawgiver conflict with nature's rights, when he most wisely proclaimed: "If your brother, or your son, or your daughter, or your wife who is in your bosom, or your friend whom you love as your own soul, should try to persuade you secretly, saying: Let us go and serve foreign gods, whom neither you nor your fathers have known... your eye shall not spare him, that you should have pity on him and hide him, but you shall kill him immediately," etc. (Deuteronomy 13). This law, then, must be diligently observed by the people in the crime of heresy, lest, while indulging a man out of false mercy, they be cruel toward the public affairs of Christ.

(To the second confirmation of the fifth argument.) Nor will it be worthwhile to discuss here whether the Apostles were heretics — for whoever admits this, with what rebuke, or rather with what reproach, should I try to turn him away from so great an error? Could anything, immortal God, be said more absurd than that the first ministers of the Gospel, to a man, were not only estranged from faith, but even heretics? How much more truly

and modestly do those think who suppose that the Apostles of Christ sinned not through malice, nor deliberately, but through perturbation of mind and ignorance. The Lord openly foretold to them his death and resurrection, and yet they themselves, as Luke says, "did not understand the things that were said" (Luke 18): and shall we believe that the disciples, after so many and so great disturbances stirred up, doubted not from perturbation of mind, but from malice? For what kind of unbelief and hardness of heart that was, the Evangelist explained to us, saying: "Because they did not believe those who had seen him risen." Those, moreover, who had seen him were altogether worthy of being believed, but they could nonetheless be deceived. Certain Apostles, then, not believing these, though attested by many uncorrupted witnesses, were hard, and were unbelieving too — but not toward God, toward men. They were, then, obstinate against men, not against God and his Christ. Wherefore to charge Christ's disciples with heresy is a manifest folly, if what we have said in establishing the definition of heresy has been rightly said and confirmed. It has been confirmed, moreover, that many things must concur to constitute someone a heretic. First, he must have error. Then, that this error be contrary to catholic truth. Third, it must be certain and established that this error conflicts with catholic truth. Fourth, that pertinacy be joined to the error — not any pertinacy, but one that conflicts with a certain rule of the Church. Fifth, that this error occur, after the profession of faith has been undertaken, in one who professes to believe in Christ.

Thus far we have, in a thin and compressed manner for our theologians, defined what heresy is, from which it will immediately become clear what a heretical proposition is. For in the mind they are entirely the same thing; but, in speech or writing, a proposition is called "heretical" which enunciates internal heresy and is entirely a sign of it. But since God alone knows both the hearts and thoughts of the sons of men, no mortal, indeed, can have another's heresy clearly known and firmly conceived and comprehended in his mind. Wherefore, since speech and writing itself, and finally all other external signs, are sometimes deceptive, it is not easy to express certain and constant formulas for judges of faith, so that they may be able to judge rightly and orderly concerning heresies. For theologians, when they have discovered a proposition to be manifestly contrary to catholic faith, will perhaps immediately subscribe to it being heretical, since they sometimes speak of the matters themselves, laid out bare, according to genus and nature, and sometimes neglect what they call "circumstances," or certainly leave them to the trust and diligence of the judges. Thus they think they have properly discharged their office, if they have examined only this one point: whether the error whose mark is sought from them is openly opposed to faith.

But since, for completing heresy, certain other things are necessary besides that which is proscribed and condemned by the laws, it does not seem to have been well provided for the weakness and innocence of many, unless the censors of faith are warned again and again to strive most diligently to investigate the judgment, disposition, and mind of those erring, and this especially: whether they have that pertinacy which we have carefully and diligently defined above — for on this point especially turns the hinge of ecclesiastical judgment in this matter. Nor is it enough, for a sentence on heresy to be duly and justly rendered, merely to have touched upon heresy by suspicion; rather, some comprehension is needed, so that judgment may be rendered concerning errors without error. For unless the judge, as it were, holds these matters in hand, the judgment will be nearly rash and hasty. But if, in a capital case, civil laws have prescribed that proofs be clearer than the light of noonday, what ought to be done by the Church's judges in deciding those causes, in which not only the property, honor, reputation, and life of one man is at stake, but also the distinguished and everlasting reputation of an entire race and family? Come, then, let us establish norms by which the Church's judges may safely use in judging heresy.

Chapter VIII

Three Rules, to which the External Judgments of Faith are to be Directed

The first formula is ready at hand: the testimony of the one erring against himself — which, in every forum, is an established argument of an admitted crime, especially if the accused testifies to his own crime of his own accord and will. Although even that confession, which the judge extracts from the accused by inquiry and torture, according to both civil and canonical laws, is suitable for producing conviction in an external judgment. But on this whole matter, both of confession and of inquiry, it is more fittingly discussed not by theologians in any school, but by legal experts, and even by certain of the best men conversing familiarly.

Nor indeed would I wish anyone to interpret the words of this formula in the sense that the accused, who perhaps does not know the force and nature of heresy, is himself to estimate heresy by his own judgment, and that the judges are to follow him in their sentence. Rather, it must be understood thus: that the accused, both from his deeds and words, and from the testimony of his own conscience and mind, is a witness against himself — that the judges, from his deeds, words, mind, and disposition, detect the heresy, whose notion they ought to have set before their eyes in every judgment of faith and religion.

My own teacher once came upon a man who vehemently affirmed himself to be a heretic. "Why so?" he asks. "Why do you think yourself a heretic?" He responded that he held something against the catholic faith. Here my teacher presses further: "Do you believe the catholic faith to be false?" "By no means at all," says this man, "for I consider myself a heretic — that is, erring and estranged from truth — precisely because I think contrary to the catholic faith." Now my teacher, unable to contain his laughter, said: "Go, fool! You are all the less a heretic, the more you think yourself a heretic. For, indeed, the matter is safe, if you feel yourself to be erring precisely when you resist the catholic faith." Thus the man's folly was grasped not so much by theological reasoning as by the hands of prudence.

It also once happened to me myself that I received, from judges of faith, certain errors, I know not what, to be marked — certainly the errors of a man who, as I later discovered, had come to the tribunal neither by the judges' command nor summons, but by the persuasion and counsel of a certain priest, whom he had as the minister of his confession. Of his own accord, then, and by his own judgment, he had, before a notary receiving it, disclosed very many heresies against himself (so he thought). To me, then, it was referred, that I should give marks of the errors. When I saw them to be many and varied, I began to think more carefully to myself who could be considered their author. Whoever this man was, he seemed to have drawn certain little streams, as it were, partly from Arius's, partly from Macedonius's, partly from Wycliffe's, partly from Luther's sources. You would believe he had assiduously immersed himself in the reading of all the heretics. But if there had been any consequence and connection of matters, or any composition and joining together of the errors, this suspicion too would have occurred to me. But since I perceived that, in such an abundance of errors, there was no coherence, no bond, it occurred to me that this was more the man's insanity than heresy.

I did not wish, then, to judge the errors before first examining the author's disposition and judgment. I asked the judges, then, whether there was an opportunity to see the man. They said there was. For he had been placed in custody, and thrown into prison. He is freed from his bonds, brought forth before us, I look at him with my eyes, perceive with my mind, and see that he is not of sufficiently sound mind. I made a test from present matters, which it would take too long to recount; I proved the matter to be as I had thought beforehand. Yet I could scarcely tear the fixed opinion from the judges' minds. But I finally prevailed and persuaded them, and, as they were good men, they yielded, and dismissed the man — insane, having voluntarily confessed and convicted by his own judgment, empty of brain but also free of all punishment — to his parents' house. And on these matters there is no need for theologians to prescribe; nonetheless

they are worth knowing, for they pertain to that use which legal experts are to derive from the theological topics, which matter we are discussing in this book. Let us now pursue the rest, for this formula only needed to be touched upon.

Saint Thomas produced another, in the First Part (question 32, article 4) and on the first letter to the Corinthians (chapter 11, lecture 4). It is of this kind: if the error contrary to faith concerns matters which it is in no way probable those erring are ignorant certainly pertain to catholic faith, then the judges will safely pronounce on heresy.

As, for example, if any man, even from the middle of the common people, should deny that Christ was fixed to the cross, truly died, was truly raised from the dead, or should say it is superfluous and vain to pray for the dead, that the just are affected by no reward from God, the wicked by no punishment, and other such things. Likewise, if a man, long and greatly practiced in the theology of the school, should contend that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, or that the Father and Son are two principles of this same Spirit, or that there are not three parts of penance, or that it is by no means lawful for Christians to wage war with enemies, or that a bishop is not superior to a simple priest, or anything of this kind which it is incredible theologians should not know pertains to the Church's common faith — especially if, as I said, they have long and greatly exercised themselves in the school.

In this matter, I do not doubt that judges have sometimes erred through excessive leniency, or certainly great ignorance. For I do not wish to suspect that the laws of faith are yielded, through favor, either to the fury of the people or to the will of the powerful. There were, a few days before this, certain theologians held most learned, caught in those errors which no one who was even moderately versed in theological matters could doubt were both proper to the Lutherans and contrary to the Church's common faith. They were compelled to abjure heresies, as if suspected of heresies, not convicted. Though, indeed, if these things had been directed not by the most exacting standard of the metricists or musicians, but by the plumb-line of common law and ordinary reasoning, no judgment would have been easier or more straightforward. It was shameful, however, that experts should doubt what not even rustics doubt — namely, that it is in no way likely that men should be found in ignorance of those matters which they have long and greatly treated. Who, indeed, would believe that men most versed in theology (so the common people thought) were ignorant and unrefined in matters known and widely published among all theologians?

I had it in mind to write down what these theologians' errors had been, so that, in this image, as it were, this precept's rule might appear more illustrious, and future judges too

might be warned to be wise at another's peril, and not think relaxation and softness of mind to be clemency and mercy. For I feared that a pernicious example might be given to both the accused and the judges. For what is done by example, men think it is right to do. But since the accused themselves have already departed this life, and are free from all hatred and envy, I did not think such errors ought to be publicized — for, if I published them, attested and sealed, to everlasting memory of their shame, I would seem to cast slanders not only against the dead accused, but even against the living judges. Although I perhaps fear there, where there was no fear.

But however these matters stand, I have warned legal experts not to bring themselves to believe that there are no pertinacious men except those who have despised the judges' warnings and precepts. Before such human exhortations, believe me, the true pertinacy of heretics is found — namely, of those who are by no means ignorant that their opinions conflict with the Church's faith. The very voice of all the faithful, this same common sense, suffices — I say not for one warning, but for a thousand. Wherefore whoever spurns the Church's single voice is much more pertinacious than if he had despised six hundred theologians or judges. On the second rule, then, this much.

We shall have this third rule: if judges doubt concerning the pertinacy of some person erring, two matters must be more accurately handled by them, of which one is proper to theologians, the other common to legal experts along with theologians. The former, then, the legal expert will borrow from the theologian; the latter he will claim by his own right.

First, then, let the judges have explained and defined by the wisest theologians whether the error which comes into judgment openly conflicts with catholic faith. For, on one side, the judgment of heresy will be excluded in two ways: either because it is uncertain that the dogma contrary to that error is a truth of catholic faith, or because the opposition of such an error and catholic truth is obscure and a matter of opinion. As, for example, if someone should formerly have denied that the letter to the Hebrews was Paul's, but held it certain that it was canonical, and raised a question about the author of the letter, not about its authority — there are theologians who think this to be heresy. I myself, however, unless the Church's definition stood in the way, do not think Christ's faith is placed in any extreme danger, if we do not know the author of a canonical book, provided we know the book to be canonical. Wherefore, whether someone should say the author of that letter was Paul, or Luke, or Barnabas, if the letter's authority is solid, fixed, and constant for him, he will not immediately overturn Christ's faith. Since, then, in Saint Jerome's time it was not yet established, with certainty, whether it was a certain truth of faith that Paul wrote that letter to the Hebrews, if the contrary error had then

been referred to the tribunal of faith, it would perhaps have been a judgment of a crime, but would not have been a judgment of heresy. Likewise, that we need God's special help so that we may believe, hope, and love as is fitting, is a most certain dogma of faith by far. Whoever denies that there are infused habits of hope and charity will, as some think, conflict with this dogma; but since that conflict, though it appears quite probable, is nonetheless not comprehended by manifest reasoning, the error of such men is to be noted, their rashness and impudence noted; but heresy is not even to be suspected before the decrees of the Holy Council of Trent.

This point, without anyone mentioning it, warns the censors of faith to receive that loan which they are necessarily to take from theologians, not from just any, but from learned, experienced, and practiced ones. These, since they have established which of theology's topics are certain and firm, and which, on the contrary, are probable and not necessary, then, by frequent and ready use of theological arguments, easily detect whichever errors clearly conflict with catholic faith.

The other matter was that judges should apply diligent effort so that the pertinacy of the one erring might become clear to them. If this is perhaps called into doubt, and is not gathered either from prior words or deeds, or from the erring person's status, condition, and disposition, they will detect it by no better method than by showing to the one erring a certain mark of that catholic truth which his error contradicts. As, if some open passage of Scripture should be produced, or the definition of a legitimate general council, or a constant decree of the apostolic see, or any one other certain mark of those by which both catholic truths and their contrary heresies are judged. If, when these signs and marks are produced, he yields, this will be a most probable argument of ignorance; but if he resists, it will be a most certain argument of pertinacy — especially if he is not lacking in either talent or learning. For if he is so unrefined and unskilled that he can in no way have understanding of these matters, I would indeed prescribe no certain rule or constant prescription, by which such a man's pertinacy might become known.

Certainly, if any formula is to be described in a rough and thick manner, it will be this judgment: the Church's common sentence and the same agreement and conspiracy of the faithful — to which, if this man is opposed even when he sees that all are against him, he will be judged pertinacious and accordingly a heretic.

Nor, however, will it be necessary to traverse the whole world and ask the opinion of each individual faithful person. For what is the opinion of individual faithful persons is not weighed by any art, or by diligence and inquiry, but is judged by a certain sense of prudence, as it were. For just as, if someone should deny that all fire heats, there is no

need, for him to be held obstinate against nature, to establish that general proposition by induction and demonstration of individual fires, but rather by signification and reasoning, since, once certain instances are demonstrated, the same reasoning applies to the rest — so too, in the Church's faith, he will be pertinacious who has resisted all the faithful of his province or city in a matter of faith.

But let us leave these matters, and grant this to our own dullness: for we are inept, in that we drive the dull and unrefined to a rule and line. All these matters which we have said in establishing this last rule, if you direct them according to common prudence's reasoning, will perhaps be correct; but if you wish to weigh them by the precepts of a more exacting discipline, certain of them will perhaps be found not correct. For what can we prescribe, in such uneven variety of both matters and minds, that could be equal among all and one for everyone? — especially since such causes are almost entirely a matter of conjecture, in which judges, by certain indications and traces, attempt to penetrate into men's very hearts, which, if they could know, they would need no plumb-lines, no norms, no rules.

What heresy is, then, what a heretical proposition is, and by what way and method both the theologian and the legal expert are to distinguish them, I think I have now said enough and more than enough.

Chapter IX

On the Erroneous Proposition, the Heresy-savoring One, the One Offensive to Pious Ears, the Rash One, the Scandalous One

Next, as was proposed, let us look at the erroneous proposition. Its notion and definition is not the same for everyone, but each has his own — so that you may prove even here that saying to be true: "As many men, so many opinions." This, first of all, must be defined and established: that the erroneous proposition is separated from the heretical one not merely in thought, but in reality too. For, as some think, the Council of Constance, from which we have received these various kinds of errors, does not use "erroneous proposition" in a general sense, as though it were the common genus of heretical error and the rest — which seems to be the proper signification of this term. For who would believe an erroneous proposition to be anything other than an error?

But the Council, as I said, is far from this usage — which I shall immediately make plain, if I cite the fathers' own words: "It is discovered," they say, "from the aforesaid articles, that many are notoriously heretical, others not catholic but erroneous, others scandalous, some offensive to pious ears, several rash." This form of speech would be both false and absurd, if the erroneous proposition were commonly taken for any error

whatsoever. For then it could equally rightly be said, after many argumentations have been enumerated, that among them some are syllogisms, some inductions, some argumentations — which is so inept that no one fails to understand it. Without doubt, then, the erroneous proposition is separated from the heretical one, not as a genus from a species, which would be a distinction of reason, but as one species of error from another, which is a true distinction of things, not merely of terms.

This, then, we ought next to establish — which perhaps ought to have been said earlier, but a late lesson is not to be reproved, especially if it has been reserved for an opportune time — namely, that catholic truths are found not in a single manner, but in two divisions. For there are certain catholic truths which pertain to faith in such a way that, if they were removed, faith itself would be removed too. These we have, by frequent usage, called not only catholic truths, but truths of faith. There are other truths which are themselves catholic and universal too — namely, which the whole Church holds — which, though overturned, shake faith, but do not overturn it. And in the contrary errors of such truths, I said above, faith is obscured, not extinguished, weakened, not destroyed. These I have never thought should be called "truths of faith," although they are truths of Christian doctrine: "Special prayers applied to one person, through prelates or religious, benefit that person more than general ones"; "Friars are not bound to seek their living by manual labor, but are permitted to be mendicants"; and several other similar propositions, which all Catholics without doubt think true, and which can, and even ought to, be called catholic truths. Those propositions, then, which contradict the truths of this latter kind, I call erroneous — which, since they are contrary to catholic doctrine, are errors close to heresy, but are not heresies.

Nor do we speak this way merely by our own custom, but this too is grounded in the custom and speech of our forefathers: that they attribute the name of the genus, absolutely, to that species which is most imperfect in that genus. Thus Aristotle, in the Categories, separated disposition from habit, although disposition is otherwise a genus of habit itself. For virtue — which no one is unaware is a habit — is a disposition of the perfect toward the best. And, so that we need not cite more examples, of which there are almost innumerable, this is common, worn smooth even in the common people's mouths — that they sometimes take the term "animal," although common to all living creatures, only for those in which nothing appears except the mere force of animation. From this custom not even Paul shrank, when he called man "animal" — as it were, brutish and devoid of reason. The fathers of the Council of Constance too seem to have spoken in this sense, if we weigh their words carefully. From this we easily understand that erroneous propositions were divided from catholic ones, and placed at a lower rank

than heretical ones. An error, then, which is something less than open heresy, yet contrary to catholic doctrine, is called an "erroneous proposition." More modest theologians, finally, when in their disputations they do not dare call something against sound doctrine "heretical," confirm, with a more moderate term, that it is "erroneous." Since, then, I am drawn and compelled to this sense both by common custom and by a greater reasoning of philosophy, I easily allow myself to be brought to it, and gladly wish to be retained in it.

There is also another degree, likewise, of the erroneous proposition. For when some truth is, in the vehement opinion of the wise, indeed a truth of faith, but has not been plainly defined by the Church nor demonstrated by certain argument, then to oppose that truth is not heretical, but erroneous. Namely, heresy, as we said above, depends on the will of those erring too, not merely on the intellect. Error, however, like falsity, is weighed from the very matters signified, with no regard to the one asserting it. Thus, although that truth pertains to faith by its own nature, since this is neither certain nor established, heretical pertinacy is absent, but grave and dangerous error is not absent.

Similarly, a proposition can also be called erroneous in a certain third degree, which is contrary to a certain catholic truth of faith — not manifestly, indeed, but by the far probable and nearly necessary opinion of all the wise. For grave is the error of one who obstinately defends what all learned men think constitutes great danger to catholic faith. Whoever, then, either clearly overturns an appendage of the doctrine of faith, or brings faith itself into peril, errs vehemently indeed in Christian discipline, and accordingly his sayings are rightly called erroneous. But on the erroneous proposition, more than enough has been said.

The proposition that "savors of heresy" is defined by some as that which, in the signification which the words show at first sight, has a heretical sense, though, piously understood, it has some true sense — such as, they say, are these propositions: "The Father is greater than the Son," "Christ is a creature," "There are three gods." This definition neither expresses the power of the term, nor declares the force and nature of the matter defined, nor is it joined to it by any mutual connection. For who would doubt that this proposition, "It is ridiculous to carry the Sacrament of the Eucharist about with solemn rite through the public streets," savors of the Lutherans' heresy, by which they deny that the true body of Christ is contained in the Eucharist? And yet it is not true in any pious sense. You will read many such propositions, everywhere, in Erasmus, John Carion, and certain other writers of this present age, which neither carry open heresies, nor have any sound sense, but, since they carry a certain taste and smell of heresy, we rightly say they savor of heresy, and that those who produce them both have

the taste, and produce the smell, of heretics.

Nor do those examples please me, by which they illustrate their definition. I desire truer examples indeed, and more fitted to the matter under discussion — although, in this category, nothing should be required of those who think all these degrees of propositions are mixed and confused. But the first example is taken from John's Gospel and Christ's doctrine. That Christ's doctrine and the Gospel savor of heresy, I would not dare to write. That second example is fitting and apt, if we agree with those who think that discourse, "Christ is a creature," is simply true, but that theologians refuted it because it acquired a certain stench from Arius. On this opinion Saint Thomas said much (III, question 16, article 8). And Sophronius, at the Sixth Synod (action 11), plainly confesses Christ to be both created and uncreated, and this same John of Damascus too, in book 3. But Jerome too (on Isaiah 45) does not shrink from the term "creature" applied to Christ. I myself, however, have always been persuaded that this statement is both simply false and absolutely contrary to catholic faith. For in the word "creature" there is an internal negation implicit, which absolutely removes divinity from Christ's supposit. For he who says something was made from nothing thereby denies it existed from the substance of the one generating it: for it is by this distinction that what is truly and properly "made" is separated from what is truly and properly "begotten." Just as, then, "Christ began to be" is contrary to faith, since it evidently follows from this that the Son of God began to be, and accordingly at some point did not exist, so too "Christ was made from nothing" is contrary to faith, since it implicitly denies that the Son of God exists from the nature of the one from whom he came into being. Whether "beginning," then, or "being made," or "being a creature," cannot be truly enunciated of the Son of God, since they contain a hidden and lurking denial which would exclude the Son of God, for whom the name "Christ" is taken, either from being eternal or from being from the Father.

Thus, as it seems to me, these propositions and other such were condemned by the Nicene Fathers not as savoring of heresy but as heretical. But that a heretical proposition and one savoring of heresy are the same, does not seem likely to me. For a man would surely be considered foolish who, of a thing certainly established to be wine, should say it "tastes of wine" — unless as a joke or in ridicule. Now, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three gods openly conflicts with faith. For that sense which is called "pious" is impious. By this same reasoning, certainly, that proposition, "Deity was crucified," would be said to savor of heresy — which, however, the Fifth Synod manifestly condemned as heretical. Likewise, "Essence generates essence" would be placed at the rank of savoring heresy, which the Lateran Council defines must be placed

among the number of heretical statements. What of these? "The divine essence is not the person of the Father," "In the three persons there are three deities," and several other such, which certain people, in a novel sense recently devised by themselves, have said are true. Certainly nothing so absurd could be said or devised that, if you twist it into some contrived sense, would not be true and consonant with both human and divine reason. But it is not consonant to call such fabricated meanings, foreign to the usage of the saints and the Church, "pious," and to defend frivolous men by the contrivance of such meanings.

I myself, indeed, to say what I think, judge that the authors of these propositions had nothing less than the taste of heretics. But if I perceive some taste in them by my own palate, that taste is of ignorance, not of heresy. But when I hold to the force of speech and the custom of words, I do not say the propositions we are discussing savor of heresy, but that they manifestly conflict with faith. These metaphorical discourses, moreover, we can perceive better by considered understanding than explain by a circumscribed definition. Wherefore what savors of heresy, and what does not, is judged not so much by the definition and argumentation of a speculative discipline, as by a certain sense and taste of prudence. You would see a man exercised in refuting the dogmas of the Lutherans and discerning the mind — who, like a hunting dog, most keenly investigates, by a certain scent of suspicion, the heresies in a book he undertakes to read, and most sharply senses that the author of that book is corrupted. Another blockhead, without sense, might read this same book, and be able to detect nothing at all, smell nothing, touch nothing even by suspicion. Such are, today, not a few who, having Baptista of Crema, Heinrich Herp, John Tauler, and other authors of this stripe daily in their hands, daily on their lips, nonetheless grasp their errors in mind and spirit by no scent, no traces, no taste. Surely the Lord has taken away from Judah and Jerusalem the judge and the prophet, and the diviner, and the elder... and the wise man among the architects, and the prudent one — not only of mystical speech, but of judging hidden heresy. Why should the dogs not be mute and unable to bark, who now have no keenness of nostrils for investigating? And though wolves declare, by so many signs, what they are and what they wish, what they seek and desire, a certain stupor has nonetheless mostly overcome the dogs, while the shepherds are going blind and deaf, in some manner, so that they neither hear what is warned by keen-scented men, nor see what is done by wolves — unless perhaps all of them, both shepherds and dogs, have grown stupid and fallen silent from fear. But wherever this stupidity comes from, it is the same for the Church's ruin. For wicked men can now safely not merely bring their speech near the ear, to creep like cancer, but spread their poison more openly and vomit forth the most pestilent venom of their error. This, had the mind not been on the wrong side, could have been

distinguished and discerned from sound humor even when hidden and enclosed in the veins, by applied diligence and care and grave and sharp judgment, just as white color can be distinguished from black, or sweet taste from bitter. But it is not for this occasion to lament the Church's calamity.

For now this alone is at issue: that the tastes of propositions are to be discerned more by the powers of sensing and tasting than by those of speculating. For it is these, not nature, that distinguish them. Thus they are judged not by precepts and rules, but by prudence and keenness. I shall dispatch this matter briefly and make it clear with a single example. You will read that proposition, "The Father is greater than I," in the Gospel. You have the author of this doctrine known and understood; you attend diligently to the preceding and following words in the Gospel; you hold in memory the rest of that doctrine's principles. You will now discover, unless your taste is affected by some bad humor, that this proposition, "The Father is greater than I," does not taste to you of heresy, but of modesty. Athanasius read this same proposition in the books of the Arians; he knew the authors inside and out; he had perceived the Arian doctrine's causes and effects, principles and connections. And what, in Christ's Gospel, was sweeter than honey and the honeycomb, this same proposition, transferred into Arius's books, tasted of heresy, and was most bitter to his palate. And just as the same wine tastes of pitch from one vessel, and does not taste of it from another, and the same thing smells badly, from a dung-heap, well, from a woman's jewel-box, so one and the same discourse breathes a most pleasant scent from one heart and mouth, a most foul one from another, retains a sweet taste from one, an unpleasant one from another. Just as we also see water smell and taste differently from the roots and channels through which it passes. Not, then, from the very nature of things and discourses is every taste or smell to be judged, but sometimes things and discourses themselves receive taste and smell from the veins and paths through which they pass. The taste of propositions, then, as I said, is judged not so much by science as by prudence. Wherefore which proposition savors of heresy, and which, on the contrary, does not, not just any theologian, but only the prudent and experienced, will be able to judge.

The same, moreover, I would say of the proposition that "sounds badly," or is offensive to pious ears. For there is, just as of the tongue and nostrils, so too of the ears, their own judgment, rejecting absurd and repugnant sounds. But just as not only false and most absurd matters, but even grave and true statements, expressed in disorderly words, offend ears — especially sharp and keen ones — so too the refined and religious ears of theologians recoil not only from false and heretical opinions, but also from those which they perceive, by an understanding judgment, to sound badly and absurdly, even though

they detect in them no falsity of heresy.

We can, then, speak of the ill-sounding proposition in two ways: in one way, generally, whereby every proposition contrary to faith offends the ears of the faithful, and all the more, the more openly they see it to be contrary to catholic faith; in another way, specifically, whereby we establish a certain rank of propositions distinct from that supreme rank of heretical ones. In this sense we properly call "ill-sounding" and "offensive to pious ears" those propositions in which no error contrary to faith can be manifestly noted, but something dissonant and absurd, I know not what, which seems unworthy of pious and religious ears. Indeed, in discerning these dissonant and absurd propositions, I would not wish to give ear to the unlearned and imprudent common crowd, whose judgment is most crude. Certainly, although, in certain matters — those, namely, common to all the faithful — right judgment has been given by faith to the learned and unlearned equally and commonly, so that propositions held ill-sounding by the crowd's opinion are also, for the most part, ill-sounding by the judgment of the intelligent, the promiscuous crowd's hearing is generally rather duller — sometimes, indeed, more tender than is needed — and often both receives with the ears and bears in mind many things which cultivated and understanding ears reject; on the contrary, it refutes certain things as dissonant which do not provoke skilled and wise theologians at all, indeed do not even move them. "Skilled and wise theologians," I say. For, in certain persons, the ear's sense is most fastidious, in certain others even most arrogant. Since, then, certain theologians too reject some things which mild and modest ears do not offend at all, it is necessary, if we wish to judge these matters rightly and wisely, to have a polished, refined, subtle, prudent sense of the ears.

But if the Church had placed the judgment of dissonant and consonant propositions in the ears of the common crowd, we would certainly judge that proposition, "The Blessed Virgin contracted original sin from the first parent," to sound badly and offend pious ears. For the crowd, hearing it, would without doubt be struck, shocked, tormented. But offense to pious ears is a crime. To place this among crimes, however, when the Church has judged it foreign to every crime, is a mark of rash insolence. Certain words of the Gospel too, if the crowd is our law, would have sounded badly and been offensive to pious ears too. For the Lord sometimes stirred up the crowds with ambiguous and obscure words. Indeed, he sometimes struck the disciples' tender little ears remarkably and harshly — for he was accustomed to grate the Pharisees' ears with a biting truth. The Pharisees, having heard Christ's word, were scandalized; his discourse was hard for most disciples; the crowds thought he had a demon.

Nor is it in doubt that, in this present age too, there are certain Pharisees, a stolid crowd and multitude blunted by false opinions, and, finally, certain disciples, for whom the discourse of truth is most harsh. These, if you should reprove the abuses which are very numerous in worshiping and adorning images, in chapels, temples, monasteries, sepulchral monuments, and everlasting memorials being erected; if you should assert that, in such matters, sometimes, or rather too often, vanity prevails more than religion, the devil more than Christ — these, I say, will perhaps say you, seized by Lutheran opinions, pour forth intolerable sounds. There is, then, no need to have regard for the promiscuous, weak, perturbed, imprudent crowd, but for the prudent, sincere, pious, uncorrupted one. Nor is theology alone required, but piety and prudence too, without which no ears can distinguish consonant from dissonant sounds.

Wherefore, to conclude once and for all, since it is not for just anyone to distinguish an ill-sounding proposition from a well-sounding one, the most prudent theologians, as I have already said again and again, must be consulted by the Church's judges, unless they wish to err vehemently in judgments of these matters.

And although we ourselves have no comprehension, no definition, by which judges may be able to judge each individual ill-sounding proposition in particular, we can nonetheless, in a general way, note this: that there are two degrees of such propositions. One, of those we said above savor of heresy — namely, those which taste badly to the faithful's palate also sound badly to the hearing. But since the sense of taste is cruder and thicker, hearing more subtle and sharp, the other degree of ill-sounding propositions is that which, though they do not savor of heresy, nonetheless carry a certain absurd and foreign sound, which seems to differ from sound doctrine and the sincere and solid speech of the Church. In this manner they strike those pious ears both harshly and gravely, although the reason why they strike thus is often most hidden.

Of this kind these examples seem most fitting, which the Council of Constance noted: "The degrees and masterships of universities were introduced by vain worldly ambition, and profit the Church as much as the devil"; "Sylvester and Constantine erred by endowing the Church"; "The Roman Church is the synagogue of Satan"; "The election of the Pope by the Cardinals was introduced by the devil." Likewise: "The Pope ought not to be called 'most holy' on account of his office; otherwise the devil would be called holy, since he is God's official." Likewise: "More people are now saved at Rome from among the married than from among the clergy." Likewise: "Monasticism is not piety." Likewise: "The monarchy of the Roman bishop arose after the time of Saint Jerome." Likewise: "Phocas established the Roman Church as the head of all the churches." And countless others, which, lest I be too long, I omit.

If anyone should have so delicate a palate as to judge that these propositions too carry the taste of heresy, I would not contend greatly with him, especially concerning one or another of these. Although my palate, I confess, is sometimes dull and sluggish; my ear is more subtle and alert. Thus I find it easier to perceive propositions by hearing than by tasting. But, as I said, neither sense is instructed by rules, if prudence and a certain spirit of judgment are lacking; but if these are present, without our precepts, a theologian's judgment can be most correct. On the ill-sounding proposition, then, this much.

The rash proposition, likewise, is customarily used in two ways: commonly and properly. Commonly, so that every proposition averse to faith is also called rash, even if it is manifest heresy: for what could be more full of the most inconsiderate and mad rashness than to contradict Christ's Church? But this term is properly used when an assertion can be marked as rash, as heretical, erroneous, or savoring of heresy cannot. In this sense, the rash proposition holds the last place after these degrees of propositions.

Rashness, moreover, is understood not in one simple way. For we sometimes say things are done "rashly" which are done not deliberately but by chance. In this sense, rash are those things which are blurted out turbulently and without deliberation. In this signification, rashness — which is led to judgment by no discernment or discrimination — is contrary to wisdom, in which not chance and fortune, but reason and deliberation, hold sway. He, then, who, moved by no reason or authority, affirms matters, but writes and repeatedly asserts rashly, or whatever comes to his lips, is rightly reproved as foolish and rash. For, though he sometimes speaks the truth, it is not deliberation and reason but chance and luck that brings it about that he speaks truly. Such are certain things which certain pious men rather fabricate than contemplate concerning the life and deeds of Christ the Lord — which they also write not so much truly and prudently as devoutly and fervently. Their credulity in assenting, and facility in asserting, is sometimes blind and rash indeed, but this rashness is nonetheless not of such a kind that it ought to be restrained by judges of faith, who can, by their own right, undertake censure of graver errors, but cannot of this lighter imprudence or folly. For knowledge of faith has been entrusted to them, not of prudence — especially that prudence which often fails pious men. We see, however, that such meditations or contemplations, though published inconsiderately and imprudently, without reason and grave testimony, are generally joined with piety, and even with sanctity. It is not fitting, then, that dove-like simplicity be vexed by the judgment of a most severe tribunal, however inconsiderate and imprudent it may be.

It is also said to be "rashly asserted" what is asserted insolently and too boldly. In this manner, in all matters, boldness in asserting and rashness in pronouncing is shameful

indeed, but in those matters which pertain to the Church's doctrine it is especially dangerous. For it carries an arrogant contempt of the ecclesiastical rule — a contempt which, unless judges of faith restrain and suppress it, it cannot be said how great a danger the whole Church's doctrine would incur. Those propositions, then, which are asserted not merely with inconsiderate speech, but — to use graver terms — with confident boldness, insolent effrontery, impudent exultation, and arrogant boasting — I say not against faith, but against the rule of ecclesiastical modesty — theologians at present judge to be rash, and place and establish among the degrees of error which, since they are appendages of heresies, are to be attended to by judges of faith.

As: "The Blessed Virgin was not assumed into heaven with her body" — which, though by no means contrary to faith, is said with insolent rashness, since it conflicts with the Church's common consensus. Likewise: "In baptism, informing grace and the virtues are not infused into infants" — since the Council of Vienne judged the contrary opinion to be chosen. Likewise: "An angel was not created simultaneously with the corporeal world"; or: "he himself is not incorporeal either" — the contrary of both of which the Lateran Council under Innocent III taught us. Likewise: "The day of judgment will be on some certain day, month, or year to come" — say, for example, five or six years from now — which the Lateran Council under Leo X carefully guarded against and provided for; for it is no small rashness to claim foreknowledge of that matter which the Father has divinely placed in his own power, and has revealed neither to the apostles nor to angels. Likewise: "John the Evangelist was sanctified in the womb"; and, in sum, all those propositions in which someone is excepted, without suitable testimony or probable reason, from the universal law of faith and the Scriptures. For exceptions of this kind, though they do not remove the laws of faith, rashly cut them short.

There is, finally, that rash proposition too which conflicts, in a matter of the doctrine of faith, with the common decree and definition of a celebrated university. For although the Parisian articles circulate, which are not all articles of faith — since they do not even remotely touch upon this matter — Christ's Church has nonetheless always looked up to that academy's fixed and constant decrees on faith and religion. But those who despised them, and thought them empty and light and worth nothing, have all, to a man, come into danger — both those who openly departed from the Church, and those who became suspected by the Church, and, finally, those who still lie hidden, but will, like the rest, in their own time, expose themselves.

The scandalous proposition, moreover, certain people confuse with the one offensive to pious ears — so that they are distinguished in terms, but entirely the same in reality. And of this kind they set forth these examples: "A tyrant can be killed by any of his subjects

whatsoever"; "Fasting is not pertinent to Christian perfection"; "There is no precept concerning receiving baptism." But the degrees of errors are so confused and mixed up in these that there is no first, no second, no third or fourth. The scandalous proposition, then, is customarily called such in two similarly similar ways. First, in common usage, whereby every discourse that offers occasion for ruin, however openly heretical, is called scandalous. In this sense the Council of Constance condemned that fifteenth proposition — "Any tyrant whatsoever can lawfully be killed by any subject," etc. — as both heretical and scandalous. Such are also the other two, which are placed by these authors as examples.

But, in the latter sense, that discourse is properly called "scandalous" in which scandal can be noted, but not heresy. Such was that enumeration of the inconveniences of auricular confession, in which enumeration of inconveniences Erasmus was occupied, to Germany's great scandal. Such too are either fabricated fables, or even true narratives, by which the hidden vices of monks are either invented or exposed. This, without doubt, cannot be done without offense to the weak. For we do not here use "scandal" in the common people's sense, for what offends the ears or what the faithful people abhor, but for what offers to the weak a cause of ruin, and, placed before the faithful's feet, makes them stumble, rush, and be offended by it.

Thus, to object the abuses of the Roman Church to the unlearned common people, and publish them to the crowd, is scandal. Thus these propositions are scandalous: "A wicked prelate is truly a thief and a robber"; "Through ecclesiastical censures the clergy exploit the people and multiply avarice"; "Priests living criminally pollute the power of the priesthood"; "Clerics devoted to the decretal letters are fools"; "Those giving alms to mendicant friars are excommunicated"; "The confirmation of the young, the ordination of clerics, the consecration of places are reserved to bishops on account of greed for temporal gain and honor"; "Universities and colleges have been introduced by men's vanity"; "The stomach is swollen and distended by legumes and fish, and is thereby rendered most suited for coitus and venereal pleasures." Some of these savor of heresy, I do not deny; but even if they should be twisted into a true sense, not only the error, but even that truth itself — whatever it may be, that could perhaps be found in these sayings — brings scandal to the unlearned and weak. For not only false things, but sometimes true ones too, cause scandal. On the scandalous proposition, then, we have said almost enough.

As for the schismatic, seditious, slanderous, and contumelious proposition, what use is there in defining it? For who is there for whom what is explained at greater length by some is not already evident? I therefore deliberately pass over easy matters, sufficiently

explained by themselves for anyone. For this book of ours does not promise to relate things widely known and worn smooth everywhere, but attempts to explain matters that are obscure and do not immediately occur to and confront everyone. But we do not produce an Amalthea's horn, or a library equipped with everything. Indeed, we strive for brevity — would that this zeal for brevity did not deceive us! For it has deceived many: some, who, thinking themselves brief, were most lengthy; others, who, while laboring to be brief, were most obscure. But enough on this. Let us now proceed to the rest.

Chapter X

How Theological Arguments are to be Found and Drawn from the Topics

We have discussed the marks of both catholic truth and its contrary error, and we have distinguished the errors themselves, as far as I was able. It follows that we should teach the way and method of seeking the mark and formula of each kind. This will be the same art as finding an argument and drawing it from the topics of theology. Although the more common precepts for investigating and unearthing a theological argument do exist. For this is clear: that the capacity for both sides of every matter is supplied from the same topics. Wherefore a heretic will draw arguments from the theological topics no less than a theologian. But his arguments will be uncertain, weak, and deceptive under an appearance of truth; the theologian's, since he has attained not the shadow but the truth itself, will be certain, firm, and constant.

Nor, however, does the theologian always express certain argumentations from the topics, but sometimes, indeed often, only probable ones too. And not only because certain topics generally provide uncertain arguments, but because a firm topic sometimes provides an argument that is not firm. For I would not wish anyone to be led into this error, of thinking that, if a topic is firm, all arguments drawn from it are firm, or, conversely, if a topic is weak, everything received from it is weak. From the Sacred Letters, indeed, probable arguments are sometimes drawn — as if they are sought from the mystical sense, or even if the literal sense is not clearly defined. And, conversely, the authority of human history, weak though it is in itself, sometimes supplies certain arguments.

Wherefore, where we have applied the art and precepts by which arguments are unearthed from the theological topics, judgment is still needed, so that they may be examined. For if no method of judgment, no discernment, is applied, an abundance of argumentation will indeed be easy and ready, but of no value except among those accustomed to estimate things by number, not by weight. But the perfect and complete

theologian will not only heap up various arguments from the topics, but will separate the discordant from the concordant, and the certain from the uncertain. For just as a complete dialectician's faculty is fulfilled by two things, invention and judgment, so too the theologian must be equipped both for finding and for judging, if his art of discoursing in theology is to be complete — an art, I say, by which he can both establish his own dogmas and refute contrary errors.

I think, moreover, that I have instructed the theologian's judgment, when I have expressed the force and nature of the theological topics. Namely, from the ten parts into which I divided the breadth and power of the theological topic, I have made clear which of those parts contain firm arguments, and which weak ones. And since the marks of catholic truths are the same, and the most certain signs by which questions of faith are discerned, and also the most certain arguments by which theology's conclusions are proven, I believed no other task needed to be given for judging the arguments that would prove our dogmas than was given a little before for producing the marks that would signify our truths. That part of judging, then, needs neither warning nor precepts beyond what we have said, nor does it properly pertain to the treatment of the topics, which this book of ours promises by its own title.

Since this is clear, it follows that we should discuss what is our present business: by what methods we can attain that use of argumentation which we want from the theological topics. Here this first occurs: that the order of the disciplines, and the very structure and connection of matters, warns that whoever wishes to find arguments from the theological topics should hold the common precepts which dialecticians have handed down concerning finding arguments. For, if we must speak simply and briefly, the same precepts by which arguments are drawn from dialectical topics are, for the most part, drawn from theological ones too — although there is also another, particular approach to the theological topics, by which firm arguments may be derived from them by a special way and method, especially those most necessary for the theologian's use.

(The first precept for finding an argument.) Of all such precepts, this is the chief: that the theologian should have all the topics of theology known and treated. Known, I say, and treated. For it is not enough to have retained them in memory, but he must have them ready and available. First, then, let the number and nature of the topics be learned: which they are, how many there are, what force and property each has. Whether these matters are received from us, or from another who has come more prepared and better equipped than I, after me, for writing on these things, does not matter much. Certainly, what is necessary for thoroughly learning these matters I have, moderately, I think, taught in the books above. To have the number, powers, and properties of the topics at

hand, then, whether from here or elsewhere, is the first step in knowing them.

The next step is to have surveyed and comprehended all the topics themselves. For he who either has not read the Sacred Letters, or, even having read them, has not understood them at all, how will he argue from the first topic? He who has never at all observed the Traditions of Christ and the Apostles, by what method will he draw arguments from the second topic? He who has been assiduous in neither the Church's nor the Councils' nor the Pontiffs' doctrine, what use of argumentation will such topics supply to him? What argumentations, indeed, will he gather from the Holy Authors, who has not even touched the books of the saints? What capacity for discoursing will he be able to have from the theologians of the School, who has never exercised himself in the School's conflicts? Will that man reason from Physics, Metaphysics, Astronomy, Geometry, who has never cultivated human reason with these disciplines? What benefit, finally, will the Philosophers and Historians bring to him who has not been engaged in reading them? All these things, then, when we seek an argument, we ought to embrace in mind, thought, and understanding: not only having the topics known, but having cultivated them themselves most diligently.

But you say: is there anyone so puffed up with error as to persuade himself that he knows all these things? I, if a theologian has not attained these things, blame nothing at all: I reprove this — if, not having attained them, he has usurped for himself the name of theologian. That kind of argumentation, however, which is fittingly drawn from all the topics, is complete and absolute, and has every quality, and can fall to no one except a consummate theologian. But when something is persuasive, in which even mediocre arguments appear, it seems to be perfectly complete — because the common crowd of theologians generally does not understand what is lacking from perfection, and, as far as they do understand, thinks nothing has been omitted. This too, as Cicero says, happens in poems and paintings and many other matters, that the unskilled are delighted and praise things not worthy of praise, for this reason, as he believes: that there is in them something good, which captivates the ignorant.

Thus you might find some who, since they themselves cannot judge what fault there is in each matter, are marvelously delighted by certain little works of younger men, in which there is nothing recondite and exact, no arguments drawn from their own proper sources: everything common, ordinary, imperfect, and almost entirely of the probable kind. Thus their whole disputation is thin and dry, scarcely watered by the water of one, and that a common and worn, spring, in small and scanty amount. How much more abundant and vigorous is Saint Thomas, who not only relies on reason or authority, but argues in every way, and discourses accurately from every topic, and disputes, having

gathered testimonies together with reasonings. But there are certain obscure points in Thomas's writings, while these others' writings are lucid. Certainly indeed. But this is not said by him deliberately, nor does the obscurity lie in his talent, but in the matters themselves. And things proper to a matter are more obscure than common ones. Wine mixed with water is indeed clearer, but it is also more diluted. Unmixed wine, more difficult to drink, has entirely more strength. On the first precept of invention, then, this much. Let us pursue the rest.

(The second precept.) To assign theologians' argumentations to their proper topics seems so easy that it perhaps need not be prescribed. For no one is so unrefined as not to know immediately to which source each theological argument should be referred — either to the Sacred Letters or to Councils, etc. Although it is not useless to reduce, to its own proper topic, each argument you find in approved doctors. For thus you will both procure a treasury for yourself from others' inventions, and, once you have understood which topic's use they lacked, you will yourself diligently investigate what was omitted — as, in the controversy of Catholics with the Pelagians, after the testimonies of the Sacred Letters, Councils, the Apostolic See, and the saints, by which Augustine sufficiently and abundantly won the case, Thomas added theological reasonings, which would add both weight to the testimonies and light to the cause.

To recognize, then, in the ancient theologians, the topics of their argumentations, is most useful — both for understanding their strengths, and for discerning their varied method of argumentation, and because, by this diligence and practice, a certain abundance is prepared, so that we not only have ready what they discovered, but so that, whenever we seek from the theological topics, similar argumentations will occur to us in similar matters.

And in every art it is worthwhile to know both what and how something is to be done. Both these matters we attain by imitating the skilled in such a way that it is difficult to judge whether we attain more by precepts or by examples. For theologians, as far as concerns invention, the examples of the ancients will help more than precepts — I say not only ours, but not even any other craftsman's. Indeed, the ancient theologians excelled in prudence of argumentation, let alone science — men who were not less learned than these more recent ones, and certainly were more prudent and better men. For, as far as concerns skill in Sacred Scripture, in which the treasury of theological argument is especially contained, no one can compete with the ancients. But not only in understanding Scripture, but in many other matters too are the more recent negligent — and especially in unearthing theology's own proper arguments. Nor do I despise the more recent theologians, "whose many sayings are sharp enough indeed, but, as though

newly and just now born, too finely drawn and minute," if compared to the ancients. These seem, I know not how, to have more authority, more force, more strength, not only for moving the emotions, but also for overcoming the adversaries of faith. In this precept, then, however easy, effort must be applied, if we seek not only abundance, but also the degrees of the arguments.

(The third precept.) Much more, indeed, must the theologian labor, once the topics are known and treated, to cast the question he wishes to discuss into the theological topics. And when he has drawn it through all of them, he must consider more accurately what can be said, by argument, on each side from each individual topic. Then he must gather everything, both what seems to agree and what seems to disagree with the proposed cause, and, judgment applied, discern thoroughly which side of the question the arguments drawn favor. For, as I said above, a theologian can scarcely separate invention from judgment, if his purpose is to seek and embrace truth.

Nor, however, will we always find, in every topic, arguments suitable either for or against a matter. For it is not the case that, if a hunter or fisherman has learned places suitable for hunting and fishing, however much diligence they apply, one will immediately fish or the other hunt. For no art can be so certain that it does not sometimes lack the fruit of its work. That all the topics should converge in our disputation is, then, desirable. If less than all, more and weightier ones will have greater weight. But if none at all, the reputation of the art is not thereby to be diminished, nor should the mind be cast down from its confidence, but arguments must be sought again and again. For, though submerged, these will nonetheless sometimes emerge, if the sea, however vast, is also stirred by our diligence, and by divine grace, which opens to those who knock, and never fails those who seek.

This, however, I would wish taken as said of the class of probable questions. For the dogmas of faith all flow from those topics which rest on authority. Wherefore no certain decree exists among us that does not likewise arise from the topics. There is no need to fear, then, that the arguments of the topics will fail us in a question of faith. But however the matter stands — for we do not all inquire with the same talent and skill, nor in the same way — the arguments of such matters will always, indeed, be included within the topics; but they will be unearthed either in fewer or greater number, according to how great the erudition, talent, and diligence of the one inquiring is.

And this, indeed, is enough. For the matter itself has been made plain, so that it is not difficult to see what must be done for each thing in seeking an argument. And many things too offer themselves without inquiry, especially to learned men long and greatly

engaged in the use of such matters. Although what is inserted into a disputation with deliberate thought and preparation, we rightly prefer to what arises from a sudden thought of the mind — which, since it is most swift and lasts only a very brief time, can offer arguments but cannot weigh them. Thus, so that we can both investigate and find arguments without any error, a certain formula must be established, which, if we follow it in theological disputation, we shall never depart from the right path. This formula, moreover, will be most consonant with theologians' reasoning and discipline.

When material for discourse has been offered to the theologian, he must weigh the question accurately and establish first, of all the variety we explained above, what kind it is. For unless the theologian has comprehended the nature of the question, he will not easily understand what kind of arguments must be investigated for it, nor from which topics they should be sought. For although all the topics are connected and intertwined among themselves, nonetheless certain kinds of arguments arise from each individually: nor, as I said right at the beginning of this work, are they all equally accommodated to every question.

But when he has established the kind of question — this above all, which is the most difficult of all: whether it pertains to faith or not — let him draw it through all the topics, especially those which will be more fitting and consonant with the question. For if the question is supernatural, it must chiefly be cast into those topics which rest on God's authority. But if it is natural, it will be drawn chiefly through those topics which stand on nature's reasoning. But if the question is mixed, and depends partly on nature, partly on revelation, it must be drawn through all: for all can equally supply arguments.

Although there is no kind of question at all that is not usefully drawn through all the topics. For Scripture often hands down matters of nature, and reason too either urges or explains supernatural matters. And divine authority supports human authority, and, conversely, human authority serves the divine. Nor indeed can truth, which ought to be simple, be mixed and tempered from dissimilar matters. But divine and human reason, as I have very often said, are not dissimilar, nor does the one lead one way, the other another, but both look to the same point and are referred to the same end. Thus we have received that our forefathers were accustomed to curse those who first tore apart, by opinion, these things naturally coherent. To this same view have the theologians of the School so assented that, unless they had joined these two things in their disputation, they would not think themselves truly theologians.

Having cast the question through all the topics, then, and gathered arguments from here and there — whether they seem discordant or congruent — let him dispute both sides,

but, in the end, let him nonetheless conclude what is true, and, on the contrary, what is false. Let him first teach what Christ's faith holds concerning this question, and prove what it holds by suitable and certain testimonies; then, what reason either prescribes or certainly urges: for if the question is natural, reason prescribes; but if it is above nature, reason urges.

In this matter, to speak most modestly, I have moderately helped our School among our own people. Before us, it was not so equipped with arguments of faith: theological matters were conducted almost entirely from reason-drawn arguments. I have changed Saint Thomas's order. For, in the Summa against the Gentiles, he indeed places reasonings first, testimonies afterward. I, however, in my own lectures, always taught first, from the beginning, what faith prescribed concerning each individual question, then what reason showed. But the cause of this change is ready and clear. Saint Thomas, indeed, against the Gentiles, had to conduct theology's business by reason, since testimonies of Scripture, among them, hold either a secondary or even no place at all. But among us, who instruct Christian disciples, authority holds the first place, reason the second.

Indeed, Augustine too approves this order of discoursing, as more consonant with our nature, even though, accommodating himself to the Manichaeans, he sometimes does what he admits, in disputing, to be a fault. "The order of nature," he says, "is such that, when we learn something, authority precedes reason... But since we are dealing with those who think and speak everything against this order, and say nothing else so much as that reason must be given first, I shall accommodate myself to them, and undertake what I confess to be faulty in disputing" (On the Morals of the Catholic Church, chapter 2). By this example, Thomas accommodated himself in the same manner to the Gentiles: for, in the Summa Theologiae, authority generally prepares man for reason, and reason then leads him to understanding and knowledge (Augustine, On True Religion, chapter 24).

But in authority and reason themselves there are degrees of arguments, and what is owed to each can easily be understood: as, the first are those drawn from Scripture, the second those from the traditions of Christ and the Apostles, the third those from the Church's decrees, and the rest follow in order thereafter. It is, however, disputed among theologians whether the authority of Scripture or of the Church is prior. But this, like other matters which pertain not to invention but to disposition, I have not thought needed to be pursued. And this matter, if it should ever come into dispute, has, unless I am mistaken, been sufficiently discussed above, how it is to be judged. This is clear: that the Holy Spirit's authority in Scripture and in the Church is entirely the same, if you

look at the matters themselves. Wherefore, in itself, neither is either first or greater, neither is either later or lesser.

What is it, then, that sometimes tends to bring doubt on this point, and seems worth considering? I believe that, whenever doubt arises, one should consider what kind of talent, learning, and background the man has with whom you have undertaken a disputation. For just as there are those who prefer the Scriptures to the Church's use, so too you will find many for whom the Church's custom and sense seem greater. But since the Church is prior and more ancient, it cannot be doubted that its authority is, in a certain manner, greater — for that it is both better known and more frequent is established. But in all cases, as I said, regard must be had for the one with whom you discuss. Thus Peter (2 Peter 1) says to the Jews, "we have a more sure word of prophecy" — although Peter's own word is not, for us, of any lesser rank. But on this — for it is a great matter — more elsewhere (in book 14). Now to our proposal.

These and such matters, then, are to be surveyed in every question, and a custom and practice must be acquired, so that we may be good reasoners of arguments, and, by adding and subtracting, see what the total sum is — from which you may understand how much is owed to each question. But just as neither physicians nor generals nor orators, however much they have grasped the precepts of their art, can attain anything worthy of great praise without practice and exercise, so too the precepts for finding a theological argument are handed down for us to observe, indeed, but the magnitude of the matter demands practice and exercise. Since, then, our words can profit little, unless they are applied to the matter, and use confirms the precepts, it was necessary to state theses for the sake of exercise — which is nearly what has been established by the Peripatetics. Diogenes writes that Archelaus first disputed on both sides — let the credibility of this rest with him: for Cicero relates that such exercise was invented by Aristotle. This custom of discoursing on all matters from opposite sides has rightly been approved by the theologians of the School, for the reason that what is true, and what, conversely, false, in any given matter, cannot otherwise be discovered.

For although knowledge of truth, as Augustine says to Dioscorus (letter 56), is capable both of judging and of subverting all falsehoods, if only they are brought forward — even those previously unheard — nonetheless, since this very truth cannot shine forth in disputation unless a contest of causes has been made from both sides, and no conviction on any matter can be produced unless the adversaries' persuasions are first uprooted, it is most natural that, before we prove our own points, we should remove the opposing ones and refute the contrary opinions. But scarcely will anything be found so consonant with all minds that it has no one opposing it. For every discourse of human eloquence, to use

Hilary's words, has always been subject to contradiction — not only because there is, in another head and a different mind, an almost different opinion, but because, with dissenting movements of the will, dissenting sense of mind arises too. Whence he thinks the tenets of philosophers are so called, because each person generally embraces that which is not what reason prescribes, but what pleases the mind — not what reasoning dictates, but what inclination dictates. It is necessary, then, for theologians, discoursing variously on opposite sides, to exercise themselves as though in a mock battle — which Saint Thomas did most diligently in his Disputed Questions.

Since, in the practice of every art, the imitation of the best craftsmen is most valuable, it is fair that examples in theological discoursing be sought from those who have excelled in this art, among whom Augustine and Thomas are easily the foremost: Augustine without dispute, Thomas by the judgment of experts. For not only in an ambiguous disputation, in which discourse on both sides of an entire genus is amply permitted, but in every question whatsoever, he is so abundant and rich, on both sides, that it is a wonder that, in so many and varied matters — often neither widely known nor worn smooth — he had excellent arguments ready and prepared on both sides. He divides everything, I confess, into many articles, and prescribed, for almost every article, a set number of argumentations, as if by a certain law. His kind of disputing was also somewhat dry, and the treatment of questions composed in one perpetual style. He was, finally, of that sect of authors which pursues so little the flower of eloquence that the body of the disputation, with its sinews appearing without flesh, seems deformed — certainly foreign to every ornament of eloquence.

Thus curious and delicate men are alienated, by this most learned and weighty man, by satiety of his lengthy work, disgust at its uniformity, and horror at its uncultivated diction. A man eloquent and articulate indeed, but rather little a theologian, said at the Council of Trent — wishing to persuade his hearers of this — that against heretics, especially the Lutherans, there was no great use of scholastic contention, but that one ought rather to discourse with them in oratorical fashion, since our own manner was thorny and most troublesome. If this were true, examples of disputing in Theology would not be sought from better sources than those I mentioned earlier. Indeed, although I am not unaware how — I do not say the school's manner of disputing, but the whole theology of the school entirely — is odious to heretics, I nonetheless think that the scholastic form of discoursing is all the more effective for refuting heresies, the more it is odious to heretics. For if the Lutherans are by no means captivated by the academy's subtlety, they will not be captivated even by discourse artfully composed according to the rhetoricians' rules either, since they have become too great and too clever to be

caught by oratorical artifice. Since, moreover, they fear neither a sharp theologian nor an eloquent rhetorician, they are not, believe me, to be struck either by the theologian's keenness or the rhetorician's flow — that is, not with words and disputation, but with force and whips.

But if the matter should come to such a point that I am compelled to contend against Lutheran dogmas, let others choose — I do not prevent it — a sweeter kind of discourse, by which they may more gently and familiarly entice such men to the Church's benevolence, provided they leave to me the School's bones and sinews, and the compressed solidity of discoursing. What Augustine, moreover, argued against the adversaries of the Church, although discovered more sharply and expressed more subtly than everyone can readily grasp, nonetheless has all the greater efficacy for refuting heretics, the more finely it has been cut to the quick. And also, when discourse flows as if in a torrent, in the orators' manner, however much it sweeps up of every kind, you can scarcely hold or grasp anything. But when it is pressed, by a certain way and method, to the School's standard, it can more easily be contained and embraced.

Thus we have received, from Saint Thomas, an excellent manner of disputing, if only we held to it. Let no one seek, from so weighty a man, the delights of oratory, feminine cosmetics, childish paint, but true and grave opinions, solid and proper arguments, discourse fitted to the matter under discussion. All these Saint Thomas so excellently provided that, if there are few faults in him — which those envious critics recount — he nonetheless compensates for them with very many and greatest virtues. Although, being both modest and prudent, he gave the number of most minute articles and the equal law of disputation both to the less refined and, more especially, to his own century. I myself think, indeed, that not only Saint Thomas, but certain other authors of the School too, if they had cultivated the more humane letters, and had wished to express what they had learned in the School eloquently, could have done so most elegantly and splendidly — and that men devoted to eloquence, if they had not shrunk from the School's undertaking, but had learned this theology and wished to treat it, could have spoken most weightily and abundantly. But either the one, delighted by their own pursuit, despised the other, or nothing is entirely blessed in every respect, so that we should always desire something. But if one or the other must be chosen, I would indeed prefer unadorned knowledge to talkative ignorance. For only he who has joined eloquence to wisdom can supply examples of theological disputation complete in every respect. Come, then, whatever quality ours may be, let us offer it too — which, though it will not be better than the old, will perhaps be more fitted to the present time.

Chapter XI

First Example, Where a Principle of Theology is Turned Into a Question

My first controversy with the Wycliffites and Lutherans concerns the sacrifice of the Eucharist. And I act against my own custom, when I institute a disputation about a matter most manifest. For if anything is so certain and established that learned men have constantly and perpetually agreed upon it, I am not accustomed to argue, lest by arguing I make a matter that is not at all doubtful become doubtful. Nor indeed will I take pains to prove, by my own arguments, a matter plainly defined in the Church, but I shall rather devote myself to confirming one of the principles of Theology not so much by reasoning as by exposition. Thus it will happen that, by illuminating the truth, I shall drive away the darkness of all errors. And yet the arguments for the Church's sacrifice are most certain; but those with which the Lutherans fight against it are, as they themselves think, very weighty, while as I truly judge, they are all frivolous and fabricated, scarcely worthy of the late-night labor and talent of old women—matters, certainly, on account of which one ought not depart either from the common sense of the faithful or even from the private opinion of a single friend. But the blind disciples of a raging teacher are carried away by his error and persuade themselves by argument that the Eucharist is not a sacrifice.

(First argument) Calvin, moreover, chiefly relies on that testimony of the Apostle (Heb. 7): "And indeed there were many made priests, because by reason of death they were not suffered to continue: but this, for that he continueth for ever, hath an everlasting priesthood. Whereby he is able also to save for ever them that come to God by him; always living to make intercession for us. For such a high priest did become us, who is holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners, and made higher than the heavens; who needeth not daily, as the other priests, to offer sacrifices first for his own sins, and then for the people's: for this he did once, in offering himself. For the law maketh men priests, who have infirmity: but the word of the oath, which was since the law, the Son who is perfected for evermore."

In this passage Paul distinguishes the priesthood of the Old Testament from the priesthood of the New, in that in the former there were many priests, while in the latter there is a single priest. The reason for this he explains by saying that those men were mortal: wherefore they needed successors, who would be substituted in the place of the deceased. But it is not fitting that Christ, who is immortal, should have any substitute successors—such as those who now daily sacrifice, and who are themselves many and mortal, turning back to the shadows of the law, in which many mortal men alike were

made priests. Our priests too are themselves weak and have need, daily, as the old ones did, first to offer sacrifices for their own sins, then for those of the people. These new priests, then, since they are most similar to the old ones, are legal priests, not evangelical ones. He confirms this, he says, especially by the fact that a priest must be called by God, as Aaron was, as the same Apostle affirms (Heb. 5); but we can produce no calling that would support our priesthood. Therefore the sacrifice, which cannot exist without a priest, vanishes.

(Second argument) Calvin further supposes that Paul fights against the faith of the Church, when in the same epistle (Heb. 9) he says: "Nor yet that he should offer himself often, as the high priest entereth into the holies every year with the blood of others: for then he ought to have suffered often from the beginning of the world: but now once at the end of ages, he hath appeared for the destruction of sin, by the sacrifice of himself." From this passage he again gathers that our priests are legal ones, who enter into the holy places not merely each year but each day, offering another's blood—blood which, according to the Apostle, was offered once.

Since, moreover, Paul expressly asserts that the victim which is sacrificed by an offering must necessarily be immolated and slain, then surely if Christ is offered as a sacrifice at each Mass, he is likewise slain at each Mass. Either, then, Paul's argument is empty when he says, "for then he ought to have suffered often from the beginning of the world," or, if Christ is presented as a sacrifice, he truly suffers. But we offer on the altar a body that is living and impassible; the offering, then, will perhaps be possible, but a sacrifice by no means. This, indeed, is that argument which Calvin and Oecolampadius marvelously boast of, and, though battle has not yet been joined, they exult over it like fierce victors already.

(Third argument) The Lutherans press further, in addition, that passage (Heb. 10): "For the law having a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things, by the self-same sacrifices which they offer continually every year, can never make the comers thereunto perfect: for then they would have ceased to be offered; because the worshippers, once cleansed, should have had no more conscience of sin." And after many other things, which it would take long to relate, we read thus: "And every priest indeed standeth daily ministering, and offering often times the same sacrifices ... but this man offering one sacrifice for sins ... by one oblation he hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified."

Paul, then, shows the offerings of the Old Testament to be weak and feeble, in that they were repeated often. Those, therefore, who in the New Law repeat the same sacrifices, by

their own repetition testify that their prior offerings were weak and slight, and thus that Christ's offering was imperfect, since they add many offerings daily. "For the power of a medicine," as Chrysostom says, "is such that it is applied once, and not frequently" (Hom. 17 on Heb.). And Theophylact says that the stronger remedies cure even when applied once; but those which are applied and repeated more often are, by that very fact, shown to be less strong. [...] But also a remedy that is applied the same way often signifies that the same sickness is troubling the sufferer. Wherefore, if the same victim is applied, as it were, like the same medicine, in the new offerings of the priests, the first offering of Christ neither perfectly cured the sick nor perfected the sanctified forever, seeing that men are cured, sanctified, perfected daily by new and repeated sacrifices.

Add that a little later the Apostle asserts: "Now where there is remission of these, there is no more an oblation for sin." After Christ's single victim, then, by which all sins were expiated on the cross, and after iniquities were also remitted through Christ's sacraments, no offering for sin remains. Therefore no such sacrifice exists in the Church. This the Apostle testifies immediately by saying: "For if we sin willfully after having the knowledge of the truth, there is now left no sacrifice for sins." Whoever says "none" says not merely that baptism does not remain, but that no victim at all remains. But we say that some remains: we speak, then, against the Apostle.

Nor, they say, can this be met by pretending that in the New Law there are not various or many sacrifices, as there once were in the Law, but one and the same repeated often—as Chrysostom and Theophylact meet it. For the Apostle rejects from the New Testament not only the sacrifices of many diverse things, but also condemns the repeated offering of the same victim in these words: "Nor yet that he should offer himself often," etc. (Heb. 9). But Christ even now offers himself on the altar, as will later be shown from the opinion of the Catholics. He says, too, that the repeated offering in the Old Testament was made precisely because the first was imperfect (Heb. 10). Whether many things are offered, or the same thing is offered often, Paul's argument stands unconquered: that if the first offering were perfect, it would need no later one—and thus the later priests would have ceased to offer. From which they argue that the other Catholic escape route is likewise empty: namely, that the Apostle speaks of the bloody offering, by which Christ died once on the cross, while ours are unbloody. For whether the sacrifice is bloody or unbloody, if it is resumed often, the first offering did not perfectly sanctify nor exhaust the past sins, for which another victim is brought forward. There is, then, they think, no crack through which we can escape, but we must confess that the whole Epistle to the Hebrews rejects the sacrifices of the new priests—especially chapter 10, where, if Paul spoke only of the bloody victim, he would

easily be evaded, either when he says, "Now where there is remission of these, there is no more an oblation for sin," or even more when he says, "If we sin willfully... there is left no sacrifice for sins." For it matters nothing whether it is bloody or unbloody, if it is an offering and a victim for sin.

(Fourth argument) To this, Matthew (Matt. 26), Luke (Luke 22), and Paul (1 Cor. 11) openly relate that the Lord at the Last Supper did not offer his body and blood to God, but distributed the Eucharist to the disciples to be received. The best Mass, then, will be that which is most similar to the first; but the first was a supper, not a sacrifice. For if Christ had then offered his blood for sins, sins would already have been remitted before the cross—unless Christ's blood was offered in vain at the Supper, a blood that did not then obtain the remission of sins, which it now obtains when presented to the Father by the priests.

(Fifth argument) Luther, moreover, objects to us those passages in which the cup of Christ's blood is called a testament (Luke 22, 1 Cor. 11). A testament, however, is not the work of the heir but of the testator; but sacrifice is our work; therefore the sacrament of the blood is not a sacrifice. This reasoning, good God, with what ornamentation of words he clothes it, like an ape in purple! "What," he says, "is such rashness, that we should call a testament, that is, a promise of inheritance, our own work, which we present to the testator as a satisfaction? And where we ought to be grateful for what we have received, there should we approach proudly, about to give what ought to be received, so that the testator is no longer the bestower of his own goods but the receiver of ours? For it cannot be," he says, "that the same thing should be both received and given by the same person, both offered and accepted, at once. How mad, indeed, will be the poor and needy man, if he says he confers a good work upon the rich man from whose hand he receives a benefit?"

(Sixth argument) They also bring forward, on this matter, the testimonies of the ancient saints. First, that of Chrysostom: "This sacrifice of ours is an example of that which Christ made on the cross... We do not offer a different sacrifice, but always the same one; rather, we perform a commemoration of it" (Hom. 17 on Heb.). And Theophylact says: "Rather, we perform a memorial of that oblation by which Christ offered himself" (on Heb. ch. 10). From this correction Oecolampadius gathers that for Chrysostom and Theophylact our Mass is not properly a sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ, but an example of it. Otherwise they would not have corrected what was truly and properly said.

They add that saying of Augustine: "He gave the image of his holocaust to be celebrated in the Church" (Bk. 83 Questions). And again, elsewhere, he says that Christians celebrate the memorial of the sacrifice already accomplished (Against Faustus, ch. 18). And in a certain letter to Boniface (Ep. 23) he teaches that in the immolation of the Eucharist the name of the reality is customarily attributed to the figure and image itself. Basil, finally, according to Euthymius (on Matt. ch. 64), called these things of ours "images" of the true sacrifice. They are not, then, the true sacrifice, but a figure of the sacrifice.

(Seventh argument) Nor do they wish to press us only with testimonies but with reason too. For if sins were redeemed by sacrifice, as we Catholics assert, our redemption would also come to be through ourselves, by our own offerings. Thus not only would Christ be a redeemer, but men too would be their own redeemers—which is manifest folly.

(Eighth argument) They add that it cannot be that our operation confers the remission of sin on another by the force of the work itself, which certain of our own theologians call "ex opere operato." For only the works and actions of Christ remit sins of themselves; but sacrifice and the Mass are our own operation; it is therefore impious to affirm that by its own force it both renders God propitious and also blots out sins. And in this one point the Lutherans think the state of this whole controversy is to be established. For they claim to have this argument so firm, certain, and ready that it can withstand all the gates of hell.

This reasoning, moreover, Irenaeus seems to confirm (Bk. 4, ch. 34), in these words: "It is not the sacrifices that sanctify a man, but the conscience of the one who offers, being pure, sanctifies the sacrifice, and moves God to accept it as from a friend." "The sinner," he says, "who kills a calf for me, is as one who kills a dog." Since, therefore, the Church offers with simplicity, her gift is justly reckoned a pure sacrifice before God. As Paul also says to the Philippians: "I am filled, having received of Epaphroditus the things you sent, an odor of sweetness, an acceptable sacrifice, pleasing to God." He had said, moreover, that this is that sacrifice which we theologians try to infer from the first chapter of Malachi. No victim, then, remains among us that of itself blots out the sins of others, but if it has any power, it has it from the one who offers. By this argument Bucer attacks us.

(Ninth argument) Moreover, the remission of a man's sins is his sanctification and justification; but this comes to each one through his own faith, as the Apostle writes to the Romans; no priestly oblation, therefore, remits the sins of others by the work worked (ex opere operato). For not even Christ's own operations are applied to men except through their own proper faith, according to that saying: "Whom God hath

proposed to be a propitiator, through faith." Likewise, if by its own force the priest's offering washes away the faults of others, then this sacrifice confers grace. For the washing away of faults cannot be without the grace of water springing up unto eternal life. Nor can we escape by saying that venial sins, but not mortal ones, are remitted through the sacrifice. For if the blood of Christ is offered in sacrifice, it surely remits all sins, since it was shed for the remission of all. Unless it is in vain and without cause that we Catholics ask that this sacrifice wipe away all our crimes, and again that it be the washing away of wickedness and the remission of all sins.

(Tenth argument) Moreover, since we Catholics confess that in this sacrifice the blood of Christ is contained, it would follow that by a single sacrifice all the penalties of sins would be abolished. For the thing offered is of infinite value. It would, then, be vain to celebrate several Masses for the same persons. Those, indeed, who say that the fruit of the infinite victim is limited by the offering priest, are refuted by the Lutherans in many and various ways. First, because the fruit of the sacraments is not defined by the ministers: therefore not that of the sacrifice either. Then, because although the priest offering may be in mortal sin, the sacrifice nevertheless profits the one for whom it is offered; the power of this sacrifice, then, receives no limit from the offering priest. Likewise, because the value of an infinite thing is not diminished whether it is given by a poor man or a rich one; a hundred gold pieces are worth a hundred, by whomever they are finally offered. Rather, the greater the thing offered is, and the poorer the one who offers it, the more the offering is held in price.

To this add: if I offer my own blood to God once, my blood, once shed, is fit for the blotting out of all sins, and its price is not diminished by the one offering it. For all the martyrs, though of unequal merit, nevertheless equally obtained the pardon of all sins. If, then, the priest truly offers the blood of Christ, he will not circumscribe it by any limits, so that it is enough, even offered once, to redeem all sins. The sacrifice of the altar, finally, is now offered by Christ the high priest to the Father for us; from him, then, it has an infinite value, the very value which, for the same reason, it had on the cross. Nor indeed can we deny this, since Christ has an everlasting priesthood, whence he is also able to save forever those who approach God through him, always living to make intercession for us.

And the Council of the Lateran under Innocent III says: "One is the universal Church of the faithful, in which the very same person is both priest and sacrifice" (ch. "Firmiter," On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith). He speaks, without doubt, of that which we offer on the altar. Again, in the Council of Trent it was defined that Christ offers all our satisfactions to the Father; much more, then, will he offer that victim

which, in order that we may please God, we present on the altar as a sacrifice. This matter not only Ambrose (Bk. 1 On Duties, ch. 48) notably attests, apart from the other Latins, but the Greeks also manifestly testify in their own canon. Indeed, just as the priest does not consecrate and confect the sacrament of the Eucharist in his own name, so he does not offer the sacrifice of the Eucharist in his own name but in Christ's. But if the blood of Christ is now the victim for the redemption of faults, and the value of this blood is bounded by no limit, especially if it is offered by Christ himself: it remains altogether that by a single oblation all the penalties of faults are dissolved.

(Final argument) Calvin lastly contends that the sacrament of the Eucharist conflicts with the very word "sacrifice." The Eucharist, he says, is a gift to be received with thanksgiving, while a sacrifice is a payment which God receives as satisfaction. As great, then, as the difference is between giving and receiving, so great is the distance between sacrament and sacrifice. By this argumentation it follows that the other sacraments cannot be sacrifices either. The Eucharist too, after sins have been freely remitted, after reconciliation has been obtained, promises us life and an increase of graces. But sacrifice sings a different tune, namely that God, as though still angry, is placated by some price presented, and that the crimes which the sacrifice is said to expiate are not yet expiated.

I pass over other ridiculous arguments; for they are unworthy of a serious response from us. But those above, though at first sight probable, will nevertheless, upon careful examination, be found to be empty. While I explain this and briefly set forth my belief concerning the Church's sacrifice, attend, I ask you, reader.

If there is any disputation in which it is necessary to define the very matter under dispute, I should believe this to be it above all, which is now being undertaken by us, since we see not only the Wycliffites and Lutherans but even certain Catholics, in ignorance of the force and nature of sacrifice, caught up in the greatest error and ignorance of matters of the utmost importance. About to explain, then, what sacrifice is and what its definition contains, I take this first: that sacrifice is properly a work of religion, that is, of that virtue which offers worship and ceremony to God. For sacrifice is, as it were, a "sacred deed" (sacrum factum), as Gregory says (Decretum, 1, q. 1, ch. "Multi"); to do sacred things for God, without doubt, pertains to the worship and reverence of God; to sacrifice, then, is properly an act of religion, one dedicated solely to the honor of God, as Augustine writes (Against the Letters of Petilian, Bk. 1, ch. 18; and City of God, Bk. 10, ch. 4), and as Luke also writes (Acts 14).

I take, next, this: that sacrifice is a species of sacred and religious work, and thus a sacred work is, as it were, the genus of sacrifice. For those who extend this word to all sacred

ceremonies and acts of religion may see for themselves by what reasoning they do so; certainly they conflict with the perpetual usage both of the Church and of Scripture. For the Church recognizes seven sacraments, but does not recognize seven sacrifices. Not every sacred work, then, nor every rite of religion, is a sacrifice. Whence the Council of Florence, too, not obscurely distinguishes sacrifices from other sacred things. And in the Old Law it is established that there were certain laws concerning sacrifices, and other laws concerning the remaining sacred rites—a necessary distinction, lest we confuse sacrifices with other sacred acts.

Add that in a sacrifice there must be a victim, which is immolated to God; but it is ridiculous to want to imagine a victim in every religious ceremony. Add also that "sacrificium" is the term the Latin translator always uses for what the Greeks call thysia; but for the Greeks, thysia is not just any single sacred work, but a special ceremony of religion, in which something sacred to God is effected either through blood, or through fire, or in some other manner. Although Theophylact holds that thysiai are properly more those things sacrificed through fire than those through blood. But Porphyry, too, says that from the exhalation of fire, which the Greeks call thymiasis, "thysia," which we call sacrificium in Latin, was also anciently so called among the Greeks. Now, however, we do not rightly understand it when we call by the name "thysia" that worship celebrated by blood. Thus far Porphyry. But even granting that this is the first origin of the word, these authors do not deny that the common usage of the word contains all those things which are immolated either by fire or by blood. And these the Latin translators declare to be called "sacrifices." Let it, then, be established that sacrifice is a certain species of sacred worship.

But if the proper meaning of this word is to be taken from the usage of correct speakers and the custom of divine Scripture, we shall find that a sacrifice exists only then, when some sacred thing is offered to God. For where there is no offering, there indeed cannot be a sacrifice either. For whoever confects the sacrament of baptism, or confirmation, or orders, or matrimony, or extreme unction, does indeed without doubt perform a sacred and divine act, but he would be said, quite absurdly, to be performing a sacrifice. Since not even the Eucharist itself, so long as it is kept in the pyx, has the name of sacrifice. It is only then first called a victim, when it is offered. Offering, then, belongs to the very definition of sacrifice. This Paul often teaches, as in Hebrews chapter 5: "Every high priest is appointed, that he may offer sacrifices for sins." And chapter 7: "To offer sacrifices for his own sins." And chapter 9: "Gifts and sacrifices are offered," etc. And chapter 10: "By the self-same sacrifices which they offer continually," etc.

Nor is there need to labor here, where there is nothing ambiguous. I add this, which some accept with difficulty: that if the force and nature of this word are carefully weighed, not every sacred offering is a sacrifice, but something beyond mere offering claims the name of sacrifice, as St. Thomas most subtly said, as he says all things (II-II, q. 85, art. 3, ad 3). And Theophylact says (on Heb. ch. 8): "There is, by an exact reckoning, a difference between a gift and a victim. For thysiai, that is, sacrifices, are offerings made through blood and flesh, or at least all things that are sacrificed by fire. Gifts, however, are things like fruits and whatever else is bloodless and lacking fire."

This distinction Paul carefully observes in the Epistle to the Hebrews: "Every high priest is appointed to offer gifts and sacrifices" (Heb. 5). And again: "Every high priest is appointed to offer gifts and victims" (Heb. 8). And Chrysostom (Hom. 18 on Heb.), explaining that saying, "Sacrifice and oblation thou wouldest not," carefully noted this difference between oblation and sacrifice. Not every oblation, then, is a sacrifice.

This whole matter is proven especially by the argument that, when the offering of a living animal was made according to the prescription of the Law, it was nowhere called either a victim or a sacrifice—unless you would say the Jews sacrificed their sons when, after the ceremonies of purification, they presented them before the Lord. Since this is absurd, let us agree that not all things offered to God are victims or sacrifices. 603. But if, concerning the thing that was being offered, the priest did something sacred—as if he shed the blood of an animal, or made incense burn, or ground the grain, or fried in a pan grain sprinkled with oil—then, and only then, did he truly perform a sacrifice. That all these things are sacrifices we read in Leviticus chapters 2 and 6, Numbers chapter 5, and 2 Chronicles chapter 28. Skillfully, then, and excellently, St. Thomas noted that the essence of sacrifice consists in this: that something be done concerning the thing offered to God, whereby the thing itself is in some manner made sacred. For if the priest offered it whole and unharmed, it would be called a gift and a present, but not, likewise, a sacrifice. This is more clearly perceived in the Greek word thysia, as we said a little before.

From these things it is easily understood that the Lutherans, in the Augsburg Apology, wrongly defined sacrifice as being a ceremony or a work rendered by us to God, that we might do him honor—such as gifts, first-fruits, tithes. This definition, along with its examples, to say nothing of other arguments, the Apostle sufficiently refutes, both by distinguishing gifts from sacrifices and, more strongly, by arguing that if Christ often offered himself as a sacrifice, he would also often suffer.

But that the knowledge of this hidden and involved matter may be opened, this is first objected to what has been said: that the Prophet often mentions the "sacrifice of praise"

(Ps. 49, 106, 115), which Paul interprets as "the fruit of lips confessing to the name of God" (Heb. 13). The definition of sacrifice, then, is not so narrowly confined. This next seems contrary: that the Apostle writes to the Romans, "I beseech you, that you present your bodies a living sacrifice" (Rom. 12). It is not necessary, then, that there be in sacrifice a victim that is slain, but it is enough if we present our living body as a sacrifice. Thirdly, this is objected, which is on everyone's lips: "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit" (Ps. 50). Finally: "I am filled, having received the things you sent, an odor of sweetness, an acceptable sacrifice" (Phil. 4). And again: "Do not forget beneficence and fellowship, for by such sacrifices God is well pleased" (Heb. 13). Moved by these arguments, some have thought that the name "sacrifice" ought to be circumscribed by wider boundaries: for we have constrained it too narrowly.

I, however, am so far from this opinion that I do not think the true definition of sacrifice, which we have set forth, is at all obscured by these arguments; rather, I think it made more illustrious. For words are employed in sacred Scripture in two ways: one properly, the other figuratively. And this, though very easy, is nevertheless most worthy of attention. For ignorance of this matter has deceived many, both among others and among our own. I say, then, that the word "sacrifice" is taken in two ways in sacred Scripture, both properly and by transference. We, moreover, when we define matters, guided by the necessary method of Philosophy, set forth not what a word signifies by metaphor or some other trope, but what it properly contains. The proper nature of sacrifice, then, has been plainly defined by us, but in all the testimonies which have been set against us there is a certain transference and misuse of the word. This we easily understand in each case, if we refer them to the true and proper nature of sacrifice.

In the first testimony, indeed, the fruit of the lips that praise God is called a victim, when the tongue and lips, mortified, are consecrated to the praises of God. For just as a calf slain as a victim uttered no other sounds than for the praise and glory of God, so a tongue, dead to reviling, detraction, and foul speech, and sacred to the praising of God alone, is offered as it were a certain sacrifice, according to that which is written: "We will render the calves of our lips" (Hosea 14). Although in the Psalms it may be said that the words "sacrifice" and "victim" are used without any trope. For it was prescribed in the Law, among other things, that there be a thanksgiving sacrifice, in which true victims were slain. But Paul (Heb. 13), as is his custom, transferred by allegory those carnal victims to the spiritual sacrifice of lips praising God.

In the second testimony, indeed, the reasoning of the metaphor is more direct and clear. For we then offer our body as a victim to God, when we mortify our members, which are upon the earth, and offer to the Lord our flesh, dead indeed to sin but living to justice.

As Jerome says: "That virginity is a sacrifice of Christ, whose mind no thought, nor whose flesh any lust, has stained" (Against Jovinian, Bk. 1). And perhaps, when the Apostle said "living victim," he was playing, in his usual manner, with words that clash with one another. Similar are these: "The widow who lives in pleasures is dead while living"; "sweet sea"; "heavenly earth"; "spiritual flesh," "carnal spirit." It is not necessary, then, to gather from the Apostle's saying "living victim" that an animal need not be slain when it is presented as a victim. Rather, if we hold to Paul's meaning, we shall argue in the contrary manner.

Now in the third testimony too the transference is open. For the heart, contrite as it were like ground grain and, as it were, set ablaze with the fire of divine love, is called by a certain similitude a sacrifice. Add that it is familiar to the sacred authors to attribute the words of images to the realities signified through the images, as the name of David to Christ (Ezekiel 34), the name also of the Rock to the same (1 Cor. 10). Such is that saying: "I am the true vine." Since, therefore, through those external sacrifices of the Law certain more excellent spiritual realities were prefigured, the sacred letters call these realities entirely by the names sacrifices, holocausts, victims. As the slayings of brute animals were figures of the mortification of the carnal and irrational passions which reign in the body, and therefore the mortification of the flesh is called a victim, not properly indeed but by a figurative expression. And in this manner the rest, which need not be explained by a long discourse.

We have, then, plainly shaken off the three prior scruples; the fourth we shall remove more easily, once it is established that in these passages the Apostle speaks not properly but figuratively. This can be clearly demonstrated. First, because sacrifice pertains most closely to religion, while almsgiving and beneficence pertain to mercy or liberality. Then from that testimony of Hosea: "I desire mercy, and not sacrifice" (Hos. 6). In this passage sacrifice is not obscurely separated from works of mercy. Certainly if the word "sacrifice" properly contained gifts bestowed on the poor, the Prophet would in no way say: "Sacrifice and oblation thou wouldest not." What, then, does the Apostle mean when he calls those gifts, which are given to the poor, "victims"? Surely that they are most acceptable to God. Namely, the people believed that victims especially pleased God, and breathed to him a most pleasant odor (Gen. 8, Exod. 29, Lev. 1 and 3, Num. 28). This persuasion, moreover, had so settled in the minds even of the faithful that they sometimes despised works of piety and charity in preference to sacrifices. The apostles, not at all ignorant of this, and desiring to recall the unlearned people to true and genuine piety, called works of mercy and charity "victims"—not falsely, indeed, but with the words slightly altered by a certain figure of speech. Thus Paul (Phil. 4) called it an

acceptable sacrifice, an odor of sweetness. Thus James says that pure and undefiled religion is to visit orphans and widows in their tribulation (James 1). This same matter that expert lawyer signified plainly and without alteration of words, saying: "To love one's neighbor as oneself is greater than all holocausts and sacrifices" (Mark 12).

What, then, properly is a sacrifice, and by what reasoning it is transferred by trope, has been sufficiently said. Nor should these things seem too many, when we see the disputations of many wandering and erring through ignorance of the force and power of this word. But these things needed to be explained more fully, lest the weighty matters of the discussion be swept away by the speed of the discourse, out of an excessive zeal for brevity. But enough on these matters.

It follows that we divide sacrifice into its species as briefly as possible. The Lutherans, in the Augsburg Apology, say there are two proximate species of sacrifice, and no more: one is the propitiatory sacrifice, namely for placating God and obtaining pardon of sins; the other is the eucharistic, that is, of thanksgiving. They assert that it is greatly necessary for us, in this controversy, to keep these two species of sacrifice before our eyes and to guard with singular diligence against their confusion.

This I too warn again and again; but I also observe this: that by this division many species of sacrifices have been faultily omitted. For sacrifice was accustomed to be made not only for sin, or to render thanks, but also in the manner of a supplication, that life's comfort and prosperity might be had from God. If it were permitted in Latin, we might call this the "impetratory" (petitionary) sacrifice. Such was the sacrifice of Jacob (Gen. 28), and such too was that which that woman offered, who said in Proverbs: "I have vowed victims for my safety" (Prov. 7). Indeed in Leviticus (Lev. 7), after the sacrifice for sin, the peace-offerings are distributed into two species, so that some are of thanksgiving to a God already appeased, others are made by vow or spontaneously undertaken in order to appease God.

And besides these kinds of sacrifice, there was perhaps another prepared for this: that a covenant with God might be ratified with blood poured out. Mention of this kind is made in Exodus 24 and 4 Kings 23. Not to mention the sacrifice for the consecration of the high priest, which the lawgiver distinguished from the other sacrifices (Lev. 7). For the holocaust, which was the proper tribute of human servitude and was sacred to God as a testimony to the divine majesty and dominion, doubtless does not belong to those two species of sacrifice at all.

There were, then, more than two kinds of victims in the Old Testament; but whether there is even one in the New is now asked. To this question I shall answer at once, having

first explained two matters which, though very easy to explain in this controversy, are nevertheless most necessary. The first is this: that the name "sacrifice" is sometimes taken for the thing which is offered to the Lord, sometimes for the very action of sacrificing. For the thing, as in Hebrews 5: "Every high priest is appointed to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins." For the action, as in that passage in Tully: "to present victims for sacrifice." In this way St. Thomas employed this word (II-II, q. 85, art. 3, in the body, and ad 3), nor did he employ it absurdly, since "craftsmanship," "wool-working," and similar words are used in the same way by the most learned.

The other point is that Catholics assert both the sacrament of the Eucharist and the sacrifice of the Eucharist in two ways. For there is the "sacrament only," that is, those external species of wine and bread, which contain the body and blood of Christ. There is also the "reality and sacrament," namely the body and blood of Christ, which reality is contained interiorly under the species. Similarly, too, in our offering and Mass, there is an external sacrifice of the species of bread and wine, which Augustine, on Psalm 37, called the "sacrifice of bread and wine." And there is again an interior sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ, which we offer especially to God the Father under those species; I say "interior" not because the reality itself is not seen in its own manner through the species, but because, enclosed within the species, it is hidden and unseen in itself.

These things being laid down, let this be the first conclusion: in the New Law there truly now is, and properly, a sacrifice. This is proven first, altogether plainly, from Malachi: "I have no pleasure in you, saith the Lord of hosts, and I will not receive a gift of your hand. For from the rising of the sun even to the going down, my name is great among the Gentiles, and in every place there is sacrifice, and there is offered to my name a clean oblation" (Mal. 1).

But the Lutherans interpret this passage as referring to the spiritual sacrifice common to all the faithful. This can in no way be defended. First, because all our works are as a menstruous cloth (Isa. 64); they cannot, then, be called absolutely a clean oblation—especially according to Luther, who contends that our righteous deeds are sins. Then, because those men say that to offer our work as a clean oblation and sacrifice is Pharisaical; but the Prophet is not speaking of a Pharisaical sacrifice. Moreover, because spiritual sacrifices are not proper to the Gospel Law, but were common in every law; but the prophet speaks expressly of a certain sacrifice proper and singular to the New Law. Finally, because the same prophet, in chapter 3, speaking again of that very same sacrifice of the New Law, says: "He shall sit refining and cleansing the silver, and he shall purify the sons of Levi" (he does not say "the sons of Israel," but "of Levi") ... "and they shall offer sacrifices to the Lord in justice." A peculiar priesthood, then, was to be

instituted, and peculiar ministers of sanctification, for a peculiar sacrifice of the Gospel Law.

For as to the fact that the Protestants refer that passage of the first chapter to the spiritual sacrifice common to all the faithful, but that of the third chapter to the preaching of the Gospel, of which Paul speaks to the Romans (15: "sanctifying the Gospel," etc.)—by this very inconsistency of theirs they testify that they depart from the unity of truth. And since these are sacrifices only by a figurative expression, those who take refuge in tropes at this point both undermine the whole force of the Scriptures and also contradict themselves. For they themselves confess that one ought not take refuge in tropes in understanding the sacred letters, unless a great absurdity would follow from the proper meaning of the words.

Nor indeed does Augustine side with them, who, in the second book Against the Letters of Petilian (ch. 86), interprets this passage of Malachi of the sacrifice of praise, of which it is written, "Offer to God the sacrifice of praise." For thus too the Septuagint translated: "From the rising of the sun to its setting my name is glorified among the nations." Which the Apostle explains, saying: "By him, therefore, let us offer the sacrifice of praise always to God, that is, the fruit of lips confessing to his name."

But not even Jerome sides with these men, when he expounds the testimony of Malachi in these words (nearly the same in his commentary on Zechariah ch. 8): "Therefore the discourse is properly now directed to the priests of the Jews, who offer the blind, the lame, and the sickly for sacrifice, so that they may know that spiritual victims will succeed the carnal ones, and that not the blood of bulls and goats, but incense, that is, the prayers of the saints, are to be offered to the Lord, and that the offering is to be made not in one province of the world, Judaea, but in every place, an offering by no means unclean, as it was from the people of Israel, but clean, as it is in the ceremonies of the Christians."

These authors, I say, are not for our adversaries, nor do they stand on the side of falsehood against the truth. For it is the rule of the Scriptures, as the same Jerome testifies in that very passage, that, where a most manifest prophecy is woven concerning future things, one should not weaken by uncertain allegories the things that are written. Since, then, throughout the whole world, indeed among all nations, one and the same victim is offered—clean sacramentally, and, in its external species of bread and wine, alien to all foulness of flesh and gore, but interiorly unbloody too, although it is itself the body and blood—what is the point of overturning by allegorical and spiritual interpretations that prophecy which we perceive to be properly fulfilled in the most pure sacrifice of Christ?

It is not the case, then, that if Augustine and Jerome recognize, in the Church of the Gentiles, a sacrifice of praise, the prayers of the saints, and, finally, other spiritual victims, which are allegorically and figuratively victims, they thereby exclude the true and proper sacrifice of the Eucharist.

Indeed, this same Augustine himself, writing to Paulinus, thought that in the Mass and sacrifice which the Church celebrates and frequents, every kind of prayer, petition, and praise, of which Paul speaks (1 Tim. 2), is contained. Assuredly the offering of the Eucharist, with great excellence and preeminence over the other offerings, is a sacrifice of thanksgiving and praise, in which the name of God is most gloriously and magnificently illustrated with the highest splendor. The Eucharist, too, is that true incense of most sweet odor, to which all the prayers and petitions of the saints are referred, whence they themselves borrow a pleasant odor. This was the reason for Irenaeus (Bk. 4, Against Heresies, ch. 32 and 34) to understand from the prophecy of Malachi that both kinds of victim would exist in the Church of Christ: both the one that is properly a victim, of thanksgiving and praise, which for this very reason we call the Eucharist, and that which is called a victim figuratively, by allegory.

But lest the Lutherans claim they are being attacked by prophetic and obscure testimonies, let us bring forward another, most clear, from the Gospel. There exists, then, in Luke, a most open testimony written for the confirmation of this matter. "Taking bread," he says, "he gave thanks, and broke it, and gave it to them, saying: This is my body, which is given for you: do this for a commemoration of me. In like manner the cup also: he took it, and gave thanks, saying: This is the cup, the new testament in my blood, which shall be shed for you" (Luke 22).

Here I first observe that Cornelius, bishop of Bitonto, was rightly rejected by the fathers and all the theologians in the Council of Trent, for having said that Christ at the supper did not offer his own body and blood. For, according to Jewish rite, to give thanks to God by taking the cup in one's hands and raising it is truly to offer a sacrifice of thanksgiving. When, then, the Lord said, "Do this," he plainly commanded the apostles that what they saw him do, they too should do, by presenting the victim of thanksgiving—that is, of the Eucharist. As Cyprian, to Caecilius, explained in these words (On Consecration, dist. 2, ch. "Scriptura"): "Scripture says that, as often as we offer the cup in commemoration of the Lord and of his passion, we should do that which it is agreed the Lord did." And a little later: "We have been admonished and instructed by the Lord to offer the cup of the Lord mixed with wine, according as the Lord offered it." And Irenaeus (Bk. 4, ch. 32) says: "Likewise confessing the cup to be his own blood, he taught the new oblation of the New Testament. This the Church, receiving from the

apostles, offers throughout the whole world to God, to him who supplies us with nourishment, the first-fruits of his own gifts, in the New Testament." And afterward, chapter 34: "We offer to him," he says, "the Eucharist, not as though he were in need, but giving thanks for his gift," etc.

Here, omitting authorities, I would not hesitate to seek out the truth by the matter and reason itself. (Irenaeus's reasoning.) For just as it happens in other matters that we offer them holily and religiously to God, having first received them from him, so too, and much more, when in the Eucharist we have received the body and blood of Christ by the largesse of heavenly blessing, we shall surely be impious and ungrateful, unless we render supreme thanks by rendering back to him the very gifts we received from God, according to that which is written: "Thine, O Lord, are all things, and what we have received of thy hand we give thee" (1 Chron., last ch.). And again: "What shall I render to the Lord for all he hath rendered to me? I will take the chalice of salvation" (Ps. 115). On which passage the Chaldee paraphrase has: "I will take the cup of redemption in the world to come." For that this psalm too pertains to the mysteries and faith of the Gospel is attested by Paul (2 Cor. 4). Now the "salvation" is Christ, as Simeon sang in the Gospel (Luke 2). But it is well said, "I will take"; for unless I first receive, I am not able to render back.

And since, generally, we can give nothing of ourselves to God, but only give back to him again, as though now our own, what we have received from him, by whose gift we had received it—these gifts, nevertheless, these presents, these holy sacrifices, were peculiarly heavenly; from heaven, then, they had to be received, and the name of the Lord had to be invoked, so that, consecrated by such a name, they might become for us the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ. But if we, in piety, gratitude, and wisdom, pour out to God blood that is properly his own, that we may keep not merely the memory but also the observance of his benefits, why should we not pour back to him the blood of Christ, properly bestowed on us by God, who gave us, along with the Son, the blood of the Son?

Hesiod bids us render back in the same measure what we have received, or even in a fuller measure if we can. Shall we, who have received the blood and body of Christ, not render back the same, if we cannot in fuller measure? What of Christ? Did he not, by the force of friendship, made as it were one with us, esteem the gifts conferred by the Father upon us as his own? Surely he did. Unless, then, he was foolish and ungrateful, in taking the bread and cup he gave thanks not only in our name but rendered to the Father, most abundantly, deserved and owed gratitude for his supreme benefit—he certainly rendered like for like, and thought it something to be commemorated and to be rendered, so long as the race of the faithful shall exist. "Do this," he says, "in commemoration of me."

I call upon you, Luther, and indeed I call upon all of you Lutherans. Do you not understand how open your conflict is with the Gospel of Christ? You, indeed, receiving the Eucharist but not offering it, celebrate the Lord's supper, but not the sacrifice of the cross. Which one of yours confesses, overcome by evidence: "In our Eucharist," he says, "the death of Christ is preached only by words, not also by symbols" (Bucer, Bk. 2, On the True and False Administration of the Lord's Supper, ch. 9). Your Eucharist, then, is not Christian. For Christ did not command that we should say these things in memory of him, but that we should do them. "Do this," he says, "in commemoration of me." It is not, then, in the mysteries, only that the victim of Christ is to be spoken of, but also to be done. By symbols, then, and not by words alone, is the memory of Christ's sacrifice to be represented on the altar. Otherwise, if there is eating but no offering, it will be an example and image of the supper, but it will not be an example and image of the sacrifice.

How much better did the whole Church throughout the world understand this, which, when the priest, the mysteries having been confected in the name of Christ, says: "As often as you shall do these things, you shall do them in memory of me," responds, in the very voice of the priest: "Wherefore, mindful, O Lord, we thy servants, but also thy holy people, etc., offer to thy excellent majesty, of thy own gifts and bounties, a pure victim," etc. It cannot in any way be denied, then, that the Church, in offering the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist, does so both by the example of Christ, led by evident reasoning, and finally impelled by the precept of the Lord himself.

But to this it is objected, nevertheless, that when the Apostle had related that command of the Lord, "Do this," etc., he immediately adds: "For as often as you shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall show the death of the Lord," etc. The very eating and drinking, then, is the symbol of the Lord's passion. It is not necessary, then, to offer a sacrifice, in order that we may also commemorate the victim of Christ by symbols.

To this argument I answer first as follows. If someone should say, "As often as we have dined together, we shall converse," we do not at once understand dining-together and conversing to be the same thing. So, if the Apostle said, "As often as you shall eat," etc., it is not necessary to interpret the eating itself as being the proclamation of the Lord's death. The Lord wished, then, that what is a table should also be for us an altar, that is, that we should not only dine but also sacrifice. Wherefore he instituted the same thing to be both sacrament and sacrifice at once, of which the one would be the symbol of the Lord's supper, the other of the Lord's death. Paul's meaning, then, is this: "Do not think you will satisfy the law if you merely eat and drink, in which act you commemorate Christ's supper: for you must also commemorate his death, which is done more by sacrificing than by eating."

Next, I do not deny that in the eating of the body and the drinking of the blood, in the separation of the blood from the body, that which was done on the cross is openly designated. "When the victim is broken," Augustine says, "when the blood of Christ is poured into the mouths of the faithful, what else is signified than the immolation of the Lord's body on the cross?" But in truth, as we have said, death can be signified in the separation of the blood from the body, but a victim is not properly signified unless the body that dies is offered. Although the consumption of the offered species does pertain to the perfection of the sacrifice. Thus the people, together with the priest, in consuming the victim of old, truly completed the sacrifice, and thus gave a perfect sign of the victim of the cross.

I think, moreover, this ought also to be noted: that although Christ at the supper offered no sacrifice at all, yet by the fact that he said, "This is my body, which shall be given for you," etc., and immediately subjoined, "Do this in commemoration of me," he sufficiently showed that we were mystically to hand over the body and shed the blood—which he himself was afterward, in fact openly and without mystery, to do. As if he said: "Do this which I shall do, but I shall do it in a bloody sacrifice, do you do it in commemoration of me, unbloody." But the Lord, as may be seen in all the Greek exemplars, always used the verb in the present tense. For he does not say "This is my body, which shall be given for you," but "which is given for you," nor, if you render word for word, did he say "This is my blood, which shall be shed for you," but "which is shed for you" (Luke 22). And in Paul: "Touto mou to sōma to hyper hymōn klōmenon" (1 Cor. 11); that is, "This is my body, which is broken for you," as Ambrose too, commenting on this passage of Paul, and Bede, expounding the Gospel of Luke, read it.

Nor is it to be doubted by Catholics—a matter we shall explain further later—that in the sacrifice of the altar the blood of Christ is shed, in its effect, no differently than if it were now being shed on the cross; likewise that the body of Christ is broken, in efficacy, just as if it were now being broken for us on the cross. Besides which, in the external sacrifice, both the blood of Christ is mystically shed and the body broken, as it were in an example and image. Whence Augustine says, "When the victim is broken," what else is signified than the immolation of the Lord's body on the cross? (On Consecration, dist. 2, ch. "Quum frangitur"). And that not only the sacrament but even the true body of Christ ... is broken by the hands of the priests, the Roman council under Nicholas defined (On Consecration, dist. 2, "Ego Berengarius"). Do you see how everything agrees with us, since we prove, not only by matters and reasonings but by the very words themselves, both that Christ at the supper mystically handed over his body and blood, and that he instituted us to follow the same pattern? For nothing prevents us, when refuting the

Lutherans, from adhering to the Greek exemplars, especially since they agree with us.

But since the Sacramentarians complain that they are not much pressed by these arguments—since they for the most part take for granted the true body and blood of Christ to be present in the Eucharist, a thing they themselves altogether deny—come, let us press these men too with reasonings especially sought out for them. Although some of the arguments we set forth before bind the Sacramentarians even more tightly, so that they could scarcely ever escape. And to say nothing of the fact that they deny a matter that is perspicuous and manifestly established and comprehended from the sacred letters (for I do not wish today to contend with the Sacramentarians on this matter)—I speak of the sacrifice—even if, in the species of bread and wine, neither the body nor the blood of Christ were present, as truly they are, it could still be taught, by many and weighty arguments, that a sacrifice exists on the altar of the Christians.

This is the first and, both from the definition of sacrifice and from the perpetual custom of the Church, the weightiest and firmest argument: that our priests offer bread and wine to God and do something sacred concerning the things offered—namely, breaking the bread and dipping a portion of it in wine; add, if you please, also consuming both things; they therefore truly and properly sacrifice. For if the offering of fine flour and meal sprinkled with oil was, in figure of Christ's future death, a sacrifice, there is no ambiguity that to break the offered bread and dip it in wine, in figure of his past death, is a sacrifice.

But what will the Lutherans reprove in this work? Is it that we render back to God the gifts of bread and wine that we have received from him? Let them accuse Abel and the other fathers in the law of nature; let them accuse Moses with his written law; let them accuse the offerings which they gladly grant were piously accustomed to be offered in the primitive Church. Rather let them accuse nature itself, which has formed us to render thanks—which, nevertheless, we cannot render to God in any other way than by giving back the very gifts we have received. But they will reprove the breaking and dipping of the bread. But by these ceremonies we designate the immolation of the cross (On Consecration, dist. 2, ch. "Quum frangitur"). It is strange, though, if they reckon this a fault in us—that we commemorate Christ's passion not only in words but also in deeds—especially since the Lord said, "Do this in commemoration of me." Surely if that is a sin, then those who baptize sin too, since they figure the death of Christ by symbols.

If, then, the definition of this word has been rightly declared and circumscribed for us, without doubt the priest on the altar truly sacrifices, even if you consider nothing other than the external species themselves of wine and bread. And further, if you weigh the

very parts of a sacrifice—that is, to be offered, to be broken, to be dipped, add also to be consumed—since there is no fault, as has been shown, in performing these things mystically, it follows that our priests not only truly and properly but also piously and religiously sacrifice. Considering this matter, Augustine calls the species of bread a victim (On Consecration, dist. 2, "Cum frangitur hostia"), a name which has so thoroughly clung to the ears and tongues of all the faithful that whoever should try to root it out from there would be vain and foolish. The Sacramentarians, then, though they might deny there is in the Church a sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ, would in no way be able to deny a sacrifice of bread and wine, lest they seem ignorant of the proper notion of sacrifice.

Moreover, Melchizedek was a priest of God Most High; he therefore offered a sacrifice to God: for every priest is appointed that he may offer sacrifice; but we do not read that he offered anything other than bread and wine; since, then, we in the same manner and order offer the species of bread and wine, we properly and truly present a sacrifice. This is the reason the Church, in the feast and solemnity of the Eucharist, celebrates that saying of St. Thomas: "A priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek, he offered bread and wine."

But the Lutherans evade this argument in two ways. First, they deny that Melchizedek offered bread and wine to God—claiming he offered them to Abraham, not to God, as is read in Genesis 14. This Epiphanius acknowledges (Bk. 2, Against Heresies, Heresy 55). Then they deny that Christ's sacrifice was "according to the order of Melchizedek" in the sense of offering bread and wine, but affirm that it consisted in this: that Christ was not made priest according to the law of a carnal commandment with that bodily oil, but, like Melchizedek, was anointed by God with the oil of the Spirit above his fellows. For thus the Apostle interprets it, writing to the Hebrews (Heb. 7, and Eusebius, Bk. 1, Church History, ch. 1).

But the first scruple is thus removed. I do not deny that Melchizedek gave bread and wine to Abraham to refresh his army; but since Scripture immediately adds, "For he was a priest of God Most High," unless the reasoning is inept, one must understand that he was accustomed to offer to God the same things which he then brought to Abraham, but to the latter as food, to the former as sacrifice. As Cyprian (to Caecilius), Ambrose (Bk. 5, On the Sacraments, ch. 1), Jerome (on Matthew ch. 26), Augustine (on Ps. 33, sermon 1), Cassiodorus (on Ps. 109), Damascene (Bk. 4, ch. 14), Chrysostom (Homily on the Betrayal of Judas) are authorities for this (On Consecration, dist. 2, "In calicem," and ch. "Accipite").

The latter scruple we shall remove in this way. It is not the case that, if in one respect the priesthood of Christ is similar to the priesthood of Melchizedek, every other similarity is excluded. Rather, if a figure is perfect, it can aptly fit in many respects. Nothing, then, prevents Christ from appearing most similar to Melchizedek both in the constitution and in the oblation of his priesthood. Moreover, no law and no religion exists without the office and function of priesthood. For these three are so joined, and have always been joined, that if you remove one, the others must necessarily be removed too. "The priesthood being translated," he says, "it is necessary that a translation of the law be made also" (Heb. 7). If, then, we Christians have a law and a religion, we surely have a priesthood too. But every priest is prepared for this: that he may offer sacrifice (Heb. 5 and 8); we Christians, then, still hold a sacrifice, without which we can preserve neither priesthood, nor religion, nor law.

But they assert that we are all priests, and that we offer spiritual victims. But since these are not properly victims but only by transference, the priesthood too will be not proper but transferred and improper; and the priesthood being translated, a translation of religion will likewise take place. Thus, surely, those who snatch the sacrifice from us are, at the same time, trying both to snatch away the true religion of Christ and to introduce a false one—one who continually removes the sacrifice from the Church. For they can be bound more tightly still by Daniel's testimony (Dan. 12), so that they cannot escape. The adversaries must indeed be asked what that "continual sacrifice" is, which the Antichrist is to take away from the Church for 1,290 days. And since in the Church there is no other continual sacrifice than that which we offer on the altar, we rightly charge the Lutherans with being ministers of Antichrist.

But why do I argue further? Why do I discuss more? Must argumentation be sought, or conjecture taken, even in matters so perspicuous? Or can it be doubted that where there is no special sacrifice, indeed no sacred matter at all, no priest properly speaking, that there also cannot be religion? Plato relates (Bk. 16, "On Kingship") that priests ought to abound in great splendor because of the greatness of the matters they handle; wherefore among the Egyptians it was not lawful for a king to rule without the priesthood [...]. In very many of the Greek cities, too, the chief sacred rites were established by the highest magistrates; and among the Athenians ... upon the creation of a king ... the greatest sacred rites were attributed to him. He relates again (Dialogue 8, On the Laws) that it was necessary that one of the magistrates always sacrifice to some god on behalf of the city.

Aristotle, then (Politics, Bk. 3, ch. 10), holds that in heroic times kings were accustomed to exercise the worship of divine matters—unless such sacrifices were of a kind requiring

a priesthood. He teaches elsewhere, likewise (Politics, Bk. 7, ch. 9), that in the best republic the priests should be constituted the most honored. "For neither a farmer," he says, "nor a craftsman, nor anyone of the base occupations, is to be appointed priest: for honor is owed to the gods by the citizens." Cicero (On Divination) and Valerius (Bk. 1) write that the ancients had such zeal for observing religion that the senate, at the height of the empire's power, decreed that a select few of the sons of leading men be handed over to the peoples of Etruria to learn the discipline of the sacred rites, lest so great an art be brought, on account of the low status of men, to the level of hire and profit, thereby harming the authority of religion.

So great an honor, guided by nature, was accorded to religion among the ancients that none but the leading men and nobles had the capacity to perform the ceremonies toward God. And do the Lutherans wish Christ to have been so foolish as to have instituted a commonwealth in which all sacrifices would be common and worn out everywhere, and the priests would be doting old men, garrulous old women, frivolous youths, tailors, butchers, and cooks—an honor to be mentioned only with reluctance, if one were even to run through it cursorily? Evidently, the Lutherans wish to shape our priesthood after the manner of the Turks, among whom the priests do not differ much from the common people. How much more religiously the ancient Germans once established that the power of beating and punishing a man should be granted to no one except by the authority of priests, so that judgments might appear not human but divine.

But why do I adduce common considerations of nature? Let us return to our own, that is, theological, considerations. The Apostle (1 Cor. 10), wishing to deter the faithful from the worship of idols, used chiefly this argument: that if they sacrificed to idols, they would be partakers of an impious and irreligious altar and table; for without distinction he calls the same thing both "table" and "altar." Now those who approach the altar of Christ are partakers likewise of this altar; but it cannot be that we are partakers of both at once, unless we serve God and idols equally. The Church, then, has an altar, and therefore has a sacrifice. For just as a "table" is that on which food is eaten, so an "altar" is that on which sacrifice is offered. Let the Lutherans, then, deny altars to the faithful, and grant only tables, since they say we have food, but not, likewise, a sacrifice.

Nor let them deprive us only of the term "altar," but of "Mass" as well, which will be an empty and vain-sounding word, if for us there is no offering on the altar. The word "Mass," moreover, both the most learned of our own party and most of Luther's own family testify, was borrowed from the Hebrew language. For among the Hebrews, "missa" means an offering.

Surely it will be most fully established that we have, from the tradition of the Apostles, both altars and the offering of the body and blood of Christ, which we call the Mass and sacrifice, if we refer this matter to those rules which we established, for investigating the traditions of the Apostles, in the third book of this work.

Certainly Irenaeus (Bk. 4, ch. 32 and 63), in words nothing obscure, affirms that it is from the tradition of the Apostles that we offer the body and blood of the Lord. Andrew the apostle too, according to what Philactetus relates from the letters of the priests of Achaia, said to the proconsul of Achaia: "I daily sacrifice an unspotted lamb on the altar" (On Consecration, dist. 1, ch. "Iacobus"). That James too added the celebration of the Mass is witnessed by the fathers of the Trullan Synod (canon 32). The Council of Carthage 3 (ch. 24), moreover, says that the Lord handed down that in the sacrament of his body and blood nothing more than bread and wine should be offered. But, as I said, there is no need for a longer discourse, when it is easy to apply those rules for investigating tradition to the present disputation.

Now the authority of the Church for this conclusion is too well known and too frequent to need pointing out. For nothing is more frequent, both in the canon and elsewhere, than her constant proclamation that she offers to God, as a pure and unspotted victim, the sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ. The Councils, moreover, on this opinion are very many: the First Council of Toledo (ch. 5); the Eleventh Council of Toledo (ch. 14); the Twelfth Council of Toledo (ch. 5); the Third Council of Braga (ch. 1); the Council of Auxerre (ch. 8); the Third Council of Carthage; the Council of Ephesus; the Council of Nicaea (ch. 14); the Lateran Council under Innocent III; add also the Trullan Council, referred to by Gratian under the name of the Sixth Synod; add also the Council of Florence in the decree of union with the Armenians; but also in the Council of Constance that error was condemned: "That it is not founded in the Gospel that Christ ordained the Mass."

What of the bishops of the Apostolic See? Surely they profess the same faith of the Apostles and the Church. Anacletus (On Consecration, dist. 1, ch. "Episcopus"); Clement (On Consecration, dist. 1, ch. "Hic ergo"); Alexander I (On Consecration, dist. 2, ch. "Nihil"); Eusebius (On Consecration, dist. 1, ch. "Consulto"); Julius (On Consecration, dist. 2, ch. "Cum omne crimen"); Felix (On Consecration, dist. 1, ch. "Sicut non alii"); Soter (in his letter to the bishops of Italy); Siricius (to Bishop Himerius of Tarragona, ch. 1); Innocent I (to Bishop Exuperius of Toulouse, ch. 1); Leo (to Dioscorus, letter 79; On Consecration, dist. 1, ch. "Necesse est"). All these are ancient pontiffs of the Church—for what need is there to mention the later ones?

As for the ancient authors, whom the Church has both consecrated and publicly dedicated—if I wished to relate them all, it would be a great burden on the reader. I shall not, then, relate all, but the most notable ones. Among the Greeks, first, Dionysius teaches this (Bk. 3, "On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy," ch. 3); Ignatius (in his letter to the Smyrnaeans); Athanasius (in the Book of Questions to Antiochus, question 34); Gregory Nazianzen (in his poems to the bishops); Eusebius of Emesa (On Consecration, dist. 2, "Quia corpus"); Chrysostom (Homily 17 on Hebrews, falsely attributed by Gratian to Ambrose, On Consecration, dist. 2, ch. "In Christo"); the same Chrysostom again (Bk. 6, On the Priesthood, shortly after the beginning), with whom Theophylact agrees (on Hebrews ch. 10); and Damascene (Bk. 4, ch. 14).

Among the Latins, you have Irenaeus (Bk. 4, chs. 32, 33, 34, and 63); Cyprian (Bk. 2, Letter 3, written to Caecilius: On Consecration, dist. 2, chs. 2 and 3; and he repeats the same in his sermon on the Lord's Supper); Ambrose (Bk. 1 of Offices, ch. 48); Jerome (to Hedibia, question 2, and to Titus 1); Paschasius (in his book On the Passover: On Consecration, dist. 2, ch. "Iteratur"); Augustine (Bk. 10, City of God, ch. 20, and Bk. 17, ch. 20, and Bk. 20, Against Faustus, ch. 18—which passage both Calvin and Bucer shamelessly cite in their own favor); Gregory (Bk. 4 of the Dialogues, ch. 58, and in a certain Paschal homily: On Consecration, dist. 2, ch. "Quid sit"); and finally Fulgentius (Bk. 2, to Monimus).

But to all these testimonies Calvin responds that the Eucharist is called a sacrifice by the fathers because it is an example and image of the sacrifice; for it is neither new nor unusual to attribute the names of realities to images of those realities: Galatians 3, "Before whose eyes Jesus Christ was set forth, crucified among you"; Romans 6, "Buried together with him in baptism"; Revelation 5, "The Lamb, who was slain from the foundation of the world"; and that in this way Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Augustine explained their belief concerning the sacrifice. This is Calvin (Institutes, ch. 18, Bk. 2, ch. 7). For Bucer indeed says that some of the Fathers, in this appellation of "sacrifice," had chiefly this in view, but that others, in the use of this word, chiefly regarded the offerings which the faithful presented of their own goods and consecrated to the Lord. This is something Luther too had noted, in that most pestilential book, On the Babylonian Captivity.

But there is a well-known saying: that whoever has once crossed the bounds of modesty ought to be thoroughly and vigorously shameless. First, these men gather that, if the holy authors assert the Eucharist to be an example of the sacrifice done on the cross, it must at once follow that it is not a true sacrifice. But if one may gather in that manner, then not even the old sacrifices were properly and truly sacrifices, since all of them were a figure

and image of that one victim which Christ, dying, immolated. Both signs, then, must be reckoned of one and the same victim: ours indeed of the past one, and that of the Old Law of the future one, but each nevertheless truly a sacrifice—unless someone is so mad as to think it pertains more to the nature of sacrifice that it signify a thing to be done than that it commemorate a thing already done. I, indeed, judge thus: that our Eucharist could not be an example of Christ's sacrifice, unless it were itself also a sacrifice. This matter I explained diligently a little before. For just as our supper would not be a commemoration of the Lord's supper, and its image and example, unless we truly ate, so neither would our Eucharist be the example and image of Christ's victim, unless we truly sacrificed.

Next, I ask this of them: whether the saints say that we offer, in this mystery, the body and blood of Christ. Bucer denies it, but he denies an open matter. For, to omit the rest, this is manifestly taught by Cyprian (to Caecilius), Ambrose (Bk. 1 of Offices), Augustine (Bk. 17, City of God, and Against Faustus, Bk. 20), Damascene (Bk. 4), Irenaeus (Bk. 4), and finally Pope Alexander (to all the orthodox): for I do not wish to be long in citing the rest. But if we offer the blood of Christ in this mystery, then it is truly indeed a sacrifice, and yet it is nevertheless an example, since the image of the bloody victim is unbloody—but so unbloody that it stands as if the very blood were now being shed.

And these arguments compel most of the Lutherans, in fact, to agree in part with the Church in asserting a sacrifice. For they do not deny the sacrifice altogether, but persist in this: that those who admit a victim for sins do injury to Christ's most perfect sacrifice, by which alone all sins were remitted; and thus that there is indeed, in the Church, a sacrifice of thanksgiving—which they call "eucharistic"—but none for sin, which they call "propitiatory."

But our second conclusion in this controversy is itself equally certain: that the Eucharist is not only, according to its name, a sacrifice by which we render thanks to God, but is also that which renders God placated and propitious toward us; and thus that it is the same victim for thanksgiving and for sin.

This is shown, first, from that passage in Luke: "This is my body, which is given for you"; and of the cup similarly: "which is shed for you" (Luke 22). It is, then, a sacrifice for sins. This the form of consecration itself bears witness to, which has "to be shed for the remission of sins" (Ambrose: On Consecration, dist. 2, ch. "Si quotiescumque"). For as to what certain Lutherans say—that the words by which the priest confects this mystery are taken materially, not significatively—it is not the business of this place and time to refute. This, indeed, is well established: that if the words of the form were taken

materially, the priest would neither confect the body or blood of Christ in Christ's name, indeed would not confect anything at all in any way. Rather, if the priest does not utter those words significatively, then by the force of the words we have neither the body of Christ in the sacrament nor his blood. From which the folly of the Sacramentarians is exposed.

Next, every priest, as the Apostle relates to the Hebrews (Heb. 5), is appointed to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins: either, then, we have no priest at all, or we have a propitiatory sacrifice. Nor indeed was Paul speaking of the legal priesthood alone, unless he had argued ineptly that Christ too offered for sins because he was a priest. Moreover, we believe—not only by the Church's definition but also by Scripture's own teaching—that some penalty remains even after the guilt has been remitted. Since, then, we have the body and blood of Christ, by God's gift, as things that are, so to speak, our own, we shall surely be able to offer them to God for the redemption of our souls, just as we offer our own penalties and even our own blood.

That this is indeed the Apostolic tradition both Epiphanius (Bk. 3, Against Heresies) and Chrysostom (to the people of Antioch) openly teach, and it can easily be shown by the rules I set forth above—which it would be most tiresome, after so long a disputation, to turn now to the use of this passage. Although the Church alone is sufficient to instill certain faith in this matter into our minds. She indeed, both elsewhere most frequently and especially in the Canon, professes that the holy people of the faithful offer this victim to God for the redemption of their souls.

As for the Roman pontiffs, it would be superfluous to enumerate them. We shall relate, then, only two of the most ancient and most holy: Alexander, in his letter to all the orthodox, saying, "crimes and sins are blotted out by these sacrifices"; with whom Julius agrees (On Consecration, dist. 2, ch. "Cum omne crimen"). To these I add also St. Gregory (On Consecration, dist. 2, ch. "Quid sit"). For among the councils we have that of Chalon (On Consecration, dist. 1, ch. "Visum est"); we have also that of Florence, and that of Trent; add also, if you like, the Trullan Council.

Now the ancient saints most constantly hand down this matter. Chrysostom (Homily 17 on Hebrews) and Theophylact (on ch. 8 of the same epistle) plainly say that in the mysteries and the sacrifice there is remission of sins. Eusebius of Emesa calls this "the oblation of redemption." Damascene affirms it to be "the expiation of every stain." Athanasius asserts the same (Book of Questions to Antiochus). Epiphanius likewise brings in the heresy of Aerius in these words: "He who prays while living, or performs the dispensation, that is, the Mass: what would it profit the dead?" To whom

Epiphanius answers that "such prayers do altogether profit the departed, even if they do not entirely absolve the whole guilt." It is incredible to say how perversely Bucer tries to twist this passage. But it is well that we have others whom the heretics, though they may burst with anger, cannot twist.

Chrysostom (Homily 69 to the people of Antioch) says: "Not rashly were these things ordained by the apostles, that in the awesome mysteries a commemoration of the departed should be made. For they know that from this much profit can come to them. For when the whole people stands, the fullness of the priesthood, and the awesome sacrifice is set forth, how shall we not prevail, entreating on their behalf?" See also the same author, Bk. 6, On the Dignity of the Priesthood. Gregory (Bk. 4 of the Dialogues, ch. 55) says: "If sins after death are not unforgivable, as he had taught they are not, the sacred offering of the saving victim is often accustomed greatly to help souls even after death."

Theophylact (on Luke ch. 12, on the passage, "Fear him," etc.) says: "Not all sinners who die are sent to Gehenna, but they are in the power of God, so that they can even be forgiven. I say this because of the offerings that are made for the dead, which are of no small benefit, even to those who died in grievous sins." See also Ambrose (Letter 8, Bk. 2, to Faustinus); and Cyprian (Bk. 1, Letter 9), for in his sermon on the Lord's Supper he plainly says this sacrifice is the expiation of iniquities. See also Paschasius (On Consecration, dist. 2, ch. "Iteratur") and Augustine (On Care for the Dead, ch. 1, and Confessions Bk. 9, chs. 11 and 28, and On Heresies ch. 53, and Enchiridion ch. 110).

We could add to these the hand of a host of theologians, already often victorious in the slaughter of heretics. But shall we, already victorious, meet the victors after the triumph over the enemies of the Church has already been won? They will come late, indeed, to the battle, but opportunely for the palm of victory. Although at this point it was necessary to summon them, not to confirm our position by arguments and reasonings, but, in the manner of the schools, closely and skillfully to refute the contrary position. For in refuting the arguments of heretics, the theology of the schools is so powerful that it can easily show what seems weighty to them to be, in fact, most trivial.

The first argument, then, which Calvin boasts of so much, is most easily dissolved. For who is there to whom those things are not perspicuous, which he decorates and amplifies with many words? That our sole priest accomplished what all those ancient priests by no means accomplished—namely, the remission of sins in his own blood; again, that he is immortal and eternal, who forever stands before God on our behalf, and represents to the Father, on the sublime altar, not only the scars of his own wounds but even the

blood which he shed on the cross, and all the offerings and prayers of the Church, and finally himself and his own Church; likewise, that by one single offering he accomplished what those ancient priests could not accomplish even by very many sacrifices.

These things, evidently, are well-worn and known even to the most minor theologians. We add this, which Calvin is ignorant of: that there is a distinction between the ancient priests and ours, in that among them there was no one of whom the others were substitutes; for the later priests did not perform the functions of some prior one, but each brought his own victim and offered it in his own name, not another priest's. So in this respect there were altogether many priests. For they did not converge upon one, as it were, head, in whose place they administered. But our priests, since they approach the altar in the name of Christ and in his person, are, in a certain manner, all of one priesthood, just as bishops and vicars have one judgment.

From another point of view, too, those ancient priests were many, because they presented many, and differing, victims; but a priest, so called from performing something sacred, when he offers the same victim and confects entirely the same sacred act, is in some manner the same, even though there seem to be many. And in truth, the priest who would placate God with blood and reconcile the world is Christ alone. We, indeed, are not called priests in this sense, but because we are dispensers of his mysteries, applying to the people the blood which he shed on the cross, and offering together with him. From this, then, our offering has its power, not from ourselves. We are not, then, many priests in the manner in which the Apostle relates the ancient ones to have been many.

As for what Calvin says—that our priests are weak and sinners, as in the Old Law—we recognize this with a great difference. For while those priests, when they brought victims that of themselves could not please God—"Neither are the sacrifices offered according to the law pleasing to thee," he says—when, I say, they brought the blood of goats and bulls, if they were themselves sinners, they gained nothing by their sacrifices (Heb. 9). For God had respect unto Abel and to his gifts, and "not the offerer from the gifts, but the gifts were pleasing because of the offerer," as Gregory rightly noted. It was, then, the weakness of the Law that it had neither a victim that was of itself acceptable to God, nor undefiled priests who, being pleasing to God, would also render the victim pleasing. Our priests, however, though they are weak, nevertheless in no way harm the Church's sacrifice, since it has its power not from them but from Christ the high priest, in whom the Father was well pleased, who is at once both priest and sacrifice, as Innocent III said in the Council (On the Supreme Trinity, ch. "Firmiter").

The excellent superiority of the evangelical victim, then, is that it is itself, of itself, most pleasing to God, and has one perpetual priest, holy and undefiled, whose offering gives force to the sacrifice, and benefits all the faithful for the memory of all ages. Wherefore, just as in the sacrament of Christ an impious minister harms nothing of the Church, so not even in Christ's sacrifice does a wicked priest deprive the Church of the fruit of the divine benefit, although he procures for himself not profit but destruction. But so much for the first argument.

The confirmation of this argument need not now be weakened by a long discourse, lest we here establish a new controversy about the priesthood of the new sacrament. We say briefly this: that those are called by God as priests who have been rightly and orderly called by the apostles and their successors. Nor indeed is the ground of our priesthood a popular one, to be declared by the votes of the many: it was not fashioned from earth, but drawn down and descended from heaven. "Stir up," he says, "the grace of God, which is in thee by the imposition of my hands" (2 Tim. 1). And elsewhere: "Neglect not the grace that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, with imposition of the hands of the priesthood" (1 Tim. 4). And in the letter to Titus: "For this cause I left thee in Crete, that ... thou shouldest ordain priests in every city, as I also appointed thee" (Titus 1). Paul, finally, and Barnabas ordained priests for every church, with prayer and fasting (Acts 14), as is now still customary in the Church. Just as, then, he who heard the apostles heard Christ, so too those whom the apostles called, Christ called; and those whom they excluded from the priesthood, Christ himself excluded.

For as to the fact that this line and method of defense is now attempted by these men—that in these scriptural passages the discourse concerns elders who governed the commonwealth, not priests who performed sacred rites—this sufficiently shows how little value they place on the dignity and authority of the priesthood, since they suppose it separated either from the venerable hoariness of old age or from the administration of the Church. Aristotle, moreover (Politics, Bk. 7, ch. 9), did not believe any others fit for the priesthood except those who were kings or leaders of the state, or certainly those who, after long governing the commonwealth by their own counsel, or having distinguished themselves in war, now weary and worn out, freed from all human care and labor, ought to hold the priesthood, so that it would reside only in an age and authority fit for the senate. Following this institution of nature, the apostles, since they perceived that the governance of the Church had been committed by Christ to the priests, judged that those should be co-opted into the order of priests who were truly "presbyters," that is, elders. And so it came about that the name "presbyter" remained attached to one who performs sacred things.

But we are placed in such a position that we need not look far ahead to future accidents of the priesthood, since we already see them in the present. For the custom of our forefathers has now already deviated from its course and track, and greatly deviated, and bishops hand down to us as consecrated priests those who are not only not "presbyters" but are even very young. Thus the authority of the priesthood is a mockery to the most wicked enemies of the Church. But we are not contending here about the abuse committed by bishops: we contend on this point, that we have received the manner of creating a priest from the apostles, and the apostles from Christ. That we cannot doubt this is proven by the most certain argument, that Christ said at the supper, "Do this in commemoration of me." For if what he commanded to be done was sacred—indeed, if, as has been proven above, it was a sacrifice—then he surely instituted the apostles as priests at that time, unless he commanded them to do it without giving them the power to do it. But to confect the body and blood of Christ, that we may do our sacred rites to God, since this is above nature, cannot be done without a divine faculty. But since the Lord commanded this sacrifice to be done "until he come," it is necessary that the capacity which Christ gave to the apostles, of performing this continual and perpetual sacrifice, they should have poured out to their successors, for the everlasting ages of all time. For thus, as Oecumenius says, the priesthood of Christ is eternal, according to the order of Melchizedek. But in refuting the confirmation of the first argument we have granted somewhat more than the reasoning strictly required.

In the second argument, moreover, many things are objected at once against what we have said, following the Church's opinion, but we shall express all of them plainly, so that the matter said can nearly be handled by hand. First, this is objected to our priests: that they offer another's blood. This is without doubt false, since the blood of Christ, though by the gift of God, is nevertheless ours—ours, I say, just as our universal cause is ours. The sun, moreover, is yours for generating, but not so yours that it generates without your own particular action.

Then Calvin objects that the blood of Christ, according to the Apostle, was offered once. This many not absurdly understand to refer to the bloody offering, which was set openly before the eyes of all. For thus the same Apostle explains himself, when he adds, "Once at the end of ages he hath appeared by the sacrifice of himself." The discourse, then, concerns that victim which was slain openly, on Mount Calvary, before the very eyes and face of the province of Judea. From which it is understood that the Apostle says not a word against the offering of the altar, where the blood of Christ, poured out in the mystery, is discerned not by the eyes of the body but of the mind. The adversaries, then, can equally twist Paul's words to apply to that offering which Christ makes unceasingly

in heaven, unbloody, forever appearing to the Father for our sins.

But lest I resort to this as if to a mere escape, I think it should above all be noted that offering is not simple and of one mode. For there is one that is universal, and another that is particular, which applies that general one, as it were, to producing an effect. And since the Lutherans seek all offerings after one single example and rule, we shall take an example of this division from the similitude of natural things, so that their ignorance may appear the more clearly.

Illumination is understood by philosophers in two ways: both that which is universal, and that which is particular. Namely, as soon as God produced the sun, it can be said that he once illuminated the world, that is, as in a universal cause. But there are, nevertheless, many proper illuminations occurring daily, which not only do not conflict with that general one, but so serve it that, without them, the universal one would be either practically idle or, certainly, entirely so. Thus, too, we interpret that saying, "He enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world"—namely, by a certain general illumination, which in this genus is one and the same, sufficient and fit, and thus everlasting; but if the particular illuminations were lacking, by which the minds of individual men are privately illumined, that universal illumination has sufficiency, but not efficacy. For general causes accomplish nothing, unless that common power of producing effects is joined to the private and proper actions of the secondary causes, for the individual effects.

Similarly, then, the one general offering of Christ was not only a fit cause of human redemption and sanctification, but was also absolute in all its measures—one to which, in its own genus I say, nothing can be added, nothing taken away. But there are many particular offerings, by which that universal efficacy is drawn down to certain individual effects. Let no one, then, think us legal priests, because we often and individually offer in the individual sacrifices of the altars, but rather let him reckon thus with himself: these are secondary priests, under one first high priest, Christ, administers and dispensers of his mysteries.

And indeed the first part of this argumentation, and likewise the second, have been discussed; there remains the third and last, in which Calvin and Bucer boast rather insolently, as though they had found an argument we cannot refute. In this one matter, I confess, they have the upper hand: for they have found how to confirm a fabricated opinion, while I cannot find a way to weaken and dissolve so slight an argument. But come, let us restrain their insolence and now show seriously how ridiculously men exult who are ignorant not only of Apostolic doctrine but of all Philosophy whatsoever.

First, then, although we wish once again to unfold the complex notion of sacrifice, we shall not easily find whether it contains slaughter and killing, when an animal is to be sacrificed. For someone perhaps will say, on the contrary, that the prophets of Baal offered a certain kind of sacrifice too, cutting themselves with lancets and knives, until they were drenched with blood (3 Kings 18). But let us grant this and concede to the arguers what we too believe pertains to the perfect immolation of an animal—that it must be killed, I say, if it is truly to be sacrificed. But we offer a body that is living and breathing: for it is the same in the Eucharist as it is in Heaven. But although the body of Christ in the Eucharist is living, and his blood is in the body, nevertheless the body is not offered by us because it is living, nor the blood because it is in the body, but the former because it was slain, the latter because it was shed on the cross.

But if Christ, offering himself on the cross, had not removed himself from our sight, but hung perpetually on the cross before the eyes of all the faithful, present in every place and every time, there would have been no need for him to leave behind an example of the deed, and for the truth to be transferred into an imitation drawn from an animal example. For just as those who were then present near the cross offered, along with Christ, the same victim to the Father, if indeed they were truly pious and understood the matter that was being enacted, so if that same external victim of the cross remained eternally before our sight, we would need no example and image of that victim. But since, although that offering and external slaying passed away, it nevertheless stands before God as acceptable and perpetual in its power, such that it is no less efficacious today before the sight of the Father than on that day when the blood flowed from the wounded side—therefore we truly offer now, along with Christ, that same victim of the cross, just as those who stood near the cross did, although they, with no image set before their eyes, since none was needed then, since the living reality itself was present and set before their eyes, whereas for us, through an image, Christ has raised up that victim, and set it, as it were, in a certain example, before our eyes. But this image and example in no way stands in the way of our now offering that same blood which Christ shed on the cross, no differently than if it were now being shed before us. This is the opinion of Chrysostom, though falsely attributed to Ambrose (On Consecration, dist. 2, ch. "In Christo"). (See also Eusebius of Emesa: On Consecration, dist. 2, "Quia corpus.")

Add that, whatever kind the sacrifice was, a corresponding death must be sought, such that if that was bloody, this too should be bloody; but if that will be unbloody, the death too will be mystical and unbloody, that is, the effect of death as though it were now present. For it is enough, in order that it be truly and properly a sacrifice, that death be applied now to the remission of sin, just as if Christ himself were now dying. This is

confirmed by the testimonies of the ancient writers.

Gregory says: "Living immortally in himself, he again dies in this mystery" (On Consecration, dist. 2, "Quid sit"). And Augustine: "Christ was immolated once in himself, and yet is daily immolated in the Sacrament" (On Consecration, dist. 2, "Semel"). Paschasius: "Christ is daily mystically immolated for us, and the passion of Christ is handed down in the mystery," etc. (On Consecration, dist. 2, "Iteratur").

And Cyril (in the Council of Ephesus), Athanasius (to Antiochus), Theophylact (on ch. 10 of the Epistle to the Hebrews), Damascene (Bk. 4), and finally Gregory Nazianzen, to omit the rest, call this an unbloody and bloodless immolation—that unique one, indeed, such as no other was ever similar, through which, as to its effect, Christ is immolated for us in the same manner as for those who were present when he offered himself on the cross. But because it happens without the shedding of blood that is perceived by the eyes in the present, while the offering occurs by the application of blood already shed, it is rightly called by the fathers an unbloody sacrifice. And to what has been said by the Lutherans in the second argument, we have said enough.

In refuting the third argument, too, there is no need to labor further after this. For we have taught that Christ's offering on the cross stands to the redemption of sins no differently than light does to illuminating, or medicine to curing. I speak of a light that would give forth all light, a medicine that would heal all diseases. But who would doubt that perfect and principal causes accomplish nothing without helping and proximate causes? For a medicament, however present and salutary it may be, unless it is applied to the sick body, brings neither help nor health to the one in need. But if the Lamb, who takes away the sin of the world, expiated our faults entirely by himself, without any aiding and associated cause, then let baptism be removed, let penance be absent, let the priesthood fall silent, let the ministries cease, and thus let every sacrament and instrument of our salvation be taken away. That precept would be empty, "Baptize in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost" (Matt. last ch.); that grace empty, "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them" (John 20); that saying meaningless, "Do penance, and be baptized every one of you ... for the remission of sins" (Acts 2); let, finally, that be false: "He saved us, by the laver of regeneration" (Titus 3). Indeed, if it please, since Christ prayed for us, let us not pray; since he fasted, let us not fast; since he wept, let us not weep. For these clever dialecticians gather that, because Christ offered once, we should not offer. Just as, then, we suffer with him, that we may be partakers of his passion, so too we offer, that we may take a part in his offering.

To us, indeed, religion is active; to the Lutherans, idle—who wish us to be idle, torpid in inaction, and, like pampered children, to do nothing. Thus they tear religion out by the roots from the souls of men, when they remove sacrifices, priests, and the other administrators of religion. We do not, then, by repeated offerings, testify that Christ's sacrifice was weak, but that it was the principal and perfect cause, which, however sufficient and consummated in itself, nevertheless accomplishes nothing without the application of the helping causes.

As for that saying, "By one oblation he hath perfected forever them that are sanctified," it is similar to my saying that God, by one illumination, illuminated the world forever. This, in reality, he did, when he kindled the sun as, so to speak, an everlasting light. Otherwise, why does the Apostle elsewhere command (2 Cor. 7) that we cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit, perfecting sanctification in the fear of God? Certainly the blood of Christ cleansed us from every fault, and yet Paul says, "Let us cleanse ourselves." Certainly by one oblation Christ perfected those who are sanctified, and yet Paul admonishes that we ourselves perfect sanctification in the fear of God. Christ, then, cleanses and perfects, and we too perfect and cleanse, but he acts with us as the principal cause, we act under him as helping causes. For we are God's helpers (1 Cor. 3).

But they add this: "Where there is remission of sins, there is now no more an oblation for sin." We respond. If remission is only as in a universal cause, then indeed there is no longer a general offering for sin; there is, nevertheless, a special offering, which applies the power of that general one to producing the effect. Just as, if the illumination is of the universal world, no other general one is needed—for we need no other sun, no other moon, no other stars. But it is still necessary that individual illuminations of the atmosphere occur daily, if the earth is to be illuminated day by day.

They add also: "After iniquities have been remitted through Christ's sacraments, to what purpose do we make offerings for sin?" I answer. The remission of iniquity is twofold: one perfect, the other imperfect. Perfect, when not only the guilt but the whole penalty as well is remitted; concerning which those sayings are understood: "Thou hast cast all my sins behind thy back" (Isa. 38); "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered" (Ps. 31); "He will cast our sins into the depths of the sea" (Micah 7); and other similar sayings. This happens through baptism to all the baptized. But we call that remission "imperfect" in which either the guilt is remitted but not the whole penalty, or the penalty is remitted after the guilt has already been remitted; concerning which we understand that saying: "for the remission of past sins" (Rom. 3); and again: "for the redemption of those transgressions that were under the former testament" (Heb.

9).

That the guilt of the ancient fathers was remitted before the death of Christ is not ambiguous: for they died, according to the faith, approved by the testimony of faith. But that it was not perfectly remitted, Paul confirms when he says Christ died "for the remission of past sins." If these had been fully forgiven to Moses, Aaron, David, and the other saints under the Law and under nature, the gate of the heavenly kingdom would not have been closed to them, nor would the infernal places have been appointed for their custody. For who would say that crimes are entirely absolved, when their penalties are paid in prison? Again, that David's crimes of homicide and adultery were relaxed at the time when he confessed his sin at the voice of the prophet Nathan—Nathan himself (2 Kings 12) and the author of the Book of Ecclesiasticus (Sirach 47) are witnesses. And if he had received full remission, to what purpose those words: "Blot out my iniquity. Wash me yet more from my iniquity ... Turn away thy face from my sins," etc.? Certainly he did not obtain this fuller and more complete indulgence from the Lord before the Lord had most severely avenged himself upon him with many punishments.

If, then, through Christ's sacraments a full remission of sins has come to anyone, we by no means offer a victim for sins of that sort—as, for example, if someone has just recently received baptism. But if the sinner has not obtained perfect remission—which is generally the case in the sacrament of penance—we present a sacrifice for his faults, that to him, to whom God is even now somewhat angry, he may at some point become propitious.

What, then, does the Apostle mean when, with horrible threats, he terrifies the minds of his hearers with these words: "For if we sin willfully ... there is now left no sacrifice for sins"? Surely he who says there remains no victim for those who sin willfully after having received the knowledge of the truth, without doubt signifies that some victim remains for the ignorant—especially for those who sinned before receiving the knowledge of the truth—as Chrysostom and Theophylact argue. The Apostle, then, exaggerates the matter with grander words and, as is his custom, instills terror by an overstatement.

He shows, then, not what a clement and merciful judge sometimes concedes by his own leniency, but what penalty is deserved by one who, having received the singular benefit of baptism, tramples on the Son of God, counts the blood of the testament unclean, and does despite unto the Spirit of grace. Unworthy, surely, is he who has been such a one, that Christ should be crucified again for him. But as often as his cross and his death are applied to us for the remission of sin, so often is he, as it were, crucified and immolated for us. If, then, it is a matter of strict justice, no victim remains for the sins of those who

sin from malice. But if it is a matter of the mercy of God, which surpasses even all understanding, then not only for the weak and ignorant does some victim remain, but also, rarely though it be, for those who have sinned willfully after receiving the knowledge of the truth.

Indeed, that this discourse of the Apostle is lofty and exaggerated is proven, first, by the fact that it is immediately followed by: "But a certain dreadful expectation of judgment," etc. And immediately: "A man making void the law of Moses," etc. And after a little: "Call to mind the former days," etc. And finally: "Cast not away your confidence, which hath a great reward." This, moreover, is confirmed especially by the fact that in chapter 6, when he had said, "It is impossible for those...," etc., lest it be thought there is no expectation of better things, as though wishing to recall them from despair to hope, he says: "We trust better things of you, my dearly beloved, and nearer to salvation: though we speak thus." From this qualification Jerome (Against Jovinian, Bk. 2) gathers that the Apostle terrified the Hebrews by exaggeration (On Penance, dist. 2, ch. "Si enim").

There is also another response, worthy, unless everything deceives me, of great attention. Namely, a victim for sin can be understood in two ways: one, for the penalty; the other, also for the guilt. That the word "sin" is sometimes used for the penalty of sin, these passages demonstrate: "I do not the thing which I work, but that which dwelleth in me, sin" (Rom. 7). And again: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much: but to whom less is forgiven, he loveth less" (Luke 7). In this passage the Lord calls the penalties of many sins "many sins." For as to the fact that the guilt had already been remitted before, whoever considers the preceding tears will not be able to call this into doubt. Indeed, she who had loved and grieved had surely already obtained the pardon of her guilt. But when it is said to her, in the present, "Thy sins are forgiven thee, go in peace," a most full pardon is granted to her, along with the discharge of all penalties. In the matter of penalties, indeed, it holds that a greater remission corresponds to a greater love, and a lesser one to a lesser love, for guilt is either remitted altogether at once, or not at all. The opinion of the Maccabees is, in common speech too, worn familiar: "It is a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sins." Here he without doubt called the purgatorial penalties owed for guilt by the name "sins." Similar is that saying: "Redeem thy sins with alms." Daniel, moreover, thought penalties could be redeemed with money (Dan. 4), for either penance dissolves guilt, or grace certainly resolves it without silver.

But whether the name of the cause is transferred figuratively to the effect, or whether the remission of penalty pertains to the full remission of guilt, it does not much matter—though St. Thomas (Bk. 4, dist. 12, q. 2, art. 2, q. 2) and Innocent testify that

such expressions are improper, by which sins are said to be blotted out, wiped away, washed, remitted, because penalties are dissolved. Now, then, when the Apostle says no victim remains for sin, he is to be understood properly of guilt. And this opinion is not contrary to the fact that the sacrament of penance—which is a judgment, not a sacrifice—remains, and that a victim for penalty—which is improperly called a "victim for sin"—also remains.

But you ask what reason many of the ancients had for calling baptism a "victim," and thus for saying that no victim remains for sin, because baptism cannot be repeated. Surely, because in baptism we die together with Christ, and through this sacrament the victim of the cross is applied to us for the full remission of sin—hence they figuratively called baptism a "victim," and interpreted that, once baptism has been received, no victim remains, because there is no second baptism. But in the sacrament of penance, the death of Christ is not applied by way of a victim, but by way of a judgment. Thus, although penance remains after baptism, nevertheless there does not, by that fact, remain a victim for sin. But enough, indeed too much, on the third argument.

The fourth argument, however, needs not refutation but reproof. For what ignorance, or what shamelessness, is it to raise up against us those testimonies which most support us? It is well established that the parts of the Eucharistic sacrifice are four: one, the consecration of the body and blood; another, the offering; the third, the breaking; the last, the consumption. By these four parts, I say, our sacrifice is made whole, is completed, is perfected—and whoever denies this, I shall prove has learned nothing of the nature of a perfect sacrifice, has inquired into nothing, knows nothing. That consecration and offering are joined with thanksgiving, we showed a little before to be gathered from the Gospel; the breaking, moreover, is most openly handed down. Here is the difference: the Lutherans think there is nothing mystical in the breaking, but only the distribution of bread, namely so that each may receive his own portion; but the holy Church, when she breaks the victim, commemorates Christ's victim by signifying the breaking of the Lord's body on the cross (On Consecration, dist. 2, "Quum frangitur"), just as Christ himself, both by word and by example, handed down that it should be commemorated.

As for the fact that the consumption of the species pertains to the full nature of this sacrifice, the Twelfth Council of Toledo testifies, saying: "What kind of sacrifice will it be, of which not even the one sacrificing is recognized to be a partaker?" (On Consecration, dist. 2, ch. "Relatum"). Augustine, moreover, in the Book of the Sentences of Prosper, agrees that, while the blood is poured from the chalice into the mouths of the faithful, the immolation of the Lord's body and the shedding of his blood are signified

(On Consecration, dist. 2, "Quum frangitur"). The consumption of the species, then, pertains to the full signification of the sacrifice. This was the reason it has been perpetual among Catholics that, while the priest partakes of the species, they do not say he "eats" it, although he does eat, but that he "consumes" it, so that we understand that in the Mass the notion of consumption, rather than of eating, prevails, and that a sacrifice, rather than a meal, is more in view. The Lutherans, sensing this, denied that Christ partook of his own body and blood, lest it be proved that he consumed and sacrificed.

But, in the first place, the very nature of a banquet requires that there be a common participation and association in the food; otherwise, he who invites to a supper would not be a fellow-guest but the founder and arranger of the banquet. And the reclining together of friends at a feast, although our word "convivium" is better, the Greeks nevertheless rightly call both "compotation" and "co-dining"—so that one who invites to a supper, and is not himself a fellow-diner and fellow-drinker, would not merely fail to enter into a proper banquet, but would not enter into a banquet at all. Next, as Chrysostom argues, lest the disciples shrink in horror from the flesh and blood, it was necessary that Christ himself taste it first. Christ, surely, commanded the apostles to do what they saw him doing; but the Church has always understood that it was enjoined upon the priests to receive; Christ, then, also received—unless a priest, complete in all his measures, made not a complete but an inchoate sacrifice.

Nor does it escape me that St. Thomas, in one place (III, q. 83, art. 4), seems indeed to teach that the sacrifice is completed before the breaking of the victim, and that reception properly pertains to the sacrament, while the offering pertains to the sacrifice; and again (art. 6, ad 6) asserts that the breaking of the victim is not so necessary that, if it is omitted, the sacrifice remains imperfect—namely because the signification of this act does not refer to the true body of Christ but to the mystical body: the breaking, then, is not to be numbered among the parts of the sacrifice. As for the fact that the sacrifice is completed before the breaking, this is proven by the great argument that the priest, immediately after the consecration, says: "We offer to thy excellent majesty, of thy own gifts and bounties, a pure victim," etc. Already, then, before the victim is broken, there is both offering and sacrifice.

But whoever objects to us St. Thomas, does so at the cost of setting Thomas both against himself and against the true nature of sacrifice; for his words in the Secunda Secundae (q. 85, art. 3, ad 3) are not obscure: that a sacrifice is properly so called when something is done concerning the things offered. He confirms this matter even by that example, as when bread is broken and eaten. Whence he gathers that first-fruits are offerings, but not, however, a sacrifice, because nothing sacred was done concerning them. He calls it a

"victim," then, sometimes before the breaking, both St. Thomas and the Church too, in that manner in which we name a thing that is imminent and proximate as though present. Thus Cicero says: "to present victims for sacrifice." Where he calls the animal to be sacrificed a "victim." Indeed, both in Leviticus and in many other passages too, "holocaust," "victim," and "sacrifice" take their name from what is about to happen imminently. But we also commonly call the bread itself, before the consecration, a "victim"—a usage from which not even St. Thomas shrinks. The priest, moreover, before the consecration, says that he offers "these holy, unspotted sacrifices," etc. What theologian, then, was so signally foolish as to think the sacrifice completed before the victim is consecrated? And, to say nothing of the hidden and interior sacrifice of blood and body, the external and mystical one certainly does not consist in the offering alone. Since, then, nothing has been done by way of sacrifice concerning the species before the breaking, not even the sacrifice has been completed. Likewise, since by the symbols of things, by Christ's institution, we are bound to enact his death—if it is a true and perfect sacrifice of ours, and the complete example of that victim which Christ presented on the cross—but there is no symbol of the realities before the species are broken, mixed, consumed—we can accept a most certain argument that, before the breaking, the sacrifice is not yet completed.

It remains, then, that not only the consecration and the offering, but also the breaking and the consumption, pertain to the integrity of the external sacrifice. This matter has been disclosed to us not by a thin argument or indication, but by a weighty and constant reasoning—apart from the fact that it is most easy to show that we have received these parts of the sacrifice from the apostles, for that Christ handed them down has been sufficiently demonstrated by me above. Let the Lutherans, then, henceforth devise more probable arguments, since this fourth one, which we have just now dissolved, is improbable. I say it is improbable to use the testimonies of Luke and Paul in order to overthrow the sacrifice of the Church.

For the reasoning that is attached is captious, and can deceive the inexperienced by its semblance of truth. First, indeed, whoever should answer the Lutherans that Christ at the supper offered a sacrifice not for sin, but nevertheless of thanksgiving, would not be easily evaded by them. For he would render a probable reason for this: that, since the day of the bloody sacrifice was already plainly at hand, or the hour at least was already approaching, there was no need to present, at the supper, a mystical victim for sin, since that general victim was imminent, by which it pleased the Father to have all sins resolved. Although Christ also offered the blood of circumcision for us, and fasted and wept for us, yet the remission of sin that was to be finally expected from the cross did not follow

from these acts. For just as the full efficacy of martyrdom is not in any random shedding of blood, but only in that in which the martyrdom is consummated, though the martyr offered his blood to God from the very beginning—so, of Christ's perpetual passion, that absolute and perfect power lay not in the beginning or middle, but in the end.

Next, the effect of the mystical offering is not that which the Lutherans falsely think we believe—namely, that it resolves all guilt and all penalties. On this matter we shall speak a little later. For the victim which Christ openly slew on the cross has one efficiency, and the victim which he mystically presented under definite species at the supper has another. That one is general, as we have said, and is applied to widely diverse effects not through the sacrifice alone but through all the sacraments individually. This is a peculiar efficiency, and is confined, under certain species, to certain peculiar effects. Christ, then, offered the victim at the supper both for venial guilt and for the penalty that would also be owed for mortal guilt. This is the peculiar effect of a sacrifice in dissolving sin. This effect the blood offered at the supper had; for on the cross it had the general power of remission. But since, as I just said, we are going to explain this matter more fully in refuting the following arguments, let us proceed in order to refute the arguments that remain.

In refuting the fifth argument, Bishop Fisher of Rochester says the "cup" is called the "new testament" because it is the confirmation of the new testament. This usage of the word, though I cannot prove it by testimonies, I do not dare to reject either. This I affirm: that this word is sometimes taken for the thing which comes from a testament, as in the Epistle to the Hebrews ch. 7: "Jesus is made a surety of a better testament." For thus, too, the authors of Scripture use the word "promise" for the thing which is promised: "Followers of them who through faith and patience shall inherit the promises" (Heb. 6); "That they might receive the promise of eternal inheritance," etc. (Heb. 9); and (Acts 1) "they should wait for the promise of the Father." If, then, "promise" is taken for the thing promised, and a "testament," even for Luther himself, is also a promise, it is no wonder if it is used for the thing itself which is left by the testament.

But the first and most important thing which Christ bequeathed to us in his testament was blood. What, then, prevents me from rendering back, at his funeral and obsequies, the thing which I hold by the benefit of the testator? What, I say, prevents us from giving back to him, living, what we received from the hand of him dying? Unless we repeat in vain and inappropriately: "Thine, O Lord, are all things, and what we have received of thy hand we give thee." That the cup is called a "testament" improperly is manifest. For whether, as it pleases Innocent (ch. "Cum Marthae," On the Celebration of Mass), a testament is a promise, or whether, as Ulpian truly holds, it is a just declaration

of the will concerning what we wish to be done after death, it is altogether clear that the cup is neither properly a promise nor a declaration, but the thing which is left by the promise and declaration of the will of the testator. But who forbids us to present this as a victim for sacrifice? But enough on the fifth argument.

Now, as for the sixth argument, what point is there in responding, unless I wish to repeat the same words I said above? For these clever dialecticians, forsooth, gather that if the Eucharist is an example and image, it cannot truly and properly be a sacrifice. This inference, indeed, is quite ridiculous. For what could be said more foolishly than that the victims of the Old Law were not sacrifices, because they were examples of the true one? Innocent III, moreover (ch. "Cum Marthae," On the Celebration of Mass), rightly mocks certain men who thought that in the sacrament there was not the truth of the body and blood of Christ ... from the fact that Scripture sometimes calls what is received on the altar a mystery, an image, a figure, and an example. Their error the Pontiff learnedly and gravely refutes: for if, because it is a figure, the truth of the sacrament of the altar is denied, then neither the death nor the resurrection of Christ should be believed to be true, since the Apostle relates them to be a likeness and an image, and Peter too writes that Christ left us an example in his passion.

Nothing, then, prevents there being, in the external sacrifice, the form, species, image, and example of the sacrifice of the cross, while, in the blood and body, which are the realities enclosed within, there exists the truth of that same sacrifice. But since, on the cross, as we have said elsewhere, the victim was bloody, openly and without mystery, while on the altar it is hidden secretly and mystically—lest we should be thought to sacrifice in the same manner as Christ did—Theophylact rightly, along with his Chrysostom, warns us that we do not immolate Christ in the way he immolated himself on the cross, but rather commemorate that victim of the cross. But since our commemoration is not idle and shadowy, but accomplishes what it signifies, although we do not kill Christ, who, having risen from the dead, dies no more, we nevertheless apply Christ's death as though it were now happening. We apply it, moreover, not by faith alone, nor by words alone, but also by symbols. For after those words, "This is my body, which shall be given for you," the Lord does not say, "Believe this," nor "Say this," but "Do this in commemoration of me." This was the reason, unless I am mistaken, that the Apostle called the symbols of the Old Law "shadows," since they were empty, and not the images themselves of the realities. For the Gospel contains the very images of the realities as it were living, not merely for signification but for efficiency. As baptism is the image of spiritual washing, which was accomplished through Christ's blood on the cross, yet it has things so joined to it as if Christ himself now shed his blood on behalf of the

one baptized. Wherefore he also once dared to say that Christ is crucified in each of the baptized—not merely in that manner of speaking by which John the Evangelist wrote that the Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world, but rather in such a way that, as to effect, it is entirely the same as if Christ were truly now crucified for those who receive baptism.

Nor indeed do I think that, when Paul said the Law has "a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things," he was disputing about signification, as most have interpreted—that "shadow" is understood as an obscure and imperfect sign, "image of the reality" as an expressed and perfect sign. While I do not deny these things are true, I judge them to be foreign to the Apostle's chief purpose. This is manifestly gathered from the words of the same Apostle. For he says: "For the law having a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things, by the self-same sacrifices which they offer continually, can never make the comers thereunto perfect," etc. Since, then, those victims had no power to produce an effect, he therefore said the Law had a "shadow" of the good things to come under the law of grace. For the shadow of fire does not accomplish what fire does, nor does the shadow of a man perform what the man does: for nothing in acting is either weaker or more empty than a shadow. But our sacraments and our sacrifice are images of the realities—not painted, shadowy, and empty images, weak in producing effects, but images expressed to the life of the very realities, and, if it is permitted to speak so, in efficacy the very living realities themselves, of which they are images: so great is the power of Christ and the Gospel, that it has attributed to the symbols and images the very same power that the realities themselves would have, if, when their commemoration is made, they were truly being enacted.

But I have spent much time in reproving the sixth argument. No response was needed at all, except that these men should diligently handle and in good faith reread the same passages. There they would plainly find the holy authors affirming both a true sacrifice in the Church of the body and blood of Christ, and a most true example as well: the one in the external form and figure, the other in the reality, which lies hidden and concealed within the mystery. Although Euthymius interprets it as an example before the consecration, but as the truth of the sacrifice after the consecration. In this same manner Damascene expounds Basil (Bk. 4, ch. 14).

In the seventh argument, men little exercised in Theology think that our own acts are in no way causes of our redemption, sanctification, and cleansing. If this were true, all these would be false: "Every one that hath this hope in him sanctifieth himself" (1 John 3); likewise: "Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit, perfecting sanctification in the fear of God" (2 Cor. 7); likewise: "Redeem thy sins with

alms" (Dan. 4); likewise: "By mercy and faith sins are purged away" (Prov. 15); likewise: "By mercy and truth iniquity is redeemed" (Prov. 16); and other sayings of this kind that occur everywhere in the sacred letters. Nor is anything, as these men falsely judge, thereby detracted from the grace, merit, force, and redemption of Christ toward us; rather, much more is attributed to the grace of God and of Christ.

I shall give an example from nature, that the power of grace may shine forth more clearly. It is established among all philosophers that all things are moved toward their own end by a certain innate force. Thus, that Creator God of the world implanted in fire lightness, that it might ascend to its congruent natural place, and, that it might give heat, which was the action fitting to fire's nature, imparted to it heat. This is readily seen in the other elements too, which are so moved by their principle and interior form that they not only do not resist, but seem to act spontaneously. Animals, moreover, not only have this inclination and form from nature, but also move themselves by certain actions of their own, both to seek out for themselves what is agreeable and to repel what is adverse and harmful. This appears especially more illustrious in men, who, since they are not driven like slaves but rather act freely as masters, choose the means by reason and set themselves in motion, so that they may achieve the ends proposed through such means. Nor, for that reason, is the power of the first cause any the less, or its might any weaker; rather, it is the more abundant and the greater, that it "reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly." For what force could have been stronger than that which established such sweet and congruent impulses in the nature of things, that it moves them by no force imposed upon them, yet moves them nevertheless most powerfully?

This excellent and singular sweetness of the power of God is poured out much more widely in gratuitous effects than in natural ones. For not only does mortal man, through the form and virtues of grace, put forth in himself vital operations which are above nature, but he also prepares himself, by his own action, to receive life itself, and is a cause to himself of his own living. For just as, if matter were itself to make in itself the dispositions by which it is prepared to receive the form of fire, that same matter would be an efficient cause to itself, so that it would be informed by that form—so too, since man himself effects in himself the preparations of vivifying grace, he himself exists as God's helper in his own generation. In this respect, as I have said, grace is sweeter and more abundant than nature. For you are able yourself to tend and preserve the life given by nature, to seek health, to drive off adverse diseases—now by applying certain external medicines, now by rousing up the powers of the soul within. But you cannot be, of yourself, the cause of your life; rather you receive it from elsewhere, with no operation of

your own intervening, no disposition of your own. For every disposition, by which the body is fitted to the soul, is put forth by the generating father, in no way by the generated son. But in spiritual birth, he who is born is not only the principle of his health after sickness, but also of his having life after he has been dead, and having it more abundantly.

Excellently, then, and fittingly to the reasoning of Philosophy, was that said: "The just man liveth by his faith." From which Jerome gathers that man is to himself "the cause of his own vivification." Namely, the acts of faith, hope, charity, and penance, which God uses to give life to the soul, man himself performs in himself, moved though he be by a gratuitous and supernatural aid. Do not contend, as though our acts were the efficient causes of grace and of the remission of guilt, when they do nothing other than dispose the soul to receive the grace and justice of God—just as heat is a preparation which affects the matter of wood, that it may take on both the form and nature of fire. But just as a man is not, to another man, the cause of his rational soul, but is nevertheless the cause of his living through the rational soul, so man, though he is not the cause of grace, is nevertheless a cause to himself of his living through grace.

To this opinion these are corollaries: "Purifying your souls" (1 Peter 1); likewise: "Wash thy heart from wickedness" (Jer. 4); likewise: "If any man, therefore, shall cleanse himself from these, he shall be a vessel unto honor, sanctified, and profitable to the Lord, prepared unto every good work" (2 Tim. 2). And indeed these vessels God himself made unto honor and prepared unto glory. But if the purification of our soul did not proceed from our own will, as Damascene argues, Paul would not have said: "If any man shall cleanse himself," etc. These things, indeed, are perhaps discussed too subtly for the Lutherans, entirely ignorant of all Philosophy, to be able to recognize. Let them understand this briefly: that in the work of our salvation, sanctification, cleansing, and healing, we are helpers of God. "In the day of salvation," he says, "have I helped thee" (2 Cor. 6); and again: "The grace of God with me" (1 Cor. 15).

For as to the question of the redemption of sins, it is much easier. For sometimes Scripture signifies by that word the payment of the penalties that remain after the guilt has been remitted. These, moreover, Christ resolves not only through his sacraments, but we too resolve through our own fasts and alms. When, then, we count out and pay the prices established by God as due for the owed penalties, then we redeem our sins. Nor, indeed, did our own nature make this price equal, but the grace of God, who could have exacted a heavier penalty for graver guilts, and a heavier compensation for graver penalties. But these prices he established by a law of clemency and mercy, indeed, but mixed with equity and justice.

But if, for the redemption of sins, these prices, though ours, are nevertheless of some weight—since he who is the just appraiser of all things, by the judgment of his own will, established it so by his own law—how much more truly and justly shall we ourselves redeem our own iniquities by offering the body and blood of Christ on the altar? Christ's, I say, who has been made for us sanctification, justice, and redemption. And although our redeemer is that one alone, yet because he nevertheless uses us and our actions to carry out the effect of redemption, we too, in this part, assist him. Nor is the glory of the Redeemer thereby diminished, but increased, since he has made us companions and partners not only of his divine nature but even of his divine operation. But we have spent altogether too much labor and effort in refuting this argument, especially since we are shortly going to explain certain of these matters at greater length.

In the eighth argument, ridiculous lute-players wander over the same string, when they deny that there are helping causes with God in the work of human redemption. What kind of folly this is we can demonstrate by an example from nature. There were certain men so ignorant of natural wisdom as to suppose that secondary causes—for so the physicists call them—do nothing at all of themselves, but that God, the maker of all things, in the presence of those causes called secondary and proximate, produces all effects by himself alone. This incredible madness of the most foolish men was hooted not only with hisses but with outright reproach out of the school of Philosophy.

But what these men err in regarding nature, the Lutherans err in the same way regarding those things which are above nature, when, attributing redemption to God alone, they exclude helping causes—as if it were blasphemy for us to say, in the realm of grace, what the wisest men have said in the realm of nature: namely, that there are helping and proximate causes, which the first and principal cause uses, in order to produce supernatural effects. In this respect the force and power of that first cause stands forth and shines more excellently, the more it confers itself upon man and shares itself with him—not only that he might exist, but even that he might be a cause—which, though its force is received from God, nevertheless truly produces effects, and even assists God himself in the accomplishing of things. For the Apostle too (1 Cor. 2 and 3) did not hesitate to write that we are "God's helpers," and dispensers and ministers of his mysteries; likewise, that he had planted, and, as a wise architect, laid the foundation, and had begotten sons through the Gospel in Christ. To pass over those sayings: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father," etc. (Matt. last ch.); "Whatsoever you shall bind upon earth," etc. (Matt. 18); "Whose sins you shall forgive," etc. (John 20). From which the Synod of Constance openly established that the priest truly absolves, truly confects. If these are most certain, as indeed they are, there is no need at all, as Albert Pighius does, to

deny that the sacrifice is our own operation. Much more learnedly did St. Thomas assert—a passage I briefly touched a little before—that a sacrifice is an offering, and an act of that virtue which is contained in the pious worship of God.

It is, then, our own operation, I do not deny it. But there are two kinds of our operations. Some, which we render in our own name, and which rest on our own grace and merits, such as almsgiving and fasting. Others, however, have their efficacy not from us but wholly from Christ, such as baptism and the priest's absolution in the sacrament of penance; for since the priest baptizes and absolves not in his own name but in Christ's, actions of this sort, in which there is a pure and bare ministry, receive their force not from the minister but from Christ—of whom they are, in fact, more truly said to be than ours; for it is he who baptizes, he who absolves. Wherefore, whether the minister be just or unjust, it matters not at all to the effect of the sacrament. Just as it matters nothing, in the case of one who kindles a fire and applies it to burning, whether he himself is cold or hot. He will impart only as much heat, not as much as he himself has, but as much as the applied fire has.

The prior of our operations, then, do not confer on others the remission of sin ex opere operato, that is, by the force of the deed accomplished, but whatever effect they obtain, they obtain by our own merit. But operations of the latter kind can, of themselves, remit sins, because, as we said, they belong to Christ rather than to us. Thus, once we confect Christ's sacraments and apply them to others, we resolve, by the force of the effected realities, both the guilt and penalties of others, and we impart the grace of Christ, not our own. The sacrifice of the altar, moreover, which I explained in refuting the first argument, is included in the latter kind of operation. For the priest does not present the victim in his own name, but in Christ's; he does not represent his own merit and grace to God, but Christ's; he does not offer his own blood, but Christ's. Just as, if he were to kindle a fire and apply it to burning, he would induce the effect of the fire, so, when he confects the blood of Christ on the altar and applies it by his own offering, he brings about the efficacy of Christ's blood. Wherefore the effect of this sacrifice is neither greater from a good minister nor lesser from a bad one, nor does the wickedness of the priest impede the effect of this sacrifice, as Innocent testifies (Bk. 3, On the Sacred Mysteries of the Altar, ch. 5).

Nor is this dogma newly invented, for it is thoroughly well-known even from the books of the ancient authors. This is taught by Gregory (1, q. 1, "Multi"), Augustine (On Consecration, dist. 2, "Utrum"), Jerome (Against Lucifer), Chrysostom (Homily 2 on the Second Epistle to Timothy), whose words I have chosen to record: "The sacred oblation," he says, "whether Peter or Paul or a priest of whatever merit offers it, is the

same which Christ himself gave to the disciples, and which the priests now confect. This one has nothing less than that one. Why is this? Because it is not men who sanctify this, but Christ, who had sanctified it beforehand. But he who thinks this one has less than that, is ignorant that it is Christ who is now also present and operating." Thus far he.

This matter we shall set forth more openly by an example from Philosophy. The philosophers teach, indeed, that assisting causes are not all of the same kind. For some do not act, unless they have received a similar quality from the principal cause. As air does not illuminate the eyes, unless the sun has communicated light with it; water does not heat, unless it has first received heat from fire. In this genus, the effect is greater or lesser according as the form and power of acting has been more or less communicated to the assisting cause. And if it should lack that form and power, it will act nothing at all, as air without light, water without heat, etc. There are other assisting causes, which apply the power of the principal causes, as one who brings fire to stubble or wood. In this kind of action, a diverse quality of the applying agents does not produce diverse effects, provided the same fire is applied. Now the ministers both of the sacrament and of the Christian sacrifice are causes of this second kind. For they do not sanctify others by a participated sanctity of their own, nor do they cleanse others because they themselves have first been cleansed by Christ. But whatever they may be, if they present the sacrament of Christ or offer the sacrifice, they join to it that same blood and merits of Christ.

Irenaeus, moreover, in the first place, does not speak solely of the sacrifice of the altar, but also of the other offerings, which are figuratively called sacrifices. This is easily apparent, since he cites the testimony of Paul to the Philippians, where the discourse is about alms. He also relates: "God had respect to Abel and to his gifts"; and likewise: "If thou offer thy gift at the altar," etc. Next, Irenaeus speaks plainly of the sacrifice in relation to the one offering it. But not even the victim of the altar purifies the one offering it, if he himself is worthless and impure. Rather, he is defiled the more by a sacrilegious offering. Whence he also says (Bk. 4, ch. 34) that if someone does not have the fear of God, he by no means, through what has rightly been offered outwardly as sacrifice, draws God to himself while having sin within. "Nor," he says, "shall such an offering profit him anything."

Moreover, the sacrifice of the altar belongs not to the minister alone, but to the whole Church. Thus, although it does not benefit, but rather harms, an evil priest offering it, it is nevertheless useful to the one for whom it is offered, not by the merit of the priest, but by that of the Church. This matter Irenaeus set forth in that same chapter, in these words: "Since, then, the Church offers with simplicity, her gift is justly reckoned a pure sacrifice." But since, in the Church of God, the Head is also included—which is

Christ—it follows that it is not necessary for the holiness of the ministering priest to sanctify the sacrifice, which is holy in itself and offered by the Undefiled Priest. For the same is both priest and sacrifice, Christ Jesus.

Since, then, I have refuted that argument, which seemed to these men most firm and most weighty, with answers clearer than any daylight, what, I ask, will the remaining arguments be like? In which there is no force at all for proving, and which are indeed feeble even for contradicting. Namely, the ninth argument will be refuted with the least effort. For in the remission of sin two things are understood: both the pardon of the guilt and the resolution of the penalty. The former, indeed, comes to men either through their own faith and charity, or through the sacrament of faith; the latter, however, comes also through another's faith and charity. For the fellowship of the Church, the brotherhood of the faithful, makes the penalties common through friendship—a matter it is the business of another place and time to prove. But much more does the just man participate in this relaxation of penalty from Christ's passion; and Christ's passion, through the sacrifice of the altar, is not only commemorated but also communicated. The priest's offering, then, on behalf of the one for whom it is made, conduces in a twofold way to the relaxation of penalty: both because the priest's own work is meritorious, which he benignly and liberally imparts to his needy neighbor for the discharge of the penalty, and because it is the sacrifice of the Church and thus of Christ. The former effect we attribute to the sacrifice ex opere operato, for the latter it has ex opere operantis. Wherefore, if the priest is upright and wishes to give his own labor and satisfaction to a needy brother, he serves that brother's advantage and benefit in a twofold way, as I just said; but if he is wicked, there is still the one benefit of the sacrifice, which proceeds from the Church and from Christ who is offering it—which a sacrilegious minister does not intercept at all. Just as a wretched servant who distributes alms does not deprive the master of the fruit of the alms.

In the confirmation of this argument, moreover, the force of the sacrifice in remitting sin is inquired into: whether it remits guilt, or penalties, or rather both—both guilt and penalty. On this matter I see three opinions held, none of which I approve.

One, that the sacred offering can also remit mortal guilt, and thus confer grace. Another, which attributes to the sacrifice no power in the remission of sin except that of obtaining it, in the way that almsgiving delivers from all sin and from death, because it stands before God in the place of prayer, through which we obtain those goods. This Ecclesiasticus expounds, saying: "Shut up alms in the bosom of the poor, and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil." Nor, for that reason, do they deny that the sacrifice is propitiatory. Since even he who obtains pardon for another is said to have rendered

propitious the one whom he has appeased by his prayers. By this way and reasoning, then, they say this sacrifice remits not only penalties but also all sins, both venial and mortal. The third opinion is that which says the sacrifice, ex opere operato, avails for penalties, but in no way for guilt; that there is, then, in the victim of the altar, satisfaction and the discharge of penalty, but not expiation and remission of guilt: for the sacraments are prepared for this latter effect, while the sacrifice was instituted for the former.

Indeed, those who have taken up that first opinion use the same arguments that we have touched upon: that Alexander and Julius relate that all crimes are blotted out by this sacrifice; Athanasius, Cyprian, and Damascene affirm that all filth is expiated; Chrysostom and Theophylact not obscurely teach that there is remission of sins. But if theologians gather, from those words, "Whose sins you shall forgive," etc., that the ministers can both remit all guilt and confer grace ex opere operato, why should we interpret the same words otherwise, concerning the sacrifice? Especially since sins are properly called "guilts," while the liability to penalty is so called only by a trope, in which the effect is signified by the name of the cause. But it is not permitted to the theologian to take refuge in tropes, when there is nothing absurd in the proper meaning.

Again, the holy fathers have taught that this sacrifice washes away crimes and wipes away filth. But he who washes and wipes away filth removes a stain; this victim, then, does not resolve penalties alone, but guilts too, in which we understand the stain to consist; for when guilt is remitted, the penalty remains, not the stain. Add that the blood of Christ is here mystically shed for the remission of sins, just as the very form of consecration establishes for us; but the blood of Christ was shed also for guilts, not only for penalties; both, then, this sacrifice resolves. Finally, since the same Christ is offered to the Father on the altar who offers himself to the Father in Heaven, just as the offering which he presents to the Father, having entered the Holy of Holies, remits mortal guilts too, so also that which is made on the altar will remit both guilts and penalties.

Nor is the second opinion destitute of its own supports. For, after the sacrifice for sin has been offered, in order that the faithful might understand the power of prayer in the victim for blotting it out, the Church entreats in these words: "May this sacrifice be a saving intercession unto pardon, may it be the washing away of crimes, the strength of the weak, a bulwark against the world's perils, the remission of all sins." And St. Thomas (in the Fourth Book, distinction 12, question 2, article 2, sub-question 2), when in the first argument he had objected that saying, "may it be the washing away of crimes," etc., replied that expressions of this kind are improper. For this sacrament is said to wash away crimes, because it impedes them by administering strength against them. And to the fourth argument, he says: "The Eucharist, insofar as it is a sacrifice, has an effect in those

for whom it is offered, in whom it does not presuppose spiritual life in act; and therefore, if it finds them disposed, it obtains grace for them by the power of the true sacrifice, from which all grace flows into us, and consequently blots out mortal sins in them, not as a proximate cause, but insofar as it obtains for them the grace of contrition." Thus far St. Thomas.

The third opinion, finally (if indeed I may call these "opinions," which I see conflicting with the common sense of Catholics), since in the efficacy of this victim it does not know how to distinguish mortal sins from venial ones, lest it should grant that both are remitted through the sacrifice, thinks it necessary to take refuge in the notion of penalties for both alike; this is their chief reason for so thinking.

Of these three opinions, as I have said, I altogether agree with none. For that first is not true, unless all the theologians are mistaken, who with one voice and one mind dissent from it. For if mortal guilts were resolved through the sacrifice, the sacrament of penance would not be necessary for salvation. For where the priest had already once blotted them out by the offered sacrifice, there would be no need to extinguish the same guilts again by another remedy. Nor would God, who does not abound in superfluous things, institute two external signs proximately for the same effect. But it is established that the sacrament of penance was instituted for the remission of guilts. If, then, the sacrifice of the altar of itself also abolished sins, we would be indiscriminately misusing two external signs for the remission of guilt. Since the sacrifice would present this so easily, the discipline of penance would be entirely rendered pointless, since to offer a sacrifice is a remedy most ready to hand for anyone. What? Would priests then remit mortal guilts without confession, merely by offering sacrifices? If this could be done by a priest, the Church would in vain insist on the precept of confession—since priests would resolve, through the sacrifice, all the guilts of sinners, without knowledge of the case and without confession. Thus, after baptism has been received, some victim would remain for sins—which we have said above conflicts with all the ancient expositors (for perhaps these men will disdain the more recent ones).

From which the delirium of Ambrose Catharinus is exposed: that sins committed before baptism are remitted through the sacrifice of the cross, but after baptism, all sins are remitted through the sacrifice of the altar. For that the victim of the cross is the general cause of the remission of sins, whether committed before or after baptism, is taught both to the Romans and to the Hebrews by the Apostle, and we too would demonstrate it most manifestly, were it not foolish to refute improbable inventions.

Rather, those things must be refuted which these men asserted on the other side: Alexander, Julius, Athanasius, etc., say that the sacrifice blots out crimes and remits sins. We refute this in three ways. First, we said, not so very long ago (to the third argument), that when the penalties owed for guilts are blotted out, dissolved, remitted, then crimes are said to be "blotted out, dissolved, remitted." In this sense the Church, through indulgences, grants the most full pardon of all sins, that is, of all the penalties which we have contracted by sinning. Nor does it much matter whether those words are said improperly and figuratively or properly without figure, because, namely, the guilt is not fully remitted so long as the sinner is liable for the discharge of the penalty.

Next, since consumption pertains to the perfection of the sacrifice, as we showed above (to the fourth argument)—for unless it were consumed, the ancients did not think the sacrifice consummated and perfect—it is no wonder if the body and blood of Christ, since they confer grace while being consumed, remit all guilts as a consequence—namely, that effect being proper to and joined with grace. And this the Church seems to signify when she says: "May the sacraments we have received, we beseech thee, O Lord, wipe away all our crimes." By these words she wished it to be understood that the sacrifice, if you regard the guilt, does not blot out crime because it is offered, but because it is consumed. For it is by this same reasoning that it is both the perfection of the sacrament and of the sacrifice.

Finally, St. Thomas, in the Fourth Book of the Sentences, as was just now cited, answered that those expressions are to be reduced to that form by which what is obtained through prayer is said to be "made" by the prayer. In this sense it was said: "Grant a pure life, loose the chains of the guilty," etc. To which Moses too seems to have looked, when, after prescribing the individual victims for sin, he adds: "And the priest shall pray for him, and it shall be forgiven him" (Lev. 4, 5, and 6).

But it is ridiculous if we refer those words, "Whose sins you shall forgive," etc., simply to guilts and penalties: that all similar sayings, however and wherever and by whomever spoken, should be interpreted in the same manner. It is one thing, believe me, to appoint judges who pronounce sentence concerning sins, who have the power of retaining and remitting, who impose a heavier or lighter penalty according to the lightness or gravity of the guilts; it is another thing, after grace has been begun and the sacrament of reconciliation received, to become a partaker of the Lord's altar. But if, after guilt has been remitted, no penalty at all remained, and if venial sins were not admitted after mortal ones had been forgiven, there would be no need, after the institution of the sacrament of penance, to have a victim of propitiation.

But in this matter too Christ has especially indulged us, who not only gave penance to repair and mend the grace that was lost, but also left the sacrament of the Eucharist, the same as the sacrifice of the altar, by which we might have our grace kept whole and sound. For by this sacrifice we not only render like for like, for a friendship reconciled, but we also render propitious the somewhat-angry judge, threatening a temporal penalty for a guilt committed and remitted; by this sacrifice we wipe the feet, and what the water poured into the basin conferred on the apostles, the same, and much more, does the blood poured into the chalice bestow on the penitent; by this sacrifice, finally, offered, we are disposed, washed, prepared, that we may be able to approach the Lord's table purely, and, not merely as friends, to "recline at the feasts of the gods." The order of things, then, and the nature of the sacraments demands that we not interpret the remission of sins in the same way in the sacrament of penance and in the victim of the altar.

Nor do we here take refuge in tropes. For it has been explained that the resolution of penalty pertains to the full remission of sin, and that a guilt is not fully remitted for which a penalty remains to be discharged. And if we should, in this passage, bend the sayings of the saints to a trope, we would not do so without necessary cause, nor without the well-known usage of that word. But the washing away of crimes is not without the water of grace, nor is anything either wiped away or washed away, unless it has a stain. I, reader, do not wish to press the metaphors of "washing" and "stain" too literally to the quick, as those who inquire into these matters too subtly might do, perhaps truly, but with little benefit to common utility. For if we always wished to hold the testimonies of Scripture and of the ancients to that standard, we would find that they sometimes diverge from strict truth.

This I shall make manifest with a single example, since even to me the length of this disputation is already burdensome. No one can call it into doubt that David's guilt was remitted upon his confession of sin, unless he has either not read what we wrote a little before or has never considered it with himself. "I said," he says, "I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord," etc. But that he had not yet, with the guilt remitted, attained full cleanness, he himself testifies, saying: "Wash me yet more from my iniquity, and cleanse me from my sin"; likewise: "Thou shalt sprinkle me," etc. He who says "yet more" surely feels himself to have been washed, but not fully and perfectly. Some stain, then, remained; some filth still lingered, which had not been entirely wiped away by the prior washing.

In this manner, then, the ancients said that the sacrifice washes away crime and purges filth, although they knew that, through penance, the guilt had already been remitted

beforehand and the grace of justification had been received. The resolution of the penalty, then—since every penalty is a purgation and medicine of the soul—the ancients called "washing" and "wiping away"; or certainly they felt that, through imperfect grace, the human heart is not fully healed, washed, cleansed, since we draw from sin certain lingering habits of vices and certain inclinations toward a changeable good. Since these things do not vanish at once through any contrition whatsoever, it is established that they are, so to speak, the filth and diseases of the soul.

Kindly, then, did the Lord act, in his own will, toward Zion, when, after the sacrifice of a humbled and contrite heart, by which guilt is blotted out, he accepts another sacrifice of righteousness, by which the penalty is resolved. By both, filth is purged, by both we are washed and cleansed, but not, nevertheless, in the same manner. For there are many and various purifications from diverse things, which, if you wish to hold them all to be similar, you would confess yourself to be foolish. For that the stain of sin should be entirely and wholly, so that not even a trace remains, washed away by any washing of grace whatsoever—neither reason nor authority admits this.

But the blood of Christ is offered and mystically shed for the remission of all sins. To me, indeed, thinking most often on this matter, this above all seems worth considering—which I briefly noted in refuting a certain earlier argument—that the blood of Christ operates in all the sacraments indeed, but in each produces its own proper effect, according to each sacrament's peculiar signification and nature. Just as the universal first cause does not pour out its whole force into each of the assisting causes, but attempers itself entirely to their power, whether perfect or imperfect, and produces, as it were, various offspring, differing in perfection and imperfection: so the blood of Christ, of itself, effects the remission of sins both in Baptism and in Penance, but not, however, in a similar manner. For in Baptism, since it is regeneration, it fully and perfectly resolves both guilt and penalty; but in Penance, since it is a judgment and has satisfaction attached to it, it resolves the guilt, but not fully the penalty, until the satisfaction has been completed. And in all the other sacraments too there is indeed remission of sins, but in a certain manner and, as it were, accidentally. Because, namely, neither Confirmation nor the Eucharist nor Orders nor Matrimony are instituted, of themselves, for the remitting of sin, yet they cannot have their proper operations without grace, which, if it finds sins in the soul, drives them out as contraries to itself.

I find that the sacrifice of the altar, when I begin to recall the reasoning to the truth, since it is of itself propitiatory, is of itself also instituted for the remission of sin. But since it has the species of bread and wine, and this same thing is both an altar and a table, the very nature of the matter and the order of nature demands that the effect of this altar

exist in those who are able to be partakers of this table—namely, having received the sacrament of reconciliation, before which it is absurd to approach the banquet of friends. In these, however, mortal guilt has been remitted. Wherefore the blood of Christ, in the species of bread and wine, of itself, confers the remission of penalty and of venial guilts; sometimes, however, though accidentally, it confers the remission of mortal guilts too—not because it is offered, but because it is consumed. For then, as I have often said, the sacrifice is consummated. Which, if it should happen to find a man in mortal sin, though unaware of it, it confers grace and justifies him, if we believe the authority of St. Thomas.

Wherefore, although the blood of Christ is offered and mystically shed for the remission of sins—to answer the argument now—it is nevertheless, from the signification of the species of bread and wine, as from an instrumental and assisting cause, defined to produce that remission of which those are partakers who do not unworthily approach the altar of the Lord, that is, who are conscious of no mortal guilt which they have not first washed away through penance. As for the effect of the sacrifice ex opere operato, I know it can also be offered, as if in the place of prayer to obtain grace, even for a mortal sinner. It is not necessary, however, that it always have effect, nor that it obtain, as if by a promulgated law, penance and pardon for the sinner, although this prayer is most greatly pleasing to God.

But you object: The Son is always heard for his own reverence, and this sacrifice the Son always offers to the Father: it has, then, an everlasting effect; for the prayer of the Son cannot be poured out in vain and to no purpose. To this argument I answer: Those prayers which Christ pours out through himself, the Father hears at every time and place; but those which he offers through men, he does not always hear. Just as the first cause, in those effects which it wills to produce by itself, without any other assistant, never in these acts in vain, so, when it operates through secondary causes, it is sometimes said to act in vain—that is, sometimes the end vanishes, not from the principal cause, but altogether from the assisting one. In the same manner, if Christ in Heaven offers this sacrifice, as he truly does offer it, he did not institute it to offer for every effect of the blood, but for an effect defined under certain species and figures. Let the first opinion, then, be thus refuted for us.

But those who place in the victim of the altar only the power to obtain by petition err, first, concerning the penalties of sins. That these are redeemed by the sacrifice of Christ's blood, as by a price presented, since this matter was well known, we touched upon briefly a little before. For if by alms the penalties of sins are redeemed, why should we deny that they are redeemed by the blood of Christ offered on the altar? Who indeed

would tolerate that penalties are resolved by the sacrifices of the Old Law, but not resolved by the sacrifice of the New Law? Or is the blood of Christ of less worth to God than the blood of a goat? But just as in the sacraments, not only because our own action is meritorious does it have satisfaction attached for the penalty owed for guilt, but also from this fact—that through such signs the blood of Christ is properly applied to us—by the force of that very blood, both greater grace is conferred and a greater part of the penalty is remitted: so too, in the sacrifice of the altar, not only because our offering has merit, but because through such an external sign the commemoration, and thus also the application, of Christ's passion occurs, ex opere operato, that is, by the power of the blood itself, a fuller remission of penalty accrues both to the one offering and to those for whom it is offered. I speak of the living, for in the case of the departed the same cause does not apply. To these, indeed, just as the merits of Christ reach them through indulgences only in the manner of a suffrage, so perhaps the power of the sacrifice too has effect for them only in the manner of prayer and suffrage. But it benefits the living by way of redemption and payment, which must be accepted by the law of justice, just as if as much money as is owed were paid in full.

They err, next, concerning venial guilts, which both the theologians of the schools and the ancient saints too testify to be blotted out altogether by this sacrifice (On Consecration, dist. 2, ch. "Iteratur" and ch. "Utrum"). Nor indeed, by any lesser consensus of the Church, are venial sins remitted through the sacrifice of the altar than through holy water, through the Lord's Prayer, or through similar works of religion of this kind. And there is at hand a most certain argument, which we gathered above from the force of the form by which the blood is consecrated, and of the species of bread and wine: that the sins of friends—namely, of those who do not unworthily approach the Lord's table—are resolved through this sacrifice. Those, moreover, are light and venial sins, which can be found even in friends. So that you may plainly understand Christ's providence and kindness toward us, who applied the heavier cure of penance to the graver diseases, but cured the lighter ones with the easier medicine of the sacrifice. But enough on these matters.

Let those men, and also those who have followed the third opinion, see how they can defend their cause, when reason and truth itself convict them that not only penalties but venial guilts too are remitted through the victim of the altar. And concerning the confirmation of the ninth argument, I fear I have said too much already.

The tenth argument, however, contains a most obscure question concerning the value of the sacrifice, on which I understand certain theologians—whom I see held to be most learned in the schools—have held some remarkable opinions; but nothing is so

improbable that it cannot sometimes appear probable by argumentation, especially to those who judge from the surface of things and pursue, with their subtleties, the mere smoke of Theology. To refute their opinions concerning the value of the Mass would be long and tedious. I shall, then, briefly set forth my own, as much, namely, as will suffice to answer this argument.

First, then, it ought not to be called into doubt that the value of the Mass is, in a certain sense, infinite—that is, as to sufficiency, not as to efficiency. For just as the virtue and power of God is indeed sufficient to produce an infinite effect, since it is itself infinite, yet always produces a finite one, because a created thing cannot receive the infinite: so the blood of Christ, wherever it is found, whether on the cross or on the altar, is of infinite price, because it is fit to satisfy for infinite men, if there were such; but since they are always finite, the effect is always finite, although the price of the blood is bounded by no limit. And concerning the victim of the cross, indeed, there is today no controversy among us; but that the victim of the altar is of infinite value is thoroughly perceived and known by two arguments. One is that which we are now attempting to refute. For in that part where it teaches the sacrifice to be infinite, because it presents to God blood of infinite price, it is difficult not to approve the efficacy of that argumentation.

The other argument is this: that if the value of the Mass were finite, ten men who offered a sacrifice would satisfy less for the penalty owed than if only two offered it. For if you divide any finite thing among ten men, no such portion will fall to each individual as would fall to two, if it were divided between two alone. Thus, if ten heard a Mass, the value, distributed among more, would exist in a lesser degree in each of them than if only two were present at the sacrifice. Likewise, the more ministers who served at the altar or in the choir for a solemn sacrifice, the smaller the portion of the victim they would receive. Wherefore, whoever, after me, should come to the Mass either as a hearer or as an assistant, would take away from me a part of the fruit and satisfaction. All of which is, indeed, absurd. From which it follows that if two of the faithful bring an offering and alms to a priest to present a victim for them, the first would not receive a lesser benefit from Christ's blood than if the second had never existed at all. Just as, if someone near the cross had offered that blood to the Father together with Christ, he would obtain nothing less if he were alone than if an infinite number were present at the same time, offering the same sacrifice with the Son. For it is the same victim on the cross and on the altar, though there it is open, here it is hidden in mystery.

Nor, however, can the priest receive from many, for one Mass, whatever fee he pleases, but only what will suffice for him to eat from the altar with sobriety. For he does not sell the fruit and merit of Christ's blood, but hires out his own labors and ministry.

Wherefore he can in no way claim more from many, as if the benefit were less in the case of many than in that of one. But it must be universally agreed that a priest, whether he celebrates for a few or for many, may by his own right seek the food necessary for life. If one does not give it, he does no injury by seeking it from many. Rather, you would do him injury if you compelled the priest to present the victim for you alone, unless you provide him with food. How much and what kind of food is necessary for a man is a matter for prudence to judge, more than Theology. At one time and place a single coin will not suffice for the doer of the work; at another, it will perhaps be more than enough.

Indeed, as to what we said concerning the benefit of the sacrifice, Cajetan rightly noted that this is to be referred only to those who offer it. For those who do not offer do not receive an equal share, as if it were offered for many as opposed to being offered for one alone. Thus, if a priest of his own accord, invited by none of his friends, sacrifices for them though absent, I say it will not be worth as much for the many as it would be worth for one, if it were sacrificed singularly for one of them alone. I speak with respect to satisfaction; for as to impetration, there is no less force in a sacrifice offered for many than in one offered for a single person alone. This matter is common to all prayers, for which there is no loss in impetratory power from being poured out on behalf of many.

But the helpers and hearers of Masses, even those who provide food for the priest or in any way serve the sacrifice, truly do offer the sacrifice, and thus each, according to his own devotion, receives a part of that victim. Certainly, the more closely an assisting cause of the sacrifice is joined to the principal cause, the more it satisfies for penalty. Thus a priest more than a deacon, a deacon more than a subdeacon, a subdeacon more than an acolyte, an acolyte more than a hearer—though he who gives the priest the stipend necessary for life excels both of these. And these too, the more devoutly and religiously each performs his own office, the more they will satisfy. Indeed, such devotion and religion can exist in offering the sacrifice that the whole penalty owed is resolved by a single offering. For it is not the case that, if the sacrifice is of infinite value, therefore the whole penalty is always redeemed. Since it is infinite in the manner of a universal cause, which, infinite though it be, the assisting causes are accustomed to determine to finite effects—effects greater or lesser according as the power of the assisting causes is greater or lesser. This we perceive in the first cause of natural things, which, although it is itself of infinite power, produces, through secondary causes, finite effects, as great and of such a kind as the power and nature of the assisting causes can allow.

Nor does the priest impose limits on the sacrifice by his own merit and holiness, but by his own intention and application, whereby he applies the power of the sacrifice to this one or that one for whom he offers it. Just as, indeed, for baptized infants, through the

minister's intention, the blood of Christ is applied and a certain degree of grace is conferred—not the degree the minister's holiness has determined, but the degree Christ has willed to prescribe (for what degree that is, is unknown to mortals): so, for those for whom the sacrifice is offered, if they do not offer it themselves at the same time, a certain degree of penalty is remitted, which we do not know, but which Christ has fixed by his own will. But just as adults receive greater grace from baptism the more religiously and devoutly they receive baptism, so too he who offers the sacrifice more holily and fervently will receive greater benefit from the sacrifice.

For infants, moreover, the peculiar washing of the minister determines the power of the cross to a fixed degree of grace, which we believe to be equal in all of them, because the disposition is equal in all; but for adults, since the disposition is not the same but differs for each, not the same degree of grace but a different one is conferred on each. In the same way, the universal and infinite power of the sacrifice is determined by the individual priest's own offering, either to a certain and equal remission of penalty in those who stand in the same relation to the sacrifice, or even to an unequal one in those who, since they are assisting causes of the sacrifice, are affected differently and differently—that is, well, better, best.

But if the blood of Christ were as properly ours as each man's own blood is properly his own, without doubt, by the offering of Christ's blood, the whole penalty, however infinite, would be dissolved. But, as we have said, the blood of Christ is ours in the manner in which the light of the sun is ours—namely, as a universal cause, whose power, greater or lesser, is received according as the subject is more or less disposed, and according as the assisting causes bring more or less help to the effect. And after this, in refuting the tenth argument, it will be idle to expend more words.

The eleventh argument, too, was to be laughed at rather than refuted. "But the Mass is ridiculous"—especially, when, amid such great blindness and misery of men, "there is nothing at all for us to laugh at." The first part of this argument, then, is most easily eluded. For there is no incompatibility at all; rather it is most fitting that the very thing by which we render thanks to a beneficent God, we should offer to an angry one. For by the very same gifts—an ox, a sheep, a lamb—the ancient fathers both rendered thanks to God and took care to placate him. In this manner we render back to God the body and blood of Christ, gifts granted to us by divine gift, both propitiatorily and eucharistically.

For as to their thinking that the species of sacrifice are confused, if the same one is both eucharistic and propitiatory, in this they are marvelously deceived. For the threefold power of the soul—of vegetating, sensing, understanding—is not confused, if all three

exist eminently in the one rational soul. From which it is understood that, if the many and various sacrifices of the Old Law all passed over into the one sacrifice of the New Law, in which they are contained and made eminent, this is not a confused mixture of species, but the perfect excellence of the Christian sacrifice. Next, we see this in the realm of morals: that diverse kinds of virtues and vices come together in one action, if diverse ends attach to it. The same act, indeed, is theft and sacrilege; the same act is mercy and religion. Nothing, then, prevents the same victim, referred to diverse ends, from being both propitiatory and eucharistic.

We recognize God, indeed, in the remission of sin too, as both merciful and just, so that he both remits sins freely and yet remits them at a price. "Being justified freely," he says, "through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus" (Rom. 3). And again: "You are bought with a great price" (1 Cor. 6). Christ, moreover, gave us this price, and gave it freely, that we might pay our debts. Wherefore we render immense thanks both to the Son and to the Father—indeed, as I have said at some point, we render like for like. But since this price, though received, is nevertheless our own, by presenting it we truly redeem our sins and appease God with his own benefits.

This matter Irenaeus pursues (Bk. 4, ch. 34) in these words: "God, who needs nothing, takes up into himself our good works, for this purpose: that he may grant us the reward of his own good things; as the Lord says, 'Come, ye blessed,' etc. ... So too has he given a word to the people concerning offerings to be made, although he had no need of them ... Thus he also wishes us to offer a gift at the altar." Thus far Irenaeus. And Pope Celestine, the first of this name (in his letter to all the bishops of Gaul), elegantly exclaims: "O mercy of God, who wills our merits to be what are your gifts; and for these things which you have liberally bestowed, you are about to give eternal rewards." This was the reason why the Lord Christ, at the very beginning of the supper, gave thanks upon taking the bread and wine, in order to distribute them to the disciples. He who was giving, then, was himself receiving, and therefore he gave thanks. In this manner we too both give thanks to God for the gift received, and give back what we have received, for the redemption of our souls.

All these matters have been explained, for the most part, in argument 2 for the first conclusion, and in argument 3 for the second conclusion, and in the response to the fifth argument. For the latter part of this eleventh argument, too, has been sufficiently refuted in the response to the third. As for why the Eucharist is a sacrifice while the other sacraments are not, this is not the reason these men give, but because in the Eucharist the body and blood of Christ truly remain, while in the other sacraments they do not remain. Whence, since we have such precious gifts in the Eucharist, we both may and

ought to offer them to God. Without an offering, however, there is no sacrifice. In the offering of the Eucharist, too, Christ is mystically and unbloodily immolated, and therefore there is a victim there, which is not the case in the other sacraments. I speak properly, for by transference baptism is sometimes called a victim.

Let them depart, then, these blind and unlearned Lutherans, whom we have shown, in this one example, to be ignorant of all the disciplines: of Theology, Philosophy, Dialectic, Grammar. For they are ignorant not merely of the matter, but even of the very name, of sacrifice.

Chapter XII

Second Example, Where a Conclusion of Theology is Turned Into a Question

Although in each of the preceding books the malice of the Lutherans has compelled us to discourse on some one principle of Theology, and thus to present many examples of questions that come into controversy contrary to the order of nature and of the discipline, yet in the previous chapter we exercised our pen more diligently in that kind of combat, and, as if for a display, indulged in a freer disputation. Although this was no mock contest but a true battle, which, with the world looking on, we fought in the Council of Trent. There we kindled a great light for the fathers, dispelled the darkness of the adversaries, and were seen to be theologians. We indeed acted more boldly than the other authors of the school. For they are accustomed dryly, employing no oratorical ornaments, to relate the opinions and reasonings of the heretics; but we so amplified, augmented, and adorned those very arguments of the heretics that we seem both to have sharpened the weapons the enemy has, and to have supplied them with weapons they lack. But, as I have often said elsewhere, truth surpasses falsehood, however marvelously equipped and adorned it may be. But lest the volume grow beyond due measure, we shall not pursue the remaining examples so copiously in that manner, but shall dispute narrowly and concisely, and shall briefly touch upon not all but the chief arguments of both sides.

Come, then, let this be our second question: Whether Christ's soul, from the very beginning of its creation, saw God clearly. For there are arguments on both sides so probable that neither seems firmly established.

Bucer, moreover, denies that Christ's soul was perfect from the beginning; Erasmus calls it into doubt; the theologians scarcely show it. Those who deny it, however, can use arguments of this sort.

First, there was faith in Christ: as it is written, "Faith shall be the girdle of his loins" (Isa. 11). His mind, then, did not see God, since faith is the evidence of things not appearing (Heb. 11).

Next, Christ had hope, as he himself says, speaking to the Father: "My hope from the breasts of my mother" (Ps. 21). But what a man sees, why does he hope for? (Rom. 8).

Moreover, he feared, as may be seen in Mark (Mark 14); but fear concerns either a future or an uncertain evil (Aristotle, Rhetoric Bk. 2). He did not, then, clearly see God, in whom nothing is known as future or uncertain.

Moreover, he grew in grace not only with men but also with God (Luke 2). He was not, then, blessed, nor did he see God, because the blessed cannot grow in grace.

Furthermore, in knowledge and blessed vision there is no succession of things known. But God showed certain things to Christ's soul, and concealed others, to show them later, according to that saying: "The Father... showeth him all things which himself doth, and greater works than these will he show him" (John 5). And again: "Of that day... no one knoweth... not the Son" (Mark 13).

It is likewise more excellent and pleasant to attain glory and honor through worthy works than without any merit at all. Christ, then, received his soul's happiness as the reward of virtue. Wherefore he did not attain the vision of God in the first instant. For merit precedes reward, and labor precedes wages. Nor can it happen that one should simultaneously merit blessedness and be blessed, unless the soul is simultaneously both on the way and at the way's end.

This argument, moreover, is confirmed by very many testimonies of the sacred letters. As that: "Because his soul hath laboured, he shall see and be filled" (Isa. 53). "We shall be satisfied when the glory of God shall appear" (Ps. 16). Likewise: "Thou hast loved justice, and hated iniquity: therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows" (Ps. 44). Likewise, when he had said, "My flesh shall rest in hope, and thou shalt not leave my soul in hell," Christ himself adds: "Thou hast made known to me the ways of life; thou shalt fill me with joy with thy countenance" (Ps. 15). Not, then, before death had God filled him with the joy of his countenance—wherefore he did not even see God face to face. Likewise: "The Lamb that was slain is worthy to receive... divinity and wisdom" (Rev. 5): he had not, then, received them before death, but merited to receive them by dying. Likewise: "Behold, thy Savior cometh; behold his reward is with him, and his work before him" (Isa. 62). Behold reward, behold work: he merited, then, the glory of the soul. For the glory of the body, although it was the reward of his

own work for Christ, was nevertheless not simultaneous with it. Likewise: "It became him, for whom are all things and by whom are all things, who had brought many children into glory, to perfect the author of their salvation through his passion" (Heb. 2). What Paul means by "perfection," although the name itself indicates it, he explains in the same epistle, saying: "That they should not be perfected without us" (Heb. 11). Christ, then, attained his own end through his passion.

Finally, the highest joy cannot coexist with the greatest sorrow; but he who sees God rejoices most greatly; but Christ was most greatly saddened, according to that saying, "My soul is sorrowful," etc., and again, "My soul is filled with evils." He did not, then, see God—unless you wish two contraries to have existed simultaneously in the same subject, and the same soul to have been at once filled with evils and filled with joy at the countenance of God.

These, indeed, are the most weighty arguments that are drawn from the loci of Theology against the true conclusion of Theology. For if there are any others, they are either easy and readily at hand for anyone, or they are all reducible to what we have set forth. But nothing should move us to depart from the school's decree.

All theologians, however, hold that Christ saw the essence of God from the instant of his conception (St. Thomas III, q. 9, art. 2 and q. 34, art. 4). This conclusion, though it were proven by the authority of theologians alone, ought to be held sufficiently firm, as we established in Book 8; but it is also demonstrated by these arguments. First, from that saying: "We saw his glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father." At this point St. Thomas observes that the glory of Christ's soul was derived from the personal union of the Word and the soul. For the evangelist not obscurely signifies this when, repeating the same word, he says, "the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father." We must necessarily judge that soul to have been such as befitted one that was united to God in the highest degree—namely, perfect in every respect, and absolute in all its measures. Whoever does not think so, thinks most foolishly about the personal union of God and man.

Now, if Christ's soul, united to the Word, had not been glorified, it would surely have been imperfect. For a great perfection is lacking to the human mind, if happiness is lacking. And Paul is a witness that to see God through a glass in a riddle belongs to imperfect man, in these words (1 Cor. 13): "When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away. When I was a child, I spoke as a child, I understood as a child... but when I became a man, I put away the things of a child. We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. Now I know in part," etc. Since,

then, Christ did not, from the womb, understand as a child, but was entirely a perfect man, from the womb too he saw God face to face. This is what Jeremiah foretold, saying (Jer. 31): "The Lord hath created a new thing upon the earth: a woman shall compass a man."

Add that to whatever is communicated being, there is also communicated the proper operation of the thing, which follows from being. As to whatever is given the being of fire is also given the power to give heat, and whatever were given the being of the sun would without doubt give light. But the proper action of God is to see himself: for by this vision he is blessed; therefore, since Christ's soul had divine being, it likewise had, in its own way, the proper action of the divine nature, and thus it saw God. Add also that the union of Christ's soul with the Word was greater than the union of the blessed; but from this latter union arises clarity in the intellect of the blessed, that he may see God; therefore, much more will such clarity arise from that former one. St. Thomas confirms this with this reasoning: The nearer the receptive is to the influencing cause, the more abundantly and fully it receives its influence; but Christ's mind was nearer to the cause of the light of glory than all the blessed angels; therefore it knew God more fully and perfectly.

St. Thomas further argues that glory comes to be in the soul from the fact that the divinity becomes present to the intellect, just as light comes into the air from the presence of the sun. For "because the glory of God entered by the way of the east... the earth shone with his majesty" (Ezek. 43). Since, then, that light itself not only entered into Christ's soul but was joined to it in the same personal being, glorious brightness followed from it, as splendor follows the sun.

Moreover, God is reached by an intellectual nature through knowledge and love; but Christ's soul reached God most closely, since it was closest to God; therefore its own actions, knowledge and love, reached God not from afar but most closely. But when the mind is a wayfarer, it is a pilgrim from the Lord, and looks upon the promises from afar; but when it sees through the [beatific] species, it is present and near, as the Apostle relates to the Corinthians (2 Cor. 5) and the Hebrews (Heb. 11). If, then, Christ's soul was a pilgrim and a stranger upon the earth, it certainly was not near to God through knowledge, but the angels were nearer to God.

Nor does it escape me that the calumniators can object that it is one thing for a reality to be present to the soul according to real being, another for it to be present according to intelligible being. For our own soul is most intimately joined to our own intellect, if you consider real being. But because it is not joined according to intelligible being, we are

unable to see it in itself, as long as we are surrounded by a mortal body.

But this objection would perhaps have force, if the Son of God had been united to the rational soul in the same way as to a stone or a log, and if in that union intellectual being had not been the primary object regarded and sought. But the ancient fathers of the Church believed that principally the mind was assumed, through the mind the soul, through the soul, or the very flesh itself. Augustine (in the book On the Christian Combat) says: "The invisible and unchangeable Truth received the soul through the spirit, and through the soul the body." And in his letter to Volusianus, he says: "The very greatness of the divine power fitted to itself a rational soul, and, through it, the human body, and altogether the whole man, to be changed for the better." And Damascene (Bk. 3) says that the Word of God was united to the flesh through the medium of the intellect. This matter St. Thomas explained divinely, as he does everything.

And this was the reason, unless I am mistaken, why the evangelist said not that the Son, or Life, or Light, but that the Word was made flesh. For "Word" openly signifies the offspring of the mind and bears the mark of an intellectual nature. To what purpose, indeed, would John say that the primarily intelligible—that is, the Word—joined itself to that extreme thing, that is, to flesh, unless to warn us that the Wisdom of God indeed reached from end to end mightily, but nevertheless disposed all things sweetly, and united the flesh to itself for the sake of the soul? For that which was intelligible in itself—to what should it join itself before the intellect and the mind? Surely from the end of the assumption it is clearly apparent what the Word of God sought in that conjunction. Since I am going to speak more fully on this matter not much later, this is now enough: that the end of man consists in the knowledge of God. He, then, who was made man in order to lead man to his own end, that is, to the clear knowledge of God, joined the mind chiefly to himself, by which the end is foreknown, sought, possessed.

This, moreover, that other argumentation confirms: "For this was the Son of God born, and for this came he into the world, that he should give testimony to the truth" (John 18). "Behold, I have given him for a witness to the people, a leader and a master to the Gentiles" (Isa. 55). But in order for a witness to be perfect, this is first required of him: that he rightly know and hold that of which he is going to give testimony. If, likewise, someone is to be held a consummate leader and teacher, he must know both the end to which he leads and the entire truth which he teaches. But Christ was the witness of truth, appointed leader and teacher by the Father; wherefore it was necessary that the mind and reason of man, in that very union, be perfected in the highest degree by the Word of God.

Nor is there need to labor long, to find when the apostles saw the glory as of the Only-begotten from the Father, since Peter discloses this in most significant words (2 Pet. 1): "Not following cunningly devised fables, we make known to you the power and presence of our Lord Jesus Christ, but having been made eye-witnesses of his greatness. For he received from God the Father honor and glory, this voice coming down to him from the excellent glory: 'This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased, hear ye him'; and this voice we heard brought from heaven, when we were with him on the holy mount." He calls it "power," by which the Word was made flesh; but "presence," by which he dwelt among us; but "power and presence" together, because the Son of man was in heaven—that is, his soul saw God, and yet he lived in a mortal body on earth. For thus David had foretold in very few words: "He shall make him blessed on the earth" (Ps. 41).

For that a blessed man was, as it were, passing through the earth, we often read in the Scriptures; but that he dwelt among us as a sojourner... and as a wayfarer turning aside to lodge (Jer. 14)—this presence of power is a miracle. Surely they saw the glory of the soul in the body as in a mirror: therefore he aptly said "beholding"; but the glory as of the Only-begotten, in the voice that descended from the excellent glory, "This is," etc. He is an eye-witness: hear him; he is a teacher of a truth explored and seen: hear him; he is a leader, who knows both the way and the destination: hear him, and indeed see and touch him; for he dwells among you, though that glory is with me, which you now behold. But enough on the first testimony of John.

The second principal testimony for confirming that conclusion is this: "The Word... dwelt among us... full of grace and truth" (John 1). Whence St. Thomas gathers this in two ways. For whether you put the fullness of grace in Christ's soul, or the fullness of truth, either way it is concluded that it saw the essence of God.

For the grace of the wayfaring state, in relation to the grace of the homeland, is imperfect, and falls short of fullness precisely as much as it falls short of perfection. Wherefore, if imperfect grace was in Christ, he was surely not full of grace. But he objects that the Blessed Virgin, while she lived even a mortal life, was full of grace, and yet did not see God. But this scruple St. Thomas removes (III, q. 7, art. 10). For Christ was full of grace not partially but in every way, as he had shown in articles 1 and 9 of the same question. Namely, "in him it hath well pleased [the Father] that all fullness should dwell... making peace," etc. (Col. 2). And again: "In him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead corporeally" (Col. 2). No perfection or fullness of grace, then, was lacking to him. Thus he had consummate grace, with which the glory of the soul is joined and connected.

That this soul had also the fullness of knowledge and truth, he proves in III, q. 9, arts. 1 and 2, and likewise q. 10, art. 4. Namely, all fullness would not have dwelt in Christ, if the fullness of knowledge had been lacking to him. Now, "when that which is full and perfect is come, that which is in part is done away." Christ's soul, then, did not know God in part, but fully and perfectly. Wherefore in it there was not faith, but vision.

But indeed Cajetan breaks the whole force and sinews of this argument, when with a probable reasoning he contends that it should be read: "Full of grace and truth, John giveth testimony of these things." It would indeed break it, if this were a probable opinion. But with the common edition censured, the Greek and Latin exemplars rejected, the interpreters snubbed, the holy expositors dismissed, what do we think will be probable? The Church certainly understood better that those words, "And we saw his glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father," were interjected parenthetically, when he says: "The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, whose glory we saw, as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth."

The third testimony for that conclusion follows shortly after in the same Gospel: "And of his fullness we all have received... because... grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." This statement, connected with the preceding one, unless we are blind, most openly shows that those words, "full of grace and truth," are to be referred to Christ. But leaving this matter aside, let us proceed with what is at hand. Christ, then, received grace and truth, so that from him grace and truth might flow forth into all. He had, therefore, the greatest and most perfect grace and truth. For just as the sun had light, that thence all things might receive light, so surely it had the greatest and most perfect light. Wherefore, just as the most perfect light can produce all the effects of light, and the most perfect justice all the effects of justice, so Christ's grace and truth had all the effects of grace and truth. Whence Dionysius (ch. 4, On the Divine Names) says that the sun, because it is the universal cause of generation, extends by its own power to all those things that fall under generation. But the chief effect of consummate grace and truth is to see God.

Moreover, the salvation of human nature was the end of the assumed humanity. For through this, as through an instrument, God worked salvation in the midst of the earth. Whence the Apostle writes that Christ, the author of their salvation, brought many children into glory (Heb. 2). And elsewhere: "God sent his Son... that we might receive the adoption of sons." Now the disposition and quality of an instrument is chiefly weighed from its end. But the salvation of the soul consists in a healthy intellect and a healthy will. But the will is healed through grace, the intellect through truth. It was necessary, then, that he through whom salvation, and altogether all grace and truth, was to come to all others, should have had perfect grace and perfect truth. For the principle

in each genus must be perfect, just as we see the sun in the genus of luminous things, fire in the genus of hot things. From the beginning, then, Christ's will perfectly loved God from perfect grace, and perfectly knew from perfect truth. Now the happiness of the soul consists in the perfect love and knowledge of God. Christ's soul, then, was happy from the beginning, and thus saw God.

Moreover, "that which is in potency is brought into act by that which is in act; for that must be" luminous "by which other things are illuminated." Since, then, the rest were to have grace, truth, and glory through Christ, he himself, at the very moment he began to move others toward that end, both had grace and had truth and glory. But he surely began that motion from the beginning. For those things which are moved by the first causes toward an end are usually perfected by a certain succession of time; but the very moving causes themselves have their own perfection at once, from the beginning, by a bounteous and provident nature. As fire, when it received heat along with its substance, water becomes hot gradually. The celestial bodies too received all at once their powers, by which they would perfect terrestrial and lower things in time. God, then, who was to communicate both grace and glory to all through Christ's humanity, though he bestows these things on the rest in time, conferred them on Christ's soul immediately from the beginning. For as to why he did not give glory to the body from the beginning, the reasons are readily at hand.

The fourth testimony for that conclusion follows immediately: "No man hath seen God at any time: the Only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." Here one may see, in a man who was a fisherman, both an admirable connection of things and an incredible composition of doctrine. That you may perceive this, reader, please attend diligently. No matter of faith is rightly transacted, if all the witnesses are hearsay, none an eye-witness. Rather, as Augustine says, we believe hearsay witnesses, because they heard from persons worthy of faith, who testified that they had seen the matter with their own eyes. Since, then, Moses and John the Baptist, the first and the last of the old Law—and thus all the prophets—and, likewise from the new Law, the Apostles, were all Christ's witnesses by hearsay, it was necessary that there be one, on behalf of all, who would give testimony from sight. But such a witness—one, I say, not for a thousand, but for a thousand thousands—could not exist unless he were both just, lest he should wish to deceive, and also wise, lest he himself be deceived. Wherefore it was necessary that he be full of grace and truth, lest we should want anything in the best and most complete witness. For because he was full of grace, he was most just; because full of truth, he was most truthful.

Since, then, the fullness of testimony and altogether absolute perfection come from sight, and therefore a witness from hearsay is not full of truth, when Scripture had said of John, "He was not the light, but was to give testimony of the light," but of Christ, "That was the true light," etc., and of Moses, "The law was given by Moses"—it immediately joined also this: "Of his fullness we all"—Moses, John, the Prophets, the Apostles, and altogether all witnesses universally—"have received." Because both he was the light, and he was full of grace and truth, and grace and truth came through him, and, finally, he was a witness from sight. For no man hath seen God at any time—neither Moses, nor John, nor the Prophets, nor the Apostles, nor the Evangelist: the Only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, who saw the hidden things, he hath declared him.

Lest this be referred to the divinity of the Son alone, and not also to his humanity, both reason and authority forbid it. The reason is that Christ was appointed by the Father as witness of the truth not only because he was God, but because he was man. Wherefore, from both natures, it was necessary that the testimony be perfect. The authority is that of Christ himself, who afterward explained this matter more manifestly, saying: "Amen, amen I say to thee, that we speak what we know, and we testify what we have seen," etc. And immediately: "No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended from heaven, the Son of man who is in heaven."

At this point Cajetan truly and diligently observes that the verb "ascended" is not of the present but of the past tense, which is clear from the Greek exemplar. For what John had said before—"No man hath seen God at any time"—Christ now says in other words: "No man hath ascended into heaven." For a man is then said to be in heaven, as to his soul, when he sees God. In this sense it was said to the thief, "This day thou shalt be with me in paradise." And the angels appointed to the guardianship of men, because they always see the face of the Father who is in heaven (Matt. 18), are also said always to be in heaven, although they are often on earth.

Before Christ, then, just as no man had seen God, so no man had ascended into heaven. But so that you might, so to speak, touch with your hand that this discourse concerns Christ according to human nature, it is fittingly added: "the Son of man who is in heaven." In this sense he himself later spoke to the Father: "I will, Father, that where I am, they also whom thou hast given me may be with me; that they may see my glory, which thou hast given me..." (John 17). Nor did the Baptist keep silent about this perfection of Christ in bearing witness; rather, in this matter too he professed his own testimony to be surpassed by Christ's, saying: "What he hath seen and heard, that he testifieth" (John 3).

Nor indeed am I ignorant that the ancient theologians generally referred these passages to Christ's divinity, according to which Christ both saw God and was everywhere; but in that age they had a most bitter war with the Arians and Eunomians, and for that reason they used every testimony they could to assert Christ's deity, especially since the matter was readily and easily available, as is nearly the case in the passages cited. For that saying, "No man hath ascended into heaven, but... the Son of man who is in heaven," I do not quite understand how it can truly and properly fit his divinity. For the Son of man had not then ascended into heaven because he was God, but because he was man. But how he could have ascended into heaven except as to his soul can scarcely be explained. I am compelled, then, along with Cajetan, to press this Gospel passage in support of the glory of Christ's soul.

The fifth testimony, which St. Thomas uses, occurs in the eighth chapter of the same Gospel: "And if I give testimony of myself, my testimony is true, because I know whence I came and whither I go." And later: "If I should say that I know him not, I shall be like to you, a liar; but I do know him, and do keep his word." For that the discourse concerns knowledge, as distinguished from faith, those words seem to show: "I shall be like unto you, a liar." For the Jews had faith at that time, although they were contending with Christ. That he was speaking according to his humanity, this proves: "I know him, and do keep his word."

But this argument of St. Thomas I see can be refuted. For there is a certain "knowledge of the saints," joined with charity, though it does not have evidence. "By this we know," it says, "that we have known him, if we keep his commandments. He who saith that he knoweth him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar" (1 John 2). If someone should contend that Christ, in John chapter 8, is speaking of this knowledge, it would be scarcely refutable. Indeed, someone might perhaps say that these arguments of St. Thomas prove what is fitting, but not what is strictly necessary; that they are, thus, congruent, but not compelling.

But we do not, in the first place, hold that all of St. Thomas's arguments—even those brought forward to prove a certain conclusion of Theology—are certain and necessary. For surely, even among the ancient theologians, among the highest pontiffs of the Church, and finally in the councils too, you may find certain arguments which indeed persuade but do not compel; but, mixed with other certain and established ones, they not only adorn the whole body of the disputation but also confirm it. So far, then, is it from the case that probable arguments joined to necessary ones should be reproved, that they are even to be commended. Though, for my part, I use such arguments while they are available: when they are absent, I do not require them.

Of this kind seems to be this: "In him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge of God" (Col. 2); those treasures would not all have been in Christ, if the knowledge of the blessed had been lacking to him. Similar is this: that Christ was the head not only of men but even of angels (Eph. 1, Col. 2); but it would be incongruous for members to surpass the head in knowledge and clarity. In this genus of probable arguments perhaps also belongs this: "But if the ministration of death... was in glory, so that the children of Israel could not steadfastly behold the face of Moses, for the glory of his countenance; which is made void," etc. (2 Cor. 3). And afterward: "For that which was glorious in this part was not glorified, by reason of the glory that excelleth. For if that which is done away was glorious, much more that which remaineth is glorious," etc., down to that: "But we, with open face," etc. It was not fitting, then, that the first minister of the New Testament should lack the glory of spirit and soul, from which not only the countenance but the whole body would be entirely glorified (Matt. 17; see also Origen, Homily 12 on Exodus). Let these things, then, be said first.

Next—a matter certainly most worthy of attention—I cannot approve of those who confuse, in Theology, those arguments which show what is fitting, as if it were not sometimes also necessary, or as if all unfitting things were equal, and there were not some things from which both reason and all Theology recoil.

Indeed, arguments that confirm something to be congruent and fitting in our religion are altogether twofold. Some are of such a kind that, even if the reality in question, which is being proved, had not existed, no inconsistency would nevertheless arise. As when theologians show that it was fitting for God to take on flesh for the reparation of the human race; and that it was fitting that, of the divine Persons, it should be the Son; and many other things of this kind. That these things were fitting, the theologian indeed proves in the highest degree, but had God prepared other remedies for our sin—which without doubt he could have done, in countless ways—no inconvenience of reason, nothing unfitting to God would have resulted. Arguments of this kind, then, demonstrate nothing at all in Theology, but only explain that what we believe by faith was most congruent to God and to us.

There are other arguments, which show something to be fitting in such a way that, unless the matter is so, something always arises which in no way seems consonant either with the divine nature or with human reason. As that the Blessed Virgin remained intact after childbirth—sacred Scripture, in its literal sense, has perhaps nowhere taught this explicitly. It clearly hands down that she was a virgin in conception and in giving birth. But since it was unfitting for the Virgin herself later, willingly, as it is said, and knowingly, to destroy an integrity preserved by so singular a miracle and mystery, and

that she who had remained incorrupt beyond the order of nature should expose herself to a corrupter—so firmly has the settled opinion of this perpetual virginity clung to the minds of the faithful that, even if there had been no Apostolic tradition, this reasoning alone would be sufficient to produce faith in those who are formed not for contention but for discipline, or even moderately instructed.

Nor do I think we should philosophize differently in the present question. For when we have shown that it was not fitting for the Word of God to assume an imperfect intellectual soul, empty of knowledge and wisdom, we consider that we have won our case. Because the contrary situation is so unworthy of the Word's wisdom and providence that it does not even become verisimilar, if we think rightly about the personal union of the Word and the soul. Let us agree, then, that grace was distributed to the other saints of the Church in parts—namely, according to the measure of Christ's gift (Eph. 4)—but that to Christ himself the Spirit was not given by measure (John 3). For it was fitting that as much grace be given as that soul could receive; as much as the very nature of grace itself would allow to exist in things.

For as to what we say about the spirit of grace, the same reason entirely underlies the same being said about the spirit of wisdom, knowledge, and understanding. For "being made so much better than the angels, as he hath inherited a more excellent name than they" (Heb. 1). Thus he was anointed by God with the oil of gladness above his fellows. He had, then, not only equal happiness with the angels, but much greater. Wherefore, just as he enjoyed [God], so too he saw God. Those who deny this depart not only from the school but from the very institution of ancient Theology.

Ambrose (On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation, ch. 7): "God in the flesh assumed the perfection of human nature, took on the sense of man," etc. The Word, then, assumed a perfect soul, not an imperfect one. And in Bk. 7, Letter 47, to Irenaeus: "He received the fullness of human nature and perfection: just as nothing was lacking to God, so nothing was lacking to the completion of manhood, that he might be perfect in each form." Whence David also says: "Beautiful in form," etc.

Augustine, in the book On the Trinity: "As soon as the Word came into the womb, it became a perfect man." And on Exodus: "Christ had absolutely nothing, as regards the soul's merit, by which he could advance." And that verse of Ps. 64, "Blessed is he whom thou hast chosen and taken to thee," he interprets as concerning the united humanity. Remigius, on that passage, "And behold, the heavens were opened to him": "But was it then first that the heavens were opened to him, even according to his human nature? For the faith of the Church holds that the heavens were opened to him no less before than

after."

The Greek author whom St. Thomas very often cites in the Catena—although at this point the reading is corrupt and attributed to Gregory Nazianzen—says: "He is said to advance according to his humanity, not because he himself received an increase, having been perfect from the beginning, but because it was gradually manifested." Damascene (Bk. 3): "Those who say Christ advanced in grace do not honor the union which is according to the hypostasis." Theophylact: "The things said and done by him from boyhood were divine, not as of a twelve-year-old, but as of a perfect man. But the evangelist interprets what it is for him to advance in wisdom: for he adds also 'in stature.' For he calls the advance of age an advance of wisdom."

Jerome, on Isaiah ch. 7 (on that passage, "that he may know to refuse the evil," etc.): "Although the evangelist testifies of him many ages later, 'And the child grew,' etc., and this is said that the truth of a human body may be established, nevertheless, still wrapped in swaddling clothes... he will have the judgment of good and evil (...), that through these words we may know that the infancy of a human body did not prejudice the divine wisdom." And on Jeremiah ch. 31 (on that passage, "The Lord hath created a new thing," etc.): "According to the increments, indeed, of age... he will seem to advance in wisdom..., but the perfect man... will be contained in the womb of a woman." Leo (Letter to the Emperor Leo, 95): The Deity "beatifying the assumed nature, so that, glorified, it might remain in the one glorifying." He was speaking of the Incarnation. And in another place he cites Cyril, in these words: The Word assumed "the nature of humanity, perfect in its own account."

And Cyril himself, on John, Bk. 1, ch. 17: "We saw," he says, "the glory of Christ so much more sublime than the glory of creatures, that any man in his right mind would confess that it befits none other than the Only-begotten Son of God. For he was full of truth and grace. (...) For it is not given to him according to measure, as to the rest, but as it is perfect, it exists perfectly within the perfect. (...) But if his glory is full, you will say, of grace and truth, how is it written in Luke that he advanced in wisdom and grace? or what can be added to what is full? Rather, it was the opinion of others concerning Jesus, not his own perfect grace, that grew, so that, knowing him more from day to day, they thought he was advancing more and growing in grace." See also ch. 20, on that passage, "Of his fullness we all have received." There are many such testimonies of the ancients, which we omit for the sake of brevity, since even these which we have cited we have touched upon without any exposition or argumentation.

Now we shall also briefly refute the arguments of the contrary side. For here we wish only, through certain summaries and indicated signs, to admonish the less experienced to exercise themselves more diligently in similar questions, which have not been worn smooth by the theologians' usage. For they will always find something, if they seek it. And in the present question too I do not doubt that he who has had a richer reading and greater erudition will find far more.

The first argument, then, is nothing difficult, if we understand that "justice" and "faith" there are used for "the just" and "the faithful"—a matter to which not only Jerome is a witness (in his Commentary on Isaiah) but also the Seventy interpreters. See Thomas III, q. 7, art. 3.

To the second, the answer is even easier. For God is called Christ's "hope," because his confidence was in God, not in man. Likewise, because he also hoped for many things from God, although he did not hope for the glory of his soul, which he already had. St. Thomas, Part III, q. 7, art. 4.

To the third, see St. Thomas III, q. 15, art. 7.

To the fourth, see St. Thomas III, q. 7, art. 12, where he also answers that testimony of the Gospel. And we too, a little before, related not a few ancient authors who in no way admitted that either Christ's grace or wisdom could at any time have advanced within itself: so full, from the beginning, was he of both grace and wisdom. But one who grows in men's estimation, although he himself remains altogether the same, is said by Scripture to "grow": "David went on growing and increasing" (1 Chron. 11). Likewise: "Jehoshaphat grew and was magnified exceedingly" (2 Chron. 17). Likewise: "He must increase, but I must decrease" (John 3).

But since what is exalted among men is often an abomination before God, lest you should think this a deceptive, Pharisaical ostentation, Scripture says he was, within, before God, such as he showed himself to men outwardly, and was approved not by men only but also by God. For the evangelist perhaps wished to recall that which is written of Samuel: "And the child Samuel advanced, and grew, and pleased both the Lord and men." But St. Thomas (III, q. 15, art. 7) teaches that Christ grew in the effects and works of grace and wisdom, "because from day to day he performed more perfect works." And that which grows in effect is sometimes said to "grow." As there: "The word of God grew," and again, "The word of God grew mightily" (Acts 6 and 11).

In the fifth argument, two testimonies are related, which the Arians were accustomed to use to attack the wisdom, and thus the divinity, of the Son. This was the reason certain

fathers, by interpreting these passages of the Son according to human nature, thought they had sufficiently answered their adversaries. And in truth, in that battle which we waged with Arius, it was enough that, in this respect, all his thrusts and attempts be evaded. But we need to overcome all the errors, and even to vindicate Christ's soul from every ignorance that might seem to detract anything from his dignity.

Ambrose, moreover, in Bk. 5, On the Faith, ch. 8, does not dare to assert, although he was disputing against Arius, that Christ, according to his humanity, either advanced in wisdom or was entirely ignorant of anything, if we take these words properly. He says that certain men held the contrary opinion, but those who held it were, he says, "more bold" than he was. St. Thomas, indeed, does not hesitate, on the authority even of this same Ambrose, to confirm that Christ, not according to beatific or infused knowledge, but according to another, acquired or experiential knowledge, was at some time ignorant of something which he later learned. For "he learned from the things which he suffered." Thus, if the discourse concerns this experiential knowledge, the Father was showing the Son the miracles which he was performing through him, about to show greater ones in the time to come, since he was also about to do greater ones. According to this knowledge, likewise, he did not know the day of judgment before it existed, for he will experience it then, when the judgment takes place. That these things may probably be said, we do not deny; but there is no necessity for us to force ourselves into these straits, since there is a sounder understanding of these passages.

Concerning the former testimony, indeed, I judge as follows. Christ had been reproved by the Jews both for breaking the Sabbath and for making himself equal to God. He answers, then, both calumnies at once, in these words: "The Son cannot do anything of himself, but what he seeth the Father doing." Here he first so acknowledges an equality of power that he seems to arrogate nothing to himself. For he also acknowledges the Father's authority, to whom he refers whatever he does. "The Son," he says, "cannot do anything of himself."

Next he refutes them by this argument: "Why, O Jews, do you reprove me? By that same reasoning, surely, you will also reprove my Father. For it is not from my own head, as they say, that I fabricate what I do, nor do I bring forth works from passion or caprice, but I have received from the Father that which I do. 'The Son cannot,'" etc. "But I do not receive it in a dream, or by some fanciful opinion, but with the most certain and clearest sight I discern and comprehend the Father working, and whatever he does, these very same things I too, not with closed eyes but seeing, likewise do. If, then, you take me for one doing unlawful works on the Sabbath, yet I do the same things my Father does, and in the same manner: reprove, if you please, God himself, whom I hold as the author and

principle of all my works." That he may prove that he sees the Father doing the works, he adds: "For the Father loveth the Son, and therefore hideth nothing from him, but does everything in his sight, with him beholding all things. Nor did he do only the things he did beforehand in the Son's presence, but even greater things which he is about to do, he will do in the Son's sight, with the Son thus watching and simultaneously doing them."

By these words he does not deny that the Son understands things before they even happen at all, but he speaks in the human manner and accommodates himself to our modes of speech. For we are said to "show" things then, when they are so present that we point them out not to the intellect but, as it were, with the finger, to sense. This is for us the greatest certainty of a matter. Nor is it an obstacle that he uses the future tense, "he will show," concerning things which are present to the eternal God. For Scripture is thus accustomed to attemper eternal things to us and to our time. Indeed the Father both begot and begets and will always beget the Word. Although he who adds, "That you may wonder," seems to speak of some future demonstration, which will also be open to the rest. Wherefore nothing against the glory of Christ's soul can be gathered from this passage.

The latter testimony too works nothing against us. First, because Jerome (on Matthew 24) and Ambrose (Bk. 5, On the Faith, ch. 8) deny that those words, "nor the Son," are found except in a few Greek exemplars. Indeed Ambrose contends they were interpolated by heretics. For the reading of Matthew and Mark was the same. But the Arians had corrupted the Gospel of Matthew by inserting those same words—words which neither the Latin nor the Greek exemplars now have.

Next, even if it had been so written by the evangelists, in that sense the Son is said "not to know," because he pretends not to know and does not wish to reveal it to others. For the Father, indeed, knows, because he manifests it to the Son; the Son does not know, because he conceals it and does not make others know. That the word "to know" is sometimes taken in this manner is clear both from worn common usage and Ambrose proves it from this: "I will go down, and see whether they have done according to the cry... or whether it be not so, that I may know" (Gen. 18). Similar is this: "God looked down from heaven upon the children of men, to see if there be any that understandeth," etc. (Ps. 52). And where we have, "The Lord your God trieth you, that it may appear whether you love him," the Septuagint edition had, "that he may know whether you love him." But on this matter see Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and the other fathers. For on matters so well known, I ought not, nor do I wish, to be lengthy.

To the sixth, St. Thomas answers excellently in III, q. 19, art. 3; see him.

The first testimony, by which that reasoning was confirmed, is explained by the words immediately preceding. "If he shall lay down his life for sin, he shall see a long-lived seed," etc. And immediately: "Because his soul hath laboured, he shall see and be filled."

The second testimony St. Thomas interprets thus: that Christ merited the manifestation, indeed, of the anointing, according to that saying, "Wherefore God also hath exalted him," etc.; but did not merit the anointing itself; but in Scripture a thing is sometimes said to "happen" then, when it becomes known. "All power is given to me," etc. Because, then, Christ loved justice, etc., therefore God exalted him as king of demons, men, and angels (Phil. 2): for "to anoint" is "to appoint a king."

He also answers (on this Psalm)—and this better—that the sense is this: that the rod of thy kingdom might be the rod of direction, that thou mightest love justice, etc.—for this reason, that is, in order that thou mightest do these excellent things, God hath anointed thee with oil, etc. This is similar: "Man laughs, weeps, discourses, therefore he has intellect and a rational soul." For it is not necessary that the things which precede be the cause of those which follow. As there: "Wherefore also the wisdom of God said," etc. (Luke 11). Nor, if it were said explicitly, "God hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness, because thou hast loved justice," etc., would this do anything against us. For it is according to the custom of Scripture that sometimes the effect is put in the place of the cause, as there (Ps. 16): "I have called upon thee, for thou, O God, hast heard me."

Finally, we can answer, in a third way, that Christ's actions were not the meritorious causes of the anointing but, as it were, material and dispositive ones. For St. Thomas teaches (III, q. 34, art. 3) that Christ was sanctified through his own act. Just as, then, we truly say that the matter of wood was disposed by heat, and therefore was kindled; that a man was contrite, and therefore grace of justification was given to him: so the prophet could say that Christ had the best acts in the first instant, and therefore was anointed with the oil of the Holy Spirit. Nor is it necessary that that word "therefore" denote an efficient or meritorious cause, but it will suffice if it be a cause that disposes the subject, as it were materially.

Concerning the third testimony, hold this. St. Thomas thinks that in that psalm the discourse concerns the eternal life of the resurrection, not only in Christ but in his members. For that resurrection and full life of delights of the whole head and members was the fruit of Christ's passion. Who, as Paul says, raised us up together and made us sit together in the heavenly places—namely then, when he himself, having risen, sat at the right hand of God. If, then, Christ speaks in this passage not only in his own person but in the person of his members, nothing is difficult to understand. For if he said to Saul,

"Why persecutest thou me?" because Paul was attacking his members, he could also say to the Father, "Thou shalt fill me with joy with thy countenance"—since our glory is altogether no less the glory of Christ than our disgrace and toil are altogether Christ's.

But shortly I do not see why we should not also take, properly of Christ himself, that after the resurrection he was filled with joy in God's countenance. For before, both his body was empty of that pleasure which flows into the body from the vision of God, and his soul was not filled on all sides with joy; rather, the whole sensitive appetite lay open to sorrow and anguish. After the passion, then, God filled him with joy in his own countenance. Since, though before he clearly and fully saw the face of God, nevertheless not every affection and appetite fully and perfectly rejoiced. On this matter, in refuting the last argument, we shall add something most worthy of attention.

The fourth testimony, moreover, is easy to understand, for it is also written by the poet that Priam's face was worthy of empire.

In the fifth argument, Isaiah calls "Christ's reward" the faithful people. "Ask of me," he says, "and I will give thee the Gentiles for thy inheritance." Whence he immediately adds: "And they shall call them the holy people, the redeemed of the Lord." Justin Martyr (Dialogue with Trypho), however, reads and interprets this passage differently: "Behold," he says, "the Savior is present, who gives back his own reward and his own work before him." For truly Christ gave back to us what he merited, that is, the reward of his own work. But Jerome plainly interprets this to be said because the Savior himself is the judge of all, so that he may render to each according to his works—rewards to the just, eternal punishments to sinners.

Concerning the sixth testimony, finally, I say nothing else at present, except that Christ's glory before the passion was not yet consummated, but whatever was lacking to him, for us and for our salvation, for the absolute glorification of man—this, without doubt, Christ merited through his passion. Indeed, all buildings are not completed in the same manner: some lack even walls, others lack only the roof. We, then, are completed by receiving not only the glory of the body but also of the soul, since the glory of both parts was lacking; but Christ lacked only that of the one: wherefore, by the addition of that one, he was consummated.

To the last argument St. Thomas answers (On the Passions of the Soul, art. 10, ad 9) that contraries cannot exist in the same subject per se, but can well exist per accidens. As when someone walking on a ship is carried in the direction contrary to that in which the ship is moving. "So," he says, "in the superior part of Christ's soul there was joy per se, because through his own act; but sorrow per accidens, because through the passion of the body."

He then answers that that joy and sorrow were not contraries, because they were not about the same thing.

But this former answer can be refuted. Since local motions, if sometimes contrary in the same subject, are nothing strange, seeing that almost their entire substance and character is a certain external relation. Thus father and son bear contrary relations, and can truly exist, in relation to diverse termini, in the same subject. But in absolute forms and qualities this cannot happen, that two contraries—whether per se or per accidens—should exist in the same subject. For it fights against the nature of things that water be simultaneously hot and cold, especially in the highest degree; nor does it help to contend that one is per se, the other by antiperistasis. But joy and sadness are absolute qualities.

But someone will also refute the latter answer, since Christ, seeing the divine reasons in the essence of God, rejoiced over his own death, which he perceived to be conformed to God's reason and will; but he was sad over that same death, because it was an evil contrary to nature. Wherefore the material object of joy and sadness was the same. Now for joy to be the contrary of sadness, it is enough that both agree in the material object. For the formal reason of joy and sadness always differs, whether we are sad and rejoice about the same thing or about different things. We cannot deny, then, if in Christ's will there was both supreme joy and supreme sadness concerning his own death, that two contraries existed simultaneously in the same subject. And these affections of soul mutually expel each other, even though the object is not the same. For surely, when we wish to drive away sadness, we take care to rejoice not only over other reasons but also over other things. Which is an argument that these affections are contrary.

But this difficulty seems to be resolved in three ways. First, then, someone will perhaps say that in Christ's intellectual appetite, which is properly called "will," there was no sadness at all. Since that portion of the soul most fully enjoyed God (III, q. 46, art. 8). But just as joy was not derived from the higher power to the lower ones, so that the mystery of our salvation might be transacted in Christ's passion, so from the lower power sorrow did not reach the higher one. There was not, then, sadness in Christ's will, but it was in the sensitive appetite, which is properly the subject of sadness. This opinion the Lord seems to signify when he says, "My soul is sorrowful." For the animal appetite, since it is animal, is not intellectual but sensitive. This opinion St. Thomas also favors (III, q. 15, arts. 4 and 6, and q. 46, arts. 7 and 8). For Cajetan abundantly refutes Scotus's arguments (on art. 1, q. 46). If this is true, then contraries are not in the same proximate subject, but joy is in the will, sadness in the sensitive appetite. And therefore they are not, properly, even contraries. St. Thomas (III, q. 18, art. 6, in the body, and q. 46, art. 8, ad

1).

To this answer, however, this is objected: that the Lord had, in his will, an act by which he truly did not will death; but sadness is "concerning those things which happen to us against our will," as Augustine says. The prior proposition, since Cajetan denies it, is proven. First from St. Thomas (III, q. 18, art. 6), where he says that "the natural will and the will of sensuality willed something in Christ other than the divine will." And in art. 5 he cites Augustine against Maximinus, in these words: "In this, that Christ said, 'Not what I will, but what thou wilt,' he shows that he willed something other than the Father. Which he could not do without a human heart." And indeed, from that Gospel testimony, not only the ancient saints but the Sixth Synod under Agatho gathered both two wills in Christ and two operations of wills. Surely he who says, "Not as I will," openly signifies an act of will.

But Cajetan would escape by saying that "will" is sometimes used to designate the sensitive appetite. St. Thomas himself interprets Ambrose to explain this passage of the Gospel in this manner (III, q. 18, art. 2). Indeed, St. Thomas could not have refuted the third argument of article 5 of question 18 of the Third Part, if he had admitted that Christ's will could will something which it had not had before. For "he is blessed," as Augustine teaches, "who has whatever he wills." In the other blessed, most probably, Cajetan denies that there are such "non-willings," since in that state they are idle. Since, then, Christ was, according to intellect and will, perfectly blessed, it does not seem that he had such non-willings.

We can, next, evade this last argument, even if we say—which is indeed probable—that in Christ's intellectual will, which is properly the will, there was not only sadness but the greatest and highest sadness. For since in a sacrifice for sin, contrition of heart and sorrow of will are especially required ("a sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit," etc. [Ps. 50]), and this spiritual sadness is the medicine contrary to sin, which has its seat chiefly in the will, it was surely fitting that the Son of God, about to present himself as a victim for sin, should undergo not only the pains of body and sensitive soul but also the anguish of spirit and the sadness of will, so that for all our faults that victim, most acceptable to God, might be crushed in every possible way. (Isa. 53) Thus truly did he bear our infirmities, and carried our sorrows. Thus he was not only wounded for our iniquities, but bruised for our sins. Thus the chastisement of our peace was upon him, and by his bruise and pain we are healed. Thus the Lord was pleased to bruise him in infirmity, who laid down his soul for sin (ch. 9).

Augustine, moreover (Bk. 14, City of God), asserts that Christ took on those defects of our nature which, though not repugnant to the perfection of grace, nevertheless "come from the love of good and holy charity." But Christ commends his own charity all the more, if he also presented that sadness itself, for our faults, to God as a sacrifice—more than we owe to God for those same faults. Plainly, likewise, Ambrose said to the Emperor Gratian: "Just as he had taken up my will, he also took up my sadness." For "will" is properly the intellectual appetite. And "to will" is properly an act of the will; but he says, "Not as I will." Also, sadness of the will is properly man's sadness, for that which is found only in the sensitive appetite is the sorrow of an animal rather than of a man. But it was fitting that human sins be dissolved through a sorrow properly human. Thus, when he said, "My soul is filled with evils," he meant every appetite of the soul filled with sorrow, whether sensual or rational. Since even the pronoun "my" bears the mark more of the rational than of the sensual.

If these things are true, as they seem to be, nothing prevents that through supernatural power both the highest joy and the greatest sadness existed in the same subject. Both because they were not properly contraries, since opposition ought to occur concerning the same thing, as St. Thomas often assumes. And because it is foolish to wish to reduce to the laws of nature that which is done by God beyond the order of nature. It was a miracle that the same man should be both a wayfarer and a comprehensor; a miracle that nothing was derived from the glory of the soul to the body; a miracle that no consolation overflowed from the joy of the higher power into the lower ones; a miracle that, with the lower powers disturbed, the higher ones were neither disturbed, nor ceased from their perpetual operation, nor slackened their work, nor resolved their rest and delight even in the smallest part. Amid these miracles, for the accomplishing of the mystery of our redemption, although the will enjoyed God as seen, it nevertheless took on, of its own accord, as much sadness as the greatest it could receive; and it could receive as much as could exist as the greatest in the nature of things, so that the sorrow for sins might be no less than the charity, and it might also surpass all knowledge (Eph. 3).

But also, once, as a young man—that we may now finally extricate ourselves from this—before a famous assembly of theologians, I said that just as, throughout his whole life, the Lord as it were suppressed the glory of his soul so it would not overflow into the body, so too, at least on the cross, he restrained the joy which by its own nature would arise from the clear knowledge of God. I confess that joy necessarily arises from God as seen, in the will, no differently than light from the sun, heat from fire. But the sun sometimes withdrew its rays, and even fire was compressed so as not to give heat: wherefore it should seem strange to no one, if in the redemption of mankind, to be

accomplished through the sufferings of one man, all pleasure were repressed which the reason of nature otherwise demonstrates to proceed from the vision of God.

Nor is it an obstacle that Benedict XII defined beatitude to consist in vision and enjoyment. But Christ was blessed in three respects. Since that pontiff hands down that concerning consummated beatitude; but Christ, although he had the essence of beatitude, did not have its accidents, which also per se follow from it. For it was fitting that he be consummated through his passion. Although even enjoyment can be understood without joy: for a man enjoys the fruits of his own tree even when, through sickness, he takes no pleasure from them. Thus Christ not only saw but also enjoyed, although, forsaken by God and altogether deprived of all consolation, he did not rejoice ("Why hast thou forsaken me?").

Wherefore, like the other martyrs, he set before his eyes the joy that was to be his, that he might endure the cross, despising the shame. Hebrews ch. 12. Where in altogether wonderful ways he commended to us both his love and his example. Certainly, whether you solve the question in the first, second, or third way, you make a miracle of it; but this last way is the more plausible, the more it kindles in us little sparks both of penance and of love and of gratitude.

But let this be the end of this question. For it is clear that, in a matter sterile and dry, no small or meager supply has been furnished from the loci of Theology. There remains the third kind of question to be treated, that which depends both on faith and on nature; on which matter we shall discourse in the following chapter.

Chapter XIII

In which that Question is Called Into Doubt which, Being Natural, Also Pertains to Faith

Since we have spoken of that kind of argument which looks both to explaining the principles of faith and to confirming the conclusions of Theology, we must next dispute concerning those arguments which pertain also to the proof of natural matters. Now natural questions are of a twofold difference. For some can be proven by arguments of nature alone; others are also confirmed by the authority of faith. And as regards the nature of the reasoning, there is indeed no distinction between these two kinds. For the arguments of each question are to be sought altogether from the same loci, that is, from the human disciplines. All these arguments are contained in the three final loci. In this they differ: that the latter questions, since they are of faith, extend more widely and can be proved from every locus.

In this genus is that which I wish to treat in this chapter: Whether the soul of man is immortal, as Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Theophrastus, Themistius, Seneca, Cicero, and the better philosophers held, or rather mortal, as I see was the view of Lucretius, Galen, Pliny, and Alexander.

Nor should my critics reproach me for undertaking a matter which has been most diligently disputed by very many, among whom, it is agreed, is St. Thomas, whose supply of arguments on both sides is so great that nothing seems able to be added. But since he brought forward almost no arguments from faith, while Henry and Scotus say that the reasons of nature persuade probably, not demonstrate necessarily, I shall, as it seems to me, do nothing rash if I dispute on this very question which so many and such distinguished minds have handled. For I shall not be doing something already done, but, unless my judgment deceives me, something plainly useful, not to say necessary—especially since even our own Cajetan, very unlike himself, wrote that he indeed believed the rational soul to be incorruptible, but nevertheless did not know it. In which matter he partly agrees with Henry and Scotus, whom he himself had once wonderfully derided. Partly, I say, since he did not deny that others knew it, but only that he himself did.

That this controversy, then, may be established as accurately as possible, we shall argue first that this question in no way pertains to faith, and then that it cannot be demonstrated by the reason of nature.

(First argument) Augustine, moreover, teaches—and not once but often (On the Baptism of Infants, Bk. 3, ch. 10; and Retractations Bk. 1, ch. 1; and on Genesis Bk. 10, chs. 1, 3, and 4)—that it is not a matter of faith whether rational souls are transmitted by propagation, or rather are created individually, each from nothing. And if the soul of man were propagated by the power of the seed, it would without doubt be, as generable, so also corruptible.

(Second argument) Next, the Sadducees thought that man's soul was mortal, and yet they were not held to be heretics; indeed, the faithful people honored them as religious.

(Third argument) Moreover, there are four testimonies of Scripture by which the immortality of souls can chiefly be taught. One is this (Eccl. 12): "Until dust return into its earth, from whence it was, and the spirit return to God, who gave it." The second (Wisdom 2): "God created man incorruptible, and to the image of his own likeness he made him." The third (Matt. 10): "Fear ye not them that kill the body, and are not able to kill the soul." The fourth, which the Lord uses in the Gospel (Matt. 22): "I am the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. He is not the God of the dead, but of the living."

For as to what Augustine affirms (question 33, on Numbers)—that it is more evident from the law of Moses than from other sources—that does not even seem probable to me, in order to claim souls exempt from destruction. But of those four which are commonly cited by theologians, the first can be evaded, since Augustine himself (Bk. 10, on Genesis, ch. 9) teaches that it is weak against those who believe souls are generated by propagation. It is, then, weak also against those who might say souls perish along with bodies. And just as it is written, he says, "Until the spirit return to God, who gave it," so too we read, "The spirit going and not returning." The second, likewise, someone might perhaps refute by saying that the discourse there is not about the soul, but about man, whom God from the beginning made immortal by grace. Whence it is immediately added: "But by the envy of the devil, death came into the world."

The third, however, may be interpreted of spiritual death, that is, of eternal death, concerning which you have this: "The teeth of the lion, his teeth killing the souls of men." This is suggested because it is immediately added: "Fear him, who, after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell." Wherefore St. Thomas did not wish to use this testimony either in the First Part, or in the Summa Against the Gentiles, or in the question On the Soul. For the fourth deals with the resurrection, not with immortality. For thus the Lord says: "But as touching the resurrection of the dead, have you not read," etc. Nothing, indeed, prevents the soul from perishing along with the body and afterward rising again together with the body. It is not, then, a decree of faith that souls are immortal.

(Fourth argument) That the immortality of the soul cannot be shown by natural argumentation, this is a first conjecture: that although Ambrose (On the Good of Death, ch. 9) and Augustine (Bk. 2 of the Soliloquies, and On the Immortality of the Soul) strained every sinew to prove it, they achieved nothing at all. Nor do we surpass Ambrose and Augustine.

(Fifth argument) To this add that Scotus (Bk. 4, dist. 43, q. 2), Jandun (Bk. 3 On the Soul, questions 5 and 29), and Cajetan (on the Epistle to the Romans, ch. 9), when they weighed St. Thomas's arguments—men, indeed, endowed with great genius and great learning in Philosophy—yet pronounced in the end that the matter is not demonstrated but believed. But it is not likely that those reasons, if they were evident and clear, would bring no light of evidence to such keen and sharp eyes.

(Sixth argument) Moreover, Aristotle did not always write the same thing on this matter, but now this, now that; it is not, then, probable that, amid such variety and inconsistency, he had a certain and established view of the soul's immortality. For as to

the fact that he sometimes held for the incorruption of the rational soul—to omit other passages which both St. Thomas (Bk. 2, Against the Gentiles, ch. 79) and Ferrariensis (in his Commentaries) assert—this passage is plain and unambiguous, found in Bk. 2, On the Generation of Animals, ch. 3, where Aristotle openly teaches that man's mind is not in the power of the seed, as the other souls are, but comes from outside. But if it is not drawn out from the potency of matter, nor produced by the generating man through the power of the seed, it surely subsists of itself and does not depend on matter.

That he sometimes also departed from this opinion, Cajetan suggests in many ways (on Bk. 3 On the Soul), and it seems to me probable from these arguments. First, that Aristotle, if he retains his own principles, cannot escape the infinity of souls, unless he falls into the error of Averroes or the delirium of Pythagoras. Second, because in Bk. 1 On the Heavens he asserts that whatever is incorruptible has also been perpetual. Third, because in Ethics Bk. 1 he reproves Solon, because he had asserted that after death there survives a man's true happiness. Whence he also bewails the brevity of man's happiness, and requires wealth and riches as aids to happiness. Nor will you find in him a single word about man's soul after death. But it is not credible that he, if he thought the soul immortal, would say nothing at all, even briefly, either about the manner in which the separated soul would understand or about its happiness. Fourth, from the proem of the book On the Soul, where he lays down that foundation: that if understanding is imagination, or not without imagination, it does not happen that the soul is separable; but in the third book he laid down the antecedent, that understanding is not without imagination: whence also the consequent, etc. Fifth, because not only Gregory of Nyssa, whom St. Thomas cites, but also Justin Martyr (in his book Admonition to the Greeks) and Theodoret (Bk. 5, On the Cure of Greek Maladies) agree that Aristotle denied the immortality of souls. Who indeed would believe such great and such men to have given false testimony? Unless even Alexander of Aphrodisias, an outstanding Peripatetic beyond all others, also falsely imposed this opinion on his own master.

(Seventh argument) Moreover, the immortality of souls is so joined and connected with God's providence toward men that whoever denies the one will also deny the other; and whoever grants this, must necessarily admit that, as we said above. But God's providence toward human affairs cannot be manifest by human reasonings, but is perceived, thoroughly established, only from divine oracles. To which the Prophet testifies, saying (Ps. 72): "I thought that I might know this: it is a labor in my sight, until I go into the sanctuary of God, and understand concerning their last ends." And again (Ps. 93): "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men, that they are vain. Blessed is the man whom thou shalt instruct, O Lord, and shalt teach him out of thy law."

(Eighth argument) Moreover, for investigating the immortality of the soul, that is the most direct way which Aristotle entered upon—namely, the soul's proper operation. For just as a thing stands in relation to operation, so it stands in relation to being. By daily experience he proved that our soul understands nothing without a phantasm; that it, therefore, depends upon the body, not only that it might receive the species of intelligible things but also that it might use them and understand the things themselves. They answer that the soul's proper action depends upon the body not as upon a subject but as upon an object. But this answer is refuted. Because, if, as far as the light of reason and the investigation of the senses teach, no understanding of ours is without the body, it matters nothing whether it is in this way or that, since either way it is most probably gathered that the soul, if it were outside the body, would, like a dormouse in torpor, be idle from all activity. For we experience that the intelligible species depend on the phantasm both in coming to be and in operating. Hence Aristotle wavered and achieved nothing, if indeed he did achieve anything, except that souls perish along with bodies, lest, namely, they remain vain and idle outside their bodies.

(Ninth argument) This is confirmed above all by the fact that, if the soul subsisted through itself, and thus was immortal, it would not need the body, as other forms do, for its being, but only for operation. For it is surely necessary that it beg intelligible species from bodies through the senses of the body. Otherwise, the intellect, subsisting through itself in nature, and thus free from the heaviness of the body and the imperfection of matter, would in no way bind itself to a body, if it had of itself innate species, by which it might understand without the assistance of the body. But we see that the species received from the body also depend on the body in operating. For this reason it is necessary that the one understanding contemplate phantasms. Not, then, will the soul understand through those species when separated from the body. But it has no other species superadded. Wherefore, separated from the body, it will lie torpid in sleep and idleness—which is absurd.

(Tenth argument) Moreover, the Sixth Synod, in Action 11, teaches that man's soul is not immortal by nature, but by grace restraining it from death. And again, it says, "the souls do not have a nature properly immortal, but have obtained this by grace." No natural argument, then, can show the soul's immortality, seeing that it is by its own nature mortal.

(Eleventh argument) Add the twenty-one arguments by which St. Thomas (Question on the Soul, art. 14) probably argued that the soul might seem corruptible. If I were to repeat these here, I would be tiresome. For I do not see how I could add others to these, unless I wished to be most similar to Jandun and other authors of this stripe, who, in

order to bring forward arguments by which the mortality of the soul might seem provable, set forth arguments by which they persuade that it is not essentially the form and act of the body. These arguments Cajetan indeed related (on Bk. 3, On the Soul), and he would perhaps have done far more prudently had he disdained them.

(Twelfth argument) Add also that Scotus subtly answers the arguments that prove the soul to be immortal (Bk. 4, dist. 43, q. 2). If, then, the reasonings found by earlier authors do not demonstrate, and it is not in our power to devise other new ones, let us confess that the soul's immortal life is disclosed by no certain argument of nature.

These I have been able to set forth most briefly, which those would use who continued to weaken the immortality of souls—a doctrine which, however, both the catholic faith teaches most firmly, and certain reason of nature also. This the following conclusions and reasonings will disclose.

First conclusion: "That man's soul is mortal manifestly conflicts with the catholic faith."

Gen. 37: "I will go down to my son mourning into hell." Job 21: "They spend their days in wealth, and in a moment they go down to hell." Wisdom, likewise, chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5, most openly hands down that souls do not perish along with bodies. Eccl. 12: "And the spirit return to God who gave it." 2 Maccabees 12: "It is, therefore, a holy and wholesome thought," etc. Matt. 10: "Fear ye not them that kill the body, and are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him that can destroy both soul and body in hell." John 12: "He that hateth his life in this world, keepeth it unto life eternal." Phil. 1: "For to me, to live is Christ, and to die is gain (...). But I am straitened between two: having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ..." In 1 Cor. 15 the Apostle gathers, as something most absurd, "Then they also that are fallen asleep in Christ, are perished. If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable." And later, relating that saying of the foolish, "Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we shall die," he immediately adds: "Be not seduced. Evil communications," etc. 2 Cor. 5: "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord; (...) but we are confident, and have a good will to be absent rather from the body, and to be present with God." And a little before: "For we know that if our earthly house of this habitation," etc.

But concerning the testimonies of Scripture, which St. Thomas said were infinite, we have cited enough. Although I fear that someone may rightly and justly reprove us for having used unnecessary witnesses in a matter not in doubt. Especially since those who deny the immortality of the soul believe neither Christ nor the Gospel, and hold the faith of the Church and of the saints as nothing. Thus it seems superfluous to draw arguments from those loci which contain the authority of faith.

Nor is this conclusion, strictly speaking, theological, such that it need be confirmed by theological argumentations. Rather, Theology, insofar as it is productive of action and is concerned with the office of acting, has these two primary foundations: that God is the principle and end, and thus the procurer, of man, and likewise that there is a perpetual life of souls, in which God is the rewarder of those who seek him. Unless a believer holds these deeply fixed and, as it were, engraved in the soul, I do not say he cannot attain the means and end of his own happiness, but he cannot even approach God (Heb. 11) so as to seek from him the means and the end. Since, then, the first principles of every discipline are presupposed as the most well-known preliminary notions, there was no need even to relate those testimonies which we have recalled from the sacred letters. Except that there are certain men so curious that they would even have wished Paul to speak more openly about the incorruption of souls—which is just as if some philosopher were so signally foolish as to desire that, in the books of philosophers, and especially of Aristotle, that principle be often and clearly repeated: "Anything either is or is not." But concerning this first proposition, since it lies open before our eyes, we have said enough.

Second proposition: "The soul is naturally immortal, and not by a gratuitous gift."

There were, moreover, certain Arabs who said that the soul is by nature mortal, but will be raised immortally with the body at the last day. Led by a similar error, someone might say that the soul, along with the body, would indeed immediately perish if left to its own nature, but that by the power of divine might it comes about that it is preserved eternally, either for rewards or for punishments. Whoever asserted this would easily twist the Scriptures to his own sense. For they do not affirm that the soul is immortal by its own nature, but only say that it remains after death. Just as faith asserts that the body will have perpetual life after the resurrection, yet this will not be in the nature of the body, but in the divine power. This opinion the words of the Sixth Synod cited above seem to suggest. And Augustine (Bk. 10, On Genesis, literal commentary, ch. 23) inclines more to that opinion which teaches that souls are generated by the parents. If this opinion is true, the soul is not immortal by its own nature.

This I myself used to condemn not as heretical but as erroneous: for I always preferred to stand short of the line rather than cross it, and to be accused rather of foolish ignorance than of rash insolence. But if you consider the matter more diligently, you would not doubt that the mark of heresy should be branded on this error, when it is referred to the Apostolic See.

First (Augustine, Bk. 13, On the Trinity, ch. 9), because it is manifest that certain philosophers, guided by the reason of nature, both sought out and found the

immortality of souls. The perpetual life of souls, then, is not supernatural, or granted to them by a gratuitous gift. "For what man is he that can know the counsel of God? or who can think what the will of God is? (...) unless thou give wisdom, and send thy Holy Spirit from above?" (Wisdom 9).

Next, in the Fifth Lateran Council under Leo X, session 8, it is defined to be heretical to say that it follows from the principles of Philosophy that the soul is mortal. And yet, if the soul were naturally corruptible, there would be some natural cause of this corruption. Likewise, "since some," it says, "have dared to say concerning the nature of the rational soul that it is mortal, and some, philosophizing rashly, assert that this is at least true according to Philosophy, we condemn all who assert the rational soul to be mortal—since it is not only, of itself and essentially, the form of the human body, but also immortal." Thus far the Council.

Moreover, not the theologians only but all the faithful universally have received the immortality of souls from our forebears in such a way that we believe them to be incorruptible not by a miracle, but by nature. This consensus of the Church, moreover, ought to be for us a most certain argument of catholic dogma. That theologians and the faithful all alike hold this view in this matter is also clear from this: that they immediately recoil in horror from anyone who asserts that souls are mortal. For they hold inscribed in their minds, by the very same faith, that angels and men's souls are, by their own nature, intellectual and thus also immortal.

Add that, since Augustine's age, no one of the faithful has doubted that rational souls are created from nothing and infused, each into its own individual body, to use the phrase of the Lateran Council. But if rational souls are not generated by the power of nature, nor drawn out from the potency of matter, but come from outside, surely they subsist of themselves: wherefore they do not perish with the body. As for that testimony (Eccl. 12), "The spirit return to God, who gave it," not even Augustine himself extricates it fully. For if man's spirit comes from outside, it follows that it is not propagated by any power of a natural agent. Wherefore, if it is ingenerate by nature, it is also incorrupt by nature. For natural causes destroy nothing except that which they themselves can generate.

For as to Augustine's interpretation—that God gave the spirit to the first man when he breathed into his face the breath of life, but in him who was the head of the rest of men, gave the spirit to the rest—this, with due respect to so great a man, in no way weakens the force of the argument. For since Moses, at the beginning of Genesis, expresses the proper force and nature of natural things, what is signified in the first man is understood also of the rest. Scripture, moreover, in order to show that the other living things could

be produced by the powers of nature, says: "Let the earth bring forth the green herb," etc. And again: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life," etc. And again: "Let the earth bring forth... cattle and creeping things," etc. For no one can doubt that the first individuals of whales, cattle, serpents, lions were founded and created by God without an intervening assisting cause. For this reason it is added: "And God created the great whales, and every living and moving creature, which the waters brought forth, according to their kinds. Likewise, and God made the beasts of the earth according to their kinds," etc.

But Scripture wished to signify that such living beings were then so brought forth by God that we should nevertheless think their generation to lie in the power of the elements and of the bodies formed from the elements. But when it comes to man, lest a similar condition be believed of him, of the body it says, "God made man from the slime of the earth"; but of the soul, "He breathed into his face the breath of life." This diverse distinction of a differing condition, so carefully observed by Moses, manifestly indicates that the souls of the other living beings are in the potency of matter, but man's spirit, by which he was made a living soul, is not, but is created and infused by God, who alone is both its breather and its creator.

Besides which, he who says, "Let it return to God, who gave it," not obscurely teaches that the spirit does not perish, but remains. For this explains what he had said a little before: "Man shall go into the house of his eternity." Otherwise, how does it go to God, if it dissolves like soft air and vanishes like a shadow and smoke? Just as he expresses the nature of the body when he says, "Let the dust return to its own earth, from whence it was," so he manifests the nature of the spirit when he says, "And the spirit return to God," etc. Now that which Augustine brings forward—"the spirit going and not returning"—is our own gloss. For Scripture does not say, "the spirit coming and not returning," but "the spirit going," namely from the body, "and not returning," etc.

Moreover, those fools, whose error is presented in Wisdom ch. 2, thought the soul to be by nature mortal. For they were not speaking of a miracle, but of nature. But the Wise Man not only plainly fights against them but even reproves them as foolish and senseless. He holds, then, that souls are by nature immortal.

Third proposition: "It is erroneous, not to say heretical, to teach that the immortality of the soul cannot be demonstrated by natural reason."

For if it has an incorruptible nature, there will be some demonstrative reason for this, either a priori or a posteriori. For no proposition that is per se and necessary, from the nature of the thing and the connection of terms, exists without being able to be shown

necessarily either from its effect, or from its property, or from its definition, or from the cause of the subject. But you say: "The squaring of the circle is indeed demonstrable, but no demonstration has yet been found. So, then, Scotus and Jandun will hold that the soul's immortality can indeed be shown, but has not yet been shown."

Fourth proposition: "It is dangerous and rash—not to add anything further—to affirm that no argument yet found truly demonstrates the immortality of the soul."

Because an argument which is taken from a thing's own operation, or even from its power, which necessarily and naturally follows from the substance of the thing, truly shows what the nature and substance of that thing is. Theologians, moreover, argue for the incorruption of the soul both from its own operation and from its own power—namely, from understanding and from the intellect. Those syllogisms, then, are true demonstrations. Someone will perhaps say, "I do not deny that they are demonstrations, but I deny that they are demonstrations for us—for whom those arguments are not certain and clear, although they are fit in themselves to produce certainty and evidence." O insolent rashness: to measure others by your own intellect, and to judge the eyes of others by your own! To assert that honey is by its nature sweet, but that it was nevertheless sweet to no one, because it was not sweet to you! To think that no one can see what you cannot see! That what is not evident to you is obscure to everyone!

St. Thomas says that from the premises it can be manifestly shown that the human soul does not perish with the body; he concludes in these words (Bk. 2, Against the Gentiles, ch. 79): "It is clear, then, that the human intellect is incorruptible; therefore also the human soul, which is an intellective substance." Likewise (Part I, q. 75, arts. 2 and 6): "It is necessary to say that the intellectual soul is incorporeal, subsistent, incorruptible." Scotus, on the contrary, says these are not manifest and necessary reasons. Chrysostom affirms (Homily 4 On Providence) that those philosophers who doubt the soul's immortality doubt whether it is day at noon. And shall we believe that such holy and modest men lied about an evidence they did not have? And Augustine asserts that certain philosophers found the immortality of the soul by natural reason, although few—he says—and that with difficulty.

Moreover, God does not fail in the things necessary for life, according to the reason of nature, to be well and constantly ordered. But a man can scarcely order his life rightly and justly, unless he perceives both that God exists and that souls are immortal—scarcely, I say, or rather in no way at all. For it is recorded that those who either have lived without God, or thought the soul perished with the body, have

generally had the most depraved morals. This matter the Wise Man has wisely expressed (Wisdom 2; Ps. 94; Job 35). For as soon as the impious adopted that opinion that souls die, consequently despairing of every good of the future life, and fearing no evil after death, they gave themselves up to unchastity, to the working of all uncleanness, to avarice. "After this," they say, "we shall be as if we had not been. Come, therefore, and let us enjoy the good things that are present," etc.

And Augustine (Confessions Bk. 6, near the end) says: "Unless I had believed that there remains, after death, a life of the soul and the consequences of merits—which Epicurus refused to believe—Epicurus would have won the palm in my mind." As for the atheists, when the Prophet had set down that saying, "There is no God," he immediately added, "They are corrupt, and become abominable," etc. Thus Justin, in the Dialogue with Trypho, says it is not difficult to know what the opinion of those tends toward who deny that God cares for me and for you. For impunity, and license to do and say whatever they wish, is the lot of those who fear no punishment and expect no benefit from God.

It was, then, a matter of divine providence that in the necessary rule of morals and life he should not have imbued the leaders and teachers of humanity with conjectures and opinions, which could easily be dragged this way and that, but with a certain and constant reason. For thus it is written (Ps. 93): "Who teacheth man knowledge." And again (Job 35): "Who teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth, and instructeth us more than the fowls of the air." But if to the other animate beings certain instincts have been given by nature, and, as it were, anticipated cognitions—not vague and unstable, but fixed and firm—so that they are carried straight toward the good congruent with their nature, and drawn back from what is harmful, why should we deny that, at least in the minds of those whom the author of nature has prepared for the instruction of others, certain and constant preconceptions have been implanted, without which they would not have been sufficiently instructed and formed toward the truth of goodness? For the condition of beasts is not better than ours (I do not mind repeating the same words often [see Bk. 10, ch. 4]). Hence even barbarous nations have agreed with the wise that the wicked pay penalties, and thus that souls are immortal. For God always most providently takes care of those things that are necessary to each nature. Who, indeed, would assert that the common corruptions of the mind are uncertain?

But you say finally: "What are these necessary and evident reasons, which seemed to Scotus and Cajetan probable and obscure?" I shall say, if I first mention what was most prudently said by Aristotle (Ethics Bk. 1)—that it is foolish to demand equal certainty and evidence in all matters. For in the natural disciplines certainty is less than in the

mathematical, and in the moral disciplines even less than in the natural. But amid this disparity of certainty, no one is so foolish as not to grant them the name of "science." Those syllogisms, then, both produce knowledge and are truly demonstrations, by which we philosophize concerning both nature and morals, even though in those reasonings there is not so great a necessity or evidence.

The first demonstrative reason, then, on the authority of Chrysostom, is this (Homily 4, On Providence or Fate): He who says the soul is mortal necessarily denies that God is both the procurer and the judge of human affairs. For if the just depart afflicted by injuries, the wicked, having gained an abundance of all things, and there is, after death, neither reward nor punishment, then certainly there is no piety in heaven that cares for such things, no justice that either punishes the wicked or grants rewards to the good. And other matters which I have pursued more fully in chapter 4 of this book.

Scotus answers that this argument is much weaker than the rest: "For it is not," he says, "known by the reason of nature that there is one ruler of men, rewarding and punishing according to the laws of justice." This answer can be confirmed in two ways. First, because the Wise Man, when he had used this same argument, said that ignorance of this matter is ignorance of the mysteries of God. But if he reckons both God's providence and the immortality of souls among the mysteries of God, there is no reason for us to reckon them among the perspicuous. His words are these (Wisdom 2): "And they knew not the secrets of God, nor hoped for the wages of justice, nor esteemed the honor of holy souls."

Second, because Justin Martyr, both a martyr and a philosopher, in his book On the Refutation of Aristotle, teaches that the Gentiles composed their disputations about God and created nature not by a science which avails for demonstration, but expounded their own opinion by probable reasoning. And afterward he says: "These things sufficiently declare that what we have said about the philosophers of the Gentiles is true: that they did not discourse about natures by a science of demonstrating, but expounded their own opinion by conjecture and a likely reasoning." Add to these that St. Thomas passed over this argument everywhere, which he would not have done, had it been certain and necessary.

But indeed no arguments of this kind can move me to depart from that opinion which I see pleased Chrysostom. For he held it a perspicuous and constant matter that no one would deny God to be both the ruler and the judge of men, except one who had said in his heart, "There is no God." But since this matter has been demonstrated to us above (ch. 4, ad 7), as I said, by a manifest argument, and is to be more accurately demonstrated

afterward, we think it sufficiently established now, if we have proven that that reasoning, which teaches the immortality of the soul, leads at last to this: that the providence and justice of God toward men cannot stand firm, unless the incorruption of the soul stands firm too.

For as to Scotus's thinking this argumentation can be evaded otherwise, it is quite ridiculous. "Even granting," he says, "that God renders to the good and the wicked, according to their merits, both rewards and punishments, still no small vengeance upon the wicked is the very foulness of their guilt, the torment of the soul, and the scourge of conscience. But abundantly great is the reward and prize, that is, the very fruit of virtue, by which the good are marvelously delighted." In this sense he cites that saying of Augustine, worn smooth by everyone's speech: "Thou hast willed it, O Lord, and so it is, that every disordered soul should be its own punishment." He could also have brought that saying from the Apostle (Rom. 1): "Receiving in themselves the recompense which was due to their error."

When he says this, he considers little into what snares he runs. For first he must untie this knot (1 Cor. 15): "If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable." Next, the Prophet did not think this question could be resolved, unless it were referred to the ends of the good and the wicked—that is, to the last things which would await the righteous and the wicked; but from present goods or evils, he thought, this question is not only not solved but also complicated. "My feet," he says, "were almost moved... because I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners," etc. (Ps. 72). "I thought that I might know this: it is a labor in my sight, until... I understand concerning their last ends... How are they brought to desolation," etc. Nor did Jeremiah (Jer. 12) or Habakkuk (Hab. 1, 2, 3) think this question should be answered otherwise. Their meaning I would explain more gladly, were the discourse not hastening on to other matters.

Moreover, we make God very restricted, if he counts as reward for his own only that they served him with an equal mind, indeed even a joyful and willing one. O singular reward, that "snatches away hope" of every future good—which alone, as Cicero says, consoles man in his miseries! For who would doubt that mortal souls, in hard and adverse circumstances, are raised up and sustained by the hope of future things, but are broken and collapse, if they contend with despair of all things?

Imagine for me such a commonwealth, where the worst citizens cast off all fear of punishment and future retribution, while the best are deprived of hope of future grace and benefit; and, since law has applied no spur to the good nor any bridle to the wicked,

that state could not, I say not be well ordered, but could not even exist at all. Thus, whoever establishes it without reward and punishment, you yourself will judge to be most foolish. What kind of thing is it, then, to attribute the governance and administration of such a commonwealth to God—which no wise man would allow to be attributed to himself?

It is demonstrated, then, that souls are immortal, by a reasoning so evident and necessary that it cannot be refuted, unless you make God either improvident and negligent of human affairs, or foolishly constituting that city in which there is no fear of punishment, no expectation of reward.

"But the Wise Man says that the incorruption of souls pertains to the mysteries of God." First, I can truly deny this. For he did not refer this matter to mysteries, but to the fact that the way of the impious prospers, that they leave everywhere signs of gladness, that they oppress the just poor man and spare not the widow, etc., and in all these things God not only keeps silent but even seems to treat the good harshly and bitterly, and the wicked, on the contrary, gently and softly. These, indeed, are the mysteries of God, which human reason comprehends either with difficulty or in no way certainly at all. Next, there are certain natural matters clearly set before the eyes of all; others lie hidden in secrecy, surrounded by the densest darkness. These you would most rightly call the mysteries of nature. Among these, I confess, is the immortality of the soul, which indeed by few, and that with difficulty, can nevertheless be investigated and found.

Justin's words, moreover, are for the most part true, but to snatch away from the philosophers all demonstrations altogether is both absurd and even contrary to Paul, as will be made clear in refuting the seventh argument. For St. Thomas is not accustomed to use argumentations of this kind, even though they are clear and established. For he takes care not, in arguing, to pass from one genus to another, which Aristotle taught, in the art of demonstration, to be a fault. But it is clear that in this reasoning one leaps from God's providence and justice to the incorruption of the soul, which do not exist in the same genus. But enough on the first demonstration.

The second is of such a kind that it can be refuted by the shameless, but not by rightly instructed men. This we made the last argument in the proof of the fourth proposition. Cicero confirms it (On Old Age, and Tusculan Disputations Bk. 1) in this manner. Just as it is sufficiently proven that God exists, because no nation is so wild that it does not know one ought to be held—so it is established among all nations, by common consent, that the souls of the departed are freed by death's occurrence. This matter, altogether, they wished to be attested by funeral ceremonies. For they would not have bestowed

these on bodies, unless they had persuaded their minds that souls are sacred and divine. Hence, moreover, as Cicero affirms, they held it impious to establish a reward for funeral and burial rites, and denied honors of this kind to brute animals.

These two reasons the Wise Man, as I seem to myself to see, touched upon. One when he says: "Nor hoped for the wages of justice"; the other, when he adds: "Nor esteemed the honor of holy souls." Surely he who judges that the destruction of men and of beasts is one and the same—since he treats his own soul with the highest ignominy and disgrace—ought to be buried not with the rite and religion of men but with the burial of an ass, that he might have a funeral worthy of his own opinion and judgment. But enough on the second reason.

The third, Scripture indicates rather than explains, when it immediately adds: "Because God created man incorruptible, and to the image of his own likeness he made him." That man was made to the image of God, in that he has an intellectual nature, cannot be called into doubt. From that part, then, incorruption belongs to man, in which he has intellect. The soul, then—whence man understands and is like God—must be incorruptible. This reasoning, since it is drawn from man's nature and proper form, and thus not from foreign and extraneous but from proper and fitting principles, must be more diligently illustrated and explained by us. This St. Thomas did divinely: for he understood this to be the certain and expedite path by which one arrives at the immortality of the soul.

The first foundation of this demonstration, then, is that every intellectual form is subsistent—that is, that its being does not depend on matter. This proposition St. Thomas shows (Bk. 2, Against the Gentiles, ch. 51): because the intellect does not need a sustaining body, since understanding is neither received in the body nor accomplished through the body. But you say: it does not need the body as a subject, indeed, but it needs it as an object. But this is clearly refuted in two ways. First, an animal would not be subsistent through itself, because it needs external objects for its own proper operation. Next, that which pertains to something accidentally does not alter the judgment concerning the nature of the thing. As a stone, which is held in a higher place, etc.

Since, then, the intellective soul, from the nature of its own proper operation, is not sustained by the body, it follows that, of itself, it does not depend on the body. Because an act cannot, of itself, depend on the body except as on the matter and subject in which it is received. See St. Thomas in Question on the Soul, art. 14, and Against the Gentiles Bk. 2, chs. 55 and 79. Certainly, if understanding were received in the body, the intellect would not perceive all things without distinction, nor would it know the universal, but only the particular. But if arguments of this kind are not evident to you, remember that

neither should others be judged by your own intellect, nor should mathematical evidence be required here. But it is now time for us to repel the objections raised against us.

The first, then, is repelled thus. We can interpret a "question of faith" in two ways: both from its own nature, and as regards us. From its own nature, that is a question of faith which has been revealed by God to the Church, even though it is unknown to most. As that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, the Spirit himself revealed to the apostles; likewise, that the souls of the saints, as soon as they leave the body, see God. Of these matters it was once permitted to hold various views, and to affirm or deny without prejudice to the faith, since neither matter was, so to speak, plainly defined by the Church. Thus, as regards us, those matters were not always held to be questions of faith, but, with faith preserved, certain learned men held an opinion contrary to the truth. In this way Augustine asserted it was not a question of faith whether the rational soul is derived by propagation. But now, since in those times after that it has been established by the consensus of the theologians and of all the faithful that the soul exists not through generation but through creation, that question without doubt pertains to faith. Nor, however, if this was at one time put in controversy, does the same reason underlie the immortality of the soul, which has never been called into doubt by Catholics. But enough on the first argument.

To the second, however, nothing is difficult to answer, since we see that not only under an unfaithful ruler, such as the Romans then were, but even under a Catholic emperor, many in Germany today publicly profess manifest heresies. It matters greatly whether rulers are both faithful and both willing and able to restrain the most insolent rashness of heretics. Besides which, where there are factions, men most foul and criminal are, by favoritism toward parties, tolerated in the commonwealth—why do I say "tolerated"?—sought after, fostered, embraced. Since the commonwealth of the Jews was in this state, it is surely not surprising if a carnal people tolerated the Sadducees—men, namely, factious, who served the flesh so much that they denied the existence of any spirit at all. Just as the Gentiles wished their gods to be such as they themselves were—adulterers, warriors, plunderers—so a people corrupted by vices wishes to have as presidents of religion men who are not bound but free, not servants of the spirit but slaves of the flesh. But in refuting this most easy argument we have spent more words than were necessary.

The third we shall refute most briefly. For that the first testimony most certainly proves the immortality of souls has been shown by us a little before. The second, too, we were just now explaining how much weight it has. But the third can be evaded by no answer.

For if men cannot kill the soul, but can kill the body, it is certain that souls do not perish with bodies. Likewise, if God sends souls into hell, they do not, then, die with the body. The fourth, finally, Cajetan affirms proves simply the immortality of the soul; whence he would defeat the Sadducees concerning the resurrection, who denied that the dead rise again for this reason, that they believed the soul died with the body. By synecdoche, moreover, Scripture uses the names Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob for their souls. On this point Ambrose Catharinus, as often elsewhere, reproves him without cause. For he charges Theophylact, indeed rather Jerome, who was the source of that opinion for Cajetan.

"But St. Thomas's exposition is more excellent." I do not disagree. Nor did St. Thomas alone understand that passage without a figure, but Chrysostom and Theophylact too, and even Ambrose. But you say: "How was Abraham alive at that time?" Chrysostom answers (Homily 71 on Matthew, on the Faith of the Resurrection): just as Adam, after he ate of the forbidden tree, was nevertheless dead once the sentence was pronounced, so Abraham, by the most certain promise of the resurrection, was alive. Otherwise, what does the Church mean when she says: "To the King to whom all things live, and to whom our bodies do not perish"? And so much on the third argument.

The fourth, moreover, has already been dealt with above. For we said, in Book 7 of this work, that the ancient saints cultivated not so much the human disciplines as the divine letters. This was the reason why, in matters of nature that were most obscure, they were content with common reasoning and did not seek out better ones. Demonstration of natural conclusions, then, must be sought from the philosophers, and especially from St. Thomas—a perfect philosopher, in my opinion, whose admirable nature and genius, when perfected by grace, both everywhere else and especially in the book Against the Gentiles, seems alone to have supplied, as if by a miracle, whatever could be sought from human genius.

But to Scotus, Jandun, and Cajetan the reasons seemed probable, not likewise necessary. Scotus and Jandun, moreover (for I shall speak of Cajetan later), seem to have sought mathematical demonstrations. For if they wished to be wise unto sobriety, and to weigh attentively the nature of the matter under discussion, they would surely understand that the reasons which prove the incorruption of the soul do not merely persuade but conquer—if not the shameless and resistant man, at least the docile man, well informed in the rules of the discipline.